Draft CDDH report on the effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes

Note

1. This draft report has been prepared in view of its discussion and possible approval at the 2nd meeting of DH-SYSC-IV (9-11 September 2020) and subsequent transmission to the CDDH for consideration at its 94th meeting (Athens 3-6 November 2020).

2. The CDDH report on the effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes will then be submitted to the forthcoming high-level conference on inter-State disputes to be held in spring 2021 under the auspices of the German Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers.
## List of acronyms used in this document

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACHR</td>
<td>American Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>CDDH</td>
<td>Steering Committee for Human Rights</td>
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<td>DH-SYSC</td>
<td>Committee of Experts on the System of the European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<td>DH-SYSC-IV</td>
<td>Drafting Group on effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Rights Committee</td>
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<td>ICERD</td>
<td>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Commission of Human Rights</td>
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<td>IACtHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Court of Human Rights</td>
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<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. A growing number of cases linked to inter-State disputes which are pending before the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) have brought the question how to ensure their effective processing and resolution to the forefront of last years’ debates on tackling the caseload of the Court. The processing of inter-State cases and of the high number of individual applications, which relate to inter-State conflicts raises exceptional challenges for the Court, as these cases are particularly time-consuming for Judges and Registry staff and complex as a result of their nature and dimension.

2. It is widely recognised that the right of an individual application is a cornerstone of the system for protecting the rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). The inter-State application, on the other hand, can be seen as embodying the system of collective guarantee enshrined in the Convention. The subject-matter of inter-State applications tend to be, albeit not exclusively, in relation to particularly serious situations, often where large-scale violations of the Convention are alleged. Through its inter-State case-law the Court has played a prominent role in guaranteeing a peaceful public order in Europe and addressing the responsibility of States, from a Convention perspective, for injuries caused by their internationally wrongful acts. The Court’s case-law in inter-State cases is notable for being more extensive than under other human rights instruments. Hence, preserving the smooth functioning of the inter-State application as a distinct mode of Convention proceedings constitutes an intrinsic part of the shared responsibility of the States and of the Court to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention as well as the viability of the system of the Convention.

3. In analysing the challenges that the processing in parallel of inter-State applications and individual applications related to inter-State cases or conflicts may create this [draft] report takes a close look at the differences in procedural requirements applicable to these two types of applications. The lower admissibility requirements applicable to the inter-State application reflect the distinct features of this application which are enshrined in the Convention and established by the Court in its case-law. These include notably the unqualified right of a State to bring any alleged breaches of the Convention to the Court as well as the particular quality of the inter-State procedure as an expression of the system of the collective guarantee of the Convention. Despite complexities of the parallel processing of inter-State applications and individual applications relating to inter-State conflicts, the Court’s recent practice of prioritising inter-State applications without putting aside the examination of individual applications can help ensure the effective processing of these cases and avoids duplication or conflicting judgments. This part of the [draft] Report also highlights how the Court addresses the relationship between inter-State cases and individual cases on a substantive level, notably in respect of establishing the existence of an administrative practice in contravention of the Convention.

4. The examination of inter-State cases or individual cases relating to conflicts in parallel by the Court and other international bodies may potentially result in contradictory results concerning human rights obligations set forth in the Convention and other international human rights instruments. Ultimately this would lead to uncertainty for States as to how they can fulfill their international human rights obligations and for individuals as regards the exact scope of their rights. It may also potentially threaten the coherence of human rights law and the credibility of human rights institutions. Nevertheless, an analysis of the relevant case-law of the Court as well as a comparative outlook over the case-law of other international bodies reveals that in practice few cases relating to inter-State disputes and concerning the same events or subject-matter have
been brought in parallel before the Court and other international bodies or have in fact led to diverging or conflicting decisions.

5. A significant part of the analysis in this [draft] report is dedicated to a number of challenges relating to the establishment of the facts which are specific to the processing and resolution of inter-State cases and related individual applications. These challenges relate to the obtaining of necessary evidence *inter alia* by fact-finding missions, witness hearings and a variety of different sources of information as well as the assessment of the evidence before the Court. The analysis of the case-law of the Court with regard to the standard of proof and its fact-finding functions emphasises the principle that issues of admissibility of evidence and the establishment of the facts remain exclusively within the competence of the Court. On the other hand, States should give consideration to the question how to enhance the ways they fulfil their obligation to cooperate with the Court, notably as regards facilitating the Court’s on-the-spot investigations and ensuring witnesses’ attendance of Court hearings.

6. According to the case-law of the Court, it is the individual, and not the State, who is directly or indirectly harmed and primarily injured by a violation of one or several Convention rights. Therefore, the Court’s principle is that just satisfaction in inter-State cases should always be awarded for the benefit of individual victims. Practical difficulties encountered by the Court relate to the identification of victims when large scale violations of human rights are involved, which in turn increases the risk of awarding just satisfaction to individuals who may not be eligible for such an award. Hence, it is important that, as the Court has stated, the applicant State is, from the outset, asked to submit a list of clearly identifiable individuals who are victims of the alleged human rights violations. Moreover, there is often a time gap between the judgment on the merits and the one on just satisfaction. In order to avoid undue delays it is important that the parties exchange their observations on just satisfaction within the time that may be fixed to this end in the operative part of the judgment on the merits.

7. Lastly the [draft] report looks at friendly settlement as a possible mechanism for resolving inter-State cases. While the Court’s practice in this respect is not extensive the friendly settlement of individual applications has grown and shown some positive results in the last couple of years. This experience reveals distinct features of the mechanism such as its consensual approach and the confidential nature of negotiations which may offer opportunities not only for adopting a large variety of measures to remedy the alleged violations of the Convention and provide redress to the victims but also for taking measures that may have a wide impact on society in terms of effecting change in terms of protecting and promoting compliance with the Convention. The exchanges of views amongst independent experts and stakeholders at the High-level Conference organised by the German Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers may usefully bring more food for thought into the Council of Europe’s intergovernmental processes aimed at making proposals for a more efficient processing and resolution of cases related to inter-State disputes.
II. THE MANDATE OF DH-SYSC-IV

8. Following the Declaration adopted by the High Level Conference meeting in Copenhagen (12 and 13 April 2018, the Copenhagen Declaration), the Ministers' Deputies, at their 1317th meeting (30 May 2018), invited the CDDH to include in its report “Contribution to the evaluation provided for by the Interlaken Declaration” among other elements “proposals on how to handle more effectively cases related to inter-State disputes, as well as individual applications arising from situations of conflict between States, without thereby limiting the jurisdiction of the Court, taking into account the specific features of these categories of cases, inter alia regarding the establishment of facts”.2

9. At its 91st meeting (18-21 June 2019), the CDDH had an in-depth exchange of views on the topic3 on the basis of a (i) document prepared by its Bureau4 (ii) contributions made by the member States prior to this meeting,5 and (iii) a report by the Plenary Court on “Proposals for a more efficient processing of inter-State cases” submitted to the CDDH.6 The CDDH did not, at that stage, adopt a text on the subject matter.7

10. The Committee of Ministers adopted, at its 1361st meeting (19-21 November 2019) the terms of reference of the Committee of Experts on the System of the European Convention on Human Rights (DH-SYSC) which operates under the authority of CDDH. The DH-SYSC was given, inter alia, the specific task of developing proposals to improve the effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes in the light of the Committee of Ministers’ decision on the follow-up to the evaluation set out by the Interlaken Declaration.8

11. At its 92nd meeting (26-29 November 2019), in the framework of adopting its “Contribution to the evaluation provided for by the Interlaken Declaration”,9 the CDDH took the view that questions regarding inter-State applications require a more in-depth examination. Therefore, the CDDH considered it useful that the CDDH/DH-SYSC conduct work facilitating proposals to ensure the effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes as well as individual applications arising from situations of conflict between States, without thereby limiting the jurisdiction of the Court, taking into account the specific features of these categories of cases, inter alia regarding the establishment of facts in the next biennium.10

12. Also, at its 92nd meeting the CDDH decided to set up the Drafting Group DH-SYSC-IV to operate under the authority of the DH-SYSC with a view to submitting to the Committee of Ministers, before the 31st of December 2021, its proposals on effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes. The CDDH gave to DH-SYSC-IV the following terms of reference:

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8 See document DH-SYSC-IV(2020)01.
10 Ibid, see §§ 124.
“In the light, in particular, of the reflections carried out during the elaboration of (i) the Contribution of the CDDH to the evaluation provided for by the Interlaken Declaration[11]; (ii) the follow-up given by the CDDH to the relevant paragraphs of the Copenhagen Declaration and (iii) the CDDH Report on the place of the European Convention on Human Rights in the European and international legal order,[12] the DH-SYSC Drafting Group on effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes (DH-SYSC-IV) is called upon to elaborate proposals on how to handle more effectively cases related to inter-State disputes, as well as individual applications arising from situations of conflict between States, without thereby limiting the jurisdiction of the Court, taking into account the specific features of these categories of cases, inter alia regarding the establishment of facts. In this context and under the supervision of the Committee of Experts on the System of the European Convention on Human Rights (DH-SYSC), the Group is tasked to prepare:

- a draft CDDH report to be submitted to the forthcoming high-level expert conference on inter-State disputes in the framework of the ECHR system to be held in spring 2021 under the auspices of the German Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers 7 (deadline: 15 October 2020);
- a draft final activity report of the CDDH for the Committee of Ministers containing the reflections and possible proposals of the Steering Committee in this field (deadline: 15 October 2021).”

13. On 11 December 2019, the Deputies took note of the CDDH report “Contribution to the evaluation foreseen by the Interlaken Declaration” and agreed to transmit it to the Court for information and possible comments.13 On 12 March 2020 the Rapporteur Group on Human Rights (GR-H) held an exchange of views on this report in the light of comments received from the Court.14 A Committee of Ministers’ decision on the report is awaited in due course.

III. INTRODUCTION

1. Statistics15

14. Starting from the 7th of May 1956 when the first inter-State application was introduced 15 inter-State cases have been resolved by the European Commission of Human Rights and the Court.16 Thousands of individual applications relating to inter-State disputes have also been resolved throughout the years. The numbers of cases terminated are: 2851 in relation to the conflict in Georgia; 2357 in relation to the conflict in Ukraine; 1715 in relation to the Cyprus issue; 497 in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 109 in relation to the conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

15. Nonetheless, the number of applications linked to situations of conflict between member States continues to be high in the recent years. There are currently eight inter-State applications

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[15] This information has been provided by the Registry of the Court.
[16] The full list of inter-State applications is available at https://echr.coe.int/Documents/InterState_applications_ENG.pdf
pending before the Court with a great majority of cases linked to situations of conflict between member States\(^\text{17}\) as well as numerous related pending individual applications.

16. As regards individual applications related to the conflict in Georgia, more than 3,300 individual applications against Georgia were lodged by persons affected by the hostilities in South Ossetia at the beginning of August 2008. In the course of 2010, 5 communicated cases and 1,549 new applications belonging to that group were struck out of the Court’s list as the Court concluded that the applicants no longer wish to pursue the application within the meaning of Article 37 § 1(a) of the Convention. The Court subsequently dismissed the requests made by the applicants’ lawyers, asking the Court to reconsider its decision and to examine these cases pursuant to Article 37 § 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, 6 leading cases were declared inadmissible by a Chamber in December 2018 and 900 cases were declared inadmissible by a Single Judge in June and July 2019.

17. As a result, 435 individual applications against Georgia are still pending. Ten of them were communicated, and the applicants and the third party (the Russian Federation where the applicants are Russian nationals) submitted their observations on the admissibility and merits. Furthermore, 21 of these applications were registered, as from 2010, against both Georgia and the Russian Federation in which the applicants (Georgian nationals) complain about breaches of their Convention rights resulting from the hostilities in August 2008 and the alleged absence of adequate investigations in both States.

18. As of February 2020, the Court has also received 176 applications involving applicants from Georgia complaining against the Russian Federation, out of which 170 applications involving 845 applicants were communicated to the Russian Government for information. The Georgian Government was informed about the communication as a third party.

19. As regards individual applications related to the conflict in Ukraine, according to the information provided by the Court as of February 2020, there were a total of 6,490 pending individual applications concerning the events in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, of which 120 have been communicated\(^\text{18}\). The 6,490 applications are linked to the inter-State case *Ukraine v. Russia* (regarding Crimea), no. 20958/14 and to the inter-State case *Ukraine v. Russia* (regarding Eastern Ukraine) no. 8019/16.

- 5,590 of the 6,490 applications concerned Eastern Ukraine. 4,500 of those 5,590 applications were lodged against Ukraine and 40 of them were lodged against the Russian Federation. The remaining 1,050 applications were lodged against both countries. On 5 May 2020 the Court decided to strike out of the list 327 applications\(^\text{19}\).

- The remaining 900 of the 6,490 applications concerned Crimea. 770 of those 900 applications were lodged against the Russian Federation and 10 applications were lodged against Ukraine. 120 applications were lodged against both countries.

20. As regards individual applications related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, according to the information provided by the Court as of February 2020, there were 1,710 pending individual

\(^{17}\text{See list of inter-State applications is available at }\text{https://echr.coe.int/Documents/InterState_applications_ENG.pdf}\)

\(^{18}\text{Five of the communicated applications had been introduced against the Russian Federation only and therefore they were communicated solely to Russia. The remaining applications had been directed against both Ukraine and the Russian Federation and they were thus communicated to both Ukraine and the Russian Federation.}\)

\(^{19}\text{Yuldashev and others v. Russia and Ukraine, no. 35139/14, 5 May 2020}\)
applications; 1054 of which against Armenia and 655 against Azerbaijan. Of the 1710 applications:

- 1110 pending applications concern issues of displaced persons’ continued inability to return to their homes and property from which they fled in the years 1988-1993 involving complaints similar to those examined by the Court in the cases of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (no. 13216/05) and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (no. 40167/06). 608 applications are against Armenia and 502 applications are against Azerbaijan.

- 562 pending applications concern complaints by civilians, predominantly regarding damage and destruction of property but a handful of cases also involve the killing of civilians (439 applications are against Armenia and 123 applications are against Azerbaijan). Of these, 5 applications were communicated in July and December 2019; two applications were communicated against Armenia and two against Azerbaijan.

- 28 pending applications (5 against Armenia and 23 against Azerbaijan) concerning the mutilation of dead (mostly) soldiers’ bodies. All these cases were communicated in November 2016.

- 11 pending applications (5 cases against Azerbaijan) concerning the detention and alleged torture/killing of Armenian citizens in Azerbaijan. All these cases were communicated.

2. Challenges

21. Processing inter-State cases and the high number of related individual applications as described above, raises exceptional challenges for the Court, as these cases are particularly time-consuming for Judges and Registry Staff and complex as a result of their nature and dimension. It should be recalled that the concern about the high number of applications brought before the Court has been the central focus of the process of reforming the system of the Convention from the outset. As stated in the Copenhagen Declaration, improving the Convention system’s ability to deal with the increasing number of applications has been a principal aim of the current reform process from the very beginning. It is in connection with the need for further action to address the caseload challenges that the Copenhagen Declaration stated that “[t]he challenges posed to the Convention system by situations of conflict and crisis in Europe must also be acknowledged”.

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20 The “four-day war” in April 2016, shelling along the line of contact between Azerbaijan and the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” “NKR” has led to 1057 applications (695 against Armenia and 362 against Azerbaijan) with complaints by civilians on both sides, predominantly regarding damage and destruction of property but a handful of cases also involve the killing of civilians. One application from each side were rejected as inadmissible due to the applicants’ failure to substantiate their claims by Chamber decisions in February 2019 and a total of 346 applications (108 against Armenia and 238 against Azerbaijan) were subsequently rejected by Single Judge decisions in November 2019 (on the basis of the Chamber decisions). 147 applications against Armenia were rejected by Single Judge decisions in March 2019 for having been lodged out of time. Consequently, there remain 562 applications in this category (439 against Armenia and 123 against Azerbaijan).

21 One judgment was issued recently, namely Saribekyan and Balyan v. Azerbaijan (no. 35746/11, 30 January 2020), a request for referral to the Grand Chamber is pending. Amongst the 11 pending applications there are: 1 case against Armenia concerning the conviction for murder, espionage, etc in the “NKR” of two Azerbaijani nationals (communicated), 4 cases (1 against Armenia and 3 against Azerbaijan) relating to the killing of soldiers close to the line of contact between Azerbaijan and the “NKR” in November 2016 (all communicated) and 1 case against Armenia concerning shelling and resultant death close to the line of contact in July 2017.


