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# **FINAL REPORT ON FINDINGS OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN UKRAINE**

**Media monitoring period  
22 June – 21 July 2019**

**Kyiv, Ukraine**

Final Report on Findings of the Independent Monitoring of Media Coverage of the Parliamentary Election Campaign in Ukraine / O. Burmahin, D. Dutsyk, Ye. Kuzmenko, O. Iurkova. – Kyiv, 2019 – 117 p.

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*Opinions expressed by the authors of this publication do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Council of Europe.*

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## KEY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT

### ➤ FOR THE STATE AUTHORITIES

- Politicians, media owners and authorities should refrain from attempts to influence media content or interfere in any way in the activities of media and journalists as it undermines their independence. Interference with the activities of journalists and media personnel should not be tolerated, and any allegations of such should be promptly and efficiently investigated.
- The authorities should ensure the presence of a strong, independent and properly resourced public service media, which operate(s) under a clear mandate to serve public interest and to set and maintain high standards of journalism.
- The state authorities should allocate additional funding to media for producing gender-sensitive content. Incentives or rewards for good practices should be offered, for example, through state funding.
- The state authorities should support and promote good practices through dialogue and the development of networks and partnerships between stakeholders in the media sector to further combat sexism and gender stereotypes in the sector.

### ➤ FOR THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE

- Identify effective state regulator(s) to oversee and ensure compliance with election laws by the media. Also, assess the need for a regulator in the sphere of Internet and establishment of this institution in a strict accordance with international principles and standards of regulation of the global network. The regulator(s) should:
  - ✓ have a balanced composition,
  - ✓ act impartially, independently and transparently,
  - ✓ investigate violations,
  - ✓ make decisions quickly,
  - ✓ be able to impose reasonable, adequate and effective sanctions, and
  - ✓ act with the purpose of ensuring pluralism and freedom of speech, monitoring of the main mass media (subject matters and time of speeches for candidates and their supporters, terms and conditions for accessing the media - absolute or proportional equality), searching for new ways to cover the electoral process with due regard for the evolution of the media

- Foresee a system of adequate sanctions for violating the electoral legislation by the mass media in the field of election campaigning, informing voters and covering the election process.
- Improve current legislation with the aim to clearly differentiate election campaigning from the voters' informing, and to introduce effective mechanisms for dealing with hidden advertising and advertorial/paid materials ("dzhynsa").
- Introduce restrictions or prohibitions on the placement of campaign materials on TV and radio, prohibition on placement of campaign materials via outdoor advertising during the election process.
- Consider introducing a special regime for placing campaign materials prior to the start of the election process.
- Update the electoral legislation and introduce regulation of activities in the Internet during the elections, both in terms of campaigning and informing, as well as in terms of monitoring the spending of the election campaign funds on similar activities, and, more specifically, funds from other sources or other countries.
- Take measures to minimise misuse of personal data by candidates for election purposes (BigData), including through voter targeting.
- Adopt legislation that bans sexism in the mass media, encourages monitoring and enforcement of such measures.

#### ➤ **FOR THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTING OF UKRAINE**

- Create precedents and introduce the practice of responding to violations in the manner prescribed by the Law of Ukraine 'On Television and Radio Broadcasting' in order to bring to liability television channels that violate the requirements of the electoral law in so far as informing and campaigning.
- Adopt all the necessary amendments to National Council's normative legal acts in order to ensure that protocols are drawn up on administrative violations in the cases provided for by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Violations.
- Create precedents and introduce the practice of drawing up protocols on administrative violations in cases provided for by the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses.

- Create precedents with final findings and assessments for differentiating the nature of the materials – campaign/informational.
- Introduce Council's own practice of responding to cases of hidden campaign materials' distribution by TV channels, including instances when campaign materials are included in the information programs, as well as introduce interaction with other state authorities on verification of funding and the role of the subjects of the election process in cases of such violations.
- Encourage media companies to adopt their own policies for gender equality, in particular in terms of pay, career growth, work-life balance, access to managerial positions and media content.
- Initiate adoption of a self-regulatory act against sexism in mass media encouraging commercial broadcasters to sign such act.

