

## STANDING COMMITTEE (T-RV)

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON SPECTATOR VIOLENCE  
AND MISBEHAVIOUR AT SPORTS EVENTS AND  
IN PARTICULAR AT FOOTBALL MATCHES

COUNCIL OF EUROPE



CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

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Rec (2015) 1  
ANNEX B  
Final version

### **Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events**


#### **ANNEX B on Security - Recommended Good Practices**

##### **A. Introduction**

1. This Annex provides a range of good practices on the security component of a wider and overlapping integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service. The good practices recommended herein are based on extensive European experience.
2. It must be stressed at the outset that the good practices cannot be considered in isolation from the guidance contained elsewhere in the Recommendation.
3. The focus of this document is on policing football. It is recognised that private security and other agencies can and do undertake what are described as "security" functions, usually in the context of wider safety operations in stadia or at other organised events, and, for ease of reference and consistency, their activity is covered within Annex A (Safety - Recommended Good Practices).
3. As indicated throughout the Recommendation, whilst the good practices herein have been established in respect of the delivery of policing football operations, States can adapt and apply the content to other major sports where necessary or desirable.

##### **B. Integrated Multi-Agency Approach**

4. As stressed above, the good practices on policing football herein cannot be considered in isolation from the safety and service good practices contained within the Recommendation. The aim throughout should be on developing and implementing an integrated, multi-agency approach in respect of safety, security and service.
5. Moreover, the good practices are not intended to be prescriptive. Policing strategies and operations are the preserve of each State and there is no intention to undermine this core principle.




Moreover, it is neither possible nor desirable to provide definitive models of application in view of wide variations in the constitutional, judicial, policing, cultural, and historical circumstances, and the equally varied character and severity of football-related incidents, among and within States. Instead, the intention is to provide a range of good practices which should be taken fully into account by States in developing, refining and delivering a customised policing football strategy.

**C. Thematic Contents**

6. For ease of reference, the recommended good practices herein are presented under the following, inter-related, thematic headings:

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## **D. Role of Police in National Co-ordination**

7. Policing agencies have a key role to play in the national multi-agency co-ordination arrangements highlighted throughout this Recommendation. It is imperative, therefore, that policing interests are represented by expert practitioners who are able to influence key policy decisions.

8. A crucial objective centres on ensuring that national and local policing strategies are consistent with the wider integrated approach. The police also have an important role to play in providing updated information on trends in supporter behaviour and associated risks and in clarifying how European good practices on policing football can be adapted for inclusion in the national arrangements.

9. Policing information and expertise is also critical in respect of monitoring and analysing events at domestic football matches and/or incidents involving domestic club supporters in connection with football matches played abroad.

10. Similarly police information and risk assessments should be central to national co-ordination of multi-agency preparations for high risk football matches and tournaments and international matches played in other States.

11. High level participation of a number of key partner agencies in the national co-ordination group (notably governmental interior, justice and sports departments; prosecuting agencies; and national football authorities) should assist the police in identifying and explaining the enabling legal measures necessary to facilitate delivery of the policing strategy.


12. The police also have a key role to play in identifying the training necessary to ensure that policing personnel are able to deliver their tasks effectively and proportionately. In view of the interaction between the police and stadium personnel, the national co-ordination arrangements should explore the scope for organising integrated joint training of key policing and stadia safety personnel, taking into account European experience and established good practices.

## **E. Role of National Government and the Police**

13. Irrespective of the national policing structure (that is irrespective of whether responsibility for strategic and operational decisions rests at national or local level), co-operation between the police and national government is critical not least in terms of resource provision and international police co-operation.

14. However, such co-operation is also crucial in respect of ensuring that the national legislative, regulatory and administrative framework includes provisions which empower the police to undertake all of their football-related activity effectively. Aside from reviewing the relevant provisions in core public order and criminal law, the police and Interior and/or Justice authorities should evaluate the efficacy of any football specific policing/security provisions, along with identifying the legal measures necessary to deliver an effective exclusion ("banning order") strategy (see Exclusion Strategies below).

15. In addition to matters in which the police have operational primacy, the national co-ordination arrangements should review the legal, regulatory and administrative framework to ensure



that it includes provision obliging the lead agency concerned to consult the police in respect of matters of shared interest.

16. In practice, the lead governmental authority on matters like football stadia licensing/safety certification and responsibility for in-stadia safety and crowd management may be a sports department or other authority so it is crucial that the partnership between the police and government extends to governmental agencies with a direct interest in football safety and security.

## **F. Role of Prosecuting Agencies**

17. Across Europe there are wide variations in the role, structure and competencies of prosecuting agencies. However, irrespective of the arrangements in place, an effective partnership between prosecuting and policing agencies can be crucial both at a strategic level, in terms of identifying gaps in criminal law provision, and at a tactical level, in terms of the gathering and presentation of evidence in respect of judicial or administrative proceedings.

18. This is crucial as spectators identified as being involved in criminality in connection with football events should be prosecuted in accordance with the appropriate legal provisions.


19. To ensure that the legal provisions are used appropriately and effectively, prosecuting agencies and the police need to work in partnership in developing a prosecution strategy designed to fully exploit the legal options at their disposal.

20. The independence of the judiciary remains a constant and important safeguard though strategies can and have been applied by the police and prosecuting agencies in some countries to enhance awareness among the judiciary of the problems associated with football related violence and disorder and the need for a proportionate but effective response.

21. However, a common characteristic of most (though not all) football related violence and disorder is that the impact will often exceed the severity of the actual offences committed. Most offences committed in connection with a football event are low level criminality (especially when considered in isolation), a consequence of which is that penalties imposed on conviction can often be perceived as ineffectual.

22. This phenomenon generates challenges for law makers as well as prosecuting agencies. It would not be appropriate for persons convicted of low level criminality to receive disproportionately severe sentences simply because an offence was committed in connection with a football event. However, European experience evidences that supplementing a criminal conviction with the imposition of exclusion measures, following a judicial or administrative process set out in the relevant legal provisions, can be very effective. The role of prosecuting agencies can be crucial in encouraging the court, or other designated authority, to impose such exclusion measures when adjudicating on football-related criminality.

23. It is worth stressing that whilst preventative detention or arrest without conviction can provide a short term measure to assist in the maintaining of public order, it cannot substitute for the prosecution of offenders if sufficient evidence is available to convince the designated judicial or administrative adjudicator that a conviction is likely and if a prosecution is considered to be in the public interest. Nor, in many countries, does such a detention or arrest provide evidence of guilt for exclusion purposes.



24. In respect of international police and judicial co-operation, it is important for the prosecuting agency and police to liaise with the relevant Government Departments regarding the potential for sharing information in accordance with national law and international police and judicial co-operation arrangements. This can be important in circumstances where there is evidence that an individual has caused or contributed to violence or disorder whilst attending a match in a State in which the individual is not resident.

25. The aim here should be to identify and exploit the available options for the police, prosecuting agency or other designated authority to share details of a conviction, or alternatively evidence (ideally CCTV coverage or other images) of violence or criminality, with the relevant agency/authority in the individual's country of residence.

## **G. Role of Police in Local Co-ordination**


26. In view of the crucial role played by local policing and partner agencies in delivery of an integrated approach in cities and towns hosting football matches, the police have a vested interest in actively participating in the local multi-agency co-ordination arrangements highlighted throughout this Recommendation.

