THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
FOR LANGUAGE LEARNING AND DIVERSITY

Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe
From Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education

Reference Study

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Preface

This text, part of a series published by the Language Policy Division, is clearly significant in its own right because it deals with certain influential factors in the organisation and sociolinguistic foundations of language teaching and in the linguistic ideologies at work in problems related to the languages of Europe. It is however part of a larger project since it is one element of a collection of publications focused on the Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe: From Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education.

This Guide is both a descriptive and programmatic document whose purpose is to demonstrate the complexity of the questions involved in language teaching, often dealt with in a simplistic manner. It aims to describe the processes and conceptual tools needed for the analysis of educational contexts with respect to languages and for the organisation of language learning and teaching according to the principles of the Council of Europe.

There are several versions of this Guide for different audiences, but the ‘main version’ deals with a number of complex questions, albeit in a limited framework. It seemed necessary to illustrate these questions with case studies, syntheses and studies of specific sectors of language teaching, dealing in monographic form with questions only touched upon in the Guide. These Reference Studies provide a context for the Guide, showing its theoretical bases, sources of further information, areas of research and the themes which underlie it.

The Modern Languages Division, now the Language Policy Division, demonstrates through this collection of publications its new phase of activity, which is a continuation of previous activities. The Division disseminated through the Threshold Levels of the 1970s a language teaching methodology more focused upon communication and mobility within Europe. It then developed on the basis of a shared educational culture, the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (published in its final version in 2001). This is a document which is not concerned with the nature of the contents of language teaching but rather with the form of curricula and syllabi for language teaching. The Framework proposes explicit referential levels for identifying degrees of language competence, and thus provides the basis for differentiated management of courses so that opportunities for the teaching of more languages in schools and in lifelong learning are created. This recognition of the intrinsic value of plurilingualism has simultaneously led to the development of an instrument which allows each learner to become aware of and to describe their language repertoire, namely the European Language Portfolio. Versions of this are increasingly being developed in member States and were at the heart of the European Year of Languages (2001).
Plurilingualism has been identified in numerous Recommendations of the Council of Europe as the principle and the aim of language education policies, and must be valued at the individual level as well as being accepted collectively by educational institutions. The Guide and the Reference Studies provide the link between teaching methods and educational issues on the one hand and policy on the other, and have the function of making explicit this political principle and of describing concrete measures for implementation.

In this text Pádraig Ó Riagáin shows how policy-makers need to consider social factors in the widest sense as part of the process of policy formulation. The statement is often heard that Europe is a multilingual geographical entity with particular consequences for policy development, but in this study Ó Riagáin analyses what this means in terms of demographic change. He presents not only the arguments but also the sources of data and the ways in which policy-makers can draw upon social data. He points out that it is not only the widely recognised factor of migration which must be taken into account but also the changes in birth-rate and the ageing of most European populations. With respect to the latter, the concept of lifelong learning seems to offer policy-makers a formula on which to base their plans but as Ó Riagáin points out, this is a concept in need of clarification and justification.

This specific aspect of the problems of language education policies in Europe gives a perspective on the general view taken in the Guide but nonetheless this text is a part of the fundamental project of the Language Policy Division: to create through reflection and exchange of experience and expertise, the consensus necessary for European societies, characterised by their differences and the transcultural currents which create 'globalised nations', not to become lost in the search for the 'perfect' language or languages valued at the expense of others. They should rather recognise the plurality of the languages of Europe and the plurilingualism, actual or potential, of all those who live in this space, as a condition for collective creativity and for development, a component of democratic citizenship through linguistic tolerance, and therefore as a fundamental value of their actions in languages and language teaching.

Jean-Claude Beacco and Michael Byram
1. Introduction

Demography deals with the collection, presentation and analysis of data relating to the basic life-cycle events and experiences of people: birth, marriage, divorce, household and family formation, employment, ageing, migration and death. The discipline emphasises empirical investigation of population processes, including the conceptualisation and measurement of these processes and the study of their determinants and consequences. The field of demography is also concerned with the broader nature of social and economic change. The concepts of cohorts, life tables, event histories, population momentum and stable populations that have emerged from demography have made significant contributions to an understanding of social change and the formation of policy. Demographic Linguistics, sometimes referred to as Demolinguistics, deals with all of the foregoing issues, but in addition, examines the relationship between these demographic variables and linguistic phenomena, such as the trends and the spatial and social distribution of speakers of a given language, bilingualism and multilingualism.

Demographic patterns themselves have important implications for the development of education systems – whether initial, mainstream or lifelong, adult education – especially as regards the allocation of financial resources and the recruitment of teaching personnel (Eurydice 1981). In the post-war period, the explosion of pupil numbers prompted a period of expansion, but little change in the overall structure or direction of education. This was followed in the 1980s and 1990s by a contraction in the size of the school going population which created a different range of problems, while also shifting the focus from the quantitative to qualitative aspects of education primarily, though not entirely, through extending the period of initial education into the early twenties for many.