#### ➤ **FOR THE ELECTORAL SUBJECTS**

- During the campaign, focus on their own position and program clauses related to important aspects of the country's life. Put forth efforts for raising awareness of the audience about how the state mechanism works whilst not ignoring the problems. This would increase the level of electoral debate in the country and would increase the level of trust in society, the transparency of the election and the process of country's governance, and the strengthening of democracy.
- When criticizing, remember about the meaningful side of criticism: it must be argumentative, and not purely emotional, and should not contain aggressive language that sparks hostility. The latter increases the polarization and radicalization of society, promotes tension and does not contribute to the development of democracy.
- Initiate meaningful and detailed discussions, including those in social networks, on key issues of state development with the involvement of the broader public and opinion leaders, thus creating a culture of political debate in Ukraine.
- Increase the transparency of the campaigning in social networks. In particular, to create public pages instead of private profiles. This concerns also an open advertising policy for candidates and political forces, since it should not be carried out from third-party accounts.

## ➤ FOR THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER

- Enhance the information & political broadcasting and more actively provide coverage of complex political processes in the news, including elections.
- Demonstrate to the media market a standard of quality work in elections coverage, as opposed to biased editorial policies of private TV channels.
- Create high quality and competitive analytical content dedicated to political topics. In particular, ensure the launch of a political talk show (not only the debates) from the first days of the election campaign, which could provide a quality discussion on the issues of the election process.
- Fill and manage the Facebook page more actively whilst promoting educational content (due to the effectiveness of the campaign of short video with the involvement of celebrities calling to vote during the first round of elections). Also, draw attention of the social networks' audience to the channel's high-quality products using modern formats: quotes, short videos, etc.
- Elaborate and adopt a gender equality policy and serve as an example for commercial media on this matter.
- Pay attention to covering the realities, as they are, not being afraid to show people's emotions, positive or critical/negative viewpoints. Neutrality should not be seen as an ultimate goal as the news then becomes superficial and sterile. At the same time, UA:Persnyi should present all sides of the story with a comparable time and manner of presentation to avoid any preference or bias. It is important to ensure that UA:Persnyi's news is newsworthy, enriching the public discourse. It is thus important that their journalists actively seek for information and do not just wait what other media outlets report in order to recycle their reports.

## ➤ FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA

- It is vital for TV channels' credibility to assure that all personnel (editors, producers, journalists, news program & talk-show anchors and hosts) are perceived as professional and impartial while carrying out their journalistic duties. Adherence to this requirement is extremely important when preparing the news (news structure, composition, topics, editing, visual, audio aspects of concrete news items; selection of guests & topics & questions in talk-shows) and also in the way news is presented (communication with respondents, guests, how questions are formulated, toned, how deep journalist goes with additional inquiries, whether a viewer can perceive, feel, hear and see that journalist is really involved, issue-driven or whether

journalist is biased in some way and leaning towards or distancing against certain views).

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding training of journalists and other editorial staff

- Improve journalists' knowledge on matters from the elections sphere.
- Increase the level of journalists' knowledge on how social media work, including in election campaigns. This will allow journalists to treat social networks more carefully and as sources of information and not be easily manipulated, which ultimately would lead them to providing better coverage the election process. This need exists not only at the central level, but also in the regions where it is necessary to provide coverage and quality analysis of politicians' online campaigns during the future parliamentary and local elections.
- Enhance journalists' knowledge on how propaganda and external information influences work. Get them acquainted with the main narratives of Russian propaganda and manipulative techniques for the rapid identification of such possible influences.
- Organise trainings that raise the level of critical thinking, and encourage journalists to participate in them.
- Increase the level of journalists' knowledge on fact checking.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding presentation of sociological data during election campaigns

- When presenting the results of sociological surveys, it is necessary to provide information on: full name of the organization that has carried out the survey; customers who ordered the survey; time when survey was carried out; territory covered by the survey; size and method of forming a sociological sample; survey method; precise wording of questions; possible statistical error.
- When the results of an interactive audience poll are publicly presented, they should be accompanied by a text message "This poll reflects the opinion only of this particular audience". The message should be displayed on the screen (for television programs) in a form suitable for a viewer to perceive it, or it can be announced (for radio programs) in a clear manner by the speaker or program host immediately before and after the indicated results are presented.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ **regarding the decrease of the conflict level in the media environment**