27. This participation is crucial in terms of ensuring that local policing strategies are consistent with the national and local multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service and in developing with partner agencies a shared ethos in delivery of joint or overlapping functions.

28. It is also crucial in respect of ensuring that police information and risk assessments are taken fully into account in multi-agency preparations for international and domestic football matches hosted in the locality.

29. Effective local co-ordination should also ensure that:

- the roles and responsibilities of policing (and other) personnel in football related operations are clear, concise and widely understood and that this clarity of function extends to operations in both public and private spaces, including football stadia;
- the police are consulted at an appropriate level on all aspects of the wider integrated approach which may impact on delivery of the policing football strategy, including stadium licensing, ticketing, stewarding and other in-stadia operating arrangements, local hospitality and related activities (including community and supporter liaison), transport and other logistical arrangements, and crisis planning for emergency scenarios (inside and outside of stadia);
- local policing arrangements (and those of partner agencies) are regularly reviewed and refined as appropriate in the light of any changes to the national strategy and national and local post-match analysis of events connected to previous matches; and
- key police messages are communicated to host and, in particular, visiting supporters about designated/recommended areas for pre and post-match recreation and policing tolerance levels (offering clear advice on what constitutes unacceptable behaviour) highlighting any additional or exceptional measures planned for high risk matches.



30. The constitutional relationship between the police and municipal authorities, including Mayors, varies across Europe. In some States, municipal authorities play an important role in determining the character and scope of policing operations in their locality whereas in others the police are wholly independent or accountable to a national policing structure or national government. Clearly, therefore, the character of the football-related partnership between the police and local government will need to reflect the constitutional position.

31. However, irrespective of designated remit, there is a clear need for the police to develop a close partnership with municipal authorities, not least because all football matches occur in a specific locality and are subject to local dynamics and organisational arrangements.

32. The police and municipal authorities also have a mutual interest in assessing risk and preparing appropriate and proportionate preventative measures designed to minimise disruption to local communities and businesses whilst providing visiting and host fans with a welcoming environment;

33. A high profile example evidencing the need for this partnership centres on public viewing events. This issue is covered in depth within Annex A (Safety: Recommended Good Practices) which incorporates guidance highlighting (inter alia) that:

- a police risk assessment should be a pre-requisite of hosting such an event;
- the police should determine the appropriate safety and security arrangements at the event, along routes to and from the venue, and in the surrounding area; and
- the police should monitor crowd behaviour on the basis of an ongoing dynamic risk assessment and respond to minor incidents with early intervention in a proportionate and targeted manner to prevent escalation.

34. A further area where an effective partnership between the police, municipal authorities and other agencies, notably football clubs, can be of special assistance centres on the planning and exercising of the multi-agency response to emergency scenarios inside and outside of stadia.


## **H. Co-operation between the Police and the National Football Authorities**

35. Effective co-operation between the police and football authorities is pivotal to the delivery of a successful integrated football safety, security and service strategy in terms of:

- assessing risk and identifying associated multi-agency preventative arrangements in respect of domestic and international matches (played at home or abroad);
- evaluating post-match multi-agency operations and reviewing and refining, where necessary, the arrangements for future matches.

36. Moreover, effective co-operation is critical in terms of sharing with the football authorities, police views on a range of potentially key in-stadia safety and security national policy considerations including:

- stadium licensing/safety certification;
- ticketing arrangements;





- sale and consumption of alcohol;
- deterring and preventing the use of pyrotechnics;
- potential segregation of rival supporters (inside and on the approaches to and from stadia);
- entry checks and controls;
- counter-terrorist threats and operations; and
- threats posed by organised criminality (linked, for example, to counterfeit tickets and the unauthorised sale of tickets through the black market).

37. Information sharing is a further area where effective co-operation can assist in determining the appropriate mechanism for exchanging information on convicted and/or excluded (banned) persons. If this is permitted by national data protection law then the police should ensure that operating arrangements are in place to facilitate such information exchange.

### **I. Co-operation between the Police and Football Clubs**


38. Close co-operation between the police and stadium authorities/match organiser (and other involved parties, including any private security or stewarding companies operating in stadia) is crucial in respect of the delivery of effective in-stadia safety and security arrangements.

39. The key partnership at a local level is between police match commanders and the individual appointed by the match organiser as being responsible for safety and crowd management within the stadium (commonly referred to as the stadium safety officer - though the term security officer is used in some countries).

40. Without prejudice to their respective roles, remits and competencies, as set out in national legislation, the police commander and stadium safety officer should work closely together in order to specify the role of the police (if any) in a range of crowd management related scenarios, including:

- pre entry cordons and searching;
- monitoring and managing crowd movements;
- opening and closure of entry gate and turnstiles;
- supporting safety personnel (stewards) in preventing and dealing with any public disorder or other criminality;
- delaying the start of a match;
- abandonment of a match and liaison with the referee;
- supervising evacuation of the stadium; and
- activation of the organiser's emergency procedures.

41. This liaison process should include determining the procedures to be applied in circumstances, such as an emergency or major incident, when it is appropriate for the police to take control of all or part of the stadium and for the eventual return of control to the organiser. Once



agreed, the arrangements should be set out in a written agreement between the organiser and the police (often described as a statement of intent).

42. Close co-operation should also ensure that police views on a number of key in-stadia safety and security considerations are taken into account by the organiser. A range of important issues can be covered in this way, including:


- arrangements for ensuring effective and efficient separation of rival fans (where necessary);
- measures designed to deter and detect the possession and use of pyrotechnics in football stadia;
- in-stadia alcohol policy;
- use of CCTV for crowd management and evidence gathering purposes;
- shared or designated in-stadia communication arrangements;
- monitoring of crowd densities and behaviour by trained police or stadium personnel;
- stewarding arrangements;
- possible use of visiting stewards in a liaison capacity both in-stadia and en-route to and from a stadium; and
- arrangements for a multi-agency control room, incorporating where appropriate a police command post.

43. The above issues are considered in more depth in Annex A (Safety - Recommended Good Practice).

## **J. Policing Football Operations - Key Functions**

44. European experience evidences the importance of police strategists and operational commanders taking full account of the following established European good practices in developing and refining national and local policing football strategies, notably in respect of:

- (i) integrating policing arrangements into a wider, multi-agency approach to safety, security and service in connection with football matches;
- (ii) developing effective policing partnerships with key stakeholders in order to make public spaces safe, secure and welcoming for supporters and local communities alike before, during and after football matches;
- (iii) supporting the event organiser in making football stadia safe and secure for participants and supporters in terms of minimising the risk of (and responding proportionately and appropriately to) any significant in-stadia public disorder or other forms of criminality; and
- (iv) planning and delivering proportionate policing operations based on pre-match risk analysis, ongoing dynamic risk assessments, and key operational principles like dialogue, graded deployment, and early targeted intervention where necessary.





## K. Understanding Supporter Dynamics and Risks

45. The starting point for developing and refining any effective football policing strategy centres on obtaining a clear understanding of supporter behaviour, crowd dynamics and the character and threat posed by individuals or groups who have previously engaged in football-related criminality. This can be a complex issue though updated policing profiles on the behaviour of football club and national team supporters can be of assistance in terms of preparing initial risk assessments (see National Role of NFIPs below).

46. European experience evidences that the behaviour of supporters generally and risk groups in particular can be variable and influenced by a wide range of external factors, including policing tactics. It cannot be assumed that risk supporters are programmed to automatically act in a certain manner or are immune from policing measures designed to proactively and positively engage with supporters. Similarly supporters not associated with known risk groups can and do sometimes act in a violent or other unacceptable manner.

