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POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF THE PROJECT

Hyper-automation of Order for Payment Procedures in Justice

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Research Question and Method

The Spanish hyper-automation model for order-for-payment procedures should not be understood merely as a technological innovation, but as a model of procedural organisation within civil justice. According to the application file, the model combines structured digital filing through LexNET, automated extraction and classification of information, and Robotic Process Automation (RPA) to transfer data into the Minerva case-management environment, with the aim of accelerating the registration, distribution and processing of civil payment-order cases. The Spanish authorities present this system as one intended for repetitive, rule-based and low-risk tasks, and not as a substitute for judicial decision-making affecting the rights and freedoms of citizens. The same application also underlines that the model targets a type of procedure that is especially suitable for automation because of its scale and procedural simplicity: order-for-payment proceedings are described as the most frequent civil procedure and as representing up to 60% of incoming cases in some courts. This chapter therefore addresses a narrower and more practical question than whether the Spanish hyper-automation model is successful in its domestic setting. Its purpose is to examine whether, and under what conditions, such a model can be implemented in other judicial contexts in the near future. The answer cannot be assumed merely from the fact that automation has produced efficiency gains in Spain. In the field of justice, procedural technologies are inseparable from the legal framework in which they operate, the structure of civil procedure, the organisation of court administration, and the level of digital development of the institutions expected to use them. For that reason, the transferability of this model must be tested against the realities of the judicial systems to which it might be exported.

The model is therefore analysed here not as a single indivisible mechanism, but as a set of distinct and potentially transferable components. These components include: first, a standardised method of electronic filing; second, a dedicated procedural form capable of capturing structured data at the submission stage; third, automated classification and extraction of information from submitted documents; fourth, RPA-based transfer of that information into a case-management system; and fifth, continued human supervision over any act capable of affecting the procedural position of the parties. This decomposition is essential, because some parts of the model are more easily transferable than others. A judicial system may be capable of introducing standardised e-filing and workflow automation before it is ready, legally or technically, to deploy AI-assisted extraction tools. Similarly, a system may automate clerical handling of claims while reserving all legally sensitive determinations to judges or court officers.

The method adopted in this chapter is therefore both functional and comparative. It is functional because it begins by identifying the concrete role played by the Spanish hyper-automation model within the procedural chain of civil debt recovery. It is comparative because it then examines whether those functions could realistically be reproduced in other legal and institutional settings. This approach makes it possible to focus not on superficial similarity between legal systems, but on the existence of the practical and normative conditions required for implementation. In other words, the question is not simply whether another country uses digital tools in its courts, but whether it possesses the combination of procedural structure, legal permission, digital infrastructure and institutional capacity necessary for this specific form of automation to operate effectively and lawfully. On that basis, the chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it identifies the conditions of transferability that appear necessary for the model to function elsewhere. These include the existence of a simplified or standardised debt-recovery procedure, a reliable system of electronic filing, sufficient interoperability between filing and case-management systems, clear legal rules on what may be automated, and safeguards ensuring that efficiency gains do not undermine fairness, transparency or accountability.



Second, it examines the prospects for implementation in a European Union context, not in the abstract, but through the perspective of a judicial system already operating within a framework of digital justice and standardised debt-recovery mechanisms. Third, it considers Albania as a non-EU European context, in order to test whether the model can also be adapted to a system where digital justice reform is more gradual and where institutional capacity and infrastructure may require staged implementation rather than immediate full transplantation.

The central argument advanced in this chapter is that the Spanish hyper-automation model is indeed transferable, but only in a modular and conditional way. What can be exported most readily is not “artificial intelligence in justice” in a broad sense, but a narrower combination of structured filing, rule-based workflow automation and supervised data processing within a high-volume civil procedure. The closer a target jurisdiction comes to the procedural and digital environment in which the model was developed, the more realistic near-term implementation becomes. By contrast, where legal bases are unclear, digital filing remains fragmented, or court organisation is not yet prepared for interoperable automation, the model can only be introduced gradually and with significant institutional adaptation.