- Editorial teams of online publications are recommended to find a balance between click-bait headlines (i.e. those that provoke readers to click on the link; such headlines are often of poor quality, emotional and provocative) and those that do not mislead the reader and do not provoke aggression or negative emotions.
- Talk show TV-hosts should avoid having a biased attitude towards the guests present in the studio or political processes; they should stay neutral and make sure that discussion in the studio remains sufficiently ethical, and prevent offensive, xenophobic, racist, or other expressions that incite hostility.
- Refrain from supporting and even block discussions that incite hostility and hatred on social media pages.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ **regarding completeness of information**

- In their news coverage of the campaign, broadcasters should enhance their reporting by providing the relevant context, background information, using experts and alternative viewpoints in the framework of their news items. By offering such views, they could help their viewers to better understand what the given information means for them, what the consequences of bad governing are, its alternatives and other perspectives. The stories should be presented from various angles, presenting different viewpoints – all sides involved in an issue – experts, civil society representatives (but not always the same ones).
- When covering any controversial issue, especially of a political nature, it is important to present all sides involved, including when a side refuses to comment. In such scenario, such a refusal shall be presented so that the public is not misled. In addition, it is evenly important to provide impartial background information (intro into the story) if the issue is long-term and complicated. It is usually not satisfactory to limit coverage of such controversial topics by purely presenting opinions of sides involved without proper contextual information. At the same time, it is important to consider balance of expert/analytical views.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding the sources of information

- Do not use anonymous sources (exception - you disregard the recommendation to indicate a source if it would impose a threat to safety/life of the source).
- When using information from social networks, check the source of this information, and clearly indicate it; even links to verified accounts are not a guarantee that your source distributes credible information, as the source may have its own mercenary motive.
- Treat critically references to mass media that use social networks as the main source of information.
- When covering events in Ukraine, it is better to use Ukrainian sources of information; when covering events in other countries, use the media of the respective country, and it is better to refer only to those media that have a long history and known experience.
- Regarding Russian sources of information – see section "Regarding the possible Russian influence".

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding work with social networks

- Focus on educating voters in social networks by using formats attractive for readers, such as short videos and motivational photos. Actively promote analytical information by "packing" it into visualized formats - "teach while entertaining" ('edutainment'). At the same time, keep in mind which format is most in demand by the target audience of the media.
- Devote part of media content to expert explanations of the role of social networks in the electoral process and the mechanism of their work. For example, tell about the dangers of distributing disinformation and manipulative content through closed groups in social networks and messengers. Such education will allow voters to better identify possible manipulations in social networks and resist them more effectively.
- Explain to audience the damage and threats of disinformation, fake news and information noise, as well as the consequences of these phenomena for the society. Do it in a form that is interesting and easy to understand.
- Use social networks to initiate a real public debate on important issues of the country's development, requiring the involvement of top candidates.

Collaborate with other media on this matter to create joint initiatives that can contribute to quality changes in the information space.

- Elaborate editorial policies for days of "election silence" in social networks, since during these days the "silence" is being actively violated by both the election headquarters of candidates, and the media themselves. Since social networks lack legal mechanisms to monitor observance of the essential rules of campaigning, reaching an agreement on the 'rules of the game' by responsible actors would be advisable. The media or media organisations may become initiators of this process.
- Improve the rules for publishing content from social networks. Clearly mark unverified information as such and update it after verification. Avoid headlines that distort news content, since, as indicated by research, many users reacts to headlines only.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding the possible Russian influence

- Do not use Russian sources of information about international and Ukrainian news, except when they are the primary sources of information - for example, when the news concerns important statements or actions of Russian officials.
- Do not use sources of information access to which is officially restricted in Ukraine.
- Be wary of the reports of events occurring inside the Russian Federation, knowing that consumers of such information are immersed by the aggressor country's media space and thus are easier to be manipulated.
- Provide balanced coverage of politicians' or candidates' statements that re-echo narratives of Russian propaganda. Present them critically, alongside with the context and background that are necessary for understanding, and, if needed – with the opposite point of view.
- Use responsible approach to terminology when covering topics related to the Russian aggression in the Donbas region. Clearly articulate who is the opponent of the Ukrainian army, indicating the country-aggressor.

➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

❖ regarding avoiding materials with signs of being advertorial/paid ("dzhynsa") during content planning

- Release any materials offered to the editorial staff by the 'customer' as sponsored features only (always marked as 'Advertisement'; or 'Campaign



advertisement', 'Election message' for campaign materials). Otherwise, publish your own editorials with regard to the interests of the media target audience.

- Adhere to the principles of balance, truthfulness, accuracy and impartiality, and never allow ideas that might indicate advertising of any particular presidential/parliamentary candidate or party.
- Do not give advantage (or any preferences) to representatives of the state authorities during election campaigns.
- Limit presentation of officials during the period prior the elections, especially if officials are taking part in the elections. The coverage of officials activities shall be based on the newsworthiness of topic in which a politician is involved, not on a pure fact that a top official is involved. The news program shall try to avoid automatic coverage of top officials. If it is decided that the coverage of an official is newsworthy, then a broadcaster should do its best to provide the necessary background to all such stories, including independent and/or opposing views to those of the government.
- When planning materials, take into account the significance of the topic for the public.
- Check information, especially the one that is critical of, or incriminating any particular persons, and look into who might benefit from it. Only then decide whether to work on the topic.
- Adhere to a standard of balanced opinions and, where it is impossible, explain to the audience clearly, why this has happened.
- Cover the events that are important to the public, rather than those organised for publicity or advertising purposes.
- Do not parrot politicians' statements or allegations, check them and supplement them with experts' comments.

#### ➤ **FOR THE EDITORIAL TEAMS OF MASS MEDIA**

##### ❖ regarding gender related issues

- Cover the activities and programs of the candidates to the fullest extent possible regardless of their sex and ensure equal and unbiased attitude towards them.
- Adhere to gender equality in editorial work (equal opportunities and attitude, equal access to decision-making positions) and when dealing with the media content, with a special focus on combatting sexism.

- As a self-regulatory body for journalists and editorial staff in Ukraine, the Commission on Journalism Ethics must accept, consider and review complaints on sexism in the mass media, and recommend to the media that any sexist content be deleted or altered.
- Implement education and training strategies, as well as tools for journalists and other media professionals, to detect sexism, promote positive and non-stereotyped portrayal of women and men in the mass media, and facilitate gender-sensitive communication. These additional measures should be supported with adequate resourcing.
- All editorial boards, irrespective of the patterns of ownership, should develop and adopt editorial standards in respect of the gender factor.
- Journalists and editorial staff should: a) make efforts to find female experts, commentators and speakers; b) examine and adhere to gender parity when selecting talk show guests; c) let women talk, rather than use reported speech to talk about them.
- The mass media should indicate the authors' names, so that the readers could understand the standpoint around which the materials were written and whether a parity exists in the way, the journalists are represented in the media.

## INTRODUCTION

The coalition of civil society organisations consisting of “The Commission on Journalism Ethics”, “Human Rights Platform”, “Ukrainian Media and Communications Institute” and “StopFake” have been systematically monitoring the media coverage of the Parliamentary election campaign in Ukraine. This activity was carried out with the support of the Council of Europe’s projects ‘Supporting the transparency, inclusiveness and integrity of electoral practice in Ukraine’ and ‘Strengthening freedom of media, access to information and reinforcing the public broadcasting system in Ukraine’ implemented within the framework of the Council of Europe’s Action Plan for Ukraine 2018–2021.

The monitoring is intended to offer professional, comprehensive and objective assessment of political diversity and balance in news and current affairs coverage on ten TV channels and eight online media outlets. Moreover, the role of social media during elections, the potential impact of disinformation propaganda, to what extent the media struggle against stereotypes and how they portray gender-related topics are other aspects and indicators included in the monitoring. The main goal of the project is to inform the public about the conduct of the media during the elections, to initiate a discussion about the objectivity and quality of the media reporting and to promote their adherence to international standards and best practices regarding freedom of expression and independence of media.