47. Policing strategies, therefore, should not be unduly influenced by assumptions and expectations about the threats posed by supporters based on historical trends and preliminary risk assessments.


48. Moreover, experience demonstrates that stereotyping supporter behaviour and policing supporters (including known risk groups) in a disproportionate manner can sometimes be self-fulfilling in terms of generating potential conflict with the police, empowering any violent or confrontational supporters, and exacerbating the actual degree of risk through generating support and sympathy among other supporters.

49. European good practice demonstrates that treating supporters on their behaviour rather than reputation provides an effective basis for reducing risk while determining policing deployment and tactics on the basis of an ongoing process of dynamic risk assessment and early and targeted police intervention can prove to be highly effective in terms of marginalising the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation.

## L. Risk Categorisation of Supporters

50. In view of difficulties in predicting the behaviour of supporters, and following a detailed review of extensive European experience, the following supporter risk categorisations should be applied in respect of all football matches with an international dimension:

- **Risk Supporter:** "a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or anti-social behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event";
- **Non-Risk' Supporter:** "a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing little or no risk to public disorder and other criminality whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event".



51. The purpose of limiting the categorisation to risk and non-risk is to assist host policing operations by obliging visiting police delegations (either from abroad or another city) to identify the potential risk factors and circumstances which may impact on visiting supporter behaviour. It also reinforces the importance and need for the host police to adopt a process of ongoing dynamic risk assessment in order to monitor the actual degree of risk throughout the period of an operation.

52. Although this categorisation arrangement and process was designed for international matches, it can also be adopted for domestic matches.

### **M. Risk Based Policing Operations**

53. There are a number of references to "dynamic risk assessment" throughout the Recommendation. A summary of this important concept is provided at Appendix 1. It sets out a model of application covering dynamic risk and graded tactical police deployment throughout the period of a football event. It is based on European experience and extensive research into crowd dynamics in connection with football matches.

### **N. Communication and Engagement with Supporters**


54. European experience evidences the importance of the police, professional football clubs (through designated Supporter Liaison Officers where appointed), and partner agencies communicating with supporters as a means of providing a welcoming environment and minimising safety and security risks. This process is often labelled as "dialogue".

55. A police commitment to communicating with supporters as part of a wider policing football strategy is now established good practice. However, there are various interpretations of what dialogue means in practice and a number of different models have been adopted within various States. The exact character of the dialogue approach to be employed can be customised by the police to reflect a wide range of national and local circumstances, including the character of the football dynamic and associated risks. Similarly a decision to embrace dialogue can be either a national or local police decision depending upon designated roles and responsibilities and policing structures.

56. One version featured in Annex C (Service - Recommended Good Practices) highlights a model of dialogue that centres on establishing permanent communication structures between the football club, supporter group representatives and the police. In this respect, specially trained "dialogue officers" can play a fruitful role.

57. The aim of this model is to provide an ongoing mechanism for an exchange of perspectives with supporters, in part to develop trust, and in part to help reduce the risk of conflict on match days. It also aims to create opportunities for supporter representatives to be advised, and, where appropriate, consulted about match day security and planning, post-match evaluation and legal measures.

58. In other States, the dialogue concept centres on training and obliging designated personnel or all frontline police officers to communicate with supporters during a policing football operation. This version reflects that enshrined in the dynamic risk approach set out in Appendix 1.



59. At an operational level, dialogue can be a core policing tactic, particularly at low risk matches or, more usually, it can be employed to complement other strategic and tactical aims. To that end, effective dialogue with supporters can assist:

- challenge supporter perceptions of policing operations;
- demonstrate that policing tactics are designed to provide a safe and secure environment for all supporters;
- encourage supporters to understand and comply with operational decisions;
- encouraging self policing;
- isolate the influence of violent or confrontational supporters and reduce the level of associated threats (though risk groups not inherently immune from dialogue); and
- facilitate early targeted intervention without escalation of risk.

60. European experience demonstrates that whilst a customised model of dialogue can and should be incorporated into the ethos of any policing football operation, there may be a need to provide training in communication and conflict resolution skills either for dialogue policing specialists or all frontline policing football personnel, including crowd control units.

61. In recommending that all policing strategies embrace the concept of dialogue, it is recognised that some police officers may be apprehensive and reluctant to openly communicate with supporters (especially if they are more used to conflict scenarios). That is why the importance of personnel receiving specialist football policing training is stressed throughout this Recommendation.


62. In terms of dialogue techniques, training is especially important as uniformed police officers are highly visible and will often be approached by supporters seeking assistance and information. It is therefore desirable for all police officers to be aware of the importance of, and be comfortable with, presenting a friendly, calm and respectful demeanour when engaged by supporters.

## **O. Exclusion Strategies**

63. European experience demonstrates that whilst dynamic risk based policing coupled with effective dialogue and hospitality measures can significantly help reduce the risk and scale of any disorder, some supporters may continue to act in a violent or other unacceptable manner. The behaviour of such individuals can pose risks to the safety of other football supporters and local communities alike.

64. As indicated above, it is important for the football policing strategy to be supported by effective means for undermining and isolating the influence of supporters seeking confrontation and for excluding supporters who have caused or contributed to violence and disorder from football matches and, importantly, the wider football experience.

65. There are various exclusion options in place across Europe which provide a menu for States wishing to develop or refine their own exclusion strategy. In determining an appropriate exclusion strategy, a number of considerations need to be taken into account. These include the character and location of the violence and misbehaviour and the degree of threat posed.



66. In some States, football clubs and/or the National Football Association impose stadium bans designed to help reduce in-stadia risks.

67. However, in isolation, stadium bans will not deter or prevent violence and disorder outside of stadia, where many incidents actually occur. Moreover, the potential scope of such stadium bans is limited and not consistent with the need to attach wider preventative conditions to the exclusion process. Nor will stadium bans prevent the individuals from travelling to matches elsewhere (including abroad) and causing or contributing to violence.

68. In this regard, European experience and good practice demonstrates that each State should take all possible measures (including travel restrictions) to prevent its own citizens from participating in and/or organising public disturbances in another country.

69. If the character and degree of football related disorder extends beyond stadia (as it does in most States), a judicial or administrative exclusion process, set out in national law, will provide greater scope for attaching geographical constraints, time-limited restrictions on movement (known as travel bans) and other preventative measures.


70. It is also desirable for exclusion arrangements to make provision to fast track the process at least to the extent of imposing temporary constraints pending the final outcome of a judicial or administrative decision. This is usually possible and is already applied in some States.

71. A number of factors and objectives will need to be taken into account when expanding or refining existing exclusion measures, particularly if adopting a judicial process. These include ensuring that:

- prosecuting and judicial agencies are consulted and fully understand what is required and why it is necessary;
- enabling legislation includes various safeguards (such as an exemption options) and incorporates measures that will be widely perceived as reasonable, targeted and proportionate;
- enabling legislation provides a degree of clarity regarding the character of the evidence that will be necessary for a judicial (or administrative or policing) exclusion measure to be imposed;
- exclusion periods are time limited in order to be proportionate and provide the (banned) individual with opportunity to demonstrate that their behaviour has been transformed; and
- supporter concerns are answered and the potential scope and impact of the exclusion process explained to provide reassurance that the measures are targeted, designed to maintain their safety, and likely to influence the way they are treated by the police and other agencies.