Apart from general problems of pupil numbers, there have also been questions connected with differential needs of pupils (Eversley & Kollmann 1982). These have been largely, although not entirely, posed by the large and growing number of children of different languages and cultures entering the schools of Western European industrialised countries. About 15 million people of immigrant origin were living in these countries in the early 1980s. The onset of economic recession in 1973 had brought a virtual halt to worker recruitment and an increasing stability of settlement among immigrants. Schools were increasingly educating not only children who were themselves migrants, but also second generation immigrants, local-born like indigenous children, although living within a different culture and often speaking a different language in their homes. The low educational achievement of many of these children gave cause for concern (Purnell 1984). Since the 1980s, of course, the scale of immigration has further increased and its composition and distribution has become more diversified.
Contemporaneous with these developments has been a shift towards the concept of lifelong learning. ‘The rapidity of structural and technological change and the decline in unskilled and semi-skilled work call for the continual renewal of knowledge and skills, beginning from a starting point where the minimum threshold for full economic and social participation rises constantly’ (OECD 1992). To these structural changes in European economies must be added demographic changes which are squeezing the size of the labour force and extending the size and composition of dependency groups. ‘In a typical OECD country in 1960, men lived some 67 years, of which 46 were spent in work. The other 21 years were mainly spent in infancy and in school, and short periods of not working and in retirement. Today, men live to 74 with only half of their lives (37 years) spent in employment. The other 37 years consist of longer periods of time in education, unemployment and, especially, in retirement’ (OECD 1999). ‘It needs to be asked how feasible or desirable it is to extend ever longer the initial education and training phase which, in combination with the generally lengthening retirement period, sees working life increasingly compressed into an intensive middle period of the lifespan, itself typified by a growing number of career changes’ (OECD 1992).

Language teaching is, therefore, an intrinsic part of mainstream education. Its scale and direction will thus be implicitly affected by all of the demographic developments per se. But for particular groups, and in particular locations it will have an explicit role in helping to integrate them into host societies. These themes will be revisited when the demographic picture has been presented in more detail.

2. Sources of Data

Population change depends on the direction taken by two rather different components, natural increase/decrease (i.e. births minus deaths) and migration. The main sources of relevant data are the census of population and birth and death statistics in each country. Not surprisingly, there is considerable variation in the coverage and efficiency of different national administrations. Compiling European statistics for comparative purposes is difficult and much remains to be done to harmonise the collection of this data. Nonetheless, published annual demographic and other statistics on a pan-European basis are more complete than in the past (Coleman 1996). Those utilised in the preparation of this paper include ‘Recent Demographic Developments in Europe: 1999’ (Council of Europe 1999); ‘Statistics in Focus: First Demographic Estimates for 2001’ (Eurostat 2001) and ‘World Population Report 1998’ (United Nations 1998). A few research publications have already appeared on comparative European population (see Noin & Woods 1993, Coleman 1996). In addition, there are a large number of research publications dealing with migration. (Of special relevance is the Council of Europe survey of the demographic aspects of migration flows to Europe - Population Studies No. 25, 1993).
Demographic statistics are largely based on census of population returns from member states. Apart from the general difficulty created by national differences, there are particular problems associated with all migration data. ‘First, the criteria for identifying migrants vary from one country to another, and often within one country there are different criteria for nationals and foreigners. … (Secondly) the reliability of the data-gathering process is also open to question. Regardless of the type of criteria used, the completeness of the data gathered varies, and it is not unusual for the registrations to cover only one in two emigrants, not to say one in ten’ (Poulain 1993). As one author observed, ‘we currently only have a vague idea of total stocks and flows of international migrants’ (Salt 1996).

National and international data sources in the field of demographic linguistics is even more unsatisfactory. Of the 37 countries survey for the Council of Europe by Courbage (1998), only 19 included one or more questions on language in their national census, while only 9 included questions about language in national surveys. As a consequence, data about nationality or ethnic affiliation, which is more widely available, is frequently used as a proximate measure of language phenomena.

3. The Demographic Situation in Europe: An Overview

In 1999, when the Council of Europe published its last demographic review, the number of member states in the Council stood at 41. With its present membership, the Council brings together the overwhelming majority of the population of Europe, as well as substantial segments of Asia through the membership of the Russian Federation and Turkey. However, in the demographic data published by the Council of Europe some European states, which are not yet members of the Council, are included.

The total population of the Council of Europe member states at the beginning of 1999 numbered 773 million (a further 38 million reside in non-member states located in the European region.) Countries vary greatly as regards population size. There are 24 countries with less than 10 million inhabitants, including seven with less than one million. However, most of the population (67.7%) reside in just seven countries: Russian Federation (148 million), Germany (82), Turkey (62), Great Britain (59), France (58), Italy (57), and Ukraine (51).