The media monitoring data was collected by 13 independent media monitoring specialists working full time at least 5 days a week.

The monitoring lasted between 22 June and 21 July 2019 on a daily basis.

## METHODOLOGY

The methodology was developed by the Council of Europe experts Rasto Kuzel and Oleksandr Burmahin considering comments and proposals from other project's partners. The methodology is internationally recognised and has been previously used in similar projects in more than 50 countries, including Ukraine, over the last 20 years. Given its comprehensive, content-focused approach, the methodology offers an in-depth analysis of pluralism and diversity in the media coverage, in particular, by reviewing the coverage of certain actors and topics, which are studied in the appropriate context, with detailed comparisons and analysis.

The media monitoring provides for quantitative and qualitative analysis of the coverage. The quantitative analysis is focused on the airtime allotted to the candidates and other political actors (i.e. Government, local self-government authorities), as well as coverage tone of the subjects — positive, neutral or negative. The monitoring also examined thematic structure of the news and thematic variety by measuring actual time dedicated to specific topics.

Qualitative monitoring analyses media outlets according to the following principles: ethical or professional standards: balance, accuracy, timeliness, choice of questions, suppression of some information, abuse of position, presentation and positioning of events, provocative rhetoric that are hard to measure quantitatively. Additionally, monitoring experts analyze whether the work of media outlets complies with the principles and standards of Code of journalism ethics and regularly inform the Commission on journalism ethics as to any breaches. See detailed description of methodology at: [http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/metodologiya\\_monitoryngu](http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/metodologiya_monitoryngu).

**The monitoring was focused on:**

**Prime-time (evening) news bulletins of the following ten national TV channels:**

- TV Channel "UA: PERSHYI",
- TV Channel "1+1",
- TV Channel "Inter",
- TV Channel "Ukraine",
- TV Channel "ICTV",
- TV Channel "STB",
- TV Channel "112 Ukraine",
- TV Channel "Pryamyi",
- TV Channel "5th Channel",
- TV Channel "NewsOne".

**Talk shows/debates (each airing):**

- "Pulse"* (TV Channel "112 Ukraine"),

*“Live programme with Svitlana Orlovska and Mykola Veresen”* (TV Channel “Pryamyi”),  
*“Freedom of speech” (“Svoboda slova”)* (TV Channel “ICTV”),  
*“The Right to Power” (“Pravo na vladu”)* (TV Channel “1+1”),  
*“Ukrainian Format”* (TV Channel “NewsOne”),  
*“Countdown” (“Zvorotniy vidlik”)* (TV Channel “UA: PERSHYI”),  
*“People Are Against” (“Narod Proty” – Ukr.)* (TV Channel “ZIK”).

**Eight online media outlets (the content of news feed was monitored):**

“Obozrevatel”,  
“Segodnya.ua”,  
“Strana.ua”,  
“Korrespondent”,  
“Ukrayinska pravda”,  
“Gordonua.com”,  
“Hromadske”,  
“Novoye Vremya”

**Social networks — Facebook pages of the 10 most popular parties and their official leaders:**

Party “People’s servant”, Dmytro Razumkov;  
Party “European Solidarity”, Petro Poroshenko;  
Party “Opposition platform – For life”, Yuriy Boiko;  
Party “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna), Yuliya Tymoshenko;  
Party “Voice”, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk;  
Party “Power and dignity”, Igor Smeshko;  
Oleg Lyashko;  
Party “Civic position”, Anatoliy Hrytsenko;  
Party “Opposition bloc”, Oleksandr Vilkul;  
Party “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda), Oleg Tyagnybok.