72. There is good European experience demonstrating that effective and comprehensive exclusion measures can be highly effective in:

- deterring misbehaviour;
- preventing repeat offending;
- undermining the influence and status of potential troublemakers;



- reducing the scale of any violence;
- transforming the post-exclusion behaviour of offenders; and
- assisting the police in targeting those individuals who remain committed to behaving in an unacceptable manner.

These outcomes are more likely to be achieved if exclusion is pursued in tandem with more positive measures like dynamic risk based police deployments amid an ethos of dialogue and hospitality.

## **P. International Police Co-operation**

73. Detailed, established and highly effective good practices in respect of international police co-operation in connection with football matches with an international dimension is provided in Appendix 2. These good practices (otherwise and widely known as the Handbook on International Police Co-operation) cover a range of crucial considerations and procedures on matters such as information exchange, deployment and functions of visiting police delegations and facilitating international police co-operation.


74. The Handbook also stresses that a National Football Information Point (NFIP) should be set up and equipped and resourced to undertake a range of key policing football functions associated with minimising risk.

75. The establishment of a NFIP is mandatory for States that are Members of the European Union, however it is strongly recommended that non Member States also set up an NFIP and otherwise ensure compliance (wherever possible) with the other procedures and practices set out in the Handbook.

## **Q. National Role of NFIPs**

76. Whilst the primary role of the European network of NFIPs is to exchange information and facilitate international police co-operation, the good practice (Handbook) also recommends that each NFIP undertakes a range of duties that are national in character. These include recommending that NFIP personnel should:

- be trained and equipped to provide a national source of expertise regarding football policing and associated safety and security matters;
- co-ordinate information exchange in connection with football matches and where appropriate, coordinate and organise the training and work of intelligence officers and / or spotters.
- have access to relevant national police databases;
- develop a profile on national and club supporters, including risk-groups and how they relate to other supporters at home and abroad including local population groups and the circumstances which can increase potential risk (including interaction with police and stewards).
- act as a source of knowledge and expertise on supporter dynamics and associated risks with the police, civil servants and academics contributing to this process.



77. European experience demonstrates that to deliver its national (and international) functions effectively, it is crucial for the NFIP to be adequately resourced and to be supported by national policing arrangements designed to provide the NFIP with timely and accurate information and intelligence.

## **R. Communication and Media Strategy**

78. European experience also demonstrates the importance of the police actively participating in the development of effective multi-agency communication and media handling structures as a means of explaining the importance and content of an integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service.

79. An effective communication strategy is crucial in terms of using the media to provide information and reassurance to local communities in cities and towns hosting football matches and in providing supporters with a wide range of information on policing football operations, including behavioural tolerance levels, and relevant legislative and regulatory provisions. It can also be important in terms of highlighting the priority accorded by the police (and partner agencies) to creating a safe and welcoming environment for all football supporters.


80. It is therefore recommended that national and local police spokespersons work closely with their counterparts in government, local authorities, football authorities, and other partner agencies in the preparation and delivery of a comprehensive communications strategy.

## **S. Terrorism and Serious and Organised Criminality**

81. The good practices recommended herein are focused on effective crowd management, reducing safety risks, and preventing and countering public disorder, low level criminality and anti-social behaviour. It takes no account of policing measures designed to deter and counter terrorist threats and serious and organised criminality.

82. These are specialist policing areas where advice must be sought from expert sources. The aim, thereafter, should be to accommodate the advice received within the wider policing football operation taking into account the possible impact of any counter-terrorist measures on the ethos and delivery of an integrated approach to safety, security and service. The same approach is recommended in respect of policing measures designed to deter and counter any threats posed by serious and organised criminality.

83. Additional information on Counter Terrorism is provided in Annex A (Safety - Recommended Good Practice).





## Appendix 1

### Summary of Dynamic Risk and Graded Deployment

#### Key Principles

Current understanding of effective crowd management, reinforced by extensive research, highlights the importance of:


- maintaining perceptions of appropriate policing among crowd participants;
- avoiding the use of force against crowds as a whole when only a minority are posing a risk to public order;
- a ‘low profile’ or ‘graded’ tactical approach to policing that enhances police capability for communication, dialogue and dynamic risk assessment.

#### Facilitation

- the strategic approach should be preventative through low-impact targeted intervention rather than repressive;
- it is important that at every stage of an operation police strategy and tactics should take account of and facilitate the legitimate intentions of supporters, as far as these are peaceful (e.g. to celebrate their identity and culture, travel to and from the fixture in safety);
- if it is necessary to impose limits on supporter behaviour, it is important to communicate with those supporters why police action has been taken and what alternative means the police are putting in place through which legitimate aims can be achieved.

#### Balance

- during any crowd event the levels of risk to public order can change rapidly;
- it is important that there is a proportionate balance between the style of police deployment and the level, sources and nature of risk at the point of police crowd interaction;
- it is important that the policing is graded and capable of changing directly in response to the nature and levels of emerging and decreasing risk;
- where balance is achieved the majority in the crowd are more likely to perceive the actions of the police as appropriate and less likely to support and associate with those seeking confrontation;
- therefore, to help decrease the likelihood and scale of incidents, it is critical that risk assessments are accurate and inform police tactics at all times.



## **Differentiation**

- the indiscriminate use of force can contribute to a widespread escalation in the levels of public disorder through its interaction with crowd dynamics;
- differentiation between individual supporters actually posing a danger and those that do not is therefore a consideration that must be built into every strategic and tactical decision relating to the management of crowds (i.e. training, planning, briefing and operational practice);
- it is inappropriate to act against a whole crowd who happen to be present in a given location, unless there is evidence that they are uniformly seeking to provoke disorder.

## **Dialogue**

- it is important to communicate proactively with supporters. This is best achieved by police officers with good communication skills;
- the focus is to create a welcoming atmosphere and avoid the potential for conflict;
- this approach can assist in the gathering of high quality information regarding supporter intentions, perspectives, concerns and sensitivities and any other information regarding potential risk;
- it also allows the police to communicate concerns regarding supporter behaviour, risks they may face and solutions to any emerging difficulties.

## **Models of good practice**


### **Before the event**

Risk assessment should take into account:

- the underlying culture of the supporter group to be policed (e.g. characteristic behaviour, motivations and intentions);
- any factors likely to impact on risk e.g. the activities of other groups (such as opposition supporters and / or local communities), sensitivities, history, and anything else that has particular significance (dates, places, forms of action, symbols);
- any circumstances likely to impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, those supporters or groups perceived to pose a risk to public order.

Behavioural tolerance levels should be defined and priority given to communicating these to supporter organisations. Consideration should be given to encouraging supporters to gather in a safe/controlled environment (e.g. a fan zone).

Based upon this information and intelligence relating to the specific fixture it should be possible to predict and distinguish fixtures with normal risk and increased risk to public order.



## **Initial contact**

Since the level of risk to public order is not fixed but highly dynamic it can increase and decrease rapidly in response to circumstances. The levels of risk must therefore be monitored and accurately assessed on an ongoing basis.

To achieve this:

- police should engage in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with supporters (non-aggressive posture, smiling, deployed in pairs or in small groups in standard uniform, dispersed widely across and within crowds, accommodating requests for photographs, etc.);
- where language is not a barrier, officers should try to communicate with supporters to gather information about their demeanour, intentions, concerns, sensibilities and any other issues relevant to their behaviour;
- interventions units (i.e. ‘riot squads’ with protective equipment, vehicles, etc) should be kept in discreet locations unless the situation determines that a more forceful intervention is required.

