

STANDING COMMITTEE (T-RV)

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON SPECTATOR
VIOLENCE AND MISBEHAVIOUR AT SPORT
EVENTS AND IN PARTICULAR AT FOOTBALL
MATCHES



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**Ad Hoc Working Group on Safety, Security and
Service preparations for UEFA EURO 2020**

1st peer-review exercise with match commanders

English FA Cup Final

Wembley Stadium, London (UK)

18 May 2019

Final report and list of participants

(Adopted by written procedure)

REPORT

I. General introduction

Established by the Council of Europe's Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence (T-RV), the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Safety, Security and Service Preparations for UEFA EURO 2020 (hereinafter referred to as «the Working Group») adopted at its 1st meeting, in 2017, an Action Plan which comprises the delivery of several consultative visits and peer-review exercises across some of the hosting countries of the tournament, with the aim to promote the sharing of their experience, skills and knowledge in reaching a common goal: ensure a safe, secure and welcoming tournament.

Following the discussions at the 5th meeting of the Working Group, held in December 2018, the British delegation offered to host the first peer-review exercise on the occasion of the final match of the football season, scheduled for mid-May 2019.

The above-mentioned Action Plan of the Working Group comprises visits and exercises in six out of 12 organising countries: after three consultative visits – Azerbaijan, Hungary and Bilbao (Spain) -, the mission to London was the first peer-review exercise to be carried out. The Action Plan shall be completed by the end of 2019, after a consultative visit to Italy and a peer-review exercise to Amsterdam, both planned for the last quarter of the year.

While the consultative visits are aimed at monitoring, in the context of the UEFA EURO 2020 tournament, the compliance with commitments under the 1985 Convention and the 2015 Recommendation, the peer-review exercises are specifically addressed to promote cooperation and communication between police strategists and match police commanders of the 12 hosting cities.

This report aims at, on one side, updating on the concept and state of preparations of London as hosting city of the tournament and, on the other side, sharing the impressions of the visiting team with the British hosts and with the Working Group and the T-RV delegations.

II. Visit background

As planned, the first peer-review exercise was held in Wembley Stadium, London, on the occasion of the English Football Association Cup Final, on the 18th May 2019.

The Council of Europe visiting delegation comprised representatives from four organising countries (Hungary, The Netherlands, Romania and Scotland), T-RV delegates and the T-RV Secretariat. Azerbaijan, Denmark, Germany and Italy apologised, whereas Ireland, Russian Federation and Spain did not reply to the invitation.

The visiting delegation met officials from the UK National Football Information Point (UKFPU), London Metropolitan Police Service, English Football Association and Wembley Stadium general management.

The programme of the visit and the list of participants are respectively Annexes 1 and 2 of this report.

Prior to the peer-review exercise, the T-RV Secretariat drafted and circulated among the visiting team a structure of the report (Annex 3) that each match commander should fill in with his/her impressions of the visit, and which is the basis of this report (Chapter IV).

III. General findings

London is one of the 12 hosting cities of UEFA EURO 2020 and Wembley stadium will be the one hosting more matches (seven), including the two semi-finals and the final of the tournament.

The scenario chosen by the British hosts for this first peer review-exercise was the match of the English Football Association Cup Final. Finalist teams were Manchester City and Watford.

Around 87,500 spectators attended this match, roughly half from each team. Wembley stadium is the second biggest across Europe, with a capacity of 90,000 spectators. The stadium was sold out for this match, bearing in mind that around 5,000 seats were used as buffer zones. This was the most important event at the end of the football season in England, after the closure of the Premier League, one week before.

The British NFIP, the silver commander for the London Metropolitan Police Service, the English FA and the Wembley Stadium safety management were all fully committed to share their experience and challenges with the visiting team. Besides walking through the “last mile” and observing the ingress to the Wembley stadium, the visiting team was briefed about the overall safety, security and service issues, both from the public and private perspectives. Briefings covered both the match of the English FA Cup Final and the plans for UEFA EURO 2020.

Based on a dynamic risk assessment carried out by the Police in co-operation with the organiser, this match was considered as a low-risk one, even if it was a Cup Final. Therefore, the safety and security were mostly ensured by the private security structure of the English Football Association, which is both the organiser of the competition and the operator of the Wembley stadium. A total of 1,583 stewards and only 50 police officers were involved in safety and security within the stadium and across the private land (stadium outer perimeter).

Unlike the European continental model, the UK model gives primacy to the role of stewarding and private security structure in ensuring safety and security inside and in the outer perimeter of the stadium. Therefore, more than 40% of the football matches in the UK are police-free, i.e., the private security and stewards manage the security of the event and may call the Police via the European emergency number (112) if a serious incident occurs inside the stadium or in its outer perimeter.