Population growth varies from one group of countries to another as a result of differences in initial population size and differences in growth rates. While the majority of countries have population growth rates of between zero and 10%, there is an increasing trend of negative population growth. However, the history of population growth during most of this century has been one of increase. The change to low rates of growth or decline is frequently referred to by demographers as ‘the (first) demographic transition’ (Coleman 1996). ‘From the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, life expectancy was transformed from about 40 years to about 70 and average family size of five or six children ever born was transformed to
about two. ...All Europe then seemed to share a general pattern of convergence towards similar demographic patterns’ (Coleman 1996). Although the timing of the demographic transition has varied by up to 60-70 years in the European region, by now the post-transitional stage has been reached by nearly all countries, resulting in the homogenisation of natural increase. The few exceptions are in Turkey and parts of the former USSR. (Council of Europe 1999.)

‘Since the 1960s, a further phase of radical change has begun in Europe’s demography – sometimes referred to as ‘the second demographic transition’ (Cliquet 1991). In Western Europe the reduction in mortality, which stalled in the 1960s, has resumed. Thus, survival improves year by year at all ages of life, except for young adulthood, and now adds for the first time to the demographic aging process. International migration from outside Europe, which began on a large scale in the 1950s and 1960s, was in decline by the mid-1980s. Since then very rapid increases, especially with those seeking asylum or illegal immigrants, have taken gross immigration flows to Europe to record levels. The fertility decline which followed the ‘baby boom’ of the 1960s has ceased or even been reversed in some Northern European countries by the late 1980s (Coleman 1996).’

Another development has to be noted. The countries with the lowest, usually negative, natural increase rates are mostly situated in Eastern Europe, to a substantial extent coinciding with the former Soviet region (Council of Europe 1999). Population growth trends in Eastern Europe and the New Independent States reflect the unique post-World War II social and economic histories of these areas. The pronounced decrease in growth rates in Eastern Europe and the New Independent States is the result of rising mortality in a majority of countries of the region and a sharp decrease in fertility from levels already below replacement, both at least partially attributable to the social uncertainties and economic hardships of the post-Soviet era. However, part of the downward trend in growth in the region in the early 1990s, and which has continued into the second part of the decade, is temporary in nature. The age structures of Russia and her neighbors help account for the observed decrease: Numbers of women of reproductive age have been unusually low during the 1990s relative to the 1980s and to the coming decade. The combination of low fertility rates and fewer women in the reproductive ages has resulted in sharply smaller birth cohorts during the present decade, a dip that is expected to reverse itself within the next few years. (United Nations 1998.)

The most recent appraisal, from Eurostat, Statistical Office of the European Communities, suggests little change in more recent years. In 2001, the population of Western Europe grew slightly, but only by 0.39%. All EU Member States witnessed a rise in total population, but net migration is responsible for over 70% of the population increase. The balance of migration (i.e. emigration and immigration combined), at 1.05 million in 2001, was very slightly down on 2000, but still much higher than in 1998. On the other hand, many central and eastern European countries again saw population falls, either from natural causes or net migration outflows.
The following sections discuss these changes in more detail.

4. Birth Rates

A population continues to grow as long as the number of births taking place and the number of migrants joining that population exceed the number of deaths occurring. In the absence of significant international migration, a country’s population grows as long as its birth rate exceeds its death rate. Since the 1960s, the average number of babies born to women over their reproductive lifetimes has been declining (Sporten 1993). In 1995, the total fertility rate was below replacement level (about 2.1 children per woman) in all Council of Europe Member States except Albania and Turkey, where it was above (Council of Europe 1999). The number of women of reproductive age will decrease over the next 25 years. The total fertility rate is projected to increase very slightly, though not by enough to offset the decreasing supply of potential mothers. The net result in Europe will be a slow decrease in number of births (United Nations 1998).

Most Eastern European countries have joined Southern Europe in terms of the smallest numbers of children born (Council of Europe 1999). Europe’s lowest levels are found in countries such as Italy, Spain, Bulgaria and Latvia. On the other hand, Eastern and Southern Europe are also the areas where countries with Europe’s highest birth rates are to be found. This is due to some countries having started later on their demographic transition. The highest levels have reported in Turkey and Cyprus and, probably, although up to date figures are not yet available, Albania and Azerbaijan. At the regional level, however, the highest birth rates are currently found in Northern Europe, particularly Scandinavia. This has come about in recent years, after the opposite position for more than a century, and would probably be a surprise for a non-demographer! (Council of Europe 1999.)

Births outside marriage continue to rise everywhere (Hall 1993, Kiernan 1996). In 1998 these amounted to one in every two births in Sweden, Estonia and Norway and two out of three in Iceland. EU-wide, it’s about one in four (Eurostat 2001). The report observes that the trend “reflects the growing popularity of cohabitation and a decline in the incidence of marriage”.