This will assist the host police gather information and inform command decisions regarding tactical deployment on the basis of continuous and ongoing risk assessment.

## **Increasing risk**


Where circumstances posing risk are identified it is important to:

- communicate to those posing the risk that they are provoking the potential for police intervention;
- where an incident involves visiting supporters host police assessments should be validated by the visiting police delegation;

Should the above measures not resolve the situation, then further police use of force may be required. The objective of police deployment at this stage is to minimise further risk and it is therefore essential that any action does not escalate tensions (e.g. indiscriminate use of force).

Where any potential for an increase in risk is identified:

- it is vital that information about the persons creating the risk and its nature is communicated clearly to the intervention squads being deployed so that any use of force can be appropriately targeted;
- those not posing any risk should be allowed to leave the vicinity and / or some time to impose ‘self-policing’.




**De-escalation**

- once the incident(s) has been resolved policing levels should return to an appropriate level.

**After the event**

- a through debrief should be conducted and any relevant information (e.g. the quality of information received before and during the event, the behaviour and management of supporters, police tactics and the enforcement of tolerance levels) must be recorded.



## Appendix 2

### Extracts from the Handbook on International Police Co-operation

#### Contents

Introduction - Basic Principles

Chapter 1 - Information management by the police

Chapter 2 - Event related preparations by the police

Chapter 3 - Co-operation between police forces during the event

Chapter 4 - Co-operation between police and the organiser

Chapter 5 - Co-operation between police and criminal justice and prosecuting agencies

Chapter 6 - Co-operation between police and supporters

Chapter 7 - Communication and media strategy

#### Appendices

1. Specifications for and sample of Police Identification Vest
2. Categorisation of Football Supporters

#### INTRODUCTION: BASIC PRINCIPLES

The purpose of this document is to enhance safety and security at football matches with an international dimension, and in particular to maximise the effectiveness of international police cooperation.

The content, where appropriate, can also apply to other sporting events with an international dimension.


The content is without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the competencies and responsibilities of the different agencies within each Signatory State.

Although this document is mainly focused on international police cooperation, in view of the multi-agency character of managing football (and other sporting events), there are references to police interaction with other key partners such as the event organiser.

International police cooperation and football policing operations must be guided by the principles of legality and proportionality.

Whilst the competent authority in the organising country is responsible for providing a safe and secure event, authorities in participating, neighbouring and transit states have a responsibility to assist where appropriate.

This document should be widely disseminated and applied in all European countries and beyond in order to minimise safety and security risks and ensure effective international police co-operation.



## **CHAPTER 1 - Information Management by the Police**

### **Section 1**

#### **I. INTRODUCTION**

The timely exchange of accurate information is of the utmost importance in enhancing safety and security and preventing football-related violence and disorder.

It is mandatory for Members of the European Union to establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP) to act as the central and sole contact point for the exchange of relevant information for football matches with an international dimension, and for developing international police cooperation concerning football matches.

It is strongly recommended that all Signatory States outside of the European Union also establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP) with the same roles and responsibilities.

Where there is direct contact between organising and visiting police, any information exchanged shall be shared simultaneously with the relevant NFIPs. Such contact should not jeopardise the key role of the NFIP in ensuring the quality of the information and wider dissemination to other relevant partners and authorities.

In establishing an NFIP, the signatory state should ensure that:

- the NFIP is able to perform its tasks efficiently and to a satisfactory standard;
- the NFIP is equipped with the necessary technical facilities to perform its tasks efficiently and swiftly;
- NFIP personnel are trained and equipped to provide a national source of expertise regarding football policing and associated safety and security matters;
- the NFIP has access to the relevant national police databases; and
- the NFIP is supported by national policing arrangements designed to provide the NFIP with timely and accurate information and intelligence to enable the NFIP to fulfil its national and international responsibilities.

#### **II. TASKS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION**

The NFIP shall support the competent national authorities and act in accordance with national laws. On the basis of information that has been analysed and assessed, the NFIP should assist the competent national authorities to develop and deliver a multi-agency strategy on football related issues.

The NFIP shall support local police with regard to national or international football matches.

For the benefit of NFIPs of other countries, each NFIP should maintain an updated risk-analysis related to its own clubs and its national team.





Risk analysis means developing a profile on national and club supporters, including risk-groups and how they relate to other supporters at home and abroad including local population groups and the circumstances which can increase potential risk (including interaction with police and stewards).

The risk analysis should be shared with other NFIPs using the NFIP website (www.nfip.eu).

The exchange of personal information is subject to the applicable national and international law, and/or bi-national or multi-lateral agreements.

The NFIP shall ensure that all information is subject to quality control in respect of content.

The NFIP can, if appropriate, extend this exchange of information to other agencies which contribute to safety and security.

All information shall be exchanged using the appropriate forms provided on the NFIP website. The NFIP website is a highly secure website available for the exclusive use of NFIPs which contains information relating to football matches with an international dimension (e.g. club overview, pre and post-match reports).

### III. EXCHANGE OF POLICE INFORMATION

#### 1. Kinds of Information

A distinction can be made between general information and personal information. The term ‘event’ is used to mean a specific football match or tournament in all its aspects.


##### (a) General information

General information can be divided into three categories:

- strategic information: information that defines the event in all its dimensions, with particular attention to safety and security risks associated with the event;
- operational information: information that assists in making an event related analysis of any potential risks;
- tactical information: information that assists the person in charge at the operational level to respond appropriately to safety and security issues during the event.

##### (b) Personal information

In this context, personal information refers to information on individuals who are assessed as posing a potential risk to public safety in connection with the event. This may include individuals who have previously caused or contributed to violence or disorder in connection with football matches.



## 2. Chronological Sequence of Information Exchange

Three phases may be distinguished: before, during and after the event. These three phases need not always be strictly separated.

### (a) Task of the NFIP of the organising country

#### 1. Before the event

At the strategic level, information requirements are forwarded to the NFIP of the supporting country/countries. This requirement shall include:

- a risk analysis of supporters of the visiting team
- other relevant information regarding the safety and security of the event e.g. supporter travel details and political or other threats

The NFIP of the organising country shall provide information on the applicable legislation and policy of the authorities (e.g. alcohol policy) the organisation of the event and key safety and security personnel.

All relevant information shall be put at the disposal of the other NFIPs concerned and entered on the NFIP website via the appropriate forms.

At the operational level, the NFIP of the organising country shall provide information to the NFIP of the supporting country (countries) in particular regarding the integration of the visiting police delegation into the organising country policing operation and information for visiting supporters, etc.


The NFIP of the supporting country / countries shall be requested to provide timely and accurate information regarding the movements of risk and non-risk supporters, the participating team (where there is a threat) and ticket sales, together with any other relevant information

#### 2. During the event

At the operational level, the NFIP of the organising country can request confirmation of the information previously provided and request an updated risk analysis. The request shall be forwarded and answered via a system of liaison officers if such a system has been set up.

At the tactical level, the NFIP of the organising country shall provide feedback on the accuracy of the information provided.

General information regarding the return of supporters including any that have been expelled and/or refused entry shall also be provided to the NFIPs of the country of origin and the relevant transit countries.



