

**STANDING COMMITTEE (T-RV)**

**EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON SPECTATOR VIOLENCE  
AND MISBEHAVIOUR AT SPORT EVENTS AND IN  
PARTICULAR AT FOOTBALL MATCHES**

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Report by the Consultative Team  
(including the National Report by Hungary)

**Adopted by written procedure**

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# **Part 1: National Report**

**prepared by  
the Hungarian authorities  
for the consultative visit**

## **Foreword**

The regulation that was fine-tuned in 2009 and 2011 and serves as the basis for the currently applicable legislative background, eliminated the earlier deficiencies of the legislative environment by the simultaneous amendment of several statutes, openly shifting to the direction of tightening and by the implementation of higher responsibility of organizations involved in organizing and conducting sports events.

The sports policing regulation created in 2011 by the simultaneous amendments of Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police (hereinafter: Rtv.) the Act on offences (hereinafter: Sztv.), the Act on sports (hereinafter: Stv.) and the Act on the Penal Code (hereinafter: Penal Code) established forward-looking and efficient conditions in this field, which clearly address the issue of identification of misbehaving supporters, in addition to the actions indicated in the following outline points:

- The amendments defined in Rtv applying to persons excluded by the organizers, banned from sports events or sports facilities by the authority dealing with offenses or by a court, as well as persons disqualified by a court from attending sports events enable the organizer of the sports event and the persons selling tickets to apply for data from the registry.
- The amendment of the Criminal Code also enabled the implementation of efficient action against the forms of sports hooliganism committed without violence. The amendment of Sztv. enables the application of the legal institution of banning in an even broader scope.
- The amendments of Stv. affected ticket sales, admission control systems, the institution of banning and the related record keeping by the police and security organizations, the new system of institutions applying to the security classification of sporting events, the rules on the security control of facilities by the competent agencies of the Interior Ministry, the responsibility of organizers and associations, their security-related tasks and the extended system of sanctions applicable if these are violated.

As a result of the amendments, in an effort to **cease spectator's anonymity**, to prevent and efficiently **terminate acts of violence in the spectator area**, further tightening was introduced.

The State Secretariat for Sport participated in the comprehensive re-regulation of the chapter of Act I of 2004 on the safety and security of sports events by providing professional suggestions and a regulatory concept, furthermore, it is constantly taking part in practical work as well, since it has delegated a member to the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events.

In accordance with the **provisions of the legal amendments implemented in 2009 and 2011**, the Hungarian Football Association (hereinafter: MLSZ) created the document titled "**The Strategy of Hungarian Football 2010 to 2020**". The strategy was already developed with regard to the expectations of UEFA and the progressive scientific ideas, and reformulated the tasks related to the preparation, implementation and follow-up management of security-related tasks. The development of the **new security concept** means that for the first time a **comprehensive safety and security strategy** has been created for Hungarian football.

Under the new security approach (philosophy), focus has been shifted from the assurance of security by staff to the **preliminary guarantee of the conditions of security and to the organization and implementation of security as a service**. Progressive philosophy takes an **integrated approach** to taking into account the interests of the **sport, the spectators and football**, and requires that the tasks are resolved in accordance with the progressive scientific principles and international regulations. This strategy involves the opportunities and obligations of state-of-the-art infrastructural development, the preventive policing actions, the tightening of the control of compliance with the

general safety requirements, the expansion of the range of opportunities of taking action, the establishment of the opportunity of imposing sanctions and the appropriate enforcement of the sanctions. **In the triple system of safety-security-service, stadium security, prevention, communication and the establishment of the infrastructural facilities essential for the protection of persons and property become necessary according to the expectations of the strategy.**

Owing to the new security philosophy, the **safety and security staff** will not work with the representatives of the **infrastructure, licensing and competition organization** area like an island, rather in close cooperation. The establishment and constant development of cooperation among the individual areas has contributed to creating awareness, acceptance of security issues and the standardization of the practical implementation of the tasks. The MLSZ adopted the security regulation of the Association to the new security concepts in 2011 already, which it has regularly reviewed since then, even annually, if necessary.

The new security regulation fully implements the security expectations formulated in the strategy, it is in accordance with the applicable Hungarian rules of law and the requirements of FIFA and UEFA. Owing to the new security approach and the renewal of the regulatory system we see the start of the application of a uniform stadium security approach within MLSZ.

In the matches played under the organisation of the MLSZ, owing to the new security philosophy and the constant assessment of safety and security activities, the security conditions of the organization of matches have improved, and the **number of stewards involved in securing sports events has decreased significantly, by over 25%**. Thanks to the cost-efficient ways of conducting sports events, despite the reduction of the number of stewards, **the quality of organisation and conduct has improved, the number of incidents has not increased, and their level of severity has decreased.**

## **I. National structure**

In respect of the safety, security and guarantee of services concerning sports events in Hungary (including football matches) the applicable regulation is Act I of 2004 on the Sports (hereinafter: Sports Law) and Government Decree 54/2004. (III. 31.) on the Safety of sports events (hereinafter: Decree). The Sports Law and the Decree impose stricter safety requirements and actions for football, handball, volleyball, water polo and ice hockey matches specified in the Decree. In the legal regulation, the following responsible bodies are indicated for securing, safety of football matches and for services provided in the sports event:

- Hungarian Football Association,
- sport organizations functioning in football, furthermore, the hosting body or host,
- Police (National Police Headquarters, county level police headquarters and police stations),
- the National Ambulance Service and the alternative healthcare providers,
- the agency of state administration in charge of public health,
- the National Disaster Prevention Directorate General of the Ministry of the Interior and its bodies,
- National Office for the Judiciary,
- The Prosecutor General's Office,
- the minister in charge of sports policy (Ministry of Human Capacities, State Secretariat for Sport),
- Ministry of the Interior,

- the owners and operators of sports facilities,
- the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events

Responsibilities of actors in charge of the security and safety functions of football matches:

The **Hungarian Football Association** (hereinafter: MLSZ) develops and operates the systems of competition organised in the sport of football. It acts as an organiser in arranging the *matches of the national team and the national cup matches*.

In the sport of football, the MLSZ defines the regulations, thereby ensuring the proper functioning of the sport, with special regard to the *security policy* containing the requirements concerning the safe conduct of sports events, the *doping, the sport discipline and competition policies*. The *provisions of the security policy* must be applied in the championships organised by MLSZ, *for securing the matches of professional adult teams and teams of different age groups, whether the teams play at home or as a visitor, in league, national and international cup matches, as well as in training matches organised by the member organizations*.

The MLSZ or the sports organization participating in the competition system is required to employ a *security officer* holding a relevant qualification for matches organized in the highest league division, in national cup matches held with the participation of sports organization participating in the highest league division, for international cup matches and matches of the national teams. The MLSZ operates its own *security committee* within its organization, for the security and safety of football matches.

The **sports organizations operating in the sport of football** are the organisers of every football match, with the exception of matches of the national team and international cup matches.

The football sports organisation is *required* to employ a *security officer* holding a relevant qualification if it participates in the highest league division. The security officer liaises with the fans of the club; furthermore, constantly informs the competent police unit on the organized travel of supporters to matches with the team as the visitor and carrying special security risk; and he arranges for the travel of stewards in a proportionate number. The visiting organizer and its team will take part in admission control of the supporters and in securing the visitor sector. The security officer direct the work of the stewards and writes the security assessment of the match.

The Police (**National Police Headquarters, county level police headquarters and police stations**) inspect the sports facilities suitable for conducting the contests for security compliance, on the one hand, together with the following organizations:

- disaster protection service,
- National Ambulance Service,
- the agency of state administration in charge of healthcare,
- sports association,
- the sports organization that uses the facility,
- owner,
- operator,
- the organiser of the sports event,
- the healthcare provider having a contractual relationship with the organizer of the sports event,
- the hosting organization,
- the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events

On the other hand, the Police provide security service for the sports event within the sports facility as a public function, i.e. free of charge, in the case of sports events of special security risk. In sports events of normal and increased security risk, the organiser is responsible for security within the sports facility. The organiser of a sports event with increased security risk is required to request the police headquarters having powers for the location of the sporting event within 15 days prior to the date of the sports event, to participate in the maintenance of order within the sports facility, for a fee. In a sports event with normal security risk, the organiser may request the involvement of the Police for a fee. The Police and the organiser will determine the police units and equipment necessary for securing the sports event with increased security risk for a fee and the amount of the fee depending on the planned number of stewards, the security technology condition of the sports facility, the duration of the sports event and the number of police required. Naturally, during the matches the public areas are also secured by the Police.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Sports Law and the Decree, the Police will prohibit the conduct of the sports event with spectators present, or limit the number of spectators, furthermore, it may impose an administrative fine on the organiser or the host if the statutory security requirements are violated.

The Support Unit Department of the General Directorate of Policing of National Police Headquarters – as the entity also responsible for the direction of support unit duties and for the definition of the tasks of spotters – maintains the sports policing records, which is the registry of persons excluded from participating in the sports event by the organizer, banned from the sports event or sports facility or disqualified from visiting sports events. The Police may transmit data from the sports policing registry for the purpose of protecting public order and public safety, preventing violence and disturbances, compliance with the obligation of international police cooperation, protection of the rights of other persons and the safety of the events, furthermore, rejecting attendance in a sports event and rejecting to sell tickets.

The National Police Headquarters operates the National Football Information Point, which is responsible for fulfilment of international duties related to law enforcement pursuant to 2002/348/JHA: Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension, furthermore, to Resolution 2006/C 322/01 of the Council of the European Union concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved. The activities of information acquisition, surveillance of supporter groups and risk assessment performed by NFIP are of special importance in prevention and in the safe organization of events.

The Police operate a network of spotters to maintain connection with the supporters of first league ice hockey, handball, basketball, football and water polo teams. The spotters collect information in the period of preparing for the matches for the success of the security activities, during the matches they are in constant contact with the supporters, in order to ensure the transmission of security-related information.

Healthcare services in international sports events are provided by the **National Ambulance Service** (or by an alternative healthcare provider). The functions of the ambulance service are defined in separate rules of law, which take into account the following in the definition of the forms, levels and methods of the provision of healthcare services for the events:

- the number of persons participating in the event,
- special characteristics of the event (outdoor, wet, etc.),
- the age of the participants.



The number of staff and equipment of the ambulance service must ensure in any case that the farthest point of the event is accessible from the location of placement of the rescue units in 10 minutes. *The ambulance service uses special units for attending to the athletes participating in the sports event.*

The representatives of **National Directorate General for Disaster Management**, Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter: OKF) are involved in the security technology inspection of sports facilities suitable for the conduct of competitions organized in the system of competitions. In addition to the establishment of an environment compliant with the relevant statutes, it is also the duty of OKF to assess the substance of the fire protection documentation (fire safety policy, evacuation calculations, rescue and evacuation plans, fire alarm plans, action protocols, review documentation, training materials on fire safety). *Conditions of consent granted by OKF applying to competitions to be conducted in the sports facility.* The Disaster Protection Service delegates one member to the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events.

The **National Office for the Judiciary** participates as a member in the activities of the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events, it conveys the proposals and findings of organizations participating concerning sports events to the organization.

The representative of the **Prosecutor General's Office** is a member of the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events, furthermore, it performs additional professional and scientific activity on the subject of the safe conduct of sports events (e.g. professional conferences), it informs the system of organizations on decisions and processes related to the safety of sports events.

The **agency of state administration on public health** participates in the security technology inspection of sports facilities suitable for the conduct of competitions organized in the system of competitions. The consent issued by the organs of the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service is always required for the use of sports facilities in a competition system.

**The Minister in charge of sports policy (Ministry of Human Capacities, State Secretariat for Sport)** fulfils the assignments, pursuant to the provisions of the Sport Law, related to the *direction, regulation of sports (see: preparation of statutes) and its control, it also arranges for the implementation of the decisions of the Government on sports*, and it participates in the activities of the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events as a member. Pursuant to the Sports Law, in order to implement the socially beneficial aims of sports, the State ensures *public safety* in sports events, it contributes to the *safe conduct of sports events, furthermore, participates in sports-related international cooperation.*

**The Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events** (hereinafter: Classification Committee) decides, pursuant to the provisions of the Sports Law, on the classification, rating of matches in the sports of *football, handball, basketball, water polo and ice hockey* according to the security risk. The Classification Committee consists of professionals delegated by the National Police Headquarters, disaster management, the National Ambulance Service, the president of the National Office for the Judiciary, the Minister in charge of sports policy and the national associations of the individual sports. The Classification Committee *classifies matches organized in the highest league division, national cup matches held with the participation of sports organizations playing in the highest league division, international cup matches, furthermore, matches of national teams, which classification may be normal, increased or special risk.* The individual ratings according to security risk define the role of the police and the financial aspects of the role of the police.

In addition to security technology inspections and the definition of classifications according to security risk, the Classification Committee also participates in the processing of annual status reports

and evaluations and in the training of sports policing professionals (so-called contacts) as well. The Classification Committee is entitled in the case of severe or recurring deficiencies, to submit proposals to the minister in charge of sports policy on the suspension or withdrawal of the state support of the sports association or a sports organization operating as its member organization. The Classification Committee can also operate of formulate proposals on legislative changes concerning issues of sports policing.

**Owners and operators of sports facilities** are involved in the security technology inspection of sports facilities suitable for the conduct of competitions organized in the system of competitions. The owners and operators of sports facilities serving the conduct of sports events defined in the Decree must have a four-year security technology development plan ensuring the concerted security technology development of the sports facility, adopted jointly by the organizations performing inspections, as well as a related cost budget.

## II. **Legal framework**

The safety and security of sports events, especially football matches, are determined by the following statutes and other regulations:

**Act I of 2004 on sports:** The Sports Law provides for the conditions of the organisation of sports events, for the responsibility of the organiser, the tasks of the *host*, it regulates *admission control*, participation in sports events, *surveillance by camera*, *banning from the sports event and the sports policing registry*.

- It is the *responsibility of the organiser* to take or initiate with the authorities every measure that becomes necessary for protecting the safety of the persons and property of the participants of the sports event, and to prevent violations of the law. Sports events shall only be organised in compliance with the requirements defined by the association operating in the given sport. The organiser shall organise the sale of admission tickets, admission control in the premises of the sports event, the placement of the groups of fans in such a manner that the various groups of fans shall be separated. It is the responsibility of the organiser to take the actions defined by statutes, in order to ensure the security required by the security risk rating specified by the Classification Committee. In the sport of football, in the case of matches with special and increased security risk, the organizer applies admission control systems, and only name tickets and passes may be sold, furthermore, upon entry the organizer is authorized to verify the identity of the holder of the entry ticket or pass.

The organizer is required to commission a steward organization or steward, in order to ensure the legitimate and professional implementation of the tasks of event management. The organiser and the steward commissioned by it are jointly and severally liable. *In the case of matches subject to the Decree*, the steward organization shall be an individual undertaking or and economic partnership subject to the Act on the protection of property and individuals and activity of private detectives, and only persons holding a protection of persons and property ID issued by an authority may be stewards, who must be in compliance with the qualification, training requirements defined in the statute on qualifications and in the internal policy of the association of the given sport, trained for order maintenance in the sports event.

During the term of the event, the steward or the managing organization are required to cooperate with the police according to the needs of the police, they are required to support and promote the work of the police in order to maintain security. In the context of sports events subject to the Government decree on the security of sports events, if the statutory security requirements are violated, then the county police headquarters having competence

for the venue of the sports event may impose a fine of two hundred thousand to two million forints, depending on the severity of the infringement, the value of the damage caused, the rate of threat to public safety and the repetition of the infringement, on the organizer and the steward.

If the administrative fine is imposed repeatedly or is not paid, the police will limit the number of spectators allowed in the sports event by a resolution, or prohibit the conduct of the event with the participation of spectators.

If a spectator does not comply during the term of the sports event with the conditions of admission to the sports event, or displays illegal conduct in the sports event (e.g. racist, hatemongering, offensive conduct), and does not stop this conduct despite the warning of the steward, they must be removed from the sports event. If the person to be removed does not comply with the instruction, then the steward may detain them until the police arrive at the premises, but in any case not longer than the end of the third hour starting from the time of the report, assuming that the detention takes place in an area covered by an image recording device operating in the premises.

