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**REPORT OF HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL COHESION**

# TOWARDS AN ACTIVE, FAIR AND SOCIALLY COHESIVE EUROPE

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## Introduction

1. This report follows from a decision taken at the Warsaw Summit of the Council of Europe, in May 2005, which instructed the Committee of Ministers to appoint a high-level Task Force to review the Council of Europe strategy to promote social cohesion in the 21st century, in light of the Organisation's achievements in the field.

2. The background to both the decision to set up a Task Force and the work of the Task Force lies in the desire to take stock in light of achievements and profound changes. Democracy has spread across the continent, levels of well-being are higher than they have been in the past, social stability is widespread and Europeans generally express satisfaction with their lives. However, there are grounds to question whether the conditions still prevail for a strong social commitment. The socio-economic transformation attendant on globalisation and the rewriting of the European political map bring new pressures to bear on and raise questions about the social cohesion approach. Against this backdrop, the Task Force enquires into both the continued relevance of the concept of social cohesion in today's Europe and the approach taken by the Council of Europe and makes a case for a revised vision of social cohesion. Things have obviously changed. There is no doubt either, however, that a healthy and vibrant society is the cornerstone to continued progress. Given this, Europe has to find ways of adapting its social (policy) achievements to changing needs and circumstances without losing their essential character. As the *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion* puts it: "Each generation has to find afresh a manageable equilibrium of forces".

3. The terms of reference of the Task Force are as follows:

*a.* In the light of the decisions taken at the Third Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Task Force is instructed to review the Council of Europe's *Strategy for Social Cohesion* by preparing an in-depth report and recommendations on promoting social cohesion in Europe. Within a context of change and the financial realities facing many countries, and taking account of the differing concepts of social cohesion found in different countries, the Task Force is invited to propose innovative and practical ways in which social cohesion can be promoted within the changed European and world environment of the 21st century.

*b.* The report should propose preventive strategies, as well as remedies and solutions to the problems currently faced by member States in the field of social cohesion and also make proposals for future Council of Europe work in this field.

4. The set of tasks that follows from this is, *inter alia*, to review the activities and guiding provisions of the Council of Europe as regards social cohesion, including legal instruments and recommendations and reports emanating from the work of intergovernmental committees in the social field and the Secretariat (the Directorate General on Social Cohesion in particular). The Task Force also undertook a wide-ranging

analysis of recent developments relevant to social cohesion. On the basis of these deliberations, this report makes the case for and proposes an orientation for future action on social cohesion in Europe. Throughout, the work of the Task Force was guided by a number of key questions: Why social cohesion as a guiding idea and is it still relevant? What are the national and international components of and challenges to social cohesion? What is the potential future contribution of the Council of Europe in this field?

5. This report both assesses the current situation and takes forward a set of ideas for future policy. It offers an exposition of the likely implications and consequences of some contemporary changes for social cohesion and a consideration of options for policy makers. The report aims to provide guidance for reform, at national and international levels, and to prioritise a set of actions. especially on the part of the Council of Europe. The recommendations, however, are framed within a multi-agency context which recognises the vital roles of member states, regional authorities, social partners, NGOs and citizens, *inter alia,* alongside the Council of Europe and other international organisations.

6. The Task Force carried out its work between January 2006 and October 2007. To achieve its objectives, the Task Force met regularly and undertook extensive consultations with a range of stakeholders. A diversified methodology was utilised. This included hearings with a range of relevant parties, commissioning work, undertaking documentary research. Throughout, the Task Force was assisted by the Secretariat.

7. The work of the Task Force was organised as follows:
*Preparatory phase* (January – August 2006): introductory hearings, preparation of background documents, identification of appropriate supporting information, submissions, commissioning of specialised inputs from experts;
*Report compilation phase* (September 2006 – May 2007): agreement on report outline, analysis of relevant information and documentation, including past and present Council of Europe programmes, declarations and publications, search for good practices;
*Consultation phase* (July – September 2007): discussions with and feedback from different organs of the Council of Europe, the social partners and civil society;
*Final drafting phase* (September – October 2007): conclusion of editorial and other tasks.

8. The report is divided into four main sections, apart from this introduction. Part 1 is devoted to a discussion of the origins and varied meanings of social cohesion, as concept and as frame for policy, as well as elaborating the approach of the Task Force. Part 2 analyses the relevance of social cohesion in light of the prevailing challenges. Part 3, following on from this, engages in a discussion of the classical social policy domains and how they might better respond to relevant challenges. The final part is devoted to priority recommendations for action, emphasising especially those in which the Council of Europe can and should take the lead. Appendix 1 details the state of play as regards ratification by the member States of the main relevant legal instruments of the Council of Europe. Appendix 2 presents the main supporting empirical data of relevant trends in Europe. Appendix 3 provides an indicative list of indicators for social cohesion at local level.

# 1.
# Social Cohesion as Idea and Policy Focus

## Social cohesion in international policy

9. For at least a decade now, social cohesion has been utilised by policy makers as a guiding idea for the social goals and achievements of Europe. Social cohesion places the focus on societal well-being and views harmonious and stable social relations as integral to economic and social progress and peaceful co-existence. A core concern is the extent to which people feel connected to society and give their loyalty and commitment to a set of values and social goals that are widely shared. The concept was incorporated into the Council of Europe's political strategy at the 2nd Summit of Heads of State and Government in 1997. A European Committee for Social Cohesion (CDCS), made up of representatives of the member States, was established in 1998. The Committee of Ministers adopted a *Social Cohesion Strategy* in 2000, revising it in March 2004. Other Council of Europe bodies have utilised and expanded the concept, including the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Within the Secretariat, a Social Cohesion Directorate (DG III) undertakes work to continually renew and update the understanding of social cohesion and identify means for 'reconciling' ongoing changes and social cohesion. In effect, the Council of Europe has elaborated social cohesion as integrally linked to the Organisation's fundamental goals: realisation of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

10. The European Union (EU), for its part, has long used social cohesion as a frame of reference for the Structural Funds and other policies geared to ensuring the economic and social cohesion of the territories. Articles 158-162 of the Treaty establishing the European Community laid down that the Union should promote an overall harmonious development and strengthen economic and social cohesion by reducing development disparities between the regions. Member States are asked to conduct and coordinate their economic policies with this in mind and Community policies and actions must also take into account the objectives set out in Article 158. The Lisbon Strategy, initiated in 2000, highlighted the importance of social cohesion as a foundation for a competitive knowledge- and employment-based economy. It selected as its flagship the concept of social exclusion, an approach which directs attention to inclusion and participation. The blueprint for policy that is involved is one focusing on activation, economic development and social cohesion - addressing especially the 'non-active' sectors of society to enable them to participate in employment and be self-supporting while combating the worst excesses of social exclusion (e.g., homelessness, child poverty). When the Lisbon Strategy was revised in 2005, job creation and competitiveness were further prioritised.

11. Social cohesion is garnering increased attention also in other world regions and in the international agenda as a way of addressing new realities, associated with globalisation especially. For example, in 2006 the EU and Latin America, in the context of their regular summits, organised a high-level conference on social cohesion and the

2007 XVII Iberoamerican Summit was devoted specifically to social cohesion. The summit stressed how social cohesion is becoming both an objective of and a transversal tool for economic, social and political interventions. Social cohesion is presented as multidimensional in nature, referring not only to inclusion of and participation by all in economic, social, cultural and political life but to a sense of solidarity and belonging to society, based on an effective enjoyment of citizenship and democracy. With similar concerns in mind, the ILO introduced in recent years two important topics to the international agenda: the 'social dimension of globalisation' and the 'Agenda for Decent Work'.

## Interpretations of social cohesion

12. Many different interpretations of social cohesion exist in the policy world and in academia (Box 1). One of the most influential is that emphasising shared values and commitment to a unifying community. This set of ideas views social cohesion as resting on the bonds and connectedness among individuals in society. In this usage, social cohesion is close in meaning to the idea of social solidarity – when individuals and groups feel common cause with others and can recognise and are prepared to act for the collective good, seeing themselves as members of the community.

**Box 1**

**Different Interpretations of Social Cohesion**

Social cohesion…

- is created by strong social bonds and acceptance by members of society of their joint responsibilities
- requires all individuals to be able to participate in economic life and enjoy its advantages
- necessitates processes challenging power structures and the distribution of resources in society
- requires tolerance and recognition of persons from different cultures and identities.

13. A second interpretation emphasises full and active participation, especially in economic life. This perspective highlights the role of the market and the significance of economic inclusion. One of the most important functions of policy is to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to participate in economic life, especially as regards access to employment. All behaviours and practices that serve to marginalise people from the labour market constitute, therefore, a threat to social cohesion. In considerable contrast, views deriving from a perspective that regards societies as being shaped by conflict emphasise concentration of power, especially as it is associated with economic interests, and how markets will distribute resources unequally unless there is organised, state-led ameliorative action. The political project that derives from this approach sees social cohesion as necessitating, on the one hand, redistribution towards those who are least advantaged and, on the other, the creation of institutions and processes that challenge the

existing structures of power and distribution and mediate between sectors of the population with different interests and ambitions. A further approach places emphasis on cultural factors. In the context of multi-cultural societies, social cohesion is seen to require tolerance and cultivation of diversity and respect for different cultures. Identity is central here as is recognition - people want to have their own beliefs and culture valorised, especially if these are different to those of the majority. This view sees cohesion as being at risk if claims around different identities are not managed in a way that recognises and accommodates diversity.

**The Council of Europe's approach to social cohesion**

14. The Council of Europe has done more than any other national or international organisation to develop social cohesion as a set of goals and practices for policy, converting it from a concept into a policy approach. Among other things, this means that there is an *acquis* to build on. The achievements of the Organisation in the field of social cohesion rest fundamentally on its legal instruments but derive also from activities relating to statements of vision and good practice.

15. The hallmark of the Council of Europe approach is to treat access to rights for all as an essential reference for a cohesive society and also as a principle facilitating recognition of the dignity of all individuals regardless of their ability to meet their own needs. A full range of civil, political, social and economic rights are protected by the Council of Europe's two fundamental rights instruments – *The European Convention on Human Rights* and the *European Social Charter* – and the organs charged with ensuring that these rights are respected. The *European Social Charter* represents a pivotal consensus about the Council's approach to social cohesion. The fact that it is the most widely ratified of the Council of Europe's social rights instruments can be taken as evidence that it picks up on core themes of the European social model. The Charter contains 19 substantive articles, the first 10 pertaining primarily to employment, labour market and industrial relations matters and the remainder dealing with education, housing, social security and health care. Compliance with the undertakings of the Char*ter* is assessed by an international supervisory mechanism on the basis of reports submitted by ratifying States on an annual cycle.[1] In 1999, the Revised *European Social Charter* entered into force, bringing together in a single instrument the rights contained in the original *European Social Charter*, as amended by the rights specified in the Additional Protocol of 1988[2] as well as a series of new rights. The Revised Charter is underpinned by the principle of the indivisibility of all human rights and strengthens non-discrimination as an over-arching principle, specifically ensuring that the enjoyment of the rights is to be secured without discrimination on any ground such as racial origin,

[1] Since 2006, when the reporting procedure was changed, states present a report annually on one of four groups of provisions such that each set of provisions is reported on every four years.

[2] This sets out the following: the right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex, the right to information and consultation, the right to take part in the determination and improvement of working conditions and working environment and the right of elderly persons to social protection.

colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, state of health, association with a national minority, birth or other status. Employment-related rights again figure prominently but the Revised *European Social Charter* added the rights to protection against poverty and social exclusion and to decent housing at a reasonable price. With the introduction of an innovative mechanism of enforcement - a collective complaints protocol – social partner groups as well as NGOs have the right to bring complaints directly to the European Committee of Social Rights.

16. Examining the approach taken by the Charter is revealing about the relationship between social rights and social cohesion. Such rights are framed in the Charter in terms of undertakings on States rather than, say, as rights of individuals. The Charter, therefore, sets out a legal framework but its approach also extends to setting standards and promoting certain practices and values about process (such as consultation and, in the case of social welfare services, the participation of users and voluntary or other organisations). A further significant aspect of the *European Social Charter* approach is that it allows for an improvement in standards over time. A review process operates whereby governments are required to check periodically which new obligations they could accept. In addition, the Charter is based not on a uniform model but on shared values – instead of uniformity, the principle of moving harmoniously towards a common set of standards prevails.

17. The Council of Europe also has a number of other legal instruments pertaining to social rights. The *European Code of Social Security* and its Protocols, having entered into force in 1968, aim at encouraging the development of social security in all member States of the Council of Europe. The Code defines norms for social security coverage and establishes minimum levels of protection which States must provide in such areas as medical care, sickness benefits, unemployment benefit, old-age benefits, employment injury benefits, family benefits, maternity benefits, invalidity benefits, survivors' benefits, etc. The rights of migrant workers have been a particular concern to the Council of Europe. The *Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers* (1977) regulates the legal status of migrant workers with a view to ensuring that they are treated no less favourably than workers who are nationals of the host State and promotes the social advancement of migrant workers and their families. The Convention calls for the equal treatment of migrant workers with national workers in, amongst others, the following areas: housing, education, social security, social and medical assistance, vocational training, the use of employment services and working conditions. It is among the least ratified of the Council of Europe's legal instruments (see Appendix 1). Together with the *European Convention on Social Security* (1977), it aims for the elimination of discriminatory provisions based on nationality through the application of the principle of equality of treatment and the neutralisation of restrictions based on the territorial scope of legislation.

18. As well as the standard-setting instruments, the Council of Europe fosters social cohesion through intergovernmental programmes and policy development. The *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion* is now the leading relevant policy document.

## The Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion

19. The *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion* dates from 2004 and as the title implies is an update of the original strategy (which was produced in 2000). An analysis of the main emphases of the Revised Strategy is insightful.

20. The Revised Strategy continues the Council of Europe's tradition of a rights-based approach, orienting itself to building social cohesion as a basis for human rights. The approach developed in the Revised Strategy can be summarised in terms of four hallmark features (Box 2).

**Box 2**

**Key Elements of the *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion***

- Prioritising democratic negotiation involving development of shared responsibility, rights and the rule of law;
- Emphasising that recognition of rights for all must be accompanied by a set of policies to bring about economic growth, the welfare of all and sustainable development;
- Calling for, above and beyond the legal recognition of rights, the active reintegration of vulnerable groups;
- Highlighting that responsible implementation of public action and consultation among actors impacts positively on the values underlying cohesive societies.

21. The first is the idea of shared responsibility crossing the public and private spheres. This leads the Revised Strategy to discuss and underline the essential, but changing, role of the State and other public bodies and also to identify other key actors and processes, such as dialogue with the social partners and the involvement of NGOs. In this and other ways, it broadens the universe of action, encouraging participation in civil society and extending further the range of 'actors for social cohesion', e.g., the part played by parents and families in inculcating a sense of social responsibility in their children, the need for business and the media to recognise that their activities have social consequences.

22. Secondly, the Revised Strategy stresses that an approach exclusively based on legal recognition of individual rights is insufficient to ensure social cohesion. Needed also is a set of policy processes which weave together economic growth, the welfare of all and sustainable development. Specific mention is made of the following policy domains: social protection, social services, employment, housing. The Revised Strategy especially underlines the need to integrate the social dimension into economic life, emphasising that sustainable economic development depends on sustainable social development as well as a sustainable environment. In this and other ways, social cohesion is something to be actively striven for.

23. A third notable feature of the approach developed in the Revised Strategy is that it pays particular attention to the groups at risk of becoming vulnerable. Those specifically mentioned are: children, young people, families in precarious life situations, migrants and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, elderly people. The Revised Strategy, supporting an inclusive approach, underlines the active reintegration of citizens and vulnerable groups. This type of 'integration through democracy' does not demand the renunciation of differences but instead renders them an important factor in the process of defining individual rights in the public arena.

24. Fourthly, the Revised Strategy draws attention to cultural and ethical dimensions and how important these are to social cohesion. It develops social responsibility as an ethic. It makes reference, for example, to the 'social virtues of cooperation' in our competitive and market-led world. The family and the education system are seen to have a vital role to play in this regard. The exigency is to rebuild a sense of society, of belonging, of commitment to shared values. Placing this in the context of the Organisation's work overall indicates that consultation and joint decision making are two of the 'democratic competences' essential for ensuring social cohesion in our modern societies.

25. The Task Force endorses the approach taken by the Revised Strategy. The fundamentals are laid down there. Implementation is crucial but so also is a clear set of policy goals that are relevant to contemporary and likely future conditions. Looked at from both of these angles, there are aspects of the approach to social cohesion that need to be further fleshed out.

**The relevance of the concept of social cohesion today**

26. One of the fundamental questions posed by the Task Force concerns the utility of social cohesion as a leading concept, not just for the Council of Europe but also at member State level. Having carried out a thorough analysis, the Task Force concludes that the concept does point the way forward. It has many advantages.

27. First, there is its transversal nature. Social cohesion is not just fundamental in its references to social life but has the potential to draw a whole series of policy domains together and to link them to an over-arching set of goals. Rather than adding another theme to the policy repertoire, social cohesion is in fact a global approach, bringing social factors together with economic, political and cultural factors. Policy needs such a broad social approach (although not a vague one) that can serve as a vision or end point in relation to social objectives. There is one other powerful advantage stemming from its transversal nature: social cohesion connotes the notion of all parts working together, the need for balance between the different parts and for systematic and co-ordinated action so that this balance can be realised.

28. Second, social cohesion is an approach that facilitates living peaceably together in an environment that is made up of both uncertainty and stability. It encourages

exploration of new arenas for consultation and concertation as well as clarification of individual and collective responsibilities. The need to find new spaces for dialogue and consultation is vitally important in circumstances such as the present. Social consultation processes which give a place to individual autonomy have a key role to play in restoring or consolidating trust. In addition, as the *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion* points out, there is on the one hand the need and on the other hand the opportunity to orient public activities in a different direction. Social cohesion directs attention to the new roles of the public institutions in facilitating fora for consultation and clarifying communication channels with the citizenry. An approach based on social cohesion prioritises bridge-building across dividing lines, highlighting the existence of visible and invisible forms of inclusion and 'belongingness' but also marginalisation and discrimination.

29. Third, social cohesion is a modular idea which has a direct connection to the functioning of democracy. Using a social cohesion lens enables us to identify the social underpinnings of democracy, in particular the social conditions that need to be in place for an optimally functioning democracy. This relates not just to the extent to which people vote and are in other ways active democratically. It also applies to the way that the public authorities reach decisions and the degree to which they take the wider interests of the public into account. A noteworthy strength of social cohesion is that it is applicable at all levels, i.e., it has reference to not only the local or community levels but also the national and international scenes. In addition, with the concept of social cohesion, a kind of 'filter' can be introduced to gauge the extent to which a given action or decision, whether public or private (the latter referring to private matters which also affect the interests of society), contributes to equity, dignity and participation.

30. A further reason why social cohesion is relevant is because as a concept it encapsulates the social goals of Europe in a way that other concepts do not. In comparison to social inclusion for example – the flagship social policy idea of the EU since the Lisbon Strategy was introduced in 2000 – it has a much stronger set of references to the functioning of democracy and the healthiness of society. The policy 'solutions' that follow from the two concepts are also different. Whereas social inclusion tends to prioritise inclusion in the labour market, social cohesion is more concerned about a broad range of social relations, bonds and balances as foundational to a 'good society' and a healthy democracy.

**The approach adopted by the Task Force**

31. One downside of social cohesion is its abstract character. Vagueness impedes the development of a clear prism for analysis and decision making. Having reviewed the existing definitions and taken stock of the various aspects of social cohesion, the Task Force is of the view that a clear and concise understanding of social cohesion is essential. In this regard, the Task Force endorses the definition of social cohesion elaborated in the *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion*. Furthermore, the Task Force emphasises that moving beyond vagueness is to be achieved not by oversimplifying the definition but by

setting out, alongside a definition, the principles of the approach and how social cohesion is to be achieved (Box 3 and Box 4).

**Box 3**

**Task Force Approach to Social Cohesion**

Council of Europe Definition
Social cohesion is the capacity of a society to ensure the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation.

The Task Force emphasises in addition…
Society's capacity to manage differences and divisions and ensure the means of achieving welfare for all members.

Principles
Equal access to rights and resources, with attention also to vulnerable groups, and dignity/recognition for individuals, as expressed through human rights
Sharing of responsibilities
An activating approach (participation and reconciliation)
Managing the balance across interests, generations and domains of action

32. It will be seen from the definition that social cohesion draws on and follows from a societal capacity, and willingness, to increase wellbeing and minimise disparities and marginalisation. This is the understanding of social cohesion that has become classic in the Organisation. The Task Force augments this definition by emphasising that the achievement of social cohesion also has to centre on actively managing differences and divisions in a context of democratic citizenship. This is the bridge-building element. Both material or objective resources (e.g., economic situation, social protection) as well as more subjective dimensions (such as feelings of belonging, security and recognition) have to be managed. This highlights a policy approach that seeks actively to prevent, negotiate and manage tensions, divisions and conflicts (relating to resource distribution as well as identity). Economic development and social development are viewed by the Task Force as inalienably related and sustainability is seen to hinge on the effective management of both with a particular eye to balance among different sectors of the population, different generations and different policy domains.

