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# **FINAL REPORT ON FINDINGS OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN UKRAINE**

**Monitoring period  
14 January – 21 April 2019**

**Kyiv, Ukraine**



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*Opinions expressed by the authors of the publication do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Council of Europe.*

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## MAIN REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

### ➤ FOR THE STATE AUTHORITIES

- Politicians, media owners and authorities should refrain from attempts to influence media content or interfere in any other way in activities of the media and journalists as it undermines their independence. Interference with the activities of journalists and media personnel should not be tolerated and any allegations of such should be promptly and efficiently investigated.
- Authorities should ensure the presence of strong, independent and adequately resourced public service media, which operate(s) under a clear mandate to serve the overall public interest and to set and maintain high standards of journalism.

### ➤ FOR THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE

- Identify an effective state regulator(s) to oversee how mass media comply and ensure their compliance with electoral law. Also, assess the need for a regulator in the sphere of Internet and establishment of this institution in a strict accordance with international principles and standards of regulation of the global network. The regulator(s) should:
  - ✓ have a balanced composition,
  - ✓ act impartially, independently and transparently,
  - ✓ investigate violations,
  - ✓ make decisions quickly,
  - ✓ be able to impose reasonable, adequate and effective sanctions, and
  - ✓ act with the purpose of ensuring pluralism and freedom of speech, monitoring of the main mass media (subject matters and time of speeches for candidates and their supporters, terms and conditions for accessing the media - absolute or proportional equality), searching for new ways to cover the electoral process with due regard for the evolution of the media
- Foresee a system of adequate sanctions for violating the electoral legislation by the mass media in the field of election campaigning, informing voters and covering the election process
- Improve current legislation with the aim to clearly differentiate election campaigning from the voters' informing, and introduce effective mechanisms for dealing with hidden advertising and advertorial/paid materials ("dzhynsa")

- Introduce restrictions or prohibitions on the placement of campaign materials on television and radio, prohibition on placement of campaign materials via outdoor advertising during the election process
- Consider introducing a special regime for placing campaign materials prior to the start of the election process
- Update the electoral legislation and introduce regulation of activities in the Internet during the elections, both in terms of campaigning and informing, as well as in terms of monitoring the spending of the election campaign funds on similar activities, and, more specifically, funds from other sources and other countries
- Take measures to minimize misuse of personal data by candidates for election purposes (BigData), incl. through voter targeting.
- Take all measures to prevent the possible absence of a quorum in the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine in the beginning of the election process in August 2019 due to the untimely appointment by the Parliament of the members of the National Council.

➤ **FOR THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TELEVISION AND RADIO  
BROADCASTING OF UKRAINE**

- Create precedents and introduce the practice of responding to violations in the manner prescribed by the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting" in order to bring to liability television channels that violate the requirements of the electoral law in so far as informing and campaigning;
- Adopt all necessary amendments to National Council's normative legal acts in order to ensure that protocols are drawn up on administrative violations in the cases provided for by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Violations;
- Create precedents and introduce the practice of drawing up protocols on administrative violations in cases provided for by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses;
- Create precedents with final findings and assessments for differentiating the nature of the materials - campaign/informational.
- Introduce Council's own practice of responding to cases of hidden campaign materials' distribution by TV channels, including instances when campaign materials are included in the information programs, as well as introduce

interaction with other state authorities on verification of funding and the role of the subjects of the election process in cases of such violations.

- Encourage media companies to adopt their own policies on gender equality, in particular in terms of pay, career growth, work-life balance, access to managerial positions and media content.

#### ➤ **FOR THE ELECTORAL SUBJECTS**

- During the campaign, focus on their own position and program clauses related to important aspects of the country's life. Put forth efforts for raising awareness of the audience about how the state mechanism works whilst not ignoring the problems. This would increase the level of electoral debate in the country and would increase the level of trust in society, the transparency of the election and the process of country's governance, and the strengthening of democracy.
- When criticizing, remember about the meaningful side of criticism: it must be argumentative, and not purely emotional, and should not contain aggressive language that sparks hostility. The latter increases the polarization and radicalization of society, promotes tension and does not contribute to the development of democracy.
- Initiate meaningful and detailed discussions, including those in social networks, on key issues of state development with the involvement of the broader public and opinion leaders, thus creating a culture of political debate in Ukraine.
- Increase the transparency of the campaigning in social networks. In particular, to create public pages instead of private profiles. This concerns also an open advertising policy for candidates and political forces, since it should not be carried out from third-party accounts.

#### ➤ **FOR THE OPINION LEADERS**

- Understanding their responsibility, it is better to raise the literacy of voters instead of promoting separate messages; it is better to discuss ideas and meanings, rather than candidates' personalities. Opinion leaders can influence the improvement of quality of the public discussion.
- In case of active promotion of a particular point of view, to clearly state their connections or affiliation with the candidate or media team that supports the candidate (if any). For example, to mention them in a profile.

- Avoid distorting or silencing facts in favour of one of the parties. Refrain from comments without knowing the situation or having accurate information. Instead, to clarify the issues which fall within the scope of their expertise. This is especially true for journalists, who should communicate difficult things to the audience without violation of the professional ethics.
- Understand that by promoting one of the candidates, a public opinion leader risks his/her reputation. Especially if he/she is at the same time an expert and expresses an expert opinion. A strong concept of reputation is one of the foundations of public trust, on which, in turn, democracy is based.

#### ➤ **FOR THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER**

- Enhance the information & political broadcasting and more actively provide coverage of complex political processes in the news, including elections.
- Demonstrate to the media market a standard of quality work in elections coverage, as opposed to biased editorial policies of private TV channels.
- Create a competitive political content for TV and radio. In particular, ensure the launch of a political talk show (not only the debates) from the first days of the election campaign, which could provide a quality discussion on the issues of the election process.
- Fill and manage the Facebook page more actively whilst promoting educational content (due to the effectiveness of the campaign of short video with the involvement of celebrities calling to vote during the first round of elections). Also, draw attention of the social networks' audience to the channel's high-quality products using modern formats: quotes, short videos, etc.
- Elaborate and adopt a gender equality policy and serve as an example for commercial media on this matter.
- UA:Persnyi could put more emphasis on reporting the reality as it is, not to be afraid of showing people's emotions, positive or critical/negative viewpoints. Neutrality should not be seen as an ultimate goal as the news then becomes superficial and sterile. At the same time, UA:Persnyi should present all sides of the story with a comparable time and manner of presentation to avoid any preference or bias. It is important to ensure that Persnyi's news is newsworthy, enriching the public discourse. It is thus important that their journalists actively seek for information and do not just wait what other media outlets report in order to recycle their reports.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

- It is vital for TV channels' credibility to assure that all personnel (editors, producers, journalists, news program & talk-show anchors and hosts) are perceived as professional and impartial while carrying out their journalistic duties. Adherence to this requirement is extremely important when preparing the news (news structure, composition, topics, editing, visual, audio aspects of concrete news items; selection of guests & topics & questions in talk-shows) and also in the way news is presented (communication with respondents, guests, how questions are formulated, toned, how deep journalist goes with additional inquiries, whether a viewer can perceive, feel, hear and see that journalist is really involved, issue-driven or whether journalist is biased in some way and leaning towards or distancing against certain views.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding training of journalists and other editorial staff

- Improve journalists' knowledge on matters from the elections sphere.
- Increase the level of journalists' knowledge on how social media work, including in election campaigns. This will allow journalists to treat social networks more carefully and as sources of information and not be easily manipulated, which ultimately would lead them to providing better coverage the election process. This need exists not only at the central level, but also in the regions where it is necessary to provide coverage and quality analysis of politicians' online campaigns during the future parliamentary and local elections.
- Enhance journalists' knowledge on how propaganda and external information influences work. Get them acquainted with the main narratives of Russian propaganda and manipulative techniques for the rapid identification of such possible influences.
- Organise trainings that raise the level of critical thinking, and encourage journalists to participate in them.
- Increase the level of journalists' knowledge on fact checking.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding presentation of sociological data during election campaigns

- When presenting the results of sociological surveys, it is necessary to provide information on: full name of the organization that has carried out the survey;



customers who ordered the survey; time when survey was carried out; territory covered by the survey; size and method of forming a sociological sample; survey method; precise wording of questions; possible statistical error.

- When the results of an interactive audience poll are publicly presented, they should be accompanied by a text message "This poll reflects the opinion only of this particular audience". The message should be displayed on the screen (for television programs) in a form suitable for a viewer to perceive it, or it can be announced (for radio programs) in a clear manner by the speaker or program host immediately before and after the indicated results are presented.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding the decrease of the conflict level in the media environment

- Editorial teams of online publications are recommended to find a balance between clickable headlines and those that do not mislead the reader and do not provoke aggression or negative emotions.
- Talk show TV-hosts should avoid having a biased attitude towards the guests present in the studio or political processes; they should stay neutral and make sure that discussion in the studio remains sufficiently ethical, and prevent offensive, xenophobic, racist, or other expressions that incite hostility.
- On social media pages, refrain from supporting and even block discussions that incite hostility and hatred.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding completeness of information

- In their news coverage of the campaign, broadcasters should enhance their reporting by providing the relevant context, background information, using experts and alternative viewpoints in the framework of their news items. By offering such views, they could help their viewers to better understand what the given information means for them, what the consequences of bad governing are, its alternatives and other perspectives. The stories should be presented from various angles, presenting different viewpoints – all sides involved in an issue – experts, civil society representatives (but not always the same ones).
- When covering any controversial issue, especially of a political nature, it is important to present all sides involved, including when a side refuses to

comment. In such scenario, such a refusal shall be presented so that the public is not misled. In addition, it is evenly important to provide impartial background information (intro into the story) if the issue is long-term and complicated. It is usually not satisfactory to limit coverage of such controversial topics by purely presenting opinions of sides involved without proper contextual information. At the same time, it is important to consider balance of expert/analytical views.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding the sources of information

- Do not use anonymous sources (exception - you disregard the recommendation to indicate a source if it would impose a threat to safety/life of the source).
- When using information from social networks, check the source of this information, and clearly indicate it; even links to verified accounts are not a guarantee that your source distributes credible information, as the source may have its own mercenary motive.
- Treat critically references to mass media that use social networks as the main source of information.
- When covering events in Ukraine, it is better to use Ukrainian sources of information; when covering events in other countries, use the media of the respective country, and it is better to refer only to those media that have a long history and known experience.
- Regarding Russian sources of information - see section "Regarding the possible Russian influence".

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding work with social networks

- Focus on educating voters in social networks by using formats attractive for readers, such as short videos and motivational photos. Actively promote analytical information by "packing" it into visualized formats - "teach while entertaining". At the same time, keep in mind which format is most in demand by the target audience of the media.
- Devote part of media content to expert explanations of the role of social networks in the electoral process and the mechanism of their work. For example, tell about the dangers of distributing disinformation and manipulative

content through closed groups in social networks and messengers. Such education will allow voters to better identify possible manipulations in social networks and resist them more effectively.

- Explain to audience the damage and threats of disinformation, fake news and information noise, as well as the consequences of these phenomena for the society. Do it in a form that is interesting and easy to understand.
- Use social networks to initiate a real public debate on important issues of the country's development, requiring the involvement of top candidates. Collaborate with other media on this matter to create joint initiatives that can contribute to quality changes in the information space.
- Elaborate editorial policies for days of "election silence" in social networks, since during these days the "silence" is being actively violated by both the election headquarters of candidates, and the media themselves.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding the possible Russian influence:

- Do not use Russian sources of information about international and Ukrainian news, except when they are the primary sources of information - for example, when the news concerns important statements or actions of Russian officials.
- Do not use sources of information access to which is officially restricted in Ukraine.
- Do not give too much attention to domestic events in Russia, as this immerses Ukrainian audience into the media discourse of the aggressor country.
- Provide balanced coverage of politicians' or candidates' statements that re-echo narratives of Russian propaganda. Present them critically, alongside with the context and background that are necessary for understanding, and, if needed – with the opposite point of view.
- Use responsible approach to terminology when covering topics related to the Russian aggression in the Donbas region. Clearly articulate who is the opponent of the Ukrainian army, indicating the country-aggressor.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ on avoiding materials with signs of being advertorial/paid ("dzhynsa") during content planning

- If any "customer" offers a material to your media outlet (TV or radio channel), then the choice should be between agreeing to publish it as an advertising material (with the obligatory plate "advertisement"), or making your own editorial material based on the interests of your target audience.
- The editorial materials should be balanced, truthful and reliable, without any PR theses about a presidential candidate/member of the parliament, a party. The material should not contain any unverified statistics, incorrect dates, allegations that do not correspond to reality, or unreliable facts. Only in this case, the text can be regarded as a quality one and useful for your audience.
- No privileged treatment should be given to public authorities by the media during election campaigns. Media should be able to criticize activities or inaction by the authorities and other official bodies whose activities are financed from the public money, to investigate corruption and other wrongdoings and they should not face any pressure in the form of retaliation
- It is advisable to reasonably limit presentation of officials during the period prior the elections, especially if officials are taking part in the elections. The coverage of officials activities shall be based on the newsworthiness of topic in which a politician is involved, not on a pure fact that a top official is involved. The news program shall try to avoid automatic coverage of top officials. If it is decided that the coverage of an official is newsworthy, then a broadcaster should do its best to provide the necessary background to all such stories, including independent and/or opposing views to those of the government.
- When planning the materials, take into account the significance of the topic for the public
- Check the information to see if it can be an "information leak" made on purpose and look into who might benefit from it. Only then decide whether to work on the topic.
- Plan meaningful content for publishing; do not load the audience with cliches and empty words. It is often a sign of an advertorial/paid material when, instead of answers to important questions, the campaign headquarters offer cliches and excessively broad PR messages.