23 See the Copenhagen Declaration, § 45.
22. One of the greatest challenges in inter-State cases is the establishment of facts in particular when the Court has to act as a court of first instance for lack of a prior examination of the cases by the national courts. 24 These challenges relate particularly to the obtaining of the necessary evidence *inter alia* by fact-finding missions, witness hearings, the different sources of information as well as the assessment of evidence before the Court. 25

23. Moreover, the processing in parallel of, on the one hand, inter-State cases relating to conflict situations and, on the other hand, a high number of individual applications relating to such situations raises questions regarding their prioritisation as well as in terms of avoiding inconsistencies and duplications. This is compounded by the possibility of parallel proceedings in other international bodies in respect of inter-State complaints or individual applications linked to the inter-State cases or related individual applications pending before the Court.

24. The sensitive and political nature of inter-State cases makes their friendly settlement according to Article 39 complex and difficult.

25. The Article 41 procedure is normally very complex. The absence of lists of clearly identifiable individuals by the applicant government from the outset has raised practical questions in terms of awarding just satisfaction in inter-State cases to individual victims.

26. This [draft] report approaches these issues from the perspective of the requirements of the Convention and the Rules of the Court as well as the relevant principles established by the Court in its case-law. The States’ duty to co-operate with the Court in the examination of inter-State and related individual applications is underlined wherever applicable and constitutes a transversal thread in this analysis. A comparative outlook on specific aspects of proceedings of other international bodies draws on similarities of approaches and convergences between the Court and these bodies with regard to the identified challenges; it seeks to highlight elements for possible further reflection by DH-SYSC-IV with a view to making proposals regarding the effective processing and resolution of cases relating to inter-State disputes.

**IV. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARALLEL PROCESSING OF RELATED INTER-STATE AND INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS**

27. As shown above a considerable number of individual applications relate to inter-State conflicts or inter-State applications pending before the Court. This [draft] report does not seek to elaborate how individual applications are linked to inter-State conflicts or applications as this would require a comparison and analysis of the parties in the respective proceedings, the relevant provisions of the Convention on which the parties rely, the scope of the applicants’ complaints and the types of redress sought. Such an analysis is at the discretion of the Court which is exclusively competent to assess the similarity of cases, involving the comparisons, mentioned above and to determine whether its jurisdiction is to be asserted or excluded by virtue of Article § 35 § 2(b) of the Convention. Therefore, whenever this [draft] report makes reference to related inter-State cases and individual applications, or to individual applications related to inter-State conflicts, it relies on the Court’s concept of establishing a connection between individual and inter-State applications.

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24 See also document CDDH(2019)22, § 20.
1. Specific features and categories of inter-State applications

28. This section highlights the specific features of the scope and contents of inter-state applications which distinguish them from individual applications. Article 33 of the Convention lays down, in unqualified terms, the right of any High Contracting Party to refer any alleged breach of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party to the Court. The European Commission of Human Rights characterised this right as an expression of the system of collective guarantee enshrined in the Convention rather than a mechanism for inter-State dispute resolution or to enforce the rights of States. On this view, the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention are designed to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings from infringement by any of the High Contracting Parties rather than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves. Thus, when a High Contracting Party refers an alleged breach of the Convention, this is not to be regarded as exercising a right of action for the purpose of enforcing its own rights, but rather as bringing before the Court an alleged violation of the public order of Europe. While the right of an individual application to the Court pursuant to Article 34 of the Convention is considered as a cornerstone of the system for protecting the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, the inter-State application provides an additional pathway to ensure the protection of the rights of individuals.

29. The Court acknowledges that an application brought before it under Article 33 of the Convention may contain different types of complaints pursuing different goals. Accordingly, two main categories of complaints can be distinguished. First, an applicant State Party may complain about general issues (systemic problems and shortcomings, administrative practices, etc.) in another State Party. Article 33 empowers the Contracting Parties to bring an inter-State application before the Court regardless of whether the victims of the alleged breach are nationals of the applicant State. In such cases the primary goal of the applicant Government is that of vindicating the public order of Europe within the framework of collective responsibility under the Convention even if the State's own nationals are not concerned. The Court’s judgments with regard to such claims may – as in other cases decided by the Grand Chamber – have an indirect erga omnes effect given that they may serve to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties.

30. The second category of inter-State cases involves complaints where the applicant State denounces systemic violations by another State Party of the basic human rights of its nationals. In fact such claims are substantially similar not only to those made in an individual application under Article 34 of the Convention, but also to claims filed in the context of diplomatic protection that is, "invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State."
State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility”.

31. Moreover, applications relating to **inter-State conflicts** have emerged as a third category of inter-State applications in the last ten years (see section III/1 above on statistics).

32. The requirements regarding the **content** of an inter-State application are specified in Article 46 of the Rules of the Court. In the context of its proposals for a more efficient processing of inter-State cases, the Court has observed that it is appropriate to request at the outset of the proceedings that translations of all the relevant documents to which the parties refer in their observations, in particular copies of any relevant documents and in particular the decisions, whether judicial or not, relating to the object of the application, be submitted in one of the two official languages of the Court. Overall this would save both time and resources. Rule 46 (g) could thus be amended accordingly, by asking the Rules Committee to come up with a concrete proposal which would help to determine, in particular, which documents should be translated by the parties. The Court has started to implement these recommendations.

33. From the applicant State’s perspective it appears that it would be feasible to provide at the outset at least translated summaries of all documents it has submitted pursuant to Rule 46 (g) into one of the official languages of the Court rather than translations of all such documents. The Court would be better placed to determine on the basis of the summaries which documents are relevant to be translated in full and, thereafter, request the applicant State to provide such translations.

**2. The Court’s practice with regard to the admissibility of inter-State applications and individual applications**

34. Inter-State applications are subject to fewer admissibility requirements than individual applications. While the criteria established in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention apply to both individual and inter-State applications those set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same provision apply to individual applications only.

35. The **six-months rule** as stipulated in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention applies in the same manner to both types of applications.

36. Similarly, the requirement of **exhaustion of domestic remedies**, also established in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, applies to both the individual and the inter-State application. In respect of the inter-State application, the Court ascertains whether the persons concerned could have availed themselves of effective remedies to secure redress, having particular regard whether the existence of any remedies is sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice and whether there are any special circumstances which absolve the persons concerned by the instant application from the obligation to exhaust the remedies. The rule on the exhaustion of domestic remedies does not apply where the existence of administrative practice, namely a repetition of acts incompatible with the Convention, and official tolerance by the State, has been shown to exist and is of such a nature as to make proceedings futile or ineffective. For example, in the

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34 *Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) [GC]*, no. 25781/94, § 45, 12 May 2014.
36 *Cyprus v. Turkey (merits) [GC]*, no. 25781/94, § 99, 10 May 2001.
37 *Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC]*, no. 13255/07, 3 July 2014, p. 125. The Court defines administrative practice as comprising two elements: the repetition of acts and official tolerance. As to the repetition of acts, the Court describes these as an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected not to amount to
case of *Ireland v. United Kingdom*, the Commission found that the employment of interrogation techniques in violation of Article 3 of Convention constituted administrative practice and that consequently the rule on the exhaustion of domestic remedies did not apply.\(^{38}\) In the case of *Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece*\(^{39}\) the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, according to the generally recognised rules of international law did not apply taking into consideration that the object of that inter-State application was the determination of the compatibility with the Convention of legislative measures and administrative practices in Greece.\(^{40}\) The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies may also be found inapplicable in respect of individual applications where it can be established that an administrative practice existed.\(^{41}\) In respect of individual applications, the Court has taken into account new remedies introduced after the date on which the application is lodged provided that individuals have reasonable time to familiarise themselves with the judicial decision.\(^{42}\)

37. The admissibility criteria set out in Article 35 § 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention do not apply to inter-State applications, which therefore, cannot be declared inadmissible as *manifestly ill-founded*. However, this cannot prevent the Court at the admissibility stage from establishing whether it has any competence at all to deal with the matter brought before it, under the general principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by international tribunals.\(^{43}\) Similarly the admissibility criteria of proving *victim status* is applicable only to individual applications not inter-State applications.


\(^{40}\) Ibid, § 8.

\(^{41}\) *Donnelly and others v. United Kingdom*, nos. 5577-83/72, second admissibility decision, § 3, 15 December 1975; *Akolvar and others v. Turkey* no. 21893/93, § 67 and 68, 16 October 1996; *Aksoy v. Turkey* no. 21987/93, § 52, 18 December 1996.

\(^{42}\) The assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the state of the proceedings on the date on which the application was lodged with the Court. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions following the creation of new remedies. The Court has applied this exception in in cases concerning the length of proceedings (*Predil Anstalt v. Italy* (dec.) no. 31993/96 (French only); *Bottaro v. Italy* (dec.), no. 56288/00 (French only); *Andrašik and Others v. Slovakia* (dec.), no. 57984/00; *Nogolica v. Croatia* (dec.), no. 77784/01; *Brusco v. Italy* (dec.), no. 1468/07 (French only); *Korenjak v. Slovenia* (dec.), §§ 66-71; *Techniki Olympiaki A.E. v. Greece* (dec.); in cases concerning a new compensatory remedy in respect of interferences with property rights (*Charzyński v. Poland* (dec.); *Michalak v. Poland* (dec.); *Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey* (dec.) [GC]); in cases concerning failure to execute domestic judgments (*Nagovitsyn and Nalgiev v. Russia* (dec.), §§ 36-40; *Balan v. Moldova* (dec.)); in cases concerning prison overcrowding (*Łatak v. Poland* (dec.); *Stella and Others v. Italy* (dec.), §§ 42-45).

\(^{43}\) *Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec)*, no. 38263/08, § 64, 13 December 2011.

merely isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system. By official tolerance is meant that illegal acts are tolerated in that the superiors of those immediately responsible, though cognisant of such acts, take no action to punish them or to prevent their repetition; or that a higher authority, in face of numerous allegations, manifests indifference by refusing any adequate investigation of their truth or falsity, or that in judicial proceedings a fair hearing of such complaints is denied. Any action taken by the higher authority must be on a scale which is sufficient to put an end to the repetition of acts or to interrupt the pattern or system. It is inconceivable that the higher authorities of a State should be, or at least should be entitled to be, unaware of the existence of such a practice. Furthermore, under the Convention those authorities are strictly liable for the conduct of their subordinates; they are under a duty to impose their will on their subordinates and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure that it is respected.
3. Procedural questions

38. Arguably, differences in admissibility criteria applicable to inter-State applications and individual applications which are lodged for the protection of the same individuals lead to different conditions for the protection of the rights and freedoms of individual applicants before the Court, depending on whether the application is lodged by individuals or by a State for their protection. This could raise a question in view of the objectives of the Convention which guarantees equal protection to all individuals. 44

39. This question does not appear to have emerged in proceedings before the Court or to have been addressed in the case-law of the Court. However, reference could be made to the distinct inherent features of Article 33 of the Convention (see section IV/1 above), notably the fact that it is an expression of the system of collective guarantee of the Convention and that the right of State Parties to refer alleged breaches of the Convention to the Court is enshrined in this provision of the Convention in unqualified terms.

40. The admissibility requirements applicable to applications lodged under Article 33 of the Convention, as they have been set out in Article 35 § 1, reflect the inherent features and the specific function of inter-State applications in the Convention system, which enable the State Parties to protect the public order of Europe within the framework of collective responsibility under the Convention. Inter-State applications remain ultimately concerned with the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals. On this view, in lodging an inter-State application, a State is not so much exercising a right of action for the purpose of enforcing its own rights, but rather as bringing before the Court an alleged violation of the public order of Europe (see section IV/1 above).

41. Another set of procedural questions points to various aspects of the relationship between inter-State applications and individual applications. Firstly, a question is raised whether an inter-State application may be permitted to be lodged if individual applications in the connection with the same events are pending before the Court. 45 The Court has held that an inter-State application does not deprive individual applicants of the possibility of introducing or pursuing their own claims. 46 It is the Court’s recent prioritisation practice, where an inter-State case is pending, that individual applications raising the same issues or deriving from the same underlying circumstances are, in principle and in so far as practicable, not decided before the overarching issues stemming from the inter-State proceedings have been determined in the inter-State case. 47 This does not mean that the Court puts these cases aside. The Court instead identifies and examines in a systematic manner individual applications relating to inter-State cases in parallel with inter-State cases as well as individual applications relating to inter-State conflicts (in the absence of inter-State cases) and may make decisions it considers appropriate such as declaring inadmissible those which are manifestly ill-founded. 48 Recently the Court also decided that any individual applications related to inter-State cases which were not declared inadmissible or

45 Ibid.
46 Varnava and others v. Turkey, nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, §§ 118 and 119, 18 September 2009.
47 See Copenhagen Declaration, § 45. See also Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia, nos. 14594/07 and 6 others, § 4, 20 December 2016; and Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court in respect of the case of Ukraine v. Russia, ECHR 432 (2018), 17 December 2018.
48 Lisnyy and others v. Ukraine and Russia nos. 5355/15, 44913/15 et 50852/15, 5 July 2016.
out at the outset were to be communicated to the appropriate respondent Government or Governments for observations in parallel with the inter-State case.49

42. A second question is raised with regard to the **potential risks of duplication and inconsistencies** stemming from the processing in parallel of inter-State and individual applications lodged in connection with the same events.50 Arguably, there would be “double jeopardy of [the respondent] State when following a finding of violation of the rights of particular individuals in an inter-State application the Court finds violations of the Convention rights of the same persons under the same circumstances under proceedings instituted on an individual application.”51 The Court’s recent practice is that the Convention only entails a prohibition of “double jeopardy of [the respondent] state” in so far as pursuant to Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention the Court shall not deal with any application that “is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.”52 For an application to be "substantially the same", the Court considers whether the two applications brought before it by the applicants relate essentially to the same persons, the same facts and the same complaints.53 As regards the examination of the second limb of Article 35 § 2 (b) see section V/1 below.

43. The Court’s prioritisation policy explained in the paragraph 41 above aims at avoiding potential duplication and inconsistencies as well as managing resources more efficiently.

44. Moreover, the Court’s methodology to take into account findings or conclusions reached in inter-State proceedings in related individual applications is also conducive to avoiding any potential inconsistencies and duplications. For example, as explained above a previous finding of administrative practice in contravention of the Convention may render the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies inapplicable to both inter-State and individual applications (see paragraph 36 above). The establishment of the existence of an administrative practice in an inter-State case may also have a bearing on the Court’s subsequent consideration of the burden of proof in individual applications arising from the same subject matter. It appears that the Court in *Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia*, having previously concluded in the inter-State case of *Georgia v. Russia* that an administrative practice existed, created a rebuttable presumption that an applicant in any following individual application arising from the same subject matter was concerned by the same administrative practice. Consequently, in these situations the Court reversed the burden of proof to the respondent State.54

45. Another set of questions arguably stemming from the lower requirements of admissibility in inter-State cases compared to individual applications points to potential issues of identification and representation of alleged victims of violations of the Convention by the State. Notably when lodging an inter-State application for the protection of the human rights of specific persons, the applicant State has the obligation to identify the alleged victims and to submit to the Court duly issued documents confirming the declaration of authority by those persons to be represented before the Court by the applicant State. The person who is represented before the Court must (i) be aware of the fact that he/she is represented by that State before the Court, (ii) regard

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49 See [Press Release](#) quoted above, note 47.
51 *Shioshvili and others v Russia* no. 19356/07, § 44, 20 December 2016.
52 Ibid. §§ 46, 47.
53 *Vojnović v. Croatia* (dec.), no. 4819/10, 26 June 2012, § 28; *Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2)* [GC], § 63; *Amarandei and Others v. Romania*, no. 1443/10, 26 July 2016, §§ 106-111 (French only).
54 *Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia*, quoted above, § 49.
him/herself as a victim of violation of the Convention and (iii) be willing for the State represents his/her interests before the Court.\textsuperscript{55} As it has been noted above (see paragraph 37) the admissibility criteria of proving \textit{victim status} is, pursuant to Article 35 § 3 (b), applicable only to individual applications not inter-State applications. With a view to improving the efficiency of processing inter-State applications the Court has noted that in connection with the application of Article 41 of the Convention to inter-State cases, the applicant State should, from the outset, be asked to submit the list of clearly identifiable individuals. This will ensure that if just satisfaction is afforded in an inter-State case, it should always be done for the benefit of individual victims.\textsuperscript{56} Whilst accepting that such information is necessary for the Court to have before it when dealing with just satisfaction, the requirement that it be lodged at the beginning of the application places a high threshold requirement on the applicant State.

\textbf{4. Comparative elements}

46. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which monitors the implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) by its State Parties examines both state-to-state complaints (Article 11 of the Convention) as well as complaints filed by individuals or groups of individuals claiming to be victims of racial discrimination by their State (Article 14 of the Convention). In 2018 the CERD received for the first time three communications under Article 11, namely \textit{State of Qatar vs. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the State of Qatar vs. United Arab Emirates; and the State of Palestine vs. State of Israel}. On 27 August 2019, CERD decided that it has jurisdiction and declared the first two communications admissible. On 12 December 2019, the CERD decided that it has jurisdiction over the third communication. No applications relating to these are filed under Article 14 of the ICERD. Therefore, up until now parallel proceedings of individual and state-to-state complaints have not occurred before the CERD Committee.