The Elements of the Model That Can Be Transferred

Before asking whether the Spanish hyper-automation model can be implemented elsewhere, it is necessary to identify with precision what is actually being transferred. The model is not a single technological tool, but a procedural chain made up of several coordinated elements. According to the General Directorate for Digital Transformation of the Administration of Justice, its functioning depends on the interaction between the LexNET platform, which serves as the secure channel for the exchange of procedural documents, and the Minerva procedural management system, into which the extracted information is later introduced. Between those two stages, the model combines automated classification and extraction of data with Robotic Process Automation (RPA), so that information contained in payment-order applications can be captured, structured and routed with less manual intervention than in a traditional workflow. The file therefore presents hyper-automation not as a replacement for the justice system’s legal actors, but as an organised way of reducing repetitive handling in the early and clerical stages of civil debt-recovery proceedings.

The first transferable element is therefore structured electronic filing. The importance of this point should not be underestimated. The efficiency of the model does not begin with artificial intelligence, but with the fact that information enters the system through a digital environment designed to capture it in a standardised way. In Spain, this occurs through LexNET, and the application file explains that a specific form for payment-order proceedings was activated in that system in order to improve data orientation at the submission stage. Since February 2025, that form has become the exclusive mandatory channel for the filing of initial documents in civil payment-order proceedings when those filings are made by legal operators. The relevance of this feature is clear: automation becomes significantly more reliable when the incoming claim is already partially standardised. What is being transferred here, therefore, is not only a digital filing platform, but a procedural design choice that requires information to be submitted in a form that machines can process consistently.

The second transferable element is the use of a standardised and procedurally suitable case type.



Spain's order-for-payment procedure is especially apt for automation because it is designed for pecuniary debts that are certain, due and payable, and because it is structurally simpler than a fully contested civil action. The European e-Justice Portal confirms that the domestic Spanish order-for-payment procedure is optional, applies to qualifying monetary debts, and has had no upper monetary limit since 31 October 2011. It also shows that the procedure follows a relatively clear progression: submission of a written claim, judicial scrutiny of the formal requirements, a period for payment or objection by the debtor, and, if no opposition is made, the possibility of proceeding to enforcement. These characteristics explain why the Spanish authorities selected this procedure for hyper-automation. A procedure of this kind contains a large number of repetitive acts and document-based checks, which makes it more suitable for structured digital handling than a complex or highly discretionary form of litigation.

The third transferable element is automated extraction and classification of information from incoming documents. The application file explains that documentation submitted through LexNET is classified through artificial intelligence and that relevant information is extracted from the forms before being entered automatically into Minerva through RPA. This means that the model is not limited to digitising filing, but attempts to transform unstructured or semi-structured procedural material into usable operational data. From the perspective of transferability, this is an important distinction. Many judicial systems already possess some form of e-filing, but far fewer have a mechanism capable of converting filed material into structured data that can feed a broader case-management workflow. What is being transferred at this stage is therefore an intermediate layer between filing and adjudication: a technological capacity to identify, organise and route information in a way that reduces manual duplication of clerical work.

The fourth transferable element is workflow automation through RPA. Here the essential feature is not artificial intelligence, but process execution. Once relevant information has been captured, RPA allows the system to perform routine actions automatically, such as entering data into case-management software and advancing administrative processing steps according to predefined rules. The application file presents this as one of the principal reasons for the model's efficiency gains, while outside reporting on the programme also confirms that the initiative was understood as part of a broader automation effort in judicial procedures concerning monetary claims. In late 2023, public reporting indicated that the programme had begun implementation in the judicial bodies of Murcia, with planned extension to other territories, and that the rollout included training and support for court personnel as part of their digital adaptation. That detail is particularly important: it shows that workflow automation is not a self-executing technological layer, but one that depends on organisational uptake and human capacity-building.

The fifth and final transferable element is the preservation of human supervision over legally sensitive acts. The application file insists that the system does not make decisions that affect the rights and freedoms of citizens and does not seek to replace human actors. This feature is central to any serious discussion of exportability. What appears transferable in the near future is not a model of automated adjudication, but a model of assisted procedural administration, in which technology absorbs repetitive and low-risk tasks while judicial or court personnel retain responsibility for acts that determine the parties' legal position. This distinction is also consistent with the design of the domestic Spanish order-for-payment procedure itself, in which formal scrutiny, possible rejection, objection by the debtor, and transition to enforcement or ordinary procedure remain embedded in a legal framework that ultimately depends on human authority and procedural guarantees.