Since the early 90's of last century, stadiums in the UK were transformed into safer, all-seat venues, with fences around the playing surface torn down to avoid catastrophes like the 1989 human crush at Hillsborough Stadium that killed 96 people.

Although the Police have been progressively reducing their presence inside the stadiums, a public debate is regularly fed on the allegedly excessive costs of policing football matches in the UK, in the public spaces. For instance, the London Metropolitan Police Service is being reimbursed about 5% of policing costs by football clubs because it only receives money back

for policing inside the stadium. Under current rules, clubs are only obliged to pay for policing in the stadium and on the outer perimeter, leading to the taxpayer picking up most of the bill.

By adopting a proportionate approach, the police match commander has at his disposal, as a reserve, an important number of police officers and more or less coercive assets, including riot police, armoured vehicles and helicopters, to respond to different types of incidents inside and around stadia. This is particularly the case of Wembley stadium, as it is considered as a national critical infrastructure.

From a different perspective, increasing pitch-invasions and other relevant incidents inside stadia indicate that stewards and private security are not sufficiently respected without police presence and this might suggest that probably the UK has gone a bit too far with police-free matches. In the match observed, the visiting delegation only registered one pitch invasion, but which occurred after the end of the match.

Outside of Wembley stadium, mobility and crowd management are major challenges for the police, since 85% of spectators arrive by public transportation (Wembley Park Station) and use the “last mile” concourse, thus jeopardising an effective segregation of rival groups of supporters. Furthermore, due to the real estate pressure around the stadium, free spaces are getting scarce for car parks and other stadium operation facilities.

Cross-national issues like counter-terrorism and international police co-operation are a responsibility of UK agencies, respectively the Counter-terrorism Coordinator and the NFIP. Moreover, the London Metropolitan Police Service are closely co-operating with their counterparts in Glasgow (Scotland), to ensure a common British standard of policing during UEFA EURO 2020.

IV. Impressions of match commanders

The following is a summary of the impressions provided by the four national delegations during this peer-review exercise, as regards public and private policing operations, both inside and outside of the stadium, as well as national good practices that can be replicated, in accordance with the previously agreed structure:

1. Policing inside the stadium

1.1. What works

- Integrated and balanced safety/security/service standards are fulfilled in a versatile manner;
- The system leading spectators through the stadium, the politeness of the stewards and their attentive perception of their tasks, the eye-catching cleanliness and structured order all those are pleasant features for a very warm welcome of the spectators at the Wembley Stadium;
- Considering that the police are involved in the securing activity by contract with the organiser, it is very useful to agree on the number of involved police forces a few days before the match, where the chief of police, the head of the security, representatives of the involved clubs are present;
- It is also positive the fact that police intervene inside the stadium only in case of crime or serious disorder, or any other unexpected event that couldn't be solved by the stewards. The number of stewards was considerably huge assuring the efficient procedure of ticketing and entering and maintaining safety;

- In terms of sharing of responsibilities, it was clear that, inside the stadium and in its outer perimeter, safety, security and service were the responsibility of the stadium security (organiser). There is, in principle, no role for the police inside the stadium;
- Police (silver commander and his complete staff) have their own command room inside the stadium, next to the private security command room. There was a good cooperation between the silver commander and the stadium director/security officer based on trust and “knowing each other”;
- There was not only a sufficient number of stewards deployed but also a good allocation of these officers inside the stadium. They had high visibility and established very good interaction with the fans;
- Excellent bag policy, with dedicated lanes (bag and no bag) and an A4 bag size policy;
- Clear signage;
- Significant provision for catering and hospitality to encourage early entry to stadium and minimise crowd congestion outside;
- Excellent ticketing policy resulting in a very good segregation of fans;
- As regards car access control, only authorised police and staff cars are allowed to enter in the stadium underground parking.

1.2. What can be improved

- The use of pyrotechnics during the ceremony was a surprise. Even if this pyro show was ensured by professionals, it should be envisaged to find alternative safe and secure ways for this festive part of final matches. Wembley Stadium, in particular, as one of the world most famous stadiums, gives an important example which should be worth to copy;
- At the top levels of the stadium, the segregation between the two sets of fans was realised using a line of stewards and a black textile long strip. Maybe a different approach of this issue can result in a safer environment for the stewards and the fans;
- The arrangements for searching inside the stadium were not clear, which would have made ejection more problematic. If the spectator is refusing to leave once inside, it creates a situation where a forced ejection / police intervention may be necessary.