The steward is entitled to search the clothing, luggage of persons participating in the sports event. In order to develop its services, the safety policy of MLSZ already provides, and in the near future the statutes will provide, for the system of safety stewards. Safety stewards are persons in compliance with the training and qualification requirements published by the MLSZ and supporting the tasks of the stewards and the organizers, whose main task is giving a friendly welcome, information to the spectators and ensuring their safety. They are not allowed to take policing actions against the spectators.

- The Sports Law regulates the *conditions of admission control* in detail. A spectator may enter the premises of a sports event, if:
  - a) they have a valid entry ticket, season pass or other certificate entitling them to enter the venue of the sports event,
  - b) they are not obviously under the influence of alcohol, illicit drugs or other stupefying substances,
  - c) does not have on their person intoxicating beverages, illicit drugs or any object that jeopardizes the conduct of the sports event, furthermore, the safety of persons and property of others, or that has been prohibited to be taken to the sports event by the organizer prior to the purchase of the entrance ticket, and the buyer of the entrance ticket has been properly informed on this prohibition,
  - d) does not have on his person any banner, flag that incites hatred or totalitarian symbols otherwise prohibited by law,
  - e) is not subject to the penalty of exclusion, is not banned from visiting sports events or disqualified from visiting sports events as penalty for offense,
  - f) undertakes to prove their identity if instructed so by the steward,
  - g) acknowledges that during the time of the sports event image and voice recordings may be made of them.
  
- The Sports Law deals with *camera surveillance* separately. Surveillance is only allowed during the time of the sports event, in the premises thereof, in public areas occupied by supporters waiting for admission and in the parking lot designated for the spectators. In the sport of football, during the time of sports events with increased and special security risk, the organizer and the steward are required to survey the participants by cameras placed in

locations defined by the police, in the number defined by the police, capable of making recordings in a quality enabling the individual identification of the participants, and store the recording. Data may be requested from the recordings exclusively for the purposes of national security, law enforcement, prosecution of offenses and for the tasks of the judicial system. The organizer, the steward or the representative of the steward organization will simultaneously and continuously monitor the data recorded by the camera, in the area of the sports event, in a dedicated room (control point). The representative of the police or the national security service tasked with this function may be present during such monitoring.

- The organiser is required, in the case of a sports event organized by it, to reject the sale of entrance tickets to persons removed from the sports event, as well as to prevent such persons from participating in the sports event. The organizer is required to provide information on the opportunity of exclusion from participating in the sports event, in and outside the sports facility on highly visible billboards, which must also be provided – as a general contractual term – in Hungarian, English, German languages and in the language used in the country of the foreign visiting sports organization. The term of exclusion may be from 6 months to 4 years.
- The sports policing records is the registry of persons *excluded* from participating in the sports event by the organizer, *banned* from the sports event or sports facility by the offences authority, or *disqualified* from visiting sports events by court. The database managed by the police contains the legally defined data of *excluded*, *banned* or *prohibited* persons, which data are processed until the end of the term of the punishment.

#### **Government Decree 54/2004. (III. 31.) on the Security of sport events**

The Decree is the Implementing regulation of the Sports Law. The Decree regulates the framework of the operation of the Classification Committee, the conditions of requesting and paying the charge of police protection, the cooperation of the organizer, the steward and the police, the details of the information to be provided to the police. Pursuant to the Decree, security plan must be prepared for sports events, which must include all the substance elements prescribed in the Decree (e.g.: the regime of entrance into and exit from the venue of the sports event, the technical-protective equipment intended to be applied by the steward, a layout drawing of the traffic junctions located in the vicinity of the event), furthermore, a rescue and evacuation plan must be prepared, which must provide for information related to the safety of persons and property and the tasks to be executed. Furthermore, the Decree defines the aspects of the security technology inspection of sports facilities and the obligatory substance elements of the security technology development plan. The Decree also provides for the functions of sports associations. If the conditions necessary for the safe arrangement of the sports event are missing or do not comply with the provisions of the Sports Law and those of the Decree, then the competent association will prohibit the conduct of the sports event or the conduct of the sports event with spectators present, or it will restrict the participation of the spectators to a specified part of the sports facility.

**Government Decree 215/2004. (VII. 13.) on the rules of sports medicine and the network of sports health care, EüM Decree 5/2006. (II. 7.) on ambulance services:** this decree regulates the provision of healthcare services for participants of sports events. The entity in charge of ambulance services, the entity in charge of the provision of ambulance services in the event must prepare an ambulance plan if the number of persons attending the sports event is above 5000. The ambulance plan must be prepared with regard to the nature of the given event, the number of participants, the geographical conditions and the weather expected at the time of the event.

**ORFK Directive 8/2010. (OT 5.) on the classification and police protection of sports events:**

This directive provides for the regime of the classification of sports events, the inspection of the venues of sports events, preparations for and provision of police protection and the specific tasks related to the protection of sports events. This directive applies to the National Police Headquarters, the county level police headquarters, police stations and the Riot Police.

**Act LXIII of 2003 on the announcement of the Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches, concluded on 19 August 1985 in Strasbourg, in the framework of the Council of Europe:** Hungary signed the Convention on 18 April 1990. In respect of Hungary the Convention took effect on 1 June 1990.

The purpose of the **security policy of the MLSZ** is to ensure that the preparation, implementation and assessment of the security-related tasks of football matches are executed subject to standard and obligatory rules. It ensures the concerted implementation of the relevant rules of FIFA and UEFA, furthermore, it contributes to the safe playing of football, the undisturbed entertainment of the spectators and the guarantee of their personal and property safety. It regulates and promotes the cooperation, training and advanced training of security professionals and organizations. It develops the standard approach to stadium security and enables the standard assessment of incidents in accordance with their weight, furthermore, it promotes the implementation of the rules of law.

**Act II of 2012 on offences, procedures for offences and the system for registering offences** provides for the opportunity of *banning* persons placed under procedure from sports facilities, from sports events to be conducted in the system of competition of any sports association, furthermore, from sports facilities serving as the venue of sports events conducted in the system of competitions of any sports associations, owing to an offense related to participation in the sports events, travelling to or departing from the premises of sports events. Each term may be between six months and two years.

**Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code** regulates disqualification from visiting sports events. A court may disqualify the perpetrator, for acts of crime committed during participation in the sports event, travelling to it or departing from it, related to the sports event, from visiting sports events to be conducted in the system of competitions of any sports association, or from entering any sports facility, when such facility serves as the venue of a sports event conducted in the system of competitions of any sports association. The term of disqualification may be from 1 year to 5 years.

**Further provisions**

- Pursuant to Government Decree 210/2009 (IX.29.) on the conditions of the performance of commercial activities, it is not allowed to serve beverages with alcoholic content exceeding 5% at sports events, in the period beginning two hours prior to the start of the sports event and ending one hour after the closing thereof, in the area of the sports facility. If necessary, the competent local governments may restrict the sale of intoxicating beverages in the vicinity of the stadiums.
- Pursuant to Government Decree 173/2011. (VIII. 24.) on the surveillance of pyrotechnic activities for civil purposes, pyrotechnic products shall be used in sports facilities only in the presence and under the direction of a pyrotechnician, with the authority permit of the Police, and if this provision is violated, then a fine shall be imposed on the activity pursuant to the law on offenses.

### III. A review of offenses

The following table contains the data of the sports policy register for the championship season of 2016/17:

Sports policing data of men's football matches, Division 1			
Number of matches	Police were also involved	Infringements against public officials	Police reports filed
198	198	0	54

The following table shows the distribution of exclusions, bans and disqualifications per season:

Sanctions per season						
Category	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Exclusion	0	18	14	1	4	9
Disqualification	10	6	19	18	17	3
Ban	4	0	1	0	7	2
Total	14	24	34	19	28	14

The most common misdemeanours resulting in *exclusion* are the following:

- operation of pyrotechnic articles,
- behaviour violating field rules,
- use of tickets issued to another person's name or void for any other reason.

#### **Case description 1: Hungary – Romania European Championship qualifier, 4 September 2015**

Prior to the match several national and international discussions were held, with the participation of representatives of the sports associations and the staff of the national authorities. Owing to discussions of several months, in Groupama Arena of Budapest there was only verbal sparring between the Hungarian and Romanian fan groups, there were no actual fights even though the separation between the fan groups was minimized, despite the classification of special security risk. The principles of progressive protection are especially applied in matches of increased security risk, i.e. the appropriate preparation of the facility, which means that supporters of opposing sentiments are separated in such a manner that does not adversely affect the conditions of rescue evacuation. The distance between the two fan groups was reduced, because a banner made of non-flammable material was spread on the seats and in the sectors a net was mounted next to the fences. Near the stadium a fan zone was designated for visiting fans, where the visiting fans could refresh themselves after the long journey, they could park their cars and had a chance to get prepared for the match under decent and safe circumstances.

During the match misbehaviour only occurred between Romanian fans (they got in a fight), there were no run-ins between the two fan groups. 3 Romanian fans needed medical attention because of the disturbances. During the match 4 pyrotechnic articles were used. Owing to the verbal acts of Hungarian supporters, UEFA initiated a disciplinary procedure, in which it was imposed as a penalty that the next match is to be played behind closed doors. In the stadium in this match of special security risk the police were only involved in a low profile in the protection services, despite the classification. The police units were placed in a manner and in a place only marginally visible for the supporters, and they were only deployed in the run-in between Romanian supporters, in the way defined by dynamic risk assessment. When it became necessary, we made the presence of the police visible for fan groups inclined to misbehaviour.

In ticket sales MLSZ provided tickets available without a club card in a limited number only. Hungarian groups of supporters without tickets planned to view the match in the direct vicinity of the stadium, on a screen located about 800 m from it. After some time, the Hungarian supporters had a clash with the police, as a result, police units were deployed, several persons were picked out and apprehended and the crowd was dispersed. The visiting supporters left the Arena under police protection. During the match 32 police officers were injured, 24 police vehicles were wrecked, 11 persons were apprehended, 32 persons were escorted to the police station and criminal charges were pressed against 11 persons for public nuisance. The occurrences in the vicinity of the stadium had no adverse impact on the stadium itself or on the sports event, during the clash the police kept the Hungarian fans away from the zone of the Romanian supporters and from the stadium.

**Case description 2: Ferencvárosi TC – Újpest FC Hungarian Division 1 football match, 21 October 2017.**

For several decades the Ferencvárosi TC – Újpest FC football matches have carried the highest risk in Hungary. Certain fan websites register them as among the 10 "best" derbies on account of supporter conduct. There is an irreconcilable antagonism between the two supporter groups, these matches are always classified as carrying special security risk, and the police are actively involved in the security services.

The strategy of the Hungarian Football Association and the amendment of the relevant legislation greatly contributed to the fact that the matches did not adversely affect regular life in Budapest, in the stadium the number of severe disturbances decreased meaningfully.

In accordance with the provisions of the policies and statutes, the organizations involved in security services held a personal discussion about the match organized for 21 October 2017. In the discussion organized for 5 October 2017 – of which the parties also prepared a memorandum – the security managers of the two sports organizations, the police units affected by the protection of the event, the representative of the sports facility, representatives of the economic association in charge of community transport, and those of the entities in charge of ticket sales and serving the spectators were in attendance.

In the discussion an agreement was reached on the size of the separating element between the two fan groups, the placement and travel of the visiting supporters. In order to maintain the order of public areas, the two sports organizations jointly financed the costs of the travel that they were legally obliged to organize. In addition to clarifying the arrival of the supporter buses, the regime of ticket sales, the content and process of communication to the supporters were also discussed.

In accordance with the statutory requirements and the policies of the MLSZ, so-called visiting stewards were also involved in the security services of the match, their functions as stewards were thoroughly clarified. In accordance with the recommendation of the MLSZ, the involvement of visiting stewards was also defined in a security plan created with contents defined in statutes. In addition to the clarification of admission control, the processes of taking action in the case of infringement and traffic control actions were also clarified. Concerning the match, it was expected that supporters protesting against the ticket sales regime of the team of FTC would organize a protest rally in the direct vicinity of the stadium, which could have made the smooth conduct of the match quite a challenge.

In the discussion the affected parties agreed to operate a common, integrated control point, where they would assess the risks, in order to define the necessary crowd control measures, the behaviours to be followed in the case of extraordinary situations. The sports organization organizing the match

provided fire control with an increased number of firefighters, as well as healthcare services, and with regard to the special risk classification of the match, the police searched the premises for explosives free of charge.

One supporter of Ferencváros hurled a beer cup into the field during the match, he was indicted for the crime of breach of peace. During the match, in the visitor sector a struggle developed among the supporters. When the supporters saw the police units deployed, they stopped the struggle, no one had to be taken to the police station.

In the match the Security Inspector evaluated the implementation of the security tasks, who concluded that:

- unfair supporter behaviour was displayed by both sports organizations,
- both supporter groups displayed racist conduct,
- the visiting supporters operated 6 pyrotechnic articles,
- the visiting supporters got in a fight with their own stewards.

The Disciplinary Board mandated FTC LabdarúgóZrt. as a repeated infringer to pay a fine of 350,000 forints, and Újpest 1885 Futball Kft. as a repeated infringer to pay a fine of 800,000 forints.

During the securing of the match 2 persons were apprehended (caught while committing a crime, breach of the peace and misbehaviour), 2 persons were fined (offense related to explosives used for civil purposes and to pyrotechnic articles) for 100,000 forints.

12,341 home and 1075 visiting fans, a total of 13,416 persons were present in the match.

#### **IV. Requesting guidance**

National Police Headquarters:

- The regulations of the EU required the exchange of data and information, while there is no obligatory direct data exchange between NFIPs on persons disqualified from the matches. Accordingly, the data of excluded, banned and disqualified persons included in the sports policing records may be forwarded to police units of other EU member states subject to the national statutes. This will create difficulties in conducting the UEFA EURO 2020 as well. We believe this matter should be regulated at EU level, and the exchange of these data should be operated in the regime of the NFIPs.

The Prosecutor General's Office:

- What are those admission control procedures, solutions that you support, also with regard to aspects of data processing?
- In the case of persons not allowed to attend sports events (because of exclusion, ban or disqualification), which solution do you prefer, consider efficient and recommended?

Hungarian Football Association

- In the case of safety stewards what are the powers that you consider important to be implemented in the statutes? Is the power of searching clothing and luggage an essential condition for the safety stewards to work?



## **Part 2: Report by the visiting team**

**Budapest, 15-16 November 2018**

## Section A General

### A.1 Executive Summary

The delegation which included representatives of UEFA and Supporters Direct Europe (SD Europe) has compiled this report which contains recommendations in respect of the safety, security and service arrangements in connection with football events held in Hungary and also the status of the preparations for the UEFA EURO 2020 matches.

The delegation would point out the difficulties in preparing a report based solely on a short visit to a country and that it is not possible to obtain a detailed picture of the situation on the basis of a small number of meetings and visit to one or two stadia. The delegation would therefore make it clear that its findings are based entirely on that limited contact achieved.

The recommendations in this report are broken down into those specifically relating to the preparations for UEFA EURO 2020 which should be viewed as a priority due to time pressures and those relating to the arrangements for the annual calendar of domestic and international matches.

However, it should be noted that all of the recommendations are interlinked and cannot be seen in isolation. To be effective, any integrated safety, security and service strategy has to maintain a good balance between all of its components, not least because European experience and good practice evidences that each component can and does have an impact on delivery of all aspects of the wider strategy.

The delegation stresses that the aim of the visit was to be that of a critical friend and offer comment in support of the authorities and other relevant stakeholders in Hungary to develop and implement a strategy designed to demonstrate compliance with the Convention CETS No. 218 (hereafter «the Convention») and provide a safe, secure and welcoming environment at football matches and other sports events.

To assist this process, the report is presented in a thematic structure that reflects the Articles of the Convention on an integrated approach at football matches and other sports events. The recommendations are set out in the form of an Action Plan which highlights amongst other things the need for:

- setting up a government-led national multi-agency co-ordination group;
- implementing an integrated and comprehensive multi-agency strategy at national and local levels;
- clarification of the current legislative framework;
- improved stadium safety certification and stadium safety management operating arrangements;
- an obligation for all stadia hosting professional football matches to have a designated, trained and assessed as competent stadium safety officer, tasked with responsibility for all in-stadia safety and security;
- more effective arrangements for ensuring that all stadium safety and security personnel, and supporter liaison officers, are trained and assessed as competent to undertake their various tasks;
- a review of policing football operations to ensure that strategic and tactical decisions reflect established European good practice;

- adequately resourcing the NFIP structure;
- implementing an effective inclusion and, importantly, exclusion (banning orders) system.