The growth, or decline, over time of specific age groups in a population, in turn, helps determine changes a society’s requirements for educational services. An increase in the size of the under-5 population, for example, implies an associated increase in need for child health services and an impending increase in demand for additional classrooms, teachers and public funding for primary schooling. This was the case earlier after the ‘baby boom’ in the 1960s. However, because fertility is expected to continue to fall during the coming decades, the size of the under-5 age population will actually shrink during the coming decades (United Nations 1998). While the demographic consequences have been known for some time, much less is known about the long-term social and economic implications. The formation of non-
replacement cohorts is, nonetheless, becoming increasingly and widely established. But, as noted above, very recent trends are divergent rather than convergent.

5. An Ageing Europe

Every nation is aging. That is, in every country the average age of the population is increasing as greater proportions of population reach middle and elderly age groups. (Thumerelle 1993, Warnes 1993.)

The age-sex structure of more developed countries in Europe already has the rectangular shape of older populations, but the size of the population 65 years of age and older a quarter of a century from now will be about 50 percent larger than the number alive in 1998.

Europe is, and is projected to remain, the major area of the world most affected by ageing. Life expectancy continues to increase. EU babies born in 1998 can expect to live 80.8 years if they’re girls and 74.5 years if they’re boys. Increases in life expectancy were also observed in central and Eastern Europe. (Eurostat 1999). This general trend hides the considerable diversity in ageing patterns across Europe (Council of Europe 1999). If 65 is accepted as the usual threshold for old age, Western and Northern Europe have the highest proportions of elderly people. Reflecting the combination of a decline in birth rates and improved mortality rates in the age group, these regions have been joined by several countries in the Southern region – Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. In the past decade, these countries have seen the most rapid increase in the relative and absolute size of their elderly populations. In fact, the oldest country in the world in 1998 is Italy, with 1.6 persons aged 60 or above for each person below 15 years of age, followed by Greece, Spain and Germany. By 2050, the oldest country of the world will be Spain, closely followed by Italy, with respectively 3.6 and 3.4 persons aged 60 or above for each person below 15 years of age (United Nations 1998). The countries of Eastern Europe also tend to show a significant acceleration of population ageing.

Just as the number of births taking place over the course of the next 25 years will remain relatively steady in spite of falling fertility, the number of deaths expected between now and the year 2025 will rise from year to year in spite of falling mortality. The seeming anomaly of increasing numbers of persons dying each year in a period of falling mortality is attributable to the changing size and composition of the populations subject to prevailing mortality risks (Noin & Woods 1993, Meslé 1996). Even though mortality rates have fallen as life expectancy has increased, because the total population subject to the risk of mortality is growing and because ever greater proportions of national populations are reaching the upper adult ages, where death rates are highest, the actual number of deaths occurring each year continues to grow.
6. Migration

While fertility and mortality are generally considered the primary forces underlying population change at both the national and regional levels, international migration can have a substantial impact on population growth rates. International migration also affects age and sex structures in countries which are recipients or net senders of migrants. During the 1990s, voluntary, primarily economically motivated international migration has continued to add to the populations of a number of the more developed countries. On the other hand, Russia illustrates the case in which international migration partially offsets a negative rate of natural increase in a low-fertility population. Russia serves as the destination of both economic migrants and ethnic Russians relocating from other parts of the former Soviet Union. Russia has also served as the source of migration to destinations in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Eastern and Southern Europe (United Nations 1998). Net international migration has mitigated a negative rate of natural increase since 1992. From 1990 to 1997, roughly 3 million more migrants entered Russia than departed.

The international conditions of migration have changed to such an extent over the past thirty years that we can state that immigration is both an old and a new phenomenon (ILO 1998). In fact, the migrations of before and after 1973-74 represent two distinct phases in flow trends. Immigration to Europe took off during the sixties, in a context organized and governed by bilateral agreements between labour-exporting countries and host countries, which defined recruitment methods and provided for the establishment of joint consultation and co-operation structures. Up to the seventies, industrialized European countries that needed workers turned to countries with a surplus labour force to satisfy their internal demand. Thus, three categories of countries emerged. First, in the countries of the Eastern bloc international migration was limited and strictly controlled. Secondly, countries such as France, Germany, the UK and some of the smaller countries of north-western Europe whose economic growth depended on a labour force recruited abroad. Thirdly, countries of southern Europe became major exporters of labour, especially Italy, Spain and Portugal. The importing countries drew their labour not only from their European neighbours but also from beyond Europe, usually in relation to their colonial or ex-colonial links. For example, France drew from North Africa, the UK from the Caribbean and South Asia. Germany, by contrast, at first absorbed large numbers of migrants from the east after the division of Europe, and subsequently turned to Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece.

The 1973 oil crisis marked a change in these immigration policies, and since then extremely selective policies have been adopted in respect of non-Europeans. This new attitude, which presented the manpower-exporting countries with a fait accompli, was reflected in a number of decisions taken unilaterally without preliminary consultation, such as incentives to return, revision of conditions of residence and family reunification, or the adoption of a policy of integration. However, it is worth noting that while the oil crisis is usually taken to mark a watershed in immigration trends and policies, there were other and perhaps more
important causes. There were fundamental changes in labour needs, especially with
the decline of manufacturing and the rise of service employment. This led to an
increasingly feminised immigrant labour force and a relatively greater role for skilled
migrants (OECD 1987). The characteristics of the migrants are thus now more
varied with women becoming increasingly involved in labour migration and refugee
movements. There is also a growing movement of highly skilled technical,
professional and managerial workers. At the same time, the actual forms of
movement are also becoming more diversified. Permanent immigration and short-
term labour migration now exist alongside refugee movements while there are also
increasing movements by asylum seekers or those without legal status or
documentation. Finally, the political changes in Eastern Europe added an East-West
dimension to the prevailing South-North immigration flow.