- Take care of the balance of opinions, and in a situation where it cannot be observed, clearly explain to the audience why this happened. For example, there was no time to ask the opinion of the other party, or the party itself was unavailable, or refused to provide comments. And do not stop there - try to get answers from the opponent as soon as possible. Even if it seems that one party's guilt has already been proved, the party still has to be given an opportunity to provide comments.
- When preparing to cover the event, ask if it is genuine, and not organized exclusively for someone's PR. If you see that the event is organized in someone's interest – it is best to simply ignore it. Materials like "presidential candidate took part in honouring veterans" should not be published as a matter of principle. On the occasion of the Veterans' Day, for example, the floor should be given to the veterans themselves and not to a presidential candidate for his/her PR.
- Check the declarations and statements of politicians, and add the opinions of experts, instead of simply repeating the politicians' messages. If someone lies, and you can prove it - prove it! If the person is doing it simply for PR – it is not news then.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding gender-related issues

- Cover the activities and programs of the candidates to the fullest extent possible regardless of their sex and ensure equal and unbiased attitude towards them. Media coverage of male and female politicians, in particular, during the elections, influences their public perception, and therefore, the voting (results).
- Keep in mind that gender equality in media sphere has two levels: equality inside a mass media (equal opportunities and attitude, equal access to decision-making positions) and equality in media content, with a special focus on combating sexist stereotypes. Ensure equal access to managerial positions in media both for men and women.
- Ensure gender equality in media content with a special focus on combating sexist stereotypes.
- Develop editorial policies and standards of responding to sexism and respecting gender parity in media.

- Conduct trainings for journalists and editors on gender-sensitive media literacy. Develop training modules for media professionals, heads of media organisations and self-regulatory organizations.
- Make efforts in finding female experts, commentators and speakers.
- Respect gender balance while selecting guests for the talk-shows.
- Change the trend of speaking about women indirectly instead of giving them an opportunity to have a say.
- Indicate the authorship of published materials for the readers to understand from which perspective the materials are written and whether gender parity among journalist in media is respected.

## INTRODUCTION

The coalition of CSOs consisting of the Commission on Journalism Ethics, “Human Rights Platform”, “Ukrainian Media and Communications Institute” and “StopFake” carried out systematic monitoring of the media coverage of the presidential election campaign in Ukraine. The activity was implemented with the support of the two Council of Europe Projects: “Strengthening freedom of media, access to information and reinforcing the public broadcasting system in Ukraine” and “Supporting the transparency, inclusiveness and integrity of electoral practice in Ukraine”, implemented within the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine 2018-2021.

The monitoring is intended to offer professional, comprehensive, and objective assessment of political diversity and balance in news and current affairs coverage on 12 television channels and 8 online media outlets. Moreover, the role of social media during elections, the potential impact of disinformation and propaganda, to what extent the media struggle against stereotypes and how they portray gender-related topics were other aspects and indicators included in the monitoring. The main goal of the project was to inform the public about the conduct of the media during the elections, to initiate a discussion about the objectivity and quality of the media reporting and to promote their adherence to international standards and best practices regarding freedom of expression and independence of media.

The initial data for media monitoring was collected by 15 independent specialists working 5 days per week; afterwards, experienced media experts reviewed the data and provided further assessment and analysis. The monitoring was carried out every day during the period of 14 January – 21 April 2019.

## METHODOLOGY

The methodology was developed by the Council of Europe consultants Rasto Kuzel and Oleksandr Burmahin. It also included comments and proposals from other project partners. The methodology was recognized at the international level and applied in similar projects in over 50 countries for the last 20 years, including Ukraine. Taking into account content-oriented comprehensive approach, the methodology enables giving deep analysis of the pluralism and diversity in media coverage, in particular, analysing coverage of specific subjects and topics that are assessed in the proper context, including detailed comparison and analysis.

Media monitoring provided for quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media coverage. The quantitative analysis was focused on the amount of time allocated to candidates and other political actors (such as government, local governments) as well as tone of coverage in which these subjects were portrayed - positive, neutral or negative. Monitoring was also focused on the thematic structure of news, evaluating the thematic diversity by measuring the actual time devoted to different topics.

Qualitative media monitoring was used to assess the performance of media according to principles of ethical or professional standards - balance, accuracy, timely, choice of issues, omission of certain information, advantage of incumbency, positioning of items, inflammatory language that is hard to assess in quantitative terms. Additionally, the monitoring specialists evaluated the compliance of media performance with the principles and standards enshrined in the Code of Journalism Ethics and inform the Commission of Journalism Ethics on regular basis regarding possible violations.

The full text of the methodology is available at [http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/metodologiya\\_monitoryngu](http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/metodologiya_monitoryngu).

### **What was monitored:**

#### **Evening prime-time newscast on ten nation-wide channels:**

TV Channel "UA: PERSHYI",  
TV Channel "1+1",  
TV Channel "Inter",  
TV Channel "Ukraine",  
TV Channel "ICTV",  
TV Channel "STB",  
TV Channel "112 Ukraine",  
TV Channel "Pryamyi",  
TV Channel "5th Channel",  
TV Channel "NewsOne".

#### **Talk show/debates (each release):**

"Pulse" (TV Channel "112 Channel"),  
"Echo of Ukraine" with Matvey Ganapolsky (TV Channel "Pryamyi"),  
"Freedom of Speech" (TV Channel "ICTV"),  
"The Right to Power" (TV Channel "1+1"),  
"Vitaliy Portnikov Politclub" (TV Channel "Espresso.TV"),  
"Ukrainian Format" (TV Channel "NewsOne"),  
"People Are Against" ("Narod Proty") (TV Channel "ZIK"),

#### **Eight online media outlets (monitoring of news feed content):**

obozrevatel.com,  
segodnya.ua,  
strana.ua,  
korrespondent.net,  
pravda.com.ua,  
gordonua.com,  
hromadske.ua,  
nv.ua

#### **Social networks:**



Facebook pages of 10 most popular candidates (**Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Yuriy Boiko, Oleg Lyashko, Oleksandr Shevchenko, Oleksandr Vilkul, Andriy Sadovyi** (until withdrawal from elections) and **Yevgeniy Murayev** (until withdrawal from elections);

Facebook pages of monitored media and specific programs ("**Fakty**" (TV Channel "ICTV"), "**Vikna**" (TV Channel "STB"), "**Podrobnosti**" (TV Channel "Inter"), "**TSN**" (TV Channel "1+1"), **TV Channel "Pryamyi", TV Channel "UA:Pershyi", TV Channel "5th Channel", TV Channel "NewsOne", TV Channel "112 Ukraine", TV Channel "Ukraine"; obozrevatel.com, segodna.ua, strana.ua, korrespondent.net, pravda.com.ua, gordonua.com, hromadske.ua, nv.ua);**

Facebook pages of 10 leaders of public opinion (**Dmytro Chekalkin, Dmytro Gordon, Vitaliy Portnikov, Yuriy Butusov, Oleksiy Mochanov, Oleg Ponomar, Sergiy Ivanov, Roman Shrike, Sonya Koshkina, Vakhtang Kipiani**).

## CONTEXT

Presidential elections in Ukraine in 2019 took place under difficult conditions. In particular, this was noted in reports of international election observation missions. OSCE/ODIHR observers in their report noted that "The election takes place in a challenging political, economic and security environment, against the backdrop of continuous challenges to Ukraine's territorial integrity. The overall context is characterized by ongoing armed conflict and other hostilities in the east of the country and the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation, resulting in the continued control of certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by illegal armed groups"<sup>1</sup>. These factors significantly influenced the topics of political debate and the topics of the presidential candidates' information campaigns.

Also, these elections were held under the existing oligarchic media system (large media holdings, which include central TV channels, are owned by top oligarchs who retain their influence on political processes in the country), the lack of a strong Public Broadcasting Company and the growing role of new media, including social networks. The number of information TV channels that cover political processes in the country round-the-clock has increased compared to previous campaigns. This campaign was characterized by a uniquely large number of political talk shows and electoral marathons.

Despite this, international observers (the CEC registered 2344 international observers from 19 international organisations and 17 countries) noted in their reports that the 2019 Presidential elections were competitive and were accompanied by respect to fundamental freedoms.

## GENERAL FINDINGS

### TV Channels and Online Media Outlets

- In general, during Presidential election campaign Ukrainian voters were in a oversupplied information space due to the increase in the number and variety of communication channels which were not used in previous election campaigns. Traditional media (television, print and online) were supplemented by social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube), various messengers; the significance of opinion leaders and bloggers increased and they used the new media for promoting their own political position, and hence for supporting one or another candidate.
- Despite the diverse media environment, the media remained under the strong influence of their owners and openly demonstrated their preferences to specific candidates and political actors during the campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Ukraine, Presidential Election, 31 March 2019  
<https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/415733?download=true>

- In general, during the two rounds the mass media provided voters with a diverse information about the candidates. However, there was very little analytical coverage.
- Petro Poroshenko received the most coverage among the candidates in both rounds. However, this coverage was not always positive. It had a different tone depending on the position of one or another media. The coverage of the campaign was also influenced by the general reluctance of one of the key candidates, namely Volodymyr Zelensky, to being interviewed, to communicate with the media and to participate in TV debates with his opponent Petro Poroshenko. Instead, he used social networks to communicate with the voters, making it difficult for traditional media to represent his position on important topics.
- TV Channel "UA:Pershyi", which is a public one, could not organise a TV debate in the second round between Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelensky, as required by the electoral law, because of Zelensky's refusal to visit the studio. Thus, Petro Poroshenko was alone in the studio and was able to answer experts' questions and present his program. Instead, for the first time in the history of Ukraine, the debate between the two candidates took place at the "Olympic" stadium in Kyiv in a non-classical way.
- The monitoring recorded a significant number of materials with violations of journalistic standards and materials with signs of political ordering ("dzhynsa"). It is characteristic, that in the first round such materials positively represented the names of all the favourites of the presidential race. The materials with signs of paid journalism were recorded in all media covered by the monitoring, except "UA:Pershyi" and website hromadske.ua.
- Violations in the dissemination of sociological data (including candidate ratings) were recorded both on television and in online media outlets. As well as a number of TV channels continued to present the polls of viewers in the talk show studios with violations, namely without indicating that it is not representative.

### Social Networks

- For the first time in Ukraine, in the second round, social networks began to set the tone of the election campaign, which is related with communication strategy of Volodymyr Zelensky. For some time, the role of the media was reduced to coverage of what is happening in social networks. Subsequently, the audience's attention was several times switched to television, in particular during the talk shows with the participation of the candidates, where they made loud statements.
- There was virtually no political debate among candidates. In the first round, all candidates built their Facebook strategy "in contradiction" - opposing to the current authorities represented by President Petro Poroshenko, without offering their own meaningful messages. He himself avoided direct rivalry, emphasizing his achievements as a current president. In the second round, all the newsbreaks of the campaign developed around its form, not the content: the time and place of the debate, the medical examinations, and so on.
- Most candidates built one-sided and quite formal communication. Social networks were used to the full extent only by Volodymyr Zelensky, creating

the effect of informal communication on equal terms, actively involving the audience in communication.

