



PROFILES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPACITY

DENMARK

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NATIONAL POLICY

International terrorism is a threat to global peace and security and can strike any country and any population – including Denmark and the Danes. The threat of terrorism is complex and unpredictable, and it is important to make use of a variety of tools at the national as well as international level in the fight against terrorism. Thus, a broad action against terrorism is one of the most important priorities of the Danish Government.

Denmark finds it absolutely vital to combat the immediate threat of terrorism by contributing actively to enhanced international co-operation. Furthermore, Denmark finds it important to eradicate the causes of terrorism through targeted development assistance in regions exposed to fundamentalism and radicalism. Denmark is therefore fully committed to the international cooperation in combating terrorism.

In Denmark, the adoption of a first "anti-terrorism package" in 2002, a second "anti-terrorism package" in 2006, subsequent amendments concerning "foreign fighters" in 2016 and 2020, and along with a number of legislative amendments, has provided the necessary legislative basis for effective prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

General information

Terrorism offences are criminalized in chapters 12 and 13 of the Danish Criminal Code. The most relevant counterterrorism provisions are summarized below.

Criminal law

Section 101 a (1) of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who is a Danish national or habitually resident within the Danish state and who is affiliated with armed forces fighting against the Danish state in an armed conflict to which the Danish state is a party. The penalty for violation of section 101 a (1) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 years. In particularly aggravating circumstances (inter alia situations in which the relevant person has participated in combat) the sentence may increase to imprisonment for life.

Section 101 a (2) criminalizes the recruitment of another person who is a Danish national or habitually resident within the Danish state for armed forces in the circumstances described in subsection (1). The subsection also criminalizes public incitement of such person to join hostile forces in such conflicts. The penalty for violation of section 101 a (2) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 years. In particularly aggravating circumstances (inter alia situations involving offences committed in a systematic or organized manner) the sentence may increase to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 16 years.

Section 114 (1) of the Criminal Code, criminalizes any person who commits any one or more of specific listed acts (inter alia homicide, aggravated assault or deprivation of liberty) with intent to seriously threaten a population or wrongfully coerce Danish or foreign public authorities or an international organisation to perform or fail to perform a duty, or to destabilise or overthrow the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, where by virtue of its nature or the context in which it was committed the act is suited to inflict serious harm on a country or an international organisation. The penalty for violation of section 114 (1) is imprisonment for a determinate term or life imprisonment.

According to section 114 (2) the same penalty is imposed on any person who transports weapons or explosives with the same intent as referred to in subsection (1). Furthermore, it follows from section 114 (3) that the same penalty is imposed on any person who threatens to commit one of the offences referred to in subsections (1) and (2) with the intent referred to in subsection (1).

Section 114 a of the Criminal Code provides that if any of the acts referred to in paragraph 1-8 of section 114 a (inter alia certain violations of the Criminal Code that falls within the Hijacking Convention or the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages) are committed and the offence does not fall within section 114, the penalty may exceed the most severe sentence prescribed for the offence by up to half.

Section 114 b of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who (i) grants financial support, whether directly or indirectly, to, (ii) organizes or raises funds, whether directly or indirectly, for, or (iii) makes funding, other property, or financial or other similar services available, whether directly or indirectly, to a person, a group or an association committing or intending to commit any

terrorist act falling within section 114 or 114 a. The penalty for violation of section 114 b is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 years.

Section 114 c (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who recruits another person to commit or facilitate any act falling within section 114, 114 a or 114 b or to join a group or an association for the purpose of facilitating the commission of illegal acts of this nature by the group or association. The penalty for violation of section 114 c (1) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 years. When the crime is committed under particularly aggravating circumstances (inter alia offences committed in a systematic or organised manner), the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 16 years. The penalty for violation of section 114 c (2) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years.

Furthermore, section 114 c (3) criminalizes any person who accepts being recruited to commit any act falling within section 114 or 114 a. The penalty for violation of section 114 c (3) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years. If the relevant person is a member of armed forces, the sentence may increase to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve years, or in particularly aggravating circumstances (inter alia situations in which the relevant person has participated in combat) the sentence may increase to imprisonment for life.