Thus, the nature of the phenomenon has undergone major changes. While waves of
emigration used to consist mainly of young men on their own, now - a logical
development in the older immigration countries - they consist of relatives joining the
head of the family abroad. On the other hand, in countries newly affected by
immigration, the characteristic phenomenon of men migrating on their own has
reappeared. While flows of legally admitted workers are composed for the most part
of top-level specialists, illegal immigrants now account for a very important
proportion of total immigration. The new migrants, excluding illegals, are of urban
origin and have a higher level of skills training than their predecessors.

Of course, these shifts took time to become established. Poulain (1993) reviewed
the data for the period 1980-1990 for the Council of Europe. Overall figures revealed
only a slight general increase. More detailed analysis shows, however, that growth
was low in countries which already had a large foreign population (e.g. Germany,
Belgium, France, Sweden), but growth of the foreign population was clear in
southern countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy. The same development was
found in Nordic countries other than Sweden. 'This change shows a reorientation of
migration flows in the 1980s to southern or far northern countries where the size of
the foreign population had previously been relatively low. In the traditional
countries of immigration, a saturation effect can be observed presaging a future
redistribution of foreigners within Europe' (Poulain 1993).

Furthermore, when the trends for the period 1985-1990 were examined separately, it
appeared that immigration flows form Third World countries were increasing
everywhere, but especially in Germany and the Netherlands. The prime trend in
flows from Central and Eastern Europe is the exponential trend detected in Germany,
with Sweden and Denmark some way behind. Poulain concluded 'in the space of five
years almost all the countries (then members of the Council of Europe) present an
increase in immigration from both South and East, but the ratio between the regions
seems to split Europe in two. Northern Europe is the preferred destination for
immigrants from the East, whereas Southern Europe now specialises in immigrants
from the South'.
Salt (1996) takes the analysis up to 1992. He concludes that the rate of increase accelerated after 1988. From 1988 to 1992 total foreign national stocks in Western Europe increased by about 3.42 million to 18.27 million, that is, a 23% increase. The majority of this increase occurred in Germany and Southern Europe. (German data, furthermore, do not include the immigration of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler), mainly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, who are not treated statistically as foreigners.

The figures for 1995 are shown in the following table.

Table 1: Numbers (thousands) and percentages of foreign population (non-citizens) in selected Council of Europe countries in 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nos. (’000s)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1990)</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7,174</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,060</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Statistics in Europe are based on citizenship, which means that people disappear as foreigners once they naturalize. Thus France, which makes it relatively easy for people to naturalize, will have a lower percentage than Switzerland, where naturalization is much more difficult. According to its 1982 Census, for example, France had a “foreign” population of 3.7 million though in fact it had a “foreign-born” population of 6.0 million. On the other hand, most children born in France to foreign parents (about 11% of total births in 1994) are not considered to be French.

6.1 Germany: A Case Study

It is clear from Table 1 that Germany plays a dominant role in the immigration picture in Europe. It may, therefore, be useful to examine some features of the immigration population in that country in more detail.

Table 2 summarises the net migration flows between 1960 and 1997 for three of the most important source regions (Thousands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>From EU-15</th>
<th>From Turkey</th>
<th>From Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-65</td>
<td>925.1</td>
<td>155.9</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>-157.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-73</td>
<td>736.1</td>
<td>704.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-77</td>
<td>-357.0</td>
<td>-23.6</td>
<td>-134.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-80</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>290.2</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-91</td>
<td>183.2</td>
<td>211.5</td>
<td>259.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-97</td>
<td>142.6</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>421.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1960-97</td>
<td>1,289.4</td>
<td>1,201.2</td>
<td>1,111.3(^1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Münz, Seifert & Ulrich 1997

Although there are a few maverick figures (suggesting unusual factors at work), the overall pattern follows closely that already described — a rapid and substantial increase to 1973, then a relatively stagnant period between 1973 and 1986 during which a considerable amount of return migration took place and, finally, accelerated and substantial growth again after 1986. This last phase of increase showed no sign of slowing down in the late 1990s.

Table 3 shows that national figures can hide important regional variations (in the table, 1983 figures relate to West Germany only).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N(000s)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N(000s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>874.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1093.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>686.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>917.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin (West Berlin 1983)</td>
<td>236.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>355.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) I am grateful to Carol W. Pfaff (Freie Universität Berlin) for drawing my attention to the sources used in this section.
Two features are apparent. First, the relatively low levels of immigrants in the regions of former East Germany. Secondly, the degree of concentration in six regions where between 10 and 20% of the resident population are immigrants.