### 3. After the event

The NFIP of the organising country shall (via the appropriate forms on the NFIP website) provide information to the supporting NFIPs:

- regarding the behaviour of supporters so that the risk analysis can be updated by the NFIPs of the country/club they support and/or where they reside;
- concerning the description of any incident. Information regarding arrests or sanctions shall be exchanged in accordance with national and international law;
- on the operational usefulness of the information they have provided and of the support of the visiting police delegation(s) (see Chapter 2).

#### (b) Tasks of the NFIP of the supporting country / countries

##### 1. Before the event

The NFIP of the supporting country / countries shall respond to the information requirement of the organising country NFIP and, on its own initiative, provide all relevant information to any other NFIPs concerned.

##### 2. During the event

The information supplied shall be updated and the movements and stay of the supporters shall be monitored. Useful information concerning event related incidents in their home country during the matches or tournaments shall also be provided to the organising country and any other relevant NFIP.

##### 3. After the event

Based on the information provided by the organising country NFIP and the visiting police delegation the risk analysis shall be updated (see Chapter 2).


An assessment shall be carried out concerning the information exchange and the work of the visiting police delegation.

## Section 2

### Additional guidance on the tasks of NFIPs

At the national level the NFIP shall coordinate the exchange of information regarding football matches and where appropriate, coordinate and organise the training and work of intelligence officers and / or spotters.

NFIPs shall be the channel for the exchange of information with non-EU countries. If these countries do not have an NFIP they should be asked to indicate a central, single contact point. Contact details should be forwarded to other NFIPs and entered on the NFIP website.



At the national level the NFIP shall act as a knowledge centre. In addition to the police, civil servants and academics could contribute to the role of the NFIP as a knowledge centre.

An NFIP can enter into a formal bilateral agreement with a third party regarding the exchange of certain information in accordance with their own national legislation. This information shall not be further shared without the agreement of the originator.

For tournaments, the NFIP of the organising country shall communicate with the NFIP of the supporting country / countries via the designated national liaison officer where appointed.

On the occasion of a one-off match the NFIP of the organising country shall communicate with the NFIP of the supporting country through the designated liaison officer or Operations Coordinator of the country.

In respect of matters such as counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime the organising country NFIP or the competent police agency shall communicate through any existing network or specialist liaison officers appointed for that purpose.

If a local football information centre exists, it shall cooperate with the NFIP. The local information centre and NFIP shall keep one another informed. This information flow should take into account information provided by the visiting police delegation.

## **CHAPTER 2 - Event-related preparations by the police**


### **Visiting Police Delegations**

Efficient event preparations by the police in the organising country will be supported by a comprehensive exchange of information, in accordance with the principles which are to be found in chapter 1 of this handbook.

The organising NFIP, following close consultation with their police, should invite a visiting police delegation from countries that can contribute added value. This added value should be considered in the light of a number of factors such as professional experience in managing the behaviour of visiting supporters including risk supporters and the ability to provide the organising police with information designed to minimise risks to public order.

The organising NFIP can also invite police officers who are seeking to gain experience as a member of a visiting police delegation, enabling them to provide added value at football matches involving their supporters in the future.

The formal invitation for a visiting police delegation shall be transmitted via the NFIP in the organising country, who will receive advice from the police concerned. Taking into account the specific aims of cooperation, the invitation should indicate the composition of the delegation and



clarify their roles and responsibilities. It should also specify the intended duration of the visiting police delegation's time in the organising country.

For international tournaments and one-off matches (should either NFIP request) the formal invitation for a visiting police delegation shall come from the Ministry responsible in the organising country, on the advice of the organising country NFIP, and can be subject to an inter-governmental agreement.

If a visiting police delegation is not invited by the organising NFIP, the NFIP of the sending country can, if deemed appropriate, submit a proactive proposal to the organising NFIP to send a delegation. If the organising NFIP does not accept the proposal, any police delegation that still travels is acting in an unofficial capacity outside of the scope of this handbook.

The detail of the arrangements (e.g. police powers, equipment, uniforms etc.) concerning the visiting police delegation shall be agreed through negotiation between the respective NFIPs, following consultation with the local police for the one-off match. If a bi-national governmental agreement is not in place, these arrangements shall be in compliance with the national and international laws applicable.


The visiting delegation must not exceed the number agreed by the organising NFIP and must respect the organising police command and control arrangements. If they act in a manner that is not within the terms of the agreement then they are acting outside of the scope of this handbook.

The detailed invitation for support shall be agreed between NFIPs concerned well in advance of a tournament and/or one-off match to allow the visiting police delegation sufficient preparation time. In that context, an invitation for support should be presented as soon as possible after the announcement of the date of the match.

For one-off matches with an international dimension the visiting police delegation will require at least 3 weeks' preparation time. If there is less than 3 weeks prior notice of a match (for example in the later stages of a European club competition or due to an increased level of risk) the invitation shall be sent immediately. For international tournaments, the visiting police delegation requires at least 16 weeks' preparation time.

### **Financial Arrangements**

On each occasion the organising country shall pay for accommodation, meals (or subsistence) and other facilities made available locally whilst the visiting country shall pay for travel and salaries of the delegation members involved. Exceptionally, the respective NFIPs can agree on alternative arrangements. These arrangements need to be clarified in the Protocol for deployment of visiting police delegations, as available on the NFIP-website.



## **Organising Police Responsibilities**

The police in the organising country shall provide an opportunity for key members of the visiting police delegation to acquaint themselves with the organisation of police operations in the organising country and/or the venue town(s) and with the stadium location, and to get to know the operational commander(s) at the venue town(s) on the match day(s).

- for international tournaments, this should take place at least one month prior to the tournament (e.g. by hosting workshops or seminars for key members of visiting police delegations).
- for one off matches with an international dimension this will be on one of the days prior to the match.

## **Accompanying Visiting Police Delegations**

Ensuring the safety of all members of a visiting police delegation is paramount and shall be reflected in all organising and visiting police risk assessments concerning police deployment.

Visiting members of a police delegation, in particular the Liaison Officer, Operations Co-ordinator and operational police officers (see below) should work alongside local police officers (commonly known as cicerones) who themselves should be serving police officers, preferably with experience of policing football in their own city or country, including familiarity with the venue area and potential risk areas.

### **Cicerones:**

- must be integrated into the national / local policing operation and have the ability to relay information enabling operational police commanders to make key decisions;
- must have knowledge of their police organisation, processes and command structure;
- shall not be tasked with monitoring their own risk supporters whilst they are deployed accompanying members of a visiting police delegation;
- should be thoroughly briefed on the organising policing operation, their responsibilities, and on the tasks expected of the members of the visiting police delegation;
- will be responsible for the safety of visiting police delegation and provide a channel of communication with the organising police;
- should be deployed with the visiting police delegation for the duration of the operation; this will assist in developing an effective working relationship;
- shall work with the visiting police delegation in a common language agreed beforehand.

## **Composition and Tasks of the Visiting Police Delegation**

The composition of the visiting police delegation shall enable them to support the organising country policing operation for example by:





1. Undertaking and communicating to the organising police an ongoing dynamic risk assessment (see Appendix 1);
2. Communicating and interacting with visiting supporters;
3. If allowed in the national legislation of the organising country and subject to the agreement of the organising country intelligence and evidence gathering on behalf of the organising police or for their own purposes.