For that reason, the Spanish hyper-automation model should not be described as a system that can simply be “copied” from one country to another. What can be transferred are its functional layers: structured e-filing, data-oriented procedural forms, automated extraction, rule-based workflow execution, and human-supervised use within a procedurally suitable case type. Each of those layers may travel at a different speed. A country may be able to adopt standardised filing forms long before it is ready to deploy AI-assisted classification, while another may already possess e-filing but lack the legal or technical conditions for automated routing into a case-management system. Identifying these elements separately is therefore the necessary starting point for assessing implementation in other contexts.

Conditions for Transferability

The transferability of the Spanish hyper-automation model depends first on the existence of a procedurally suitable case type. Not every judicial procedure lends itself to this form of automation. The model is most likely to function where the target system already has a simplified, document-based and high-volume mechanism for uncontested or weakly contested monetary claims. This is one of the reasons why the order-for-payment procedure is such an attractive testing ground. In Spain, that procedure is designed for pecuniary debts that are certain, due and payable, and it operates through a relatively structured sequence of filing, formal scrutiny, payment or opposition, and possible enforcement. At EU level, the European order for payment procedure likewise reflects the same logic of standardised debt recovery, since it is a simplified procedure for uncontested cross-border monetary claims based on standard forms. A second condition is the existence of a clear legal boundary between what may be automated and what must remain human. This is crucial in the judicial sphere. The more a system is used to assist with the interpretation of facts or law in an individual case, the more legally sensitive it becomes. The EU legislator has recognised this distinction explicitly by classifying as high-risk certain AI systems used by judicial authorities to assist in researching and interpreting facts and law or applying the law to the facts of a case, while excluding purely ancillary administrative uses that do not affect the actual administration of justice in individual cases. That distinction is highly relevant here: the easier it is to confine the model to filing, classification, routing and clerical workflow, the easier it is to justify its implementation in another jurisdiction. A third condition is digital and organisational readiness. A hyper-automation model cannot function reliably in a court system that still depends on fragmented paper filing, weak interoperability, or highly inconsistent procedural practices. It requires, at a minimum, a secure channel for electronic submissions, standardised forms, and a case-management environment capable of receiving and processing structured data. It also requires that court personnel, lawyers and technical operators be able to work within the new workflow. Public reporting on the Spanish rollout is useful in this respect, because it shows that implementation was connected not only to software deployment, but also to territorial expansion, training and the digital adaptation of judicial personnel. This confirms that transferability is as much an institutional question as a technological one.

Finally, transferability depends on whether the target jurisdiction is willing to adopt a phased rather than absolute model of implementation. What can realistically be exported in the near future is not a fully autonomous form of digital justice, but a narrower architecture: structured filing first, rule-based automation second, and only then more advanced tools for extraction or classification, always under human supervision. The central lesson is therefore not that another country must replicate Spain in full, but that it must reproduce the legal and operational conditions that made the Spanish model workable in the first place. Where those conditions are absent, implementation remains possible, but only gradually and with substantial institutional adaptation.



Implementation in a European Union Context

The implementation of the Spanish hyper-automation model in another European Union jurisdiction is easier to envisage than its transfer to a wholly different legal environment, because the EU already provides a partial common procedural and regulatory framework for debt-recovery mechanisms and digital justice. This is particularly visible in the European order for payment procedure, created by Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006, which was designed to simplify, speed up and reduce the cost of litigation in cross-border cases concerning uncontested pecuniary claims. The procedure operates through standard forms and applies across the Member States with the exception of Denmark. Although this European mechanism is distinct from Spain's domestic order-for-payment procedure, it reflects a similar procedural logic: high-volume monetary claims can be handled through simplified, document-based and standardised channels. That shared logic makes the Spanish model conceptually more transferable within the EU than outside it.

At the same time, implementation in the EU cannot be understood as a simple matter of replicating Spanish software in another Member State. What makes transfer plausible is not the existence of a uniform European civil procedure, because no such general system exists, but rather the fact that many Member States already operate within a legal culture that recognises simplified recovery of uncontested debts, standardised procedural forms, and increasing digitalisation of court communication. The Spanish hyper-automation model would therefore be most readily implementable in a Member State that already combines three elements: a standardised order-for-payment or comparable debt-recovery procedure, secure electronic filing, and a case-management environment capable of receiving structured data from filed claims. Where these conditions are present, automation of intake, classification and clerical workflow can be introduced as an extension of existing practice rather than as a disruptive break with procedural tradition.