2. Policing outside the stadium

2.1. What works

- As inside the stadium, the same welcoming measures atmosphere were recognized outside of it. The stewards had a proactive and friendly way of speaking with a huge number of spectators;
- Good accessibility by public transport (Underground Wembley park station), thus preventing people from taking their cars close to the stadium;
- Police were present at several locations and in a proportionate number. There were no large number police officers at one location. Police officers were kind and approachable;
- There was an ideal ratio to manage this match: 90 police officers for 1500 security officers;
- The Football Association (organizer) pay for the police officers deployed for the inside of the stadium and in its outer perimeter;
- There is a possibility to use other police assets in London (not dealing directly with the actual match);
- Very good segregation of the two sets of fans using a small number of police officers;
- Very good video surveillance of the stadium area. If needed, police helicopters and drones can be used to supplement the view;

- Swiping of the outer concourse of the stadium before the match;
- General infrastructure in and around the area (restaurants, public transport links etc).

2.2. What can be improved

- When almost 90,000 people are leaving a stadium at the same time the difficulties in managing such a big crowd seem unavoidable. Many thousands of spectators stood into an endless queue directed to the metro/train station. It took around one hour until the “last mile” boulevard came back to normal. Maybe there is a possibility to increase the frequency of the metro / train during this rush hour after the match;
- High dependency on the underground transportation. Consequently, there should be a contingency plan to deal with a major failure in the underground functioning in a match day;
- In any case, it would be recommendable to care for best relaxation of the crowd during this period. A chill-out fan-zone could be a successful support for that. Some video walls along the public way could promote that aim and could result in a win-win situation by getting important information and nice memories of the match (e.g., successful situations and goals of the today-match; texting: «Congrats to the winner», «Thanks for the visit»; messages about the public transportation; offers of the surrounding pubs; information on incoming events at the Wembley Stadium; behavior in emergency situations; weather forecast);
- The segregation of risk supporters, when both groups arrive during the same time frame at Wembley Park station, and along the «last mile» boulevard;
- Near the entrance gates, the police officers guide the supporters to their stands. This should be done by security officers with the police in the neighbourhood;
- Many persons were selling merchandise (shirts, flags, shawls, etc.) in the streets and nearby the underground station. UEFA wants the authorities to act on that. In the case of this match, the police didn't react. The stadium management argued that they had to pay for the police staff and that it wasn't a priority;
- The area surrounding the stadium is a very busy residential and business area, which is still growing;
- East corner relatively narrow, which could lead to crowd pinch point.

3. English good practices that could be replicated

3.1. Inside the stadium

- The service measures as seen in Wembley, namely the welcoming and friendly approach and the professional action of well-trained stewards, deserve to be considered as a reference model;
- The effective work of a huge number of stewards along with a low deployment of police officers is a great development, which saves a lot of public resources;
- Due to the lack of risk for this fixture, the policing inside the stadium was difficult to identify;
- The security checks are almost the same as the ones used in the airports. An attempted passing of a jacket between two security check stations was recognized and stopped immediately by the supervisor. Afterwards, the supervisor instantly informed a steward of the necessity of passing all objects through the security check. In addition, a friendly clarification of the affected guest and an apology for the time delay, was done by the supervisor;
- The fact that the police have their own command room inside the stadium is an important facility, even if it doesn't allow them to see the pitch and the tribunes;

- The co-location of the Tactical Firearms Commander with the Police Match Commander, which is possible due to the size of the control room;
- Excellent signage inside and around the stadium, as well as advertisement of the emergency numbers and contacts.

3.2. Outside the stadium

- Wembley stadium is the absolute center of the whole borough. Everything else was and will be “added” in the course of a long-term plan. Thus, optimal conditions prevail which offer exceptionally high infrastructural advantages. There are just a small number of parking spaces (2,900 places, which can be segregated), so the influx is ensured almost exclusively (85 %) by public transport;
- The policing costs for the match-day operation are supported by the organiser;
- Very clear handover procedure in case of major incidents from the organizer to the police commander;
- As for the original nature of the bag policy, it is rather innovative that on the route of the arrival to the ingress gates, stewards checked the size of handbags and drew the attention of the supporters to leave bags bigger than A4 size in the cloakroom set up for this purpose;
- Queue management of transport links. This was managed by transport stewards which in other countries would currently need be organised by police as it is outside of the scope of event organiser’s responsibility;
- After the game, the crowd of supporters was blocked before arriving at the underground station. This happened several times on their way to Wembley Park station and it was absolutely necessary to avoid overcrowding of the station;
- Use of portable fencing. This appeared to be incredibly simple to erect and disassemble at short notice, with the mobility of same a positive feature.