33. The Task Force endorses much of the Council of Europe's existing approach, especially as set out in the *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion*. However, the Task Force also develops elements of an approach of its own which involves a number of changes to or elaborations on current thinking.

34. The first principle of the Task Force approach is social rights. A rights approach accords a foundational place to human dignity and recognition. It also makes a connection to human rights as the vital pivot for social cohesion - it is only on the basis of dignity for all that we can achieve cohesive societies. A social rights approach also has

particular sensitivity to the situation of vulnerable groups. In the view of the Task Force, such groups include those living in poverty as well as those mentioned in the *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion* (children, young people, families in precarious life situations, migrants and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, elderly people).

35. Secondly, responsibility for inclusion and participation, particularly by the more vulnerable groups and individuals, must be broadened into the exercise of citizenship. The now common specialised and particular approaches to inclusion, while consequential, are limited in terms of both their capacity to affect the behaviour of all the relevant parties and the realms of activity that they cover. The social cohesion concept seeks a broader, more civic and societal responsibility which calls for a transversal approach. In the Task Force's understanding of social cohesion, the contemporary policy portfolio needs more coherent, co-ordinated and participatory approaches which embrace diversity, take the groups concerned as partners rather than targets, and recognise the connectedness among different domains.

36. Thirdly, participation and social dialogue must be broadened in content, reach and the partners involved. In essence, the Task Force fully endorses the values and achievements of social dialogue and suggests that processes of civic dialogue be set alongside those of social dialogue. The concern of civic dialogue is to foster consensus and resolve conflicts in an increasingly complex Europe. European societies need (more) non-violent consensual processes for resolving conflicts and miscommunications, whether they relate to resources or identity. People's willingness to co-operate and act collectively is critical. There are different forms of civic dialogue. One, intercultural dialogue, is an important means of taking account of cultural factors which are increasing sources of misunderstanding and division. One could also understand civic dialogue in intergenerational terms. Participation and dialogue cannot be consolidated, however, without addressing the 'representation deficits' which seem to be expanding in European societies. The fact that minorities and migrants and other groups are often poorly organised and under-represented is one example that cannot be over-looked; nor indeed can the declining levels of the public's trust in democratic processes and institutions.

37. Fourthly, in any 21st-century social cohesion strategy sustainability must be of the essence. The *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion* underlines this but does not specify it further. This is a critical issue in the view of the Task Force. Sustainability must be considered along two key axes. The first pertains to demographic developments and changes to the composition and quality of life of European populations, with all their consequences in terms of confidence in the future and development of multicultural competences and tolerances at all levels. Secondly, attention must be given to the relationship between economic, social and environmental sustainability as a condition for social cohesion.

38. Social cohesion is not just a process, however. It is also a set of outcomes. Hence social cohesion is expressed, and can be measured, by the achievement of certain conditions in society. In the view of the Task Force, a socially cohesive society is one in which social rights are well-established and capable of being realised, people and groups

act responsibly, social dialogue is accepted as normal and institutions and procedures are in place for wide civic dialogue and democratic participation, and a sense of security and confidence about the future prevails widely. There are, then, four main lines of policy activity to achieve social cohesion at national and international levels: refocusing on the realisation of social rights, further development of a sense and set of actions around social responsibilities, strengthening mechanisms of representation and social and civic dialogue, building the conditions for a common and secure future (Box 4). This is essentially a transversal approach, in that the objectives transcend individual domains of policy and can be realised only by integrated actions. The recommended actions to be undertaken to realise these objectives will be developed in the last part of the report which sets out a programme for action.

**Box 4**

**Priority Objectives for Social Cohesion in 21st Century Europe**

1. Reinvesting in social rights and in cohesive societies
2. Building a society of responsibilities that are both shared and social
3. Strengthening mechanisms of representation and democratic decision-making and expanding social and civic dialogue and engagement
4. Responding to demographic change and multiculturalism by building confidence in a common and secure future for all

39. These objectives are pertinent both to member States and the Council of Europe (as well as other international bodies). But what are the specific strengths and weaknesses of the Council of Europe in the field?

## The value-added of the Council of Europe

40. The Council of Europe is the guardian of social Europe. It has built up an *acquis* in the domain, which includes legal instruments and standards, a body of knowledge, information and expertise, and good working relations with a range of stakeholders. As well as orienting itself to social cohesion in Europe in general, the Organisation takes up and keeps the focus on the interests of vulnerable or potentially vulnerable groups, drawing the attention to those without a strong voice in our societies (such as Roma, those who are mentally or physically ill or disabled, ethnic and other minorities, migrants, persons living in poverty, children). Europe needs to have the interests of these people defended.

41. A second strength of the Council of Europe lies in its transnational character, a powerful advantage given that the main challenges today cross national frontiers and draw their momentum from international as much as national processes. Against this

backdrop, the large membership – 47 – and consequent geopolitical coverage of all parts of Europe means that not only can the Organisation address the transnational dimension but it can do so in a way that takes cognisance of a broad perspective and set of influences. The Organisation's capacity to draw attention to the situation in and needs of the non-EU member countries is vitally important, in general and in regard to social cohesion.

42. Thirdly, there is the fact that the Council of Europe is unique, in a pan-European context, in that its field fundamentally embraces the social. This means among other things that if social cohesion were not to be taken forward as a pivotal interest and concern of the Organisation there would be a large gap. Although its ensemble of concerns are unique to it, the Council of Europe does have complementarity with the EU as well as other international organisations, especially the OECD, UN, ILO, and WHO. That said, however, the Council of Europe needs to work further on clarifying its unique role and the basis on which a more co-operative relationship between it and other international organisations can be put in place.

43. Fourthly, the value-added of the Council of Europe derives from the way it operates. In particular:

a) its role as a platform for dialogue among member States in Europe and its mechanisms for fostering inter-governmental collaboration;
b) its orientation towards bringing together different 'constituencies' - regional and local authorities, social partners, NGOs, the academic community, the media;
c) the fact that it undertakes accompanying measures (enabling capacity-building and assistance as well as monitoring);
d) the existence of flexible instruments (e.g., partial agreements) and the mix of 'hard' (legislation) and 'soft' mechanisms (standard setting and monitoring, policy advice/development, educational work, awareness raising, financial assistance).

44. The Task Force is also cognisant of certain weaknesses of the Council of Europe. Its relative scarcity of resources, with these being cut back or under threat, weakens the Organisation's capacity to act, especially in a long-term time frame. Having to defend itself continuously is inimical to the building of a strong identity and long-term planning. Reference must also be made to the fact that as an organisation it lacks strong powers. This relates not just to its powers of enforcement which are relatively weak but to the general reliance on 'soft' methods. Apart from the area of human rights, the Organisation depends largely on co-operation, persuasion, example, review. In regard to social cohesion in particular, there are a number of points about the Organisation's structure that merit question. The DG on social cohesion (DGIII) has a mandated role only in relation to the *European Code of Social Security* and its protocols, the *European Convention on Social Security* and the *European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers*. Notably, it has no specific role in relation to the main instrument for social cohesion in Europe – *European Social Charter* – which is managed by the Directorate General on Human Rights. There is, furthermore, the structure of the Organisation which is ordered

according to specialism and bureaucratic function. Among the possible outcomes are a rather weak association between units and a paucity of projects that cross functional areas within the Organisation. This means that the Organisation risks fragmentation and, to the extent that social cohesion is a transversal concept, effectiveness is hampered by current organisational practice which emphasises horizontal specialisation and established divisions. The current set-up especially runs the risk of the Directorate General on Social Cohesion being engaged in peripheral rather than core matters.

45. In the view of the Task Force, today's Europe needs the Council of Europe's expertise and action on social cohesion more than ever. However, to respond to the challenges involved, the Council of Europe must itself change and in doing so provide an example to member States and other relevant actors of a new approach. The Task Force therefore reaches the following conclusion:

> Social cohesion is a strategic concept for the Council of Europe, intersecting closely with the achievement of the Organisation's core objectives on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The promotion of social cohesion should be one of the core activities of the Council of Europe. However, to make a significant contribution the Organisation needs to focus its activities closely on four signature action lines – intensifying the achievement of social rights, developing social responsibility, promoting social dialogue and civic dialogue, and building a greater sense of security and confidence in the future. In addition, the Council of Europe needs to put in place a transversal approach in its own operations and especially to make for better synergies among the different dimensions of its work on social cohesion and among social cohesion and other areas of its organisation and activities.

46. This conclusion will be elaborated in Part 4 in terms of recommendations for a programme of action.

## 2.
## Socially Cohesive Europe: Main Challenges

47. A guiding question for the Task Force, and social policy more generally, is how the profound changes that are underway in Europe (and the world at large) are affecting social cohesion. At the minimum these alter the context in which policy is made. They also refashion the type of problems that have to be addressed

48. The challenges to social cohesion involve a mix of exogenous changes and endogenous changes. Five types of change are especially challenging from a social cohesion perspective: globalisation, demographic change, migration, political changes, socio/economic and health-related trends. Appendix 2 presents some supporting statistical information.

### Globalisation

49. Today globalisation is a widely-used term but it tends to be framed rather unidimensionally. Globalisation has to be understood in a broad and complex way, as encompassing a number of processes including the movement of capital, business, information, commodities, services and people around the world and the building of supranational authority and institutions. Markets have been extended all over the planet to assure more efficient allocation of resources. In the process globalisation has also connected market participants worldwide and created complicated sets of interdependences. One consequence is increased migration. As compared with the past, labour supply and demand at a particular location can change more rapidly and drastically and workers, and potential workers, have to be prepared to move readily to search for appropriate employment. Additionally, technical progress has allowed faster development of new products, which themselves often have significantly shorter life-cycles than was true even in the recent past.

50. The full implications of these processes are not yet clear, but an impact on social cohesion is to be expected at several different levels:

**(i) Globalisation provides opportunities for further economic development of all parts of Europe and for catching up by those countries and regions with the lowest standard of living**

51. At the macroeconomic level globalisation implies a further specialisation of production among countries and regions exploiting comparative advantages in terms not only of raw materials but also skills and the relative costs of labour. Globalisation processes contain a potential for further economic growth accompanied by declining inequality among countries and regions of Europe which, if it materialised, would contribute to enhanced social cohesion in Europe at large. One of the inherent sources of potential in globalisation is for increased specialisation, especially on the supply side,

enhanced diffusion of technology and a competitive spur to innovation and growth in productivity. There are also potential price benefits to consumers. However, these are not automatic effects. Countries, individually and collectively, will have to find a strategy to best reap the potential benefits from the related package of developments. In particular it appears that the less developed countries need to base their growth dynamics on productivity increases and on creating new comparative advantages in order to sustain and strengthen their competitiveness in the global arena. To this end, innovativeness, increasing scientific and technological capacity, improving human capital and effective usage of information and communication technologies, within and across countries, constitute important considerations for policy.

**(ii) Globalisation challenges social policies to secure the individual when becoming subject to intensified competition and at the same time contribute to flexibility in the labour market**

52. In general, supply-side measures have been the favoured response to globalisation in Europe – policy has sought both to increase the attractiveness of labour to employers and to better equip workers and potential workers for the labour market. A recent analysis of globalisation and European social policy reached three conclusions: the gains of globalisation are not uniformly distributed across individuals, regions and countries; the costs of globalisation are more likely to be concentrated in the short-run while the benefits will take longer to materialise; the gains will not accrue automatically but will depend on success in undertaking adequate competitive, regulatory and social reforms.[3] This analysis also points out that globalisation reinforces tendencies to diminish 'local solidarity' and to pit one welfare system against another. Another consequence is that many people have to live in situations of precariousness. Even if a society is managing globalisation relatively well, individuals working in particular sectors have become subject to a 'new' risk in the globalisation age: at short notice their job may be eliminated or transferred to a distant place, sometimes another continent. The risks of job loss and diminished returns are much higher for unskilled workers than for skilled workers. If this challenge is not tackled in appropriate ways, the world of work will become more polarised between skilled and unskilled work.

## Demographic Changes

53. A second set of changes affecting social cohesion are demographic developments. While the world's aggregate population continues to grow, many classic industrialised societies in Europe are seeing their populations stagnate and undergo lasting change in age structure. Population forecasts from the UN anticipate that the population in Europe will decline by some 70 million up to 2050 while population in the rest of the world is expected to increase by some 3 billion.[4] While these figures have to be treated with care

[3] Begg, I., Draxler, J. and Mortensen, J. (2007) *Is Social Europe Fit for Globalisation? A study on the social impact of globalisation in the European Union*, Brussels: European Commission. Available at: http://www.recwowe.eu/

[4] UN (2007), *World Population Prospects The 2006 Revision*, New York: United Nations.

since they are estimates, factors in the trend towards population decline in Europe, which began decades ago and is still ongoing, include changes in reproductive patterns (with birth rates well short of replacement levels) and significantly longer life expectancies (forecasts signal a further rise). Relevant issues include the possibility of combining family life, work and social life, and issues relating to housing conditions and family benefits. Working conditions are also a decisive factor. The very real pressures placed on economies and societies, whether in terms of productivity or social and economic renewal, must also be acknowledged. The Task Force is cognisant of this as well as the extent of variation in Europe in this regard.

54. These and related developments carry four key family-related risks or challenges for contemporary Europe.

**(i) Lack of readiness to commit to family and parenthood**

55. Policy can no longer take the existence of families for granted. People's readiness to form families at all is now at stake in many parts of Europe. Between 1980 and 2003 the total fertility rate in the EU-25 fell from 1.88 to 1.48.[5] While falling fertility tends to be equated in the popular mind with increasing childlessness, delayed family formation and decreasing propensity to marry are also involved. As a result, Europe has a shrinking family sector, children have become a more scarce resource and the population structure is ageing. A key part of the reason for these changes is the extent to which people feel that their circumstances are in line with their desires and whether they have a sense of security around their future. There is evidence for the EU that people wish to have a larger number of children than they succeed in having.[6] This seems to be traceable not only to a lack of resources in an absolute sense but to opportunity costs in terms of a woman's time and career in the labour market. If behaviour is linked with policy provision, one could read the evidence to say that countries with higher gender equality exhibit higher fertility scores than those where women find it difficult to reconcile an independent life with family obligations.[7]

56. The desired work/family arrangement and the chances of attaining it form another part of the explanation for falling fertility. The evidence suggests that people in many parts of Europe do not have what they want in this regard. Despite significant policy reform towards reconciling work and family life, especially in an EU context, there exists a wide divergence between the actual employment/family arrangements that people have and those that they would prefer.[8] In general across Europe, the model that is considered too seldom available is the 'one and a half earner' arrangement (whereby the man works

[5] Eurostat (2004) 'First Results of the Demographic Data Collection for 2003 in Europe', *Statistics in Focus*, Population and Social Conditions, 13/2004, Luxembourg: Eurostat.
[6] Fahey, T. and Spéder, Z. (2004) *Fertility and Family Issues in an Enlarged Europe*, Dublin: Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
[7] Kaufmann, F-X. (2002) 'Politics and policies towards the family in Europe: A framework and an enquiry into their differences and convergences', in F-X. Kaufmann, A. Kuijsten, H-J. Schulze and K.P. Strohmeier (eds), *Family Life and Family Policies in Europe Problems and Issues in Comparative Perspective*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 419-490.
[8] OECD (2001) *Employment Outlook*, Paris: OECD.

full-time and the woman part-time). The Task Force is of the view that these kinds of issues have to be seen as key to sustainability: how sustainable is social life in Europe when in many societies a significant gap exists between expectations and reality as regards family and private life?

### (ii) The prevailing double role of women

57. In general, the movement of women into the labour force has not resulted in a sharing of home-based and labour-market work between women and men. Women continue to be responsible for the bulk of work in the home; the average woman doing between two and three times the amount of unpaid work carried out by men.[9] The imbalance is much greater in the Central and Eastern European countries as compared with Western Europe. 'Work/life balance', such a widely-used term today, takes on a very different meaning in this context, suggesting that the task of 'reconciliation' is largely a female responsibility.

### (iii) The opportunities open to young people

58. Central to the 'demographic problematic' also is the issue of the chances open to young people and the extent to which the implicit promises to them as the next generation – of a career in gainful employment and fulfilled choices in their private lives – can be realised. Opportunities for today's young people vary widely across Europe. In many places young people are experiencing a relative loss of autonomy vis-à-vis former generations. Getting a foothold in the labour market can be especially difficult for them with consequences relating to job security and quality, the prospects of progressive career development, dependence on family and even the chances of founding a family of their own. For sizeable numbers of young Europeans, work means fixed-term contracts, forced part-time work, temporary work, seasonal jobs, undeclared work and even sometimes child labour. Then there are those young people, in some countries a large proportion of the cohort, who have to leave their home country to find employment. The financial and social implications of this can be profound, not just for the people involved but also for the sending countries. Without more effective action to improve the life chances and opportunities of young people, two long-term consequences are likely: a decline in intergenerational mobility – already visible in some countries[10] - and a decline in the number of families (as young people postpone the move into family formation). If we wanted to identify a target group for intervention, the evidence suggests that it should be 20-35 years olds.[11]

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[9] Gershuny, J. (2000) *Changing Times: Work and Leisure in Post-Industrial Society*, New York: Oxford University Press.

[10] Blanden, J., Gregg, P. and Machin, S. (2005) *Intergenerational Mobility in Europe and North America*, London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.

[11] Esping-Andersen, G. (2005) 'Inequality of incomes and opportunities', in A. Giddens and P. Diamond, (eds) *The New Egalitarianism*, Cambridge: Polity, pp.8-38.

### (iv) Risks around care and the sustainability of social protection

59. The dejuvenation of the population and the stretching of life at the upper end of the age gradient raises issues (for States, enterprises, families and individuals) around care. There is a series of risks involved here. One risk is that States will not be able to (afford to) provide quality care in the volume needed. A second is that family members will not be able to care for or see their relatives cared for in a manner that satisfies them. In this regard it is important to note that a strong ethic of informal and family care is integral to value systems in Europe and that informal care is quite widespread. Recent research shows that about 4 out of 5 people across the EU-25 consider it a good thing to strengthen family responsibility in looking after elderly persons.[12] And yet families' resources are not infinite. There is the additional consideration that caring tends to be quite gendered with the bulk of the work falling on women. For these and other reasons policy responses cannot revolve solely, or even chiefly, around the family and it is important that public policies strike a better balance between rights and responsibilities. A third risk, especially in how the ageing of the population is often conveyed in the public debate, concerns the pressures on income support systems, pensions especially. With the ratio of the working to the retired population shifting to the disadvantage of the working, income-generating population segment, the conditions and funding of pension systems become subject to contestation. This is too narrow a response to the demographic and ageing issue overall.

## Migration and Cultural Diversity

60. Migration as a dynamic and expanding phenomenon is a defining feature of our contemporary world. In 2005 there were some 191 million international migrants. Six out of every 10 migrants live today in developed countries and just 7 out of every 100 international migrants are refugees. Nearly half of all international migrants are female. Three-quarters are concentrated in just 28 countries. Between 3 and 3.5 million immigrants, including those already living in their new country on a temporary basis, became official long-term residents in OECD countries in 2004.[13] Net migration into EU has been especially on the increase, rising threefold between the mid-1990s and 2003 to reach some 2 million.[14] The impact of migration will be felt at many levels, creating two challenges in particular.

### (i) Challenge of integration of migrants and their access to rights and resources

61. There is no consensus in Europe about migrants' entitlements or their integration into society. Indeed, access by 'foreigners' to rights and services is one of the new frontiers of potential conflict in European societies and the defence of the national culture, and also 'national resources', is a common response. The integration of migrants

[12] Alber, J. et al. (2004) *Perceptions of Living Conditions in an Enlarged Europe*, Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
[13] OECD (2006) *International Migration Outlook*, Paris: OECD.
[14] Begg, Draxler and Mortensen (2007), note 3.

has been a major challenge. The fact that the integration of national minorities and people who arrived during an old wave of immigration is still not completed testifies to this. Economic, social, ethnic and even religious factors continue to act as potential or actual sources of division. There are many reasons why European societies find it hard to integrate migrants and ethnic minorities but at root is the close link between the prevailing models of nationhood and citizenship. Europe is made up of what are effectively national states. The notion of citizenship in the sense of nationality, and indeed of belonging to a national territory supposedly homogeneous in cultural terms, remains very strong. Among other things it reinforces large and frequently false differences between citizens and non-citizens, ignores the fact that European societies are not homogeneous, that many migrants are invited and that migrants are a source of increased economic activity. Despite international commitments, constitutional principles and efforts to outlaw discrimination against migrant workers, European societies still have a long way to go in respect of integrating migrants. Integration is therefore a major challenge for all.

### (ii) Challenge of increased cultural diversity

62. Societies are becoming much more diverse. This is not just because of migration, One very obvious consequence of migration is increasing numbers of cultural identities in the national arenas. While they have many positive aspects, these developments also entail a series of major challenges. For example, new cultures are often presented as threatening the integrity of values on which European societies are based. In the EU-15 today people regard racial and ethnic divisions as the most intense sources of tension (unlike in the new EU member States wherein social class-related tensions assume more prominence).[15] The sharing of cultures and acceptance of different cultures are essential factors for social cohesion, particularly today in light of substantial migration flows and therefore of populations from different backgrounds and cultures living side by side. This, of course, creates cultural richness and calls for a great deal of tolerance, but it also requires migrants to show a willingness to accommodate to the norms and traditions of the host country, although this should not mean giving up their identity and cultural roots. All of this suggests that strategies to address cleavages arising from cultural and racial diversity are quite urgent.