Section 114 d (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who train, instruct or otherwise teach another person to commit or assist terrorist acts punishable according to sections 114, 114 a or 114 b knowing that such other person intends to use his skills for such purpose. The penalty for violation of section 114 d (1) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 years. When the crime is committed under particularly aggravation circumstances (inter alia offences committed in a systematic or organised manner), the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 16 years. The penalty for violation of section 114 d (2) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years.

Section 114 d (3) provides that it is criminal to receive training or instruction to commit acts punishable to sections 114 or 114 a. The penalty for violation of section 114 d (3) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years.

Section 114 e of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who otherwise facilitates the activities of a person, a group or an association committing or intending to commit an act falling within section 114, 114 a, 114 b, 114 c or 114 d. The penalty for violation of section 114 e is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years. However, if the relevant person is a member of the armed forces, the sentence may increase to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 years, or in particularly aggravating circumstances (inter alia situations in which the relevant person has participated

in combat) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 16 years.

Section 114 f of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who is active in or gives substantial financial support or other substantial support to a force, group or association intending to exert influence on public affairs or cause obstruction to the social order through the use of power, where the offence does not fall within sections 114-114 e. The penalty for violation of section 114 (f) is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years.

Section 114 g of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who is active in an illegal military organization or group, where the offence does not fall within sections 114-114 f. The penalty for violation of section 114 g is a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years.

Section 114 h of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who, contrary to the legislation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction etc., in aggravating circumstances (i) exports dual-use products without permission, (ii) gives incorrect or misleading information or suppresses information that is essential to a decision to be taken by public authorities on dual-use products, or (iii) acts contrary to terms stipulated in public authority decisions on dual-use products. The penalty for violation of section 114 h is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years.

Section 114 i of the Criminal Code criminalizes the reception of financial support in the form of money or other services for the establishment or operation of an institution or activities or for similar purposes in Denmark from a group or an association committing or intending to commit acts falling within section 114 or 114 a. The penalty for violation of section 114 i is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years.

Section 114 j of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who is a Danish national or habitually resident within the Danish state and who enters or stays in an area as referred to in subsection (3) without permission. According to subsection (3) the Minister of Justice may, following negotiation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, lay down rules determining that a conflict area in which a group or an association as referred to in section 114 e is a party to an armed conflict will fall within subsection (1). The Dayr Az Zawr and the Idlib provinces in Syria are currently covered by the ban, cf. section 1 (1) (i) and (ii) of the departmental order no. 708 of July 6 2019. The penalty for violation of section 114 j is a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years.

It follows from subsection (2) that the prohibition does not apply to any entry and stay for exercising a public function or office with a Danish, foreign or international organization. Furthermore, according to subsection (4) the Minister of Justice or the person so authorized by the Minister may permit a person, upon application, to enter or stay in a prohibited conflict area if the entry or stay serves a legitimate purpose.

Section 136 (2) of the Criminal Code criminalizes any person who expressly approves of any of the offences mentioned in Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code in public. The penalty for violation of section 136 (2) is a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 years.

In addition, acts aimed at inciting or assisting in the execution of an offence, inter alia section 101 a, sections 114-114 d and section 136 (2) of the Criminal Code, are punishable as attempts in accordance with section 21 of the Criminal Code if the offence is not completed.

Furthermore, it follows from section 23 of the Criminal Code that the penalty provided for an offence applies to everybody who is complicit in the act by incitement or aiding and abetting.

Procedural Rules

The introduction of the first "anti-terrorism package" was accompanied by several amendments to the Danish Administration of Justice Act aimed generally at strengthening the investigative possibilities available to the police. The amended provisions, which facilitate the investigations carried out by the Danish Security Intelligence Service, include data interception, which allows the use of so-called sniffer programmes; repeated covert searches under one warrant, and access to discovery of documents without any prior court order.

A number of additional changes aimed at alleviating a variety of practical problems related to the implementation of interceptions of communications were introduced. Thus, a duty was imposed on telecommunications companies and internet service providers to log traffic data of relevance to police interception of communication, etc. The companies are obliged to register and store the data for one year.