4. Good practices in other countries that could be replicated

4.1. Inside the stadium

- i) Austria:
 - The attention and consistency, as well the pro-active friendly and professional behavior of the stewards were recognized as an example to follow;
 - The deployment of police is decided by a committee. This committee decides according to criteria provided by the fire brigade, the rescue forces, the police and the mayor;
 - The cost for police is almost 60 pounds per hour with a minimum number of 6 hours of operation. This example seems to be very practicable, cost-saving and comprehensible.
- ii) The Netherlands:
 - The lord mayor is responsible for public order. Together with the prosecutor and the chief of police they form a triangle. During the risk games they will be present in the command room of the stadium. When necessary (disasters and large incidents) they can directly decide what to do;
 - Police work is based on a dynamic risk assessment and information-led policing. That means “no information about disturbing the public order, no role for the police”;
 - It would be interesting to exchange good practices on making a risk assessment and scenarios to be worked out.

iii) Romania:

- Very effective use of spotters;
- Targeted exclusion of troublemakers.

iv) Scotland:

- Sight of the arena for the Match Commander. While not an issue for a low risk match, the Match Commander's effectiveness is enhanced when they can observe the event as it occurs, crowd dynamics, flashpoints, etc. This is not possible from the control room at Wembley;
- Dependent on risk categorisation, the absence of a visible police presence in stadia increases the threat of disorder and the ability of the Match Commander to respond timeously to incidents occurring inside the stadium.

4.2. Outside the stadium

i) The Netherlands:

- The local authorities are responsible for crowd management. The police will advise on measures to be taken. The costs of police deployment are borne by the organiser or the local authorities. There are several specialists on that topic in the police force. It is very useful with events of a larger scale.

ii) Romania:

- Good segregation of rival fans on the route to and from the stadium;
- Very good communication with the fans, prior, during and after the match;
- And overall, the existence of a banning order system that allows the Gendarmerie and Police officers to apply bans directly to the fans for minor offences up to 1 year.

iii) Scotland:

- Policing style and tone in Scotland for football matches is, unless specifically required otherwise, one of early and ongoing engagement and communication with supporters, including risk supporters. This encourages the cooperation of the majority of the supporters and should a more robust style of policing be required in response to any escalation in events, there is less likelihood of non-risk supporters becoming engaged with policing or attempting to interfere in the policing operation.

5. Final comments

Tickets for the Wembley Stadium are generally very expensive, so that the spectators' behavior is perceived as very civilized and deliberate, but nevertheless full of positive emotion.

Further relevant aspects observed:

- Almost 30 full height turnstiles at each of the 4 main entrance areas (in a total of 126) are in place;
- The permanent security team worked on a 14-day/10-night shifts before the match;
- The capacity of the Wembley stadium (90,652) and the number of events during the year results in 4,000 staff in match days, with 1,500 stewards included;
- The role of the police (prevention and detection of crime, protection of life and property) is clearly understood;

- No club colours in premium;
- Magnetometers were in operation at all premium entrances;
- A restricted bag policy was in place with outer check points (all ticketholders are now prohibited from bringing any bag into the stadium unless it is smaller than an A4 piece of paper);
- A clear accreditation system to verify the allowed zones for entrance was in place (security passes and colored wrist ribbons), electronic tickets (to overview at every time the number/and percentages of spectators inside the stadia, as well as the processing time for these tickets);
- The traffic system to reach Wembley stadium was monitored at the command and control room.

V. Conclusion

The Council of Europe and its visiting team would like to warmly thank all the hosts and, in particular, Mr. Adrian Roberts, UKFPU assistant director and Superintendent Nick Collins, the silver commander of the London Metropolitan Police Service, for planning and holding this peer-review exercise in a very professional, effective and welcoming way.

The visiting team estimates that this peer-review exercise was an excellent opportunity for police decision-makers, strategists and match commanders to exchange between them and with the London Metropolitan Police, the English FA and the Wembley stadium safety management their good practices and challenges in the context of the organization of a major event like the English FA Cup Final and in an outstanding venue like Wembley stadium.

Even if the level of participation in this visit was below what the Secretariat initially expected, the four national delegations and T-RV members present had an excellent opportunity to realise how the English football policing system works in theory and in practice, notably how the private and public safety authorities share roles and responsibilities inside and outside of the sports venue.

A news of this first peer-review exercise was published on the Council of Europe sports website (Annex 4).

The second peer-review exercise will be organised and hosted by the gold commander of the hosting city of Amsterdam, in co-operation with the Dutch Football Association and the Johan Cruyff Arena management, on the occasion of the UEFA EURO 2020 qualifying match between the Netherlands and Estonia, in Amsterdam Arena, next 19 November 2019. This will be another major opportunity for police decision-makers, strategists and match commanders to exchange their views and challenges around the planning and implementation of an integrated and balanced safety, security and service approach at football matches across the hosting cities of UEFA EURO 2020 tournament.