## Political Changes

63. Politically there are also many changes. There is an impression today that there is reduced scope for influencing political choices and that politics is a matter for those who are interested in it. The political systems of the former communist countries are encountering considerable individual suspicion of centralised state institutions, and even

[15] Böhnke, P. (2005) *First European Quality of Life Survey: Life Satisfaction, happiness and Sense of Belonging*, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

in some countries civil society in its organised forms.[16] Perceptions of corruption in government, which tend to be higher in central and Eastern Europe as compared with the Western States, are contributory factors. The nature of participation is also changing. Alongside people's declining participation in elections in many parts of Europe, there have taken place such changes as an increase in diffuse forms of participation via associations and the simultaneous organisation of local and global movements. In a situation which is changing rapidly, one can identify a number of risks from a social cohesion perspective.

### (i) Risk of declining trust and participation in the political system and of under-representation

64. Europeans, to an extent which varies from one country to the next, appear to be faltering in their belief in the determination and capacity of the public institutions to protect collective interests and the most vulnerable groups. The seeming inertia in political circles and a reduction in social mobility reduces interest in political life. A related challenge is associated with representation - as societies become more diverse and more individualised, the conventional forms of representation come to be challenged. In particular, the extent to which migrants, minorities and low-income sectors of the population are represented in conventional politics has to be reconsidered. The matter should not be seen in terms of democracy narrowly conceived, however. People's choices are becoming increasingly complex and more unique to themselves. Without a multiplicity of forms of representation and without proper account being taken of the many and varied interests of citizens and residents, including marginalised groups and 'foreigners', our societies face the risk of 'democratic elitism'.

### (ii) Risk of shifts of power among levels and actors

65. Decisions are being made at many different levels, some of which are far removed from people's lives. This increases the likelihood of asymmetry between the individual/citizen and the traditional forms of participation and economic and institutional decision-making. In addition, as States' capacities and resources are increasingly shaped by international markets and transnational institutions, national governments have less leeway as compared with the past. The countries in the east of Europe are undergoing especially deep transformations as they open themselves up to capitalism against the background of the destruction of the former totalitarian state model. However, it is important to point out that for the whole of Europe globalisation calls into question the sufficiency of resources and decision-making capacities at the national and sub-national levels. Social cohesion especially is something that is generated and manifested at the local level and so challenges us to develop new approaches, not least those that are somehow simultaneously local, national and international in scope and focus.

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[16] Rose, R. (2006) *First European Quality of Life Survey: Participation in Civil Society*, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

### (iii) Risks associated with privatisation

66. The contemporary development trajectory involves a trend to replace collective safeguards and assets with market mechanisms. In this view, the cultural heritage, water, air, seeds and even genetics, as well as assets essential to the preservation of social cohesion such as pension systems and social and health services, become subjects for privatisation and business transactions. Central and Eastern European countries have seen a profound set of changes, including a wide-ranging transfer of assets, a re-mapping of meanings and cognitive patterns relating to wealth, property, work and social status, and the formation of new patterns of political behaviour. Not only has social policy been cut back but the enterprises have forfeited their previously extensive welfare functions. Here and in other parts of Europe the regulating role of the public authorities is under severe challenge. Social rights are often understood as mechanisms that remove the individual's own responsibility. In this view, passive individuals wait around for institutional solutions to their human needs, thereby contravening individual freedom and responsibility. Social rights are seen as something of a luxury when economies struggle to adjust to globalisation and when issues of security loom large. One result is that some social groups, including ethnic minorities, migrants and people who are disabled or ill, continue to suffer inequality and even discrimination. Another consequence is that disadvantaged groups have to compete with each other for scarce rights and resources.

## Socio-economic and Health-related Changes

67. European social policy, as well as the environment in which it has to operate, have undergone profound changes in the last 10 to 15 years. Tensions and conflicts about access to welfare and health remain deep in European societies. Their roots may be found in a 'stock' or 'cake' approach to sharing out material assets and guaranteed rights, an approach which tends to pit different sectors of the population against each other, e.g., national vis-à-vis migrant, young as against elderly, rich versus poor, worker versus entrepreneur. New vulnerabilities and new risks have emerged. Since the 1990s especially, reform in social and health provision in Europe has been widening in scope and depth. The reform measures most commonly observed include increased participation of beneficiaries in the cost of medical care, stricter conditions governing entitlement to social benefits and a greater use of compulsion, the raising of pension age and greater recourse to measures to incentivise employment.[17] Even if the majority of people are likely to maintain if not improve their position, there are three very important risks to be highlighted in this context: poverty, inequality and ill-health.

### (i) Risk of poverty

68. Figures from the EU (on income poverty rates in the EU25 in 2004[18]) indicate an EU-wide poverty rate of 16%, (incomes below 60% of median income), with national

[17] International Labour Office (2007) *Social Security in Europe at the Dawn of the New Century*, Geneva.

[18] European Commission (2007) Commission Staff Working Document, *Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2007 Supporting Document*, SEC (2007) 329.

rates ranging from 9% in Sweden and 10% in the Czech Republic to 21% in Lithuania and Poland and 20% in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. In most countries, the income poverty rate (for the population aged 16 years or over) was higher for women. The rate of child poverty is somewhat higher than that of adult poverty - at 19% for those aged 0-17 years, and 18% for the 18-24 age group. The at-risk-of-poverty rate then decreases with age as individuals progress in the labour market, before it rises again after people retire. One of the most important aspects to note is that for part of the population poverty is a long-lasting rather than a short-term or transitory phenomenon. Across a range of EU member States, anything up to 10% of the population continue to be below the poverty line from year to year. In this kind of scenario the potential for social fracture, for example, family breakdown, disadvantaged communities, growing levels of crime, is quite large. It is clear also that, across countries, a significant sub-section of the population does not benefit from economic prosperity.

### (ii) Risk of rising inequality

69. The degree of social cohesion is also crucially affected by how the income situation of those at the bottom of the income distribution compares with that of the middle class or those at the top. The value for the income quintile ratio was 4.9 for the EU in 2004, which means that the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the EU population with the highest income (top quintile) was nearly 5 times that received by the 20% of the EU population with the lowest income (lowest quintile).[19] Member States with the lowest income inequality are also among the countries with the lowest income poverty rate, e.g., Slovenia, Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark. The regions of Europe with the highest disparities are the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Mediterranean region, the Baltic nations and some of the transition countries, especially Poland and Slovakia and Turkey.[20] High levels of inequality are inimical to social cohesion. One of the lessons from comparative analysis is that social mobility increases as inequality decreases and that the opportunity structures are more egalitarian in countries with more equal income distributions.[21] Moreover, it seems that the capacity of economic growth to reduce poverty depends very much upon initial inequalities in a country. When growth accelerates in a very unequal society, the reduction in poverty is smaller than in a society with more equal endowments.[22]

### (iii) Risk of inadequate access to health and health care

70. The health care system, the largest public sector in most developed countries, faces a number of challenges. Four are particularly noteworthy. First, costs are rapidly increasing, mainly because of technological, demographic and social developments and higher expectations and needs on the part of patients. At the same time, there has, for example, been an increase in non-contagious and chronic diseases, especially what might be called 'avoidable' health problems such as obesity and abuses of such addictive

[19] Ibid.
[20] Eurostat (2007) *Europe in Figures Eurostat Yearbook 2006-2007*, Luxembourg: Eurostat.
[21] Blanden, Gregg and Machin (2005), note 10 and Esping-Andersen, note 11.
[22] See Begg, Draxler and Mortensen, (2007), pp. 71-72, note 3.

substances as alcohol, tobacco and drugs. Secondly, taking an overview of reforms, in many countries beneficiaries have witnessed their contributions, as well as their personal share in the cost of medical attention, increase considerably.[23] Thirdly, demographic trends create a series of challenges, the most obvious being that associated with the ageing of the population. There is also the matter of coverage and compensation. Recent reforms are leading to reduced coverage of medicaments and surgery. Fourthly, patients' and practitioners' use of medicines and procedures is constantly growing and changing. A related concern linked to the use of medicines is a new trend of searching for medical answers to social problems like youth violence and/or antisocial behaviours.

**Task Force Analysis Summarised**

71. Taken together, this analysis leads to (at least) four reasons why the concept of and fight for social cohesion are more relevant than ever in the Europe of today:

- **The deeper conditions for a stable and consolidated democracy have not yet been fulfilled**. Democracy, one of Europe's great achievements, is work in progress. While this is most obviously true for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it is generally the case that in all countries the existing structures have difficulty in enabling everyone to be politically active and have their voices heard. The meaning and nature of 'democracy' is changing – rather than just seeing it in terms of voting at elections, democracy today means 'having your say' at all levels of public decision making. The Task Force emphasises that social factors and conditions are critical in this respect – for example, people's sense that their opinion matters, the resources that they have available to make their voices heard - along of course with the institutional structures and procedures for political participation and engagement.

- **New needs and vulnerabilities are emerging** and these are increasing the risk of fragmentation. It is important to point out that the possibilities for social unrest are different nowadays to earlier periods of European history. In particular, it is now minorities who are most likely to engage in social protest as compared with the past when the fear was of a social revolt by the majority. While the exigency for political action might be different, if viewed through the eyes of sustainability, societies with significant sectors of their population in a condition of disengagement and disaffection cannot function to best effect.

- **Diversity, mobility and changing values** are such that people living in the same community or society have less in common and may therefore be less likely to subscribe to a common culture and set of norms and values. Migration is obviously a key change here but so also are changes in values which endorse greater individualisation and encourage people to express and realise their own

[23] International Labour Office (2007) *Social Security in Europe at the Dawn of the New Century*, Geneva.

personality, cultural identity and 'life project'. Public policy has not yet caught up with this transition.

- **The responses of policies to the challenges and changes are a key part of the situation and must be put under the spotlight**. Social policy in Europe effectively changed direction in the 1990s. The view became widespread that social policy itself was part of the problem, negatively affecting economic performance and facilitating certain sectors to opt out. A new policy orthodoxy took shape. Although it varies in nuance and implementation, at its core is an acceptance of the need to undertake reform of the social security and labour market in an integrated fashion, to better incentivise employment and reward behaviour rather than status, to invest more in services, including those for children and families, in order to increase self-sufficiency and family autonomy. For some countries, this represented a major move away from a redistribution-oriented social policy model in which the labour market was more highly regulated and taxation and social security benefits acted to compensate the less well-off. It is, like all policy responses, far from perfect - some of the consequences have been negative, as indicated above.

72. Against this backdrop, the next part of the report offers some critical reflections on different aspects of relevant policies looked at through the lens of social cohesion.

## 3.
## Social Policies and Social Cohesion

73. The Task Force is of the view that member States should adopt social cohesion as a specific and active policy concern and place social cohesion at the centre of their development models. The goal of such a policy should be an active, fair and socially cohesive society in which policies for economic and social development work in tandem.

74. While the Task Force emphasises and develops social cohesion as a transversal approach, the classic package of social policies is of course central to social cohesion. This policy infrastructure already exists in most countries, and is to be found mainly in social protection, employment, health, education and housing policies. The meaning of social cohesion is not and should not be fixed though. A very strong reason to be open is because of differences across countries. Although the notion of a 'European social model' is widely spoken of, in practice there are many differences among countries and regions of Europe, especially if one defines Europe in terms of the 47 member States of the Council of Europe. For these and other reasons, a sustainable social cohesion strategy cannot be either fixed or uniform.

75. Yet, there are commonalities and it is possible to identify the fundamentals of how social policies can address social cohesion. This section is oriented to elaborating this, taking as its starting point the classic social policies and how they can be better oriented towards social cohesion, especially given the changes that are underway and the insights that are coming forward about old and new approaches to social problems. Yet reorienting such policies as employment, social protection, health, education and housing is not enough. The Task Force is of the view that, in addition to these policy domains, member States need what will be in many cases a new domain of policy – one specifically oriented to activation and societal integration. This takes in policies on migration, on integrating migrants, on promoting cultural diversity and reconciliation, further instituting social dialogue and activating all sectors of society. The discussion throughout concentrates on essential elements, pointing especially to factors and balances that have to be kept in mind and to some old and new problems.

### Employment and Labour Policy

76 In the context of globalisation, it is important to recognise that labour markets are multi-faceted, possessing different types of strengths and vulnerabilities. This is not to deny, however, that globalisation poses huge threats and that the presence of a sound and effective labour market is vital for ensuring a sustainable growth environment and enhancing the competitiveness of the economy. In some parts of Europe, labour markets are beset by fundamental problems. There may be, for example, a mismatch between supply and demand due to weaknesses in the links between the education system and the labour market. There is also significant under-employment among certain groups, e.g., Roma, those aged over 60 years, some groups of young people. Another factor that

exacerbates mismatches is the changing skills balance and the associated skills premiums (whereby the returns on skills and human capital are rising and the less-skilled are faring poorly). There is also the outflow from the declining agricultural sector. Another potential problem is informal work, that which is not covered by the usual employment regulations, which in some countries accounts for up to half of all workers.

77. What is to be done? The Task Force draws attention to the need for a global approach which combines labour market issues with those of protection and security. Economic and labour market changes must contribute to social cohesion, just as social cohesion policies should seek to promote economic growth. There are three fundamental balances to be achieved in the light of globalisation, demography and migration: to find an appropriate balance between firm-based flexibility, the rights and well-being of workers and the quality of family-life/working life; to secure sufficient investments in education, training and life long learning so as to enable people to manage changes in the labour market and at the same time facilitate transitions and mobility; to find a general balance between rights and responsibilities in relation to employment.

Dealing with flexibility

78. Labour flexibility is very popular as a policy response to globalisation. However, flexibility is not unidimensional. In thinking about flexibility, it is helpful to differentiate between flexibility that is negative, in that it leaves no choice to the employee or the firm, and a positive form of flexibility that gives people the possibility of achieving their aspirations and allows enterprises to function effectively. The Task Force endorses an approach to flexibility that has a dual emphasis: adapting the enterprise for people as well as the more familiar adapting of people for the market. Flexicurity - a model that offers flexibility for employers and security for employees – should be an important response.[24] We have to keep up the search for a mutually beneficial combination that defends individuals from the potential costs of job insecurity while giving employers labour flexibility. Having said this, it is important to put flexibility in perspective and not to take it too much for granted as the best response. There are limits to flexibility, not just in terms of the conditions under which it is possible but also in the sense that labour flexibility represents only one variable in the performance of socio-economic systems. Flexibility should, therefore, be seen within a broader repertoire of measures, a complement to such activities as research and development, effective education systems, a sound macro-economic policy mix and labour markets that facilitate transitions.

79. One of the most important 'balances' to be achieved is that between family and working life. The demands of globalisation have led especially to measures which aim for the two-earner family model. For many countries, this represents a huge change. Allowing parents to combine work and family is a challenge for workers, families, public policies and company life. The system seems to work best when parents are given choice

[24] There are several types and patterns of flexicurity arrangements in place across Europe. See Klammer, U. (2005) 'Flexicurity Schemes' in *Reconciling Labour Flexibility with Social Cohesion: Facing the Challenge*, Trends in Social Cohesion no 15, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

in terms of childcare through such measures as the provision of facilities ensuring a comprehensive childcare service and the offer of a financial allowance to allow them either to perform these tasks simultaneously or to alternate between periods of childcare and periods of occupational work without losing other social rights (such as old age, sickness and invalidity insurance). This also means that children have to be provided with out-of-school and other services. Where employment is concerned, flexible working hours for all parents of dependent children and increased opportunities for freely chosen part-time work should make it easier to balance work and family life. Better recognition of people's wishes as regards care for dependent elders and type of family arrangement will also have to be considered in this context.

Promoting activation and transitions

80. Transition and social mobility have always been a part of life in Europe. The changes set in train by globalisation underline the need for economic and social governance systems that are actively oriented to both transitions and social mobility. Connecting activation, rehabilitation and labour reintegration strategies with social protection should be treated as a goal of policy. A life course perspective is helpful for this purpose. The literature speaks of at least five transitions[25]: from education/training to employment; transition among forms of employment; transitions between employment and household/civil activities; between employment and disability; between employment and retirement. The transitions of young people have to be a particular concern. On the one hand, young people's qualification levels are higher today but in comparison to the previous generations they enter the labour market later, experience less stability of employment, and are more exposed to labour market segmentation and unemployment. Young women and men are affected differentially by this situation, given that there are still professions where women are strongly under-rerpresented and that gender discrimination remains a feature of the labour market. These issues need addressing, especially in the context of the skills premium and balances between generations and socio-economic groups. Obviously a long-term view is required along the lines of active ageing strategies that especially help young people to gain a proper place in the labour market.

81. As experience with activation policies builds up, certain characteristics of 'good activation policy' are becoming clear. Incentives and support are emerging as critical. Labour market activation policies need to be considered jointly with inclusion strategies, particularly when referring to those farthest from the labour market, for whom systematic further efforts are needed. A second important aspect of such strategies is the personalisation of interventions. Advisory services that are 'close' to people and that provide tailored pathways if not to individuals then to groups are vital to reform. The purpose has to be to develop programmes to motivate people to actively search for employment while at the same time providing them with the necessary supports and

[25] Schmid, G. (2002) *Wege in Eine Neue Vollbeschäftigung, Übergangsarbeitmärkte und aktivierende Arbeitsmarktpolitik*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.

protecting them from material need. Gender differences and divisions are particularly noteworthy and so gender needs to be a cross-cutting concern when planning and executing interventions. The need to integrate and inter-relate different types of service interventions (e.g., health, education, housing, and so forth) is a third element of good practice. Quality and proficiency, including knowledge and capacity to deal with people of migrant and/or minority background, on the part of the professionals providing the services and their institutions is a fourth element.

Balancing employment-related rights and responsibilities

82. This, the third balance, means developing collective and individual responsibilities and combating divergent social standards. Developing collective responsibility may be served by more closely involving the representatives of insured persons and funders in the functioning of social protection and labour market regulation bodies, considering again the role of minimum standards and devising an appropriate information and communication policy. Developing individual responsibility may entail requiring those insured persons who can do so to share the cost of medical care and to pay supplementary contributions in order to receive supplementary benefits over and above a certain level ensured by basic social protection. Emphasising responsibility in the context of social solidarity draws attention to the following, inter alia:

- the development and preparedness to use back-to-work contracts in the field of unemployment insurance;
- the introduction and use of preventive and treatment options in the field of sickness insurance;
- a commitment to rehabilitation in the context of accident or disability;
- a fair approach to balance between generations where retirement is concerned;
- acceptance of an integration contract where a guaranteed minimum income is granted.

83. Individuals are required more and more to be active participants in their own (and their family's) welfare. Rights are an important part of the new social context whereby all stakeholders are asked to act more responsibly. In this context it is useful to recall the employment-related rights set out in the Revised *European Social Charter*:

- right to work in an occupation of one's choice;
- right to just, safe and healthy conditions of work;
- right to take part in the determination and improvement of the working conditions and working environment;
- right to information, consultation and freedom of association;
- right to work in another country;
- right to equal opportunities and equal treatment;
- right to protection in cases of termination of employment;
- right to dignity at work.

In the words of the Parliamentary Assembly, "more ownership and the practical implementation and application of the European Social Charter at national level are essential".[26]

84. Enterprises too, and the question of corporate social responsibility in particular, are a vital part of the scenario. The possibility of a 'responsibility vacuum' increases given that it is more and more common for decision makers in distant locations and lacking democratic legitimation to make decisions that are of national and local import without local people and their elected representatives being able to wield significant influence. This kind of situation calls for a supranational framework that can properly channel the global growth of economic and financial trading and give binding responsibility for the social and ecological dimension. At a minimum, decision makers at all levels (including those in the 'private' sector) must be more conscious of the socio-economic and sustainability dimensions of their actions and be prepared to accept binding responsibility in this regard.

**Social Protection Policy**

85. Social protection systems are potentially a major asset for social cohesion because they acknowledge a status outside the market, involve positive actions on the part of the State, and combat conditions that limit individuals' and communities' capacity for autonomy. The successes of the European welfare state, especially in combating inequalities, are legendary. It is part of the European *acquis*, a reflection of core European values. The origins of social policy in all countries lie in combating risks – while the nature of risks may be changing the basic logic of a system that protects against risks remains sound. In the view of the Task Force, the over-riding set of challenges for social protection now is to keep up with changing risk constellations, to ensure that the basics, even if they vary in content and nature across countries, are secured and also to facilitate good transitions, understood especially in a life course perspective. The Task Force wishes to emphasise that the strong competition arising from globalisation makes it all the more essential to have sufficient social protection against social risks, including unemployment, and to strengthen social protection's function as a social investment for the benefit of both economic competitiveness and social cohesion. Reform should not be allowed to jeopardise the principles of solidarity which underlie social protection and which have served Europe well. On the other hand, social protection systems should not be change averse - change is essential, but it must be guided by a coherent, long-term and coordinated policy of social reform.

86. It is therefore important to consider ways of making the various components of social protection contribute more effectively to social and economic cohesion. The Task Force draws attention to the following in this context.

[26] Parliamentary Assembly, *Europe's Social dimension: Full implementation of the revised European Social Charter evaluation of new labour regulations and minimum wages*, Doc 11277, 26 April 2007, p.6.