- All candidates, with the exception of Petro Poroshenko, used offensive language in the first round. The latter started to do so in the second round. This aggravated the polarization among Facebook users.
- Candidates' pages actively promoted paid messages, mostly targeting the regions that were considered their electoral base. In the second round, the "Komanda Zelenskoho" (Zelensky Team) public page used micro targeting for very narrow audiences.
- In the first round, most opinion leaders tried to analyse the situation and promote voters education. In the second round, the majority focused on supporting a particular candidate and/or criticizing the other one. Polarization of thoughts and aggression of statements has increased.
- The monitoring of Facebook media pages showed that there was no demand for meaningful discussions from the audience. During the first round, the audience of several media "did not notice" the elections, giving preference to entertainment content and news about disasters and crime. In the second round, the election campaign news became more popular than entertainment and "yellow" content on all media pages. Virtually all of them concerned the "show aspect" of the elections.

#### Signs of Potential Russian Influence

- There were tendencies to use Russian websites and informational agencies as sources of information, in particular on international and Ukrainian news, messages on Russian internal affairs not related to Ukraine; The consumers of this information constantly remained within Russian information space.
- Messages echoing with the narratives of Russian propaganda were often rebroadcasted in the form of quotes from presidential candidates and politicians.
- The number of messages that could be interpreted as attempts to discredit the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian authorities significantly increased. News that could be seen as attempts to legitimize the pseudo-republics in the Donbas and the occupation of the Crimea appeared in different media. The narrative "There is no Russia there" ("Russia is not an occupant state and it did not carry out a military attack against Ukraine") remained popular, while the news about the events at the front did not mention an aggressor state.

#### Gender

- Media outlets give preference to the voices and the faces of men, despite changes in society and the growing contribution of women to the media. According to the monitoring, disproportionately more time was provided to men compared to women on national TV channels - 85% of the prime airtime, whereas for women - only 15%.
- Monitoring data shows that in most cases, the author was a man in the news, but most of the news was without authorship. For readers to understand from what perspective these materials were prepared and whether there is a parity

of representation among journalists in the media, the media should mention authorship.

- In addition, monitoring data confirms the tendency to talk about women and not to give them a word.
- On the one hand, some journalists have become sensitive to gender equality. On the other hand, it has a non-systemic, personal factor. This is due to the lack of editorial policies and editorial standards for responding to sexism and the observance of gender

## **LEGISLATION IN THE SPHERE OF ELECTIONS COVERAGE AND THE ROLE OF THE REGULATOR**

Generally, the legislation regulating the electoral process is fragmented and consists of a number of laws and by-laws. In particular, these documents include the Constitution of Ukraine, the Laws of Ukraine “On the State Register of Voters” and “On the Central Election Commission”, the Code of Ukraine of Administrative Proceedings, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Code of Ukraine of Administrative Offenses, the Law of Ukraine “On Advertising”, resolutions of the Central Election Commission etc. In the information sphere, in addition to the special provisions of the relevant sections of the laws on elections, general provisions of the Laws of Ukraine “On Information”, “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, “On Printed Media (the Press) in Ukraine”, “On Information Agencies”, “On the Procedure of Coverage by the Mass Media of the Performance of State Authorities and Local Self-Governance Bodies in Ukraine” apply.

The key legislative act governing presidential election is the Law of Ukraine “On Elections of the President of Ukraine” (No. 474-XIV of March 5, 1999, with amendments and supplements).

Despite the long-standing recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe and the OSCE/ODIHR, the harmonization of the electoral legislation has not been carried out as of March 2019. As many as 4,370 amendments have been proposed to the draft Election Code of Ukraine (draft law No. 3112-1), adopted in November 2017 with the minimally required majority of MPs’ votes in the first reading. The draft is now being prepared for the second reading.

As mentioned in the previous monitoring report, the electoral legislation requires essential improvement in various aspects. The problems of media during elections, arguments of candidates (parties) with the media in the course of campaigns, provision of voters with a possibility of making an informed, conscious choice and violations of the legislation by the media themselves during election campaigns require various expert examinations and prompt actions. In order to ensure this

response, it is, first of all, necessary to create a model at the legislative level: - rules - regulator - responsibility.

There are many gaps in this sphere at the level of legislative regulation in Ukraine. Therefore, it is possible to talk only partially about the existence of rules, and partially about the presence of the regulator for television and radio broadcasting (absent for printed media and online media), and practically absent responsibility (in particular, taking into account the practice of applying the current legislation).

In view of all of the old challenges in the sphere of legislation presented in the Conclusions and Recommendations of the International Conference "Media and Elections in Ukraine: Challenges and Possible Solutions"<sup>2</sup> in 2016 and the Conference "Freedom of Speech and Electoral Process in Ukraine: Old and New Challenges"<sup>3</sup> in 2017, remaining relevant in the middle of 2019 too, **the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should make an utmost effort to** promptly tackle them on the eve of the Parliamentary elections in 2019 and local elections in 2020.

In particular, the current legislation needs amendment, and new regulatory legal acts have to be adopted:

- To determine the state regulator(s) for the purposes of supervision over the compliance and ensuring the compliance with the legislation on elections by the media. In particular, it is necessary to evaluate the need of determining the regulator in the field of Internet and introduction of this institute in strict compliance with international principles and standards of regulating the worldwide web. The regulator should have a balanced composition, act in an unbiased, independent and transparent manner, investigate violations and approve decisions promptly, as well as have reasonable, adequate and effective sanctions at its disposal. It should act with a view to ensuring pluralism and the freedom of speech, monitoring the main media (the subject and duration of addresses of candidates and their supporters, conditions of access to the media, i.e. absolute or proportionate equality), search of new ways of covering the electoral process taking the evolution of media into account<sup>4</sup>;

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<sup>2</sup> On 5 April 2016, Kyiv, the Council of Europe, together with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, held an international conference, "Media and Elections in Ukraine: Challenges and Possible Solutions". Around 200 participant took part in the discussion.

<sup>3</sup> 30 November 2017, Kyiv, the Conference was held by the Council of Europe Office in Ukraine within the Action Plan of the Council of Europe for Ukraine for 2015-2017 of the projects "Strengthening Freedom of Media and Establishing a Public Broadcasting System in Ukraine" and "Reform of the Electoral Practice in Ukraine", as well as the project "Freedom of Media in Ukraine". The National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting and the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy were the national partners of the conference.

<sup>4</sup> The Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting", the Law of Ukraine "On the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting", the draft law "On Audiovisual Services", the Law of Ukraine "On Printed Media (Press) in Ukraine", special legislation in the field of Internet and the electoral process.

- To provide a system of adequate sanctions for violations of the electoral legislation by the media with regard to election campaigning, informing the voters and covering the electoral process<sup>5</sup>;
- To improve the current legislation with a view to clearly distinguishing between election campaigning and informing the voters, introducing efficient mechanisms of countering hidden advertisement and paid journalism;
- To introduce a limitation or prohibition of placing campaigning materials on TV and radio, prohibition of placing campaigning materials in outdoor advertising during electoral process;
- To consider the possibility of introducing a special regime of placing campaign related materials before the start of electoral process;
- To renew the legislation on elections and start regulating the activities in Internet during elections, both with regard to campaigning and informing, as well as monitoring the spending of election funds on such activities, and, especially, funds from other sources and countries;
- To take measures in order to minimise abuse of the personal data in electoral purposes of the candidates (BigData), including through voters targeting.
- To take all measures in order to prevent possible absence of quorum of the regulator when the electoral process starts in August 2019<sup>6</sup> due to untimely appointment of members of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine by the Parliament.

Any rules on regulating election campaigns should be developed in a transparent manner and implemented in advance, and ignoring the mentioned challenges may cause serious threats at the level of national security. Moreover, such changes should diminish the impact of the owners on the editorial policy of the media, improve the level of compliance with the current electoral legislation by subjects of the electoral process and the media in the course of campaigning and covering elections, including correspondence with the international and European standards of holding elections (in particular, standards of fairness, reliability and balance), ensure proper informing of voters on events and facts related to the electoral process and procedures, and equal terms of access to the media for parties and candidates.

However, in existing conditions, regardless of the gaps in the legal sphere, the efficiency of the regulator in the field of TV and radio organizations requires analysis and discussion. As the national channels are losing popularity, but still remain a

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<sup>5</sup> The Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences, the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting", the Law of Ukraine "On the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting", the draft law "On Audiovisual Services", the Law of Ukraine "On Printed Media (Press) in Ukraine", special legislation in the field of Internet and electoral process.

<sup>6</sup> The cadence of three members of the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting delegated by the parliament ends on 5 July 2019. According to the procedure, stipulated by the Law of Ukraine "On the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting", the appointment process lasts at least 38 calendar days (Art.5 of the mentioned Law). The National Council is competent when at least six of its members are appointed (Art. 4(2) of the Law).

basic source of information for 74% of the population in Ukraine , and importance of their compliance with the standards of coverage and requirements as to the placement of campaign materials during elections can hardly be overestimated

Both the monitoring study of a coalition of CSOs and the monitoring of the National TV and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine have shown numerous violations of the provisions of the national legislation by broadcasters in covering the presidential election campaign. First of all, they are systemic:

1) Absence of the source data as provided by law when presenting on television the information on the results of the sociological polls related to election process ;

2) Absence of textual note: "This survey reflects the opinion of this audience only" which should be shown on the screen when presenting results of the audience's interactive polling;

3) Violation of principles of electoral legislation with regard to credibility, completeness and accuracy, objectivity of information and unbiased presentation of the information when covering election process.

It is worth noting, that violations by the television and radio organisations, when it comes to showing the polls data, after appeals by the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting and the Commission on Journalism Ethics, the Human Rights Platform and the Ukrainian Media Institute to be responsible to the society and the law, and eliminate the violations, are conscious on the side of the respective editors, hosts and other officials.

Moreover, there were materials containing election campaigning, which were included in information TV programs on silence day, both before the first and before the second round of elections, 203 hours 35 minutes of air time on "1+1" channel of various programs with the participation of one of the candidates, statements by a host of TV channel "Pryamyi" supporting another candidate and elements of signs of hate speech addressed to his opponents, and so on.

The incompliance with the requirements of the legislation on elections with regard to balanced and unbiased coverage, and ensuring equal conditions for candidates by the media are the most dangerous violations by TV channels, as demonstrated by the studies. You can find more information on these and other instances of violations in interim reports of the CSOs coalition.

When it comes to responding to the mentioned violations, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine, during the whole campaign, chose either of the following options: to inform the television company on the signs of violation of the current legislation and require bringing its activities in line with the legislation on elections, inform the Central Election Commission on the identified



signs of the violation, ask the TV channels to provide explanations on the identified signs of violations. Starting from January 2019, the Regulator sent 30 information letters of this kind to 19 TV channels. It received 13 letters in response from 7 broadcasters.

It is also worth noting that in the course of the Presidential campaign, the regulator did not produce any single report of administrative offence with regard to violations of the TV channels in campaigning. Deficiencies of the regulatory legal acts of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine were pointed out as a possible reason for inaction, at a meeting of the working group on supervision over the compliance with the legislation on elections by television and radio organisations. It was informed only in April 2019 that the process of their amendment had started and a hope was expressed that this process would be completed by end of May 2019, and the regulator would be able to produce protocols and send them for judicial review in the course of the Parliamentary elections.

As of 16 April 2019, no other actions/decisions were taken by the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine with regard to violations of the TV channels.

In the context of breaches of the electoral legislation by broadcasters and establishment of the signs of violations in their actions, there were regular discussions going on between the representatives of the regulator, the Central Election Commission (CEC), the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and experts of international organisations with regard to the possibilities of the regulator or other state authorities to react the identified violations. The main arguments of these discussions included: the regulator insisted on the deficiencies of the legislation, disabling its sanctions to the media on election issues or making them vulnerable in case of judicial appeal, the NACP, when it comes to financial control, insisted on their need to receive decisions with conclusions what certain materials were of campaigning nature, which would enable them to check the sources of financing of such publication, and the CEC noted that it had no powers to respond to such violations by the media as long as since 2012. The issue of the state body or a department thereof that would provide conclusions as to specific material being of campaigning or informative nature was one of the key issues. It was eventually decided that it would be the task of the Expert Council of the Public Board of the regulator. However, there was no systematic work arranged in this regard during the presidential election campaign. In the course of three months, the independent Expert Council gave three opinions, with only one of them dated 27 March 2019, relating to the presence or absence of the elements of pre-election campaigning. It concluded that a product, namely, the film "Yuliia Lytvynenko: asking questions" contained signs of election campaigning, in particular, public assessment of the activities of a presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyi by another candidate, Yuliia Lytvynenko. However, this opinion did not lead to an answer to the key

question of supervision over the broadcasters during the electoral campaign: is it campaigning or informing? The phrase "contains signs" is similar to the expressions used by the regulator itself in its monitoring reports. This is not a specific, final answer/evaluation/legal fact with respective legal consequences, but an assumption.