The delegation fully recognises that the recommendations contained in this report represent a significant number of work streams and that it will take time to define, adopt and implement the necessary actions.

The delegation would therefore like to stress that the Standing Committee is wholly committed to provide the governmental and football authorities, and other competent agencies in Hungary with further support to meet the challenges that lie ahead and would welcome periodic feedback on the progress made by the authorities in Hungary concerning implementation of the recommendations in this report.

In conclusion, the delegation would like to put on record its gratitude for the willingness of all parties met during the visit to engage in open discussion and welcomes the commitment expressed to share experiences and expertise with their European counterparts.

The delegation would also like to thank all of the colleagues in Hungary for their hospitality and much appreciated help and support throughout the visit.

## A.2 Introduction

In the context of the Action Plan of the Working Group on the Safety, Security and Service preparations for UEFA EURO 2020, the Council of Europe Standing Committee on the Spectator Violence Convention (T-RV) carried out a consultative visit to Hungary under the Compliance with Commitments project (CwC).

The visit was arranged by the Ministries of Human Capacities State Secretariat for Sport and Interior, with the collaboration of the Hungarian National Football Association, and took place on 15 and 16 November 2018 in Budapest.

The visiting delegation comprised of:

- Adrian Dincă Chair of the TR-V Standing Committee
- Ana Criado Contreras, delegate of Spain
- Martin Schlosser, member of the Bureau, delegate of Austria
- Ken Scott, Sports Grounds Safety Authority (SGSA), delegate of UK and Rapporteur
- Marie-Francoise Glatz, Secretariat of the Standing Committee, Council of Europe
- Paulo Gomes, Secretariat of the Standing Committee, Council of Europe
- Stephen Thomas, security officer and representative from UEFA
- Lena Gustafson-Wiberg, representative from Supporters Direct Europe

The team met with representatives from:

- Hungarian National Police, Head of Public Order Department
- Members of the Department of Sports Innovation and Strategy, State Secretariat for Sport Ministry of Human Capacities
- Prosecutor General's Office
- Hungarian Ambulance Service
- Hungarian Football Federation (head and deputy head of the safety and security department and Federation SLO )

- Hungarian Disaster Control Department and the Fire Safety Service for the Football Federation
- Project coordinator of the private security company for the Football Association
- Safety management of the current and new stadia
- Supporters' liaison officers (SLOs) and representatives of the organised groups of supporters from the seven main teams of the football First League competition.

## **Section B Visit Background and Explanation**

### **B.1 Purpose of the Visit**

The aim of this visit was two-fold:

- to assess alignment with policy articles in the Convention and the good practices of the 2015 Recommendation. That is, to explore matters such as national legislation, national co-ordination arrangements, roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders, levels of international police co-operation, communication with supporters and to examine the level of football-related violence in Hungary; and
- to evaluate the state of preparations of Hungary for UEFA EURO 2020.

In looking at the arrangements for UEFA EURO 2020, it was essential that consideration be given to the core elements of the national arrangements for preventing and tackling violence and disorder in connection with domestic football events generally. UEFA EURO 2020 safety and security preparations cannot be seen in isolation from the national provisions in this area, due to the important overlapping and interlink of these two elements. Also, the work done at this stage of the safety and security preparations for this major event will be the foundation of the safety and security arrangements adopted for UEFA EURO 2020 and beyond by state authorities and private partners.

### **B.2 Visit Itinerary**

The visit was designed to enable the delegation to meet with the Hungarian stakeholders listed above through two plenary sessions and was also provided with an opportunity to visit the Groupama Arena to observe at first hand the safety and security operation in place for a low risk Nations League football match between Hungary and Estonia on 15 November 2018.

A site visit was carried out on 16 November 2018 to see progress in the development of the new Puskas Ferenc national stadium. Works are due to be completed in November 2019.

### B.3 Supporting Documentation

To assist the visit, the Hungarian authorities provided the delegation with a National Report which constitutes the first part of this report and it includes detail of the national structure and the legal framework within Hungary.

Post visit the delegation was provided with a digital copy of the HFF document *The Strategy of Hungarian Football – The Decade of Revival 2010-2020*.

The delegation is extremely grateful to the Hungarian authorities for providing the documentation.

### B.4 Status of Report

The delegation is aware that in such a short duration and within a very tight schedule, it was not possible to conduct an in-depth assessment of every aspect of the safety and security preparations both currently in place and also in preparation for UEFA EURO 2020 and acknowledges the possibility that some questions or remarks may have got lost in interpretation or translation. Moreover, the delegation can only comment on what it was told and what it observed which may not necessarily be wholly indicative of the wider situation in Hungary.

The delegation wishes to stress that the aim of this report is to assist the Hungarian authorities and other relevant stakeholders through the provision of external and expert observation in the field of safety, security and service at sports events.

The delegation recognises and acknowledges when carrying out consultative visits that safety and security arrangements are the responsibility of the host nation. This report and any subsequent advice is not intended to undermine that core principle.

Moreover, it is neither possible nor desirable to provide definitive models of application in view of wide variations in the constitutional, judicial, policing, cultural, and historical circumstances, and the equally varied character and severity of football-related incidents and risks, among and within each country.

## Section C UEFA EURO 2020 –Safety, Security and Service Preparations

### C.1 Background Information

Note - The National Report circulated before the meeting and the various inputs at the sessions over two days did not, apart from the presentation on the design and building of the ‘Puskas Ferenc Stadium’ and the visit to the construction site, deal specifically with arrangements for UEFA EURO 2020.

It is, therefore, assumed that all of the arrangements set out during the visit to display compliance with the Convention will be adopted and utilised for UEFA EURO 2020.

The European Football Championships is one of the three major global sports events. Organizing such a tournament places major demands and responsibilities on all the authorities in the host country, notably in respect of ensuring the safety and security of the participating teams and staff, visiting supporters and local communities.

UEFA EURO 2020, the 16th European Championships, will take place from 12 June to 12 July 2020 and will be unique in that it will take place in 12 cities in 11 countries with 24 teams competing. A newly rebuilt Puskas Ferenc stadium in Budapest, Hungary will host matches in the Group and Round of 16 stages.

### C.2 Integrated Approach to Safety, Security and Service

Adopting an integrated, multi-agency approach to safety, security and service is imperative when hosting major tournaments and in organising the annual calendar of national and international football events. Extensive European experience and established good practice demonstrates that this approach is crucial in helping to reduce risks associated with sport events because all three pillars are inter-related and overlap. No one agency and no element of a wider strategy can prevent or tackle safety or security risks in isolation. It is imperative, therefore, that all agencies work together to ensure that the various operations are complementary.

It is recognised that in some European languages the terms "safety" and "security" share a common definition. As a consequence, attempting to explain the three pillars can pose difficulties. However, European good practice evidences the importance of distinguishing between the two concepts. For ease of reference, therefore, the following outline definitions have been found to be useful:

- "safety" is generally interpreted as incorporating measures designed to protect the health and safety of individuals in their capacity as spectators at an event or members of the wider community;
- "security" is generally interpreted as incorporating measures intended to prevent or respond to criminal and anti-social behaviour inside and outside of arenas and other sports stadia; and
- "service" is generally interpreted as including a wide range of measures (services) designed to meet the needs of individuals in a manner that makes them feel comfortable, appreciated,

welcome and active participants in an event - it also embraces a range of preventative measures like sports-related community projects and supporter engagement.

Experience shows us that adopting a service ethos can play an essential role in reducing safety and security risks in connection with football tournaments. Providing visiting supporters and local communities with a respectful, friendly and welcoming atmosphere can have a major and positive impact on risk levels through marginalising the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation or acting in an unacceptably provocative or anti-social manner and generating a high degree of self-management of behaviour among supporters.

It is considered imperative, therefore, for a service-focused approach to be adopted by all agencies involved in providing a safe and secure environment inside and outside of stadia.

It can also help foster enhanced co-operation between public and private authorities responsible for managing football-related events.

In essence, a service approach is complementary to effective crowd management and implementation of an effective exclusion strategy and as such is integral to the development of a wider integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service. This applies equally to routine national and international football events and major tournaments like UEFA EURO 2020.

The above categories or pillars are only used for ease of reference and it is imperative to recognise that initiatives developed under one of the three headings are bound to overlap and/or impact on the other two, given the extent to which they are inter-related.

The key to successful delivery of the integrated concept centres on the adoption of a strategic approach and the need for the integrated approach to be co-ordinated effectively at national and local level.

This ethos lies at the heart of this report and its recommendations.

### **C.3 Strategic Co-ordination**

In order to ensure that a coherent and integrated safety, security and service strategy is developed and implemented effectively at international, national and local level, government-led national co-ordination arrangements need to be in place and refined in the light of national experience, emerging trends and national and international good practice.

This dynamic reinforces the need for that co-ordination to be strategic and multi-agency in character and not just event specific. This is important as event arrangements should be based on the concepts, partnership ethos, infrastructure, strategy and operational arrangements established at a national level. Experience demonstrates that this can greatly assist in applying the arrangements to a particular football (and where appropriate, other major sports) event.

The delegation regrets that it did not have an opportunity to meet with members of Government, Director Generals, and heads of Police and Hungarian FA.

## C.4 Operational Co-ordination

At local level there appeared to be good working relationships involving all key agencies. The engagement process did appear to be largely security driven and did appear to be predominantly police-led, however, mention was made on a number of occasions of the need to embrace both the safety and service elements of the Convention.

What was clear, however, was that all agencies appeared to operate independently of each other with lack of clarity over lead roles and responsibilities. Statements of Intent which would set out the boundaries of each organisations' responsibilities and avoid potentially confusing overlap were not in place.

Also of concern is the current situation of the Hungarian Football Association(HFA) taking complete control of the Groupama Stadium when the stadium is used as the temporary home of the national team. This arrangement includes the importation of HFF staff including safety officer in place of the established safety team.

Whilst no evidence of safety breaches directly related to this arrangement were identified during the match visit, the potential for safety failures is given unnecessary opportunity due to this practice. Such practice also has implications for the assessment of the safe capacity of the stadium which should be reviewed against the skills, competencies and qualifications of the replacement safety team.

## C.5 Legislative and Regulatory Framework

The foundation upon which the key building blocks in relation to safety at sports grounds is built lies in the existence of sports ground specific legislation, and within Hungary there exists a Sports Law and Decree with supporting regulations. The legislation however is generic, appears to be in the main police/security based and covers a range of sports played within Hungary. No evidence was displayed during the trip to reassure in respect of those issues faced by authorities which are uniquely football specific.

There was no written evidence to demonstrate the connection between the overarching legislation and its application at organisational level. Whilst there is a need for a Sports Governing body licence to be in place at sports grounds, the lack of a structured safety certification process highlighted many areas of concern around transparency of process, decision making and clear link with the design and management of sports grounds including crucially the setting of a safe capacity and embedding of safety management principles.

The concept of the Committee responsible for Classifying Safety of Sporting Events, its structure, constitution and general role appears to be a positive move.

Clearly from the composition of the group there is a demonstration of an integrated approach amongst the various groups. However, the focus of the group is towards security and determination of policing levels and misses the opportunity to recognise the key principles of safety. The group also lacks a technical input which could be used to input more in the areas of stadium design and construction, structure and safety management.

It was also unclear as to what standards for safety of sports grounds are used within Hungary. It was pointed out on a number of occasions that inspections of stadia are carried out by a multi-disciplinary



team but no reference was made as to what the purpose of the inspection was, nor to the standards against which a stadium is measured during inspection.

**Recommendation 1 – It is recommended that the composition of the multi-disciplinary team in charge of inspections be extended to include a professional person with sports grounds safety technical qualifications and skills.**

## C.6 Visit to Puskas Ferenc stadium

A visit to the stadium which is currently being erected on the site of the former National Stadium was undertaken as part of the evidence of preparedness in relation to hosting of matches as part of UEFA EURO 2020. The main superstructure is well advanced and will provide accommodation for around 68000 seated spectators on 3 levels. Completion is scheduled for late 2019 in preparation for the hosting of four matches in the tournament.

The stadium is designed to high standards of safety, comfort and spectator experience with potential for operation beyond sporting events. It will feature completely covered stands, good spectator viewing standards and corporate facilities including 84 sky boxes and a museum.

The new stadium is intended to have good entry and exit facilities for general spectators, corporate guests, VIPs and the media. It will incorporate a police station, with detention areas and rooms to accommodate police officers at pitch level, with medical service/first aid, facilities also located at pitch level.

A match control room is planned with a CCTV system incorporating 423 cameras, designed in accordance with UEFA and Hungarian standards in respect of picture resolution.

Stadium designers claim recognition of and compliance with security and safety requirements from UEFA, FIFA and SGSA Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (Green Guide).

The site is 37 hectares, of which 25 form the outer perimeter. Local public transport networks are good, with metro stations 500 metres and 1 Km away. The stadium is served by local tram stops and a train station.

It is proposed that a fan zone will be sited in a city park nearby. The security perimeters of stadium and fan zone will enclose some neighbouring sports facilities and their parking areas. Care should be taken to ensure that tickets are personalised in accordance with national legislation.

The legislative framework for development requires an approval from the local authorities for building work to be granted before development works commence on site. What wasn't clear were the standards which are applied to the development both from national building code compliance and specific safety of sports grounds guidance perspectives to demonstrate the highest levels of safety and security are embedded in the design concept.

Also noted is that there is no third party accreditation of the building works as they progress to ensure that the development matches the originally approved concept. This lack of checking process has obvious potential issues if the finished product does not match with the design specified and is a material consideration if during the course of construction building costs overrun original budgets allocated to the project.

It was pointed out to the delegation during the visit that the sports governing body will issue a licence to sports ground as it does with all sports grounds affiliated to the governing body. This licence contains reference to the safe capacity of the stadium which is determined by the clubs themselves. The criteria for issue of the licence was not clarified but again lacked the surety of external assurance. Also lacking transparency and external verification is the capacity setting process.

The involvement of the National Directorate General for Disaster Management was referred to in the National Report prepared by the Hungarian Authorities in relation to the organisations input into “evacuation calculations, rescue and evacuation plans”. It was not made clear, however, what the specific skills and competencies of the organisation are and whether the body links this evaluation to other key safe capacity considerations such as ingress, circulation, holding capacity and egress under both normal and emergency conditions.

The HFF should appoint an organisation with responsibility for running and operating the stadium as soon as possible. This body should be charged with developing the safety management structure needed to operate the stadium safely and develop plans in support. The ability and competence of the appointed operator will impact upon the determination of the safe stadium capacity (S factor).

Due to limited availability of time, no reference was made to the consideration of external factors affecting the safety of spectators within the sports ground. Clearly the risk of terrorist activity is high on the agenda and the stadium and its safety management team should look to develop contingency plans for such occurrence which could invoke evacuation of spectators or indeed lockdown of the stadium.

**Recommendation 2 – It is recommended that consideration is given to engaging with independent third parties to give assurance in relation to the structural safety of the stadium when assessed against national building codes and also to give similar assurances around the setting of a safe capacity for the stadium based upon established international best practice.**

**Recommendation 3 – It is recommended that the stadium management team considers the development of contingency plans to be invoked in the event of an external incident which impacts upon the ability of spectators to exit the stadium via normal/local exit routes. Such planning should look at how the movement of spectators inside the stadium may be achieved to reach places of safety.**

**Recommendation 4 – The authorities should appoint an operator to develop and manage the stadium safety operation as soon as practicable. The appointed body should set about developing the suite of operational and contingency plans necessary to demonstrate effective safety management.**

# UEFA EURO 2020 - Security

## C.7 Policing Operations

It is clear that policing UEFA EURO 2020 will require a major public safety and public security strategy. There is a risk to public safety and security of clashes between rival visiting supporters and also risk elements within local communities within Hungary.

**Recommendation 5 - The police and relevant authorities should review the potential risk of local communities clashing with visiting supporters during the tournament and take further steps to simultaneously provide reassurance to both local communities and visiting supporters that the risk is being addressed by preventative action and, in parallel, by the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy towards any form of anti-social behaviour and crime and disorder.**

The delegation was informed that the Ministry of Interior had enhanced the Hungarian NFIP capacity by one additional officer in 2018 and intends to add one more in 2019. However, as the NFIP is required to lead on three core issues namely national co-ordination of spotters, deploying and receiving operational support and the secondment of two liaison officers in the IPCC operating from Europol HQ in The Hague during the tournament, whilst this must be seen as a positive development it is suggested that the relevant authorities may wish to consider if the enhanced resource will be sufficient to meet expected demand and whether further reinforcement is needed.