Taking account of demographic imbalance and family change

87. The prospect of population ageing in most European countries raises various issues in terms of social cohesion. Action has already started in many countries. The issue that is most clearly perceived, although not always effectively dealt with, is the increase in the proportion of the population with pension entitlement as well as a need for health and social care services. While the trend as a whole is basically unavoidable over the first half of the 21st century, correctives are possible in the short and medium term. For example, a sizeable proportion of the working-age population remains outside of employment: the unemployed, women with caring responsibilities, those taking early retirement, people with disabilities, and young people who cannot find jobs or are encouraged to spend too many years studying rather than receiving effective lifelong training. Dealing with these groups and others who are unemployed or under-employed is an important part of the response to demographic change. So too is immigration which remains to be developed as a source of positive policies that would help strike a better demographic and occupational balance while more fully integrating generations of people of foreign origin.

88. A further aspect contributing to the demographic situation is that many policies, in particular family policies, do not do enough to enable people to satisfy their desire for children. Each country needs a family policy, one that respects the will of each citizen (including children), valorises family life, addresses the major impact, especially on children, of family breakdown, violence and poverty and social exclusion, and is close to citizens' lives and desires. A comprehensive family policy should therefore be a core priority for each European country, linking income, childcare facilities, gender equality, education, social and cultural services, employment and infrastructural provision and planning. The Task Force is of the opinion that a large step in tackling the problem of an ageing European society is to adopt a vision based on confidence in the future and one that makes a strong case for social expenditure as a productive investment. This involves actively seeking out areas for social readjustment and improvement in the quality of people's lives and circumstances. People must be enabled to feel secure about their future and to have a sense of belonging to their society. The capacities of people in relation to their private lives, especially their family lives, are critical. In this regard it is important to point out that one of the classic motivations of family policy in Europe was to redistribute income between childless households and families with children. The Task Force wishes especially to draw policy makers' attention to the needs of families in the early stage of formation. In conjunction with a policy conducive to mothers working and to childcare and pre-school education for young children, policies should aim to eradicate financial poverty and cultural deprivation among children, support young families especially, while all the time keeping intergenerational balances in mind. One other factor needs to be a consistent concern in policy and provision, namely men's participation and role in family life. On the employers' side as well as that of employees', men must be specifically taken into account so that a fuller sharing of family work and responsibilities will be achieved.

Optimising unemployment insurance and promoting integration

89. Unemployment insurance is an important social benefit which provides security for workers made redundant or jobless, especially against a backdrop in which competition entails continuous restructuring. If it is substantial, unemployment insurance can be even a factor for economic fluidity and facilitate labour mobility. In some countries, however, unemployment insurance simply means passively distributing benefits, without an adequate system for reintegration into the labour market or for training geared to labour market requirements. As a general principle, unemployment insurance expenditure needs to be made more active. For this purpose it could be based, as is already the case in several countries, on individual back-to-work agreements which are a prerequisite for entitlement to benefits. The responsibility of the authorities in this kind of scenario is to provide appropriate support, integration and training systems. The preventive element is also important. For this, an effective policy of lifelong further training must be pursued, if necessary in preference to too many years of initial education. Some reshifting of education over the life course would therefore be involved.

90. Activation and integration are important for other groups also, for example accident victims, persons disabled by illness, those with disabilities. This raises, firstly, the question of a replacement or subsistence income and, secondly, that of return or access to employment. Having an income is a necessary condition of independent living but it is not necessarily a sufficient one. In many cases, too little priority is still assigned to integrating the people involved into working life, despite legal provisions to that effect. Practical arrangements for guidance and support in finding or resuming work are often cumbersome and inadequate. Neither the requirements for entitlement nor the amount of compensation must dissuade the persons concerned from undergoing functional or occupational rehabilitation or from resuming work. Indeed they must encourage them to do so. However reforms which shift the emphasis from passive to active measures should not lose sight of the objectives set out in the *European Code of Social Security* and its Protocols. The concept of suitable employment should be one which aims to ensure that unemployed persons are directed towards employment which uses their skills and qualifications in the most productive and effective ways for the benefit of society as a whole.

Putting old-age insurance on the right track

91. The prospect of an increase in the proportion of older people, and therefore of retired people, raises the issue of how to adjust old age insurance so as to combine security for old people with fairness between generations (which calls for an appropriate balance between them in terms of purchasing power). The main criteria for adjusting the financial equilibrium of old age insurance are comparatively straightforward: increasing contributions, reducing benefits and extending the required duration of working life or raising the statutory or effective retirement age (including through flexibility measures) to take account of the increase in life expectancy with good health.

92. The first option, increasing contributions, is nothing new but demands requisite levels of economic growth. It also presupposes that the other social risks do not also generate increases in deductions, which is likely as regards health and care expenditure. The lower proportion of economically-active persons paying contributions also increases the burden on them, correspondingly reducing the prospects for an improvement in their income and raising the issue of the comparative purchasing power levels of economically-active persons vis-à-vis older persons. The scope for increasing contributions is thus limited in this partially new context, which also has to take account of the need for fairness between generations.

93. Reducing pensions is a politically viable option only if pensions are generous relative to the incomes of economically-active people. Retired people who have paid contributions throughout their working lives and have acquired pension rights of a certain level cannot be penalised, as long as their purchasing power remains at a reasonable level. It is important in this respect to keep a close eye on the quality of adjustment mechanisms, both for rights acquired during working life and for the adequacy of pensions.

94. The most logical adjustment formula is to take account of the increase in life expectancy. Longer contribution periods or higher retirement age should do much to ensure the financial balance of retirement schemes. Many countries have already embarked on this course, but very tentatively in some cases. Adjustment of retirement scheme rules needs to be combined with a change in labour market policy so that older workers are not excluded and ageing workers are provided with suitable jobs. Working conditions and life expectancy also need to be taken into account. A revision of the rules conducive to bell-shaped career paths with working conditions and salaries geared to the ageing of workers should facilitate such changes, which will encourage gradual retirement at a more advanced age. The raising of the effective retirement age could be coupled with arrangements enabling people to take earlier retirement if they are unfit for work for health reasons. These would be preferable to facilities for early retirement from arduous or dangerous occupations, which are conducive to keeping workers in such jobs to the detriment of policies for improving working conditions.

95. The decision over whether pensions should be financed by pay-as-you-go methods or capital funding methods may also affect social cohesion. The pay-as-you-go method is based on solidarity between generations which operates immediately in financial terms. The capital funding method does not preclude financial solidarity, since the value of financial assets depends on production and profits, but it dissociates income from a person's savings from their previous income and from the income of economically-active persons. However, a distinction should be drawn here, depending on whether individual or collective capital funding is involved and depending on the ratio of the estimated amount of the funded pension to the full amount of the pension. The capital funding method also raises the question of investment management: Is this done by financial bodies seeking short-term profits or by pension funds with the social partners involved and oriented to the long term value of pensions bearing in mind issues of sustainable development and ethical investments?

Dealing with other risks and challenges

96. There is a whole series of other 'balances' that call for attention in the wake of reforms and changing exigencies around welfare and social protection. Of these the Task Force draws attention to the following:

- Creating the conditions for a renewed contributory culture in social security (making contributions pay) as an essential condition for guaranteeing the maintenance of adequate living standards;
- Modernising social security systems to respond properly to new social risks and emerging situations of need (e.g., ageing, changes in family structures, labour-market related changes) and in support of employment transitions;
- Improving management and administration of social security systems, including its resourcing (e.g., personnel, technology) and the capacity to respond to the situation and needs of those using the service (e.g., greater cultural and other diversity in clientele). There is much to be learned from reforms that are already underway in terms of both performance improvement (e.g., single access points, multimedia access, new standards of efficiency, service delivery networks, participatory management) and measures to empower benefit claimants (by providing them with a more personal service and/or personal advisor to guide them through the options) while at the same time increasing their responsibility;
- Attending to the situation of migrants and minority and vulnerable groups as they are known to experience more problems in accessing services as compared with other sectors of the population;[27]
- Consolidating the solidarity function of social security and other social protection structures, particularly through general budgets and taxation policies, as a key element combating poverty and exclusion;
- Establishing the right to long-term care;
- Linking all debates on sustainability of social protection systems to matters of adequacy of the system and coherence of objectives.

97. Process is important. All reforms should be carried out in the framework of a coherent policy aimed at achieving solutions based on wide consultation and respecting national and international agreements on the required levels of social protection.

## Health and Care Policy

98. Health is of paramount importance as a key asset and component of human life, a human right and a factor for social cohesion and democratic stability. In turn, social cohesion is one of the most important health determinants and, in consequence, equity in health must encompass equity in access to the determinants of good health. The Council of Europe has for many years addressed health issues in the context of human rights which leads it to prioritise, *inter alia*, fundamental freedoms and a concern people who are disadvantaged. Among the issues on which it has developed policy are: the

[27] Daly, M. (2002) *Access to Social Rights in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

organisation of health care for vulnerable groups; measures for respecting the non commercialisation of substances of human origin; equity in access to health; protection of patients' rights; education for health; ensuring a high quality of health care; governance of health care systems. In the view of the Task Force, the quality of health and care, equal access to adequate treatment and care and the sustainability of health provision are key issues for social cohesion.

99. Against this backdrop, the Task Force draws attention to the following:

Refocusing on the goals of health policy

100. The primary goal of health care policy has to be a fair and financially sustainable distribution of health and health-promoting services. Fair distribution is to be understood as providing care according to everyone's needs. If member States cannot achieve access to high-quality health care for everyone, the priorities must be identified in a transparent manner, involving all the parties concerned (e.g., policy makers, professionals, users, and the social partners) and according to objectives relating to quality and access. Financial sustainability is obviously a key concern. A system is considered financially sustainable when it respects given budgetary constraints, does not create the conditions for systematic accumulation of debt, and complies with priorities of citizens and policy makers. For the purpose of maintaining balanced financing of the health care system, three elements are of paramount importance. The first is to increase the flexibility of the health care system so that it can respond to the needs of citizens, changing environment, shifts in structures of diseases and technological progress. The second is to provide financial protection for individuals from co-called catastrophic expenses on health care. Equal access for the whole population to prevention techniques and health care, both of which are essential to keep people in good health, is a lasting challenge for every European country. Thirdly, it is important to boost efficiency and create a more rational organisation of health care, providing health care professionals with a decent income, while at the same time preserving the stability and effectiveness of the system.

101. Priority-setting, a necessity under current circumstances, cannot only rely on cost/efficiency studies and other (certainly important) economic considerations. A core asset for social cohesion is the perception of confidence in health care systems - if people feel confident in the health care system and feel safe in their everyday life with regard to health-related matters it raises social cohesion. A reluctance to use the health care system because of corruption, poor performance, the fear of being discriminated against or for economic reasons hinders dramatically the social cohesion of a society. Health provision also has to be inspired by the human rights and ethical vision that Europe has developed for its social protection policy. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to strive for equity in access to health care through developing an approach based on democratic accountability. That is, the health care system should be accountable for its performance according to patients' needs at national and local level and also in terms of patients' expectations of improvement, especially taking account of vulnerable groups, such as

elderly people, those who are disabled minorities, homeless, those in institutions, those living in poverty and those who are otherwise in need such as illegal migrants.

Providing for long-term care

102. Long-term care provision for persons with disabilities, the frail elderly and the chronically ill faces huge growth in demand and a drop in supply, the latter especially as women enter and remain in employment for longer periods. Long-range planning has to take into account that the long-term care sector will need more human and financial resources in the future. Member States will be required to have a policy in this area, one that attends to on the one hand the rights, entitlements and needs of people requiring care and on the other the provision of the substantial financial and human resources that will be required. A clear distinction must be made between what comes under health care and what comes under day-to-day care (e.g., personal care, support, meals). The policy portfolio must especially endorse shared responsibility among all sectors of society. In this regard, the synergies that can be found between the health care system, the social services, the NGOs and non profit sector and patients' families could be of tremendous help. The support of carers is also vital. In this and other regards, social services provided at the regional and local level tend to correspond well to relevant needs, from the viewpoint of availability and quality for service users as well as the potential to adopt a partnership approach with other service providers and also with users.

103. The situation of people with disabilities needs attention in its own right. This is not just a question of health service provision – although that is very important – but a broader matter of enabling this sector of the population to be active participants and to live independently. The Council of Europe Action Plan on people with disabilities is exemplary in this respect. It identifies and develops 15 action lines relating to such goals as participation in political and public life, participation in cultural life, information and communication and protection against violence and abuse. Throughout, emphasis is given to empowerment of people with disabilities which means, among other things, that the experience of people themselves must be validated and they and their representative organisations afforded the opportunity to participate and have a voice.

Attending to matters of health democracy and governance

104. A key part of the contemporary challenge in health is to balance rights with democratic responsibility. The rights approach puts emphasis on patients' choice as 'sovereign consumers' and their freedom of choice in the service market; the democratic responsibility approach empowers citizens' voices as responsible partners in shaping the health care system. The Council of Europe has introduced the agendas of patients' rights and citizens' participation in health matters as a feature of 'health democracy'. In terms of increasing democracy in health governance, the role of patients' fora should be considered. On the other hand, patients also need to bear in mind that they have a duty or

responsibility to keep the system sustainable. Patients' rights as customers of health services have to be balanced with responsibility and system sustainability as a basic duty.

105. Priority-setting must be inspired also by a vision of human rights and ethics. It is important therefore that States develop an ethical framework for patient-oriented health care, supported by a strong system of standards and ethical guidelines. Also important is the development of a comprehensive approach to patients' and health professionals' organisations and policies for managing them from an ethical, human rights and social cohesion point of view.

106. Corruption is a crucial aspect of governance and access to health care. Corruption can affect areas of the health system like bribery of administrators or in public procurements. There are also some less well-known aspects - 'non-official payments' - within the health care system in some Eastern European countries whereby practitioners ask patients to cover extra costs. This shows the gap between the principle of free access to health care in hospitals and the expectations of practitioners in terms of resources and the consequence of not matching both aims. The question of equity in access to health care in these circumstances is clearly a matter of concern as is that of meeting the fundamental goal of health care systems: to provide a decent level of health for the population.

**Education and Training Policy**

107. A number of mechanisms can be identified as to how the content and organisation of the education system effects social cohesion: fairness in access to knowledge and career opportunities; socialisation of children and youngsters; learning opportunities that contribute towards the betterment of life and the enhancement of democracy. Some key goals are the following.

Promoting fairness and equity in access to education

108. Given the vital importance of education to social cohesion, it is crucial that access be fair and equitable. While it appears that some selectivity cannot be avoided, access to education should be open to everybody depending on ability and preference. The openness of the education system is more delicate than may seem at first glance, because there are many hidden barriers, e.g., particular requirements for entry, lack of capacity in parts of the system, financial requirements and resource allocations that benefit pupils from better-off groups and hence reinforce the impact of social background on school achievement. From a social cohesion perspective, it is important that such barriers are progressively minimised. This calls for policies that give particular attention to educational opportunities among youngsters from disadvantaged groups in society and areas of low social capital. The differences between the educational achievements of boys and girls also have to be targeted, preferably by an activating approach taht opens up new perspectives to children of both sexes. A concern with fairness also draws in the question

of language skills and in particular the facilities of children from non-national backgrounds in the primary language. All of this means giving attention to children at the very early stages of education with recognition of the need to target specific groups as well.

109. Schools have a powerful role to play in decreasing the 'distance' between individuals of different social origins. Public schools are vital in that they are designed to incorporate the principles of fairness and bring together the interests and objectives of many different sectors to provide common underpinnings for citizenship. The provision of public schooling should not only be asserted as a principle but be implemented, with great attention being paid to quality of services. However, it is important not to over-emphasise the classic divide between the public and the private sectors where education is concerned. Nowadays, it is less a question of black and white than of adequacy of provision in the context of a more or less flexible governance framework. This presupposes consultation over the establishment of such a framework and transparency and inclusiveness in its application.

Promoting life-long education and training

110. Member States operate very different systems and levels of vocational training and education for people in the labour force. The fact that further education and training among adults in all countries is very unequally distributed – the better educated receive much more training and further education during their labour market career than the less educated – poses a major policy challenge in an era of globalisation. Given that it is the less educated who have the greatest risk of job relocation and unemployment, one of the most important policy imperatives is to ensure better access to – and more extensive participation in – training and education by the less educated groups.

111. The fact that changes in the social, economic, political and technological context presuppose, and will increasingly presuppose, successive adjustments in the mastery of vocational skills also implies that detailed thought must be given to the content of general training. This is true not only in terms of fundamental tools but also as regards basic competences and/or key skills (such as analytical ability, problem-solving skills, language skills and mastery of new technology). With regard more particularly to the initial training system, there is reason to believe that vocational training will primarily entail the acquisition of those basic skills which can be adapted to new technology or other changes in the work environment, rather than mastery of a single trade or profession.

112. Working careers must not be allowed to start with the experience of unemployment. It is therefore essential for every school leaver who is willing and able to be offered formal education or a place on an occupational training scheme, and be firmly encouraged to take it. While the composition of the policy toolkit varies from country to country, attention needs to turn everywhere to those policy instruments which lead to lasting integration into the labour market and the creation of value and human capital.

Proactive and empowering measures in the form of public works and projects must not be allowed to be discredited or dismissed as being ineffective, especially considering that they appear indispensable for sectors of the population that can be said to be disadvantaged.

Promoting education towards a better life and society

113. The Council of Europe has, since the 1970s, devised numerous education policy programmes focusing on the concept of continuing education (a concept since superceded by that of lifelong learning, although the content is much the same). The central idea is to foster an educational process that is continuous over time. Spatial continuity is also key. The idea here, with a view to social cohesion at local and regional level, is to introduce processes and an educational set-up that involve all the parties concerned, especially at local level (including those outside the education system in the strict sense of the term). Furthermore, the concept of continuing education or lifelong learning presupposes coherence and continuity in society, by which is meant partnership and dialogue among the various parties involved. This kind of approach leads to an understanding of the school and the university of the future as an educational environment extending beyond its physical boundaries, democratically run and involving all the parties concerned within and outside the education system.

114. In times such as the present the role of education in countering resort to violence and even terrorism needs to be upgraded. The Council of Europe has for long broached education policies as a means of promoting fundamental values, the rule of law and democratic citizenship and translating these into practice in people's lives. This highlights the role that education can play from a longer-term perspective. Education for citizenship entails laying down institutional, methodological and educational principles, which are relevant to general training and vocational training. In this regard, a number of key competencies relating to democratic citizenship could be considered as the very foundations of social cohesion in a democratic system, namely the ability to settle conflicts in a non-violent manner, argue in defence of one's viewpoint, listen to, understand and interpret other people's arguments, recognise and accept differences, make choices, consider alternatives and subject them to ethical analysis, shoulder shared responsibilities and establish constructive, non-aggressive relations with others.

115. With reference to higher education, to which little consideration can be given in this report, account should be taken of the measures needed to enhance its contribution not only to social cohesion within a given society but to wider-ranging cohesion, which it can foster by establishing bonds, particularly but not exclusively at European level. The contribution of the ERASMUS exchange programme in encouraging student and teacher mobility is well-known. Less well-known is the Bologna Process.[28] While it is mainly

[28] The Bologna Process is a European reform process aiming at establishing a European Higher Education Area by 2010. It is an unusual process in that it is loosely structured and driven by the 45 countries participating in it in cooperation with a number of international organisations, including the Council of Europe.

oriented to easing the mobility of those in the education sector, it is also concerned about both the European dimensions in higher education and quality in general. There is no reason why these and other issues cannot be framed from a social cohesion perspective, whereby research and teaching practice in universities and colleges should contribute also to community and public service.

Managing education in a context of multi-culturalism and migration

116. There is much evidence[29] that educational achievement among children of immigrants lags behind that of native children. This may have significant negative impact on social cohesion especially at a time when immigration is increasing. This is an effect that may be reinforced by intergenerational connections: children's educational achievement depends to some extent on their parents' level of education. Hence lack of appropriate education may last for generations. There are many possible reasons for lower achievement. One potential factor is lack of mastery of the host country language. This can (partly) be compensated for through special training of immigrant children and by early language training, e.g., in kindergartens. Another potential barrier is cultural bias in the curriculum, i.e., a tendency that the host country culture dominates the curriculum (e.g., through monocultural texts). An obvious response to this would be to modify the curriculum to include texts from immigrants' cultures as well. The Task Force is not recommending separate texts nor indeed separate schools for minorities, however. This is potentially counter to social cohesion because when different cultural groups separately determine the social content of their school curricula polarisation can result. Culturally-mixed societies should, therefore, avoid culturally separate schools and strive instead towards a comprehensive and inclusive school system, mixing different cultures, integrating vulnerable groups and teaching respect for all cultures.

117. Education in the context of multiculturalism is not just about the education of migrants however. The Faro Declaration frames the vision of a future Europe in a European identity and unity that rests on shared fundamental values, respect for and valorisation of our common heritage and cultural diversity. It represents diversity as a source of mutual enrichment and develops this idea as a means of promoting awareness, understanding, reconciliation, tolerance and respect for the other, of preventing conflicts and of ensuring an integrated and cohesive society. The role of education in countering intolerance and racism and in the context of intercultural dialogue is to be underlined. Pointing out that there is no consensus yet on the best long-term vision for living together peacefully in multi-cultural societies, the consultation document for the forthcoming White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue of the Council of Europe defines intercultural dialogue as encompassing a respectful and open exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to deeper understanding of the others' world.[30]

[29] For example, the OECD PISA project

[30] See *Preparing the "White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue" of the Council of Europe: Consultation Document*, January 2007, p 6.