Furthermore, special provisions were laid down in section 45a of the Aliens Act regarding the exchange of information between immigration authorities and the intelligence services.

Finally, the first "anti-terrorism package" included a range of other measures of importance to the activities of the Security Intelligence Service, for example amendments to the Danish Money Laundering Act and the Danish Customs Act concerned with the freezing and restraint of funds in connection with suspected acts of terrorism or other crimes.

The introduction of the second "anti-terrorism package" was accompanied by other amendments to the Administration of Justice Act aimed at strengthening the exchange of information between administrative authorities. The act introduced a new provision into the Administration of Justice Act, which

allows a less restricted access to exchange of information between the Security Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. In continuation thereof, the access of the Security Intelligence Service to information held by other administrative authorities has also been widened when the information has significance for the prevention and investigation of offences related to terrorism.

The second "anti-terrorism package" also gives the Security Intelligence Service a more prompt and effective access to standard information about airline passengers in connection with the investigation and prevention of violations of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the State, offences against the Constitution and the supreme authorities of the State, terrorism, etc.) by allowing the retrieval of such information without a warrant. This section obliges the airline companies to register and store information about crew and passengers for one year.

Furthermore, the introduction of the second "antiterrorism package" was accompanied by further amendments to the Administration of Justice Act aimed at strengthening the investigative possibilities available to the police.

In preparation for the prevention of impending acts of terrorism (or other serious criminal offences), section 791 c was introduced into the Administration of Justice Act. This section allows the police (including the Security Intelligence Service) (on the basis of a warrant) to jam or cut off radio communications or telecommunications in order to prevent violations of, inter alia, Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code.

Surveillance

An important part of all investigations carried out by the police, including the Security Intelligence Service, is the surveillance of individuals, carried out using the human eye or optical instruments. An observation can be retained by photography or film or video recording. The observation of individuals by the police is regulated by section 791 a of the Administration of Justice Act.

Under this provision the police may take photographs or carry out observation, by means of binoculars or other devices, of persons who are in a not freely accessible place, provided that such interference is assumed to be of material importance to the investigation of an offence punishable under the law with imprisonment, as set out in section 791 a (1) of the Administration of Justice Act.

Surveillance by means of a remotely controlled or automatic camera, TV camera or similar equipment

may only take place, however, if the investigation concerns an offence punishable under the law with imprisonment for one year and six months or longer, as set out in section 791 a (2) of the Administration of Justice Act.

Pursuant to section 791 a (3) of the Administration of Justice Act, surveillance of individuals in a home or other premises by means of a remotely controlled or automatic camera, TV camera or similar equipment or by means of a device used in the home or the premises may only take place if:

- (1) there are firm grounds for assuming that evidence for the case can be obtained by such measure of interference;
- (2) the interference is assumed to be of decisive importance for the investigation;
- (3) the investigation concerns an offence that is punishable under the law with imprisonment for six years or longer or, e.g., intentional contravention of Parts 12 or 13 of the Criminal Code, etc.; and
- (4) the investigation concerns an offence that has caused or may cause danger to human life and welfare or community property of substantial value.

The requirement set out in section 791 a (1) of the Administration of Justice Act for the investigation of an offence which is punishable with imprisonment as well as the requirement for imprisonment for one year and six months set out in subsection (2) will, in principle, always be satisfied in the case of investigations carried out by the Security Intelligence Service of crimes which fall within Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the State, offences against the Constitution and the supreme authorities of the State, terrorism, etc.).

Interception of communications

The interception of communications by the police – including the Security Intelligence Service – is regulated in chapter 71 of the Administration of Justice Act.

Section 780 of the Administration of Justice Act covers the following types of interception of communications: Telephone tapping, other interception (bugging), traffic data, extended telecommunications records (such as transmission mast data) and the opening and stopping of letters.

The specific conditions for interception of communications are set out in section 781 of the Administration of Justice Act.

Firstly, there must be firm grounds for assuming that messages to or from a suspect are conveyed by the communication in question (section 781 (1) (i) of the Administration of Justice Act).

It should be noted in this connection that bugging and the collection of extended telecommunications records may only be carried out where the suspicion concerns an offence that has caused or may cause danger to human life and welfare or community property of substantial value.