The concentration is more obvious still, and locally more significant, when the distribution by city is examined (Table 4).

Table 4: Numbers and Percentage of Immigrants in Selected German Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>N (000s)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt/Main</td>
<td>191.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenbach</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>141.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>München</td>
<td>287.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mannheim</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Köln</td>
<td>186.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>108.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludwigshafen</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiesbaden</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duisberg</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nürnberg</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augsburg</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>261.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>438.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6,990.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Münz, Seifert & Ulrich 1997

In five cities, immigrants account for between 20 and 30% of the population. Although it is not possible to examine the pattern in each city in detail, the evidence
from Germany and other countries indicates that within cities immigrants tend to concentrate in particular, often inner city zones.

In Germany, the change in the relationship between foreigners and the world of work has been very rapid. In 1970, when the foreign-born population in the years 15-65 was under 2m, only 0.26 per cent were without employment; by 1994, when the foreigner population in this age range was over 5m, the figure had risen to 25.7 per cent (Frey and Mammey 1996). As in most European cities, the unemployment rate in Germany has tended to rise over the last two decades, notwithstanding major economic growth. The foreign-born population has overall unemployment rates that are near to what would be expected. For example, the total unemployment rate in Frankfurt/Main increased from 2.4 per cent in 1980 to 7.5 per cent in 1994. Over that period, foreigners increased from 21.6 per cent of the unemployed to 31.2 per cent.

More tellingly, perhaps is an indication that the designation 'foreign-born population' masks a great deal of heterogeneity. Some are clearly prospering as entrepreneurs in buoyant local economies; others appear to be destined to become part of a process of long-term exclusion. For example, amongst the unemployed in Germany, there are considerable differences by national and ethnic origin. For example, when the unemployment rate overall in 1994 was 9.2 per cent, for Turks it was 19.7 per cent and for Greeks and Italians 16.7 per cent and 18.6 per cent respectively. On the other hand, the rate was barely above the national average for Yugoslavs (10.2 per cent) and those from Spain (11.2 per cent) (Frey and Mammey 1996). Also, the number of unemployed foreigners obtaining welfare assistance has increased dramatically. In 1977 there were only 4,000 foreigners in this position and by 1991 69,180 or nearly 32 per cent of all those receiving welfare benefits (Frey and Mammey 1996).

Although the preceding discussion relates only to Germany, the same pattern is repeated in other European countries. There is a common degree of concentration of migrants and ethnic minorities in cities, and this feature has grown in recent years. A second feature is the rising levels of unemployment of these groups in those cities when compared with the indigenous population. Migrants who arrived in many European cities from former colonies or those recruited under gastarbeiter systems in the 1960s and early 1970s, originally revealed very low rates of unemployment. After 1980, this pattern changed rather dramatically and migrants and ethnic minorities are now strongly over-represented in the ranks of the long-term unemployed. A third feature is that of ethnic diversity. Not all migrant communities have been affected in the same way.

Lastly, as already noted, immigrant groups can alter the age and sex structure of a country. They are typically younger and most importantly, more women are in child bearing years. Thus, their rates of natural increase (births – deaths) are more positive than those of the indigenous population. This can be seen in Table 5, which summarise the results of a population projection study for Germany. Three assumptions were made for future rates of immigration. The study showed that even
under the assumption of lowest increase, the absolute and relative size of the immigrant community is set to grow from 8.8 million in 1995 to 11.3 million in 2015.

Table 5: Projected Increase of Immigrant Population in Germany for 2015 and 2030

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year =</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Assumptions (Millions)</td>
<td>(Millions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low increase</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High increase</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base year (1995)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Münz, Seifert & Ulrich 1997

Although similar projections have not been located for other countries, there seems little reason to doubt the applicability of this conclusion – given known facts about the age-sex structure of immigrants.

6.2 Other Categories of Migration

All of the preceding discussion on migration has been based on ‘official’ statistics, usually derived from the census reports of member countries. But there are other categories of population movement which do not enter these calculations. Large numbers of migrant workers, refugees, and asylum-seekers also make up important South-North and East-West flows. During the 1990s, many of the largest movements of population across international boundaries have involved refugees.

(a) **Illegal Immigrants**

Over the past decade Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, together with Turkey have become important immigration countries, as well as continuing their traditional roles as founts of emigration. Data problems make it difficult to be sure about the size of migrants flows in the Mediterranean countries. Simon estimated that the total number of foreigners living in Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal in 1987 at around two million, of whom only 650,000 were legally resident (Simon 1987). Other estimates put the total population of foreigners living in the four countries at the end of the 1980s as 2.7 to 3 million, nearly half of them illegal (European Commission 1991). A Council of Europe report in 1990 estimated that 25% of registered immigrants in these countries came from Third World countries, but the scale of illegal immigration could push this percentage up to 50% (quoted in Salt 1996).