## Housing and Environmental Policy

Seeing housing as a factor for social cohesion

118. The significance of the relationship between social cohesion and the right to housing has been recognised in a number of international documents, such as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (Article 25.1), the Council of Europe's Revised *European Social Charter* of 1996 (Article 31), and the *International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (Article 11). States that have ratified the Revised *European Social Charter* are required to undertake measures designed to promote access to housing of an adequate standard. Adequate procedural safeguards are also requested of signatories. Equal treatment with respect to housing must be guaranteed, in particular, to the different groups of vulnerable persons. The public authorities must also guard against the interruption of essential services such as water, electricity and telephone. States are also obliged to take measures to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination. Signatories are also obliged to adopt measures with regard to those without adequate resources. For this purpose they must ensure an adequate supply of affordable housing. States are also bound to adopt measures for the construction of housing, in particular social housing and to ensure access to social housing for all disadvantaged sectors. States are also bound to introduce housing benefits for low-income and disadvantaged groups of the population. Housing allowance is an individual right: all qualifying households must receive it; legal remedies must be available in case of refusal.

119. Drawing upon the findings of a recent expert report for the Council of Europe's Group of Specialists on Housing Policies for Social Cohesion[31] the Task Force underlines the following:

- A core part of a methodology for designing housing policies should be mapping and identifying housing problems and defining the vulnerable groups as well as identifying the reasons for their vulnerability;
- Programs should have a strong focus on conditions at local level, guided by monitoring which can use previous and ongoing research findings;
- The solutions should be integrated with other policies in order to achieve a sustainable system of measures that provide for cohesion overall.

## Territorial or Area-based Policy as a Factor for Social Cohesion

120. Policies focusing on housing provision must be informed and complemented by those giving attention to territorial or area-based matters. All the work pertaining to social cohesion draws attention to the existence of regions and localities that are disadvantaged. In many cases the factors causing such disadvantage are infrastructural - involving poor provision of services, utilities and other facilities as well as a lack of jobs – and may lead

[31] Hegedűs, Teller, N. and Åhrén, P. (2006) *Housing Policy and the Vulnerable Social Groups*, Report of the Group of Specialists on Housing Policies for Social Cohesion of the Council of Europe (CS-HO), Strasbourg.

to environmental and social degradation. Emerging knowledge places great focus on the local level, demonstrating how problems and inadequacies can layer one upon another to form localities which are not just composed of vulnerable people but for this and other reasons are themselves vulnerable. The absence of capital investment, whether local, national or foreign, in these areas compounds the disadvantage.

121. An objective of policy, therefore, should be to avoid imbalances across areas or regions and to ensure that particularly disadvantaged areas are adequately catered for. In this regard, local initiatives have a major role to play as do those aimed at the social regeneration of run-down and impoverished localities or housing areas. It is not only an issue of investing in physical infrastructure, of ensuring access to services like sewerage, basic utilities, roads and public transport and housing of a reasonable standard but, also, of emphasising the rebuilding of the social and community infrastructure and social capital of these areas.

122. Employment is especially important in overcoming area-based disadvantage. Locally-available employment serves to reduce poverty, promote social inclusion and increase the self-esteem, self-confidence and resources of those who suffer exclusion from society. It also serves to augment the financial and other resources available locally. The participation of local communities in these and other types of initiatives is very important.

123. The Task Force is convinced that, in addition to the classic domains of social cohesion policy (just considered), a new policy domain or concern needs to be put in place. The focus of this is creating an active and integrated society. To some extent this is transversal to the existing policy structures but it is also a concern that needs to be specifically addressed by policy in its own right, especially in the light of the challenges identified earlier in this report. The main contours of such a policy will now be outlined.

**Policy for an active and integrated society**

124. Activation is a very prominent concept in the contemporary policy repertoire, especially in the EU. To date, its use has been more or less restricted to the economic sphere. The Task Force is of the view that 'activation' is a concept that has a much wider set of meanings and potential applications than economic activation. Activation for social cohesion in today's Europe also needs to take its meaning from civic engagement and social dialogue, on the one hand, and activities that serve to establish and sustain common values and bring about reconciliation of ethnic and/or cultural distances and tensions on the other.

125. Four kinds of activation and integration are particularly deserving of mention.

Promoting and enabling democratic engagement

126. Of essence here is the existence and strength of common political references (values and ideals, for example) as well as structures that give the opportunity for participation and dialogue. For the former, attention needs to turn on the conditions under which norms are developed in modern societies, to revisit how collective rule is (re)produced and how a sense of collective interest can be (re)introduced. The Task Force points towards democratic skills as one essential means of securing the conditions needed for instilling the values conducive to social cohesion. 'Democratic skills' development is a process that could benefit a broad range of stakeholders. It is also in line with and is a means of activating the principle of shared responsibility, which is one of a number of core principles of social cohesion identified by the Task Force. The Council of Europe[32] has identified four sets of democratic skills:

- Ability to formulate and share knowledge;
- Ability to consult on common objectives and strategies related to the general public interest – these include the ability to know what the general interest is, to clarify the distribution of roles and to share out resources fairly in line with responsibilities;
- Ability to institute contracts or commitments and to develop trust;
- Ability with regard to collective learning, capitalisation and transmission – these include the ability for collective assessment, to identify most relevant elements and learn lessons and to remember and transmit knowledge.

127. In the context of a multi-cultural society, improving democratic functioning is also related to combating all forms of intolerance and discrimination. The European Court of Human Rights has established a clear link between combating racism and promoting a vision of a democratic society based on respect for diversity.[33] The *European Social Charter* prohibits discrimination in regard to the implementation of the rights it protects. It underlines, in the various articles concerned, that these rights must be ensured without distinction as to sex, age, colour, language, religion, opinions, social origin, health, association with a national minority, and so forth. A specific article on non-discrimination in the Revised *European Social Charter* strengthens this prohibition, highlighting forms of discrimination in access to employment, the cultural dimension of access to healthcare and other services, and urban planning policies.

Expanding social dialogue and instituting civic dialogue

128. Social dialogue is a key instrument of the decision-making process and an established feature of the policy-making landscape in many countries today. Its added value has been fully recognised by major international organisations, particularly the ILO. Social dialogue, also heavily endorsed by the EU, has a clear positive impact on social cohesion. To identify just a few aspects: national planning processes are rendered

[32] Council of Europe (2005) *Concerted Development of Social Cohesion Indicators Methodological Guide*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
[33] Nachova v. Bulgaria, judgment of 6 July, 2005 (Grand Chamber), para 145.

more democratic and inclusive by social dialogue; negotiation can provide the information to identify win-win situations and design intelligent agreements that are mutually beneficial; the inclusion of stakeholders guarantees that they have a voice, that they are informed and respected and that they do not feel over-run by decisions. The Task Force favours the expansion of social dialogue and endorses the attention given by the EU to this process.

129. The Task Force also favours augmenting the understanding and practice of dialogue to include civic dialogue. In essence a form of investment in social and cultural capital, some European countries have some form of such dialogue already in place, for example citizens' fora, organised networks of NGOs. In general though, this is a new idea for most countries and involves the idea of consciously creating 'spaces' and opportunities where people from very different and potentially conflicting backgrounds can get together. For the purpose of instituting civic dialogue, consideration should be given to the following:

- greater stakeholder involvement in public decision making generally;
- the introduction and expansion of dialogue among faith communities;
- the promotion of civic leadership in low-income communities;
- recognising and promoting the work of NGOs and voluntary associations. The Council of Europe is exemplary here, having in 2003 granted NGOs participatory status which, among other things, gave them the right to be invited to certain meetings, to receive documentation and to provide expert advice on Council of Europe policies, programmes and actions. The NGOs' experience and knowledge as well as their often strong connections to people living poor and marginalised lives are to be recognised as important resources in increasing social cohesion in Europe;
- actively supporting and engaging the work of migrants' and minorities' associations, especially in the development of new economic and political measures for integrating and supporting marginalised groups.

Managing diversity and the integration of migrants

130. Cultural diversity is widely recognised as a descriptive characteristic of Europe but governance in European societies is not always multicultural. In the view of the Task Force, social cohesion issues are intimately bound up with how societies treat migrants and also minorities (especially those of migrant origin). There are different ways in which this can be both explored and rectified.

131. The Task Force underlines that combining 'pluralism' and 'equality' as conditions of social cohesion involves revisiting and maybe even revising the core set of values in society. Cultural and value accommodation is a demanding policy idea(l) for both host society and migrants. To effect it, a number of fundamental actions are required. On the part of the host country, these include measures to identify the contributions of migrants as well as factors that contribute to discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion. Given that cultural accommodation is a two-sided process, it is necessary also for migrants to

show a willingness to accommodate to the norms and traditions of the host country, without giving up their identity and cultural roots. The search for cultural accommodation may also mean revisiting human rights and rethinking the model for achieving equality. For the latter purpose the recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights, underlining the need to create an environment conducive to the full enjoyment of human rights by all, should be noted, not least because it ordains that States may under certain circumstances be under an obligation to allow for differential treatment to ensure equal enjoyment of rights by all.[34] This, especially relevant in the context of multi-culturalism, may require the introduction of appropriate exceptions to a general norm.

132. The role of intercultural dialogue is to be emphasised also, as part of the aforementioned civic dialogue or in its own right. Among the possible policy goals of this kind of activity are the following:

- Working towards secular and democratic engagement and policy making;
- Instituting procedures to build confidence in a common future and in civic values such as fairness, tolerance, respect for freedom and democracy, gender equality, solidarity and social responsibility, and engendering a sense of belonging and mutual recognition;
- Working against the ethnicisation of tensions;
- Strengthening social cohesion through the economic, social and cultural integration of migrants;
- Reconsidering all policies for their 'fairness from a cultural dimension', including stigmatisation and discrimination.

Managing migration

133. Migration and the treatment of migrants is an important test case – and one of the greatest challenges – for a socially cohesive Europe of the future. A social cohesion perspective underlines that each country should have a dedicated policy on migration and the treatment of migrants. There is guidance from international organisations on the general contours of such a policy. The UN, for example, recommends that national migration policy should, at the minimum, address the following: the role of international migration in relation to economic growth and development; family reunification; asylum and refugee protection and resettlement; the prevention of irregular migration and the promotion of regular migration; integration, including the rights and obligations of migrants and their citizenship status.[35] Member States also have available to them the template and experience of the Council of Europe. Legal instruments include the *European Social Charter*, the Revised *European Social Charter*, the *European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers* and the *European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance*. In addition, there is the Council of Europe/UNESCO Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the

[34] Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 April, 2000 (Grand Chamber), para 44.
[35] Global Commission on International Migration (2005) *Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action*, New York: UN.

European Region (ETS 165) and the work on academic recognition and mobility, adopted in 1997, which has now been signed by 43 States and ratified by 33. Promoting knowledge and ratification by States of the relevant Council of Europe legal instruments constitutes therefore an important step forward.

134. Migration has to be treated and developed as a matter for both countries of origin and those that receive migrants. There are many common interests, for example, combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking, promoting cooperation between countries with a labour surplus and those confronted with an impending labour shortage, and examining the linkage between migration and a range of social issues. Multilateral, and especially bilateral, treaties can serve to strengthen the links between countries and encourage co-operation between them in pertinent domains. The utility of a partnership approach between agencies in industrialised countries and sending countries, focused especially on both institutional and human resource capacity building in the sending countries, is also to be underlined. 'Co-development' is an important concept here, underlining, *inter alia*, the importance of engagement with migrants and their representative associations and a co-operative approach between countries of origin and receiving countries.[36]

135. Among the issues that remain as being in need of sustained policy attention are the following:

- The movement of people between home and host countries: This could be facilitated by a policy approach that establishes clear admission procedures and facilitates the acquisition of full political rights or nationality for long-term migrants. All admission procedures and criteria have to sustain dignity and respect human rights.

- The distinction between legal and illegal migration: While the former is becoming more regularised, the matter of the rights and treatment of undocumented migrants is practically ignored. At present the only right acknowledged for undocumented migrants is the right to emergency health care. The 8th Conference of European Ministers responsible for Social Security (2002) stated the need for undocumented migrants to also enjoy some basic support.

- Facilitating the acquisition of nationality for long-term migrants: Equal treatment for third-country nationals is developed in the EU Directive (2003/109/EC) on the Status of Third-country Nationals who are Long-term Residents. The Directive grants European status to third-country nationals who have been lawfully resident for an uninterrupted period of five years in an EU member State. It also seeks to

[36] Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on co-development and migrants working for development in their countries of origin defines co-development as any social, economic, cultural or political development activity in countries of origin based on co-operation between migrants, their organisations and their partners – public and private – in both countries of origin and receiving countries.

harmonise national legislation and practice regarding the granting of this status and stipulates the conditions of residence in a member State other than the one in which the status has been granted.

- Whether and under what conditions temporary and atypical workers obtain access to social and other services in their host country: The evidence suggests that national social security agencies need to work even closer together and to establish effective cooperation mechanisms, in order to strengthen their capacities in terms of organising and coordinating at both national and cross-national levels.

- Family reunification: Common and transparent family reunification rules are an important component of a genuine common immigration policy. EU member States reached agreement in 2003 with the *Directive on the Right to Family Reunification*. This directive regards family reunification as a fundamental right in the EU. Yet, the EU uses the nuclear family model as a basis for these rights. Only spouses and minor children can benefit from family reunification; nothing is said about other family models.

- Migration as a gendered phenomenon: Female migrants may be, especially if they work in poorly regulated sectors such as domestic service, more vulnerable to exploitation than male migrants. They may also be treated differently and have varying opportunities or capacities for integration. It is necessary to take effective measures to protect especially the rights of female migrants and for migration policy to have a strong gender element. For migrant women empowerment should especially take the form of strengthening their confidence and capacity to act and enabling them to understand and exercise their rights. Appropriate support structures, such as those providing for cases of domestic violence and forced marriage, are essential.

- The matter of the 'brain drain' – the permanent emigration of highly-qualified persons: The increasing international demand for certain kinds of workers, for example health care workers is leading to an outflow of such workers from the developing to the developed world. The idea of circular migration has merit in this context – the promotion and facilitation of temporary or permanent return on a voluntary basis on the part of qualified migrants in order to transfer knowledge, skills and technology. International cooperation on ethical recruitment also has a role to play.

136. Drawing upon the discussion in this chapter, there are six core elements to a policy framework for social cohesion in today's Europe. These are: employment and labour, social protection, education and training, health and social care, housing, planning and environment, activation and integration in society. The following is a summary overview of action points and considerations for a comprehensive policy on social cohesion.

**Box 5**

**Key Considerations in Orienting Policies to a Social Cohesion Perspective**

**Reframing Employment and Labour Policy**
Encouraging Flexibility
Promoting Activation and Transitions
Balancing Employment-related Rights and Responsibilities

**Modernising Social Protection Policy**
Taking Account of Demographic Imbalance and Family Change
Optimising Unemployment Insurance and Promoting Activation and Integration
Putting Old-age Insurance on the Right Track
Taking account of other changes, risks and challenges

**Developing Health and Care Policy**
Refocusing on the Goals of Health Care Policy
Providing for Long-term Care
Attending to Matters of Health Democracy and Governance

**Developing Education and Training Policy**
Promoting Fairness and Equity in Access to Education
Promoting life-long Education and Training
Promoting Education towards a better Life and Society
Managing Education in a Context of Multi-culturalism and Migration

**Developing Housing and Environmental Policy**
Seeing Housing Policy as a Factor for Social Cohesion
Better using Territorial or Area-based Policy as a Tool for Social Cohesion

**Promoting an Active and Integrated Society**
Promoting and Enabling Democratic Engagement
Expanding Social Dialogue and Instituting Civic Dialogue
Managing Diversity and the Integration of Migrants
Managing Migration

## 4.
## A Programme of Action for a Transversal Approach to Social Cohesion

137. Social cohesion is first and foremost the responsibility of nation States. Hence it is recommended that member States should undertake integrated policy development and implementation with a view to conscious and concrete promotion of social cohesion. But social cohesion is essentially a transversal phenomenon and has to be addressed as such. While it will be obvious that classical social policies have a major role to play in social cohesion, the Task Force concentrates its efforts here on a transversal approach.

138. More than ever before, European countries have to respond to issues that transcend national borders and resources. The main challenges are common to member States and hence countries will benefit from common work and dialogue on these issues. In the kind of broad-ranging response that is required, the role of inter-state organisations and institutions will continue to be vital. A Europe-wide process will greatly help both national and cross-national responses. There is a vital role in all of this for the Council of Europe. In the view of the Task Force, the Council is a most important player in achieving social cohesion in Europe. Therefore the Task Force recommends:

*The promotion of social cohesion should be one of the core elements of the work of the Council of Europe. Social cohesion is a strategic concept for the Council of Europe, intersecting closely with the achievement of the core objectives on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore central to the core mission of the Organisation.*

139. To achieve these objectives, the following sections set out both a programme of action, focusing on a number of signature lines of activity which are recommended to be prioritised both by the Council of Europe and member States, and a methodology for working transversally. Given the Task Force brief, particular attention is paid to the role of the Council of Europe and to devising ways in which it, and its constituent and affiliated bodies, can initiate and show leadership in relation to the programme of action. However, the objectives and activities are generic and so it is essential that they be put into action also by member States. There is no gainsaying the need for action at many levels.

140. Social cohesion requires a renewed political commitment, on the part of both member States and the Council of Europe. For the purpose of generating such political will, the Task Force recommends:

*Every third year a Ministerial conference of the Ministers responsible for social cohesion should be held to consider new risks and responsibilities for social cohesion in light of globalisation and other challenges and to work towards the development of a new social contract for the future. The first conference should be in 2009 and should focus on this report as a starting point to transform the recommendations into concrete programmes and actions.*

**Focus of Programme of Action on Social Cohesion**

141. The transversal approach that the Task Force deems appropriate for social cohesion rests on four strands and objectives (see Box 4 above). In some cases these involve new issues or approaches; in others they require renewed attention to existing issues.

*The Task Force recommends that social cohesion in Europe be addressed transversally by a four-fold programme that: 1) reinvests in social rights, 2) develops a wide sense and ethic of responsibility, 3) strengthens democratic foundations and mechanisms of social and civic dialogue and 4) builds confidence in the future. It is recommended that the programme and its achievement be kept under regular review and that the European Committee for Social Cohesion (CDCS) be given a major role in this regard.*

142. In order to achieve these a broad-ranging programme of action is required. The Task Force is conscious that there are many possible actions and so an effort is made to be specific about first steps. These are designed with both short- and long-term objectives in mind and to be sufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet country- or region-specific conditions. The programme is intended to serve as a road map for policy makers, to enable them to design, adjust, refocus and implement appropriate policies and methods of working. The Task Force strongly recommends that activities be undertaken simultaneously. The programme and its achievement should be kept under regular review within the Council of Europe. The European Committee for Social Cohesion (CDCS) should play a key role in this regard, especially in drawing up implementation plans for transversal strategies and regular monitoring of achievements.

1. Reinvesting in Social Rights and in a Cohesive Society

Objective: to reinvigorate the commitment to social rights and re-address vulnerabilities

143. The Task Force underlines the foundational role of human rights to social cohesion, especially the social rights protected by the Council of Europe instruments relating to employment, social protection, health, education, housing. Providing appropriate and accessible services, combating discrimination in practice and reinforcing rights-based policies aimed at integrating migrant workers and all those in a vulnerable situation are key to an updated strategy for social cohesion.

144. To take this forward the Council of Europe should:

- **Intensify the promotion of social rights in Europe**:
  a) Renew efforts to widen ratification of the Council of Europe's legal instruments, among member States and by the EU, and make these a reference standard or benchmark for social policy in Europe;
  b) Continue to invest in monitoring the implementation of the instruments and evaluation of difficulties involved. The new reporting system introduced in 2006 for the *European Social Charter*, which focuses on reporting sequentially on four thematic groups of rights, is an important innovation that should itself be monitored for effectiveness;

c) In a drive to improve the realisation of rights, institute a programme to extend the application of social rights to groups or sectors of the population which have not been central to the classic framework of rights. These include children, migrants, workers without full social rights, people with disabilities, minorities, recipients of long-term care, people living in poverty, families headed by young, low-income parents, the homeless. The content and impact of social policies applied to each of these groups as well as the pertinence of the services provided should be analysed as a first step, paying particular attention to sources of discrimination and stigmatisation. A programme on how to improve migrants' access to social rights by developing cultural competences in social services should be undertaken as a priority.

- **Further develop health as a basis for social cohesion and as a global indicator of success of social policies and protection of human rights**:
  a) Promote a 'health and human rights for all' approach, setting out standards for health care based on equity, solidarity, justice, non-discrimination and non-stigmatisation with special sensitivity to the situation of vulnerable groups and engaging the professionals;
  b) Undertake a programme together with the social partners and NGOs to highlight inequalities in life expectancy and counteract the increasing socio-economic gradient to health and the impact of epidemiological changes;
  c) Spearhead the development of a value-based 'governance framework for our time' in health care that is oriented to accountability, transparency, sustainability and patients' rights, avoiding corruption and conflicts of interest and invoking the shared responsibility of all stakeholders in society. One suggested initiating activity is to co-ordinate experience and knowledge concerning standards in different countries. The overall outcome of this work should be a 'Council of Europe reference tool' for priority setting in health care;
  d) Investigate and give guidance on how the development of social care services for dependent people can be informed by a rights-based approach.