The second condition for the interception of communications is that the interference is assumed to be of decisive importance to the investigation.

The third and last condition for the interception of communications is a requirement as to the nature of the crime, particularly that the investigation concerns an offence with a maximum penalty exceeding six years or contravention of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code.

Section 782 of the Administration of Justice Act implies a rule of proportionality, according to which the interference may not take place if, in view of the purpose of the interference, the importance of the case and the outrage and inconvenience that the measure is assumed to cause to the person(s) affected by it, it will constitute a disproportionate intrusion.

Pursuant to section 783 (1) of the Administration of Justice Act any interception of communications must take place on the basis of a warrant, and the warrant must indicate, for example, the telephone number that is the target of interception. It has been accepted in practice, however, that the telephone to be tapped may be identified by other numeric codes than the telephone number, for example the IMEI11 or IMSI12 number of a mobile phone.

If the purpose would be defeated by awaiting prior permission from the court, the police may decide to carry through a measure of interference. However, the matter must be put before the court as soon as possible and not later than 24 hours after implementation of the measure, whereupon the court will decide whether the interference can be approved and may be continued, if required.

It is possible in cases concerning violation of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the State, offences against the Constitution and the supreme authorities of the State, terrorism, etc.) to obtain an interception warrant relating to a person rather than to the particular means of communication. As a result, the police only need to obtain a single warrant in order to tap the telephone(s) of a suspect. As soon as possible

after such interference, the police must notify the court of the telephone numbers subjected to the interference but not stated in the warrant. It should be noted that the specific conditions for interception of communications, as set out in sections 781 and 782, remain unaltered.

Searches

Under section 794 of the Administration of Justice Act, the police, including the Security Intelligence Service, may carry out searches of rooms, other premises or objects that are available to a suspect, provided that:

- (1) the person concerned is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed an offence that is subject to public prosecution; and
- (2) the search is assumed to be of material importance to the investigation.

The decision to conduct a search will be made by the court by the issue of a warrant. If the purpose would be defeated by awaiting prior permission from the court, the police may make the decision to implement the measure. As soon as possible and not later than 24 hours after the implementation of the search, however, the matter must then be put before the court for a decision on whether it can be approved.

Where the suspect is not present during the search, two housemates or other witnesses should, as far as possible, be called in to attend the search. When the search has been conducted, the police will inform the person who has the room(s) or object at his/her disposal about the search.

If it is decisive for an investigation to conduct a search without informing the suspect or other persons about it in a case dealing with intentional violation of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code, the court may issue a warrant for such search specifying that no witnesses should attend the search.

Discovery of documents

Under section 804 (1) of the Administration of Justice Act, a person who is not a suspect can be ordered to present or surrender objects if there is reason to assume that the object may serve as evidence or should be confiscated or if, as a consequence of a criminal offence, someone has been defrauded thereof and can claim it back.

Another consequence of section 804 (2) of the Administration of Justice Act is that, if an object has been surrendered to the police under the provisions on disclosure of information, the provisions on seizure from non-suspects under section 803 (1) of the Administration of Justice Act will apply. This implies among other things that, under section 189 of the Administration of Justice Act, a duty of confidentiality

can be imposed on a person who has been ordered to disclose documents, if the interests of foreign countries, national security or the clarification of serious crime make it appropriate.

Disclosure of documents cannot be imposed on anyone if any information disclosed would prevent or exempt the person in question from making a statement as a witness under sections 169 to 172 of the Administration of Justice Act.

Under section 806 (1) of the Administration of Justice Act, decisions ordering the disclosure of documents must be made by the court at the request of the police.

If the purpose of such an intervention would be defeated by having to await a warrant, the police can decide the disclosure of documents. Another consequence of subsection (3) is that the police must present the case to the court as soon as possible and within 24 hours with a view to obtaining approval of the steps if the person against whom the steps are directed has so requested.

Other relevant legislation

The Aliens Act

Under section 45 a (1) of the Aliens Act – the immigration authorities are permitted to transmit information to the two intelligence services relating to cases with security or intelligence implications for their activities. The criteria defining when to transmit information are adjusted to the current threat assessments at any time.