The consultants of the Council of Europe Office in Ukraine believe, with regard to possible actions by the regulator in case of violations of the legislation on elections by TV channels, that there are grounds, based on the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting", to initiate inspections and, in case a violation/violations is/are confirmed, give a warning to the respective TV channel.

Thus, during the elections of the President of Ukraine, the regulator, when sending letters of different format to TV channels, exercised only an educational role with regard to specifics of the application of the legislation on elections by the media. When it comes to achieving the objective of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine, namely the supervision over compliance with the laws of Ukraine in the sphere of television and radio broadcasting, in particular, during the electoral process, the measures taken in response to violations by TV channels were, in our opinion, insufficient.

In order to enhance efficiency in the field of supervision, the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting should, prior to and during the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine:

- Create precedents and introduce the practice of responding to violations in the manner prescribed by the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting" in order to bring to liability television channels that violate the requirements of the electoral law in so far as informing and campaigning;
- Adopt all necessary amendments to National Council's normative legal acts in order to ensure that protocols are drawn up on administrative violations in the cases provided for by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Violations;
- Create precedents and introduce the practice of drawing up protocols on administrative violations in cases provided for by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses;
- Create precedents with final findings and assessments for differentiating the nature of the materials - campaign/informational.
- Introduce Council's own practice of responding to cases of hidden campaign materials' distribution by TV channels, including instances when campaign materials are included in the information programs, as well as introduce interaction with other state authorities on verification of funding and the role of the subjects of the election process in cases of such violations.

- Encourage media companies to adopt their own policies on gender equality, in particular in terms of pay, career growth, work-life balance, access to managerial positions and media content.

## FINDINGS OF THE MEDIA MONITORING

### TELEVISION

During the Presidential election campaign, all private TV channels had a strong political stance. Only TV Channel "UA:Pershyi" from the Public Broadcasting System kept the neutrality, but in general this TV channel paid insufficient attention to the electoral topics, ignoring important topics, especially in the first round, as the Public Broadcaster should.

The political stance of private TV channels was manifested most obviously in the first round of election. It was as follows:

- TV Channel "1+1" (owned by Ihor Kolomoiskyi): this TV channel showed its preference for the candidates Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Oleksandr Shevchenko; at the same time, the channel was critical of the current authorities, in particular the President Petro Poroshenko, who was also a presidential candidate;
- TV Channel "Priamyi" (owned by Volodymyr Makeienko) and TV Channel "5th Channel" (owned by Petro Poroshenko): preferences of these TV channels were on the side of Petro Poroshenko. TV Channel "Priamyi" also broadcasted criticism of the presidential candidates Yuliia Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
- TV Channel "Ukraine" (owned by Rinat Akhmetov): demonstrated preference for Oleh Liashko (most covered by this TV Channel), as well as Oleksandr Vilkul, nominated as a presidential candidate from the Opposition Bloc, and was critical of another candidate, Yuri Boiko, who was previously expelled from the Opposition Bloc due to a conflict.
- TV Channel "Inter" (owned by Dmytro Firtash and Serhii Lovochkin): this TV channel provided its support to the presidential candidate Yuri Boiko (one of the TV channel owners, Serhii Lovochkin, was also excluded from the Opposition Bloc and provided his public support of the Opposition Platform - For Life, which nominated Yuri Boiko).
- TV Channel "NewsOne" and TV Channel "112 Ukraine" (both channels are officially owned by MP Taras Kozak, but experts state that they are in the scope of influence of Viktor Medvedchuk): NewsOne provided its support to Yuri Boiko, whereas 112 Ukraine focused its coverage on the two presidential candidates Petro Poroshenko and Yuri Boiko, and this coverage was mostly positive.
- The group of TV channels in the holding of Viktor Pinchuk ("ICTV" and "STB") took a more or less equidistant position with regard to various candidates, which is characteristic of this group during several recent election campaigns. Thus, the ICTV channel provided the most coverage to Yuliia Tymoshenko (and it was more positive); however, other candidates were represented in news as well, namely Petro Poroshenko, Anatolii Hrytsenko, Oleksandr Vilkul, and less coverage was received by Serhii Taruta, Volodymyr Zelenskyi and others. In the news stories of the STB TV channel, the first place as to the amount of coverage is given to Petro Poroshenko,

the second one, with a slight separation, - to Yuliia Tymoshenko, but other candidates covered in the ICTV news also appeared here.

In this regard, a voter could not obtain objective information about the election campaign by viewing only one of the TV channels. For a complete picture they had to watch several TV channels.

## News

***Coverage of candidates.*** The representation of candidates in the news programs was not always determined by the information value, but perhaps by the interests of the owners.

In the first round, Petro Poroshenko received the most coverage. Six TV channels devoted him the largest share of their news stories in the prime time as the presidential candidate (5th Channel, "Priamyi", "1+1", "112 Ukraine", "STB", "UA:Pershyi") and 3 more - as the president ("Priamyi", "1+1", "112 Ukraine"). This coverage was not always positive (the positive dominated only in the news stories of "112 Ukraine", "Priamyi", "5th Channel"), and in most cases it was neutral, and there also was negative coverage (for example, "1+1").

At the same time, in the news stories of the ICTV channel, Yuliia Tymoshenko received the most coverage with a positive presentation. "Inter" and "NewsOne" most covered Yuri Boiko also with a positive presentation. On "Ukraine" TV channel Oleh Liashko received the most coverage (the neutral presentation was prevailed by positive one, but there was no negative at all).

Materials with signs of paid journalism in favour of various candidates that had no special news value were found in the stories of almost all TV channels (except for "UA:Pershyi"). Thus, for example, in the story of January 30, 2019, Yuliia Tymoshenko visited Chernyiv region, where she met the electorate and bought salo and embroidered shirts in an open market. The same news release showed a trip by Anatolii Hrytsenko, where he met the military in Dnipro. On January 31, 2019, there was a story on Oleksandr Vilkul's visit to Mariupol Metallurgical Plant. In the news stories of TV Channel "Inter", there were plenty of stories with signs of paid journalism about Yuliia Tymoshenko, Yuri Boiko, Petro Poroshenko, Serhii Kaplin, Oleh Liashko. For example, the story of how Petro Poroshenko opened the Odesa-Reni highway (February 12; the same story appeared on the "5th Channel" and "Ukraine" TV Channel), or about his working trip to Kharkiv region where he presented awards to factory workers, visited the opening restored Philharmonic Hall and opened a new physical and health complex, where he met with children (February 14). Alternatively, the story about the Qualitative and Affordable Medicine Forum organized by "Batkivshchyna"; the story contains only comments by Yuliia Tymoshenko (February 27, the story about the same forum and Tymoshenko

appeared on "1+1" and "STB" TV Channels), or the story where Tymoshenko talked about artificially high gas prices (March 5). However, the largest amount of such stories was with the participation of Yurii Boiko, who commented almost everything that is happening in the country in the news of "Inter" TV Channel, also the TV channel shows all meetings of the candidate with voters in different regions. The record number of stories about this candidate was in the news release on March 7: he was present at 5 out of 20 stories.

In the second round of elections, Petro Poroshenko was also the most covered candidate in the news programmes (except for "STB", where Volodymyr Zelenskyi got preference), mostly in a neutral tone. However, it should be noted that Zelenskyi's team took a firm decision with regard to his non-participation in the broadcast of TV channels. Volodymyr Zelenskyi refused to communicate with media and have the debates with his opponent.

**Topics.** In the first round of elections, the topic of elections was not always on the first place in the newscasts of TV channels. Some of them paid minimum attention to it, as for example "UA:Pershyi", covering mainly the nomination of candidates and official messages on the activities of the state authorities responsible for holding the elections. But in the second round, the topic of elections was on the top on almost all TV channels.

The amount of time allocated by TV channels to elections in prime time newscasts was as follows:

- TV Channel "Ukraine": 1st round - 15%, 2nd round - 19.4% (sole TV channel, where the topic of elections was on first place in both rounds);
- TV Channel "1+1": 1st round - 4.7%, 2nd round - 13.2%,
- TV Channel "ICTV": 1st round - 8.8%, 2nd round - 17.5%
- TV Channel "STB": 1st round - 7.9%, 2nd round - 11.7%,
- TV Channel "Inter": 1st round - 5.2%, 2nd round - 17.6%,
- TV Channel "Pryamyi": 1st round - 5.4%, 2nd round - 14.3%,
- TV Channel "112 Ukraine": 1st round - 5.3%, 2nd round - 14.3%,
- TV Channel "NewsOne": 1st round - 8.9%, 2nd round - 28.8%,
- TV Channel "UA:Pershyi": 1st round - 5.4%, 2nd round - 14.3%,
- TV Channel "5th Channel": 1st round - 5.1%, 2nd round - 20.1%.

Headline hot stories covered by TV channels in the context of elections were the following ones: investigation of Kateryna Handziuk's murder; investigation of corruption in "Ukroboronprom"; establishment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church; tariff increase for utilities; Russian aggression in the Eastern Ukraine. In the second round, the attention was mostly paid to the debates between Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Some TV channels pointed out topics to which all other channels paid much less attention or did not pay it at all. For example, TV Channel "1+1" raised a topic that Volodymyr Zelenskyi was an alternative figure to traditional

politicians. TV Channel "NewsOne" paid a lot of attention to the topic of Ukrainian and Russian language (emphasizing on the oppression of latter).

When it comes to other topics not related to the elections, TV channels often paid more attention to disasters, incidents and accidents than, for example, to the topics of Crimea and the occupied territories of Donbas - in general, these topics often constituted less than 1% of general news time. TV channels also paid less attention to the topic of media (including manipulations in the context of elections): from 0% to 3% of the news time.

### **Talk Shows**

During this presidential campaign, there was unprecedentedly high number of the talk shows. The majority of the monitored talk-shows were characterized by populism as well as being excessively emotional, politically biased with regard to presenters and with generally low level of discussion. Only the talk show "Vitaliy Portnikov Politclub" on the TV Channel "Espresso TV" was positively different from all others - with less emotional and more constructive.

While talk shows provided candidates with certain opportunity to communicate their messages to voters and allowed voters to receive information about candidates, a clear demonstration of political preferences in favour of or against a particular candidate reduced their value for voters. The political preferences were manifested in the format and behaviour of program presenters, as well as in the invitation of certain experts.

The part of TV channels showed their political preferences through their talk shows (even more than through the newscasts). This was openly done during entire election campaign by the following TV channels: "Pryamyi" ("Echo of Ukraine" with Matvey Ganapolsky") - in favour of President Petro Poroshenko, and against Yuliya Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi; "1+1" ("The Right to Power") - in favour of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Oleksandr Shevchenko and against the authorities; "NewsOne" ("Ukrainian Format") - against authorities and in favour of "Opposition Platform - For Life".

In the first round of the elections, the topic of talk shows was not always directly related to the elections, but all the topics discussed in the studio (social issues or others) were placed into the electoral context and were often politicized by participants of the talk show. In the second round, absolutely all monitored talk shows were devoted to the topic of the elections (results of the first round, the debates between the candidates of the second round, forecasts for the future after the elections).

Almost all TV channels violated electoral legislation when announcing sociological ratings of the candidates (except for "1+1"). Also, in the majority of talk shows the

audience in the studio participated in the opinion polls but the presenters did not emphasize on the unrepresentative nature of these polls (violation of the Law of Ukraine "On Elections of the President of Ukraine", Article 56, which states that *"throughout the broadcasting of the results of the interactive audience polling the following text message should be shown: "This survey reflects the opinion of this audience only" which should be shown on the screen when presenting results of the audience's interactive polling (for TV programs) in a form accessible for viewer or be announced (for radio programs) with the clear speaker's or presenter's text immediately before and after presenting these results"*).

The candidates used their participation in the talk shows in order to disseminate necessary messages to another audience (in particular, through news in the online media outlets, or through the social networks. For instance, Oleksandr Shevchenko actively promoted his participation in the program "The Right to Power" ("1+1") on the Facebook (including through paid advertising). Quotations of Yuliya Tymoshenko's speech in the talk show were used by a number of online media outlets which published news items.