However, the EU context also introduces an important legal limit. Even within a shared regulatory space, the use of artificial intelligence in justice remains highly sensitive when it moves beyond ancillary administrative functions. The AI Act expressly treats as high-risk certain AI systems intended to assist judicial authorities in researching and interpreting facts and law or in applying the law to concrete facts, while distinguishing such uses from purely ancillary administrative activities that do not affect the actual administration of justice in individual cases. For that reason, the Spanish model is most easily transferable within the Union only insofar as it remains confined to structured filing, data extraction, routing and clerical processing, rather than migrating into tasks that shape legal evaluation or judicial discretion. The decisive issue is therefore not whether another Member State belongs to the EU, but whether it can preserve this legal boundary while integrating automation into its own civil procedure.

For these reasons, the European Union should be seen not as a single destination for full transplantation, but as a favourable framework for modular implementation. The most transferable elements are those that fit comfortably within existing trends of standardisation and digital court administration: mandatory digital forms, rule-based workflow automation, and machine-assisted handling of repetitive procedural data. More ambitious forms of automation are possible only where national law, court organisation and technical capacity already support them. The EU context therefore reduces some of the barriers to transfer, but it does not eliminate the need for national adaptation.



Germany as a Concrete EU Example

Germany provides a particularly useful example of how the Spanish hyper-automation model could be implemented within the European Union. Unlike a purely abstract EU discussion, the German case shows how transferability works when a jurisdiction already possesses a procedurally similar debt-recovery mechanism. The German Mahnverfahren is a simplified order-for-payment procedure for the enforcement of monetary claims under sections 688 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. Its function is comparable to the Spanish order-for-payment procedure in one decisive respect: it is designed to process claims that are suitable for standardised and document-based handling, thereby removing a large category of debt-recovery cases from more complex ordinary litigation. That makes Germany an especially favourable environment for testing whether the Spanish model could travel beyond its original procedural setting. Germany is also relevant because its procedural infrastructure already contains elements that resemble the operational logic of the Spanish model. Official information from German public portals shows that applications for a payment order can be entered online, checked for plausibility, and produced in a form that can be automatically read by the court through a barcode. In civil proceedings more generally, claims and applications may be filed electronically, provided that the transmission complies with the legal requirements for secure electronic communication. This means that, as in Spain, the procedural chain does not begin with artificial intelligence, but with standardised digital intake. In a system of this kind, automation of classification, routing and clerical workflow would not amount to a radical transformation of civil justice, but rather to an intensification of an already digital and highly formalised process.

For that reason, Germany appears to satisfy many of the conditions identified in the previous section. It has a suitable procedure, a degree of digital filing capacity, and a procedural culture that already accepts standardisation in debt-recovery cases. In such an environment, the most transferable parts of the Spanish model would be the least controversial ones: data-oriented filing forms, automated extraction of structured claim information, and rule-based workflow automation within court administration. The legal justification for this would be strongest so long as automation remained confined to intake and clerical processing, without crossing into tasks involving legal evaluation or adjudicative discretion. In other words, Germany shows that the Spanish model is most plausible where it operates as assisted procedural administration, not as automated judicial decision-making.

At the same time, the German example also illustrates why even a favourable EU jurisdiction cannot be treated as a case of effortless transplantation. The European Commission's 2025 Rule of Law Report notes that Germany has developed a joint e-Justice portal as a single access point for judicial information, advisory services and the filing of claims and applications, but also records that stakeholders still see a need for significant further investment in the digitalisation of justice and point to notable regional disparities. This is an important reminder that transferability depends not only on the existence of the right procedure, but also on the consistency of digital capacity across the judicial system. Germany therefore supports the broader argument of this chapter: the Spanish hyper-automation model is transferable within the EU, but only where legal structure, digital infrastructure and institutional readiness converge to make modular implementation realistic.