47. In respect of the inter-American system of human rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is a principal and autonomous organ of the Organization of American States (OAS) whose mission is to promote and protect human rights in the North and South America. It is composed of seven independent members who serve in a personal capacity. The Charter of the OAS establishes the IACHR as one of its principal organs whose function is to promote the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the OAS in these matters. The IACHR examines individual and state petitions and monitors the human rights situation in the member States of the Organisation of American States. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), constitutes the second main pillar of human rights protection in the inter-American system. The Court is composed of seven judges, nationals of OAS member States. The IACtHR has jurisdiction over all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) that are submitted to it, provided that the State Parties have recognised such jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{57} It also has a consultative role regarding the interpretation of the ACHR or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.\textsuperscript{58}

48. Only State Parties to the ACHR and the IACHR are empowered to lodge cases with the IACtHR.\textsuperscript{59} Individual petitioners seeking redress for human rights violations not dealt with at the

\textsuperscript{55} See comments of the Russian Federation contained in document \textbf{CDDH(2019)12}, § 3.2.
\textsuperscript{57} Article 62 (3) of the \textbf{American Convention on Human Rights}.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., Article 64 (1).
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., Article 61 (1).
domestic level are entitled to submit their complaint to the IACHR.\textsuperscript{60} There are two complaints procedures before the IACHR. The ACHR provides for individual complaint in its Article 44 which states that any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the OAS, may lodge petitions with the IACHR containing denunciations or complaints of violation of the ACHR by a State Party. Inter-State complaints can be filed under Article 45 of the ACHR which provides that any State Party may, when it deposits its instrument of ratification of or adherence to the ACHR, or at any later time, declare that it recognises the competence of the IACHR to receive and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State Party has committed a violation of a human right set forth in the ACHR. The communications presented by virtue of this article may be admitted and examined only if they are presented by a State Party that has made a declaration recognizing the aforementioned competence of the IACHR. The IACHR does not admit any communication against a State Party that has not made such a declaration.\textsuperscript{61}

49. The IACHR considers inadmissible any petition or communication submitted under Articles 44 or 45 if, \textit{inter alia}, the petition or communication is substantially the same as one previously dealt with by the IACHR or by another international organization\textsuperscript{62} and if the subject of the petition or communication is pending in another international proceeding for settlement.\textsuperscript{63} Given that the same grounds of inadmissibility apply to individual or inter-State petitions or communications no procedural questions regarding potential inconsistencies or duplications resulting from parallel processing of inter-State and individual complaints seem to arise. Also, relevant literature does not seem to have identified any practical issues in this respect.

V. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PLURALITY OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS

50. Inter-State proceedings before the Court cannot be considered in isolation from the constellation of inter-State dispute settlement or litigation before international bodies which function independently of each other in the framework of international treaties on specific human rights matters. Such broader availability of dispute settlement mechanisms may potentially lead to duplications or multiplications of proceedings concerning the same or similar disputes between the same parties. Conceptually, duplications or even conflicting outcomes in respect of cases relating to inter-State disputes may materialise in two main scenarios. The first concerns the existence of an individual application relating to an inter-State dispute before the Court and the existence of an individual case between the same parties, the same facts and the same or similar claims before another international dispute settlement mechanism. The second scenario concerns the existence of an inter-State case before the Court and an inter-State case between the same parties, on the same facts and bringing the same or similar claims before another international dispute settlement mechanism.

51. In connection with the latter scenario, conceptually, two main categories of international dispute mechanisms could be distinguished. The \textit{first category} would encompass those

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., Article 44.
\textsuperscript{61} The States that have declared to accept the competence of the IACHR to receive and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State Party has committed a violation of the human rights established in the ACHR include, Chile, Ecuador, Jamaica, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
\textsuperscript{62} Article 47(d) of the ACHR.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., Article 46§1(c).
procedures established on the basis of international human rights instruments which range from negotiation and conciliation to resolution of disputes by the relevant committees or the ICJ. A typical mechanism for resolving inter-State complaints is the Human Rights Committee (HRC) which monitors the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). No inter-State complaint has been submitted to the HRC. Some other international human rights instruments set out procedures for the Committees established thereunder to consider complaints from one State party which considers that another State party is not giving effect to the provisions of the Convention or not fulfilling obligations thereunder, whenever the State parties have made declarations accepting the competence of the relevant Committee in this regard. These are the examples of the Committee Against Torture (CAT) monitoring the implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (Article 21), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights monitoring the implementation of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 10) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure (Article 12). Some of these instruments such as the ICERD (Articles 11-13) and the ICCPR (Articles 41-43) set out elaborate procedures for the resolution of disputes between State parties over a State’s fulfilment of its obligations under the relevant instrument through the establishment of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission. The procedures apply only to State parties which have made declarations accepting the competence of the relevant Committees in this respect. Moreover, the ICERD (Article 22), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment AT—(Article 30) provide that inter-State disputes concerning the interpretation or application of some of these instruments may be referred to the ICJ if the parties fail to resolve them in the first instance by negotiation, or failing that, by arbitration. State parties may exclude themselves from this procedure by making a declaration at the time of ratification or accession, in which case, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, they are barred from bringing cases against other State parties. The second category of international dispute mechanisms would encompass other dispute resolution mechanisms not exclusively established under a human rights treaty such as the ICJ and fact-finding commissions.

52. The two scenarios described in para 50 above regarding the existence of multiple proceedings of cases related to inter-State disputes before the Court and other international dispute settlement mechanisms are dealt with below. They are approached from the perspective of the applicable Convention requirements, respectively Article 35 § 2 (b) and Article 55, as well as the relevant Court’s practice, highlighting wherever applicable cases in which issues of multiple or parallel international proceedings have arisen in practice. The last part of this section offers some comparative perspectives into how other international human rights bodies address questions related to plurality of international proceedings in respect of inter-State cases and in respect of individual cases in general.

1. Individual applications submitted to the Court and another international procedure

53. Potential risks of duplication and/or diverging decisions in respect of substantially the same case may arise in situations when there are inter-State and individual applications pending before the Court and cases pending before other international bodies which may, at least, in part concern
the same subject-matter and relate to the same individuals. Parallel procedures could result in the adoption of contradictory decisions or overlapping jurisdiction, leading to legal uncertainty.

54. The second limb of Article 35 § 2 (b) provides that the Court shall not deal with any individual application where it “has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement”. This provision intends to avoid a situation where several international bodies would be simultaneously dealing with applications which are substantially the same. This would be incompatible with the spirit and the letter of the Convention, which seeks to avoid a plurality of international proceedings relating to the same cases. The Court examines this matter on its own motion. In determining whether its jurisdiction is excluded by virtue of Article 35 § 2 (b) the Court decides whether the case before it is substantially the same as a matter that has already been submitted to a parallel set of proceedings and, if that is the case, whether the simultaneous proceedings may be seen as “another procedure of international investigation or settlement” within of Article 35 § 2 (b).

55. The Court verifies, as it is the case with the first limb of Article 35 § 2 (b) (see paragraph 42 above), whether the applications to the different international institutions concern substantially the same persons, facts and complaints. If the complainants before the two institutions are not identical the application to the Court cannot be considered as being “substantially the same as a matter that has been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement”. However, the Court has recently held that a complaint brought by a trade union under a procedure of the International Labour Organisation was substantially the same as an individual application brought under the Convention by officers of the union in their own names. The Court based its findings on the close association of the substance of the proceedings and also the status of the individuals as officers of the trade union. Allowing them to maintain their action before the Court would therefore have been tantamount to circumventing Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention.

56. The Court’s examination of the concept of another procedure of international investigation or settlement ascertains whether the nature of the supervisory body, the procedure it follows and the effect of its decisions are such that the Court’s jurisdiction is excluded by virtue of the second limb of Article 35 § 2 (b). The Court has held that a procedure before the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was indeed a “procedure of international investigation or

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65 This point was raised by the Russian Federation delegation, see document CDDH(2019)12, § 3.1. and 3.2
66 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, no. 14902/04, § 520, 20 September 2011; Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, no. 20347/07, § 37, 5 July 2016. (French only).
67 POA and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 59253/11, § 27, 21 May 2013.
68 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, quoted above, § 520; Gürdeniz c. Turquie (dec.) (French only), no. 59715/10, §§ 39-40, 18 March 2014; Doğan and Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.) (French only), nos. 28484/10, 58223/10, § 20, 14 May 2019.
70 Folgerø and Others v. Norway (dec.), no. 15472/02, 14 February 2006; Savda c. Turquie (French only), no. 42730/05, § 68, 12 June 2012; Gürdeniz c. Turquie (dec.) (French only), no. 59715/10, § 37, 18 March 2014; Kavala v. Turkey, no. 28749/18, 10 December 2019.
71 POA and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec), quoted above, §§ 30-32.
72 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, quoted above, § 522; De Pace v. Italy (French only), no. 22728/03, §§ 25-28, 17 July 2008; Karoussiots v. Portugal, §§ 62 and 65-76; Doğan and Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.) (French only), quoted above, § 2.
settlement”.73 Whereas proceedings before the European Commission pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) could not be understood as constituting procedures of investigation or settlement within the meaning of Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention.74 The Court has found the Inter-Parliamentary Union to be a non-governmental organisation that does not qualify as “another procedure”; the term “another procedure” referred to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings similar to those set up by the Convention, and the term “international investigation or settlement” denoted institutions and procedures set up by States, thus excluding non-governmental bodies.75

2. Inter-State applications submitted to the Court and another means of dispute settlement

57. Generally speaking, the Court will take into account the decision or investigation results of other international bodies and seek to remain within the confines of its jurisdiction when dealing with inter-State cases and to avoid as far as possible encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other international bodies.76 Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention does not apply to inter-State cases.77 Objections as to the admissibility of an inter-State application by the Court on account of settling a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention by means of other international procedures may, however, be raised under Article 55 of the Convention.78 According to this provision of the Convention, State Parties are prevented from submitting a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention to a means of settlement other than those provided for in the Convention except by special agreement. In practice, such disputes relate primarily to the inter-State application procedure.79 According to Article 55 the State Parties to the Convention should utilise only the procedure established by the Convention in respect of complaints against another Contracting Party to the Convention relating to an alleged violation of a right which in substance is covered both by the Convention (or its protocols) and by the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it being understood that the UN procedure may be invoked in relation to rights not guaranteed in the European Convention (or its protocols) or in relation to States which are not Parties to the European Convention.”

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73 Peraldi v. France (dec.), no. 2096/05, 7 April 2009; Gürdeniz c. Turquie (dec.) (French only), no. 59715/10, § 37, 18 March 2014; Selahattin Demirtas v. Turkey (no. 2) n°14305/17, 20 November 2018; Kavala v. Turkey, no. 28749/18, 10 December 2019.
74 Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no. 23205/08, 1 February 2011.
77 Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec.), no. 38263/08, § 79, 13 December 2011.
78 The only case in which the Court has pronounced itself on Article 55 is the Commission’s decision on admissibility in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey, no.25781/94, part III.
79 This is also implicit in the provisions of the Committee of Ministers’ Resolution (70) 17 adopted by the Ministers’ Deputies on 15 May 1970 ‘UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights: Procedure for dealing with inter-state complaints’.
80 See Committee of Ministers’ Resolution (70) 17 adopted by the Ministers’ Deputies on 15 May 1970 ‘UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights: Procedure for dealing with inter-state complaints’. The Committee of Ministers [d]eclare[d] that, ‘as long as the problem of interpretation of Article 62 of the European Convention [current Article 55] is not resolved, States Parties to the Convention which ratify or accede to the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and make a declaration under Article 41 of the Covenant should normally utilise only the procedure established by the European Convention in respect of complaints against another Contracting Party to the European Convention relating to an alleged violation of a right which in substance is covered both by the European Convention (or its protocols) and by the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it being understood that the UN procedure may be invoked in relation to rights not guaranteed in the European Convention (or its protocols) or in relation to States which are not Parties to the European Convention.”
State Party concerned is given only upon the consent of both parties concerned and in exceptional circumstances. 81

58. The principle established in Article 55 is that the Convention institutions have a monopoly on deciding disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Convention. The State Parties agree not to avail themselves of other treaties, conventions and declarations in force between them for the purpose of submitting such disputes to other means of settlement. Only exceptionally is a departure from this principle permitted, subject to the existence of a special agreement between the State Parties concerned, permitting the submission of the dispute-concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention to an alternative means of settlement by way of petition. 82

59. Article 55, while not entirely excluding the possibility that inter-State disputes involving human rights issues are brought and addressed in other international bodies, creates a barrier for State Parties which are not satisfied with the judgments of the Court in an inter-State case to “appeal” such judgments to another international body. Because of the principle of monopoly established in Article 55 as well as the significance of this provision of the Convention in respect of ensuring the separation between the system of the Convention and other international dispute settlement mechanisms it was necessary to include an interpretation of Article 55 in the “Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” The Draft Revised Agreement states in its Article 5 that proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union do not constitute a means of dispute settlement within the meaning of Article 55 of the Convention. 83 Therefore, Article 55 of the Convention does not prevent the operation of the rule set out in Article 344 of the TFEU. 84 Also, while Article 55 gives the Court a monopoly in respect of the interpretation and application of the Convention it does not preclude the possibility for State parties to the Convention to seek resolution of their disputes before international non-human rights bodies. 85

3. Comparative perspectives

3.1. The International Court of Justice

60. The ICJ Statute does not contain specific provisions regarding situations when proceedings on the same issues are brought before multiple international tribunals or bodies. The ICJ,

81 *Cyprus v. Turkey*, no. 25781/94, decision of the Commission, part III.
82 Ibid.
84 Article 344 of the TFEU states that: “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.”
85 On 16 January 2017, Ukraine filed an *application* against the Russian Federation with the ICJ with regard to violations of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the ICERD. On the 8 November 2019, the ICJ *found* that it has jurisdiction on the basis of Article 24, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, to entertain the claims made by Ukraine under this Convention. Also, the ICJ found that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 22 of the ICERD to entertain the claims made by Ukraine under this Convention, and that the application in relation to those claims is admissible. On 16 September 2016, Ukraine served on the Russian Federation a Notification and Statement of Claim in an Arbitration under Annex VII to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in respect of a “dispute concerning coastal state rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait.” On 21 February 2020 the Arbitral Tribunal had issued an award concerning preliminary objections of the Russian Federation, see *PCA Case No. 2017-06*. 
however, has resorted to the general principles of law, notably *lis pendens* and *res judicata* to address the question of conflicting judgments. For example the Permanent Court of International Justice in the *Polish Upper Silesia Case* stated that the objective of the *lis pendens* doctrine is to prevent the possibility of conflicting judgments; if a case is pending before a competent tribunal, it is prohibited to commence another set of competing proceedings concerning the same dispute before another judicial body.  

61. In the case *Nicaragua v. Colombia*, one of Columbia’s preliminary objections to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the ICJ was that it had already decided Nicaragua’s claim in Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the ICJ’s judgment of 2012 in the case of *Nicaragua v. Colombia*. The Court noted that *res judicata* was a general principle of law that was reflected in Articles 59 and 60 of the ICJ Statute, which protects at the same time the judicial function of a court or tribunal and the parties to a case which has led to a judgment that is final and without appeal. For this principle to apply it is not sufficient that the case at issue is characterised by the same parties, object and legal ground; it is also necessary to ascertain the content of the decision, the finality of which is to be guaranteed. The ICJ could not be satisfied merely by an identity between requests successively submitted to it by the same parties; it must determine whether and to what extent the first claim has already been definitively settled.

62. The instances of inter-State cases being considered in parallel by the ICJ and the Court so far have not raised practical difficulties about conflicting judgments or legal uncertainty. On 12 August 2008, Georgia instituted proceedings before the ICJ against the Russian Federation relating to its actions on and around the territory of Georgia in breach of the CERD relying on Article 22 of this instrument. On 6 February 2009 Georgia had lodged the formal application with the Court alleging that the Russian Federation had allowed or caused an administrative practice to develop in violation of Articles 2, 3, 5, 8 and 13 of the Convention, and of Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 and of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 through indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians and their property in the two autonomous regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – by the Russian army and/or the separatist forces placed under their control. The case was communicated on 27 March 2009.