Depending on the exact nature of the support to be provided the composition of the delegation could be as follows:

1. **a Head of Delegation** who is functionally and hierarchically in charge of the visiting police delegation;
2. **a Liaison Officer** (or more if agreed by the respective NFIPs) who is responsible in particular for the exchange of information between his / her home country and the organising country;
3. **an Operations Coordinator** who is responsible for coordinating the work of the visiting police officers;
4. **operational police officers** (in plain clothes or uniform) with spotting, supporter liaison, escorting and other duties;
5. **a spokesperson / press officer**. The Head of the visiting police delegation can, if considered appropriate, act as a spokesperson and / or have his/her own press officer.

### **Key Tasks:**


#### **Liaison Officer and/or Operations Co-ordinator**

The assignment of a Liaison Officer and /or an Operations Co-ordinator should enable an effective exchange of information between the visiting and organising country authorities in connection with a one off football match or a tournament.

It is possible for both roles to be performed by the same officer. Whether this is appropriate is a decision for the organising and visiting police to agree on a case by case basis prior to deployment in the organising country.

The Liaison Officer/Operations Co-ordinator must, as a minimum requirement, have:

- a good working knowledge of this handbook;
- an understanding of the processes required to facilitate the international exchange of information;



- the ability to represent their country and their role effectively when liaising with the organising police services (i.e. be diplomatic, self-confident, independent and able to communicate in a common language agreed beforehand);
- a background knowledge of the situation concerning football related violence / disorder in their country.

The main tasks of a Liaison Officer/Operations Co-ordinator can be summarised as:

- gathering and transferring information / intelligence between their delegation and the organising / local police;
- ensuring effective deployment of their operational police officers (in uniform and / or plain clothes) in order to play an integral role in the organising police operation for the event;
- providing timely and accurate advice to the organising / local police commander.

During international tournaments the Liaison Officer is likely to be based in a single or bi-national Police Information Co- ordination Centre (PICC) whilst the Operations Co-ordinator may be based in a local information centre in the area where the match will be played. For one off matches they may be based in the organising country NFIP or other appropriate environment.

For a one off match the Liaison Officer/Operations Co-ordinator shall work closely with the police of the organising city.

In order to perform their functions effectively the organising police shall provide the Liaison Officers/Operations Co-ordinators with access to the relevant technical equipment.

### **Operational Police Officers**


A well balanced deployment of visiting operational police officers, whether in uniform or plain clothes (commonly referred to as spotters), can:

- be used by the organising police as a means of interacting with visiting supporters in order to assist crowd management;
- assist in reducing the anonymity of risk supporters in a crowd, and their ability to instigate and / or participate in acts of violence or disorder without further consequences;

The officers should have experience in the policing of football matches in their own country.

They:

- will have the skills and experience to communicate effectively (where appropriate) in order to influence the behaviour of supporters; and / or
- are specialists in the behaviour of, and the potential risks posed by their supporters; and
- are able to communicate effectively during the event to organising country police commanders, via their Liaison Officer /Operations Co-ordinator, information about the type of risk they might pose at any given time and place.



Members of visiting police delegations should be able to communicate positive, as well as negative issues concerning their team / national supporters. This will allow the organising country police commanders to make balanced decisions around the need to intervene or facilitate legitimate supporter behaviour.

It is important to emphasise that the primary role of visiting operational police officers is advisory and not operational or decision making.

Subject to the agreement of the organising country, visiting operational police officers can also be deployed to gather intelligence / evidence through the use of agreed equipment for use by the organising police or for prosecution purposes in their own country.

### **CHAPTER 3 - Cooperation between police forces during the event**

Maximum use should be made of the support and added value that a visiting police delegation can provide to organising police operations.

The visiting police delegation should be informed about the organising police organisation's operational plan (including their crowd management philosophy and behavioural tolerance levels). They shall be fully integrated into the organising police operation (and given the possibility to attend and participate in pre-match briefing and post-match debriefing meetings).

As regards the use of languages, arrangements shall be made in advance by the countries concerned.


The organising police and the visiting police delegation shall keep their respective NFIPs informed of developments throughout the operation and submit to their NFIP a post-match report within 7 days.

The members of the visiting police delegation shall be shielded from the media unless specific arrangements have been agreed with the head of the delegation.

The visiting police delegation should always ensure that their actions do not unnecessarily jeopardise the safety of other persons.

In case of emergency (i.e. when there is an immediate threat for his/her physical safety) or when it is jointly agreed for tactical reasons, visiting police officer(s) who are not deployed in uniform shall use the standard luminous and distinctive visiting police identification vests, as described in Appendix 3. Each visiting police officer shall bring this vest when he/she travels abroad.

The police force of the organising country, in consultation with the football organisers, shall ensure that the visiting police delegation has, when appropriate, stadium access and accreditation (seating is not required) to enable the delegation to carry out their tasks effectively. Stewards and other safety and security personnel should be made aware of this at their briefing(s) prior to the game.



Countries which have the legal possibility to prevent risk supporters from travelling abroad should take all the necessary measures to achieve this objective effectively and should inform the organising country accordingly. Each country should take all possible measures to prevent its own citizens from participating in and/or organising public order disturbances in another country.

The police of the organising country should seek to have available interpreters for the languages spoken by supporters from visiting countries. This could save visiting police delegations from having to undertake this task, which would keep them from actual operational tasks. These interpreters could also facilitate communication between the organising country's police and the visiting police delegation.

## **CHAPTER 4 - Cooperation between police and the organiser**

### **Section 1**

#### ***Role of the organiser***

The organisers of football matches with an international dimension should do everything in their powers to ensure safety and effective crowd management at the stadium, before, during and after the match, so that the police can be deployed as efficiently as possible.

A coordinated approach between all the parties involved is a prerequisite of an efficient strategy for the organisation of football matches with an international dimension. Close cooperation between the organiser, the private partners involved, the public authorities and the police is therefore strongly recommended.

In order to minimise safety and security risks the authorities and/or the police should impose on the organiser minimum requirements which they have to meet in order to organise football matches with an international dimension.


### **Section 2**

#### ***Cooperation between police and the organiser***

The organiser should appoint an individual as being responsible for safety within the stadium (commonly referred to as the Safety Officer). It is important that the police liaise closely with this individual.

The police and the organisation responsible for safety within the stadium should work together on a complementary basis, without prejudice to each side's own responsibilities, competencies and tasks, which are determined by national law and/or laid down or specified in a written agreement between the organiser and the police.

Unless determined by national law, this agreement should indicate what tasks shall be undertaken by the organiser and what tasks by the police, focusing on particular on the respective roles of the safety officer and police ground commander, and those of the safety personnel and of police officers.



Unless determined by national law, the agreement should also specifically identify:

- who should undertake pre entry cordons and searching;
- who should be in charge of measures to monitor and manage crowd movement and take decisions to open or close gates or turnstiles;
- what assistance police officers will provide to safety personnel and/or vice versa in preventing trouble or dealing with troublemakers;
- who shall decide that the start of the match shall be delayed and in what circumstances (normally the organiser on safety grounds, the police in case of actual or potential public disorder);
- who shall decide and in what circumstances that a match shall be abandoned and who shall be responsible for liaison with the referee;
- the circumstances in which the police shall take control of all or part of the stadium, the procedure for doing so and for the eventual return of control to the organiser;
- who shall direct and supervise evacuation of the stadium and in what circumstances;
- who shall inform the emergency services of any incident requiring or likely to require their presence;
- who shall activate the organiser's emergency procedures.