Albania as a Non-EU European Context

Albania provides a particularly revealing non-EU context for assessing the transferability of the Spanish hyper-automation model because the need for procedural efficiency is not abstract, but measurable. The most recent data on the Albanian judiciary show that the General Court of Appeal entered 2024 with 37,662 pending cases and ended the year with 41,700, an increase of 10.7%, despite improvements in several performance indicators. The same data indicate that civil matters constitute the dominant share of the backlog, accounting for roughly two-thirds of pending cases, while the court has operated with only about one third of its approved number of judges for much of the relevant period. Even though the average disposition time fell, average productivity per judge rose, and the clearance rate improved, the accumulation of pending cases remains one of the most visible structural challenges of the Albanian system. On that basis, the Albanian authorities have already identified backlog reduction as a strategic priority for the period 2024–2027. The significance of these figures for the present chapter is clear: Albania is not simply looking for technological modernisation, but for tools capable of easing pressure on a civil justice system burdened by excessive volume and limited human capacity. In that setting, the Spanish hyper-automation model becomes relevant not because Albania shares Spain's institutional maturity, but because it faces a similar need to manage large volumes of relatively standardisable procedural activity with limited judicial resources. The fact that the Albanian appeal backlog is heavily civil in character makes this especially important. A model that accelerates the handling of straightforward pecuniary claims at the earlier stages of the judicial chain could help reduce the accumulation of routine civil matters that, if delayed, mishandled or unnecessarily litigated, contribute to pressure throughout the system. The Spanish experience suggests that the greatest efficiency gains are achieved not by automating complex adjudication, but by simplifying intake, classification and clerical processing in high-volume monetary claims. For Albania, this logic is attractive precisely because the pressure of backlog is aggravated by shortages in judges and staff: where human capacity is scarce, reducing repetitive administrative burdens becomes even more valuable.

At the same time, Albania differs from Spain in one decisive respect: its justice system is still in the process of building the digital architecture on which such automation depends. Recent European Commission reporting notes that funding has been secured for a modern integrated electronic case management system, but that full operability is expected only by 2030. European Union support initiatives launched in 2025 likewise describe Albania as a system still addressing fragmented case management, outdated working methods and limited use of technology in justice delivery. That means Albania is not yet in a position to import the Spanish model as a fully operational package. Its relevance lies instead in showing what kind of procedural efficiency may become achievable once the Albanian system has completed the foundational stages of digital integration and workflow standardisation.

For that reason, Albania should be approached as a case of phased adaptation rather than immediate transplantation. The country's backlog data show why a model of this kind could be valuable; its current digital reform trajectory shows why it cannot yet be adopted in full. The Albanian example therefore supports the broader argument of this chapter: the transferability of the Spanish hyper-automation model depends not only on legal similarity, but on whether the receiving system has reached the point at which structured filing, interoperable case management and rule-based automation can operate reliably inside an already functioning digital environment.



What Albania Would Need in Practice

If the Spanish hyper-automation model were to be adapted to Albania, its implementation would have to begin not with artificial intelligence, but with procedural selection and system design. The first requirement would be to identify a category of civil claims that is both high-volume and sufficiently standardised to justify automated handling. In light of the backlog figures from the General Court of Appeal, civil matters are the obvious pressure point. Yet the appropriate place for intervention would be earlier in the procedural chain, before routine monetary claims generate unnecessary administrative workload and potentially feed later-stage congestion. The Spanish model is instructive here because it does not attempt to automate complex judicial reasoning; it targets a procedural segment in which standard forms, clear claim data and repetitive clerical acts make automation credible. The second requirement would be the creation of a reliable digital entry point for such claims. Albania's ongoing work on an integrated case management system is therefore highly relevant, but not sufficient on its own. A hyper-automation model requires not only a central electronic platform, but also structured claim forms, consistent filing fields, and a procedural environment in which incoming claims can be transformed into usable data rather than merely uploaded as documents. Without that layer of standardisation, there is little for automation to process efficiently. This is why the Albanian reform path should be understood as preparatory: process mapping, interoperability and digital filing are not separate from future automation, but its necessary preconditions. A third requirement would be the adoption of a strictly limited implementation model. In Albania, as elsewhere, the legally safest and institutionally most realistic approach would be to confine automation to filing, classification, extraction of structured information and clerical workflow. This is especially important in a system still coping with backlog, staffing constraints and uneven digital maturity. The purpose of automation should be to free judges and court staff from repetitive administrative handling, not to shift legally sensitive judgments into technological processes. Properly designed, such a model could contribute to backlog reduction indirectly but meaningfully: by accelerating the early management of straightforward civil claims, improving data quality, reducing duplication of clerical work and enabling available judicial resources to focus on disputes that genuinely require judicial assessment.