63. The respondent Party in the ICJ’s proceedings did not raise any objections before the ICJ in connection with the parallel proceedings of the case *Georgia v. Russia* before the Court. In its judgment of 1 April 2011 the ICJ considered that Article 22 of the CERD could not serve as a basis to find the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the case. However, in the proceedings before the Court the respondent Government drew the Court’s attention to the risk of a conflict of case-law between the Court and the ICJ if the former were to declare the application by Georgia admissible, which

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86 *German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia* (Germany. v. Poland.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 (Aug 19 25).
87 *Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast* (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 100
88 *Territorial and Maritime Dispute* (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 719
89 *Nicaragua v. Colombia*, quoted above, p. 100, § 59.
90 Article 22 provides that “[a]ny dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.”
91 *Georgia v. Russia (II)* (dec.), no. 38263/08, § 10, 13 December 2011.
92 The ICJ could not find jurisdiction in the case because of the absence of a dispute relating to matters falling under CERD prior to 9 August 2008 (that is prior to the day on which Georgia submitted its application with ICJ), the negotiations which took place after that date could not be said to have covered such matters, and were thus of no relevance to the ICJ’s examination of the Russian Federation’s second preliminary objection regarding non-fulfillment of procedural requirements under Article 22.
would jeopardise the legal foreseeability required under international law.\textsuperscript{93} The Court observed that in a judgment of 1 April 2011 the ICJ held that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application lodged with it by Georgia on 12 August 2008 under the ICERD. Noting that the procedure before the ICJ had ended and that Article 35 § 2 of the Convention applies only to individual applications the Court dismissed the respondent Government’s objection (see also paragraph 48 above).\textsuperscript{94}

3.2. The Inter-American System of Human Rights

64. As it has been already mentioned (see paragraph 49 above) the IACHR considers any petition or communication submitted under Article 45 to be inadmissible if the subject of the petition or communication is pending in another international proceeding for settlement.\textsuperscript{95} In the same line Article 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR provides that a petition cannot be considered by the IACHR if its subject matter is pending settlement before an international governmental organization or, if it duplicates a petition pending or already examined and settled by the IACHR or another international governmental organisation.

65. The IACHR elaborated on this rule in the case \textit{Roberto Moreno Ramos v. United States}\textsuperscript{96} which concerned proceedings before the ICJ regarding allegations of violations of international obligations by the United States of America in respect of Mexico under Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations based upon its procedures in arresting, detaining, convicting, and sentencing 54 Mexican nationals on death row. The IACHR held that duplication exists when the application involves the same person, the same legal claims and guarantees and the same facts. It is up to the State raising the objection to substantiate the juridical requirements regarding duplication. Claims brought in respect of different victims or brought regarding the same individual but concerning facts and guarantees not previously presented and which are not reformulations, will not in principle be barred by the prohibition of duplication of claims.

66. The IACHR found that the parties involved in the proceedings before it and the ICJ and the legal claims raised before both tribunals were not the same. While the claims in both proceedings are similar, to the extent that they require consideration of compliance by the United States with its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, this matter is raised in two different contexts; the ICJ is asked to adjudicate upon the United States’ international responsibility to the state of Mexico for violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, while the IACHR is asked to evaluate the implications of any failure to provide Mr. Moreno Ramos with consular information and notification for his individual right to due process and to a fair trial under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The IACHR has followed the same reasoning in other cases.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec.)}, quoted above, § 77. The respondent Government stated that “[i]n particular, the complaints lodged under Article 14 taken in conjunction with other provisions of the Convention – concerning alleged discriminatory attacks directed against civilians of Georgian origin – were outside the scope of the present application because they were not based on the Convention and were already the subject of examination by the ICJ. As the Court could not examine those issues, which were important for an understanding of the case as a whole, it should not examine the events related to them.”

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec.)}, quoted above, § 79.

\textsuperscript{95} Article 46 § 1 (c) of the \textit{ACHR}.


3.3. The Human Rights Committee

67. Tasked with overseeing the implementation of the ICCPR the HRC may consider individual communications that allege a violation of individual’s rights under the ICCPR if the State is a party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. The HRC is barred under Article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol from examining communications which are simultaneously examined with by another international body. However, the HRC may examine communications which have been considered previously elsewhere, even when a decision on the merits has already been issued. Hence, the Committee can consider complaints already examined by the Court or other international bodies. In order to prevent the possibility of successive applications, 18 Council of Europe member States have made reservations against the competence of the HRC to re-examine communications already considered under an alternative international procedure.

68. The HRC’s long-standing jurisprudence regarding cases when the complainant has lodged a communication concerning the same events with the Court is that it does not consider a matter that has been examined by another international body within the meaning of respective reservations to Article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol if the case has previously been declared inadmissible by the Court solely on procedural grounds. When the Court has based its decision on inadmissibility not solely on procedural grounds but also on reasons that include a certain consideration of the merits of a case, then the same matter should be deemed to have been examined within the meaning of the respective reservations to article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol.

69. Based on this interpretation of Article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol the HRC has indeed proceeded with the consideration of the merits of complaints concerning the same facts, applicants and rights which had been previously declared inadmissible by the Court. In this context the HRC has in a number of cases reached different conclusions from the Court, for example, with regard to the same claims of violations of rights as a consequence of the application of domestic legislation prohibiting women from concealing their faces in public.

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98 Article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol provides that the Human Rights Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. State Parties to the ICCPR may and have indeed entered reservations to this provision.


100 See Communication CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016, 17 October 2018, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2807/2016 submitted by Miriana Hebbadj, State Party France, see paragraph 6.3. See also CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016, 7 December 2018, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2747/2016, submitted by Sonia Yaker, State Party France, paragraph 6.2. At the time of ratification of the ICCPR France entered the following reservation: “France makes a reservation to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), specifying that the Human Rights Committee shall not have competence to consider a communication from an individual if the same matter is being examined or has already been considered under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.”


to and the least restrictive means of achieving that goal; consequently there had been no violation of the freedom religion of the applicants.\(^{103}\)

70. The parties in this case as well as the HRC had indeed referred to the previous ruling of the Court. Nonetheless, the HRC concluded that the prohibition had violated the applicants’ freedom of religion and their right to non-discrimination under the ICCPR.\(^{104}\) Subsequently, the Chair of the HRC has commented that the decisions of the HRC were informed by the parallel judgment of the Court and follows to a large extent the reasoning of the latter. However, the Court follows a margin of appreciation doctrine and the HRC applies universal standards across a much more diverse constituency. Conflicting decisions pose difficulties for State compliance and for the development of international human rights law. For individual cases the fact that another human rights body has formed a position on the factual and legal issues at stake does carry weight, although such considerations may not be fully dispositive of the matter.\(^{105}\)

71. The HRC has also considered that any ongoing enforcement proceedings of a final judgment of the Court shall also be taken into consideration when assessing whether the same matter is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.\(^{106}\) In the case *Paksas v. Lithuania*, the same applicant submitted a communication before the HRC after the final judgment of the Court.\(^{107}\) In its consideration of admissibility, the Committee considered that the part of the communication which related to the author’s lifelong disqualification from parliamentary office was inadmissible under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol because “this matter is currently being actively supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe”.\(^{108}\) Therefore, even if a final judgment has been rendered by an international tribunal, the supervision process should be taken into account. However, in this particular case the HRC considered that it was not prevented from considering the claims which the Court had declared incompatible *ratione materiae* with the Convention.\(^{109}\) Consequently, the Committee concluded that the applicant’s claim related to his disqualification from other offices than in Parliament was admissible.

72. With regard to a complaint concerning a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention the Court has reached conclusions that differed from those of the HRC, which had previously found a violation of Article 14 § 3 (d) ICCPR in respect of the same facts and complainant.\(^{110}\)

73. The CDDH has already analysed in depth issues related to overlapping jurisdiction of the Court and the UN treaty bodies, one or possibly several of them, as a case may easily fall under both the comprehensive treaties (the Convention and the ICCPR), but also under subject-specific UN conventions.\(^{111}\) Whilst it has noted that the existence of parallel human rights protection mechanisms was often a source of enrichment and enhancement of the universal protection of

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\(^{103}\) *S.A.S. v France* (merits and just satisfaction) [GC], no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014. See also Communications CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 and CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016 quoted above.

\(^{104}\) See Communications CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 and CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016 quoted above.


\(^{107}\) *Paksas v. Lithuania* [GC], no. 34932/04, 6 January 2011.


\(^{109}\) Ibid, § 7.3.

\(^{110}\) *Correia de Matos v. Portugal* [GC], no. 56402/12, 4 April 2018.

human rights, it could also lead to certain problems. These include the potential for duplication and/or conflicting findings; forum shopping; as well as the legal uncertainty for State parties on how to best fulfill their human rights commitments under the Convention and other international instruments. The CDDH has concluded that it is important that the Court continues to endeavor to interpret the Convention in harmony with other international rules for the protection of human rights in particular those binding upon the Council of Europe member States, such as the (majority of) the UN conventions, and seeks to avoid the fragmentation of international law. More consistent reference by the UN treaty bodies to regional courts, and in-depth discussion of the latter’s jurisprudence would facilitate the development of consistent international human rights principles. The intensification of encounters between the members of the Court and the UN treaty bodies is also underlined as a way to increase interaction between the systems of the Court and the UN system of human rights protection.112

3.4. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

74. The ICERD contains two mechanisms for settling inter-State disputes complaints. First, a State Party may bring a complaint before the CERD relying on Articles 11 and 13 of the ICERD when it considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of the CERD. Second, a State Party may rely on Article 22 which provides that any dispute between two or more states parties with respect to the interpretation or application of the ICERD, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in the ICERD, can be referred to the ICJ for decision.

75. The CERD has recently considered questions of parallel proceedings before it and the ICJ in connection with the inter-state communication submitted by Qatar against the United Arab Emirates.113 The respondent State argued that the ICJ was only available at the end of carefully crafted linear and hierarchical processes; allowing two parallel proceedings to progress simultaneously would jeopardise the systemic integrity of the system and risk resulting in fragmented jurisprudence. Moreover, the respondent State observed that the applicant State had created a litis pendens situation where two parallel proceedings bearing on the exact same dispute between the same parties were progressing simultaneously. This violated the principle of electa una via non datur recursus ad alteram (when one way has been chosen, no recourse is given to another). It therefore argued that to continue in parallel would create irreparable harm to the procedural rights of the respondent State, which would be required to defend itself simultaneously against the same allegation in two overlapping and parallel procedures.114

76. The CERD considered that the wording of Article 22 of the ICERD clearly indicates that the State Parties may choose between the alternative proposed by that provision. Moreover, the Committee, an expert monitoring body entitled to adopt non-binding recommendations, was not convinced that a principle of lis pendens or electa una via was applicable where it would rule out proceedings concerning the same matter by a judicial body entitled to adopt a legally binding judgment.115

77. The ICJ has so far not pronounced itself on the relationship between the two mechanisms for settling inter-state disputes under the ICERD, respectively under Articles 11 to 13 on the one hand and Article 22 on the other hand. Nor has the ICJ pronounced itself as to whether negotiations

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112 CDDH(2019)R92Addendum1 §346-355
114 Ibid, § 44.
115 Ibid, § 49.
and recourse to the procedures referred to in Article 22 constitute alternative or cumulative preconditions to be fulfilled before seizing the ICJ. In connection with requests for provisional orders the ICJ has not considered it necessary to decide whether any electa una via principle or lis pendens exception are applicable in that specific situation.\textsuperscript{116}

### 3.5. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

78. The African Commission’s mandate includes communication procedure, friendly settlement of disputes, state reporting, urgent appeals and other activities of special rapporteurs and working groups and missions. The Commission considers communications referred to it when they do not deal with cases which have been settled by those states involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity or the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.\textsuperscript{117}

79. In the case \textit{Mpaka-Nsusu Andre Alphonse v. Zaire}, the Commission found the communication inadmissible as it had already been referred for consideration to the HRC established under the ICCPR. \textsuperscript{118} In the case of \textit{Bob Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt} \textsuperscript{119}, the respondent State argued that the communication should be declared inadmissible on the grounds that the Working Group of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the prevention and protection of minorities had been seized of the matter by the complainant. However, the Commission considered that the communication was admissible, observing that the decision of the United Nations sub-commission not to take any action and, therefore, not to pronounce on the communication submitted by the complainant does not boil down to a decision on the merits of the case and does not in any way indicate that the matter has been settled as envisaged under the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.\textsuperscript{120}

80. In \textit{Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan}, the Commission observed that “while recognizing the important role played by the United Nations Security Council, the Human Rights Council and other UN organs and agencies on the Darfur crisis, [the Commission] is of the firm view that these organs are not the mechanisms envisaged under Article 56(7). The mechanisms envisaged under Article 56(7) of the Charter must be capable of granting declaratory or compensatory relief to victims, not mere political resolutions and declarations.”\textsuperscript{121}


\textsuperscript{117} Article 56(7) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights deals with applications which do not raise any matter or issues previously settled by the parties in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the provisions of the Charter or of any legal instrument of the African Union, see Rule 40 of the \textit{Rules of Court}.


\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, para 5.

VI. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

81. A number of challenges relating to the establishment of facts are specific to the processing and resolution of inter-State cases. These include obtaining of necessary evidence *inter alia* by fact-finding missions and witness hearings as well as the different sources of information and the assessment of the evidence before the Court. Such challenges arise notably in situations in which the Court has to act as a court of first instance for lack of a prior examination by the national courts.  

82. The Court has also pointed out specific challenges regarding the establishment of the facts, making reference to the examination of the question whether the existence of an administrative practice within the meaning of the Convention can be established. The Court has also underlined a number of other difficulties related to instances when the Court has to act as a court of first instance. These include the examination of the effectiveness and accessibility of domestic remedies as additional evidence of whether an administrative practice exists; the length of parties' observations and annexes; and, the failure of the respondent Governments to provide the Court with all the necessary facilities to enable it to establish the facts as well as witness and expert hearings.

1. Principles on the admissibility and evaluation of evidence

83. Neither the Convention nor the Rules of the Court seek to regulate how evidence is to be admitted or assessed by the Court. The Court examines all the material before it, whether originating from the parties or other sources, and, if necessary, obtains material *proprio motu*. There are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment; the Court adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties' submissions.

84. Proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights. In establishing the existence of an administrative practice, the Court will not rely on the concept that the burden of proof is born by one or the other of the two Governments concerned, but will rather study all the material before it, from whatever source it originates.

85. One of the reasons for this flexible approach regarding the admissibility and evaluation of evidence could be the Court’s location which is remote from the places where the incidents in question took place. Also, in almost all cases, the Court establishes the fact relying on the documents submitted to it by the Parties. That explains the Court’s approach to recognise its

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124 This is without prejudice to the fact that the Rules of the Court contain detailed provisions concerning investigatory measures and the obligations of the parties in this respect, see Annex 1 to the Rules of the Court.
126 *Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria*, nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, 6 July 2005, ECHR 2005-VII.
127 *Georgia v. Russia (I)*, quoted above § 94.
128 *Georgia v. Russia (I)*, quoted above § 95.
subsidiary role, and to defer to national courts which have had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the relevant witnesses and, thus, the chance to assess their credibility. While the Court is not bound by the findings of facts of domestic courts, it will require "cogent elements" for it to depart from such findings.129

2. The States’ duty to co-operate with the Court

86. Article 34 and Article 38 of the Convention set out procedural obligations to guarantee the efficient conduct of the judicial proceedings of the Court. Article 34 provides that Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right of any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention. The Court has consistently held that State Parties have an obligation to furnish all necessary facilities to enable a proper and effective examination of applications as this is of utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted under Article 34 of the Convention.130 A failure on a Government’s part to submit information which is in its hands without a satisfactory explanation may not only give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant’s allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of compliance by a respondent State with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention (for an explanation of the consequences of failure to discharge co-operation obligations see section VI/3.2 below).131

87. This obligation to furnish the evidence requested by the Court is binding on the respondent Government from the moment such a request has been formulated, whether it is on initial communication of an application to the Government or at a subsequent stage in the proceedings.132 It is a fundamental requirement that the requested material be submitted in its entirety, if the Court has so directed, and that any missing elements be properly accounted for.133 In addition, any material requested must be produced promptly and, in any event, within the time-limit fixed by the Court, because a substantial and unexplained delay may lead the Court to find the respondent State’s explanations unconvincing.134

88. In addition to the obligation not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention the State Parties have a duty to co-operate with the Court under Article 38 of the Convention which stipulates that the “Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties, and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities for the effective conduct of the investigation.” In respect of the relationship