## BACKGROUND

During the inauguration ceremony held on 20 May 2019, the President-elect of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi announced the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, signing a respective decree on 21 May 2019. On the same day, a group of members of Parliament from “People’s Front” party made a submission to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on compliance of the decree with the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality). The Constitutional Court considered the submission and, on 20 June 2019, found the Presidential Decree No. 303/2019 “On early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and on calling early elections” to be in line with the Constitution.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, early Parliamentary were called and took place on 21 July 2019. In their statement, G7 Ambassadors welcomed ‘the holding of competitive parliamentary elections in Ukraine where fundamental rights and freedoms were respected<sup>2</sup>.’ A joint report by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament also emphasised the democratic nature of these elections. However, international observers pointed to the instances of abuse of the media, such as the influence exerted by the media owners on the election process coverage, and to financial irregularities that had occurred because of the imperfect legal framework for allocation of funds on election campaigns<sup>3</sup>.

Herewith, the fact that both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in the context of the armed conflict and aggression by the Russian Federation in the eastern part of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea should not be ignored. These factors had a major influence on the topics of political discussions and topics of information campaigns, going beyond those organised by presidential candidates during the presidential campaign. They became even more visible during the parliamentary campaign, mostly because the representatives of one of the political forces, in particular, “Opposition platform — For life” party, travelled to Russia to meet with the Russian leaders and subsequently built their election campaign around this visit.

Similarly to the Presidential elections, the Parliamentary elections were held in the conditions of the prevailing oligarchic media system (where large media holdings that comprise national TV channels are owned by big oligarchs who retain their influence

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<sup>1</sup> The Constitutional Court of Ukraine found the Presidential Decree ‘On early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and on calling early elections’ to be in line with the Constitution, available at <http://www.ccu.gov.ua/novyna/ksu-vyznav-konstytuciynym-ukaz-prezydenta-pro-dostrokove-prypynennya-povnovazhen-verhovnoyi>.

<sup>2</sup> G7 Ambassadors welcome the ‘competitive’ parliamentary elections in Ukraine, available at <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-g7-vybory-posly/30069652.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Elections were effective and respectful of freedoms, although abuses occurred — a report by the Election Observation Mission, available at <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-vybory-misiya-zvit/30069355.html>.

on the political processes in the country), lack of a strong Public broadcaster and a growing role of the new media, including social networks. Furthermore, a change in the ownership of one of the news channels occurred. In June 2019, Taras Kozak, known as a business partner of Viktor Medvedchuk, the leader of the “Opposition platform — For life” party (Vladimir Putin is a godfather to his child), became the new owner of the TV Channel “ZIK”. After the change of ownership, many journalists resigned from the channel, stating their disagreement with the owner’s political views. Thus, Taras Kozak currently owns three news channels — TV Channel “NewsOne”, TV Channel “ZIK”, and TV Channel “112 Ukraine”.

Numerous journalists became involved in the political process by performing extrinsic functions, which could also have affected the editorial policy. For example, Dmytro Gordon, the owner and founder of the online media outlet “Gordonua.com”, headed the campaign headquarters of Igor Smeshko’s party “Power and dignity”. Besides, many journalists ran this time for the Verkhovna Rada both as political parties’ candidates and self-nominated candidates. There were heads of large media conglomerates among them, particularly, Oleksandr Tkachenko, the Director General of TV Channel “1+1”, nominated by the “People’s servant” party.