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- **Further develop education as a basis for social cohesion**:
  a) Develop a programme, together with the OECD, to enhance the contribution of education and life-long learning to improving both people's capacity to cope with transitions and social mobility;
  b) Promote democratic skills as part of a concerted programme of civic education for all sectors of the population, engaging the teaching profession(s) and local and national education providers;
  c) Spearhead a programme of activities, together with local, national and transnational agencies, oriented to public awareness to affirm the value for social cohesion of historic, cultural and environmental heritage and collective assets in general.

2. Building a Europe of Responsibilities that are both Shared and Social

Objective: increase all actors' sense of social responsibility

145. In an attempt to revive and or engender a widely-held sense of social responsibility, all stakeholders, including member States, the social partners, civil society and the Council of Europe and other relevant international organisations should strive towards 'a Europe of shared responsibilities'.

146. The Council of Europe can offer a leading example in this by:

- **Furthering the social responsibilities of the public authorities, including regional and local authorities**:
  a) Develop and disseminate guidelines for incorporating social cohesion and sustainability concerns into economic decision-making processes at all levels;
  b) Develop responsibility and transversalism at local and regional levels by
     i) Following up on the recent Recommendation of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities[37] on social cohesion by developing the concept of 'responsible territory for social cohesion and sustainable development'[38] as a basis to set up local strategies to ensure social cohesion development and rolling out the 'multi-partite social contract model' (which is being pioneered by the Council of Europe in close association with a number of bodies) as a way of formally connecting the activities of public and private service providers so as to give those who are vulnerable a guarantee of multiple, complementary services and support in the local area;
     ii) Promoting an exchange of experience, at both local and national levels, on how to support and improve the role played by public service administrations in building social cohesion, addressing in particular the improvement of channels of communication with citizens, the reinforcement of transparency, ensuring adequate levels of skill and resourcing for staff attending to the public.

- **Increasing citizens' sense of social responsibility**:
  Undertake actions, such as organising on the ground projects, exchanges, educational and other initiatives, to enable citizens to act responsibly, especially in their employment, consumption and investment patterns and life styles. A guiding motto for all this might be the 'aware, active and responsible citizen'.

- **Increasing social responsibility-oriented actions by social partners and civil society**:
  a) Promote in co-operation with the EU and the active involvement of the social partners and NGOs, the social responsibilities of enterprises, especially as regards multi-nationals and sub-contracting;
  b) Invite the media to engage in a dialogue on its social responsibilities and contribution to increased social cohesion in Europe, keeping in mind its voluntary nature and respect for the freedom of the press.

3. Strengthening Representation and Democratic Decision-making and Expanding Social Dialogue and Civic Engagement

Objective: improve democratic participation among all sectors and extend processes of dialogue and engagement

147. Social cohesion is closely linked to democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law in that it facilitates participation and improves governance procedures. At the same time, mobilising all actors and opening up decision-making processes to wider participation for the purpose of consensus-building would constitute a major contribution to social cohesion. Motivating people and groups to participate and enabling them to do

[37] Recommendation 207 (2007) on the development of social cohesion indicators - The concerted local and regional approach.
[38] Defined as "territory in which all the players, not least citizens themselves, co-operate and are committed to meeting expectations regarding well-being and social cohesion".

so, by ensuring that appropriate and sufficient representation structures and opportunities for participation exist, is crucial.

148. To take this forward the Council of Europe should:

- **Spearhead a programme of activity to reactivate democratic processes**. This should follow up on the social rights work suggested above, identifying remedies and means to address deficits of representation of groups in situations of risk of poverty or vulnerability, specifically children, young people, adults and families living in poverty and in precarious life situations, migrants, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, elderly people. A particular line of activity is to devise ways in which representation structures can be adapted to enable such groups to have a better say in decision making processes and organisations (including the Council of Europe). The NGOs should be considered major partners for this purpose but also the groups and individuals concerned themselves.
- Devote a **forthcoming meeting of the *Forum for the Future of Democracy*** to a major topic related to social cohesion, such as, for example, the interdependence of democracy and social rights.
- P**romote and support the expansion of social dialogue** as a general organising principle of social and economic life by:
  a) Engaging with the social partners on setting up programmes/agreements to improve the situation of younger workers, as regards both their work situation and their family and private life;
  b) Encouraging and facilitating the expansion of social dialogue to actively include intergenerational issues and life cycle approaches;
  c) Encouraging and facilitating the social partners to undertake initiatives to address the situation of those furthest from the labour market.
- **Institute and expand civic dialogue** by piloting, together with one or more member States, an initiative on civic dialogue which would see the creation at local level of 'fora for dialogue', for example among migrants and residents, or among faith communities, and the roll-out over time of this on a wider basis. Two specific activities should be prioritised here:
  i) The recent proposal by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities to draw up a charter on inter-generational co-operation, aimed at establishing forums for dialogue between the generations, could be taken as a pilot exercise for this purpose. As well as the Congress, the NGOs, third-sector organisations and those representing newcomers to society should be given a leading role in this;
  ii) The conclusions of the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue (which is underway at the present time and is due to be finalised late in 2007).

4. <u>Building a Secure Future for All</u>

Objective: to engender a sense of security and confidence in the future on the part of all

149. In the view of the Task Force a key to addressing demographic and other social challenges is to renew people's confidence in the future as well as their sense of personal security and belonging to society. This involves focusing not just on the opportunities open to people to pursue family as well as work-related aspirations in a context of optimism and security about the future but more global objectives also in relation to peace, security and social justice.

150. The Council of Europe could take the lead by:

- Undertaking a programme of work, in co-operation with the OECD, **to develop proposals for improving social mobility** mindful of the sustainability and durability of social protection systems.
- As well as continuing to pursue its actions in favour of children, people with disabilities, Roma, those suffering extreme poverty and gender mainstreaming, instituting a programme of work to:
  a) develop **policy models of family-work reconciliation** that are sustainable in terms of being compatible with people's preferred forms of family life, including their preferred family size, gender equality and strengthening the rights of children, and with the needs of business in a globalised world;
  b) develop **innovative policy responses to enabling young people to plan their own life projects** and make free decisions about their family life;
  c) **develop political rights of long-term resident migrant workers**;
  d) As part of its New Horizons programme (suggested below) undertake a programme of research on:
     i) how the public's sense of security is determined and how this is linked to views of future family life;
     ii) the implications of environmental change, and the ways that it is being interpreted as a lens and exigency for policy making, from the perspective of social cohesion.
- Spearheading a campaign, together with other international organisations, to promote the **adoption of codes of good practice in regard to migration and the integration of migrants** in society and develop further the concept of 'co-development' with its emphasis on migrants contributing to the development of their own countries as well as co-operative relations among member States in regard to migration and between member States and countries outside of Europe.

## Delivering on Social Cohesion

### 1. Transversalism as a method

151. As a transversal concept, social cohesion is to be secured not just by the content or orientation of policies but also by the method of working. Rather than organising for and processing work on a subject specific or exclusive basis, a social cohesion approach calls for cross-disciplinary activity. To make it operational, scope must be provided and methods devised for co-ordination between specialists in the various areas of policy that are involved. These include social welfare and employment, child and family welfare, education in general as well as that for democratic citizenship, culture, health and environment, urban and housing policies, anti-poverty and exclusion policies, those on demographic movements (migration, population) and sustainable development and co-development. The specific character of social cohesion prompts reflection on the typical methods of action both within the Council of Europe and the individual member States.

152. The Task Force, having given considerable thought and attention to the organisation of the work of the Council of Europe from the perspective of social cohesion and its strengths and weaknesses in that regard (as enunciated in par. 40 to 44 above) recommends:

*The Council of Europe should undertake reform in its structures and practices, in particular so that there is stronger internal integration and synergies, especially as regards the work on social cohesion.*

153. Strengthening transversalism has implications right across the Organisation, relating especially to the composition of Committees and groups of experts, operating procedures, and the type of activity engaged in. In particular:

- The various intergovernmental committees and their Bureaux should be asked to co-ordinate their respective agendas so as to address issues of common interest and develop shared perceptions and strategies;
- In forming committees or groups of experts, whether independent or governmental, the multidisciplinary aspect should be highlighted when candidates are sought and selected. Committee or group membership should cover the various approaches and specialisations (legal, social, economic, cultural, integration-related, etc.) so that the outcome of the work is innovative and founded on a more integrated vision;
- At the political level, common working 'platforms' might be established for central themes relating to social cohesion, bringing together representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the European Committee for Social Cohesion (CDCS), other committees, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the INGO Liaison Committee and experts. This kind of co-ordination could serve to aid their mutual communication and the development of shared strategies;
- For an easier transversal approach within the Secretariat, inter-departmental meetings should be introduced as standard practice to assist exchanges and co-ordination among objectives, approaches and responsibilities. In particular, interdepartmental co-ordination arrangements should be made between the legal departments (for example *European Social Charter*) and those handling policies on access to rights, or also between two departments concerned with the same policy but from different standpoints, such as culture and migration, poverty alleviation and environment, migrants and social security, migrants and media. Interdepartmental co-ordination is also at the level of a member state or a local or regional government entity ;
- More integrated or transversal projects or activities should be funded and undertaken. The activities of the Council of Europe Development Bank should be especially oriented to transversal projects.

**2. The Role and Activities of the Council of Europe as regards Social Cohesion**

154. The activities on social cohesion need to be better focused and central to the work of the Organisation. The Task Force recommends:

*The work on social cohesion should be organised to fulfil three functions: standard setting, monitoring and evaluation; facilitating the further development and implementation of social cohesion policy approaches;*

*assisting countries/regions in the development and implementation of programmes of action relevant to social cohesion.*

a. Standard setting, monitoring and evaluation

155. Human and social rights are essential to the sustainability and expansion of the Council of Europe's approach and *acquis* on social cohesion and the achievement of social cohesion in Europe. Hence the Council of Europe has to push forward its work on human and social rights simultaneously with that on social cohesion. As well as implementation, a key contribution of the Organisation is a monitoring/evaluation or policy watch function. This should consist of two main activities:

a) Monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the existing instruments and the factors conducive to ratification and implementation and producing methodological and other guides for this purpose;
b) Devising and disseminating, together with other agencies as appropriate, a set of policy-watch indicators to allow and enable member States and relevant bodies to assess progress towards greater social cohesion. The Task Force recommends the progressive development and application of indicators at both national and local levels.

**At the national level**, the indicators selected should reflect the principles or components of social cohesion (see Box 3): equity, dignity/recognition of diversity, participation, sense of belonging to society and sharing of responsibilities.[39] In many cases data already exist on these and where they do not, for example civil dialogue, they should be gathered

| Component | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Equity, economic well-being | Mobility (social/geographical), income inequality, persistent poverty |
| Dignity and recognition of diversity | People's perception of being discriminated against |
| Participation | Citizens' participation in democratic processes |
| Sense of belonging | Levels of trust (institutional, in the future, in others) |
| Sharing of responsibilities | Scope and extent in social and civic dialogue |

**At the local level**, awareness of the local and regional dimension of social cohesion requires, as the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities asserts,[40] the development of innovative, participatory and concerted social policies with a focus on the community level. The Task Force supports the encouragement the Congress gives to developing indicators through a process co-ordinating the actions of the principal stakeholders (elected representatives, public services,

[39] Ideally unemployment should be among the indicators but it is not included mainly because wide variations in how it is measures render cross-national comparisons unreliable.
[40] Recommendation 207 (2007) on the development of social cohesion indicators - The concerted local and regional approach.

associations, businesses) and providing ample scope for citizen participation, especially as regards the identification and validation of indicators. Appendix 3 presents a list of indicators which resulted from a recent consultative exercise in an Eastern European town. The Task Force suggests that these be developed for wider dissemination.

156. It is recommended that:

*Member States be invited to accept these indicators and set in train processes to gather, collate and exchange the resulting information for the purpose of appraising progress towards social cohesion.*

b. Analysis and development

157. Social cohesion is a dynamic approach in that it recognises change and the necessity to reform in the light of change. The need to update is therefore ongoing. Given its expertise and *acquis* in the domain of social cohesion, the Council of Europe and its Directorate General on Social Cohesion are in a unique position to facilitate analytic activity and exchange of knowledge among member State experts in the service of a progressive and informed set of actions by member States on the development and implementation of social cohesion approaches. By focusing on how policies and other factors influence social cohesion and researching emerging developments and new ways of understanding social cohesion and related approaches, the Council of Europe could also serve an 'early alert function', pinpointing trends that might be supportive of or deleterious to social cohesion in Europe (and indeed the world at large). Hence, the Task Force recommends the resourcing within the Council of Europe of a two-sided analytic/development function in relation to social cohesion. One would continue and consolidate the work on investigating the links between policies and social cohesion and the elaboration of appropriate goals and structures that best deliver on social cohesion. The second would be 'future oriented', involved in 'horizon scanning' and the exploration of future policy scenarios so as to raise the level of strategic planning, within and outside the Organisation to meet future risks, challenges, and opportunities. This could be formally organised into a New Horizons programme which offers the Council of Europe and member States the opportunity to anticipate and prepare for risks and opportunities in relation to social policies.

c. Assistance with country/regional programming

158. The Council of Europe should invite each member State to embrace social cohesion as a national objective and develop a national strategy for the progressive implementation of appropriate policies. The Organisation's contribution to the national effort might be delivered through 'country/regional social cohesion programmes'. Such programmes, initiated and renewed at regular intervals jointly with member States, would be the main vehicle whereby the Council of Europe plans and organises its activities and support to particular countries or regions. For the Council of Europe, programming would also serve the goal of engendering greater coherence and stronger synergies in its work

overall, targeting resources, concretising policy goals, minimising overlaps and making for a transversal approach on the part of different units in the Secretariat, including the Council of Europe Development Bank. The goal would be not just more streamlined Council of Europe activity but a process wherein member States engage in a strategic domestic process oriented to social cohesion.

### 3. Other aspects of organisational practice

159. The Task Force recommends:

> *In carrying out its functions, the Council of Europe should undertake activities oriented to building partnerships and links with other national and international organisations and add value to all of its activities by strengthening dissemination.*

Initiating and consolidating partnerships with other organisations

160. The *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion* points out that social cohesion can only be built by integrated measures involving many partners. The Task Force is of the view that a partnership or shared responsibilities approach makes sense also at the cross-national level. Social cohesion by its nature transcends national frontiers; active linkages also make sense in the context of resource constraints and limitations. A global social agenda is needed, underpinned by a recognition that social cohesion in one part of the world is closely connected to social cohesion elsewhere. The Council of Europe is well-placed to take a leadership role in regard to promoting social and collective objectives transnationally and raising awareness of the long-term consequences of social and economic policies and their reform.

161. The work of the Council of Europe contributes to that of other international bodies. In the social field the Organisation often acts as the 'ideas incubator' for concepts that are later taken up by the EU. The Task Force is of the view that it would be of benefit to all if, along with continued informal contacts, the Council of Europe were to intensify partnerships with the EU, Consideration should be given to a instituting a multi-annual programme of work with the EU on social cohesion. Linkages with other international organisations such as OECD and ILO, the UN and relevant subsidiary bodies, should also be strengthened with a view to undertaking complementary work. Towards that end, the Council of Europe should invite the EU and other international organisations to a series of meetings to consider the transversal method and the view of social cohesion advanced here and their significance for the social policy activities and reporting engaged in by EU member States under the Lisbon process and Open Method of Co-Ordination, as well as other relevant concepts and developments.

Strengthening dissemination policy

162. One of the key functions of the Council of Europe is to raise awareness. In this and other regards it is necessary to add more value to the Organisation's work on social

cohesion which tends to remain too confidential. Every activity undertaken should have a strategy for disseminating the results. Funding for this must be made available. This is not just a job for the central Organisation – all participants (ministries, NGOs, academics) in the Council of Europe have a role to play.

Three main objectives ought to guide the expanded dissemination policy:

a) closer targeting of outputs towards particular target groups, and especially public administrations, social partners, universities/research institutes, and the 'European publics' (via the internet especially);
b) developing more intensive communication with professional and social bodies;
c) work more closely with the international and national media.

163. The Council of Europe can only achieve these functions and reforms if it is appropriately resourced and supported. Hence, a strong commitment from member States is required, including the commitment of political will and adequate financial resources. The Task Force requests the Committee of Ministers to endorse and give their full support to this report and its recommendations. In particular, it is suggested that the report be taken forward by drawing up implementation plans on a regular basis and instituting ways of reporting on progress.

## Appendix 1 Ratification of Main Relevant Council of Europe Legal Instruments

Table 1.1 **Dates of Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force of the European Social Charter, its Protocols and the European Social Charter (revised) by the Member States**

| | European Social Charter, 1961 | | Additional Protocol, 1988 | | Amending Protocol, 1991 | | Collective complaint protocol, 1995 | | Revised European Social Charter, 1996 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | signature | ratification | signature | ratification | signature | ratification | signature | ratification | signature | ratification |
| **Albania** | | | | | | | | | 21/9/98 | 14/11/02 |
| **Andorra** | | | | | | | | | 4/11/00 | 12/11/04 |
| **Armenia** | | | | | | | | | 18/10/01 | 21/1/04 |
| **Austria** | 22/7/63 | 29/10/69 | 4/12/90 | | 7/5/92 | 13/7/95 | 7/5/99 | | 7/5/99 | |
| **Azerbaijan** | | | | | | | | | 18/10/01 | 2/9/04 |
| **Belgium** | 18/10/61 | 16/10/90 | 20/5/92 | 23/6/03 | 22/10/91 | 21/9/00 | 14/5/96 | 23/6/03 | 3/5/96 | 22/3/04 |
| **Bosna and Herzegovina** | | | | | | | | | 11/5/04 | |
| **Bulgaria** | | | | | | | | | 21/9/98 | 7/6/00 |
| **Croatia** | 8/3/99 | 26/2/03 | 8/3/99 | 26/2/03 | 8/3/99 | 26/2/03 | 8/3/99 | 26/2/03 | | |
| **Cyprus** | 22/5/67 | 7/3/68 | 5/5/88 | | 21/10/91 | 1/6/93 | 9/11/95 | 6/8/96 | 3/5/96 | 27/9/00 |
| **Czech Rep.** | 27/5/92* | 3/11/99 | 27/5/92* | 17/11/99 | 27/5/92* | 17/11/99 | 26/2/02 | | 4/11/00 | |
| **Denmark** | 18/10/61 | 3/3/65 | 27/8/96 | 27/8/96 | | *** | 9/11/95 | | 3/5/96 | |
| **Estonia** | | | | | | | | | 4/5/98 | 11/9/00 |
| **Finland** | 9/2/90 | 29/4/91 | 9/2/90 | 29/4/91 | 16/3/92 | 18/8/94 | 9/11/95 | 17/7/98 | 3/5/96 | 21/6/02 |
| **France** | 18/10/61 | 9/3/73 | 22/6/89 | | 21/10/91 | 24/5/95 | 9/11/95 | 4/5/99 | 3/5/96 | 7/5/99 |
| **Georgia** | | | | | | | | | 30/6/00 | 22/8/05 |
| **Germany** | 18/10/61 | 27/1/65 | 5/5/88 | | | *** | | | 29/6/07 | |
| **Greece** | 18/10/61 | 6/6/84 | 5/5/88 | 18/6/98 | 29/11/91 | 12/9/96 | 18/6/98 | 18/6/98 | 3/5/96 | |
| **Hungary** | 13/12/91 | 8/7/99 | 7/10/04 | 1/6/05 | 13/12/91 | 4/2/04 | 7/10/04 | | 7/10/04 | |
| **Iceland** | 15/1/76 | 15/1/76 | 5/5/88 | | 12/12/01 | 21/2/02 | | | 4/11/98 | |
| **Ireland** | 18/10/61 | 7/10/64 | | | 14/5/97 | 14/5/97 | 4/11/00 | 4/11/00 | 4/11/00 | 4/11/00 |
| **Italy** | 18/10/61 | 22/10/65 | 5/5/88 | 26/5/94 | 21/10/91 | 27/1/95 | 9/11/95 | 3/11/97 | 3/5/96 | 5/7/99 |
| **Latvia** | 29/5/97 | 31/1/02 | 29/5/97 | | 29/5/97 | 9/12/03 | | | 29/5/07 | |
| **Liechenstein** | 9/10/91 | | | | | | | | | |
| **Lithuania** | | | | | | | | | 8/9/97 | 29/6/01 |
| **Luxembourg** | 18/10/61 | 10/10/91 | 5/5/88 | | 21/10/91 | *** | | | 11/2/98 | |
| **Malta** | 26/5/88 | 4/10/88 | | | 21/10/91 | 16/2/94 | | | 27/7/05 | 27/5/05 |
| **Moldova** | | | | | | | | | 3/11/98 | 8/11/01 |
| **Monaco** | | | | | | | | | 5/10/04 | |
| **Montenegro** | | | | | | | | | 22/3/05** | |
| **Netherlands** | 18/10/61 | 22/4/80 | 14/6/90 | 5/8/92 | 21/10/91 | 1/6/93 | | | 23/1/04 | 3/5/06 |
| **Norway** | 18/10/61 | 26/10/62 | 10/12/93 | 10/12/93 | 21/10/91 | 21/10/91 | 23/1/04 | 3/5/06 | 7/5/01 | 7/5/01 |
| **Poland** | 26/11/91 | 25/6/97 | | | 18/4/97 | 25/6/97 | 20/3/97 | 20/3/97 | 25/10/05 | |
| **Portugal** | 1/6/82 | 30/9/91 | | | 24/2/92 | 8/3/93 | | | 3/5/96 | 30/5/02 |
| **Romania** | 4/10/94 | | | | | | 9/11/95 | 20/3/98 | 14/5/97 | 7/5/99 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Russian Fed.** | | | | | | | | | 14/9/00 | |
| **San Marino** | | | | | | | | | 18/10/01 | |
| **Serbia** | | | | | | | | | 22/3/05** | |
| **Slovakia** | 27/5/92* | 22/6/98 | 27/5/92* | 22/6/98 | 27/5/92* | 22/6/98 | 18/11/99 | | 18/11/99 | |
| **Slovenia** | 11/10/97 | | 11/10/97 | | 11/10/97 | | 11/10/97 | | 11/10/97 | 7/5/99 |
| **Spain** | 27/4/78 | 6/5/80 | 5/5/88 | 24/1/00 | 21/10/91 | 21/1/00 | | | 23/10/00 | |
| **Sweden** | 18/10/61 | 17/12/0962 | 5/5/88 | 5/5/89 | 21/10/91 | 18/3/92 | 9/11/95 | 29/5/98 | 3/5/96 | 29/5/1998/ |
| **Switzerland** | 6/5/76 | | | | | | | | | |
| **The former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia** | 5/5/98 | 31/3/05 | 5/5/98 | | 5/5/98 | 31/3/05 | | | | |
| **Turkey** | 18/10/61 | 24/11/89 | 5/5/98 | | 6/10/04 | | | | 6/10/04 | 27/6/07 |
| **Ukraine** | 2/5/96 | | | | | | | | 7/5/99 | 21/12/06 |
| **United Kingdom** | 18/10/61 | 11/7/62 | | | 21/10/91 | *** | | | 7/11/97 | |