(b) **Asylum-Seekers**

The marked escalation of asylum seeking in the 1980s has created a new type of refugee problem. In Western Europe the inflow of asylum seekers in 1991 was twice as big as the regular admission of foreign labour that year. Aggregate numbers of applications rose to 3.6 million during the period 1983-92 (Salt 1996). During the 1980s, the greatest percentage in Austria, Germany and Switzerland came from the
Eastern bloc countries. Elsewhere, significant numbers from Third world countries applied. By 1991-92 Yugoslavs dominated the asylum applications, with Romanians, Turks, Sri Lankans, Somalis, Iranians, Zaireans, Iraqis, Bulgarians also prominent.

(c) **STUDENTS**
In the late 1980s, only 2% of students lived in countries other than their own. But this figure is increasing. It is the objective of programmes such as Erasmus to achieve an involvement of 10% of all students.

(d) **SECOND HOMES**
Not all migration is prompted by economic or political reasons. Improved communication links between urban and rural areas has lead to a proliferation of second homes in certain remote rural areas, and this trend is compounding problems that are already affecting the indigenous populations in these areas. It has been estimated that over half a million homes in southern Europe are owned by residents of northern Europe (Gallent & Tewdwr-Jones 2000). With the general ageing of the population, this trend is likely to increase.

### 6.3 Migration: Concluding Remarks

Since the eighties, the geography, economics and structure of international migrations to Europe have changed. New destinations have been added to the traditional ones, and the whole of Western Europe, from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean countries, has become an area of attraction for migrants. New emigration areas have been added to or substituted for the earlier ones (For studies of the experience of individual countries see Fassman & Münz, 1994).

As stated by the European Commission (1990) ‘Our countries are open societies, that cannot afford – either economically or politically and perhaps even demographically – to withdraw into themselves. Nor can Europe police its borders or check its workplace like a police state; any attempt to do so would sooner or later affect the freedom and liberty of its citizens’ (quoted by Brochmann 1993, emphasis added).

### 7. Future Demographic Trends

As a determinant of future population change, migration flows must be set in context. In a total population of nearly 800 million, migrants will not significantly determine overall demographic change, however important they may be in specific regions and cities. Fertility assumptions remain the most crucial element in estimations of future population change (Gauthier 1993).

Joshi (1996) reviewed the various projections undertaken by the United Nations and Eurostat (see also Lutz 1991). There is general agreement that demographic ageing will continue. The United Nations Statistics Office forecasts that the proportion of
children in Europe will decline from 18 per cent in 1998 to 14 per cent in 2050 while the proportion of older persons will increase from 20 per cent in 1998 to 35 per cent in 2050. By then, the proportion of older persons will be nearly two-and-a-half times that of children and one in every three persons will be 60 years or above. The median age is projected to increase from 37.1 years in 1998 to 47.4 in 2050. Southern Europe, with a proportion of children of 16 per cent and of older persons of 22 per cent in 1998, is the world region with the oldest population. By 2050, the proportion of children will have declined to 13 per cent while the proportion of older persons will have reached 39 per cent (Projections from United Nations 1998).

However, the projections differ as to whether Europe’s population will decline. Coleman (1996) concludes that ‘Taking all these considerations together, it seems more likely that there will be population stagnation in Europe as a whole, rather than drastic population decline’. This would suggest two conclusions. First, that the demographic differences between East and West will not be so great as to stimulate mass migration – with the possible exceptions of Romania and the former Soviet Union (Coleman 1996). Secondly, any complacency about the lack of demographic pressure to emigrate to Europe from the East is not warranted with respect to the South (Salt 1996, Golini et al 1991). The population of countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean (e.g. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt) is likely to double over the same period that population growth in Europe is very low or zero. Given the likelihood of labour shortages in Europe, and population pressures along the southern rim, the prospects of continuing mass immigration from these countries to Europe are high.

8. Discussion

Inglis (1995) argues that the current multicultural pattern of Europe is influenced by three developments – political change, economic and cultural globalisation and demographic changes. The objective of this paper is to review just one of these three societal processes in order to identify the nature and extent of requirements for language teaching at present and for the foreseeable future. But clearly, all three influences are inter-related and should, ideally, be considered in tandem.

Before proceeding to discuss the implications of demographic analysis per se, a number of qualifications and clarifications are necessary. As already noted, data on demographic is inadequate. The most proximate measure generally included in population statistics is that of ‘nationality’, which classifies persons as national or indigenous to a country, or foreign. Such distinctions vary widely between countries. It is not exceptional for some ‘nationals’ to speak only a ‘foreign’ language, and vice versa. Obviously, it would be unwise to assume anything more than a broad correlation between ‘nationality’ and ‘language’.

Apart from the fact that some countries recognise more than one national language, speakers of languages other than national languages are often totally unrecorded in
official statistics. One of the consequences of this is that the statistics give some indication of the pattern and trend amongst immigrant communities, but completely conceal the extent and diversity of regional and minority languages – although in total they may be more numerous than immigrants overall and certainly are in particular areas.