130 Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, § 170, 27 July 2006; Tahsin Acar v. Turkey [GC], no. 26307/95, § 253, 8 April 2004.
131 Tahsin Acar v. Turkey [GC], ibid., § 254; Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615/02, § 200, 9 November 2006; Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 55508/07-29520/09, § 202, 21 October 2013; Georgia v. Russia (I), quoted above, § 99, in this case the Court affirmed in the operative part of its judgment that there had been a violation of Article 38 of the Convention although it did not award non-pecuniary damage on the account of this violation.
132 Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], quoted above § 203; Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia, no. 25091/07, § 295, 26 April 2011; Bekirski v. Bulgaria, no. 71420/01, §§ 111-13, 2 September 2010.
133 Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], quoted above, § 203.
134 Ibid. § 203
between Article 34 and Article 38 the Court has stated that the obligation under Article 38 is corollary to the obligation not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention. The effective exercise of this right may be thwarted by a Contracting Party’s failure to assist the Court in conducting an examination of all circumstances relating to the case, including in particular by not producing evidence which the Court considers crucial for its task. Both provisions work together to guarantee the efficient conduct of the judicial proceedings and they relate to matters of procedure rather than to the merits of the applicants' grievances under the substantive provisions of the Convention or its Protocols. Although the structure of the Court’s judgments traditionally reflects the numbering of the Articles of the Convention, it has also been customary for the Court to examine the Government’s compliance with their procedural obligation under Article 38 of the Convention at the outset, especially if negative inferences are to be drawn from the Government's failure to submit the requested evidence.\textsuperscript{135}

89. The Court also may establish a failure by the respondent Government to comply with their procedural obligations even in the absence of any admissible complaint about a violation of a substantive Convention right. Furthermore, it is not required that the Government’s alleged interference should have actually restricted, or had any appreciable impact on, the exercise of the right of individual petition. The Contracting Party's procedural obligations under Articles 34 and 38 of the Convention must be observed irrespective of the eventual outcome of the proceedings and in such a manner as to avoid any actual or potential chilling effect on the applicants or their representatives.\textsuperscript{136}

90. The notion of furnishing the necessary facilities under Article 38 includes inter alia submitting documentary evidence to the Court, identifying, locating and ensuring the attendance of witnesses at hearings and replying to questions asked by the Court. Not every failure to co-operate with the Court will amount to a breach of Article 38 of the Convention. The Court assesses in each case whether the extent of non-co-operation has been such as to prejudice the establishment of the facts or to otherwise prevent a proper examination of the case.\textsuperscript{137}

91. When applicants are unable to obtain certain documents to submit evidence to the Court in support of their allegations and where it is clear that such documents can only be obtained with the assistance of the national authorities, the Court may request the representatives of the respondent State to obtain them from the national authorities and make them available to the Court. Furthermore, in the light of the information already in its possession, the Court itself may also identify and request further documents from the respondent Government. The Court has found that a respondent Government has not complied with the requirements of Article 38 where it failed to submit the requested documents, or if they are not submitted within the requested time and did not provide an explanation for the refusal to submit documents to the Court\textsuperscript{138} or where it submitted an incomplete or distorted copy while refusing to produce the original document for the Court’s inspection.\textsuperscript{139}

92. If the respondent Government advances confidentiality or security considerations as the reason for its failure to produce the evidence requested, the Court has to convince itself that reasonable and solid grounds exist for treating the documents in question as secret or confidential.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{135} Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], quoted above. § 209
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} See for example case of Musayev and others v. Russia, nos. 57941/00, 58699/00 and 60403/00, §183, 26 July 2007.
\textsuperscript{138} Maslova and Nalbandov v. Russia, no. 839/02, §§ 128-29, 24 January 2008
\textsuperscript{139} Trubnikov v. Russia, §§ 50-57, 5 July 2005.
confidential. Where documents are classified as state secret the respondent Government may not be able to base itself on provisions of domestic law to justify its refusal to comply with the Court’s request for the production of the evidence but should instead provide an explanation for the secrecy of the information. The Court may review the nature of the information that is classified as secret taking into account whether the document was known to anyone outside the secret intelligence and the highest State officials. In one particular case the Court was not convinced that the domestic law did not lay down a procedure for communicating classified information to an international organisation. The Court pointed out that, if there existed legitimate national security concerns, the Government should have edited out the sensitive passages or supplied a summary of the relevant factual grounds. The supposedly highly sensitive nature of information was cast into doubt once it became clear that lay persons, such as counsel for the claimant in a civil case, could take cognisance of the document in question. Rule 33 of the Rules of the Court regulates issues regarding public access and restrictions to documents submitted by the Parties to the Registry of the Court.

3. The Court’s practice with regard to the standard of proof

3.1. Beyond reasonable doubt

93. The standard of proof is not explicitly addressed in the provisions of the Convention or in the Rules of the Court. In its first inter-State cases the Court has adopted the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” which has become part of its established case-law. This standard is not to be equated with the same standard applied in criminal proceedings but it has a rather independent meaning assigned to it by the Court which reflects the Court’s core role under Article 19 of the Convention that is to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. Thus, it is not the Court’s role to rule on guilt under criminal law or on civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility under the Convention.

94. The individual applicant has the initial burden of producing evidence in support of the application; the required standard of proof at this stage is to establish a prima facie case. In other words, there should be sufficient factual elements to enable the Court, at this initial stage, to conclude that the allegations are not groundless or “manifestly ill-founded”, as in the words of

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140 Janowiec and Others v. Russia, quoted above, § 205
141 Davydov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 17674/02 and 39081/02, § 170, 1 July 2010; Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, § 56, 12 February 2009; and Janowiec and Others, quoted above, § 206
142 Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, § 56, 12 February 2009 and Janowiec and Others, quoted above, § 206
143 Ibid. See also Janowiec and Others v. Russia, quoted above, § 207.
144 Rule 33 states that “1. All documents deposited with the Registry by the parties or by any third party in connection with an application, except those deposited within the framework of friendly-settlement negotiations as provided for in Rule 62, shall be accessible to the public in accordance with arrangements determined by the Registrar, unless the President of the Chamber, for the reasons set out in paragraph 2 of this Rule, decides otherwise, either of his or her own motion or at the request of a party or any other person concerned. 2. Public access to a document or to any part of it may be restricted in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties or of any person concerned so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the President of the Chamber in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 3. Any request for confidentiality made under paragraph 1 of this Rule must include reasons and specify whether it is requested that all or part of the documents be inaccessible to the public.”
146 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, 6 July 2005, ECHR 2005-VII; Georgia v. Russia (I), quoted above, § 94.
Article 35 § 3. However, it appears that as with the standard of proof, the application of the concept of the burden of proof allows for a certain degree of flexibility; the Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle *affirmanti incumbit probatio* (he who alleges something must prove that allegation). This was affirmed in the inter-State case *Ireland v. the United Kingdom* where the Court held that it “does not rely on the concept that the burden of proof is borne by one or other of the two Governments concerned. In the cases referred to it, the Court examines all the material before it, whether originating from the Commission, the Parties or other sources, and, if necessary, obtains material *proprio motu*.”

### 3.2. Drawing adverse inferences

95. The Court may draw adverse inferences from the lack of co-operation of the State Parties, notably for failure to produce the requested evidence during the proceedings (see also paragraph 86 above). The Court has found that a failure of a respondent Government part to submit information as it is in its hands without a satisfactory explanation may not only reflect negatively on the level of compliance by a respondent State with its obligations under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention but may also give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the allegations.

96. The Court has drawn negative inferences from the failure or refusal of respondent States to provide relevant documentary evidence in cases when an individual applicant was detained, noting the inability of the respondent Government to provide a satisfactory and plausible explanation as to what happened to that individual. Similarly, the Court has drawn negative inferences from a respondent Government’s failure to disclose documents from domestic investigation files and the fact that the Government failed to provide convincing explanations of the events in question.

97. With particular respect to inter-State applications, the Court may draw negative inferences based on its established case-law that proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. When the Court considers that the respondent Government has exclusive access to information capable of corroborating or refuting the applicant Government’s allegations, any lack of co-operation by the Government without a satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant Government’s allegations. In respect of the drawing of inferences by the Court when the respondent Government has not advanced convincing explanations for its delays or omissions in response to the Court’s requests for witnesses see section VI/4.2 below.

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149 *Ireland v. United Kingdom*, no. 5310/71, § 160, 18 January 1978
150 This is also explicitly foreseen in Rule 44C of the Rules of Court which provides that “[w]here a party fails to adduce evidence or provide information requested by the Court or to divulge relevant information of its own motion or otherwise fails to participate effectively in the proceedings, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems appropriate”.
151 *Tarık v. Turkey*, quoted above, § 66.
153 *Tangiyeva v. Russia*, no. 57935/00, §82, 29 November 2007.
154 *Ireland v. United Kingdom*, quoted above, § 161.
155 *Georgia v. Russia (I)*, quoted above § 104
3.3. Shifting the burden of proof

98. The Court’s approach not to apply the burden of proof rigidly is also demonstrated by the fact that it has on occasions accepted to shift the burden of proof from the applicant to the respondent Government. This applies to cases when the Court notes difficulties for an applicant to obtain the necessary evidence in support of his/her allegations that is in the hand of the respondent Government which fails to submit relevant documents. When the applicant makes a prima facie case and the Court is prevented from reaching factual conclusions by the absence of such documents, it is for the respondent Government to argue conclusively why the documents in question cannot serve to corroborate the allegations made by the applicants or to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of how the event in question occurred. The burden of proof is thus shifted to the Government. In cases involving situations of injuries sustained in detention the Court has shifted the burden on the respondent Governments and has not accepted in principle the argument that for a violation of the Convention to be found, it was necessary for ill-treatment to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

99. Similarly, in cases involving deaths during a military operation in areas under the exclusive control of the authorities of the respondent Government, the Court has shifted the burden of proof to the respondent Government, in circumstances where the non-disclosure of crucial documents in the exclusive possession of the respondent Government prevented the Court from establishing the facts. It was, therefore, for the Government either to argue conclusively why the documents in question cannot serve to corroborate the allegations made by the applicants, or to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of how the events in question occurred. Also, in situations where persons are found injured or dead, or who have disappeared, in an area within the exclusive control of the authorities of the State and there is prima facie evidence that State agents may be involved, the burden of proof may also shift to the respondent Government since the events in issue may lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of its authorities. If they then fail to disclose crucial documents to enable the Court to establish the facts or otherwise provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation, strong inferences may be drawn.

4. The fact-finding function of the Court
4.1. Investigative powers

100. The Court establishes the facts primarily based on documentary evidence which includes among others reports from international governmental and non-governmental organisations. Being the master of its own procedure and its own rules, it has exclusive authority in assessing not only the admissibility and relevance of evidence as it has been described above (see section

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156 Tangiyeva v. Russia, quoted above, §81.
157 Among others see Salman v Turkey, no. 21986/93, 27 June 2000, § 100. See Ribitsch v Austria, no. 18896/91, Commission Report, 4 July 1994 § 104 [T]he authorities exercise full control over a person held in police custody and their way of treating a detainee must, therefore, be subjected to strict scrutiny under the Convention. Thus where injuries occurred in the course of police custody, it is not sufficient for the Government to point at other possible causes of such injuries, but it is incumbent on them to produce evidence showing facts which cast doubt on the account given by the victim, in particular if supported by medical evidence.” See also Ribitsch v Austria, no. 18896/91, 4 December 1995 § 34 where the Court concluded that the Government have not satisfactorily established that the applicant’s injuries were caused otherwise than - entirely, mainly, or partly - by the treatment he underwent while in police custody.
158 Akkum and Others v Turkey, no. 21894/93, § 211, 24 March 2005; Aslakhanova and Others v Russia, no. 2944/06 and 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08, 425/09/10, 18 December 2012 § 97.
159 Varnava and others v. Turkey, quoted above, § 184.
160 Georgia v. Russia (I), quoted above, §§ 83-84.
but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it. The Court has often attached importance to the information contained in relevant reports from independent international human-rights-protection associations or governmental sources. In order to assess the reliability of these reports, the relevant criteria are the authority and reputation of their authors, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were compiled, the consistency of their conclusions and whether they are corroborated by other sources.\textsuperscript{161}

101. However, the Court may have to act as a court of first instance when there are factual disputes between the parties which cannot be resolved by considering the documents before it or when there has been no examination of the matters complained of by the domestic courts. The Court might, therefore, decide to resort to fact-finding procedures such as fact-finding hearings or on-site investigations. Among the key factors for such a decision are the failure of national authorities to fully establish the relevant facts of a case, systematic failures in the functioning of domestic courts, potential of the fact-finding hearing to lead to the establishment of a violation of the Convention, and in the case of an on-site visit the amount of time which has lapsed since the events in question took place.\textsuperscript{162}

102. The decision as to whether to resort to investigation measures is at the discretion of the Court and may be taken on its own motion or upon the request of one of the parties. A Government’s effective denial of cooperation in a case will be a considerable disincentive for the Court to hold a fact-finding mission.\textsuperscript{163} A well-justified request for a fact-finding hearing submitted by a party may have considerable influence on the Court’s decision-making process and a list of witnesses (including information about the relevance of their expected testimony) is an essential part of a well-argued request for a fact-finding mission.\textsuperscript{164} As regards the timing of fact-finding activities of the Court the Convention does not explicitly address this issue. However, the Rules of the Court specify that fact-finding takes place after a case has been declared admissible, or exceptionally, before the decision on admissibility.\textsuperscript{165}

103. In the early days fact-finding missions in the context of inter-State applications became relatively frequent, but since the establishment of the “new” Court in 1998 fact-finding missions have been reduced to a certain extent. For example, in the case of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece,\textsuperscript{166} which involved extensive fact-finding by the Commission, the final report contained more than 1000 pages. Furthermore, in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Commission invested greatly in fact-finding, taking testimony in various locations. Likewise, in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey, the Commission conducted a fact-finding hearing and on-spot investigations on issues related to effective control and jurisdiction in the northern part of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{167} However, in recent years, the Court is more leaning towards “limited” forms of fact-finding. In particular, in the cases of Georgia v. Russia (I) and (II), the Court conducted hearings of witnesses which took place in Strasbourg. The Court’s recent tendency not to carry out fact-finding missions is reportedly primarily related to cost and time factors; the increase in the Court’s

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, § 138.
\textsuperscript{162} See Philip Leach, Costas Paraskeva, Gordana Uzelac, International Human Rights and Fact-Finding; An Analysis of the fact-finding missions conducted by the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights and Social Justice, Research Institute, February 2009, pg 45.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} Annex to the Rules of Court, Rule A1 (3)
\textsuperscript{166} Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece, quoted above.
\textsuperscript{167} Cyprus v Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 26.5.75 et seq., Commission Report of 10.7.76
caseload and length of proceedings have seemingly a bearing on the practicability of carrying out fact-finding hearings in all the cases in which they would otherwise be justified.\footnote{See note 162 above, pg 45.}

104. The investigation powers of the Court are based on Article 38 of the Convention and are exercised pursuant to the Rules of the Court (Annex Rules A1 to A8) which contain detailed provisions concerning investigative measures and the obligations of the parties in this respect. After a case has been declared admissible or, exceptionally, before the decision on admissibility, the Chamber may appoint one or more of its members or of the other judges of the Court, as its delegate or delegates, to conduct an inquiry, carry out an on-site investigation or take evidence in some other manner. The Chamber may also appoint any person or institution of its choice to assist the delegation in such manner as it sees fit.\footnote{Rule A1 § 3 of the Annex to the Rules of Court.}

\begin{quote}
4.2. Hearings with witnesses
\end{quote}

105. As has been mentioned obtaining the necessary evidence by witness hearings (see paragraph 81 above) is one of the challenges that the Court often faces in relation to inter-State applications and related individual applications. Witnesses are summoned by the Court's Registrar,\footnote{Ibid., Rule A5 § 1; the same rule applies to experts and other persons as well.} while the Contracting State in whose territory the witness resides is responsible for serving any summons sent to it by the Court.\footnote{See Rule 37 § 2 of the Rules of Court and Rule A5 § 4 of the Annex.} Each Party can propose witnesses to be heard at a hearing. Communication in respect of the preparation of the witness hearing between State Parties and the Court is mostly done in writing but, if needed, a preparatory meeting can be organised as well.\footnote{Ibid., Rule A4 § 2 of the Annex.}

106. Even though the Court enjoys a wide discretion as regards the selection of witnesses, in practice it is often necessary to limit the number of witnesses it hears, taking into consideration that the delegation only has a relatively short amount of time to conduct a hearing. In the case \textit{Cyprus v. Turkey}, for example, it justified this approach, arguing that the effective execution of its fact-finding role necessarily obliged it to regulate the procedure for the taking of oral evidence, having regard to constraints of time and to its own assessment of the relevance of additional witness testimony.\footnote{\textit{Cyprus v. Turkey [GC]}, quoted above, §§ 110 and 339.}

107. Until now there have generally been witness hearings in inter-State cases. In the cases of \textit{Cyprus v. Turkey} and \textit{Ireland v. United Kingdom}, for instance, hearings by the Commission took place in the country concerned or in places outside the Court's premises. More recently, in the cases of \textit{Georgia v. Russia} (I) and (II) the hearings took place in Strasbourg at the Court's premises, lasting one and two weeks respectively. This approach has advantages for the Court in respect of the availability of legal staff, recording equipment and interpreters. It must also be noted that where a witness is summoned at the request of or on behalf of a Contracting Party, the costs of their appearance shall be borne by that Party unless the Chamber decides otherwise.\footnote{See Rule A5 § 6 of the Annex to the Rules of Court.} In addition, it can provide a neutral venue and thus avoids disagreement by the parties as to where the fact-finding hearing should take place. However, this approach presupposes that the witnesses are free and willing to attend the hearing.
108. Member States are obliged to ensure freedom of movement and adequate security for, among others, witnesses and experts. Issues related to the protection of witnesses as well as States’ failure to cooperate with the Court in this respect have been identified as challenging aspects of the Court’s fact-finding function. The head of delegation may make special arrangements for witnesses, experts or other persons to be heard in the absence of the parties where that is required for the proper administration of justice. For instance, in the case of *Cyprus v. Turkey*, a certain number of witnesses were questioned only by members of the Commission’s delegation, without disclosing their identity due to security reasons. Subsequently, the Court in its assessment established that the Commission took the necessary steps to ensure that the taking of evidence from unidentified witnesses complied with the fairness requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. It was noted that the respondent State could sufficiently participate in the proceedings, comment on the evidence taken and present counter-evidence even though this approach was criticised by the respondent State in question.