*) Date of signature by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

**) Date of signature by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro

***) State whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the Protocol

Table 1.2 **Dates of Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by the Member States**

| States | Signature | Ratification | Entry into force |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Albania** | 29/6/95 | 28/9/99 | 1/1/00 |
| **Andorra** | | | |
| **Armenia** | 25/7/97 | 20/7/98 | 1/11/98 |
| **Austria** | 1/2/95 | 31/3/98 | 1/7/98 |
| **Azerbaijan** | | 26/6/00 a | 1/10/00 |
| **Belgium** | 31/7/01 | | |
| **Bosnia and Herzegovina** | | 24/2/00 a | 1/6/00 |
| **Bulgaria** | 9/10/97 | 7/5/99 | 1/9/99 |
| **Croatia** | 6/11/96 | 11/10/97 | 1/2/98 |
| **Cyprus** | 1/2/95 | 4/6/96 | 1/2/98 |
| **Czech Republic** | 28/4/95 | 18/12/97 | 1/4/98 |
| **Denmark** | 1/2/95 | 22/9/97 | 1/2/98 |
| **Estonia** | 2/2/95 | 6/1/97 | 1/2/98 |
| **Finland** | 1/2/95 | 3/10/97 | 1/2/98 |
| **France** | | | |
| **Georgia** | 21/1/00 | 22/12/05 | 1/4/06 |
| **Germany** | 11/5/95 | 10/9/97 | 1/2/98 |
| **Greece** | 22/9/97 | | |
| **Hungary** | 1/2/95 | 25/9/95 | 1/2/98 |
| **Iceland** | 1/2/95 | | |
| **Ireland** | 1/2/95 | 7/5/99 | 1/9/99 |
| **Italy** | 1/2/95 | 3/11/97 | 1/3/98 |
| **Latvia** | 11/5/95 | 6/6/2005 | 1/10/05 |
| **Liechtenstein** | 1/2/95 | 18/11/97 | 1/3/98 |
| **Lithuania** | 1/2/95 | 23/3/00 | 1/7/00 |
| **Luxembourg** | 20/7/95 | | |
| **Malta** | 11/5/95 | 10/2/98 | 1/6/98 |
| **Moldova** | 13/7/95 | 20/11/96 | 1/2/98 |
| **Monaco** | | | |
| **Montenegro** | | 11/5/01 a | 6/6/06 |
| **Netherlands** | 1/2/95 | 16/2/05 | 1/6/05 |
| **Norway** | 1/2/95 | 17/3/99 | 1/7/99 |
| **Poland** | 1/2/95 | 20/12/00 | 1/4/01 |
| **Portugal** | 1/2/95 | 7/5/02 | 1/9/02 |
| **Romania** | 1/2/95 | 11/5/95 | 1/2/98 |
| **Russia** | 28/2/96 | 21/8/98 | 1/12/98 |
| **San Marino** | 11/5/95 | 5/12/96 | 1/2/98 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Serbia** | | 11/5/01 a | 1/9/01 |
| **Slovakia** | 1/2/95 | 14/9/95 | 1/2/98 |
| **Slovenia** | 1/2/95 | 25/3/1998 | 1/7/98 |
| **Spain** | 1/2/95 | 1/9/95 | 1/2/98 |
| **Sweden** | 1/2/95 | 9/2/00 | 1/6/00 |
| **Switzerland** | 1/2/1995 | 21/10/98 | 1/2/99 |
| **The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** | 25/7/96 | 10/4/97 | 1/2/98 |
| **Turkey** | | | |
| **Ukraine** | 15/9/95 | 26/1/98 | 1/5/98 |
| **United Kingdom** | 1/2/95 | 15/1/98 | 1/5/98 |

Table 1.3 **Dates of Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force of the European Convention on Social Security by the Member States**

| States | Signature | Ratification | Entry into force |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Albania** | | | |
| **Andorra** | | | |
| **Armenia** | | | |
| **Austria** | 14/12/72 | 10/6/75 | 1/3/77 |
| **Azerbaijan** | | | |
| **Belgium** | 26/11/76 | 21/1/86 | 22/4/86 |
| **Bosnia and Herzegovina** | | | |
| **Bulgaria** | | | |
| **Croatia** | | | |
| **Cyprus** | | | |
| **Czech Republic** | 21/6/02 | | |
| **Denmark** | | | |
| **Estonia** | | | |
| **Finland** | | | |
| **France** | 14/12/72 | | |
| **Georgia** | | | |
| **Germany** | | | |
| **Greece** | 21/4/77 | | |
| **Hungary** | | | |
| **Iceland** | | | |
| **Ireland** | 23/2/79 | | |
| **Italy** | 14/12/72 | 11/1/90 | 12/4/90 |
| **Latvia** | | | |
| **Liechtenstein** | | | |
| **Lithuania** | | | |
| **Luxembourg** | 14/12/72 | 13/11/75 | 1/3/77 |
| **Malta** | | | |
| **Moldova** | 22/5/02 | | |
| **Monaco** | | | |
| **Montenegro** | | | |
| **Netherlands** | 5/11/75 | 8/2/77 | 9/5/77 |
| **Norway** | | | |
| **Poland** | | | |
| **Portugal** | 24/11/77 | 18/3/83 | 19/6/83 |
| **Romania** | | | |
| **Russia** | | | |
| **San Marino** | | | |
| **Serbia** | | | |
| **Slovakia** | | | |
| **Slovenia** | | | |
| **Spain** | 12/11/84 | 24/1/86 | 25/4/86 |
| **Sweden** | | | |
| **Switzerland** | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** | | | |
| **Turkey** | 14/12/72 | 2/12/76 | 1/3/77 |
| **Ukraine** | | | |
| **United Kingdom** | | | |

Table 1.4 **Dates of Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force of the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance by the Member States**

| States | Signature | Ratification | Entry into force |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Albania** | | | |
| **Andorra** | | | |
| **Armenia** | | | |
| **Austria** | | | |
| **Azerbaijan** | | | |
| **Belgium** | 11/12/53 | 24/7/56 | 1/8/56 |
| **Bosnia and Herzegovina** | | | |
| **Bulgaria** | | | |
| **Croatia** | | | |
| **Cyprus** | | | |
| **Czech Republic** | | | |
| **Denmark** | 11/12/53 | 30/6/54 | 1/7/54 |
| **Estonia** | 1/12/99 | 20/7/04 | 1/8/04 |
| **Finland** | | | |
| **France** | 11/12/53 | 30/10/57 | 1/11/57 |
| **Georgia** | | | |
| **Germany** | 11/12/53 | 24/8/56 | 1/9/56 |
| **Greece** | 11/12/53 | 23/6/60 | 1/7/60 |
| **Hungary** | | | |
| **Iceland** | 11/12/53 | 4/12/64 | 1/1/65 |
| **Ireland** | 11/12/53 | 31/3/54 | 1/7/54 |
| **Italy** | 11/12/53 | 1/7/58 | 1/8/58 |
| **Latvia** | | | |
| **Liechtenstein** | | | |
| **Lithuania** | | | |
| **Luxembourg** | 11/12/53 | 18/11/58 | 1/12/58 |
| **Malta** | 7/5/68 | 6/5/69 | 1/6/69 |
| **Moldova** | | | |
| **Monaco** | | | |
| **Montenegro** | | | |
| **Netherlands** | 11/12/53 | 20/7/55 | 1/8/55 |
| **Norway** | 11/12/53 | 9/9/54 | 1/10/54 |
| **Poland** | | | |
| **Portugal** | 27/4/77 | 4/7/78 | 1/8/78 |
| **Romania** | | | |
| **Russia** | | | |
| **San Marino** | | | |
| **Serbia** | | | |
| **Slovakia** | | | |
| **Slovenia** | | | |
| **Spain** | 9/2/81 | 21/11/83 | 1/12/83 |
| **Sweden** | 11/12/53 | 2/9/55 | 1/10/55 |
| **Switzerland** | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** | | | |
| **Turkey** | 11/12/53 | 2/12/76 | 1/1/77 |
| **Ukraine** | | | |
| **United Kingdom** | 11/12/53 | 7/9/54 | 1/10/54 |

Table 1.5 **Dates of Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force of the European Code of Social Security by the Member States**

| States | Signature | Ratification | Entry into force |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Albania** | | | |
| **Andorra** | | | |
| **Armenia** | | | |
| **Austria** | 17/2/70 | | |
| **Azerbaijan** | | | |
| **Belgium** | 13/5/64 | 13/8/69 | 14/8/70 |
| **Bosnia and Herzegovina** | | | |
| **Bulgaria** | | | |
| **Croatia** | | | |
| **Cyprus** | 15/4/92 | 15/4/92 | 16/4/93 |
| **Czech Republic** | 10/2/00 | 8/9/00 | 9/9/01 |
| **Denmark** | 16/4/64 | 16/2/73 | 17/2/74 |
| **Estonia** | 24/1/00 | 19/5/04 | 20/5/05 |
| **Finland** | | | |
| **France** | 4/10/76 | 17/2/86 | 18/2/87 |
| **Georgia** | | | |
| **Germany** | 16/4/64 | 27/1/71 | 28/1/72 |
| **Greece** | 21/4/77 | 9/6/81 | 10/6/82 |
| **Hungary** | | | |
| **Iceland** | | | |
| **Ireland** | 16/2/71 | 16/2/71 | 17/2/72 |
| **Italy** | 16/4/64 | 20/1/77 | 21/1/78 |
| **Latvia** | 28/11/03 | | |
| **Liechtenstein** | | | |
| **Lithuania** | 15/11/05 | | |
| **Luxembourg** | 16/4/64 | 3/4/68 | 4/4/69 |
| **Malta** | | | |
| **Moldova** | 16/9/03 | | |
| **Monaco** | | | |
| **Montenegro** | | | |
| **Netherlands** | 15/7/64 | 16/3/67 | 17/3/68 |
| **Norway** | 16/4/64 | 25/3/66 | 17/3/68 |
| **Poland** | | | |
| **Portugal** | 19/11/81 | 15/5/84 | 16/5/85 |
| **Romania** | 22/5/02 | | |
| **Russia** | | | |
| **San Marino** | | | |
| **Serbia** | | | |
| **Slovakia** | | | |
| **Slovenia** | 20/1/03 | 26/2/04 | 27/2/05 |
| **Spain** | 12/2/93 | 8/3/94 | 9/3/95 |
| **Sweden** | 16/4/64 | 25/9/65 | 17/3/68 |
| **Switzerland** | 1/12/76 | 16/9/77 | 17/9/78 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** | | | |
| **Turkey** | 13/5/64 | 7/3/80 | 8/3/81 |
| **Ukraine** | | | |
| **United Kingdom** | 14/3/67 | 12/1/68 | 13/1/69 |

Table 1.6 **Dates of Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers by the Member States**

| States | Signature | Ratification | Entry into force |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Albania** | 3/4/07 | 3/4/07 | 1/8/07 |
| **Andorra** | | | |
| **Armenia** | | | |
| **Austria** | | | |
| **Azerbaijan** | | | |
| **Belgium** | 9/2/78 | | |
| **Bosnia and Herzegovina** | | | |
| **Bulgaria** | | | |
| **Croatia** | | | |
| **Cyprus** | | | |
| **Czech Republic** | | | |
| **Denmark** | | | |
| **Estonia** | | | |
| **Finland** | | | |
| **France** | 29/4/82 | 22/9/83 | 1/12/83 |
| **Georgia** | | | |
| **Germany** | 24/11/77 | | |
| **Greece** | 24/11/77 | | |
| **Hungary** | | | |
| **Iceland** | | | |
| **Ireland** | | | |
| **Italy** | 11/1/83 | 27/2/95 | 1/5/95 |
| **Latvia** | | | |
| **Liechtenstein** | | | |
| **Lithuania** | | | |
| **Luxembourg** | 24/11/77 | | |
| **Malta** | | | |
| **Moldova** | 11/7/02 | 20/6/06 | 1/10/06 |
| **Monaco** | | | |
| **Montenegro** | | | |
| **Netherlands** | 24/11/77 | 1/2/83 | 1/5/83 |
| **Norway** | 3/2/89 | 3/2/89 | 1/5/89 |
| **Poland** | | | |
| **Portugal** | 24/11/77 | 15/3/79 | 1/5/83 |
| **Romania** | | | |
| **Russia** | | | |
| **San Marino** | | | |
| **Serbia** | | | |
| **Slovakia** | | | |
| **Slovenia** | | | |
| **Spain** | 24/11/77 | 6/5/80 | 1/5/83 |
| **Sweden** | 24/11/77 | 5/6/78 | 1/5/83 |
| **Switzerland** | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** | | | |
| **Turkey** | 24/11/77 | 19/5/81 | 1/5/83 |
| **Ukraine** | 2/3/04 | | |
| **United Kingdom** | | | |

Table 1.7 **Dates of Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force of the European Convention for Regional or Minority Languages**

| States | Signature | Ratification | Entry into force |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Albania** | | | |
| **Andorra** | | | |
| **Armenia** | 11/5/01 | 25/1/02 | 1/5/02 |
| **Austria** | 5/11/92 | 28/6/01 | 1/10/01 |
| **Azerbaijan** | 21/12/01 | | |
| **Belgium** | | | |
| **Bosnia and Herzegovina** | 7/9/05 | | |
| **Bulgaria** | | | |
| **Croatia** | 5/11/97 | 5/11/97 | 1/3/98 |
| **Cyprus** | 12/11/92 | 26/8/02 | 1/12/02 |
| **Czech Republic** | 9/11/00 | 15/11/06 | 1/3/07 |
| **Denmark** | 5/11/92 | 8/9/00 | 1/1/01 |
| **Estonia** | | | |
| **Finland** | 5/11/92 | 9/11/94 | 1/3/98 |
| **France** | 7/5/99 | | |
| **Georgia** | | | |
| **Germany** | 5/11/92 | 16/9/98 | 1/1/99 |
| **Greece** | | | |
| **Hungary** | 5/11/92 | 26/4/95 | 1/3/98 |
| **Iceland** | 7/5/99 | | |
| **Ireland** | | | |
| **Italy** | 27/6/00 | | |
| **Latvia** | | | |
| **Liechtenstein** | 5/11/92 | 18/11/97 | 1/3/98 |
| **Lithuania** | | | |
| **Luxembourg** | 5/11/92 | 22/6/05 | 1/10/05 |
| **Malta** | 5/11/92 | | |
| **Moldova** | 11/7/02 | | |
| **Monaco** | | | |
| **Montenegro** | 22/3/05 | 15/2/06 | 6/6/06 |
| **Netherlands** | 5/11/92 | 2/5/96 | 1/3/98 |
| **Norway** | 5/11/92 | 10/11/93 | 1/3/98 |
| **Poland** | 12/5/03 | | |
| **Portugal** | | | |
| **Romania** | 17/7/95 | | |
| **Russia** | 10/5/01 | | |
| **San Marino** | | | |
| **Serbia** | 22/3/05 | 15/2/06 | 1/6/06 |
| **Slovakia** | 20/2/01 | 5/9/01 | 1/1/02 |
| **Slovenia** | 3/7/97 | 4/10/00 | 1/1/01 |
| **Spain** | 5/11/92 | 9/4/01 | 1/8/01 |
| **Sweden** | 9/2/00 | 9/2/00 | 1/6/00 |
| **Switzerland** | 8/10/93 | 23/12/97 | 1/4/98 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** | 25/7/96 | | |
| **Turkey** | | | |
| **Ukraine** | 2/5/96 | 19/9/05 | 1/1/06 |
| **United Kingdom** | 2/3/00 | 27/3/01 | 1/701 |

## Appendix 2

## Some Supporting Statistical Data

Table 2.1 **Income Inequality and Relative and Absolute Poverty (2004, 2005)**

| | Gini coefficient, World Recourse Institute | Income share held by lowest 10%, %, WB | Income share held by lowest 20%, %, WB | At Risk of Poverty Rate, %, EUROSTAT | At-Persistent Risk of Poverty rate, %, EUROSTAT | Percentage of population living under the poverty line (1$ a day), %, WB | Percentage of population living under the poverty line (2$ a day), %, WB |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country / Year | 2004 | 2005 | 2005 | 2004 | 2001 | 2005 | 2005 |
| Albania | - | 3.4 | 8.2 | - | - | 0.5 | 1.6 |
| Andorra | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Armenia | 0.44 | 3.6 | 8.5 | - | -. | 0.5 | 7.1 |
| Austria | 0.31 | - | - | 12 | 7 | - | - |
| Azerbaijan | 0.36 | 3.1 | 7.4 | - | - | 0.6 | 9.1 |
| Belgium | 0.29 | - | - | 15 | 7 | - | - |
| Bosna & Herzegovina* | 0.26 | 3,9 | 9,5 | - | - | - | - |
| Bulgaria | 0.26 | 3.4 | 8.7 | - | - | 0.5 | 1.5 |
| Croatia | 0.29 | 3.4 | 8.3 | - | - | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Cyprus | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Czech Republic | 0.25 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Denmark | 0.25 | - | - | 12 | 6 | - | - |
| Estonia | 0.38 | 2.5 | 6.7 | 18 | - | 0.5 | 1.9 |
| Finland | 0,26 | - | - | 12 | 6 | - | - |
| France | 0,33 | - | - | 13 | - | - | - |
| Georgia | 0.37 | 2.0 | 5.6 | - | - | 2.1 | 8.6 |
| Germany | 0.30 | - | - | 13 | 6 | - | - |
| Greece | 0.33 | - | - | 20 | 14 | - | - |
| Hungary | 0.24 | 4.0 | 9.5 | 13 | - | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Iceland | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Ireland | 0.36 | - | - | 20 | 13 | - | - |
| Italy | - | - | - | 19 | 13 | - | - |
| Latvia | 0.32 | 2.5 | 6.6 | 19 | - | 0.5 | 1.2 |
| Liechenstein | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Lithuania | 0.32 | 2.7 | 6.8 | 21 | - | 0.5 | 1.8 |
| Luxembourg | 0.27 | - | - | 13 | 9 | - | - |
| Malta | - | - | - | 15 | - | - | - |
| Moldova | 0.41 | 3.2 | 7,8 | - | - | 0.5 | 4.7 |
| Monaco | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Netherlands | 0.33 | - | - | 11 | 6 | - | - |
| Norway | 0.26 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Poland | 0.32 | 3.1 | 7.5 | 21 | - | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Portugal | 0.36 | - | - | 20 | 15 | - | - |
| Romania | 0.31 | 3.3 | 8.1 | 18 | - | 0.5 | 3.0 |
| Russian Fed. | 0.49 | 2.4 | 6.1 | - | - | 0.5 | 3.1 |
| San Marino | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Serbia & Montenegro | 0.33 | 3.4 | 8.3 | - | - | - | - |
| Slovakia | 0.19 | - | - | 13 | - | - | - |
| Slovenia | 0.28 | - | - | 12 | - | - | - |
| Spain | 33 | - | - | 20 | 10 | - | - |
| Sweden | 0.25 | - | - | 9 | - | - | - |
| Switzerland | 0.33 | - | - | - | - | - | - |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **The former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia** | - | **2.4** | **6.1** | - | - | **0.5** | **0.5** |
| **Turkey** | **0.42** | **2.0** | **5.3** | - | - | **0.8** | **5.7** |
| **Ukraine** | **0.29** | **3.9** | **9.2** | - | - | **0.5** | **0.9** |
| **United Kingdom** | **0.37** | - | - | **19** | - | - | - |