The primary goal for closer co-operation on cases involving foreign nationals is to ensure that individuals who may be assumed to pose a risk to national security are not granted a Danish residence permit.

The Security Intelligence Service is responsible for assessing, on the basis of information received from the Immigration Service, whether an individual may be considered to be a national security risk in the sense of the Aliens Act. If so, the Security Intelligence Service will inform the Minister of Justice, and, based on the information received, the Minister will issue a recommendation to the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs in conformity with the provisions of section 45 b of the Aliens Act. Ultimately, the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs is responsible for the assessment that will be relied upon when the immigration authorities have to decide whether the person concerned has to be refused permission to stay in Denmark. It is not possible to appeal an assessment

that considers a foreign national to be a national security risk to any other administrative authority.

The Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs may also decide (on the basis of a recommendation of the Minister of Justice) that the information relied upon in assessing that a foreign national may be considered a national security risk may not be disclosed to the foreign national concerned, his or her representative or the immigration authority that has to make the final decision in the case. Thus, there is no requirement to specify the grounds.

In addition, the collaboration is aimed at ensuring that the Security Intelligence Service will receive information about persons who may be of intelligence interest in other respects, for example persons whose stay in Denmark should be known to the Security Intelligence Service as the authority responsible for national security at any time. Such persons may be experts on explosives, individuals who have relations with terrorist organisations or sympathise with them, persons associated with the intelligence services of foreign states, etc.

The Security Intelligence Service also makes assessments of the existence of any basis for notifying the Special International Crimes Office, particularly in cases where a foreign national can be linked with war crimes, etc.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In its capacity as the national security and intelligence service of Denmark, the Security Intelligence Service must prevent, investigate and counter operations and activities that pose or may pose a threat to the preservation of Denmark as a free, democratic and safe society. The main objective of the Service is therefore to counter and fight threats to national security and the safety of the population.

To preserve national security is, however, not the only task of an intelligence service. Efficient and permanent preservation of national security and order requires persistent, wide-ranging and coordinated efforts by a large number of authorities. As the national security authority, the Security Intelligence Service obviously plays a central part in this connection in the efforts to ensure the direction and substance of the contributions from the individual bodies and authorities.

As part of its intelligence activities, the main task of the Service is to prevent and investigate actions or undertakings that may jeopardise the independence, safety and legal order of the State and to prevent such actions or undertakings from developing or being implemented.

The actions falling within the area of responsibility of the Security Intelligence Service in that connection are above all the actions which have been criminalised by Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. Such actions include attacks on the Constitution, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremism and espionage. Through its activities, the Security Intelligence Service must provide the basis for handling such threats as early and as appropriately as possible.

The Security Intelligence Service is part of the Danish police force. Organisationally, the Service is a unit of the National Police, but due to the special assignments of the Service, the Director General of the Service reports directly to the Minister of Justice.

Unlike the rest of the police and the prosecution service, the Security Intelligence Service does not have the power to prefer criminal charges. If the investigation of the Service gives rise to criminal proceedings proper, the case is surrendered to the ordinary police or the prosecution service. In that event, the actual indictment in cases comprised by the provisions of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code must, however, be issued by the Minister of Justice, cf. the special provisions of the Criminal Code in this respect. In such case, the Minister of Justice will make his or her decision on the basis of a recommendation from the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Particularly with regard to the preparation of consolidated threat assessments in the field of terrorism, the Security Intelligence Service has set up a Terrorism Analysis Centre which is to produce threat assessments and analyses related to the terrorist threat against Denmark as a collaboration project between representatives from the Security Intelligence Service, the Defence Intelligence Service, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish Emergency Management Agency.

The Security Intelligence Service also has a number of assignments not directly linked to the collection of intelligence and investigation against groups and persons suspected of posing a potential threat to national security.

The Security Intelligence Service is thus responsible for the personal protection of the royal family and visitors to the royal family, members of Government, certain politicians and others and must assess and determine a suitable security level relative to these persons and their institutions.

The Security Intelligence Service is also included in the performance of various other preventive security assignments in connection with state visits or other events estimated to require special security, and in

that connection the task of the Service is to coordinate security efforts relative to the local police and make recommendations for concrete security measures.