**Recommendation 6 – The relevant authorities should consider further investment in the NFIP capabilities.**

The delegation was advised that police deployment and operational decisions will be based on ongoing dynamic risk assessments and graded deployment, commencing in normal uniform with protective equipment only used where necessary. This approach is welcome, though European experience evidences that such an approach will need to be accompanied by the police adopting a policy of early and proportionate targeted police intervention to prevent the escalation of minor incidents and marginalise the influence of any supporters seeking or trying to provoke confrontation.

**Recommendation 7 - In accordance with European good practice, during UEFA EURO 2020 policing tactics, profile and uniform should be determined on the basis of: ongoing dynamic risk analysis, graded deployment, with protective equipment used only where necessary and early targeted and proportionate interventions to prevent the escalation of risk.**

The importance of the police liaising with supporters cannot be underestimated. Extensive European experiences at a series of major football tournaments over the last two decades has established that encouraging police personnel to adopt a welcoming and friendly approach towards supporters can be an extremely effective policing tactic. It is recognised that adopting such a policy can pose challenges and frustrations for the personnel concerned, especially if this is not routine procedure, and when having to manage a diverse assortment of visiting supporters with different cultures and speaking a variety of languages.

It was reassuring, therefore, to learn that the authorities will invest in the training of the police personnel in the basic usage of foreign languages, in particular English which is widely used and understood by European supporters, and that multi-lingual police officers are being identified for crowd management activities. This is a highly positive and welcoming approach.

**Recommendation 8 - Police units to be deployed during UEFA EURO 2020 should be encouraged to proactively interact with and adopt a welcoming and friendly manner towards supporters.**

## **C.8 International Police Co-operation**

There should be comprehensive international police co-operation arrangements put in place and the proactive use of police officers to establish effective dialogue with visiting supporters.

The challenges arising from language and cultural differences among visiting supporters reinforces the need for host policing operations to liaise and interact with visiting police delegations who will have a better understanding and be more experienced and expert in the character and behaviour of supporters from their respective countries.

Host country police and public authorities should be aware of the important role that these delegations can and do play in connection with international football events and should display a commitment to invite such delegations to support UEFA EURO 2020 policing operations.

A European model agreement which provides a basis for negotiating bilateral protocols on governmental and police co-operation, including visiting police delegation arrangements, is provided at **Appendix A**.

**Recommendation 9 - The relevant governmental authorities should use the European model agreement as a basis for negotiating bilateral protocols on governmental and police co-operation, including visiting police delegation arrangements.**

## **C.9 Counter Terrorism**

There will undoubtedly be challenges confronting UEFA EURO 2020 preparations in minimising the risk of terrorist incidents during the tournament.

Guidance on this is included in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee, on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events.

Authorities should be fully aware of the need for stadium security officers and sports event organisers to consult their national Counter Terrorism Police whenever seeking advice or assistance in respect of all counter terrorism matters.

# UEFA EURO 2020 - Safety

## C.10 Stadium Safety Arrangements

The arrangements for UEFA EURO 2020 should reflect the norm for major tournaments whereby the public authorities will be responsible for safety and security in public places with the organiser responsible for safety and security inside stadia and in official fan zones.

It wasn't made clear how venue stadium management who would prepare and manage the stadium under normal conditions would interact with UEFA during the period of the tournament and who would assume overall safety management responsibilities for spectators. Clearly whoever takes on this enormous responsibility must be competent in this area of work and be able to demonstrate that level of competence in the planning for the four matches. The safety management capabilities should be assessed against published criteria and accepted best practice with any deficiencies impacting upon the overall safe capacity of the stadium.

The practice of selling tickets ahead of understanding the level of competence of safety management teams and the resultant effect upon the overall safe capacity is fraught with danger. Until the final safe capacity is known it is unwise to sell tickets without a contingency plan for the intended safe capacity not being reached.

**Recommendation 10 – The relevant authorities should move quickly to determine a stadium operator who can begin to develop a stadium safety management structure and operating procedures.**

**Recommendation 11 – Clarity is required in respect of the safety certification arrangements at the National Stadium and the arrangements for determining the safe capacity of the stadium which should form part of the certificate.**

**Recommendation 12 - Clarity is required over who is legally responsible for the safety of spectators and, in particular, the role of the stadium safety officer and stadium safety management team when operating in UEFA EURO 2020 mode.**

**Recommendation 13 – In the case of a safety officer and safety management team being used which are not those normally the responsible persons within the venue, a thorough review of the competence of such people should be carried out by a competent authority and if any deficiencies are identified, appropriate amendments made to the safety management arrangements factor and, as a consequence, the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.**

**Recommendation 14 - The relevant authorities should prepare contingency plans for dealing with possible scenarios in which the number of match tickets sold exceeds the modified maximum safe capacity of the relevant stadia and its viewing sectors.**

When in use, the stadium will require large numbers of skilled and competent stewards to support the safety management plans and deliver the necessary levels of spectator safety. The training needed will take time to deliver over large numbers of stewards who will all be new to the stadium and need to understand the stadium layout. This is important as assistance to spectators will be necessary to deliver high levels of customer service and also in the event of emergency egress. Unfamiliarity of

the stadium will apply equally to spectators who will seek maximum assistance from fully trained stewards.

On appointment, the successful stadium operator should move swiftly to appoint a preferred stewarding provider who is able to provide stewards to the standard needed in the numbers required.

The delegation was informed that a first version of a Safety, Security and Service concept paper (SSNS) was submitted to UEFA for consideration and feedback is awaited.

**Recommendation 15 - Due to the large numbers of stewards likely to be needed to demonstrate necessary standards of safety, this process and any training needed to equip stewards with the skills needed should commence immediately. Training, qualification and competence should be evaluated by a third party to ensure the necessary levels of safety management are achieved. Concerns in any of the above areas should result in the appropriate alteration of the stadium management S factor and a reduction in the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.**

**Recommendation 16 – To counter the effect of large numbers of stewards who will be new to the stadium, it is recommended that a series of ramped test events with increasing spectator numbers are arranged to allow familiarisation and for testing of systems and procedures at reduced capacity levels.**

**Recommendation 17 – The relevant authorities should share the SSNS concept paper with the delegation for comment.**

## C.11 Stadium Safety Management

The effectiveness of the stadium safety management arrangements determines whether or not participants and spectators can be provided with a safe, secure and welcoming environment within a stadium. One core principle of safety management centres on the efficacy of control room operations. European experience evidences the need for control room operating arrangements to ensure close and immediate contact between the stadium safety officer, the police and other agencies involved in delivering a safe event.

In the absence of a stadium safety management team appointment it is difficult to advise in this area. However, fundamental requirements would include clear and transparent lines of responsibilities between all key agencies with statements of intent where the potential for overlap may occur, for example in the handover of control from safety management to police following a significant incident.

Clear lines of management communication must also be in place between safety management and any stewarding or security firms employed to help deliver the safety management of the stadium.

Statements of intent are not generally legally binding documents but rather a management document of record that both parties have committed themselves to abiding by specific areas of operational responsibility such as who is in charge of measures to monitor and control crowd movement and who should take decisions to open or close gates or turnstiles. It could also include the circumstances in which the police shall take control of all or part of the stadium along with the formal procedures for handing over responsibility to the police and for the eventual return of control.

**Recommendation 18 – The relevant authorities should develop and promote system of "statements of intent" setting out the roles and responsibilities of safety management personnel and the police, and the arrangements for transferring overall responsibility to the police in the event of an incident.**

The safety management team should develop contingency plans in conjunction with partner agencies setting out the response to all exceptional or emergency situations inside the stadium including but not limited to specific risks such as public disorder and emergency safety scenarios. It is further recommended that once determined the contingency arrangements should be tested in multi-agency table-top exercises.

**Recommendation 19 – Stadium safety management should work closely with the police and other emergency services in developing comprehensive multi-agency stadium contingency plans.**

**Recommendation 20 – Once developed, the contingency plans in each stadium should be tested in multi-agency table-top exercises designed to identify any gaps in the contingency arrangements. Such exercises should involve all parties involved in the delivery of the event and incorporate a selection of differing scenarios which could occur either before, during or after a match.**

## **C.12 Entry and Searching Arrangements**

The physical extent of responsibility of stadium safety management was not known at the time of the visit. In many countries, the limit of responsibility is determined by the boundaries set and recorded within the safety certificate. This would usually extend to the legal boundary of ownership of the site where thereafter responsibility would rest with the appropriate authorities (i.e. local authority and police).

This issue is particularly relevant where outer cordons are erected on private land within the curtilage of the club site to facilitate ticket checks and searching and raises questions regarding who would control searching and entry at these outer perimeters. It is also linked with concerns over the primacy of responsibility between the safety management team and public authorities and the need for documented procedures designed to remove any ambiguity.

In this regard it should be ensured that an adequate number of entry and exit points are provided at the outer cordon to more than meet the expected flow of spectators and the aggregated entry and exit widths of the venue. Entry and exit points should be clearly signed and evenly distributed around the venue. The structure forming the outer cordon should also be of robust construction and be able to withstand expected crowd pressures. To ease pressure at the outer cordon, adequate, well-lit signage, in appropriate languages for the event, should be located en-route to the stadium setting out prohibited items and stadium rules.

It should be recognised that flow rates of entry to the stadium will be significantly impaired by any significant outer cordon searching process. This should be recognised in evaluating the maximum safe capacity. It should also be recognised that entry delays caused by the imposition of strict searching regimes can generate frustration and anger among spectators and heighten safety risks. This is a concern because safety should always be the top priority.



To overcome this scenario, turnstiles should open well ahead of kick-off. This suggestion for spectators to arrive early is only likely to be achieved if there is an incentive, such as pre-match entertainment and activities.

Good channels of communication with all visiting supporters in advance of the tournament to inform of potential stringent searching regime on entry into the stadium is essential and is designed both to provide good customer care and to protect the safety and security of spectators.

Nevertheless, the possibility of well-intentioned and appropriate security measures creating congestion and therefore generating a major safety risk cannot be ruled out and the aforementioned contingency arrangements should cover such a scenario and make clear who has lead responsibility in determining whether or not searching regimes should be relaxed.

**Recommendation 21 - The relevant authorities should:**

- (i) review and determine the appropriate pre-entry searching regime to be applied during the tournament and the measures required to mitigate entry delays (e.g., effective signage en-route to the stadia, explanatory communications to visiting supporters, pre-match entertainment etc.);**
- (ii) consider the response to be adopted should delays on entry generate safety risks;**
- (iii) once the arrangements have been reviewed, the outcome should feature in stadium contingency plans designating responsibility for determining whether or not to weaken security checks in the event of an emerging safety scenario;**
- (iv) as with other contingency plans, the arrangements should be subject to a multi-agency table-top exercise.**

### **C.13 Electronic Entry System**

It is uncertain at this point if the palm recognition entry system demonstrated during the visit to the Groupama Arena will be utilised at the National Stadium. If so, it would be expected that the introduction would help facilitate speedy entry to the stadium thus helping reduce potential queuing. Contingency plans should be in place for system malfunction and potential consequences arising.

It is anticipated that the stadium will be well equipped with modern entry features and provide spectators with high standards of facilities designed to enhance the customer experience.

**Recommendation 22 – If, as anticipated, electronic entry systems are installed, stadium management should develop a robust backup system for use in case of a systems failure.**



## UEFA EURO 2020 - Service

European experience evidences that adopting a service ethos can play an essential role in reducing safety and security risks in connection with football tournaments. Providing visiting supporters and local communities with a respectful, friendly and welcoming atmosphere can have a major and positive impact on risk levels through marginalising the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation or acting in an unacceptably provocative or anti-social manner and generating a high degree of self-management of behaviour among supporters.

It is considered imperative, therefore, for a service-focused approach to be adopted by all agencies involved in providing a safe and secure environment inside and outside of stadia. It can also help foster enhanced co-operation between public and private authorities responsible for managing football-related events.

In essence, a service approach is complementary to both effective crowd management and the implementation of an effective exclusion strategy and, as such, is integral to the development of a wider integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service. This applies equally to routine national and international football events and major tournaments like UEFA EURO 2020.

The delegation did observe that the Hungarian Football Association is aware of the importance of the service pillar and is attempting to build some good practices which could be applied to the UEFA EURO 2020.

An example was the brochure prepared for visiting supporters by the HFA for the match between the Hungarian national team and Estonia which could be developed for use in the UEFA EURO 2020 tournament.

The brochure written in English contained accurate information not only in relation to the game (venue, time of the match, tickets, stadium rules, etc.), but also useful information such as emergency numbers, means of transport, maps, etc. that may be needed by away supporters.

**Recommendation 23 - The relevant authorities should provide all visiting supporters with clear, useful and easily accessible information written both in English and in the language of the visiting supporters.**

The distance from the Airport to the “Puskas Ferenc” Stadium is about 25 km. The transport takes around one hour by bus shuttle but will take considerably longer during peak periods. This transfer time could be a challenge for the organizers to ensure a smooth transport system for the visiting fans from the airport to the city centre and the match venue.

**Recommendation 24 - An effective transport policy should be developed to support spectators movement within the country during the UEFA EURO 2020 matches.**

### C.14 Racism and other Discrimination

In the National Report provided by Hungarian authorities prior to the T-RV visit, no reference was included regarding any special measures that would be adopted during the tournament for preventing and tackling racist and other forms of discriminatory behavior.

Having met with representatives of the supporter groups, it was clear that there is disagreement between the groups and the measures to tackle the issues coming from the Hungarian Football Association and UEFA, in particular in relation to the display of certain symbols and displays.

The supporter groups position is based upon the premise that as football raises high levels of emotion, any restriction could cause major crowd problems and that the display of these emotions should be punished lightly or preferably not at all.

There was an opinion expressed that authorities regard the supporter groups views to be extreme right wing due to the symbols and displays used and that they are stereotyped as racist and suffer as a consequence.

The delegation in response informed the group that racism in whatever form will not be tolerated and the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events (hereafter «the Recommendation»), in Annex C, paragraphs 49 to 52, sets out clearly that stadium authorities have a clear role to play in terms of refusing entry to persons, who display or carry with them racist or other discriminatory leaflets, symbols or banners.

**Recommendation 25 – The relevant authorities should put measures in place to refuse entry into the stadium for spectators who display or carry with them racist or other discriminatory leaflets, symbols or banners and that the relevant authorities continue to apply zero tolerance in respect of any kind of discrimination inside the stadium, fan zones and public spaces during UEFA EURO 2020 and beyond.**

## C.15 Pyrotechnics

The representatives of the supporter groups explained that pyrotechnics are a part of the Hungarian culture of football fans, and that this is also true of other European countries. They claim that pyrotechnics create a better and livelier atmosphere, and show their passion and support for their team. The groups feel that pyrotechnics should not be banned but instead be allowed under controlled conditions.

The UEFA delegate informed of the work of its independent expert to research the use of pyrotechnics within sports stadia. The outcome of this work highlighted the danger of their uncontrolled use in sports stadia and is the justification behind the UEFA prohibition of pyrotechnics within football stadia.

UEFA in spreading its message has always taken the initiative to attempt to educate and communicate with fans throughout Europe to inform of the outcome of the research and highlight the dangers.

**Recommendation 26 – The relevant authorities should take preventative measures to attempt to prevent the use of pyrotechnics in the stadium during UEFA EURO 2020 matches.**

## C.16 Inclusiveness

The importance of meeting the needs of disabled supporters should be paramount in the planning for the matches in UEFA EURO 2020 both within the stadium and also in the fan zones.

The delegation was informed that reasonable provision for spectators with differing forms of disability would be provided with the new stadium.

## C.17 Community Engagement

Whilst there is an understandable focus on providing a safe and welcoming environment for visiting supporters during the tournament, which is key to delivering a successful tournament, the opportunity must not be lost to engage and inspire local communities and encourage as many as possible to participate in the festivities. The aim is to use the event to provide reassurance and promote enhanced social cohesion and integration.

It should be recognized, however, that not all residents within the city will welcome the influx of large numbers of football supporters into their community. It is important, therefore, that steps are taken to provide reassurance and to protect the quality of life of local residents.