## KEY FINDINGS

### TV Channels and online media

- The Parliamentary campaign became a continuation of the Presidential campaign.
- The mass media generally provided diverse information about the parties and candidates running in the Parliamentary elections. However, they remained under the powerful influence of their owners and openly demonstrated their bias in favour of certain political forces (this primarily applies to the TV Channels).
- Few media maintained relative neutrality and objectivity. However, the important thing is that the Public broadcaster “UA:PERSHYI” attempted to do it.
- Among the political parties, “Opposition platform — For life” party received the most prominent coverage across the TV Channels, while “People’s servant” party — in the online media.
- All the monitored media paid major attention to the President Volodymyr Zelenskyi. The tone of the coverage was mostly neutral or positive.
- The monitored TV Channels repeatedly violated professional standards by broadcasting the materials that indicated hidden political advertising/ advertorials (the so-called “dzhynsa”). TV Channel “UA:PERSHYI” was the only TV Channel that avoided “dzhynsa” in its news broadcasts.
- Comparing to the TV Channels, the online media was more active in covering the election campaign; however, the media monitoring specialists registered numerous materials that indicated hidden political advertising (“dzhynsa”) in favour of various parties.
- The TV channels and online media also continued to violate (like they did during the Presidential campaign) the electoral law by releasing public survey findings without providing full information about the survey itself and its sponsors. Likewise, not all talk shows were helpful in making the viewers aware that the studio poll was not representative and only reflected the opinions of the audience watching that particular programme.
- The hot topics generally covered by the mass media included the return of the Russian delegation to PACE, as well as the liberation of four prisoners of war by Viktor Medvedchuk and the “NewsOne” — “Russia 1” TV Channels link-up. None of the TV Channels covered the case of Andrii Bohdan (Denys Bihus’s investigation into the involvement of Andrii Bohdan in a \$200m loan scam). Instead, it was reported only in some online media, including the online media outlet “Novoye Vremya” (nv.ua).
- Violations were registered in all the monitored media (except TV Channel “UA:PERSHYI”) during silence day (20 July) and election day (21 July).



## Social networks

- Across social networks, most of the parties emphasised personal and political qualities of their leaders, rather than their ideologies or agendas.
- The parties and their leaders made a widespread use of short videos, streaming, interactive surveys, which were well taken by social networking algorithms, as well as of other advanced methods of voter engagement. This format was used to the best advantage by “People’s servant” party and “Voice” party, building informal “peer-to-peer” communication and sharing entertainment content. Other parties and candidates had built up downward communication that is traditional and alien to social networks.
- None of the parties involved in the race had engaged in comprehensive voter education about making an informed choice.
- Parties and their leaders failed to offer comprehensive concepts for the country development on their Facebook pages and largely avoided ideological messages. The main delineation occurred along the “Europe vs Russia” topic. The most emphatic messages about the country’s future were made by “European Solidarity” party, “Voice” party (the pro-European vector), as well as by the pro-Russian “Opposition platform — For life” party and “Opposition bloc” party.
- Paid posts were actively used by Facebook pages’ owners, primarily targeting those regions that were regarded as their electoral base. Advertising mostly contained campaigning messages, information about the campaign progress, and programme highlights, which may be generally regarded as populist.
- More than half of the parties and their leaders used hate speech and tried to discredit their political opponents.
- The campaign’s main newsbreaks were associated with the relations between Ukraine and Russia.
- Certain parties and their leaders were aggressively disseminating messages that resonated with the narratives of Russian propaganda.

## Indications of possible Russian influence

- News reports indicative of Russian influence mostly appeared on TV Channels “NewsOne”, “112 Ukraine”, and “Inter”, as well as on the online media outlets “Strana.ua” and “Korrespondent”. Such reports were posted more rarely and irregularly by other online media.
- Using Russian websites and news agencies as sources of information, including for international and Ukrainian news, and reports about Russia’s local events continued as current trends. Consumers of this information are being continuously immersed by the Russian information space.
- Messages that are resonant of the Russian propaganda narratives were relayed in the form of quotations from members of the campaigning parties.

- The number of reports insisting on “the need to negotiate with Russia and the Donbas pseudo-republics” increased significantly. These reports covered the Russian Federation as a “peacemaker” rather than the aggressor country. The trend associated with discrediting the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities, including the newly elected President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, continued. Various media outlets published the news that may be regarded as attempts to legitimise the invaders’ republics in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea. The “Russia is not there” narrative (“Russia is not an invader and has never launched any military attacks against Ukraine”) remained popular, whenever the aggressor country was not identified in the reports or news from the frontline.

### Gender

- Similarly, to the Presidential elections, the media continued to favour men during the Parliamentary elections, despite changes in the society and women’s growing contribution to politics. The absence of women in political media discourse illustrates well the lack of gender parity in politics.
- Men were given overwhelmingly more prime time — 80 per cent — on the national TV Channels compared to women, while women — only 11 per cent.
- Gender imbalance during the Parliamentary elections was also noticeable in the online media. For example, eight online media outlets represented women’s opinions only in 9 per cent of their news reports, whereas 91 per cent of the news items featured male speakers.