109. Witnesses’ failure to appear before the Court is one of the most significant problems encountered during fact-finding hearings. In some cases, witnesses did not reply to the Court’s summons, got sick or the States did not locate and summon witnesses residing on their territory (as regards the States’ obligation in this respect see Rule A5 § 4 of the Annex to the Rules of Court). A study of the fact-finding function of the Court which was based on interviews with relevant members of the Registry suggested that “there are clear distinctions between the reasons for non-attendance of applicants’ witnesses and state witnesses. The reasons why applicants’ witnesses fail to appear are usually related to issues of fear and pressure, whereas the explanations for the non-attendance of State witnesses have been more diverse”. The Court on the other hand has no means to compel witnesses to attend its hearings. The Rules of the Court do not explicitly provide for hearing of witnesses through remote participation or electronic means. The feasibility of organising witness hearings in this way seems to be a working method worth further reflection.

110. Nevertheless, the Court draws its own conclusions when witnesses, notably those who are police officers or public prosecutors, fail to appear. The Court considers that the State parties’ commitment under Article 38 to furnish all the necessary facilities for the effective conduct of the Court’s investigations includes identifying, locating and ensuring the attendance of witnesses. Consequently, the Court has developed the practice of requiring the respondent Governments to provide reasons for non-attendance of witnesses that it has requested. In this regard the Court may draw conclusions as to whether the respondent State has met its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention. In addition, the Court may draw inferences from a respondent

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175 Ibid., Rule A2 § 2.
176 See comments by Cyprus contained in document CDDH(2019)12; Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1571(2007), Council of Europe member states’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights, called upon all member States to take positive measures to protect applicants, their lawyers or members of their families from reprisals by individuals or groups including, where appropriate, allowing applicants to participate in witness protection programmes, providing them with special police protection or granting threatened individuals and their families temporary protection or political asylum in an unbureaucratic manner, see § 17.2.
177 Rule A7 § 4 of the Annex to the Rules of Court.
178 See Commission’s report in the case of *Cyprus v. Turkey*, §§ 33-47 and the judgment in the same case, §§ 105-118.
179 *Georgia v. Russia (I)*, quoted above, §§ 90-92.
181 *Tas v. Turkey*, quoted above, § 54.
182 Ibid. The Court found that the respondent State fell short of its obligations to furnish all the necessary facilities under Article 38 of the Convention due to the late submission of the information which had been requested repeatedly by the
Government’s conduct in respect of not advancing any, or any convincing, explanation for its delays and omissions in response to Court’s requests for witnesses.183 This practice is reflected in the Rules of the Court which provide that where a party fails to adduce evidence or provide information requested by the Court or to divulge relevant information of its own motion or otherwise fails to participate effectively in the proceedings, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems appropriate.184

4.3. On-the-spot investigations

111. On-the-spot investigations are an important element of the Court’s fact-finding activities. They provide the Court with a unique opportunity to gain direct, first-hand impressions of the locations visited (notably detention centres), and accordingly to supplement their understanding of the situation gained previously from reviewing the pleadings and available documents in the case.185 In the early days, as it was mentioned above, the Commission was conducting more on-the-spot investigations than the Court does nowadays; such investigations were carried out by the Court in several inter-State cases.186 Recently, it appears that the Court to a certain extent has changed its practice and embraced a less procedurally challenging way of arriving at a conclusion in a given case.187

112. On-the-spot investigations have a crucial role in some cases, especially where the facts have not been established by the domestic courts. However, they are undoubtedly expensive and time-consuming for the Court. Moreover, the appropriateness of fact-finding missions where the event in question had taken place many years before has been raised as a potential issue.188

113. The effectiveness of on-the-spot investigations depends to a large extent on the full cooperation of the respondent State. Some of the difficulties which have emerged in the context of on-the-spot investigations relate to the reluctance, and at times the unwillingness of the respondent State’s authorities to ensure the Court’s delegation’s access to the territory189 or to premises relevant to the case.190 Pursuant to Rule A1 (1) the Court may decide on its own motion to carry out a fact-finding mission and does not, therefore, need to obtain the consent of the State concerned. The effectiveness of fact-finding may, however, be jeopardised in practice if the respondent State is not willing to cooperate. On occasion the Court has had to abandon a planned fact-finding mission where it has been unable to persuade the respondent State to adopt a more co-operative attitude. In such cases the Court has instead proceeded with preparation of the judgment on the basis of the evidence before it.191

Commission which in turn deprived the Commission of the opportunity to summon witnesses with potentially significant evidence.

184 Rule 44 C inserted by the Court on 13 December 2004.
186 For example in the cases of Cyprus v. Turkey; quoted above and in the case of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece, also quoted.
187 In the cases of Georgia v. Russia (I) and (II) the Court carried out only witnesses hearings.
188 See comments by Cyprus contained in document CDDH(2019)12.
189 Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 26.5.75 et seq., Commission Report of 10.7.76;
191 Shamayev v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, §§ 26-49, 12 April 2005.
5. Comparative perspectives

5.1. The International Court of Justice

114. The ICJ deals only with disputes submitted by States on issues of international law pursuant to Article 34 § 1 of the Statute of the ICJ. According to Article 44 of its Statute, the ICJ can procure evidence on the spot and summon witnesses and experts by applying to the Government of the State upon whose territory the visit will take place or notice has to be served. Witnesses and experts who appear before the ICJ upon its own decision are paid out by the funds of ICJ (Article 68 of the Rules of the ICJ). It seems that neither the Statute nor the Rules of the Court confer upon the ICJ the power to compel witnesses’ appearance.

115. On-site visits are carried out by the full bench of the ICJ on the basis of a decision by the ICJ. As such they are to be distinguished from unofficial visits or visits by experts. This practice has an incidence on the number of on-site visits cases which are rare in practice. One example is the visit made in the Gabčikovo case during which the agent of Slovakia invited the Court to “visit the locality to which the case relates and there to exercise its functions with regards to the obtaining of evidence, in accordance with Article 66 of the Rules of the Court”.

116. Article 49 of the ICJ’s Statute, read together with Article 62 § 1 of the Rules of the ICJ, confers upon the ICJ the power to obtain evidence, both documentary and testimonial, on its own motion, by means of calling upon the parties “to produce any document or to supply any explanation”. Thus, the ICJ has the power not only to request further documents from the parties but also to seek explanation and clarification from them on questions of law or fact.

117. While Article 49 does not explicitly contain an obligation by the State Parties to disclose information it states that formal note shall be taken of any refusal to comply with the ICJ’s request for information. In other words, the ICJ cannot compel the parties to produce evidence or subpoena witnesses. Neither the Statute nor the Rules of the ICJ mention specifically the duty of cooperation of states with the ICJ. Also, the ICJ seems reluctant to draw adverse inferences from a refusal to produce the requested information.

118. Article 50 of the ICJ’s Statute gives the ICJ the fact-finding power to appoint an expert to advise it regarding the case. The utility of an expert appointed by the ICJ can have two main constraints. Firstly, there is no obligation on the parties to cooperate with the expert or to provide him/her with information. Secondly, the parties do not have any right to cross-examine the expert appointed by the ICJ.

119. Furthermore, Article 50 of the ICJ’s Statute gives the ICJ the power to entrust an independent body or commission with the task of carrying out an inquiry. Such inquiries should be distinguished from site-visits discussed above because while a site visit will usually help to ascertain the facts of a case, Article 50 only covers inquiries that the Court entrusts to other bodies or institutions. The use of Article 50 powers by the ICJ has been rare in its practice.

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194 Article 67 of the Rule of the ICJ does not provide for this possibility but only that every report or record of an enquiry or every expert opinion shall be communicated to the parties which shall be given the opportunity to comment on it.
195 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Merits, 17 PCIJ (Series A) 29, 51, 1928; Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment of April 9th 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4.
120. The Court has also the power to request information from public international organisations. However, it was neither utilised nor referred to in the early years of the Court’s operation. The first use only came with the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 case. Another means by which information and expert opinion not submitted by the parties could come before the Court is through amicus curiae briefs. The practice of the Court, unlike other international courts and tribunals, to date has been limited.

121. The principles on burden and standard of proof have been established in various decisions of the ICJ. Generally, the ICJ applies the commonly accepted principle of *actori incumbit probatio*, which means that it is up to the claimant party to prove her claim. The ICJ may take another approach to the burden of proof only when the parties contest the facts brought before the ICJ. In these cases, the ICJ may divide the burden of proof in relation to different facts or particular issues or even shift the burden of proof to the party claiming to prove the negative.

122. As regards the standard of proof the ICJ has to be persuaded of a claim and no particular standard is applicable. There appears some flexibility in the ICJ’s approach regarding the standard of proof. In sum, the ICJ decides which standard to apply when, based on the facts and merits of the case. Such flexibility seems to be justified in view of the cases presented before the ICJ which involve claims of rights of nations and political questions.

5.2. The Inter-American System of Human Rights

123. Despite certain differences, the strongest similarities with the European system of human rights protection, in terms of fact-finding missions, can be found in the Inter-American system of human rights protection. The ACHR provides the IACHR with formal powers to carry out investigations to verify the facts of a submitted complaint. On the site, a Special Commission appointed for that purpose will carry out the investigation. A member of the IACHR who is a

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196 Article 34 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ.
199 James Gerard Devaney, *The Law and Practice of Fact-Finding before the International Court of Justice,* p.40
201 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 639: The ICJ decided that it was for one party to establish that local remedies were exhausted or that extenuating circumstances existed that avoided this requirement – whilst at the same time it was for the other side to prove that these local remedies had not been exhausted.
202 *Case of Certain Norwegian Loans* (France v. Norway), Judgment of July 6th, 1957, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p.9; the onus was on the party which raises the contention that local remedies have not been exhausted to prove before the Court that there are other domestic remedies which have not been used by the parties.
203 In the Corfu Channel Case the ICJ appears to have employed a high standard, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt in respect of the allegations by the applicant party with regard to the knowledge and assistance of the respondent country regarding the damages incurred by the first, given the seriousness of such allegations. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ elaborating on Article 53/2 of its Statute, which states that if a party fails to appear or defend its case, the ICJ, after satisfying itself that it has jurisdiction and the claim is “well founded in fact and law”, shall rule in favor of the other party, held that ‘satisfy itself’ means that the ICJ must attain a “degree of certainty”, as in any other case, that the facts are based on convincing evidence.
204 The IACHR with functions similar to the UN treaty-monitoring bodies and the former European Commission of Human Rights, monitors the situation of human rights in the various member States, conducts on-site visits, handles complaints alleging human rights violations and hosts several thematic rapporteurs. The IACHR also brings cases to the IACHR, as was done by the former European Commission of Human Rights in the Convention system prior to Protocol no. 11.
205 Article 48 (1)(d) of the ACHR.
national or who resides in the territory of the State in which the onsite observation is to be conducted is unequivocally disqualified from participating in it. Once the IACHR has obtained the consent of the State for an on-site observation, the latter is “governed by broad rules of inquiry.” The IACHR can specifically interview witnesses, government officials, etc. or perform on-site visits. The State will furnish to the IACHR all necessary facilities for carrying out its mission. Moreover, the State shall commit itself not to take any reprisals of any kind against any persons or entities cooperating with or providing information or testimony to the IACHR.

124. If the proceedings before the IACHR are terminated and the case brought to the IACHR either by the IACHR or a State, the IACHR will consider the case. During this phase, the IACHR is empowered to gather any additional evidence that it considers necessary in order to determine whether the State is responsible for the alleged violation. These powers include witness hearings (including experts), requesting from the parties the production of certain evidence, requesting a report or opinion from a third party or appointing its own Judges to hold a hearing at the Court premises or elsewhere. Hearings are public unless the IACHR considers it appropriate to hold a hearing in camera. The IACHR’s Rules of Procedure authorise the use of electronic means to facilitate communication between those involved in the case. Therefore, the witnesses and others can give their statements through electronic audio-visual means. One of the advantages of this approach is, surely, a reduction in expenses.

125. Article 26 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR refers to member States’ obligations in relation to the attendance of witnesses. However, the IACHR, similar to the Strasbourg Court, does not have the power to compel witnesses to attend a hearing. Also, the reasons of the non-attendance of the witnesses are various. In order to overcome these issues the IACHR can designate an expert to visit a particular location to interview witnesses when the trip itself would be difficult or expensive for the entire IACHR. A witness can also be heard by a person appointed by the President of the IACtHR with the consent of the respondent State.

126. As regards documentary evidence they must normally be authenticated before they can be admitted as evidence. In that respect, in the case of Bámaca-Velasquez v. Guatemala, the opposing party objected to the inclusion in the file of documents attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency that were not authenticated. They were, inter alia, not signed from another State and included statements from unknown witnesses etc. The party could not cross-examine the persons who had written the documents, nor could the judges question them to make a critical assessment of the reliability of the statements contained therein. The IACtHR refused to admit

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207 Ibid, Article 54.
208 IACHR on Human Rights, Regulations Regarding On-Site Observations, Oas Doc.OEA /Ser.L/V/II.35.
209 Articles 56 and 57 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR on Human Rights.
210 Ibid, Article 58.
211 In practice the Inter-American Court generally relies on the information that the Commission has provided or acts cautiously in deploying fact-finding missions given the high costs they imply.
212 Art. 51 (11) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.
213 Art. 51 (11) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.
214 Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), 17 September 1997, Ser. C, No. 33, § 13: the IACHR named several witnesses who were imprisoned in Peru. These witnesses could not appear at the seat of the Inter-American Court, so the Commission requested that the Inter-American Court proceedings be held at the various Peruvian penitentiaries. Instead, the Court, with the permission of the State, appointed an expert to interrogate the witnesses where they were incarcerated. See also Pasqualucci, J., The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. (2nd. Ed., Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013).
these documents confirming that they did not comply with the “minimum formal requirements for admissibility”.

VII. JUST SATISFACTION IN INTER-STATE CASES

1. The practice of the Court with regard to Article 41

127. The Court has already held that just satisfaction as enshrined in Article 41 of the Convention is applicable to inter-State cases. In the case of Cyprus v. Turkey the Court, for the first time, made an award of just satisfaction to individuals regarding violations established on the merits in an inter-State case. The Court derived its approach from the principles of public international law relating to state liability, the travaux préparatoires of the Convention as well as the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. The Court has noted, “according to the very nature of the Convention, it is the individual, and not the State, who is directly or indirectly harmed and primarily “injured” by a violation of one or several Convention rights. Therefore, if just satisfaction is afforded in an inter-State case, it should always be done for the benefit of individual victims.”

128. The Rules of the Court reflect the Court’s jurisprudence on the applicability of Article 41 to inter-State cases. Accordingly, any Contracting Party or Parties intending to bring a case before the Court under Article 33 of the Convention shall file with the Registry an application setting out, inter alia, the object of the application and a general indication of any claims for just satisfaction made under Article 41 of the Convention on behalf of the alleged injured party or parties. The claims of the applicant for just satisfaction, including itemized particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents, within the time-limit fixed for the submission of the applicant’s observations on the merits, are transmitted to the respondent Contracting Party for comment.

129. The granting of just satisfaction to an applicant State is assessed and decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, inter alia, the type of complaint made by the applicant Government, whether the victims of violations can be identified, as well as the main purpose of bringing the proceedings in so far as this can be discerned from the initial application to the Court. The Court acknowledges that an application brought before it under Article 33 of the Convention may contain different types of complaints pursuing different goals. In such cases each complaint has to be addressed separately in order to determine whether awarding just satisfaction in respect of it would be justified.