## **Debates**

TV channel "UA:Pershyi" – Public broadcaster, organized the debates for all presidential candidates before the first round of elections in the format of talk show "Countdown". According to the current legislation there is no mandatory participation in the debates, it is optional, thus, some of the candidates ignored them. This was the only talk show that did the fact-checking of statements made by the candidates in the studio. The presenters were equally neutral with regard to all candidates.

TV Channel "UA:Pershyi" could not hold TV debates in the second round between Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi, as it is prescribed by the electoral legislation, because of Zelenskyi's refusal to visit studio. Thus, Petro Poroshenko was alone in the studio and had a possibility to answer expert questions and present his program. TV Channel "Ukraine" was the sole channel among the six most popular nationwide TV channels in Ukraine which was broadcasting national debates of presidential candidates held by Public Broadcaster.

Moreover, for the first time in the history of Ukraine, the debates between the two candidates took place at the "Olympiyskyi" stadium in Kyiv in an extraordinary way. These debates were broadcast by a part of the central Ukrainian TV channels, in particular, "UA:Pershyi", "1+1", "ICTV", "Ukraine", "112 Ukraine", "Pryamyi", "NewsOne", "5th Channel" and TV channels that were not monitored, in particular "24th Channel" and "Espresso TV".



## ONLINE MEDIA OUTLETS

In general, monitored online media outlets provided a wide range of political views to voters, however they did not provide a more substantive and analytical coverage of the campaign.

The online media "Hromadske", "Novoye Vremya" and "Ukrayinska Pravda" covered the election campaign with the highest quality (with less violations of professional and ethical standards as well as the lack of paid journalism) and in the most neutral way. The majority of violations of professional and ethical standards were made by "Strana.ua".

**Candidates' coverage.** Likewise TV channels, part of online media outlets demonstrated political preference/antipathy for some candidates. For example, the website "Obozrevatel" published a lot of materials in favour of Yuliya Tymoshenko in a positive tone, "Segodnya.ua" gave the preference to Petro Poroshenko and Oleksandr Vilkul, and "Strana.ua" was in favour of Yuriy Boiko and against Petro Poroshenko.

In the first round of elections, Petro Poroshenko received the majority of coverage in the 7 online media outlets covered by the monitoring, while Yuliya Tymoshenko – only in one ("Obozrevatel"). Nevertheless, in the online media outlets Petro Poroshenko's coverage was more neutral than positive, and in one of the outlets, for instance in "Strana.ua", his negative coverage prevailed (often with criticism going beyond ethical limits). Volodymyr Zelenskyi was on the second place in coverage within 4 monitored online media outlets, and on the third place - in 2 outlets; such outlets as "Obozrevatel" and "Segodnya.ua" in general gave him very little attention in the first round of elections. In the second round of elections, Petro Poroshenko was on the first place in coverage of 5 monitored online media outlets ("Hromadske", "Ukrayinska Pravda", "Segodnya.ua", "Gordonua.com", "Korrespondent"), Zelenskyi - in three outlets ("Novoye Vremya", "Obozrevatel", "Strana.ua").

The monitoring recorded a lot of materials with signs of being paid for in favour of various presidential candidates in almost all monitored online media outlets (except for "Hromadske"). Most of these materials were not newsmaking. For example, on 21 January "Obozrevatel" published a news item: "Tymoshenko congratulated Ukrainians on the International Hugs Day" (news item based on Yuliya Tymoshenko's post on her official Facebook page). "Segodnya.ua" also actively promoted another candidate in such a way - Oleksandr Vilkul, for example, "Vilkul: Putting the end to the war is the main prerequisite for boosting the economy" (16 January), "Vilkul: development of highly technological industries is the precondition for economic growth" (19 January). Both news items were written based on the stories shown in the news program on TV channel "Ukraine" (both media outlets are part of one holding owned by Rinat Akhmetov).

The problem of this election campaign in the online media outlets is a breach of the standard of credibility, in particular, journalists often refer to the anonymous sources of information or to the social networks (without verification of information and posts in the social networks). "Strana.ua" is a leader of such practices: for example, in the news article of 17 January – "People's Front" will expel MP Tymoshenko because he runs for presidency – source", even the headline has reference to an anonymous source. Or in the news item of 2 February "Ambassadors asked if Zelenskyi was concerned that radicals can burn him down". Comedian had a meeting with Western diplomats" (of 2 February) journalists referred to "Strana's sources in the diplomatic circles".

Ignoring credibility standard and providing references to the anonymous sources during the election campaign reduces its transparency. Indeed, information with negative connotations about candidates is often disseminated with references to unverified or anonymous sources. Therefore, it challenges the democratic foundations of the electoral process.

Also, throughout the entire presidential election campaign, online media outlets, as well as TV channels, presented sociological polls on candidates' ratings incorrectly. The manipulations of such data were recorded in favour of one or another candidate; moreover, the violations of electoral legislation were revealed – publishing of incomplete information about sociological polls. For example, a number of media outlets ("Strana.ua", "Gordonua.com", "Inter", "NewsOne") published data of the little-known sociological company See Target, according to which a candidate Yuriy Boiko was leading in the Kharkiv region with a significant tear-off from other candidates. Meanwhile, media did not make a point on his general rating. Consequently, it could mislead voters, and they could extrapolate data obtained in one region to the whole Ukraine.

**Topics.** Online media outlets, unlike television, made the topics of elections a main one throughout the entire election campaign. It received the highest percentage of coverage among other topics in all monitored online media outlets:

- "Hromadske": 1st round - 35.5%, 2nd round - 49.5%;
- "Ukrayinska Pravda": 1st round - 48.1%, 2nd round - 61.3%;
- "Segodnya.ua": 1st round - 24.8%, 2nd round - 51.9%;
- "Gordonua.com": 1st round - 43.7%, 2nd round - 54.1%;
- "Korrespondent": 1st round - 35.6%, second round - 62.5%;
- "Novoye Vremya": 1st round - 34.2%, 2nd round - 45.4%;
- "Obozrevatel": 1st round - 37.3%, 2nd round - 48.1%;
- "Strana.ua": 1st round - 41.3%, 2nd round - 52.1%.

Online media outlets, like TV channels, widely covered such hot stories as investigation of Kateryna Handziuk's murder; investigation of corruption in

"Ukroboronprom"; establishment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church; tariff increase for utilities; Russian aggression in the Eastern Ukraine. However, besides these topics there were other ones, which could not be broadcast on TV channels, for instance ties between the presidential candidates and oligarchs. In the second round of elections, online media outlets paid their attention also to debates between Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi.

Topics which were covered but were not related to elections were Crimea and occupied territories of Donbas. However, they did not reach 1% of the coverage, as it was in the TV newscasts. Instead, the online media outlets were focused on health, economy, international events (related to Ukraine).

## GENDER

In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, adopted the Platform for Action, which contained specific provisions on the media, and, in particular, drew attention to the role of the media in promoting gender equality, in providing women with access to decision-making and in the struggle with stereotypes about women<sup>7</sup>.

This happened more than twenty years ago, and the goals mentioned in this document have not been achieved in Europe. Despite the increasing number of women in the media sector, the results of many studies indicate unequal treatment, low level of women's access to managing positions, and a stereotyped image of women in the media<sup>8</sup>.

### Representation of women and men on national TV channels

Speaking about the Ukrainian context, the representation of women and men on national TV channels is uneven.

According to monitoring data, which includes news releases in the prime time (evening) **on 10 national TV channels** ("UA:Pershyi", "1+1", "Inter", "Ukraine", "ICTV", "STB", "112 Ukraine", "Pryamyi", "5th Channel", "NewsOne") and takes into account only subjects being monitored (President of Ukraine, Government, Central Election Commission (CEC), political parties, presidential candidates) **during the period from 14 January till 29 March 2019, incomparably much time was allocated for men than women. In particular, 85% of the overall prime time was given to men, while only 15% was provided to women.**

Direct speech of men on average amounted to 43%, while the direct speech of women was 38%. Indirect speech, when they talked about the President of Ukraine, the Government, the CEC, political parties, presidential candidates was divided as follows: 57% - were devoted to men, and 62% - to women. This data could also be influenced by the fact that only 4 women were registered as a presidential candidate, as opposed to 40 men. It also made an impact on the representation of women in the media during the elections.

Thus, we can see that media give preference to the voices and the faces of men, despite changes in the society and the growing contribution of women to the media. Monitoring data confirms the tendency to talk about women and not to give them a word.

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<sup>7</sup> Section "J" of the Beijing Platform for Action: "Increase the participation and access of women to expression and decision-making in and through the media and new technologies of communication, as well as promote a balanced and non-stereotyped portrayal of women in the media".

<sup>8</sup> Handbook on the implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec(2013)1 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on gender equality and media

Margaret Gallagher accurately describes the situation, emphasising the following in 2010 GMMP Report, which examines the status of women in the news media outlets every five years: *"In the news, the tendency to ignore women or – at best – to talk about, rather than to or through women, is thus deeply embedded in normative cultural practices, and therefore in newsgathering and general production routines."*

Talking about specific online media outlets, the largest representation of women among actors subject to monitoring was on TV channel "STB" - 24% (76% men) and TV Channel "ICTV" - 23% (77% men).

The worst indicator of gender parity in the choice of speakers belongs to TV channel "112 Ukraine", where only 7% of women were present, as opposed to 93% of men. In addition, only 12% of women were on the "NewsOne" and "Priamyi" TV channels, while 88% of the speakers were men.

The situation was even worse, from the point of view of women's representation, during the second round of the presidential race when the second round included two men: Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi.

**During the period 1-19 April 2019, when the second round of the presidential election campaign was taking place, men completely occupied the entire prime airtime. In particular, 93% of the overall prime time was given to men, while only 7% was provided to women.**

Direct speech of men on average amounted to 36%, while the direct speech of women was 53%. It may be related to the direct speeches of the head of the Central Election Commission Tetiana Slipachuk, whose presence in the media increased during the second round of elections, as well as of other women members of the CEC.

Indirect speech, when they talked about the President of Ukraine, the Government, the CEC, political parties, presidential candidates, was divided as follows: 64% - were devoted to men, and 47% - to women.

It is worth noting that media can both hinder and accelerate structural changes aimed at achieving gender equality. This inequality becomes even more pronounced when it comes to the presence of women in the media content in terms of both quality and quantity.

### **Representation of Women and Men in the Online Media Outlets**

In 2011, the results of the Global Report on the Status of Women in the News Media, compiled by the International Women's Media Foundation, indicated that more and

more women became reporters, and in some European countries (in particular, in Finland and Sweden) their number exceeded the number of men<sup>9</sup>. At the same time, 73% of managing positions in the world's media are occupied by men. This is due to "institutional prejudices" that are indirectly reflected in the everyday life of media companies, in particular in terms of employment and career growth.

The number of women holding managing positions in the Ukrainian mass media was not the subject of this media monitoring, but further research is needed to complete the idea of a media landscape in Ukraine.

If we talk about the representation of women and men in the online media outlets, the monitoring data for the period from 14 January till 19 April 2019, showed that **the authors of 1,205 news articles were men, while women prepared 920 news.** At the same time, in the **13,521 news articles that were monitored, media generally did not indicate authorship on the basis of gender.**

In general, 15,646 news articles were monitored in the following 8 online media outlets - Obozrevatel.com, Segodnya.ua, Strana.ua, Korrespondent.net, Pravda.com.ua, Gordonua.com, Hromadske.ua and Nv.ua. The data only takes into account the news items with the monitored subjects such as the President of Ukraine, the Government, the Central Election Commission, political parties, presidential candidates.

At the same time, such website as Korrespondent.net does not indicate the authorship of women and men at all. Strana.ua, Segodnya.ua and Gordonua.com practically do not indicate the authors' gender. Therefore, it is impossible to follow the men's or women's viewpoint of these materials and to clarify whether there is a parity of representation among the journalists of these media outlets.

Talking about the presence of women and men as speakers and experts in the news items, **13,778 news items of online media outlets did not contain gender indications, or speakers were men, while only 1,854 news items contained women's voices and representation.**

These figures indicate that women are still a minority in the media. As far as in 2005, the GMMP came to a disappointing conclusion that *"the picture seen through the news becomes one of a world where women are virtually invisible"*.

Media coverage of political events and election campaigns is particularly evident in this sense, since it reflects the real situation regarding the use of sexist stereotypes.

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.iwmf.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/IWMF-Global-Report-Summary.pdf>.