For Albania, then, the Spanish experience suggests not an immediate copy-and-paste solution, but a practical roadmap. First, complete the digital architecture of case management and filing. Second, standardise one procedural stream of civil monetary claims. Third, automate low-risk administrative steps within that stream. Only after those stages have been consolidated would more advanced tools such as AI-assisted extraction become a realistic and legally defensible option. In that sense, the Spanish model is transferable to Albania, but only as a sequenced reform model, not as an instantly deployable technology.

Safeguards and Limits for Implementation in Albania

The Albanian case also shows that transferability must be assessed not only in terms of potential efficiency gains, but also in terms of legal safeguards and institutional limits. A model inspired by the Spanish experience would be difficult to justify if it were presented as a tool for replacing judicial assessment in individual disputes. Its legitimacy in Albania, as elsewhere, would depend on being clearly confined to procedural stages that are repetitive, formalised and administrative in nature. In practical terms, this means that any future Albanian adaptation should remain limited to structured filing, extraction of standard claim information, routing of files and clerical workflow management, while questions involving admissibility in a substantive sense, evidentiary evaluation, legal interpretation or the resolution of contested issues remain fully under human control.



This approach is also the one most consistent with the EU legal framework, which treats as high-risk those AI systems intended to assist judicial authorities in researching and interpreting facts and law or in applying the law to a concrete set of facts, while distinguishing such uses from purely ancillary administrative activities that do not affect the actual administration of justice in individual cases.

A second safeguard concerns sequencing and scale. In Albania, the safest and most realistic model would be a pilot-based introduction limited to one clearly defined stream of civil monetary claims, rather than system-wide rollout. That would make it possible to test the reliability of structured filing, data quality and administrative routing before introducing more advanced extraction tools. It would also reduce the risk of adding technological complexity to a justice system that is still consolidating its digital infrastructure. The current reform context supports that caution: the European Commission notes that a modern integrated electronic case management system has been funded, but that full operability is expected only by 2030, while the EU4Digital Justice initiative has been explicitly framed as a response to fragmented case management, outdated processes and limited use of technology in justice delivery. In those circumstances, careful piloting is not a sign of weakness, but a condition of lawful and effective implementation.

A third safeguard is institutional accountability. If a model of this kind were introduced in Albania, the system would need to ensure traceability of automated operations, clarity as to who remains legally responsible for each procedural act, and effective review whenever automation generates an error or irregularity. This is particularly important in a judiciary already under pressure from backlog and resource constraints: efficiency cannot come at the price of opacity. The value of the Spanish experience for Albania lies precisely in showing that automation can be useful when it supports court staff and judges by removing repetitive tasks, not when it obscures responsibility or displaces procedural guarantees. For Albania, the sustainable lesson is therefore not to automate more, but to automate only what can be standardised, supervised and corrected within a legally secure framework.

Conclusions

This chapter has argued that the Spanish hyper-automation model for order-for-payment procedures is transferable, but only under defined conditions and only in a modular form. What can be exported most readily is not a general idea of “artificial intelligence in justice,” but a narrower set of procedural techniques: structured electronic filing, standardised data capture, automated routing of information and rule-based clerical workflow within a high-volume civil procedure. These elements are most likely to succeed where the receiving system already possesses a simplified debt-recovery mechanism, a secure filing environment, interoperable case-management infrastructure and a clear legal boundary between administrative automation and judicial decision-making. The comparison between Germany and Albania illustrates this point clearly. Germany represents a favourable environment because it already combines a highly standardised payment-order procedure with significant digital filing capacity, even if further investment and harmonisation remain necessary. Albania, by contrast, demonstrates that the same model may still be relevant in a system with lower digital maturity, but only as a phased reform trajectory rather than as an immediately deployable tool. Its backlog pressures, especially in civil matters, make procedural automation highly attractive in principle; yet current reform efforts remain focused on constructing the digital architecture and institutional capacity that would first make such automation viable. The broader lesson is therefore one of sequenced implementation. In a near-future perspective, the most realistic path is to begin with digital infrastructure, standardised forms and limited workflow automation, and only then to consider more advanced tools such as AI-assisted extraction of procedural information. The Spanish model offers an important example of how such a trajectory may look in practice, but it also shows that transferability in the judicial sphere depends on much more than technology alone. It requires procedural suitability, legal clarity, digital readiness, organisational training and the preservation of human responsibility at every stage where parties’ rights may be affected. Under those conditions, the model can contribute meaningfully to efficiency and quality in other systems. Without them, it risks becoming an attractive but premature reform.