130. The Court bases itself on a determination of a “sufficiently precise and objectively identifiable” group of people whose rights were violated for purposes of awarding just satisfaction in respect of violations found and the criteria to be applied for an award of just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage. In the case of Georgia v. Russia (I) the Court, in accordance with Rule

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216 Pasqualucci, J., supra note 213.
217 Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014.
218 Ibid., §§ 40-46.
219 Ibid., §§ 43-45, 12 May 2014. See also Georgia v. Russia (I) (just satisfaction), no. 13255/07, § 22, 31 January 2019.
220 Rule 46 (e).
221 Rule 60 as amended by the Court on 13 December 2004.
222 Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 25781/94, §43, 12 May 2014.
223 Ibid, § 43. See also Georgia v. Russia (I) (just satisfaction), no. 13255/07, § 22, 31 January 2019.
224 Ibid. § 28.
60 § 2 of the Rules of Court, invited the applicant Government to submit a list of its nationals who had been victims of the “coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals” put in place in the Russian Federation in the autumn of 2006.\textsuperscript{225} It also asked the respondent Government to submit all relevant information and documents (in particular expulsion orders and court decisions) concerning Georgian nationals who had been victims of that policy during the period in question.\textsuperscript{226} In this case the respondent Government asked the Court to identify each of the individual victims of the violations it found in adversarial proceedings, on the ground that the task of establishing the facts fell within the exclusive power of the Court. In this respect the Court noted that the parties had exchanged observations on the question of just satisfaction in compliance with the adversarial principle. Moreover, the Court observed that in cases concerning systematic violations of the Convention it is not a court of first instance; it does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court to adjudicate on large numbers of cases which require the finding of specific facts or the calculation of monetary compensation – both of which should as a matter of principle and effective practice, be the domain of domestic jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{227}

131. The Court has observed that it was very important that the applicant State was, from the outset, asked to submit the list of clearly identifiable individuals.\textsuperscript{228} In this respect, States’ cooperation on this matter is important, which includes a duty to produce all information in its possession as prescribed by Article 38 of the Convention and Rule 44 A of the Rules of Court. Thereby, the risk of awarding just satisfaction to individuals who are not eligible for such an award due to various reasons could be decreased. Moreover, it is important, in the operative part of the judgment on the merits, to fix a time-limit for the parties’ exchange of observations on just satisfaction\textsuperscript{229} in order to avoid long intervals of time between the judgment on the merits and the judgment on just satisfaction.\textsuperscript{230}

132. In respect of criteria to be applied for an award of just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage the Court has consistently held that there is no express provision for awards in the Convention.\textsuperscript{231} The Court, however, has developed gradually a number of principles regarding the award of non-pecuniary damage. Situations where the applicant has suffered evident trauma, whether physical or psychological, pain and suffering, distress, anxiety, frustration, feelings of injustice or humiliation, prolonged uncertainty, disruption to life, or real loss of opportunity can be distinguished from those situations where the public vindication of the wrong suffered by the applicant, in a judgment binding on the Contracting State, is an appropriate form of redress in itself. In some situations, where a law, procedure or practice has been found to fall short of Convention standards this is enough to put matters right. In other situations, however, the impact of the violation may be regarded as being of a nature and degree as to have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the applicant as to require something further. Such

\textsuperscript{225} In the principal judgment the Court held that in the autumn of 2006 a “coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals” had been put in place in the Russian Federation “which amounted to an administrative practice for the purposes of Convention case-law”, see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, § 159.

\textsuperscript{226} Georgia v. Russia (I) (just satisfaction), quoted above § 58.

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., §§63-65.

\textsuperscript{228} See document CDDH(2019)22, § 31

\textsuperscript{229} See document CDDH(2019)22, § 30.

\textsuperscript{230} It should be noted that in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey (IV), Application no. 25781/94, 22.11.1994 the Judgment on the merits was issued on 10 May 2001 whereas the judgment on just satisfaction on 12 May 2014. In the case of Georgia v. Russian Federation (I), Application no. 13255/07, 26.03.2007: the judgment on the merits was issued on 3 July 2014 and the judgment on just satisfaction on 31 January 2019.

\textsuperscript{231} Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) [GC], quoted above § 56. Georgia v. Russia (I) (just satisfaction), quoted above § 73.
elements do not lend themselves to a process of calculation or precise quantification. Nor is it the Court’s role to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that non-pecuniary damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage.  

133. With regard to calculating the level of just satisfaction to be awarded, the Court has a discretion having regard to what it finds equitable. The Court reiterates in this regard that it has in the past always declined to make any awards of punitive or exemplary damages even where such claims are made by individual victims of an administrative practice.  

2. Comparative perspectives  

2.1. The International Court of Justice  

134. The Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Factory of Chorzów case that “it is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law”.  

This means that compensation is a substitute for restitution in kind if the restitution in kind is impossible to fulfill. The amount must be based on the value equivalent to what restitution in kind would have offered, i.e. on the value lost as compared to the situation if the illegal act had not occurred.  

135. In the Corfu Channel case the ICJ stated for the first time that it had jurisdiction to assess an amount of compensation. The ICJ awarded an amount of compensation for the second time in the case of Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo in which the applicant State was exercising diplomatic protection with respect to one of its nationals and seeking compensation for the injury caused to him in connection with allegations of unlawful arrest, detentions and expulsion. The ICJ stated that “in the light of the fundamental character of the human rights obligations breached and Guinea’s claim for reparation in the form of compensation, the Court is of the opinion that, in addition to a judicial finding of the violations, reparation due to Guinea for the injury suffered by Mr. Diallo must take the form of compensation”. The parties failed to reach an agreed settlement, after a period of six months, on the amount of compensation to be

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232 Georgia v. Russia (I) (just satisfaction), quoted above § 73.  
233 Ibid. § 75.  
235 The ICJ did not award compensation in this particular case as in the order dated 25 May 1929, an agreement was settled between the two States. Therefore, the ICJ declared the proceedings terminated.  
236 ICJ, Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment of April 9th 1949, Assessment of Amount of Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 244. The ICJ awarded £844,000 to the United Kingdom in its separate judgment rendered on 15 December 1949, where the Albanian Government was absent. To assess this amount, the Court appointed experts, in conformity with Article 50 of the Statute to estimate the damages.  
paid by the DRC to Guinea and, therefore, the matter was settled by the Court itself in a subsequent phase of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{238}

136. In respect of the question of calculation of the amount of the due compensation, the ICJ stated in the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),\textsuperscript{239} that first, it considers for each head of damage whether an injury is established and then, ascertains “whether, and to what extent, the injury asserted by the [a]pplicant is the consequence of wrongful conduct by the [r]espondent [state]”, taking into account “whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act and the injury suffered by the [a]pplicant”\textsuperscript{240}. If the existence of injury and causation is established, the ICJ will then determine the value. The ICJ then found that, since it had not been shown that the genocide at Srebrenica would in fact have been averted if Serbia had attempted to prevent it, financial compensation for the failure to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica was not the appropriate form of reparation.\textsuperscript{241}

137. Concerning non-material injury, the Court indicated that it can be established even without specific evidence.\textsuperscript{242} For example, in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, the Court took into account the number of days for which Mr. Diallo was detained.\textsuperscript{243} It indicated that quantification of compensation for non-material injury necessarily rests on equitable considerations, referring notably to the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{244}

\textbf{2.2. The Inter-American System of Human Rights}

138. The State parties to the ACHR have undertaken an international obligation to protect and ensure the rights enshrined in this treaty and to provide reparations to the injured parties if the State violates those rights.\textsuperscript{245} The IACtHR indicated that \textit{restitution in integrum} may include compensation, satisfaction and assurances that the violations will not be repeated.\textsuperscript{246} The reparations awarded under this principle must be proportionate to the injury caused by the violations.\textsuperscript{247}

139. Article 63(1) of the ACHR specifies that it is the “injured party” who shall receive reparations, meaning the person or persons affected by the violation.\textsuperscript{248} For certain types of human rights violations (extra-judicial executions and forced disappearances), the Court may consider the injured party to be not only the person who was killed or disappeared but also that person’s next of kin who suffered as a result of losing a loved one and who was denied recourse by State authorities.\textsuperscript{249} The definition of “next of kin” is provided in Article 2(15) of the Rules of Court, as

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{240} Ibid.
\bibitem{241} Ibid.
\bibitem{242} Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 639, para.21
\bibitem{243} Ibid., para. 22
\bibitem{244} Ibid., para.24
\bibitem{245} Article 63(1) of the ACHR
\bibitem{246} Case of Castillo Páez v. Peru (Reparations), 27 November 1998, § 48.
\bibitem{247} Ibid., § 51.
\bibitem{248} Jo M. Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, p.235
\bibitem{249} Case of Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (Reparations), 27 February 2002, § 54.
\end{thebibliography}
the “direct ascendants and descendants, siblings, spouses or permanent companions, or those
determined by the Court, if applicable”.

140. Concerning the identification of victims, the IACtHR has held that alleged victims must be
properly identified in the application that the IACHR files with the Court.250 This approach has
been confirmed in 2009, following the amendment to Article 33 of the Rules of the Court which
became Article 34(1).251 It should be noted that Article 35(2) of the Rules empowers the IACtHR
to decide whether to consider individuals as victims when it has not been possible to identify all
of the alleged victims in a case of mass or collective violations. While the IACtHR should identify
the victims of a case, the Court – as the judicial body in charge of interpreting and applying the
ACHR in contentious cases – is ultimately responsible for assessing the merits and determining
who is a victim and who, in turn, may participate in proceedings and be eligible for reparations.

141. In cases relating to indigenous communities where it often includes multiple victims, for
example in the Moiwana Community v. Suriname case252, the IACtHR recognised that frequently
official documents such as birth or death registrations were lacking.253 In such cases, the IACtHR
accepted the inclusion of those “who may be identified subsequently, since the complexities and
difficulties in individualizing them, suggest that there are still other victims to be determined.”254
As for cases with large numbers of unidentified victims, the IACtHR has ordered that victims must
be identified by documentation presented to the competent authorities within a fixed time period.255

142. The amount of compensation that the Court may order a State to pay to the victim of human
rights abuse is determined by the ACHR and the applicable principles of international law.256 It is
not limited by the defects, imperfections or deficiencies of national law.257 Concerning material
damages, the Court takes into account loss of earnings, medical expenses, costs incurred in
searching for the victim when the State fails to investigate.258 As for moral damages, the amount
of compensation is grounded in the principles of equity, as in the European system.259 In its
assessment, the Court also considers the particular circumstances of each victim.260 If the State
does not comply with a judgment of the Court, Article 65 of the ACHR provides that the Court
shall formulate pertinent recommendation in its annual report to the General Assembly of the
OAS.

251 Article 34(1) of the Rules of Court reads as follow: “The Commission shall include the name and address of the
alleged victims.”
253 Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 29 March 2006, para. 73.
254 Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Reparations), 19 November 2004, para. 48; and IACtHR, Case
of “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, 15 September 2005, paras. 183, 305.
255 Case of “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, 15 September 2005, para. 257; IACtHR, Case of Ituango Massacres v.
Colombia, 1 July 2006, para. 358; and IACtHR, Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Reparations),
19 November 2004, para. 67.
256 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (Compensatory damages, 1989), para. 31.
257 Ibid, para. 30
258 Case of Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (Reparations) 27 February 2002, para. 74 (a)
259 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (Compensatory damages, 1989), para. 27
260 Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala (Reparations) 25 May 2001, para. 104
VIII. FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT

1. The practice of the Court

143. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, pursuant to Article 39 of the Convention, place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and Protocols thereto. The Court does not automatically strike a case out of the list when a friendly settlement has been reached. It may indeed decide, pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the Convention, to continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires. The mission of the system of the Convention is, in addition to providing individual relief to “determine issues on public policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of Convention States.”261 The Court may, however, be satisfied that the content of a friendly settlement agreement even when the respondent State explicitly does not recognise a violation of the Convention in the particular case when the Court considers that it has specified the nature and scope of obligations of the respondent State in previous judgments concerning similar issues.262

144. The proceedings conducted in connection with friendly settlement are confidential. If a friendly settlement is reached and the Court decides to strike the case out of its list by means of a decision, the latter will be confined to a brief statement of the facts and the solution reached. The decision is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise the execution of the terms of the friendly settlement as set out in the decision. The Registrar enters into contact with the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement once an application has been declared admissible. The friendly-settlement negotiations shall be confidential and without prejudice to the parties’ arguments in the contentious proceedings. No written or oral communication and no offer or concession made in the framework of the attempt to secure a friendly settlement may be referred to or relied on in the contentious proceedings.263 No offer or concession made in the framework of an attempt to secure a friendly settlement may be referred to or relied upon in the contentious proceedings. Any breach of confidentiality from the applicant’s side may lead to the case being declared inadmissible on grounds of abuse of the right of application.264

145. In 2019, 1688 applications were struck out of the list by a Chamber or a Committee, in a decision, following a friendly settlement which represents a 23% decrease compared to 2018 (2185).265

146. With particular regard to inter-State proceedings it is worth noting that a number of these were terminated following political agreements or settlements reached by the Parties. Such cases date back from the time when the Commission was operational. In the case of Greece v. United Kingdom (I), the Sub-commission invited the Parties to examine the possibilities of a friendly

261 Konstantin Martin v. Russia, no. 30078/06, §§89, 90-92, 22 March 2012. The Court has also refused to strike out cases when the applicants wishes to withdraw their applications when it considered that that the case raised questions of general character affecting the observance of the Convention, see for example Tyrer v. United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, 25 April 1978.
262 Quattrini v. Italy, no. 68189/01, 8 December 2005 (French only).
263 Rule 62 of the Rules of the Court, as amended by the Court on 17 June and 8 July 2002 and 13 November 2006.
264 See, for example, Hadrabová and Others v. Czech Republic (dec), nos. 42165/02 and 466/03, 25 September 2007 and Miro Ľubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, 15 September 2009.
265 https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2019_ENG.pdf
settlement, pursuant to Article 28 § b) (current Article 39) of the Convention but these efforts were not successful. The Commission in its report under the terms of the former Article 31 § 3 of the Convention stated that following its various decisions the question of formulating specific proposals with a view to redressing any breach of the Convention does not arise in the specific case. The Commission noted that the full enjoyment of human rights in Cyprus is closely connected with the solution of the wider political problems relating to the constitutional status of the island. Once these political problems have been solved no reason is likely to subsist for not giving effect to the human rights and freedom in Cyprus. Some of the factors which the Commission has found to constitute a public emergency threatening the life of the nation under the terms of Article 15 of the Convention also seems to be at the root of the wider political differences. The Commission concluded by expressing the firm conviction that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe could make no greater contribution to restoring the full and unfettered enjoyment of human rights in Cyprus than by lending its aid in promoting a settlement of the Cyprus problem in all its aspects in accordance with the spirit of true democracy. The report was then transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which having taken note of the final settlement of the Cyprus question that had since been achieved, resolved that no further action was called for.

147. In the case of Greece v. United Kingdom (II) the Commission finalised its report indicating that the case did not appear to fall exactly within the terms of either former Article 30 or Article 31 of the Convention. Before the examination of the application had been completed, Greece and the United Kingdom, acting in concert, requested the Commission to allow the proceedings to be terminated because of “a fundamental change in the situation of the island through the conclusion of the Zurich and London Agreement for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus”. Having regard to the request of the Parties and especially to the importance of the political settlement reached at Zurich and London as a means of restoring to the people of Cyprus the full and perfect enjoyment of their rights and freedoms, and having regard to the information received that the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed in Cyprus, the Commission decided to terminate the proceedings and to report this decision to the Committee of Ministers. The report of the Commission was made public by the Committee of Ministers in 2006.