Thus, on 27 March 2019 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe defined for the first time at the international level the concept of "sexism" in the Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)1 on preventing and combating sexism. The Recommendation stresses that sexism in the media contributes to the tolerance of the environment to "everyday" sexism, which manifests itself through:

- 1) derogatory or trivialising reporting about women's appearance, dress and behaviour rather than balanced and informed discussion of their views and opinions;
- 2) imaging women and men in stereotypical roles within the family and community;
- 3) unbalanced representation and the lack of meaningful participation of women as experts and commentators.

There are only a few examples of women's image during a presidential election campaign that has just ended in Ukraine. Sexism, ageism, stereotyping, and sometimes even frank neglect were broadcast on TV as something ordinary:

1. *"How will this year's candidate look like? This will be a man, however, with a strong female background...there are four representatives of the weak sex in the voting bulletin"/* 8 February 2019, "Facts", TV Channel "ICTV"
2. *"...Yuliya Lytvynenko is a "battleaxe". She does have the principles..."* 13 February 2019, the presenter Matvey Ganopolsky in the talk show "Echo of Ukraine" on the TV channel "Pryamyi"
3. *"There are women warriors. And miraculously in our army this is combined at the same time with the women-guardians"/* 8 March 2019 TV Channel "Inter" broadcast a story about Petro Poroshenko, who congratulated the women-soldiers on the International Women's Day.
4. *"An ideal candidate with experience and with a plait... The lady of hundred begins the life again" /* 2 April 2019, the talk show "Echo of Ukraine" on TV channel "Pryamyi", the presenter Matvey Ganopolsky talks about Yuliya Tymoshenko.

As for the qualitative analyses, on the one hand, a sensitivity to gender equality has appeared among some journalists. But on the other hand, it has a non-systemic, personal factor. This is due to the lack of editorial policies and editorial standards for responding to sexism and the observance of gender parity in the media outlets.

An excellent example is "UA:Persnyi". Thus, on 29 March 2019, the "Countdown" debates talk show took place on TV Channel "UA:Persnyi", during which Yuliya Tymoshenko said: "We, women, are generally weaker, and our strength is in our weakness, and our weakness is limitless." The anchorman of the debates, Pavlo Kazarin, answered twice, "I believe in gender equality".

As correctly emphasised by the Commission on Gender Equality of the Council of Europe, gender equality does not depend solely on the desires of a few individuals. It is foremost the product of a collective commitment, which calls for a change of culture and mentalities throughout the media.

## **TEN Practical Tips for Journalists and Editorial Teams<sup>10</sup>**

**1. Follow balanced representation of women and men in the materials and news stories.** Do not forget about the meaningful participation of women as experts and commentators not only in topics of culture, art or social sphere. Do not follow the easiest way - it is not always the most interesting and of the highest quality. Involve women experts to talk about the army, economy and sports. For example, use the "Ask a Woman" base of women experts to search for them: <https://expertky.povaha.org.ua/>

**2. Show the sensitivity to gender equality among women and men journalists on your own example**

**EXAMPLE.** On 29 March 2019, TV Channel "STB" presented a story No. 13 about the start of girls' admission to the military lyceum on a par with boys. The story was broadly balanced, the thoughts of the girls themselves, as well as the sync of one of the boys, were presented: *"Girls cannot be military, the duty of man is to protect the family, and girls must be at home and wait for him."* In response, the journalists of the TV channel reacted correctly: *"People fighting for gender equality would argue with you"*.

**3. Avoid commenting on the appearance of a woman, as well as inappropriate focusing on gender and age in the performance of her professional duties.**

**EXAMPLE.** On 2 April 2019, in the talk show "Echo of Ukraine" on the TV channel "Pryamyi", the presenter Matviy Ganopolskyi, talking about Yuliya Tymoshenko, said: *"An ideal candidate with experience, and with a plait"*. In the same release, he also said about Yuliya Tymoshenko: *"The lady of hundred begins the life again"*.

**4. Get rid of outdated patriarchal notions of "images of women".** Be modern in the media, do not use the images of "woman guardian", "woman Barbie" or "woman is the weak sex".

**EXAMPLE.** On 6 April 2019, on the TV channel "1+1" there was a news item about the wives of the presidential candidates. The journalist said: *"The wives who make the presidents... they check out each look, every word and centimetre of the heels"*.

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<sup>10</sup> Coverage of Elections in Ukraine: A Guide for Journalists and Editorial Teams // S. Ostapa, D. Dutsyk, Y. Kuzmenko, V. Volodovska / Ed. O. Pogorelov - K, 2019. - 32 p



Then the story provides the opinion of the expert that *"we have already studied the style of Maryna Poroshenko over the years - she is a woman-guardian"*.

**5. Avoid the dissemination of gender stereotypes in the journalistic materials.**

Check your materials with the "mirror method" (whether a certain statement is equally appropriate for the material about a woman or a man).

**EXAMPLE.** On 2 April 2019, the TV Channel "ICTV" a story was showed about autistic children, which contains the sync that *"the colour of autism is blue, because this disease is more typical for boys."*

**Nota Bene!** The attribution of one or another colour to girls or boys is an archaic tradition of the Soviet Union.

**6. The rules of conduct, appearance or certain types of professions are not gender-specific.** Do not impose stereotyped ideas on your audience.

**EXAMPLE.** On 28 February 2019, in the story of programme "Facts" on the TV channel "ICTV", which talked about events at the frontline, the journalist said, *"In the hands of tender Olga, the machine gun looks more delicate than any jewellery"*.

**EXAMPLE.** On 8 March 2019, TV channel "5th Channel" broadcast the story No. 9, where the journalist spoke about a woman in a manner that he would never say about a man: *"how women at the frontline can remain strong and at the same time feminine"*.

**EXAMPLE.** On 16 February 2019, the website "Novoye Vremya" published the material "Money, houses, cars. NV discloses each of the six main presidential candidates", where, in particular, Yuliya Tymoshenko's quotation is presented in the form of infographic: *"A woman commander-in-chief will not take kick-backs for the arms trade beyond the borders of Ukraine. We will not supply unsuitable for use weapons and equipment to the army from our own companies using kick-backs"*. Thus, "Novoye Vremya" rebroadcasts and emphasises stereotypes, said by Yuliya Tymoshenko.

**Nota Bene!** The commission of one or another crime does not depend on sex, and both a woman and a man can take the bribe.

**7. Do not use gender-related offensive statements yourself and do not rebroadcast them.**

**EXAMPLE.** During the talk show, "Echo of Ukraine with Ganopolskyi" on the TV channel "Pryamyi", when talking about the presidential candidate - Yuliya

Lytvynenko, the presenter, Matviy Ganopolskyi, said, *"Battleaxe. She does have the principles."*

**EXAMPLE.** On 27 February 2019, the website *segodnya.ua* published the stereotyped heading *"A 'fishwife' from isolated districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions disrupted negotiations in Minsk on the exchange of prisoners"* based on the post of MP Iryna Herashchenko on Facebook.

#### **8. Avoid mentioning women through the prism of a famous man**

**EXAMPLE.** On 11 March 2019, the website "Korrespondent" published a news item *"Lutsenko's wife declared about 400 cases of robbery in the army"*, which refers to the representative of the President of Ukraine in the Parliament, MP Iryna Lutsenko.

#### **9. Cover more the issues of women's rights, gender equality and domestic violence**

**EXAMPLE.** The website *hromadske.ua* presented news related to women's rights and gender equality in a balanced and correct way.

Thus, on 7-8 March, seven news stories related to this topic were presented, in particular: *"92% of mentions about women in Ukrainian online media outlets concern politics, crime and show business - IMI study"*, as well as *"The women's team filed a lawsuit against the US Football Federation: they demand equal wages with men"*, *"Women do unpaid work in the field of medicine three times more than men - WHO"*, *"For the first time in the history, the spacewalk will be done exclusively by the female crew"*, etc.

**10. Use feminitives** when referring to a person on the basis of a profession, position or type of occupation in the feminine when it refers to women.

**EXAMPLE.** TV Channel "STB" uses such feminitives as "spokeswoman", "female presidential candidate". The website *hromadske.ua* also uses feminitives: "servicewoman", "member", "deputy". In the news of the TV Channel "1+1" feminitives related to "separatist", "worker", "agent" are being used.

## SOCIAL MEDIA

Taking into account the increasing influence of social media during the elections, the monitoring team assessed their role in the electoral process. The Facebook network was selected for monitoring. In the beginning of 2019 it was used by 13 million Ukrainians (study held by PlusOne company). This network is one of the most important communications channels in Ukraine. This applies to both business and political segment. The monitoring team focused on Facebook pages of candidates, traditional media and public opinion leaders.

### Candidates

In the first round, the official Facebook pages of the top ten presidential candidates were selected for monitoring. Pages of the candidates Andrii Sadovyi and Yevhen Muraiev were monitored but they withdrew from the race. In the second round, the monitoring of the Facebook pages of the two presidential candidates was conducted.

A quantitative analysis of the topics of the posts and audience's reaction was made, namely the number of comments, shares and the sum of all reactions. A qualitative analysis was also held based on the following indicators:

1. Facebook strategy of the campaign;
2. Use of the hate speech;
3. Information for voters and electoral education;
4. Sponsored stories and paid political advertising;
5. Disinformation (discreditation of opponents).

The course of the election campaign on candidates' official Facebook pages was dramatically different in the first and second rounds of elections - both in terms of content and degree of influence, as well as dynamics.

### The first round of elections

- **Most candidates built their strategy based on contradiction - opponency to the authorities in power represented by the President Petro Poroshenko.** At the same time, they used the same rhetorics that differed only in degree of aggressiveness. The opportunities for criticism were also the same: the corruption scandal in "Ukroboronprom", the course of Kateryna Handziuk's murder investigation, etc. Candidates practically did not criticize each other, even when they were focused on the same electoral field. Instead, Petro Poroshenko avoided rivalry, focusing on his achievements during presidential term. This led to a paradoxical result: according to sociologists he had the largest anti-ranking, however he got the second place in the first round.

- **The majority of the candidates did not offer own meanings outside the campaign slogans.** Their messages were not detailed and explanatory - they were rather simplified and populist. For the most part, the pages disseminated emotional and meaningless for voters content.
- **Three candidates, including elected President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, were using their personal accounts without using public pages.** Thus, the information about who and from which countries was managing the page remained closed. At the same time, it was not possible to publish paid advertisements from these accounts, which complicated the tracking of funding sources for candidates' ads, their target audience and content. This indicates at the low transparency culture in terms of managing campaigns in social networks.
- **All candidates actively used photos and various video formats that are well perceived by social network algorithms. However, despite this, most candidates built one-sided ("top to bottom") and quite formal communication,** almost without using social networks. Social networks were used to the full extent only by Volodymyr Zelenskyi, creating the effect of informal communication on equal terms, actively involving the audience through flash mobs and polls. The communication was built around personality of the candidate, not around his political position, with the emphasis on the fact that he will listen to the "experts" and "the people". Given the results of the elections, this lead to the situation when voters do not know the position of the elected president on most key issues of the state development.
- It should be added that **the main communication channel for Volodymyr Zelenskyi was the Instagram account**, which he created much earlier being a showman. At this time he acquired his main audience through that time. Facebook page was promoted later. Zelenskyi also had the advantage in the number of followers on YouTube and Telegram networks.
- **Candidates did not pay great attention to attracting their own audience to elections, with the exception of Volodymyr Zelenskyi**, who regularly posted short motivational videos (#непроєвибори - don't f... up the elections) explaining the practical aspects of voting (how to register, check yourself in the lists, etc.) - obviously targeting the youth audience. A great number of views (of such video) confirmed the efficiency of this format.
- **None of the 10 candidates were engaged in comprehensive educational activities for voters**, for example, explaining the president's powers or the way to make an informed choice.
- All candidates, with the exception of Petro Poroshenko, **used hate speech in the first round.** The latter rarely mentioned competitors using the words "populists", "other candidates", and so on.
- **Candidates' pages actively promoted paid content, mostly targeting the regions that were considered to be their electoral base.** Due to the new policy of Facebook (on 18 March, the social network banned the publication of political advertising without the revealing the funding sources), virtually all such messages were blocked because it was not labeled as a political advertisement.