**Recommendation 27 - The relevant authorities should ensure that the needs of local communities are taken fully into account in the planning and delivery of the tournament with associated events and initiatives designed and delivered to provide all local communities with reassurance and encouragement to participate in the festivities.**

## C.18 Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs)

The delegation was informed that the Hungarian Football Association has implemented the UEFA requirement on football clubs competing in UEFA competitions to appoint a SLO in accordance with Article 35 of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations. The role however remains at the developmental stage.

A localized version of the UEFA SLO handbook has been developed and a training event for club SLOs was held in December 2018. The HFA has not developed the SLO role at national team level but is considering doing so. There is, however, no dedicated contact for the ultras group following the men's senior national team.

The delegation informed of the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee paragraphs 43 to 45, which identifies the benefits of the SLO representative.

The SLO can act as a bridge between a club and its supporters in order to help improve communication between both parties, can provide a link with other parties involved in football, including the police and can encourage self-regulation by supporters.

The SLO can also help promote respect and tolerance for other supporters and for minorities who attend football matches.

**Recommendation 28 – The relevant authorities should develop and introduce the role of the SLO to operate at national team level and to be active within the UEFA EURO 2020 tournament.**

**Recommendation 29 – HFF should appoint a local SLO team made up of club SLOs to assist during the UEFA EURO 2020 tournament.**

## C.19 Communication and Media Strategy

The Recommendation, in its paragraphs 66 and 67, stresses the importance of developing a multi-agency communication and media handling strategy.

A key feature and purpose of such a strategy is to facilitate the dissemination of information to supporters and to local communities. A comprehensive approach should also commit to engagement with supporter groups in order to provide clear messages and receive feedback from fans.

The benefits in the use of the social network in order to disseminate information should also be considered.

**Recommendation 30 – The relevant authorities should develop a communication and media strategy that comprises not only information addressed to the mass media, but also dissemination and receipt of information to supporters and the local community. It is also recommended that this media centre is situated within the stadium.**

It is important to identify the language skills needed by key personnel to enable clear and effective communication during the tournament. The delegation was informed that, currently, reliance is on police officers who can speak different languages.

**Recommendation 31 – The relevant authorities should invest in language training for key personnel to help ensure that spectators attending the tournament are able to communicate with the various agencies and enjoy a safe event.**

## C.20 Fan Zones

The delegation did not visit the sites where the official fan zones for the tournament will be created. Consideration of the best practices regarding setting up and running fan zones in public areas of the city should be given.

Whilst the creation of fan zones is now seen as an expected extension of the tournament, it is essential that due consideration is given to the safety and security of spectators using these areas.

**Recommendation 32 – Appropriate levels of safety and security should be provided to fan zone sites which is proportionate to the risk identified at the time of the tournament.**

It should be noted that European experience evidences that some visiting supporters may prefer to gather spontaneously in town or city centres rather than attend official fan zone sites.

Likely areas can usually be anticipated which can allow for the authorities to make safety and security preparations for such an eventuality. Supporters should not be forced to frequent official fan zones, nor should they be deprived of enjoying the host city. It should not be assumed that supporters who prefer not to take advantage of the official fan zones are acting in a threatening or provocative manner.

It is good practice to engage and work closely with, and to provide reassurance to resident and business communities located in the areas in which supporters can be expected to gather.

The relevant authorities should develop the successful model of “fan embassies” to support fans in their visit to the country.

**Recommendation 33 – The relevant authorities in the host city should identify locations where visiting supporters may spontaneously and innocently gather to enjoy the atmosphere and the city. Once identified, appropriate safety and security preparations should be developed. To cater for the possibility of rival supporters gathering in close proximity, alternative back-up locations should be identified to provide separate areas for rival supporters to gather to help manage any risks.**

**In relation to open public viewing areas, extensive guidance and good practices on the preparatory and operating arrangements on large scale public viewing areas is set out in the Recommendation (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee .**

**Recommendation 34 - The relevant authorities should take account of the good practice contained in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee in developing plans for organised and spontaneous fan areas and public viewing from fan zones.**

## Section D Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events - Compliance with Policy Articles

### Article 1 - Scope of the Convention

*Intent* - The aim of Article 1 is for each State which ratifies the Convention (hereafter described as "States") to designate football and (where appropriate) other sports events covered by its Articles, preferably within its legislative or regulatory framework.

*Compliance* - During the visit, the delegation was informed that in respect of the safety, security and guarantee of services concerning sports events in Hungary (including football matches) the applicable regulation is Act I of 2004 on the Sports (Sports Law) and Government Decree 54/2004. (III. 31.) on the safety of sports events. Complementary provisions are included in the Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police (Rtv.) the Act on offences (Sztv.), the Act on sports (Stv.) and the Act on the Penal Code. The Sports Law and the Decree impose stricter safety requirements and actions for football, handball, volleyball, water polo and ice hockey matches specified in the Decree.

**Recommendation 35 - The relevant authorities should consider if the grouping of types of sports mentioned in the Gov. Decree 54/2004 is sufficient and adequate or whether a more specific and comprehensive reference to all sports would be more effective. Also that current legislation specifies that all professional football matches played in Hungary are subject to the articles of the Convention.**

### Article 2 - Aims of Convention

*Intent* - Articles 2a and 2b oblige States to adopt, apply and promote awareness of the need for an integrated multi-agency and balanced approach to safety and security operations inside and outside of stadia. Article 2c requires that, in so doing, States should take full account of the established good practices set out in the Recommendation (2015)1.

*Compliance* - The delegation acknowledges that an incipient integrated approach to safety and security operations is in place in Hungary. During the discussions all stakeholders seem to be aware of the principles of the integrated approach. Whilst the police has a leading role, special attention should be paid to other stakeholders to ensure that a balanced approach is in place with parties having a contribution for this common objective.

## Article 3 – Definition of Terminology used in the Convention

*Intent* - The aim of Article 3 is to encourage European-wide usage of established safety and security terminology.

*Compliance* - The terminology used across Europe to describe safety and security functions and personnel varies widely and is often subject to national circumstances and linguistic barriers.

Clear distinction was made in the National Report in relation to safety, security and service concepts. Specific mention of this is made in “The Strategy of Hungarian Football 2010 to 2020”, a strategic document issued by the HFA.

The delegation was not provided with the English version of the legislative framework in Hungary, so no assessment of this issue was possible.

**Recommendation 36 - The relevant legal framework should incorporate the definitions set out in Article 3 of the Convention. Also that the SSNS Concept paper currently being prepared by Hungarian authorities for UEFA EURO 2020 reflects the terminology used in the Convention, and in particular provide clarity around the roles of stewards and private security.** (status: [desirable](#))

## Article 4 – Domestic Co-ordination Arrangements

*Intent* - The aim of Article 4 (1-4) is to oblige States to establish national and local multi-agency safety and security co-ordination arrangements to ensure the development and nationwide application of a comprehensive and integrated strategy. Article 4.5 requires States to undertake a comprehensive legislative review aimed at ensuring legal clarity in respect of the roles and responsibilities of public and private agencies engaged in making football events safe and secure.

*Compliance* - The expectation is that national co-ordination will be government-led, while responsibility for local co-ordination will be vested in a designated municipal or regional authority.

### National Co-ordination

The delegation was informed that, at a national level, the coordination is realised under the umbrella of the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events, which is formed of professionals delegated by the National Police Headquarters, disaster management, the National Ambulance Service, the president of the National Office for the Judiciary, the Minister in charge of sports policy and the national associations of the individual sports. The lead of this body is provided by the National Police representative.

Although the national view is that this body is responsible for national coordination, evidence given to and seen by the delegation does not support this view. The main function of the Committee is to “decide, pursuant to the provisions of the Sports Law, on the classification, rating of matches in the sports of football, handball, basketball, water polo and ice hockey according the security risk”.

This process and procedure is quite unique within Europe, as best practices recommend that the risk assessment should be done at the local level by the relevant stakeholders and should be regularly updated taking into consideration all the evolving risks associated with the sporting events. Also for



this task the NFIP should be one of the relevant and well equipped players in order to gather, analyse and share the relevant information from the local spotters which is most useful for the local risk assessment.

The delegation was informed that the Committee meets once a month and decides on the level of risk for the upcoming matches based mostly on the risk assessment provided by the police and historical background of incidents linked to the fans of the teams involved. The delegation was informed that the level of risk can be updated, but this is very rarely the case (in the previous season, 97% of the matches were categorized as low risk, 2.20% medium and 0.80% as high risk).

Dynamic risk assessment is an essential part of the safety and security arrangements for sporting events and special attention should be provided by the relevant authorities to this process. It is very difficult to accurately address this issue at a strategic level when so much of the influence occurs at local level. The delegation is not convinced that the strategic Committee forum is the most effective or safest way to determine risk levels for all matches in Hungary and that more value would be obtained by involving the local authorities in the process.

During the discussions, the delegation was informed that no national strategy is currently in place, but some references are included in the HFA's "Strategy of Hungarian Football 2010 to 2020".

HFA, via their security department (staffed by 7 persons), seems to be one of the sources of expertise in this field and it is one of the driving forces that is pushing for the adoption of the European best practices. This is a positive aspect but it is imperative that the national strategy is government-led in order to be mandatory for all the stakeholders and impose national standards and actions.

**Recommendation 37 - The relevant authorities should review the role and responsibilities of the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events and realign its direction to become a government-led national co-ordination group tasked to develop and deliver national strategies. This would include promoting an integrated multi-agency approach to safety, security and service in connection with sport events.**

**Operational issues like the level of risk for sporting events should be devolved to local level.** (status: **essential**)

**Recommendation 38 - The Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events should draft and agree a national multi-agency strategy document setting out the key components of an integrated approach to safety, security and service.** (status: **essential**)

### **Local Co-ordination**

The national co-ordination group should consider designating a local or regional public authority with responsibility for establishing a multi-agency co-ordination group tasked to:

- a) coordinate and oversee multi-agency preparations for football events held in their locality; and
- b) ensure that the principles and content of the national strategy is adopted and applied.

The aim is to ensure a consistent approach in respect of all professional football and other sporting events played in Hungary.

It will be for the national co-ordination group to determine the structure, role, membership and *modus operandi* of the local co-ordination process.



**Recommendation 39 - The national co-ordination group should:**

- i) designate municipal or regional authorities to establish local multi-agency groups which should include a professional person with sports grounds safety technical qualifications and skills, tasked to oversee and co-ordinate preparations for football events held in their locality; and
- ii) provide guidance on the structure, role and membership of such groups, taking into account established European good practice. (status: *desirable*)

**Article 5 - Safety, Security and Service in Stadia**

Article 5 is the most demanding and explicit component of the Convention. Current compliance with each element is therefore considered separately below. However, the primary purpose of the Article is to oblige States to ensure that the measures necessary are in place for achieving the ultimate goal of providing a safe, secure and welcoming environment within football stadia.

The delegation was informed that the police have lead responsibility for safety and security inside football stadia only in the case of high-risk matches. In all other cases, the overall responsibility lies with the event organiser and its safety management team. However, it was not clear to the delegation if there is in place a defined protocol that establishes the specific responsibilities and roles of the police and stadium operators.

The Groupama Arena has two separate control rooms – one exclusively for the police (no direct view to the ground) and one including all the stakeholders (direct view to the ground and the technical facilities in place – CCTV, PA system, electronic access system etc.).

**Recommendation 40 - The national co-ordination group should make provision ensuring that the in-stadia role of the police and other public authorities is clear, both in law and operating arrangements, and widely understood by all safety and security practitioners.** (status: *essential*)

**Stadium Safety Certification**

*Intent* - Article 5 of the Convention highlights, amongst other things, the importance of each State having in place effective stadium safety certification arrangements, management of the use of pyrotechnic devices and also that stadia should create an inclusive and welcoming environment for all.

*Compliance* - To achieve these crucial objectives, attention is drawn to the importance of the parties in ensuring that effective stadium licensing and safety certification arrangements are in place and applied. The character of these arrangements is not prescribed but the onus is placed on the Parties to monitor their effectiveness and, in so doing, ensure that stadiums design, construction and crowd management arrangements are in compliance with national and international standards and good practices.

Paragraph 5 concerns stadia operating arrangements and encourages development of clear policies and procedures on matters of particular impact for the crowd management including the use of pyrotechnics, violent behaviour, and racist or other discriminatory behaviour.

Any policies developed in support of Article 5 should ensure effective liaison between the police, emergency services and the other partner agencies involved. Paragraph 5 focuses on three major risks,

and is not overly descriptive on purpose, given that the parties also have to ensure that strategies are developed for dealing with other in-stadiums risks.

The Convention envisages that responsibility for safety within a stadium rests with the organiser of the event. However, in many States, national or local circumstances dictate that this is neither practicable nor desirable. In some States, the stadium owner or lessee will be better placed to assume this responsibility, whilst in others responsibility rests with the Ministries of Interior and Emergency Situations.

The key factor is that roles and responsibilities are clarified in the legal framework and that the individuals involved are all trained and assessed as competent to deliver their roles and responsibilities effectively.

In terms of stadium safety certification, the key body appears to be the National Directorate General for Disaster Management/Ministry of the Interior (OKF), who are involved in the security technology inspection of sports facilities to ensure suitability for organised competitions.

The delegation was unable to ascertain the role of OFK and whether it has the skills and qualifications to take account of both the safety management arrangements and also structural elements of a stadium to factor in to the determination of the safe capacity.

However, there is confusion as the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events establishes the general framework for the certification and licencing processes. The police representatives are involved in this procedure, and during the discussions it was mentioned that they are one of the parties that sign the safety certificate for the sport arenas. This issue should be carefully reviewed by the Hungarian authorities, as the police representatives usually don't have the qualification and the training for assessing the technical and safety elements of a sport arena and, consequently, cannot assume the responsibility for signing a safety certificate.

The safety certificate is issued by the relevant sport federation after receiving the report from a commission which verifies on site all the 20 criteria necessary for obtaining this document.

**Recommendation 41 - It is recommended that the relevant authorities review the current safety certification system to ensure that the process allows for suitably qualified bodies and individuals to engage in the process, to ensure that both physical and safety management perspectives are considered in the setting of the safe capacity of a stadium. (status: important)**

### Accessibility

Paragraph 4 highlights the need for stadia to provide an accessible environment for all. There are many organisations and best practice documents available to assist in delivering this objective, which the relevant authorities should look to adopt.

**Recommendation 42 – It is recommended that the relevant authorities give consideration to adoption of UEFA/CAFE and the IPC standards listed below and that all existing sporting venues carry out an accessibility audit to enable development of an action plan for improvements to increase diversity and equality. (status: important)**

#### a) UEFA/CAFE Standard

<https://www.cafefootball.eu/en/access-all>

**b) International Paralympic Committee (IPC)**

**Standard**[https://www.paralympic.org/sites/default/files/document/130902143349868\\_IPC+Accessibility+Guide\\_2nd+EDITION\\_FINAL.pdf](https://www.paralympic.org/sites/default/files/document/130902143349868_IPC+Accessibility+Guide_2nd+EDITION_FINAL.pdf)

## **Pyrotechnics**

The use of pyrotechnic devices in Hungarian stadia is common and has support from many sections of spectators. The HFA recognises the dangers of such illegal use and is working with UEFA to develop a better understanding of the issues and an effective solution to the problem.

**Recommendation 43 – It is recommended that the relevant authorities should take preventative measures to attempt to remove the use of pyrotechnics in sports stadia.** (status: **important**)

## **Racism and antidiscrimination**

Similarly, legislation should be used to provide a solid basis on which sanctions can be taken against any form of racist, xenophobic or other discriminatory behaviour in sports stadia in Hungary. Preventative measures founded upon education should also be set in place to support.

**Recommendation 44 – It is recommended that the relevant authorities make use of legislation and develop contingency plans to tackle any racist or discriminatory behaviour in sports stadia. Also to recognise the importance of education in helping solve this issue by developing educational programs of awareness.** (status: **important**)

## **Stadium Safety Officers**

*Intent* - Article 5(6) of the Convention requires each State to ensure that stadium safety and security personnel are trained and equipped to undertake all of their activities effectively.

*Compliance* - The stadium safety officer is a key person who should be competent, trained and responsible for safety management issues and whose role is fundamental to an integrated approach to safety management.

The delegation met with various stadium representatives from the domestic Hungarian Premier League, including Ferencvaros, Ujpest, DVTK and Dyosgyor. It was reported that each football club appoints a safety officer/representative who directs the security staff and is obliged to co-operate directly with the police and other stakeholders. In the case of high risk matches, overall command is assumed by the police, whose payment for services is met by the organizing club.