Finally, any survey of European trends obviously has to deal in large aggregates and general patterns of change. But, as has been stressed at several points, considerable variation occurs around all European averages. Notwithstanding the evidence of converging trends on several key demographic indicators, the overall position is still one of diversity.

The most important question to be resolved in any policy process is to determine the basic unit of analysis. The demographic surveys reviewed in this paper clearly indicate that language policy in Europe cannot be based solely on developments within the geographic or political boundaries of Europe – nor indeed within any individual state as regards national policies. During the last three decades Europe has developed a complex migratory system in which nearly all forms of internal and external mobility are intermingled (Rees & Kupiszewski 1999). All these population exchanges – seasonal, temporary, permanent, cyclical, return – form global networks of connectivity. ‘Migration patterns have become so complex and diverse that it is no longer justified to consider international migration as a series of regional flows. Instead, it has become a structural phenomenon on a global scale…’ (Council of Europe 1993).

The full implications of migration flows for language policy need to be teased out. ‘Basically migration is a question of relations – individually, institutionally and internationally. This implies that the phenomenon has to be addressed at many levels simultaneously’ (Brochmann 1993). Not only is migration usually a two-way process (i.e. accompanied by return migration), but if a complete ‘fencing out is untenable, migration policy will have to incorporate a development aid component. ‘If capital does not flow to where people are, the people will flow to where the capital is’. If European migration moves in this direction, as seems likely, then there will be a strengthening of ties between areas from which migrants originate and areas to which they move, with a consequent need for personnel with the requisite linguistic capacities.

Globalisation is the word which has rapidly gained currency as describing the processes characterising the expansion and restructuring of international economic relations. These dramatic changes in economic flows of goods, services, labour and capital have been associated with economies of Europe in recent decades. But as McLellan and Richmond (1994) note, there are contradictions within the processes of globalisation. The logic of free movement in labour, goods, services and capital is countered by protectionism and by policies for protecting borders from illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. Thus, while the European Union seeks to stimulate
labour mobility among its own member states, it simultaneously seeks to control (but not eliminate!) movements from outside the Union. The implications of this policy position are clear, and underlie current policy statements by most European organisations, i.e. that education systems should ensure that each pupil becomes competent in two, or even three, foreign languages.

Given that the concern is with the actual and potential mobility capability of the labour force, demographic trends raise several questions. The declining birth rates across Europe mean that traditional education systems will have a smaller incremental effect on the composition of the labour force. Upgrading the linguistic capacity of given populations through this route will thus take much longer to implement. Changing the mobility potential, whether structural or spatial, in the short or medium term will require directing resources into adult education on a scale not hitherto envisaged. A more fluid relationship between learning and work will be needed in the future, where an initial period of full-time education is followed by various combinations of work (full or part-time), training and education available in enterprises, schools and tertiary institutions. Suitable academic and vocational pathways for learners at all levels and ages should be created, along with more sophisticated and transparent approaches for assessing and recognising competence. It is important to continue to build on the achievements represented by traditional forms of certification and to find ways of improving their relevance to the labour market (meeting of the OECD Education Committee at Ministerial level, 16-17 January 1996).

Although the concept of ‘lifelong learning’ has proved to be very attractive to policymakers faced with the shifting demands of contemporary labour markets, operationally and structurally it remains somewhat elusive. While the major sectors of initial education prior to entry to the labour market are clearly defined in a linear progression through early childhood education, pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary education, the final component – adult learning - takes into account a vast scope of the population. It is made up of a number of fragmented elements, compartmentalised in formal education, the workplace, the home or elsewhere. Thus, they usually operate in isolation from one another. There is no evidence of a "holistic" approach to adult learning that provides a basis for addressing the needs of all adults; there are only isolated examples of programmes that attempt to consider all the learning needs of particular groups of adults (OECD Observer, March 30, 2001.)

From a demographic viewpoint, the evidence would suggest that there are substantial differences between adult age groups. Younger adults are more likely to participate in continuing education or training. The training undergone by younger adults is of longer duration than among older age groups, intensifying age-related discrepancies in education and training.
There is also strong correlation between training and level of educational attainment, since younger age groups tend to have higher average levels of educational attainment (O’Connell 1999). The lower-skilled or unemployed, as well as the older worker present particular challenges.

However, lifelong education cannot be equated with training for the labour mobility requirements of the global economy. The single most important demographic fact, which calls that assumption into question, is the present and predicted increase in the relative and absolute size of older age cohorts (Belanger 1994). This will create a large, and growing demand, for learning opportunities from older people who are likely to live up to one third of their lives beyond the current early retirement age – the ‘fourth age’ - and who are likely to want to extend their working careers (Mason & Randell 1997).

There is one final point that deserves consideration. The demographic trends suggest a diversion of resources away from traditional initial education towards lifelong education programmes. What are the implications of this for teacher training? And for the balance between the training of new teachers and in-service training?
References