Annex 1 - Programme

Friday, 17 May 2019		
Afternoon-evening	Arrival of the Council of Europe delegation to London. Transfer to hotel and check-in	Jury's Inn Croydon
Saturday, 18 May 2019		
11.30	Collection from Hotel to Wembley National Stadium (NFIP UK)	Wembley Stadium
13:30 – 14:00	Collection of event day accreditation	
14:00- 14:30	Presentation from Wembley Stadium regarding event planning procedures, site overview and operations plan (Mr Liam Boylan)	
14:30- 15:00	Presentation from Metropolitan Police regarding intelligence management, police tactics and event planning integration (Superintendent Nick Collins)	
15:00- 15:30	Wembley Stadium site walk – external areas	
15:30 – 16:00	Wembley Stadium site walk – internal areas and control room	
16:00 - 16:30	Wembley Stadium site walk – Key entrances and search/screening locations	
16:30	Return to match day box	
16:30- 17:00	Pre-match meal	
17:00	Kick off – FA Cup Final - Manchester City v Watford	
19:00	End of game	
19:00 - 19:45	Observation of crowd egress	
19:45 – 20:00	Questions and answers	
20:00	Review concludes	
20:15	Return travel to Hotel	Jury's Inn

Annex 2 - List of participants

Name	Function	Country / Organization
Police decision-makers, planners and match commanders		
Mr Károly KRETZ	Colonel, Riot Police	Hungary
Mr Ádám BALOGH	Head of unit	Hungary
Mr Wieger van DIJK	Gold commander, Amsterdam	The Netherlands
Mr Ionut Catalin SINDILE	General Inspector, Romanian Gendarmerie	Romania
Mr Mark HARGREAVES	Silver Commander	Scotland
Mr John McBRIDE	Match Commander	Scotland
Ms. Eleanor MURDOCH	Planning Team	Scotland
Standing Committee (T-RV) delegates		
Mr Adrian DINCA	Chairman	T-RV, Romania
Mr Anton CERNAT	Head of the Romanian NFIP	Romania
Mr Martin SCHLOSSER	Bureau Member	T-RV, Austria
Council of Europe Secretariat		
Mr Paulo GOMES	Senior Programme Manager	Sport Conventions Secretariat
Ms Marie-Françoise GLATZ	Senior Programme Manager	Sport Conventions Secretariat

Annex 3 - Structure of the report

Based on your impressions during this peer-review exercise at Wembley Stadium, and as regards policing operations, both inside and outside of the stadium, please draft a brief report based on the following structure:

1. Identify up to three aspects per question:

- 1.1. What works (inside the stadium)?
- 1.2. What can be improved (inside the stadium)?
- 1.3. What works (outside the stadium)?
- 1.4. What can be improved (outside the stadium)?

2. Identify up to three policing innovative good practices adopted in Wembley that could be replicated in your national context:

- 2.1. Inside the stadium
- 2.2. Outside the stadium

3. Identify up to three policing good practices in your country that could be a reference for your counterparts of the other organising countries:

- 3.1. Inside the stadium
- 3.2. Outside the stadium

4. Final comments

Note: After collecting your replies, a final report will be drafted by the Secretariat, shared with the UK hosts and later circulated to all T-RV delegations, respecting the anonymity of the national respondents.

Annex 4 - News on the Council of Europe website

Peer-review exercise at Wembley, in the run-up to UEFA EURO 2020

WEMBLEY, LONDON 18 MAY 2019



A team of the [Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence](#) held a peer-review exercise at Wembley Stadium (London), on 18 May, during the English FA Cup Final.

This is the fourth of six planned consultative visits and peer-review exercises for the hosting countries of UEFA EURO 2020.

The aim of this exercise was to promote the exchange between police match commanders of the hosting cities of the tournament, in the light of the good practices enshrined in the [Saint-Denis Convention](#) and the [2015 Recommendation of the Standing Committee](#).

A team of police match commanders from Hungary, The Netherlands, Romania and Scotland, accompanied by the Chair of the Standing Committee (Romania), a Bureau member (Austria) and the [Secretariat of the Council of Europe](#), met with the British National Football Information Point, the London Metropolitan Police Service, the English FA and the Wembley Stadium management, and exchanged on national policies and practices in the field of safety, security and service at sports events.

Two other visits are planned during the second semester of 2019: Italy (consultative visit) and the Netherlands (peer-review exercise).

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