During the Hungary vs Estonia match, the delegation observed a very good level of co-operation between the police match commander and the safety officer. However, the delegation was informed that no special training scheme is in place for the safety officers, which is very important as they are responsible for the safety management of thousands of people on match day.

Also of concern is the practice of importing a substitute safety officer into a venue already operating with an established safety team whenever international matches are played, as happened for the Hungary vs Estonia match. Concern was expressed by the delegation of the risks in bringing in a safety management team who are infrequent users of the stadium and of the potential for capacity reductions to be sanctioned to acknowledge this fact.

The team considers that further thought should be given to the position and status of the safety officer. In order to discharge properly their responsibilities, a safety officer must be given a detailed job description which clearly sets out the functions of their post.

**Recommendation 45 - The delegation recommends the Club Safety Officer/representative is provided with a detailed job description which clearly sets out the functions of their post. The Recommendation, in its Annex A – Safety, and its good practices may be used to compile a checklist of functions necessary for the role. (status: important)**

**Recommendation 46 - The relevant authorities should set the minimum areas of competence to be demonstrated by such safety officers, supervisors and safety stewards, taking into account both the core functions of each group and the variety of roles that they may perform, having regard to the check-lists in the Annex D of the Recommendation, on this subject (See <https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1> Appendices 33) and the checklist <https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168073d177>. (status: important)**

**Recommendation 47 - The delegation also recommends the Hungarian authorities to identify and implement systems for ensuring the provision of adequate and appropriate training at both the theoretical and practical level for such safety officers, supervisors and safety stewards and establish, document and monitor procedures for ensuring that those who have been trained are then assessed as being competent to perform their allocated tasks. (See <https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1> Appendices 33). (status: important)**

**Recommendation 48 – The delegation recommends that a national network be established to enable stadium Safety Officers to share information along with sharing expertise and good practises. (ESSMA, the European Stadium & Safety Management Association is the European network for this practice <http://www.essma.eu/>). (status: desirable)**

## Stadium Stewards

Specific provisions about the stewarding system are included in the Hungarian 2004 Act. During the visit, the delegation was informed that a training program for stewards was put in place by the HFF, following an UEFA “train the trainer” seminar in 2018. In the course of the discussions, it was mentioned by the Hungarian counterparts that, in order to become a steward, first you need to be trained as a security guard and then a more specific stewarding training. Due to the lack of time, no further exploring of the training curricula for stewards was possible during the visit in order to see the compliance with the integrated approach and key principles of safety management.

During the visit to the match, the stewarding operation put in place by the HFF seemed to be well coordinated, the stewards were performing their duties properly and provided a welcoming environment for the spectators attending. There is clear emphasis on the service and customer care side of the stewarding role.

**Recommendation 49 - The delegation recommends that a document or stewarding plan is developed for each event which contains the respective roles and responsibilities of the police, stewards, volunteers, security companies, along with the competence expected of each practitioner. (see <https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1> Appendices 41). (status: important)**

## Article 6 - Safety, Security and Service in Public Places

*Intent* - The aim of Article 6 is to build upon the obligation in Article 4 regarding local multi-agency co-ordination through encouraging all agencies and stakeholders involved in football related activity (organised or spontaneous) in public spaces (city centres, transit routes, etc.) to co-operate in assessing risk and preparing appropriate preventative measures designed to create a safe, secure and welcoming environment whilst minimising disruption and providing reassurance to local communities.

*Compliance* - The delegation did not have the opportunity to observe football-related operations in public places during the visit. During the discussions, it was acknowledged that the police and other public authorities have primary responsibility for securing events in public places.

The Hungarian authorities explained that within their strategy there is an integrated approach involving supporters in the preparation for the events. The authorities expressed their willingness to co-operate with the supporters and discuss topics that directly affect the fans.

**Recommendation 50 – The relevant authorities should take advantage of the spirit of willingness for dialogue and co-operate with supporters in an attempt to build up a working relationship founded upon mutual respect, understanding and partnership.** (status: *desirable*)

An effective transport policy, part of the service aspect provided for the supporters, should be developed in particular in relation to the forthcoming UEFA EURO 2020 matches.

Also, in the light of the previously mentioned major sporting events, serious consideration should be given to best practice regarding setting up and running fan zones in public areas of the city.

**Recommendation 51 - An effective transport policy, part of the service aspect provided for the supporters, should be developed, in particular in relation to the forthcoming UEFA EURO 2020 tournament and fan zones should be set up and run according to best practices.** (status: *desirable*)

## Article 7 – Contingency and Emergency Planning

*Intent* - The aim of Article 7 is to ensure that stadium multi-agency contingency plans (prepared by the stadium operator) and local emergency plans (prepared by the relevant public authorities) are complementary and tested in regular joint exercises.

*Compliance* - History evidences that the lack of or misunderstanding of contingency and emergency plans was a major contributory factor in many European disasters in connection with football matches. The need for proper planning and the development of contingency and emergency plans is vital at all times and should take account of the current increased level of terrorist threat to sporting events.

The delegation was informed that the OFK regularly undertakes on-site inspections regarding the safety elements and issues recommendations and, where necessary, imposes fines.

In terms of stadium emergencies, an important role for the proposed designated stadium safety officer should be to develop and maintain a record of the contingency plans to be applied when dealing with

all types of emergencies and unexpected scenarios, both inside the stadium and also within the immediate adjacent vicinity, including emergency evacuation arrangements.

Such plans would need to be prepared in consultation with the police, fire and rescue, medical services, and counter terrorism advisers, and take full account of municipal emergency plans for dealing with emergencies in public places that impact upon stadium facilities and/or operations.

**Recommendation 52 - The national co-ordination group should review the current arrangements for preparing and testing comprehensive multi-agency stadium contingency and public authority emergency plans for incidents at or nearby stadia hosting football events.**

[status: [desirable](#)]

## Article 8 - Engagement with Supporters and Local Communities

*Intent* - The aim of Article 8.1 is to highlight the importance of encouraging all national and local agencies engaged in football-related planning and operations to communicate effectively with supporters, resident communities in host cities and territories and other stakeholders. Article 8.2 extends beyond event-related communication and falls under the generic umbrella of community development.

It commits States to encouraging public and private agencies and other stakeholders to initiate or participate in multi-agency social, educational, crime prevention and other community projects designed to foster mutual respect and understanding, especially among supporters, football and other sports clubs, local communities and agencies responsible for safety and security.

*Compliance* - The HFA informed the delegation that it has implemented the SLO concept for the clubs in the first league. However it was clear from discussion that SLO's are not in place for all the clubs, some of them undertake other roles in the club and some of the ultras groups don't recognize the SLO as being a reliable partner.

No SLO training program is in place, so further investment in this should be granted by the HFA and the clubs with the help of SD Europe and by this contributing to raising the awareness for the important role that the SLO is playing in facilitating the engagement with the fans.

During the match observation, the delegation was informed by the Ferencvaros safety officer that the club has implemented a new access system into the stadium for their fans based on a pre-registered fan ID and hand recognition system placed at the turnstiles. The system was not used for the national team match.

After investing a considerable amount of money into this system designed to cover all the sections of the stadium, following protests from the ultras of the club, the management of Ferencvaros football club decided to cancel this obligation for the ultras section. This action confirms statements of some fan representatives that parts of the stadium (i.e. ultras sections) are no go areas for regular fans.

This also points to the fact that the exclusion strategy is not functioning properly and permits risk fans to assert the power in those areas with negative consequences for the clubs and the authorities.

The supporter representatives also mentioned their request that the use of pyrotechnics becomes permitted to all sporting events in Hungary. The delegation informed them about the results of the



scientific study of Dr. Tom Smith and the dangers associated with the use of pyrotechnics inside sports stadia. UEFA informed that a session of the pyrotechnics masterclass will take place in Budapest in January 2019.

The delegation supports a policy of pro-active and regular communication with key stakeholders, including supporter representatives and local communities, which should be part of the medium term Hungarian strategy with the aim to create partnerships and positive co-operation.

The national co-ordination group should liaise closely with the police, HFA, football leagues, SD Europe, national and local supporter groups and other relevant stakeholders in developing a more effective supporter liaison strategy.

The outcome of this initiative should be to oblige all public and football authorities to develop and implement comprehensive and effective supporter liaison strategies in accordance with European good practices.

Importantly, these strategies should aim to encourage a sense of inclusion and consultation among supporters generally, whilst marginalising the influence of risk groups and their organisers and ensuring that ultra areas in stadia are subject to effective stadium safety management arrangements and constraints.

In developing fan liaison strategies, full account should be taken of the good practice options set out in the Recommendation Rec (2015)1, namely in its Annex C on Service.

**Recommendation 53 - The national co-ordination group should encourage all stakeholders to review and expand their supporter liaison activities (with the objective that every club will eventually have its own Supporter Liaison Officer (SLO) and review the current SLO arrangements to ensure compliance with the role and remit set out in the UEFA SLO Handbook, taking into account the observations and suggestions of SD Europe and good practices set out in Rec (2015) 1, Annex C.** (status: **important**)

European experience demonstrates the importance of developing and implementing a range of social and preventative community engagement projects designed to lure young supporters away from negative fan behaviour, not least through promoting a culture of tolerance and respect for others, irrespective of team supported and other manifestations of diversity.

**Recommendation 54 - The national co-ordination group should encourage all stakeholders particularly football clubs and national governing bodies, to consider the scope for developing preventative, social and educational projects connected with football events at both national and local level.** (status: **desirable**)

## Article 9 – Police Strategies and Operations

*Intent* - The aim of Article 9 is to encourage the adoption of established good practice in respect of policing strategies and operations in public places and within stadia.

*Compliance* - The police deployment observed during the match was proportionate, providing support to the stewarding operation. Police were not visible, but positioned ready to intervene if necessary. In the police command room, direct link to all of the public city CCTV cameras contributed to the overall perspective for the match commander.

The delegation observed the activity of the dialogue police teams before the match. They provided assistance to the fans, while being equipped in special vests and civil clothes. They are internally recruited from all the police departments and they must have special dialogue and interaction skills in order to be nominated to undertake this position. Special training is provided for them.

The delegation is of the view that policing strategies should be developed and refined following the implementation of a proper risk assessment process. At the core of this process are the police spotters, who must be trained and deployed on a regular basis to be effective.

It was felt that the risk assessment issued by the police was inadequate and not comprehensive in areas of relevance for the match commander to properly assess the risk which can impact upon the success of the mission. Dynamic risk assessment is also an essential element that needs to be taken into account in order to reach a balanced and well-informed decision. This is only possible with the significant contribution of the police spotters.

During the visit, it was not clear how many spotters are employed in Hungary with only general references made that one spotter is usually assigned at each police unit in Hungary.

The delegation feels that investment should be given by the relevant authorities to reinforce the spotters who are key figures in relation to the prevention and tackling of sport-related violence. A good risk assessment system can result in a more efficient deployment of police resources and can offer more solutions for police management at a lower cost.

**Recommendation 55 - The Ministry of Interior should ensure that those policing football operations take into account established good practice and are in compliance with the Convention's obligations and take full account of the key role played by the sports police.**  
(status: **important**)

The Ministry of Interior should encourage policing football operations to incorporate a strategic and tactical policy to:

- identify and target individuals and/or groups posing increased safety or security risks, with a view to early intervention to prevent escalation of risk;
- gather evidence against individuals causing or contributing to violence, disorder or other criminality or antisocial deeds;
- ensure that an appropriate number of designated police spotters are provided with necessary technical aids; and
- monitor the number of arrests and prosecutions in comparison with the number of incidents.

**Recommendation 56 - The Ministry of Interior should review current football policing operations with a view to adopting a strategic and tactical policy of identifying and gathering evidence in respect of individuals and/or groups posing increased safety or security risks.**  
(status: **important**)

The Ministry of Interior should liaise with the Council of Europe and its partners regarding the delivery of a national policing football training event for police trainers and key practitioners with a view to adapting the training to meet the needs of the Hungarian Police.

Thereafter, police academies and police training centres should incorporate the training into training programs to ensure that all police personnel (newly recruited and experienced) are aware of their role and duties in accordance with the European standards.



**Recommendation 57 - The Ministry of Interior should ensure that police personnel engaged in the preparations for, and operations during, football events receive appropriate and specialist training in European policing football good practices.** (status: **important**)

## Article 10 - Prevention and Sanctioning of Offending Behaviour

*Intent* - The aim of Article 10 is to oblige all States to review their existing arrangements for preventing and sanctioning persons who act in a violent or other criminal way in connection with football events, notably in respect of ensuring that individuals committing offences are subject to effective measures excluding them from the football experience.

*Compliance* - Extensive European practice and research shows that an essential part of any national strategy is developing and implementing an effective exclusion strategy designed to prevent violence and disorder in connection with football and other sports events. This should be developed in parallel with initiatives designed to empower non-risk supporters and the promotion of the “service” pillar.

During the discussions, the delegation was informed there are three different types of exclusion in place:

- exclusion - which is imposed by the National Association (sports body);
- ban - which is imposed by the police; and
- suspension / disqualification - which is imposed by the Courts.

Although this seems to be a very comprehensive and flexible system with multiple possibilities to issue a ban, the data for the last season mentioned that in 2017/18 there were a total of only 14 persons subject to these provisions:

- 9 Exclusions,
- 2 Bans and
- 3 Suspension / Disqualifications.

In accordance with the European standards, these are very low numbers and indicate a continuing and maybe comfortable reliance on the National Association rather than the judicial system to exclude offenders from the football experience. The Hungarian NFIP manages the banned persons database, after receiving the input from all of the above-mentioned issuing bodies.

European experience evidences the importance of effective exclusion in preventing and tackling football-related violence and facilitating stadium safety management arrangements.

Exclusion should be seen as a preventative measure rather than simply as a penalty for wrongdoing which is the function of sentencing on conviction of a criminal or administrative offence, and there are many varied exclusion options in place across Europe which enjoy different levels of success.

However the delegation is clear that the exclusion arrangements in terms of preventing and countering football-related criminality (irrespective of whether the offending behaviour occurs inside and outside of stadia) are ineffective and should be rectified, in order to provide tangible results, taking into account established good practice and consulting European experts in this area.

**Recommendation 58 - The national authorities should review the exclusion strategy as regards football and other sport-related violence, taking into account good practice enshrined in Appendix B, section O of the Recommendation Rec (2015)1. (status: *essential*)**

## Article 11 – International Co-operation

*Intent* - Article 11.1 and 11.5 set out a number of ways in which States are obliged to demonstrate a commitment to working in partnership on the international stage.

*Compliance* - The delegation encourages the continuation of the investment in the Hungarian NFIP. The adequate staffing, training and resourcing of this essential unit will definitely contribute to the decrease of the level of violence associated with sports events in Hungary.

The Ministry of Interior should ensure that the National Football Information Point (NFIP) is resourced and equipped to undertake effectively both the roles and tasks set out in article 11, paragraph 2 of the Convention CETS No. 218 and also play a key role in delivering the proposed comprehensive exclusion strategy.

Although the main task of the NFIP is international police cooperation and exchange of data regarding troublemakers at football matches, no NFIP can function effectively without an input of information provided by a national spotter network. Relevant European experience shows that the NFIP should coordinate the work of spotters at a national level and be responsible for their training.

During the visit, the delegation was informed that at least one police spotter is assigned to the football clubs in Hungary. The main problem is that they are not performing their tasks in a bespoke way, but are also required undertake other police functions outside match days.

This impacts on their capacity for gathering information and providing a dialogue link with police forces, potentially lessening the level of security for the sport events in that area.

Reference was made at the meeting with the fans representatives to a lack of developed working relationships with police spotters, confirming the problem and the need for further investment in this area.

The training of the police spotters should be a priority. In addition to creating strong liaison between the national network of spotters and the NFIP, it will ensure that the NFIP is provided with up to date and accurate information and intelligence, not least in respect of potential risks and risk supporters.

Training in best practice should be aimed not just at spotters and NFIP staff, but also police commanders (whether they act at Gold, Silver or Bronze levels<sup>1</sup>). It is important, in terms of international co-operation, for these professionals to know what to expect from their international counterparts and what they are expected to deliver. Besides taking advantage of the European

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<sup>1</sup> Gold (strategic) commander: assumes and retains overall command for the operation or incident.

Silver (tactical) commander: commands and coordinates the overall tactical response in compliance with the strategy, and is the tactical commander of the incident.