## The second round of elections

- **For the first time in Ukraine, social networks began to set the tone of election campaign.** This was the result of Volodymyr Zelenskyi's strategy of not appearing in the media (except for the participation in the talk show of the TV Channel "1+1"), and communicating with voters through professionally assembled short videos. The starting point was the video where Zelenskyi calls on the opponent Petro Poroshenko to come to the debates at the National Sport Complex "Olympiyskyi". Further discussions on the date and time of the debates were also in the video format. For some time, the attention of the viewer was fixed on social networks, and the role of the media was to cover what was happening there. Later on, the audience's attention was several times switched to television, in particular for talk shows with the participation of the candidates, where they made loud statements. In these situations, media often played the role of retransmitters, without being able to ask questions.
- As in the first round, **there are no meaningful discussions between the candidates and no request for them from the audience** (the monitoring of the most popular media materials in social networks is the evidence of this). The key reasons for the posts were events through the course of the campaign. There were no discussions on key aspects of the state's future. At the same time, if the position of Petro Poroshenko was fairly well known, Volodymyr Zelenskyi's office and the candidate himself did not formulate clear messages about his policies on key issues such as defence, Russian aggression in Donbas, foreign policy, cooperation with NATO, IMF, etc.
- **Petro Poroshenko began using the negatively coloured lexicon on the official page** against the opponent. Volodymyr Zelenskyi continued to use such vocabulary towards Petro Poroshenko. This strengthened the polarization between the supporters of candidates both among the opinion leaders and among the audience of social networks. Both candidates and their supporters were criticized for spreading the hate.
- **A great number of public pages and private groups in support of both candidates that actively disseminated disinformation and black PR** against their rivals can not be ignored. Direct ties between such pages and the candidates were not proven, but their active work contributed to the polarization of the audience and the increased emotionality of the campaign.
- Petro Poroshenko distributed official ads from his own public page and the "Petro Poroshenko 2019" page, and Volodymyr Zelenskyi from the "Zelenskyi's Team" page. At the same time, **Zelenskyi's team actively used micro targeting** for very narrow audiences, for example, students of the Kiev Polytechnic Institute.
- **As for the silence days, the candidates formally respected them in social networks**, by not holding direct agitation at their own pages. However, on 20 and 21 April, the "Zelenskyi's Team" public page conducted a massive advertising campaign with over 1200 adverts, most of which were published on April 21, where voters were called to come and vote.

## Public opinion leaders

**Ten pages of the most popular public opinion leaders** were selected for monitoring. The purpose is to analyse how the most influential Facebook users cover the presidential election campaign. Data from two analytical companies that explore social networks was used to determine the sample: <https://www.socialbakers.com/> and <https://www.fanpagekarma.com/>. The list was formed taking into account the number of subscribers and the relevance of post topics, as well as expert opinion. The consolidated list excludes candidates, politicians, government officials, organizations, politically inactive users.

Opinion leaders are individuals with an active position, high level of trust from the audience and awareness about the processes in the state. They are expected to explain how to make the best choice. In fact, for many voters, they play a role that previously belonged exclusively to the media.

- Unlike the first round, in the second one **the majority of the opinion leaders, with a few exceptions, changed the rhetoric of balanced analysis and educational outreach to voters to the rhetoric of support to a particular candidate and/or criticism of another**. This is indicative, on the one hand, as a certain mirror of change in public moods, on the other - as a possible tool for influencing these moods.
- **Only some public opinion leaders in the second round tried to analyse coherently the position of candidates** (or lack thereof) on selected key issues that are within the president's mandate. Half covered the topic of upcoming parliamentary elections.
- Both provided support and criticism of candidates and their supporters in the second round were of different degrees, but were generally more emotional than balanced. **Polarization of thoughts and the level of aggressiveness of the statements has increased**. This is a significant difference from the first round. The behaviour of only certain opinion leaders could be called quite responsible: their conclusions were based on proven facts, and the statements were correct (Vitalii Portnikov, Sonia Koshkina).
- **Opinion leaders used hate speech**, in terms of both candidates and their supporters. The most active was Dmytro Chekalkin, who was a authorised representative of Petro Poroshenko during elections: "green [https://www.facebook.com/Dmitriy.Chekalkin/photos/a.365582946801298/3395253500500879/?type=3&\\_tn\\_=-R drug addict](https://www.facebook.com/Dmitriy.Chekalkin/photos/a.365582946801298/3395253500500879/?type=3&_tn_=-R%20drug%20addict)", "Gauleiter Ze", ZeMMM, "Teletubby", "ZEnuresis", "intellectually impoverished" (about the Volodymyr Zelenskyi's supporters). Other examples are: "crazy prokhobots", "It is unclear who is clown here" (Yurii Butusov), "gossipmonger", "jerkoffs" (Oleksiy Mochanov, about supporters of Poroshenko). Therefore, the number opinion leaders had slight

decreased slightly, which was not observed during the campaign of the first round of election. One page was blocked by social network for a short time.

## TV Channels and Internet Online Media

The monitoring team covered **18 Facebook-pages of TV channels and online media** that were within scope of the media monitoring. Every day, media specialists analysed 10 posts of each page that scored the biggest number in reactions. This made it possible to understand the priorities of the audience and the policy of a particular media in terms of elections coverage.

- **Priority of election news among the Facebook-audience of traditional media varied in the first and second rounds.** During the first round, the audience of several media "did not notice" the elections, giving preference to entertaining content and news about disasters and crime. In the second one, the election campaign news for the first time became more popular than entertaining and tabloid content on all media pages that were within the scope of monitoring. Almost all of them concerned the show-aspect of the elections: whether the debate should happen, and under what conditions, whether candidates would pass medical examinations, etc. This had the effect that **meaningful content was lost in the entertaining component of the process.**
- **In the second round, absolute winner at all media pages was the election-related news**, in particular debates, and to a lesser extent, politics in general. The next topics in popularity by a significant margin, were international news, external relations of Ukraine, Russian aggression and protection from it.
- With regards to no demand from audience for meaningful discussions, some experts think that **the policy of the majority of Ukrainian TV channels had led to lower informational culture between voters.** As in recent years they had deliberately lowered the bar - they made the broadcast more primitive, focusing on emotions instead of high-quality journalism.

## Recommendations

### To subjects of electoral process:

1. **Focus on your own position and program components connected to important aspects of the country's life during the campaign.** Make efforts to raise the awareness of the audience about how the state mechanism works, without silencing its problems. This would raise the level of electoral debate in the country and would add to the raise in the level of trust in society, transparency of the elections and state governance process and strengthening the democracy.
2. **When criticising, remember about the meaningful side of criticism: it has to be evidence-based, not purely emotional, and not contain hate speech.** The

latter increases the polarization and radicalisation of society, promotes tension and does not contribute to the development of the democracy.

3. **Initiate meaningful and detailed discussions on key issues of state development** involving the public and opinion leaders, including social networks, creating a culture of political debate in Ukraine.

4. **Increase transparency of the campaign in social networks.** In particular, create public pages instead of private profiles. This includes an open advertising policy for candidates and political forces, which should not be conducted from third-party accounts.

### To opinion leaders

1. Understanding your own responsibilities, it is **better to raise the knowledge of the voters rather than to promote a particular message, and to discuss ideas and meanings rather than personalities of candidates.** Opinion leaders can influence on improvement of the quality of public discussion.

2. In the case of active promotion of a particular position, **clearly state their ties or affiliation with a candidate's team or media that supports the candidate** (if any). For example, to make them visible in the profile.

3. **Avoid distorting or silencing the facts in favour of one of the sides.** Not to speak up, not knowing the situation and not having accurate information. Instead, **clarify issues that are in the field of your competence.** This is especially true for journalists, who should communicate difficult things to the audience, while not violating professional ethics.

4. **Understand that, by promoting one or another candidate, a public opinion leader risks its own reputation.** Especially if he/she is both an expert and expresses expert opinion. A strong institution of reputation is one of the foundations of public trust, which is the basis for democracy.

### To media:

1. **Focus on education of voters in social networks**, using attractive formats for readers, such as short videos and motivational photos. Active promotion of analytical information by "packing" it into visual formats - "to teach when entertaining". At the same time, focus on which format is in demand within the target audience of the media.

2. **"UA:Suspilne" should more actively lead its Facebook page by promoting educational content** (given the efficiency of the campaign of short videos involving the celebrities that called to vote during the first round of elections). Also to attract the attention of the social networks audience to the high-quality products of the channel by using modern formats: quotations, short video cuts, etc.

3. **Raise the journalists' knowledge not only in the electoral field, but also on how social media works, in particular during election campaigns.** This will allow journalists to more consciously treat social networks as sources of information and



not become an easy object of manipulation and ultimately better reflect the election process. Such need exists not only at the central level, but also in the regions where it is worthwhile to cover and effectively analyse online campaigns of politicians on future parliamentary and local elections.

**4. Dedicate part of media content for expert explanations of the role of social networks in the electoral process and the mechanism of their work.** For example, talk about the dangers of distributing misinformation and manipulative content through closed groups in social networks and messengers. Such education will allow voters to better identify possible manipulations in social networks and more effectively resist them.

**5. Explain the harm to the audience and the threat of disinformation, fakes and information noise,** as well as the consequences of this phenomenon for society. Do it in an interesting, easy to understand form.

**6. Use social networks to initiate a real public debate on important issues of the country's development,** demanding the involvement of top candidates in them. Collaborate on this matter with other media, creating joint initiatives that can help to change the information space in a qualitative way.

**7. Coordinate policies relating to the electoral silence day in social networks.** Days of electoral silence are actively violated by the candidates' election campaign offices and the media themselves. Since there are no legal mechanisms for controlling of the compliance of what is by essence campaigning in social media, it is necessary to agree on the "rules of the game" between the responsible actors. The initiators of this process may be namely the media and media organizations.

**8. Improve the rules for publishing content received from social networks.** That is to clearly mark not verified information and update it after checking. To avoid titles that distort the content of the news, because, as studies prove, a large number of users respond only to headings.

## **SIGNS OF POTENTIAL RUSSIAN EXTERNAL INFORMATION INFLUENCE ON UKRAINIAN MEDIA**

The monitoring focused on the main narratives of Russian propaganda identified through analysis of fake news debunked by StopFake project (<https://www.stopfake.org/>) during four years.

The classification was done by StopFake co-author Yevhen Fedchenko in his article "Kremlin Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures by Other Means" – Estonian Journal of Military Studies, 2016 <https://bit.ly/2IpBVIV>. After having analysed a sample of 500 false materials, examples of Kremlin propaganda –18 themes were identified that unite them, such as "Ukrainians are fascists," "Ukraine is a failed state," and so on.

During the entire monitoring period, **there was a trend to use Russian websites and information agencies as sources of information, in particular about international and Ukrainian news,** where it would be more logical to use primary

sources of the country concerned. Often they promoted narratives of Russian propaganda.

**There was a tendency to report on the internal events in Russia, impose Russian agenda.** Consumers of this information constantly remained within Russian information space.

Messages echoing the narratives of Russian propaganda were often rebroadcasted in the form of **presidential candidates and politicians quotes**.

As to certain narratives, some of the media promoted the narrative "Ukrainians are fascists/Nazis." During the campaign, the number of messages that could be interpreted as attempts to discredit the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian authorities significantly increased.

News that could be seen as attempts to **legitimize the pseudo-republics in the Donbas and the occupation of the Crimea** appeared in different media. In particular, the occupation authorities were presented as political subjects, and Russian soldiers in Donbas were called "separatists".

**The narrative "There is no Russia there" remained popular** ("Russia is not an occupant state and it did not carry out a military attack against Ukraine"). In stories or news about events from the front line, the Russian military were called "enemy", "occupants", "mercenaries", "militants" without indicating the state they belong to. Some media that were monitored changed their policy on this issue and began to designate the enemy clearly.

#### **Recommendations to media:**

1. **Raise the level of knowledge of journalists on how propaganda and external information influences work.** Get acquainted with the main narratives of Russian propaganda and manipulative techniques for the rapid identification of such possible influences.
2. **Do not use Russian sources of information about international and Ukrainian news,** except when they are primary sources - for example, it refers to important statements or actions of officials of the Russian Federation. Do not use sources of information, access to which is officially restricted in Ukraine.
3. **Be careful about reports of internal events in the Russian Federation,** realising that the consumer of such information is in the media space of the aggressor country and, thus, can be more easily manipulated.
4. **Cover the statements of politicians or candidates that echo the narratives of Russian propaganda in a balanced way.** Cover them critically, giving the context and the background needed for understanding, and, if necessary, the opposite point of view.

5. **Be responsible with the terminology while covering topics related to Russian aggression in Donbas.** Clearly articulate who is the opponent of the Ukrainian army, indicate the aggressor state.

## COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF ETHICS OF UKRAINIAN JOURNALIST

The way people work in the mass media and communicate about the elections directly influences how those who vote (or not) behave during the elections, and therefore determines our common future life. This is emphasized by Andrii Kulykov, Chairman of the Commission on Journalism Ethics, in the handbook "Covering elections in Ukraine: a guide for journalists and editorial teams"<sup>11</sup>, which was prepared on the basis of the results of the media monitoring.

*"Awareness of those who elect, their ability to resist manipulations and, ultimately, to make informed decisions depends to a large extent on impartiality, honesty, and accuracy of our work. We must be balanced in our work (unless, of course, we declare frankly which side are we taking during the electoral competition) so that our audience knows how to use their votes as they consider necessary, rather than jumping from side to side every time in electoral preference, depending on material they found. We must aware in our work - this awareness should be to carry out professional duties according to professional standards", - Andrii Kulykov said.*

In total, for the whole monitoring period from January to April 2019, **82 violations** of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalist were found among the monitored media. All complaints received from the Commission on Journalism Ethics and relevant decisions of the CJE are published on the website of the Commission in the section "Elections" <http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/elections>.

Most of the cases found were related to:

- 1) the violation of the standard of separating facts from the comments (paragraph 9 of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalist);
- 2) the lack of separation of advertising from the news content, as well as the lack of its marking (paragraph 7 of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalists);
- 3) the violation of the rules of sociological polls citing (paragraph 11 of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalists);
- 4) the unbalanced representation of opponents' points of view, as well as the involvement of independent experts (paragraph 10 of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalists);
- 5) the violation of the standard of separating facts from the comments (paragraph 9 of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalist);

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<sup>11</sup> Covering elections in Ukraine: a guide for journalists and editorial teams // S. Ostapa, D. Dutsyk, Ye. Kuzmenko, V. Volodovska / Ed. O. Pohorelov - K, 2019. - 32 p.

The Commission carefully considered the complaints and made 18 decisions related to such mass media as TV Channel "ICTV", TV Channel "112 Ukraine", TV Channel "Inter", TV Channel "NewsOne", TV Channel "Ukraine", TV Channel "1+1", TV Channel "Priamyi", as well as online media "Ukrainska Pravda", "Obozrevatel", "Segodnya.ua", "Strana.ua", "GORDON".

Among these decisions, the Commission issued 13 friendly warnings and 5 public condemnations of the media.

***Recommendations to editors to avoid the signs of the paid materials during content planning<sup>12</sup>.***

1. Pay attention whether the material you are planning corresponds with the expectations of the target audience of your media. This requires a clear vision of who composes this target audience, namely: age group, gender, social status, wealth, education, etc.
2. If any customer proposes your media (TV/radio channel) some material, then the choice should be between consenting to publish it as advertising (with the obligatory marking "advertising"), or making your own editorial referring to the interests of the target audience, for which you work.
3. The editorial content should be balanced, truthful and reliable, without any advertising theses about a presidential/ candidate or a party. The material should not have unproved statistics, incorrect dates, allegations that do not correspond to reality, or any unreliable fact. Only in this case, the text can be evaluated as expert and useful for your audience.
4. In the planning of materials orient to the social significance of the topic.
5. Check the information to see if it is a special "fake" and learn who benefits when sharing it. Only then, decide whether to work on the topic.
6. Plan meaningful materials, do not overload the audience with clichés and empty plain words. Often the sign of paid material is when instead of answering important questions, the campaigning offices offer you clichés and ample promoting messages.
7. Try to write on relevant topics - this is always a good approach to creating content. Monitor events that happen during an election campaign, watch for news that may be of big interest, and create hot materials for the first few hours. This way, in a very short time, you can make the audience even more interested in your media.
8. Balance the opinions, and in a situation where it is impossible to do so, clearly explain to the audience why this happened. For example, there was no time to take a comment of the other party, or this representative is unavailable, or refuses to comment. And do not stop there - try to get answers quickly from the other side of

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<sup>12</sup> Covering elections in Ukraine: a guide for journalists and editorial teams // S. Ostapa, D. Dutsyk, Ye. Kuzmenko, V. Volodovska / Ed. O. Pohorelov - K, 2019. - 32 p.

the conflict. Even if it seems that the side had admitted its guilt and it is proven, still this side must be given a word.

9. When planning to cover the event, try to discover if its aim corresponds the title, and if it is not organized exclusively for someone's promotion. If you see that it is organized in someone's interest - it is better to just ignore it. In general there should not be materials theme such as "Presidential candidate took part in commemorating veterans". If this is the event to honor the veterans - then you have to give the floor to them, and not to promote a presidential candidate.

10. Check the statements of politicians, and complement these with the opinions of the experts, rather than simply broadcast. If a person says a lie, and you can prove it - prove it! If he/she just promoting him/herself - it is not news.

11. And finally. Make quality content. The audience is saturated with information. Therefore, it can be satisfied only with the best content, which it may benefit from. Often, the media literate audience recognizes the material with signs of being paid already from the heading, and it does not interest it.

## INFOGRAPHICS

# FIRST ROUND

## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE ON TV CHANNELS


14 January - 29 March 2019



### UA:PERSHYI

#### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE

positive neutral negative




14 January - 29 March 2019



### INTER

#### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE

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


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## INTER

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## PRYAMYI

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE






14 January - 29 March 2019



## 5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL

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


14 January - 29 March 2019



## 1+1

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


14 January - 29 March 2019



## NEWSONE

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


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## 112 UKRAINE

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


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## UKRAINE

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


14 January - 29 March 2019



## STB

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES COVERAGE IN THE ONLINE MEDIA

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### OBOZREVATEL

#### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




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### SEGODNYA.UA

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


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## STRANA.UA

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


14 January - 29 March 2019



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


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## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

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


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## NOVOYE VREMYA

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


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## KORRESPONDENT

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


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## GORDONUA.COM

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




## TOPICS COVERED ON TV CHANNELS

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### UA: PERSHYI

#### TOPICS COVERED




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### INTER

#### TOPICS COVERED






14 January – 29 March 2019



## ICTV

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


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## PRYAMYI

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


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## 5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL

### TOPICS COVERED




14 January – 29 March 2019



## 1+1

### TOPICS COVERED




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## NEWSONE

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


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## 112 UKRAINE

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


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## UKRAINE

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


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## STB

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
## TOPICS COVERED IN THE ONLINE MEDIA

14 January – 29 March 2019



### OBOZREVATEL

#### TOPICS COVERED




14 January – 29 March 2019



### SEGODNYA.UA

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


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## STRANA.UA

### TOPICS COVERED




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## HROMADSKÉ

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


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## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

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


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## NOVOYE VREMYA

### TOPICS COVERED




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## KORRESPONDENT

### TOPICS COVERED




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## GORDONUA.COM

### TOPICS COVERED






## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE ON TV CHANNELS

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### UA:PERSHYI

MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




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### INTER

MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## ICTV

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




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## PRYAMYI

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## 5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## 1+1

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## NEWSONE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## 112 UKRAINE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## UKRAINE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



## STB

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE IN THE ONLINE MEDIA

14 January - 29 March 2019



### OBOZREVATEL

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



### SEGODNYA.UA

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



# STB

## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




14 January - 29 March 2019



# HROMADSKÉ

## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE



## CANDIDATES' ACTIVITY IN FACEBOOK

04 February – 31 March 2019 (1<sup>st</sup> round)



# FACEBOOK

### CANDIDATES' ACTIVITY IN FACEBOOK




Page creation date: **12 July 2014**




Не втрачай ще 5 років  
31 березня

Page creation date: **24 November 2017**


#### NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TIME PERIOD




#### NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS AT THE END OF THE TIME PERIOD




#### NUMBER OF POSTS




#### NUMBER OF SHARES



#### NUMBER OF COMMENTS



#### NUMBER OF REACTIONS










## WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION ON TV CHANNELS



14 January – 29 March 2019






### WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION ON TV CHANNELS





14 January – 29 March 2019

## WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION ON TV CHANNELS



# SECOND ROUND


## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES COVERAGE ON TV CHANNELS

01-19 April 2019



### UA:PERSHYI

#### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



### INTER

#### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



### ICTV

#### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



## PRYAMYI

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



## 5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



## 1+1

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



## NEWSONE

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



## 112 UKRAINE

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



## UKRAINE

### PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




01-19 April 2019



# STB

## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE




## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES COVERAGE IN THE ONLINE MEDIA

01-19 April 2019



# OBOZREVATEL

## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE







01-19 April 2019



# SEGODNYA.UA

## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' COVERAGE






## TOPICS COVERED ON TV CHANNELS

01 – 19 April 2019



### TV CHANNEL “UA:PERSHYI”

#### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



### TV CHANNEL “INTER”

#### TOPICS COVERED






01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “ICTV”

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “PRYAMYI”

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL”

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “1+1”

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “NEWSONE”

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “112 UKRAINE”

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “UKRAINE”

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “STB”

### TOPICS COVERED




## TOPICS COVERED IN THE ONLINE MEDIA

01 – 19 April 2019



### OBOZREVATEL

#### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



### SEGODNYA.UA

#### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## STRANA.UA

TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## HROMADSKÉ

TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## NOVOYE VREMYA

### TOPICS COVERED




01 – 19 April 2019



## KORRESPONDENT

### TOPICS COVERED



01 – 19 April 2019



## GORDONUA.COM

### TOPICS COVERED






## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE ON TV CHANNELS

01 – 19 April 2019



### TV CHANNEL "UA: PERSHYI"

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



### TV CHANNEL "INTER"

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL "ICTV"

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL "PRYAMYI"

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL”

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “1+1”

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “NEWSONE”

MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “112 UKRAINE”

MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “UKRAINE”

MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## TV CHANNEL “STB”

MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE IN THE ONLINE MEDIA

01 – 19 April 2019



### OBOZREVATEL

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



### SEGODNYA.UA

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## STRANA.UA

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## HROMADSKIE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## NOVOYE VREMYA

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE






01 – 19 April 2019



## KORRESPONDENT

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




01 – 19 April 2019



## GORDONUA.COM

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE



## CANDIDATES' ACTIVITY IN FACEBOOK

01 – 21 April 2019 (2<sup>nd</sup> round)




### FACEBOOK


CANDIDATES' ACTIVITY IN FACEBOOK




#### NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TIME PERIOD




#### NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS AT THE END OF THE TIME PERIOD




#### NUMBER OF POSTS




#### NUMBER OF SHARES





#### NUMBER OF COMMENTS



#### NUMBER OF REACTIONS



## MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES OF THE CANDIDATES



# MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES OF PUBLIC OPINION LEADERS




01 – 21 April 2019


## FACEBOOK

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS  
ON PUBLIC OPINION LEADERS' FACEBOOK PAGES


### YURIY BUTUSOV




### DMYTRO CHEKALKIN



### DMYTRO GORDON



### SERGIY IVANOV






01 – 21 April 2019



## FACEBOOK

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS  
ON PUBLIC OPINION LEADERS' FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019




## FACEBOOK

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS  
ON PUBLIC OPINION LEADERS' FACEBOOK PAGES


### OLEG PONOMAR



### VITALIY PORTNIKOV



### ROMAN SHRIKE




## MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES OF TV CHANNELS

01 – 21 April 2019



### UA: SUSPILNE

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



### PODROBNOSTI (INTER)

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



### FACTY (ICTV)

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## PRYAMYI

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## 5<sup>TH</sup> CHANNEL

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## TSN (1+1)

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES






01 – 21 April 2019



## NEWSONE

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## 112 UKRAINE

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## UKRAINE

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


01 – 21 April 2019



## VIKNA-NOVYNY (STB)

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




## MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES OF ONLINE MEDIA

01 – 21 April 2019



## OBOZREVATEL

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## SEGODNYA.UA

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## STRANA.UA

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## HROMADSKE

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## NOVOYE VREMYA

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## KORRESPONDENT

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




01 – 21 April 2019



## GORDON

THE MOST COVERED TOPICS ON FACEBOOK PAGES







## WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION ON TV CHANNELS

01 – 21 April 2019




### WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION ON TV CHANNELS



01 – 21 April 2019



## WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION ON TV CHANNELS





## WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION IN ONLINE MEDIA

14 January – 19 April 2019



### WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION IN ONLINE MEDIA



14 January – 19 April 2019



## WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION IN ONLINE MEDIA



– MEN



– WOMEN




– NOT SPECIFIED



14 January – 19 April 2019



## WOMEN AND MEN REPRESENTATION IN ONLINE MEDIA



– MEN



– WOMEN



– NOT SPECIFIED