Source: World Bank, http://econ.worldbank.org
EUROSTAT, ec.europa.eu/eurostat
World Resources Institute, *Earth Trends*, http://earthtrends.wri.org

Table 2.2 **Trust in the Political System (2004) and Tendency to Trust in the Political System (2003-2004)**

| | Trust in the political system, %, 2004 | | | | | | Tend to trust, % change from 2003 - 2004 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | political parties | | national governments | | national parliaments | | political parties | | National government | | national parliaments | |
| **Country** | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | % change | trust | % change | trust | % change |
| **Austria** | 19 | 71 | 39 | 50 | 41 | 45 | 19 | 0 | 39 | -1 | 41 | -2 |
| **Belgium** | 20 | 73 | 34 | 57 | 38 | 53 | 20 | -2 | 34 | -4 | 38 | -2 |
| **Bulgaria** | 6 | 84 | 19 | 72 | 13 | 78 | 6 | -3 | 19 | -9 | 13 | -3 |
| **Croatia** | 17 | 71 | 58 | 36 | 56 | 37 | 17 | +1 | 58 | +4 | 56 | +2 |
| **Cyprus** | 31 | 63 | 75 | 21 | 74 | 21 | 31 | +4 | 75 | +4 | 74 | +1 |
| **Czech Rep.** | 10 | 79 | 25 | 64 | 18 | 72 | 10 | -3 | 25 | -5 | 18 | -2 |
| **Denmark** | 32 | 57 | 44 | 50 | 63 | 31 | 32 | -7 | 44 | -9 | 63 | -5 |
| **Estonia** | 15 | 69 | 45 | 44 | 35 | 54 | 15 | +1 | 45 | -5 | 35 | -1 |
| **Finland** | 21 | 72 | 59 | 36 | 58 | 36 | 21 | +2 | 59 | +10 | 58 | +6 |
| **France** | 13 | 79 | 29 | 63 | 35 | 53 | 13 | +1 | 29 | -1 | 35 | +2 |
| **Germany** | 11 | 81 | 23 | 68 | 29 | 60 | 11 | -1 | 23 | -1 | 29 | -2 |
| **Greece** | 15 | 69 | 45 | 44 | 35 | 54 | 28 | +8 | 55 | +8 | 63 | +9 |
| **Hungary** | 13 | 75 | 31 | 58 | 29 | 61 | 13 | -2 | 31 | -7 | 29 | -7 |
| **Ireland** | 23 | 64 | 39 | 51 | 40 | 48 | 23 | +1 | 39 | +8 | 40 | +6 |
| **Italy** | 13 | 78 | 26 | 63 | 32 | 53 | 13 | +2 | 26 | -1 | 32 | -1 |
| **Latvia** | 9 | 82 | 28 | 63 | 20 | 70 | 9 | -3 | 28 | -18 | 20 | -10 |
| **Lithuania** | 9 | 74 | 31 | 59 | 19 | 70 | 9 | -1 | 31 | 0 | 19 | -4 |
| **Luxembourg** | 31 | 54 | 61 | 29 | 56 | 28 | 31 | +5 | 61 | +1 | 56 | +3 |
| **Malta** | 33 | 46 | 49 | 39 | 47 | 36 | 33 | +4 | 49 | -3 | 47 | +3 |
| **Netherlands** | 27 | 64 | 39 | 56 | 43 | 49 | 27 | +1 | 39 | +2 | 43 | +2 |
| **Poland** | 3 | 86 | 7 | 85 | 8 | 85 | 3 | -5 | 7 | -7 | 8 | -5 |
| **Portugal** | 16 | 79 | 34 | 62 | 37 | 57 | 16 | -1 | 34 | -5 | 37 | -9 |
| **Romania** | 14 | 71 | 36 | 54 | 30 | 60 | 14 | -3 | 36 | -2 | 30 | -3 |
| **Slovakia** | 8 | 83 | 17 | 75 | 19 | 70 | 8 | -4 | 17 | 0 | 19 | -1 |
| **Slovenia** | 16 | 77 | 27 | 66 | 25 | 69 | 16 | -3 | 27 | -6 | 25 | -6 |
| **Spain** | 27 | 65 | 42 | 52 | 42 | 49 | 27 | +4 | 40 | 0 | 42 | +1 |
| **Sweden** | 21 | 74 | 48 | 47 | 58 | 37 | 21 | +3 | 48 | +6 | 58 | +5 |
| **Turkey** | 20 | 69 | 72 | 24 | 72 | 23 | 20 | +3 | 72 | +9 | 72 | +6 |
| **United Kingdom** | 10 | 78 | 19 | 69 | 25 | 61 | 10 | -2 | 19 | -5 | 25 | -2 |

Source: Eurobarometer 61, Full Report, Spring 2004, European Opinion Research Group EEIG, 2004

Table 2.3 **Trust in the Media (2004) and Tendency to Trust in the Media (2003-2004)**

| | Trust in the media, %, 2004 | | | | | | Tend to trust, % change from 2003 - 2004 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | the press | | radio | | television | | the press | | radio | | television | |
| Country | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | % change | trust | % change | trust | % change |
| **Austria** | 49 | 43 | 59 | 34 | 60 | 34 | 49 | +1 | 59 | -7 | 60 | -7 |
| **Belgium** | 59 | 37 | 69 | 27 | 65 | 31 | 59 | +3 | 69 | +1 | 65 | +2 |
| **Bulgaria** | 35 | 52 | 51 | 37 | 70 | 27 | 35 | -4 | 51 | -3 | 70 | -3 |
| **Croatia** | 40 | 53 | 50 | 42 | 56 | 41 | 44 | -1 | 54 | -1 | 57 | -2 |
| **Cyprus** | 53 | 39 | 64 | 33 | 66 | 33 | 53 | +6 | 64 | +3 | 66 | +3 |
| **Czech Rep.** | 59 | 30 | 67 | 21 | 65 | 27 | 59 | -2 | 67 | -2 | 65 | -5 |
| **Denmark** | 51 | 43 | 74 | 20 | 65 | 30 | 51 | -2 | 74 | -2 | 65 | -5 |
| **Estonia** | 52 | 42 | 75 | 20 | 75 | 20 | 52 | +4 | 75 | -2 | 75 | -6 |
| **Finland** | 56 | 41 | 80 | 16 | 72 | 25 | 56 | +4 | 80 | +3 | 72 | +1 |
| **France** | 60 | 36 | 67 | 28 | 48 | 48 | 60 | +2 | 67 | +1 | 48 | -1 |
| **Germany** | 44 | 49 | 63 | 29 | 59 | 34 | 44 | -1 | 63 | +3 | 59 | -1 |
| **Greece** | 46 | 51 | 57 | 39 | 51 | 48 | 46 | -2 | 57 | +2 | 51 | +3 |
| **Hungary** | 27 | 64 | 42 | 47 | 44 | 50 | 27 | -6 | 42 | -11 | 44 | -14 |
| **Ireland** | 47 | 45 | 75 | 20 | 74 | 21 | 47 | -2 | 75 | -1 | 74 | +2 |
| **Italy** | 44 | 47 | 55 | 31 | 37 | 54 | 44 | +3 | 55 | +2 | 37 | -2 |
| **Latvia** | 52 | 42 | 67 | 25 | 68 | 28 | 52 | -10 | 67 | -7 | 68 | -13 |
| **Lithuania** | 55 | 35 | 65 | 23 | 68 | 26 | 55 | -17 | 65 | -14 | 68 | -16 |
| **Luxembourg** | 56 | 37 | 62 | 31 | 60 | 34 | 56 | +2 | 62 | +3 | 60 | +2 |
| **Malta** | 38 | 42 | 51 | 32 | 54 | 32 | 38 | +5 | 51 | +1 | 54 | -3 |
| **Netherlands** | 58 | 34 | 68 | 23 | 67 | 28 | 58 | +3 | 68 | 0 | 67 | 0 |
| **Poland** | 50 | 40 | 59 | 31 | 54 | 36 | 50 | -4 | 59 | -6 | 54 | -6 |
| **Portugal** | 53 | 36 | 64 | 27 | 66 | 29 | 53 | +2 | 64 | -1 | 66 | +1 |
| **Romania** | 57 | 31 | 69 | 22 | 73 | 21 | 57 | +1 | 69 | +4 | 73 | +2 |
| **Slovakia** | 57 | 34 | 71 | 20 | 68 | 26 | 57 | -2 | 71 | -4 | 68 | -3 |
| **Slovenia** | 54 | 41 | 64 | 31 | 62 | 32 | 54 | +3 | 64 | -2 | 62 | -4 |
| **Spain** | 61 | 34 | 67 | 28 | 52 | 44 | 61 | +3 | 67 | +2 | 52 | +6 |
| **Sweden** | 38 | 59 | 76 | 20 | 64 | 32 | 38 | +4 | 76 | +3 | 64 | 0 |
| **Turkey** | 34 | 61 | 43 | 50 | 48 | 50 | 34 | +2 | 43 | +4 | 48 | -1 |
| **United Kingdom** | 20 | 73 | 59 | 29 | 54 | 37 | 20 | +3 | 59 | -1 | 54 | 0 |

Source: Eurobarometer 61, Full Report, Spring 2004, European Opinion Research Group EEIG, 2004

Table 2.4 **Trust in a Range of Social and Political Institutions (2004)**

| Country | The justice / country's legal system | | The police | | The army | | The religious institutions | | Trade unions | | Big companies | | Charitable and voluntary organisations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust | trust | don't trust |
| **Austria** | 68 | 23 | 76 | 19 | 62 | 27 | 43 | 47 | 38 | 48 | 34 | 53 | 57 | 30 |
| **Belgium** | 30 | 65 | 52 | 44 | 52 | 35 | 33 | 54 | 43 | 46 | 37 | 52 | 64 | 29 |
| **Bulgaria** | 18 | 67 | 45 | 45 | 58 | 27 | 36 | 42 | 11 | 66 | 16 | 58 | 30 | 40 |
| **Croatia** | 42 | 50 | 51 | 42 | 71 | 20 | 57 | 33 | 23 | 52 | 25 | 53 | 51 | 30 |
| **Cyprus** | 66 | 26 | 58 | 37 | 83 | 15 | 65 | 31 | 37 | 51 | 29 | 59 | 61 | 34 |
| **Czech Rep.** | 29 | 55 | 35 | 53 | 48 | 31 | 27 | 48 | 26 | 44 | 23 | 50 | 45 | 30 |
| **Denmark** | 76 | 19 | 86 | 12 | 67 | 20 | 74 | 16 | 51 | 36 | 47 | 39 | 63 | 27 |
| **Estonia** | 41 | 46 | 47 | 44 | 64 | 20 | 37 | 35 | 39 | 32 | 32 | 44 | 48 | 22 |
| **Finland** | 69 | 27 | 88 | 11 | 89 | 8 | 71 | 22 | 53 | 37 | 33 | 59 | 56 | 37 |
| **France** | 42 | 53 | 55 | 41 | 58 | 33 | 33 | 52 | 34 | 53 | 29 | 61 | 68 | 24 |
| **Germany** | 56 | 36 | 75 | 20 | 61 | 25 | 37 | 46 | 28 | 58 | 21 | 66 | 51 | 32 |
| **Greece** | 73 | 24 | 72 | 26 | 84 | 14 | 61 | 36 | 50 | 44 | 27 | 66 | 64 | 31 |
| **Hungary** | 47 | 42 | 54 | 38 | 52 | 33 | 39 | 45 | 16 | 61 | 21 | 62 | 50 | 34 |
| **Ireland** | 50 | 41 | 62 | 31 | 76 | 13 | 38 | 49 | 48 | 31 | 34 | 48 | 64 | 22 |
| **Italy** | 46 | 44 | 71 | 22 | 73 | 18 | 55 | 33 | 35 | 52 | 24 | 61 | 61 | 26 |
| **Latvia** | 29 | 56 | 34 | 56 | 47 | 33 | 44 | 41 | 21 | 40 | 32 | 51 | 44 | 30 |
| **Lithuania** | 27 | 59 | 31 | 59 | 54 | 24 | 46 | 36 | 25 | 35 | 25 | 49 | 44 | 26 |
| **Luxembourg** | 57 | 33 | 65 | 30 | 65 | 25 | 37 | 52 | 47 | 43 | 38 | 49 | 62 | 26 |
| **Malta** | 46 | 41 | 70 | 19 | 73 | 13 | 74 | 17 | 36 | 38 | 45 | 30 | 87 | 7 |
| **Netherlands** | 49 | 44 | 58 | 37 | 53 | 32 | 37 | 47 | 54 | 32 | 30 | 58 | 60 | 29 |
| **Poland** | 21 | 69 | 43 | 48 | 63 | 23 | 51 | 37 | 21 | 54 | 20 | 59 | 55 | 28 |
| **Portugal** | 36 | 57 | 59 | 36 | 70 | 20 | 63 | 31 | 40 | 50 | 39 | 51 | 68 | 23 |
| **Romania** | 29 | 61 | 40 | 53 | 77 | 16 | 84 | 12 | 26 | 49 | 33 | 44 | 39 | 31 |
| **Slovakia** | 16 | 75 | 32 | 56 | 63 | 22 | 44 | 42 | 27 | 51 | 25 | 54 | 52 | 30 |
| **Slovenia** | 30 | 63 | 37 | 55 | 43 | 46 | 29 | 62 | 34 | 56 | 36 | 55 | 39 | 53 |
| **Spain** | 47 | 48 | 59 | 37 | 55 | 38 | 35 | 58 | 37 | 53 | 36 | 54 | 65 | 26 |
| **Sweden** | 57 | 38 | 70 | 28 | 51 | 40 | 21 | 73 | 49 | 44 | 26 | 68 | 46 | 47 |
| **Turkey** | 68 | 29 | 69 | 29 | 86 | 12 | 65 | 30 | 24 | 52 | 28 | 53 | 58 | 30 |
| **United Kingdom** | 37 | 50 | 55 | 35 | 67 | 20 | 37 | 45 | 34 | 42 | 20 | 65 | 65 | 22 |

Source: Eurobarometer 61, Full Report, Spring 2004, European Opinion Research Group EEIG, 2004

Table 2.5 **% of Population Pereiving Discrimination to be Widespread in their Society**

| | Ethnic origin | Sexual orientation | Gender | Age | Disability | Religion or beliefs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | 14 | 9 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 10 |
| **Belgium** | 30 | 11 | 6 | 9 | 13 | 19 |
| **Bulgaria** | 16 | 5 | 5 | 16 | 15 | 6 |
| **Cyprus** | 24 | 42 | 12 | 16 | 15 | 15 |
| **Czech Rep.** | 13 | 7 | 10 | 22 | 15 | 2 |
| **Denmark** | 25 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 16 |
| **Estonia** | 7 | 4 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 2 |
| **Finland** | 12 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 |
| **France** | 35 | 14 | 10 | 12 | 20 | 19 |
| **Germany** | 10 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 8 | 6 |
| **Greece** | 28 | 24 | 13 | 16 | 17 | 16 |
| **Hungary** | 21 | 9 | 9 | 21 | 16 | 3 |
| **Ireland** | 13 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 4 |
| **Italy** | 22 | 18 | 10 | 9 | 15 | 13 |
| **Latvia** | 5 | 7 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 1 |
| **Lithuania** | 4 | 12 | 7 | 15 | 14 | 3 |
| **Luxembourg** | 13 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 9 |
| **Malta** | 25 | 17 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 12 |
| **Netherlands** | 26 | 8 | 3 | 9 | 10 | 13 |
| **Poland** | 6 | 24 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 8 |
| **Portugal** | 16 | 21 | 11 | 11 | 16 | 8 |
| **Romania** | 8 | 19 | 6 | 11 | 12 | 5 |
| **Slovakia** | 10 | 7 | 6 | 15 | 10 | 2 |
| **Slovenia** | 10 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 9 |
| **Spain** | 18 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 5 |
| **Sweden** | 17 | 12 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 11 |
| **United Kingdom** | 20 | 10 | 7 | 12 | 10 | 16 |

Source: Special Eurobarometer 263, *Discrimination in the European Union*, European Opinion Research Group EEIG, 2006

Table 2.6 **Citizens' Participation in Elections to National Parliaments**

| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | 82.5 | 86 | - | - | - | 80.4 | - | - | 84.3 | - | - | - |
| **Belgium** | - | 91.1 | - | - | - | 90.6 | - | - | - | 94 | - | - |
| **Bulgaria** | 75.2 | - | - | 58.9 | - | - | - | 66.6 | - | - | - | 55.8 |
| **Croatia** | - | 68.8 | - | - | - | - | 76.5 | - | - | 61.7 | - | - |
| **Cyprus** | - | - | 90.1 | - | - | - | - | 91.8 | - | - | - | - |
| **Czech Republic** | - | - | 76.3 | - | 74 | - | - | - | 57.9 | - | - | - |
| **Denmark** | 84.3 | - | - | - | 85.9 | - | - | 87.1 | - | - | - | 84.5 |
| **Estonia** | - | 68.9 | - | - | - | 57.4 | - | - | - | 57.9 | - | - |
| **Finland** | - | 68.6 | - | - | - | 65.3 | - | - | - | 66.7 | - | - |
| **France** | - | - | - | 68 | - | - | - | - | 60.3 | - | - | - |
| **Germany** | 79 | - | - | - | 82.2 | - | - | - | 79.1 | - | - | 77.7 |
| **Greece** | - | - | 76.3 | - | - | - | 75 | - | - | - | 76.6 | - |
| **Hungary** | 68.9 | - | - | - | 56.7 | - | - | - | 73.5 | - | - | - |
| **Iceland** | - | 87.4 | - | - | - | 84.1 | - | - | - | 87.7 | - | - |
| **Italy** | 86.1 | - | 82.9 | - | - | - | - | 81.4 | - | - | - | - |
| **Ireland** | - | - | - | 66.1 | - | - | - | - | 62.6 | - | - | - |
| **Latvia** | - | 71.9 | - | - | 71.9 | - | - | - | 71.2 | - | - | - |
| **Lithuania** | - | - | 52.9 | - | - | - | 58.2 | - | - | - | 46.1 | - |
| **Luxembourg** | 88.3 | - | - | - | - | 86.5 | - | - | - | - | 91.7 | - |
| **Malta** | - | - | 97.2 | - | 95.4 | - | - | - | - | 95.7 | - | - |
| **Netherlands** | 78.7 | - | - | - | 73.2 | - | - | - | 79.1 | 80 | - | - |
| **Norway** | - | - | - | 78 | - | - | - | 75 | - | - | - | 77.4 |
| **Poland** | - | - | - | 47.9 | - | - | - | 46.2 | - | - | - | 40.6 |
| **Portugal** | - | 66.3 | - | - | - | 61 | - | - | 62.8 | - | - | 64.3 |
| **Romania** | - | - | 76 | - | - | - | 65.3 | - | - | - | 58.5 | - |
| **Slovenia** | - | - | 73.7 | - | - | - | 70.4 | - | - | - | 60.6 | - |
| **Slovakia** | 75.4 | - | - | - | 84.2 | - | - | - | 70.1 | - | - | - |
| **Spain** | - | - | 78.1 | - | - | - | 68.7 | - | - | - | 75.7 | - |
| **Sweden** | 88.1 | - | - | - | 81.4 | - | - | - | 80.1 | - | - | - |
| **Switzerland** | - | 42.2 | - | - | - | 43.2 | - | - | - | 45.4 | - | - |
| **Turkey** | - | 85.2 | - | - | - | 87.1 | - | - | 76.9 | - | - | - |
| **United Kingdom** | - | - | | 71.5 | - | - | - | 59.4 | - | - | - | 61.4 |

Note: In Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece, voting is compulsory. In Italy, voting is a civic obligation (no penalty)
Source: Eurostat, ec.europa.eu/eurostat

## Appendix 3 An Indicative List of Indicators of Social Cohesion at Local level

### Indicators of Well-being in a Town in Eastern Europe[41]

| Access to means of living | Setting and spaces for living | Governance | Human relations | Personal and social balance | Feelings | Participation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Employment | Knowledge and observance of social rights | Relations institutions/ citizens. | Respect | Family life | Trust | Civic sense |
| Income | Management of public areas/ | Justice | Solidarity/ mutual aid | Non stress | Fear | Capacity for commitment |
| Housing | Environment pollution/transport | Institutional support and provision | Non-isolation | Personal development/life project | Recognition | Participation /mutual learning |
| Health/social security | Reconciliation of security and observance of rights | Institutional stability | Empathy | Equal opportunities | | Responsibility |
| Food | | Civic dialogue/consultation in decision-making | | Confidentiality | | Respect for public property |
| Education | | Non-discrimination | | Integration | | Concern for others |
| Culture/ leisure | | Partnership rather than patronage | | | | |
| Information | | | | | | |
| Democratic practice | | | | | | |

[41] This list is the result of a recent exercise carried out by the Directorate General of Social Cohesion.