Bronze (operational) commander: is responsible for the command of a group of resources, and carrying out functional or geographical responsibilities related to the tactical plan.

experience, adopting this best practice also helps to guarantee that both sides are more likely to combine efforts and work in harmony.

At national level, visiting spotter teams (appropriately trained and with a good knowledge of their supporters) should travel and assist the local police with the security operation for a certain match.

The NFIP should monitor the information exchange and co-operation between the local and visiting police, gathering the overall intelligence and building experience and knowledge to assist the international NFIP's at international matches.

**Recommendation 59 - The Ministry of Interior should ensure that the National Football Information Point (NFIP) is resourced and equipped to undertake effectively both the roles and tasks set out in Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Convention and also play a key role in delivering the proposed comprehensive exclusion strategy. (status: essential)**

The Ministry of Interior should ensure that the head of the NFIP participates in all meetings of the Council of Europe Standing Committee, while the Ministry of Sport should ensure that an official working in the area of sports safety should attend also these meetings.

This will enable the Hungarian authorities to be informed about the latest developments in the field and have access to a proper level of expertise in order to adapt their national provisions and procedures in this area.

**Recommendation 60 - The Ministry of Interior should continue to ensure that the head of the NFIP participates in all meetings of the Council of Europe Standing Committee while the Ministry of Sport should ensure that an official working in the area of sports safety should also attend. (status: desirable)**

## **Section E Concluding remarks and proposed Action Plan**

The delegation would like to stress that the Standing Committee is committed to providing the governmental and football authorities, and other competent agencies, in Hungary with further support in meeting the challenges that lie ahead.

The Standing Committee would in particular welcome periodic feedback on the progress made by the authorities in Hungary concerning implementation of the recommendations included in this report. The proposed draft action plan should desirably be filled by the Hungarian authorities before the tournament, and not later than three years.

Having in mind the fact that the UEFA EURO 2020 matches are only 18 months ahead, some of the recommendations should be prioritized in order to contribute to the overall safety and security measures adopted for this major event.

Finally, the delegation would like to thank, once again, all of the colleagues in Hungary who provided much appreciated help and support and demonstrated impressive levels of patience throughout the visit.

**Standing Committee Consultative Visit to Hungary  
November 2018**

**Proposed Action Plan - to be completed and updated by the Hungarian Authorities**

No.	Recommendation	Organisation in charge of the implementation of the recommendation	Time schedule for the implementation of the recommendation	Description of the action(s) taken and achieved results
<b>Part One - UEFA EURO 2020 Preparations and Operations</b>				
<b>Legislative and Regulatory Framework</b>				
1	It is recommended that the composition of the group be extended to include a professional person with sports grounds safety technical qualifications and skills.			
<b>Visit to Puskas Ferenc Stadium</b>				
2	It is recommended that consideration is given to engaging with independent third parties to give assurance in relation to the structural safety of the stadium when assessed against national building codes and also to give similar assurances around the setting of a safe capacity for the stadium based upon established international best practice.			
3	It is recommended that the stadium management team considers the development of contingency plans to be invoked in the event of an external incident which impacts upon the ability of spectators to exit the stadium via normal/local exit routes. Such planning should look at how the movement of spectators inside the stadium may be achieved to reach places of safety.			
4	The authorities should appoint an operator to develop and manage the stadium safety operation as soon as practicable. The appointed body should set about			

	developing the suite of operational and contingency plans necessary to demonstrate effective safety management.			
<b>Policing Operations</b>				
5	The police and relevant authorities should review the potential risk of local communities clashing with visiting supporters during the tournament and take further steps to simultaneously provide reassurance to both local communities and visiting supporters that the risk is being addressed by preventative action and, in parallel, by the adoption of a zero tolerance policy towards any form of anti-social behaviour and crime and disorder			
6	The relevant authorities should consider further investment in the NFIP capabilities			
7	In accordance with European good practice, during UEFA EURO 2020 policing tactics, profile and uniform should be determined on the basis of: ongoing dynamic risk analyses; graded deployment, with protective equipment used only where necessary; and early targeted and proportionate interventions to prevent the escalation of risk.			
8	Police units to be deployed during UEFA EURO 2020 should be encouraged to proactively interact with and adopt a welcoming and friendly manner towards supporters.			
<b>International Police Co-operation</b>				
9	The relevant governmental authorities should use the European model agreement as a basis for negotiating bilateral protocols on governmental and police co-operation, including visiting police delegation arrangements.			
<b>Stadium Safety Arrangements</b>				
10	The relevant authorities should move quickly to determine a stadium operator who can begin to develop a stadium safety management structure and operating procedures.			
11	Clarity is required in respect of the safety certification arrangements at the National Stadium and the arrangements for determining the safe capacity of the stadium which should form part of the certificate.			

12	Clarity is required over who is legally responsible for the safety of spectators and, in particular, the role of the stadium safety officer and stadium safety management team when operating in UEFA EURO 2020 mode.			
13	In the case of a safety officer and safety management team being used which are not those normally the responsible persons within the venue, a thorough review of the competence of such people should be carried out by a competent authority and if any deficiencies are identified, appropriate amendments made to the safety management arrangements factor and, as a consequence, the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.			
14	The relevant authorities should prepare contingency plans for dealing with possible scenarios in which the number of match tickets sold exceeds the modified maximum safe capacity of the relevant stadia and its viewing sectors.			
15	Due to the large numbers likely to be needed to demonstrate necessary standards of safety, this process and any training needed to equip stewards with the skills needed should commence immediately. Training, qualification and competence should be evaluated by a third party to ensure the necessary levels of safety management are achieved. Concerns in any of the above areas should result in the appropriate alteration of the stadium management factor and a reduction in the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.			
16	To counter the effect of large numbers of stewards who will be new to the stadium it is recommended that a series of ramped test events with increasing spectator numbers are arranged to allow familiarisation and for testing of systems and procedures at reduced capacity levels.			
17	The relevant authorities should share the SSNS concept paper with the delegation for comment.			
<b>Stadium Safety Management</b>				
18	The relevant authorities should develop and promote a system of "statements of intent" setting out the roles and responsibilities of safety management personnel and the police, and the arrangements for transferring overall responsibility to the police in the event of an incident.			
19	Stadium safety management should work closely with the police and other emergency services in developing comprehensive multi-agency stadium contingency plans.			

20	Once developed, the contingency plans in each stadium should be tested in multi-agency table-top exercises designed to identify any gaps in the contingency arrangements. Such exercises should involve all parties involved in the delivery of the event and incorporate a selection of differing scenarios which could occur either before, during or after a match.			
<b>Entry and Searching Arrangements</b>				
21	<p>The relevant authorities should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) review and determine the appropriate pre-entry searching regime to be applied during the tournament and the measures required to mitigate entry delays (e.g., effective signage en-route to the stadia, explanatory communications to visiting supporters, pre-match entertainment etc.);</li> <li>(ii) consider the response to be adopted should delays on entry generate safety risks;</li> <li>(iii) once the arrangements have been reviewed, the outcome should feature in stadium contingency plans designating responsibility for determining whether or not to weaken security checks in the event of an emerging safety scenario; and</li> <li>(iv) as with other contingency plans, the arrangements should be subject to a multi-agency table-top exercise.</li> </ul>			
<b>Electronic Entry System</b>				
22	If as anticipated electronic entry systems are installed, stadium management should develop a robust backup system for use in case of a systems failure.			
<b>Service</b>				
23	The relevant authorities should provide all visiting supporters with clear, useful and easily accessible information written both in English and in the language of the visiting supporters			
24	An effective transport policy, part of the service aspect provided for the supporters, should be developed to support spectators movement within the country during the UEFA EURO 2020 matches.			



<b>Racism and other Discrimination</b>			
25	The relevant authorities should put measures in place to refuse entry into the stadium for spectators who display or carry with them racist or other discriminatory leaflets, symbols or banners and that the relevant authorities continue to apply zero tolerance in respect of any kind of discrimination inside the stadium, fan zones and public spaces during UEFA EURO 2020 and beyond.		
<b>Pyrotechnics</b>			
26	The relevant authorities should take preventative measures to attempt to prevent the use of pyrotechnics in the stadium during UEFA EURO 2020 matches.		
<b>Community Engagement</b>			
27	The relevant authorities should ensure that the needs of local communities are taken fully into account in the planning and delivery of the tournament with associated events and initiatives designed and delivered to provide all local communities with reassurance and encouragement to participate in the festivities.		
<b>Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs)</b>			
28	The relevant authorities should develop and introduce the role of the SLO to operate at national team level and to be active within the 2020 tournament.		
29	HFA should appoint a local SLO team made up of club SLOs to assist during the 2020 tournament.		
<b>Communication and Media Strategy</b>			
30	The relevant authorities should develop a communication and media strategy that comprises not only information addressed to the mass media, but also dissemination and receipt of information to supporters and the local community. It is also recommended that this media centre is situated within the stadium.		
31	The relevant authorities should invest in language training for key personnel to help ensure that spectators attending the tournament are able to communicate with the various agencies and enjoy a safe event.		

<b>Fan Zones</b>			
32	Appropriate levels of safety and security should be provided to fan zone sites which is proportionate to the risk identified at the time of the tournament.		
33	<p>The relevant authorities in the host city should identify locations where visiting supporters may spontaneously, and innocently, gather to enjoy the atmosphere and the city. Once identified, appropriate safety and security preparations should be developed. To cater for the possibility of rival supporters gathering in close proximity, alternative back-up locations should be identified to provide separate areas for rival supporters to gather to help manage any risks.</p> <p>In relation to open public viewing areas, extensive guidance and good practices on the preparatory and operating arrangements on large scale public viewing areas is set out in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events.</p>		
34	The relevant authorities should take account of the good practice contained in the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events in developing plans for organised and spontaneous fan areas and public viewing from fan zones.		
<b>Part Two - Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events - Compliance with Policy Articles</b>			
<b>Article 1 – Scope of Convention</b>			
35	The relevant authorities should consider if the grouping of types of sports mentioned in the Gov. Decree 54/2004 is sufficient and adequate or whether a more specific and comprehensive reference to all sports would be more effective. Also that current legislation specifies that all professional football matches played in Hungary are subject to the articles of the Convention.		

<b>Article 3 – Definition of Terminology used in the Convention</b>			
36	The relevant legal framework should incorporate the definitions set out in Article 3 of the Convention. Also that the SSNS Concept paper currently being prepared by Hungarian authorities for UEFA EURO 2020 reflects the terminology used in the Convention, and in particular provide clarity around the roles of stewards and private security (status: <b>desirable</b> )		
<b>Article 4 – National Co-ordination</b>			
37	The relevant authorities should review the role and responsibilities of the Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events and realign its direction to become a government-led national co-ordination group tasked to develop and deliver national strategies. This would include promoting an integrated multi-agency approach to safety, security and service in connection with sport events. Operational issues like the level of risk for sporting events should be devolved to local level. (status: <b>essential</b> )		
38	The Committee in charge of Classifying Security of Sports Events should draft and agree a national multi-agency strategy document setting out the key components of an integrated approach to safety, security and service. (status: <b>essential</b> )		
<b>Article 4 – Local Co-ordination</b>			
39	The national co-ordination group should <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) designate municipal or regional authorities to establish local multi-agency groups which should include a professional person with sports grounds safety technical qualifications and skills, tasked to oversee and co-ordinate preparations for football events held in their locality and;</li> <li>ii) provide guidance on the structure, role and membership of such groups, taking into account established European good practice. (status: <b>desirable</b>)</li> </ul>		
<b>Article 5 – Safety, Security and Service in Stadia</b>			
40	The national co-ordination group should make provision ensuring that the in-stadia role of the police and other public authorities is clear, both in law and operating		

	arrangements, and widely understood by all safety and security practitioners. (status: <b>essential</b> )			
<b>Article 5 – Stadium Safety Certification</b>				
41	It is recommended that the relevant authorities review the current safety certification system to ensure that the process allows for suitably qualified bodies and individuals to engage in the process to ensure that both physical and safety management perspectives are considered in the setting of the safe capacity of a stadium. (status: <b>important</b> )			
42	It is recommended that the relevant authorities give consideration to adoption of UEFA/CAFE and the IPC standards listed below and that all existing sporting venues carry out an accessibility audit to enable development of an action plan for improvements to increase diversity and equality. (status: <b>important</b> ) a) UEFA/CAFÉ Standard <a href="https://www.cafefootball.eu/en/access-all">https://www.cafefootball.eu/en/access-all</a> b) <b>International Paralympic Committee (IPC) Standard</b> <a href="https://www.paralympic.org/sites/default/files/document/130902143349868_IPC+Accessibility+Guide_2nd+EDITION_FINAL.pdf">https://www.paralympic.org/sites/default/files/document/130902143349868_IPC+Accessibility+Guide_2nd+EDITION_FINAL.pdf</a>			
43	It is recommended that the relevant authorities should take preventative measures to attempt to prevent the use of pyrotechnics in the stadia. (status: <b>important</b> )			
44	It is recommended that the relevant authorities make use of legislation and develop contingency plans to tackle any racist or discriminatory behaviour in sports stadia. Also to recognise the importance of education in helping solve this issue by developing educational programs of awareness. (status: <b>important</b> )			
<b>Article 5 – Stadium Safety Officers</b>				
45	The delegation recommends the Club Safety Officer/representative is provided with a detailed job description which clearly sets out the functions of their post. The Recommendation, in its Annex A – Safety, and its good practices may be used to compile a checklist of functions necessary for the role. (status: <b>important</b> )			
46	The relevant authorities should set the minimum areas of competence to be demonstrated by such safety officers, supervisors and safety stewards, taking into account both the core functions of each group and the variety of roles that they may perform, having regard to the check-lists in Annex D of the Recommendation, on this			

	subject (See <a href="https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1">https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1</a> Appendices 33) and the checklist <a href="https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168073d177">https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168073d177</a> (status: <b>important</b> )			
47	The delegation also recommends the Hungarian authorities to identify and implement systems for ensuring the provision of adequate and appropriate training at both the theoretical and practical level for such safety officers, supervisors and safety stewards, and establish, document and monitor procedures for ensuring that those who have been trained are then assessed as being competent to perform their allocated tasks. (See <a href="https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1">https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1</a> Appendices 33) (status: <b>important</b> )			
48	The delegation recommends that a national network be established to enable stadium Safety Officers to share information along with sharing expertise and good practises. (ESSMA, the European Stadium & Safety Management Association is the European network for this practice <a href="http://www.essma.eu/">http://www.essma.eu/.</a> ) (status: <b>desirable</b> )			
<b>Article 5 – Stadium Stewards</b>				
49	The delegation recommends that a document or stewarding plan is developed for each event which contains the respective roles and responsibilities of the police, stewards, volunteers, security companies along with the competence expected of each practitioner. (see <a href="https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1">https://rm.coe.int/recommendation-rec-2015-1-of-the-standing-committee-on-safety-security/168072b9a1</a> Appendices 41) (status: <b>important</b> )			
<b>Article 6 – Safety, Security and Service in Public Places</b>				
50	The relevant authorities should take advantage of the spirit of willingness for dialogue and co-operate with supporters in an attempt to build up a working relationship founded upon mutual respect, understanding and partnership (status: <b>desirable</b> )			
51	An effective transport policy, part of the service aspect provided for the supporters, should be developed, in particular in relation to the forthcoming UEFA EURO			

	2020 tournament and fan zones should be set up and run according to best practices. (status: <b>desirable</b> )			
<b>Article 7 – Contingency and Emergency Planning</b>				
52	The national co-ordination group should review the current arrangements for preparing and testing comprehensive multi-agency stadium contingency and public authority emergency plans for incidents at or nearby stadia hosting football events. (status: <b>desirable</b> )			
<b>Article 8 – Engagement with Supporters and Local Communities</b>				
53	The national co-ordination group should encourage all stakeholders to review and expand their supporter liaison activities (with the objective that every club will eventually have its own Supporter Liaison Officer (SLO) and review the current SLO arrangements to ensure compliance with the role and remit set out in the UEFA SLO Handbook, taking into account the observations and suggestions of SD Europe. (status: <b>important</b> )			
54	The national co-ordination group should encourage all stakeholders particularly football clubs and national governing bodies to consider the scope for developing preventative, social and educational projects connected with football events at both national and local level. (status: <b>desirable</b> )			
<b>Article 9 – Police Strategies and Operations</b>				
55	The Ministry of Interior should ensure that those policing football operations take into account established good practice and are in compliance with the Council of Europe Convention’s obligations and take full account of the key role played by the sports police. (status: <b>important</b> )			
56	The Ministry of Interior should review current football policing operations with a view to adopting a strategic and tactical policy of identifying and gathering evidence in respect of individuals and/or groups posing increased safety or security risks. (status: <b>important</b> )			

57	The Ministry of Interior should ensure that police personnel engaged in the preparations for, and operations during football events receive appropriate and specialist training in European policing football good practices. (status: <b>important</b> )			
<b>Article 10 – Prevention and Sanctioning of Offending Behaviour</b>				
58	The national authorities should review the exclusion strategy as regards football and other sport related violence, taking into account European models of good practice. (status: <b>essential</b> )			
<b>Article 11 – International Co-operation</b>				
59	The Ministry of Interior should ensure that the National Football Information Point (NFIP) is resourced and equipped to undertake effectively both the roles and tasks set out in article 11, paragraph 2 of the Convention and also play a key role in delivering the proposed comprehensive exclusion strategy. (status: <b>essential</b> )			
60	The Ministry of Interior should continue to ensure that the head of the NFIP participates in all meetings of the Council of Europe Standing Committee while the Ministry of Sport should ensure that an official working in the area of sports safety should also attend. (status: <b>desirable</b> )			

# Appendix A

## **Draft Model of Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Police Cooperation for the UEFA EURO 2020**

**Prepared by the Working Group of the Standing Committee  
on UEFA EURO 2020 (document T-RV (2017)15 rev1)**

### **DRAFT MODEL OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING**

on the bilateral arrangements of policing co-operation between the host, participating and transit countries in connection with the UEFA EURO 2020 Football Championship

Recognizing the special challenge of the first time having a Final Phase of the European Football Championship (hereafter UEFA EURO 2020) played in 13 different cities in 12 different countries, hosting 24 national teams,

supporters travelling all over Europe, having an impact on EU- and non-EU Member States as well as Schengen and non-Schengen States,

being aware of the competence of various national, multinational and pan European police and law enforcement agencies,

under recognition of the respective national law and especial acknowledgement of

(Quotation of applicable legislation of the EU and CoE)

under recognition of the EU-Handbook<sup>2</sup>

The host, participating- and transit countries (singularly named) acknowledge the exceptional international importance of the UEFA EURO 2020 organised in (fill in host countries), and declare their intention to jointly co-operate in respect of the police cooperation set out in this bilateral agreement.