Upon specific request, the Security Intelligence Service assists the police in connection with special police actions, including the resolution of hostage situations, particularly dangerous arrests or other special assignments linked with the investigation and the clearing up of serious crime (the Task Force), and the Service also has a negotiator group and a witness protection programme that the police districts can make use of.

Finally, the Service is in charge of comprehensive preventive efforts, particularly in the field of terrorism, and the Service must generally contribute to providing society with the best possible defence against terrorist attacks, either alone or through partnerships with relevant public authorities and private actors, including dialogue forums, contact forums, etc., and through broadly targeted information measures.

As the national security authority, the Security Intelligence Service is responsible for the exercise of control and coordination relative to security protection of classified documents, including in relation to the places and persons that handle the information. The Service thus provides relevant security advice on staff measures as well as physical and procedural measures to public authorities, and the Service will also provide the same assistance to private individuals or companies in case of protectable interests relevant to the public, such as the critical infrastructure in Denmark.

The Security Intelligence Service co-operates intensely with a large number of national and

international partners, including central national authorities whose activities have an impact on the security field, such as the police, the Defence Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the immigration authorities and the Emergency Management Agency, as well as bilaterally and multilaterally with foreign security and intelligence services and international organisations and collaboration forums.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Measures at international level

United Nations

Denmark is fully committed to co-operating with the United Nations, its Member States and particularly with the Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 to combat international terrorism. Denmark stands fully behind the global efforts to implement Resolution 1373 and all other relevant legal instruments against international terrorism. Denmark has signed and ratified numerous major UN conventions on terrorism and fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Furthermore, Denmark has signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 14 September 2005.

European Union

The Danish membership of the European Union is a key element of Danish foreign policy. Therefore, the Danish Government contributes actively to the implementation and application of EU initiatives by all Member States.

Relevant Council of Europe conventions – Denmark	Signed	Ratified
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism [CETS No. 198]	28/09/2012	12/02/2018
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism [CETS No. 196]	16/05/2005	24/04/2007
Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism [CETS No. 217]	03/05/2016	03/11/2016
Convention on Cybercrime [ETS No. 185]	22/04/2003	21/06/2005
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems [ETS No. 189]	11/02/2004	21/06/2005
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime [ETS No. 141]	08/11/1990	19/11/1996
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes [ETS No. 116]	24/11/1983	09/10/1987
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism [ETS No. 90]	27/01/1977	27/06/1978
Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism [ETS No. 190]	15/05/2003	14/04/2004

European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters [ETS No. 73]	15/05/1972	13/11/1975
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters [ETS No. 30]	20/04/1959	13/09/1962
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters [ETS No. 99]	25/10/1982	07/03/1983
Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters [ETS No. 182]	08/11/2001	15/01/2003
European Convention on Extradition [ETS No. 24]	13/12/1957	13/09/1962
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition [ETS No. 86]	27/09/1976	13/09/1978
Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition [ETS No. 98]	25/10/1982	07/03/1983
Third Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition [CETS No. 209]	-	-
Fourth Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition [CETS No. 212]	-	-
Relevant United Nations conventions – Denmark	Signed	Ratified
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963)	21/11/1966	17/01/1967
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague, 1970)	16/12/1970	17/10/1972
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1971)	17/10/1972	17/01/1973
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1988)	24/02/1988	23/11/1989
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (New York, 1973)	10/03/1974	01/07/1975
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 1979)	-	11/08/1987*
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, 1979)	13/06/1980	06/09/1991
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, 2005)	-	19/05/2010**
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome, 1988)	10/03/1988	25/08/1995
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (London, 2005)	09/02/2007	14/09/2018
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 1988)	10/03/1988	25/08/1995
2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (London, 2005)	09/02/2007	14/09/2018
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Montreal, 1991)	01/03/1991	05/10/1998
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 1997)	23/12/1999	31/08/2001
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 1999)	25/09/2001	27/08/2002
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (New York, 2005)	14/09/2005	20/03/2007

* Denotes accession to the treaty in question. ** Denotes approval of the amendment