## **CHAPTER 5 - Co-operation between police and justice and prosecuting agencies**

The contents of this chapter should be seen in the context of wide variations in the structure and competencies of justice and prosecuting agencies in Member States.


There can be significant benefits from close cooperation between police and justice and prosecuting agencies both in respect of one-off matches and tournaments.

Whilst the organising country has sovereignty and jurisdiction to deal with all alleged event related offences, the police and other authorities in Signatory States also have a responsibility to assist and support the justice and prosecuting agencies in the organising country.

All Signatory States should ensure that it is possible to deal quickly and appropriately with event-related offences.

The organising police and other authorities should inform visiting police and supporters of relevant domestic legislation and / or criminal, civil or administrative procedures together with the maximum penalties for the most common football related offences.

Where possible, existing multi-lateral agreements on mutual legal assistance (MLA) should be fully utilised for all football matches with an international dimension where appropriate and additionally an organising country may agree bilateral arrangements with any other country for enhanced MLA before, during and after the event.



The NFIP of the supporting country / countries should inform the organising NFIP:

- of any legal possibilities (e.g. football banning orders / exit bans) they have to prevent risk supporters attending the event;
- what possibilities can be offered, in accordance with national or international law, to the visiting police delegation and / or other competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) within the framework of the bilateral agreement between the countries involved to gather evidence of any football-related offences committed by visiting supporters;
- what offences committed in the organising country could be prosecuted in the supporting country (upon the return of the offender).

The organising country may invite any other countries to send a liaison prosecutor/judge or other body with prosecutor power to be present during the event.


It is recommended that the relevant organising authority, in accordance with the national law including data protection, provides the visiting police delegation and/ or competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) with information from judicial or court records and police or investigative reports, including arrest records, of their nationals.

Alternately, a supporting country may agree to have a liaison prosecutor/judge or other body with prosecutor power available on call to travel to the organising country at its request, or appoint a designated liaison prosecutor / judge or other body with prosecutor power for liaison with the organising authority.

Within the scope of national legislation the supporting NFIP(s) will attempt to answer promptly requests for further information on arrested individuals, such as details of previous convictions, including football-related offences.

All costs related to liaison prosecutors/judges or other body with prosecutor power being sent to the organising country should be subject to bi-lateral agreement.

The organising country will provide the necessary means of communication and other facilities for the visiting liaison prosecutors/judges or other body with prosecutor power.





## CHAPTER 6 - Co-operation between police and supporters

Police liaison with supporter groups at national and local level can have a significant impact in minimising safety and security risks at football matches with an international dimension. This co-operation can however be undermined if there is a perception that supporter representatives are working on behalf of the police and for example sharing personal data.

Organising police and other authorities should take account of the potential benefits associated with supporter led / supporter related initiatives such as Fan Embassies, Fan Projects and Fan Liaison Officers / Representatives.

Visiting police delegations and supporter representatives can help ensure that organising police are aware of the character and culture of the visiting supporters. This should be taken into account as part of the organising police dynamic risk assessment process.

Ongoing co-operation and communication between police and supporter groups can help provide a basis for a safe, secure and welcoming atmosphere for all supporters, and can provide a channel for relaying important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels. This could also include the provision of an easily accessible contact and information point where supporters could address their questions.

Pursuing this approach has been shown to contribute towards promoting self-policing amongst supporters and facilitating early and appropriate intervention in respect of emerging security problems or risks.

## CHAPTER 7 - Communication and Media Strategy


### Communication Strategy

An effective and transparent communications strategy is integral to a successful safety and security concept for football matches, tournaments and other sporting events with an international dimension.

Organising country policing agencies should, therefore, work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities/organiser, the media and supporter groups in the preparation and delivery of a comprehensive multi- agency communications strategy.

An effective multi-agency media strategy is a crucial aspect of any communication strategy in terms of providing all parties, notably visiting supporters, with important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels.

The central aim should be to support a positive image of the event among home and visiting supporters, local communities, the general public and individuals participating in the safety and security operations. This can help generate a welcoming environment for all involved and play a major contributory role in minimising safety and security risks.




## Media Strategy

The police (and wider multi-agency) media strategy should at least aim to:

- provide information in a proactive, open and transparent manner;
- provide information on safety and security preparations in a reassuring and positive manner;
- communicate the police intention to facilitate the legitimate intentions of supporters;
- make clear what kinds of behaviour will not be tolerated by the police;

The police should work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities /organisers and, where appropriate, supporter groups in establishing and delivering a multi-agency media strategy which:

- proactively promotes positive images of the event;
- ensures clarity of responsibility among police and partner agencies in terms of who has the lead in communicating with the media on the various aspects of safety and security (and beyond);
- provides common background and briefing information for all police and partner agency spokespersons (briefing material should be regularly updated to take account of recurring themes or questions and emerging risks or events);
- ensures that factual information is released to the media and / or on the internet on a regular basis in the build up, during and after the event; — provides opportunity for press/media briefings on a regular basis;
- takes account of the needs/interests of different categories of journalists/media.
- provides opportunity for press/media briefings on a regular basis;
- takes account of the needs/interests of different categories of journalists/media.



## 1. SPECIFICATIONS FOR AND SAMPLE OF POLICE IDENTIFICATION VESTS

This is a slip on (over the head) non sleeve vest

Colour: NATO BLUE:

Colour code: Pantone 279C

Identification Markers

Single word: POLICE (in English only) with a box border - to be positioned in the centre of the vest both front & back.

POLICE letters and border: Nato Blue background.

Both letters and the surrounding box to be luminous silver.

Box measurements = 25 cm × 9 cm

POLICE letters: Width = 1,3 cm per letter

Height = 7,5 cm

### Vest Front:

Left Breast (above POLICE box): National Flag 10 cm × 7 cm - embroidered/sewn on or in a plastic sleeve.

Right Breast (above POLICE box): European Symbol 8 cm × 8 cm


Below the POLICE box should be a luminous silver band across the front of the vest × 5 cm wide.

### Vest Rear:


National Flag above POLICE box: 10 cm × 7 cm.

Below the POLICE box should be a luminous silver band across the rear of the vest × 5 cm wide.

Vests should be able to be secured by means of either Velcro or popper type fasteners on both sides



Colour code: NATO blue  
Pantone: 279C



## 2. CATEGORISATION OF FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS

### **Definition for a ‘Risk’ Supporter**

A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or anti social behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event.

### **Definition for a ‘Non-Risk’ Supporter**

A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing no risk to the cause of or contribution to violence or disorder, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event

### **Risk supporter checklist**

Elements	Supporting comments
<b>Public order</b>	
Historical rivalry between club	
Expected violence	
Racist behaviour	
Away supporters likely in home sector	
Pitch invasion	
Alcohol related problems	
Use of weapons	
Knowledge of police tactics	
Other	
<b>Public safety</b>	
Terrorist threat	
Political tension / use of banners	
Use of flares / fireworks likely	
Travelling supporters without tickets	
Black market tickets	
Other	
<b>Criminal activity</b>	
Counterfeit tickets	
Sale / use of illegal drugs	
Other	

The European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular Football Matches was developed by the Council of Europe and entered into force on 1 November 1985.

A Standing Committee was set up to follow the implementation of the Convention, to adopt recommendations and to reply to new challenges.

For more information <http://www.coe.int/sport>