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<sup>2</sup> Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ("EU Football Handbook") 2016/C 444/01.



## I. Human Resource Support

*The visiting State* declares its willingness to support the police of the hosting State during the UEFA EURO 2020 by deploying a police delegation to provide advisory and support activities, including the exchange of information and advice on the behavior of visiting supporters regarding any threat to public safety and public order posed by them, in particular by performing the following functions: *(provide details of the composition and role of the visiting police delegation and the specific tasks which will be performed by them).*

The hosting State should provide the *visiting State* with:

- Accreditation to all venues where supporters of the visiting State may gather
- police accompanying officers (cicerones)
- an overview of the operational plans and integration into the local policing operations
- appropriate measures to ensure the safety of members of the visiting police delegation

The visiting police may be deployed in uniform but not possess or carry firearms or other protective equipment during their deployment in the host State. The host State will define the size of the visiting police delegation. The number of deployed officers can be adapted during the tournament in accordance with the risk assessment. Special arrangements can be set out bilaterally.

The police *of the visiting State* can be in possession of hand held cameras to gather evidence, if relevant, on supporters throughout the period of their deployment. Any materials obtained will be shared with the *host State* police.

The police *of the host State of the group phase of the tournament* shall arrange for representatives of the possible visiting police delegation to visit host cities and venues event sites no later than six weeks before the start of the event in order to prepare for their deployment.

The police *of the host State* shall pay for accommodation, meals (or subsistence), internal travel costs and other facilities/necessary equipment made available locally, whilst the visiting State shall pay for travel and salaries of the delegation members involved in the territory *of the host State*. The travel expenses for a visiting police delegation travelling directly between two host States, being not the origin of the police delegation, should be paid by the police delegation.

The *visiting State* will provide medical insurance for its police officers during their deployment in *the host State*.

The *visiting State* will ensure all its police officers against personal or property damage during their deployment in *the host State*.

## II. Information exchange

The *visiting State* will provide the *host State* with regular risk assessment focusing in particular on the number of supporters, the routes and the destinations, as well as the likely behaviour in connection with the event.

The assessment will be sent:

- at least once a week, starting from the fourth week before the commencement of the event until the deployment of the visiting police delegation;
- daily, starting from the time of the deployment of the visiting police delegation.

The police of the *visiting State* shall provide (*where possible under national law*) the following information regarding supporters who are subject of a stadium ban (*or comparable banning measures*), and who are considered by the police in (*name of visiting State*) to pose a risk to public order in connection with (*name of event*):

- full name;
- date of birth;
- gender;
- citizenship;
- type of banning measure
- expiry date of the stadium ban or other banning measure.

This information shall be provided to *the host State* after the entry into force of this bilateral agreement.

..... *name of the host State* that will ensure that the data on such persons:

- will be solely used for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the event
- will not constitute the sole legal basis for action undertaken by the law enforcement forces of the *host State*
- will be removed from any data base, and not used for any purpose after, (*date of deleting the data*). *Proposal : one week after the end of the tournament*

The exchange of information, including personal data, will take place in accordance with national laws of the countries under special recognition of the European data protection legislation.

The police of the *host State* will regularly communicate to the police of the *visiting State* any relevant information related to the event, in particular information concerning the behaviour of (*name of the visiting State*) supporters and actions performed by them.

The police of the *host State* will inform the police of the *visiting State* about any (*name of the visiting State*) supporters who have been subject to measures to ensure public safety and public order in the territory of *the host State* in connection with the *name of the event*. This will include details of the offences committed and the actions taken by the competent authorities in the *host State*.

EUROPOL will host a Coordination Centre for information exchange of the NFIP Network in The Hague for gathering and delivering any football-related relevant information in connection with UEFA EURO 2020. EUROPOL will provide the infrastructure but not run the Coordination Center. The hosting, visiting and transit countries are requested to deploy members of the NFIPs to that Coordination Centre. Non-EU Member States and/or countries without a NFIP shall also deploy adequate personnel. ( Discussion about the costs should be led)

The respective national NFIP of the hosting State is responsible for the information exchange in the sense of this agreement with the competent police service at the event site.

### **III. Movement of Supporters**

The safe movement of *the visiting State* supporters whilst in the territory of *the host State* will be within the competence of the police in the *host State*.

The police or other designated authority in *the visiting State* shall conduct observation and, when needed, ensure the safe movement of the *visiting State* supporters as well as supporters from other countries circulating through their territory in connection with travel to UEFA EURO 2020 event sites.

Information about (*name of the visiting State*) supporters who are refused entry into the territory of (*name of the host State*) shall be exchanged with the police of the *visiting State*.

Host, visiting and transit countries can agree on a special cooperation in connection with supporters' movement:

- deployment of liaison officers at airports, railway stations/systems and borders;
- the cross-border escort of supporter groups; and
- deployment of any other police force on demand of the hosting or transit State

The deployment of the above-mentioned police forces can be dealt with by a separate agreement.

### **IV. Measures to control the entry of supporters in the territory of the host State**

The *visiting State* shall collect and exchange information with the police in the *host State* regarding persons who reside in a Third State and who travel through the territory of the visiting State en-route to the *event sites* and who are assessed by the competent police authority in the State in which they reside as posing a threat to public order in connection with the UEFA EURO 2020.

The *visiting State* shall undertake all possible measures, in accordance with national law, to prevent the departure from the territory of *the visiting State* of any persons who have previously caused or contributed to violence or disorder in connection with a football event and who are assessed by the

police of the *visiting State* as posing a threat to public safety or public order during the UEFA EURO 2020.

The host *State* shall provide *the visiting State* with all relevant information regarding supporters of third countries who plan to travel, or are known to have travelled, through the territory of *the visiting State*.

## **V. Co-operation with the media**

The press officers of the delegations shall communicate directly in order to ensure co-operation with the media.

The visiting, hosting or transit countries shall inform each other regarding designated media contact points.

The press officers of the *visiting State*, if appropriate, will be available for press and media briefings and will liaise closely with the competent authorities of the *host State*.

## **VI. Final provisions**

This bilateral agreement is not an international agreement and neither creates any new international legal commitments between the countries, nor violates any existing international commitments between the *host and visiting States* and other countries.

States intend to apply this bilateral agreement starting from the date of it coming into force and concluding on (*with an agreed date after the event*).

The competent police and law enforcement authorities of Parties will make direct detailed agreements as necessary for the fulfillment of any matter not specified in this bilateral agreement.

## Appendix B -Draft programme

Wednesday,14 November2018		
Afternoon-evening	Arrival of the Council of Europe delegation to Budapest. Transfer to hotel and check-in	K+K Hotel Opera
Thursday, 15 November2018		
9:00-9:15	Opening ceremony	K+K Hotel Opera
9:15-10:00	Presentation by the State Secretariat for Sport*	
10:00-10:45	Presentation by the National Police Headquarters*	
10:45-11:00	Coffee break	
11:00-11:45	Presentation by the Hungarian Football Federation*	
11:45-12:30	Presentation by the sports event security company Valton LLC.*	
12:30-13:00	Follow-up questions	
13:00-14:30	Lunch	
14:30-15:00	Departure to the match venue	
15:00-15:45	Demonstration of the Arena and its access system	Groupama Arena
15:55-16:30	Security briefing	
16:45-18:00	Q+A with the actors of safety and security	

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\*Members of the delegation can ask questions directly to the presenter.

18:00-19:30	Dinner	
19:45-20:45	Observation of the safety, security and service in practice (in groups with escort), visiting the operations center	
20:45-22:30	Hungary – Estonia UEFA Nations League match	
22:30-23:30	Attending the Security Evaluation	
23:30-	Travel to the Hotel	K+K Hotel Opera
<b>Friday, 16 November 2018</b>		
10:00-11:30	Meeting with the representatives of supporters, football teams, SLOs	K+K Hotel Opera
11:30-11:45	Coffee break	
11:45-13:00	Presentation by the head of the New Puskas Ferenc Stadium project	
13:00-14:30	Lunch	
14:30-15:00	Travel to the New Puskas Ferenc Stadium	
15:00-16:30	Tour in the New Puskas Ferenc Stadium	New Puskas Ferenc Stadium
16:30-17:00	Travel to the Hotel	
17:00-19:00	Free	
19:00-19:15	Departure to dinner	K+K Hotel Opera
19:30-21:30	Dinner	Sofitel Budapest Chain Bridge
21:30-	Travel to the Hotel	
<b>Saturday, 17 November 2018</b>		
TBC	Check-out, transfer to Liszt Ferenc International Airport	K+K Hotel Opera

## **PART 3**

### **Comments by Hungary**

### **Comments regarding C.6 - Visit to Puskas Ferenc Stadium**

In Hungary, as in other EU Member States, European harmonized standards have been used as the basis for planning (e.g.: EUROCODE).

Immediately prior to signing the construction contract, the National Sports Centres, as the builder of the facility, commissioned the Puskás Engineer Consortium for the design and construction of the facility. The Consortium has carried out an independent design review of the plans, including compliance with the standards and other regulations in regards of the following: engineering consultancy, investment planning, project management related to installation work and construction, engineering and sports expert audit, change management, risk analysis. The Design Control Rules of the Hungarian Chamber of Engineers was applied to the architecture, supporting fixture, fire protection and acoustics. During the construction the Consortium continuously monitors compliance with the rules, standards and regulations for the design and execution.

The Contractor is obliged to apply the ISO 14001 environmental management system certificate, the ISO 9001 quality management certificate, the MSZ EN ISO 50001: 2012 energy management system certificate and the MSZ 28001 (OHSAS 18001) occupational health and safety management system certificate.

After completion a licensing procedure must be carried out with the authorities (e.g.: National Directorate General for Disaster Management, National Public Health and Medical Officer Service, Police).

The Operator must obtain the Operational Licence, during which he must prove that he is able to operate the stadium and organise an event in such way the necessary regulations are met.

For events calculated with more than 3,000 participants, a separate event holding license must be requested, during which the event organizer certifies that it provides the necessary security (health, safety, etc.) services and develops a detailed contingency plan.

During the design, the capacity of the facility was determined, in accordance with these capacities data, the service systems were scaled and designed according to the relevant laws, standards, regulations (e.g.: sprinkler, escape routes, emergency lighting, etc). It was inspected by the Consortium during the above mentioned design checks.

During the construction approval, the Construction Authority, with the involvement of the National Directorate General for Disaster Management, inspected the fulfilment of the above-mentioned conditions. The audit ended positively, thus the National Directorate General for Disaster Management issued the building permit, indicating the maximum capacity.

Competences: National Directorate General for Disaster Management operates in the Ministry of Interior. Its primary purpose is to protect the life and wealth of the Hungarian citizens, the safe operation of the nation economy and critical infrastructure elements, which is an extremely important public security task.



Its main task is the official prevention of disasters; performing rescue in civil emergencies; organization and management of defence; eliminating harmful consequences; implementation of restoration or reconstruction.

The operation of the National Directorate General for Disaster Management regulated by the Act CXXVIII of 2011 on disaster management. It functions as a public authority in construction regulatory matters based on the Government decree 312/2012. (XI.8.).

The disaster management body is involved as an authority in the construction / commissioning procedures for sports facilities. The disaster management body inspects and checks the conditions and the safe capacity during the building permit procedure (also when the facility is put to use) based on the Government decree 531/2017. (XII.29.). When the facility's design is inadequate, the disaster management body shall take steps for facility modification or limits the safe capacity.

The delegation's statement that sports clubs themselves determine the safe capacity of stadiums is not appropriate.

The „independent third party” who has the assurances around the setting of a safe capacity for the stadium is the National Directorate General for Disaster Management, especially for the following:

1. public authority / authority powers are available to enforce statutory safety requirements,
2. continuous regulatory oversight is provided to maintain safety requirements,
3. the inspections are made by professionals with the appropriate skills and capabilities to ensure compliance with safety requirements (international cooperation and European good practices are in use)
4. the disaster management body has the appropriate IT support to ensure the security of spectators is up to date by taking advantage of technical advances (validated simulation software for evacuation to verify compliance)

When the "stadium safety certificate" is issued, the safe capacity data are binding for every stakeholder. The safe capacity numbers are set in the safety certificate and it shall not be exceeded by any other authority or organization.

### **Comments regarding C.3 - Strategic co-ordination**

The delegation met the Person in charge of co-ordinating the police tasks and the work of the Ministry of Interior regarding the UEFA EURO 2020, the SSNS manager of the UEFA EURO 2020, the head of department from the Ministry of Human Capacities, the Minister of Interior's advisor and a senior police officer appointed by the National Police Chief. The mentioned colleagues are the highest representatives of the Hungarian sports safety system.

### **Comments regarding C.4 - Operational co-ordination**

The security and the security preparations are not police-led actions, as confirmed by Colonel Lakatos in his presentation, since less than 2-3 percent of the qualified matches have a high security risk, where the police intervene in the security.

The Groupama Arena has a safety officer, who are involved in the security procedures on strategic level, can make comments about it, but does not takes responsibility, do not takes active part in the security.

### **Comments regarding C.5 - Legislative and Regulatory Framework**

The Hungarian legislative framework is not security or police led. The most important elements of service obligations are mentioned in the Law I on Sport. The security checks and the stadium licensing are regulated by the Law I on sport and the Government Decree 54/2004. (III. 31.) on the Securing sporting events. Stakeholders subject to each contribution had internal regulators on the implementation process.

„However, the focus of the group is towards security and determination of policing levels and misses the opportunity to recognise the key principles of safety.”

The statement above moderately needs to be complemented. The Committee also focuses on security and service issues, what should be discussed at local and strategical level in an integrated way.

The safety checks of the infrastructure contain facts and regulations. However, Hungary believes that it would be worthwhile introducing the SGSA Green Guide’s policies, because it would eliminate a lot of misunderstandings. However, it should be noted, that the parameters of the access gates, the camera system and the ticketing system are precisely defined and checked by the HFF every year for the infrastructure and there are no parameters defined. In order to maintain the security infrastructure, each sports organisation must have a five-year safety development plan which includes the possible budget of developments.