148. Another case was settled by the Parties, namely the application lodged by Denmark, Norway, Sweden v. Greece (the second Greek case). This case concerns the criminal proceedings against 34 individuals accused of subversive activities and the subsequent trial before the extraordinary court martial, during the military dictatorship. The applicant Governments alleged violations of Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention. Following Greece’s denunciation of the Convection and its

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266 Greece v. United Kingdom, no. 176/56, Report of the Commission (volume I), 26 September 1958, para. 68. After several unsuccessful attempts regarding friendly settlement it concluded it will not proceed further with its efforts in this respect.
267 ibid.
268 Resolution (59) 12, 20 April 1959, adopted by the Committee of Ministers Human Rights (Application No. 176/56).
269 Greece v. United Kingdom (II), no. 299/57
270 Greece v. United Kingdom (II), no. 299/57, Report of the Commission, 8 July 1959
ceasing to be a Party to the Convention on 13 June 1970 the Commission declared that it could not adequately continue its functions. The Committee of Ministers took note of the Commission’s report in 1971. However, on 28 November 1974, after the restoration of democracy, Greece rejoined the Council of Europe and became again a Contracting Party. Subsequently, all Parties requested that the proceedings should be closed by the Commission. The applicant Governments presumed that all the individuals were no longer detained or imprisoned. The Commission consequently decided to accede to the Parties’ concordant requests to close the proceedings and to strike out the application off its list.274

149. In 1982, the first friendly settlement was reached according to ex-Article 28 § b) in the case Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey.275 The applications related to the situation in Turkey between 12 September 1980 and 1 July 1982. The applicant Governments alleged violations of Articles 3 of the Convention (torture and inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees constituting a systematic practice), Articles 5 and 6 (detention and criminal proceedings under martial law) and Articles 9, 10 and 11 (restrictions on political parties, trade unions and the press). The Commission declared the application admissible in 1983.276 In 1985, the Parties presented, in the light of the developments in Turkey with a view to re-establishing effective democracy and securing compliance with the Convention, their joint proposal for a settlement of the case and informed the Commission that they had reached a friendly settlement. The Commission decided to discontinue the contentious proceedings under former Article 28 b).277 It noted in particular a number of measures taken by Turkey regarding criminal prosecutions and convictions concerning cases of torture, progressive lifting of the martial law in the country and that the friendly settlement provided for further progress in relation to the matters raised in the case namely conditions and procedures of detention, further implementation of personal rights and freedoms and the issue of amnesty. Noting the willingness of the five applicant Governments, including the measures taken by Turkey with a view to re-establishing an effective democracy and securing compliance with the rights and freedoms in the Convention and having special regard to the fact that the terms of the settlement provides for further progress and continued information to the Commission. Therefore, it concluded that the settlement reached was secured, in the sense of Article 28 § b.

150. The Court has accepted the friendly settlement reached between the Parties in the inter-State case, Denmark v. Turkey. The applicant Government lodged an inter-State application against Turkey alleging the ill-treatment of a Danish citizen while in custody in Turkey, in contravention of Article 3 of the Convention. In 1999, the Court declared the application admissible. In 2000, the agents of the Danish and Turkish governments submitted formal declarations according to which they had reached a friendly settlement, under Article 39 of the Convention. The Court took note of the friendly settlement reached between the parties observing that the parties had agreed to the payment of a sum of money to the applicant Government, a statement of regret was made by the respondent Government, changes had been introduced to the Turkish legal and administrative framework in response of torture and ill-treatment and that the respondent Government had undertaken to make further improvements concerning the occurrence of incidents of torture and ill-treatment and to continue their co-operation with

274 Ibid.
275 Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey, nos. 9940-44/82
276 France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey, nos 9940-44/82, admissibility decision, 6 December 1983
277 France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey, nos 9940-44/82, report of the Commission, 7 December 1985 (friendly settlement)
international human rights bodies, in particular the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.278

151. Where an applicant has refused the terms of a friendly-settlement proposals pursuant to Rule 52 of the Rules of the Court, the Party concerned may file with the Court a request to strike the application out of the list in accordance with Article 37 § 1 of the Convention. Such request shall be accompanied by a unilateral declaration under Rule 62 A of the Rules of the Court, acknowledging that there has been a violation of the Convention in the applicant’s case together with an undertaking to provide adequate redress and, as appropriate, to take necessary remedial measures. The submission of a unilateral declaration is public and adversarial proceedings are conducted separately from and with due respect for the confidentiality of any friendly-settlement proceedings. Exceptionally a request and accompanying declaration may be filed with the Court even in the absence of a prior attempt to reach a friendly settlement. The Court may strike an application out of its list, if it is satisfied that the declaration offers a sufficient basis for assuming that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue its examination of the application.

152. The Court considers that, under certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to strike out an application under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention on the basis of a unilateral declaration by the respondent Government. In this respect in determining whether the unilateral declaration offers a sufficient basis for finding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention, the Court will look at a number of factors such as whether the facts are in dispute between the parties, whether there is an admission of responsibility or liability for any violation of the Convention alleged by the applicant, whether the applicant’s grievances under the Convention are adequately addressed.279 Also, the Court rejects requests for striking cases out of the list on the basis of unilateral declarations when it considers the serious nature of the allegations of human rights violations or that accepting the request would contribute to keep the situation unchanged without a guarantee that a solution would be found in the near future; which would not help the Court accomplish its role under Article 19 of the Convention, that is ensuring the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto.281

153. The number of unilateral declarations in 2019 was 1,511, representing an increase by 75% compared to 2018, with 865 declarations. 282

154. The potential of the pilot judgment procedure in cases relating to inter-State disputes as a means of facilitating their friendly settlement is an area of inquiry worth exploring further. The pilot judgment procedure was developed and is employed by the Court where the facts of an application reveal the existence of a structural or systemic problem or other similar dysfunction in the State concerned which has given rise or may give rise to similar applications.283 In a pilot judgment, the Court’s task is not only to decide whether a violation of the Convention occurred in the specific case but also to identify the systemic problem and to give the Government clear

278  *Denmark v. Turkey*, no. 34382/97, 5 April 2000.
279  *Tahsin Acar v. Turkey* [GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 78, 79, 83
280  *Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, no. 25965/04, 7 January 2010: The Court rejected a unilateral declaration proposed by the Cypriot Government, which concerned the death of the applicant’s daughter in Cyprus despite the acknowledged violations of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention and offer of compensation, in light of the serious nature of the allegations of human trafficking and the paucity of case-law under Article 4 ECHR.
281  *Tomov and others v. Russia*, nos. 18255/10 and others, §100, 9 April 2019
282  [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2019_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2019_ENG.pdf) In 2015, 2,970 unilateral declarations were accepted by the Court. The number fell in 2016 to 1,766, and significantly decreasing again in 2017 to 754 UDs.
283  Rule 61§1 of the Rules of the Court.
indications of the type of remedial measures needed to resolve it. A key feature of the pilot procedure is the possibility of adjourning, or “freezing,” related cases for a period of time on the condition that the Government act promptly to adopt the national measures required to satisfy the judgment. The Court can, however, resume examining adjourned cases whenever the interests of justice so require.

155. Some authors argued that the method of pilot judgment should be used also in the context of inter-State applications, which address systemic human rights violations. The pilot judgment approach allows addressing large-scale human rights violations through managerial methods, thus, in a cooperative and sovereignty-preserving manner rather than with sanctions. It is argued that a constructive legal dialogue is a worthwhile option and thus should be open to the Court in inter-State cases. This methodology should not be the only means for the Court to resolve the dispute. So, far no pilot judgment has been adopted in connection with an inter-State case.

156. As regards individual applications relating to inter-State disputes mention can be made of the pilot judgment in the case of Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey. The Court found that the violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 originated in a widespread problem affecting large numbers of people, namely the unjustified hindrance of her “respect for her home” and “peaceful enjoyment of her possessions” as a matter of “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) policy. In this connection it noted that approximately 1,400 property cases were pending before it brought primarily by Greek Cypriots against Turkey. The Court considered that the respondent State must introduce a remedy which secures genuinely effective redress for the Convention violations identified in the judgment in relation to the present applicant as well as in respect of all similar applications pending before it, in accordance with the principles for the protection of the rights laid down in Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and in line with its admissibility decision of 14 March 2005. Such a remedy should be available within three months from the date on which the judgment was delivered and redress should be afforded three months thereafter.

157. Following the pilot judgment in the Xenides Arestis case an Immovable Property Commission (IPC) was set up in the northern part of Cyprus under Law No. 67/2005 on the compensation, exchange or restitution of immovable property. In its inadmissibility decision in Demopoulos and others v. Turkey, the Court found that Law No. 67/2005 “provides an accessible and effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference with the property owned by Greek Cypriots”. The Court issued the just satisfaction judgment in the inter-State case Cyprus v. Turkey on 12 May 2014. The Cypriot Government requested the Court to adopt a “declaratory judgment” stating: “(i) that Turkey is required by Article 46 to abide by the judgment in Cyprus v. Turkey by abstaining from permitting, participating or acquiescing or being otherwise complicit in, the unlawful sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot homes and property in the northern part of Cyprus; (ii) that this obligation arising under Article 46 is not discharged by the Court’s

284 L. Wildhaber, Pilot judgment in cases of structural or systemic problems on the national level in R Wolfrum, U Deutsch, the European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by applications; P Leach, Responding to systemic human rights violations: an analysis of pilot judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and their impact at national level; A Buyse, “Airborne or Bound to Crash? The rise of pilot judgment and their appeal as a tool to deal with the aftermath of conflict.
286 Ibid., § 38.
288 Ibid., §§ 40.
289 Demopoulous and others v. Turkey (dec) nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, §127, 1 March 2010.
admissibility decision in Demopoulos and Others.” 290 The Court considered that it was not necessary to examine the question whether it has the competence under the Convention to make a “declaratory judgment” in the manner requested by the applicant Government since it is clear that the respondent Government is, in any event, formally bound by the relevant terms of the main judgment. It is recalled in this connection that the Court has held that there had been a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the fact that Greek-Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus are being denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of their property, as well as any compensation for the interference with their property rights (Part III, point 4 of the operative provisions of the principal judgment). It thus falls to the Committee of Ministers to ensure that this conclusion, which is binding in accordance with the Convention, and which has not yet been complied with, is given full effect by the respondent Government. Such compliance could not, in the Court’s opinion, be consistent with any possible permission, participation, acquiescence or other form of complicity in any unlawful sale or exploitation of Greek-Cypriot homes and property in the northern part of Cyprus. Furthermore, the Court’s decision in the case of Demopoulos and Others, cited above, to the effect that cases presented by individuals concerning violation-of-property complaints were to be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, cannot be considered, taken on its own, to dispose of the question of Turkey’s compliance with Part III of the operative provisions of the principal judgment in the inter-State case.291

2. Comparative perspectives

158. The friendly settlement mechanism is envisaged in Article 48(1)(f) of the ACHR and Article 40 of the IACtHR’s Rules of Procedure. Under those provisions, on its own initiative or at the request of any of the parties, the ACHR, at any stage of the examination of a petition or case, shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned for the purpose of opening a dialogue by which the states and the alleged victims of human rights violations may undertake negotiations with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter, on the basis of respect for the human rights recognised in the ACHR, the American Declaration, and other applicable instruments. This process initiates and concludes by the consent of both parties and creates opportunities not only for a large variety of measures to be adopted to repair the alleged victims themselves, but also for measures to be adopted that may have a wide impact on society in terms of effecting change to improve observance of human rights standards.

159. Once both parties have notified the IACtHR in writing of their interest in initiating a friendly settlement procedure, the latter facilitates the process by forwarding all written information to both parties for observations. It is worth noting that throughout the entire friendly settlement procedure, the IACtHR plays an active role in promoting and advising the parties on the mechanism, as well as facilitating dialogue. However, the parties may hold meetings throughout the process, either in their countries of origin, with or without the direct participation of the IACtHR, or in the presence of the IACtHR in the context of its sessions or working visits to countries.

160. The IACtHR may terminate its intervention in the friendly settlement procedure if any of the parties does not consent to its application, decides not to continue it, or does not display willingness to reach a friendly settlement. The IACtHR may also terminate its intervention if it finds that the matter is not susceptible to such a resolution. In such an event, in accordance with Article 40 of its Rules of Procedure, the IACtHR will continue to process the petition or case at the procedural stage that had been reached in the matter.

290 Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) [GC], quoted above § 62.
291 Ibid., § 63.
161. Once an agreement setting out the commitments adopted by the parties has been reached, the IACHR, in accordance with Article 49 of the ACHR, verifies that it meets the human rights standards recognized in the ACHR, the American Declaration, and other applicable instruments, after which it adopts a report containing a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached. For legal purposes the report adopted under Article 49 of the ACHR concludes the proceedings before the IACtHR.

162. After publishing a report on a friendly settlement report, the IACtHR monitors compliance with the clauses of the agreement in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 48 of its Rules of Procedure, which enables it to adopt the follow-up measures it deems appropriate, such as requesting information from the parties and holding hearings and/or working meetings in order to verify compliance with friendly settlement agreements. In any event, the IACtHR follows up on agreements approved since 2000 through its Annual Report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

163. Processing inter-State cases and the high number of individual applications when they concern inter-State conflicts raises exceptional challenges for the Court, as these cases are particularly time-consuming for Judges and Registry Staff and complex as a result of their nature and dimension. The Court has already taken a number of measures to ensure an effective processing of these cases.

164. Recently, the Court has introduced a number of practices to counter potential risks of duplication or inconsistencies stemming from the processing in parallel of inter-State applications and related individual applications. In particular, where an inter-State case is pending, individual applications raising the same issues or deriving from the same underlying circumstances are, in principle and in so far as practicable, without being put aside, not decided before the overarching issues stemming from the inter-State proceedings have been determined in the inter-State case. A formalisation of this practice by the Court to the extent that this would not have collateral effects on the Court’s discretion and flexibility to deal with each particular case on its own, would promote a sense of legal certainty amongst the governments of Council of Europe member States. Also, the Court’s methodology to take into account any findings of administrative practice established in inter-State proceedings in related individual applications is conducive to avoiding any potential inconsistencies and duplication.

165. In practice few inter-State cases relating to the same events or subject-matter have been brought in parallel before the Court and other international bodies or have raised questions regarding the possibility of diverging or conflicting decisions. In respect of individual applications, there are a number of points of convergence with respect to admissibility requirements regarding plurality of international proceedings between the Court and other international bodies. The approach taken by the UN treaty bodies, notably the Human Rights Committee, with respect to admissibility may lead to situations overlapping competence of international human rights bodies over the same case or very similar ones. Situations of diverging or conflicting jurisprudence
between the Court and other international bodies in cases involving the same or similar subject matter have occurred in practice raising concerns about legal certainty for States Parties on how to fulfil their obligations, and for individuals as regards the scope of their rights, as well as potentially undermining the coherence of human rights law and/or the credibility of human rights institutions. Hence, the Court should continue to ensure, to the extent possible, a harmonious interpretation of substantive rights under the Convention with other international human rights protection regimes and continue its judicial dialogue with other international bodies.

166. The Court may decide to hold fact-finding hearings or on-the-spot investigations when the domestic authorities have not adequately established the facts. The tendency of the Court in recent years is not to carry out on-the-spot investigations due to the fact that they are time consuming and expensive. Also, in some cases relating to complex situations there are logistical and practical difficulties which may ultimately influence the Court’s ability to ensure that its proceedings are fair to all the parties. With particular regard to on-the-spot investigations, challenges arise as a result of the reluctance of national authorities to support and facilitate the activities of the Court’s delegation. Consideration should be given to the question how member States can improve the ways they fulfil their obligation to cooperate with the Court under Article 38 of the Convention in this regard. One of the key issues arising during fact-finding hearings is that a number of witnesses summoned fail to attend the hearing. While the Court approaches this issue in terms of assessing whether the respondent State has met its co-operation obligations and drawing, where appropriate, adverse inferences, member States should consider the question of what steps they need to take to ensure the attendance of witnesses at the Court’s hearings pursuant to Article 38 of the Convention.

167. The Court’s case-law with regard to making an award of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention to individuals regarding violations established on the merits in an inter-State case is well established. The Court bases itself on a determination of a “sufficiently precise and objectively identifiable” group of people whose rights were violated for purposes of awarding just satisfaction in respect of violations found. Submitting a list of clearly identifiable individuals by the applicant State from the outset, as well as the respondent State submitting all the relevant information in its possession, would help reduce the risk of awarding just satisfaction to individuals who are not eligible for such an award. The feasibility of encouraging a formalisation of these practices, notably in the Rules of the Court, would merit further reflection and discussions. Also, the submission of the observations on just satisfaction by the States Parties concerned within the time-limits fixed by the judgment on the merits for the parties’ exchange of such observations, would help to handle inter-State cases more efficiently and avoid undue delays between the judgment on the merits and the just satisfaction judgment. The Council of Europe member States should give consideration to the question how to further promote such approaches as principles of cooperation with the Court pursuant to Article 38 of the Convention.

168. The analysis of the Court’s practice reveals that the friendly settlement mechanism enshrined in Article 39 of the Convention offers potential for the State parties in cases related to inter-State disputes to engage in dialogue and undertake negotiations with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter. Respect for the human rights is guaranteed by the involvement of the Court. The friendly settlement procedure, which is carried out by the consent of both parties and which has to remain fully confidential, creates opportunities for a variety of measures to be adopted to remedy the alleged violations of the Convention. Also, the application of the pilot judgment procedure in individual applications related to inter-State disputes may hold potential for facilitating their resolution through friendly settlement. In addition to providing redress to the victims, friendly settlements may provide for measures that have a wide impact on society in terms of effecting change by protecting and promoting compliance with the Convention. Therefore, ways
of promoting recourse to the friendly settlement mechanism of the Convention by the Council of Europe member States should be considered.