### Adherence to the Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist

- 150 instances of violation of the Code of Ethics by the monitored media were registered during the monitoring period.
- The Commission on Journalism Ethics issued 8 decisions (5 decisions in the form of a public censure, and 3 decisions in the form of a friendly warning) in respect of such media outlets as TV Channels “1+1”, “NewsOne”, “ICTV”, “STB”, and online media outlets “Obozrevatel”, “Gordonua.com”, “Novoye Vremya”, and “Strana.ua” websites.
- The following clauses of the Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist were violated most frequently: Article 2 (serving the interests of the authorities or owners, rather than those of the public); Article 6 (respecting the right of the public to have full and objective information about facts and events); Article 7 (information and analytical materials should be clearly separated from advertising); Article 9 (facts, judgments, assumptions should be clearly separated from each other); Article 10 (opposing viewpoints must be presented in a balanced way; opinions of independent experts should be presented as well), Article 11 (distorting the content by selectively quoting findings of public opinion polls).

## LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE FIELD OF ELECTION COVERAGE, AND THE ROLE OF THE REGULATOR

The legislation governing the electoral process is generally dispersed, comprising numerous laws and regulations. They include the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine “On the State Voter Register”, the Law of Ukraine “On the Central Election Commission”, the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences, the Law of Ukraine “On Advertising”, resolutions of the Central Election Commission, etc. In the information sector, in addition to special provisions of the relevant sections of election laws, general provisions of the Laws of Ukraine “On Information”, “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, “On Print Media (Press) in Ukraine”, “On News Agencies”, “On the Procedure for Media Coverage of Activities of Government Authorities and Local Self-Government Authorities in Ukraine” also apply.

The main legislative act that governs the conduct of Parliamentary elections is the Law of Ukraine “On Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine” (No. 4061-VI dated 17 November 2011, as amended).

Despite the long-standing recommendations issued by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe and by the OSCE/ODIHR, the electoral legislation was yet to be harmonised even as of August 2019. The draft Electoral Code of Ukraine (draft Law No. 3112-1), passed on the first reading by a minimum number of votes in November 2017, was supported on the second reading in its entirety by the members of Parliament on 11 July 2019 at the 17<sup>th</sup> attempt. As of the date of this Report, it is still unknown whether the Code will be signed by the President. The final version of the Code, including all amendments and modifications, is unavailable even to parliamentarians. Besides, under a supported amendment, the Electoral Code, which is to replace the laws on Presidential, Parliamentary and Local elections, the Central Election Commission, and the State Voter Register, becomes effective only on 1 December 2023.

As noted in the previous interim monitoring reports, electoral legislation requires significant improvements in various aspects. Problems with mass media during the elections, disputes between candidates (parties) and mass media during pre-election campaign, ensuring an opportunity for voters of making an informed and conscious choice, as well as violations of the legislation by the media themselves in the course of election campaign, all this requires a variety of expert examinations to be performed and swift actions to be taken. To ensure such a response, the “rules — regulator — responsibility” model must first be established at the legislative level. At present, one can only speak with reservations about the availability of rules or existence of a TV or radio regulator (with no such regulator available for print media or online resources) with responsibility being actually non-existent (in particular, with regard to the enforcement of current legislation).

Any rules that govern pre-election campaign must be developed transparently and implemented in advance, while ignoring these challenges may result in the rise of national security threats. Furthermore, these changes might reduce the influence exerted by owners/politicians on the media's editorial policies, introduce the rules preventing significant concentration of media resources by politicians, improve adherence to the applicable electoral law by the electoral subjects and the media during campaigning and coverage of elections, in particular to the international and European election standards (such as those of integrity, accuracy and balance), ensure proper informing of voters about the facts and events related to the electoral process and procedures, as well as equal terms of access to the media for the parties and candidates.

Despite the above deficiencies in the legal framework, the regulator's practice in the field of broadcasters' operation call for a thorough analysis and for ways to be found to improve its effectiveness. Although losing in popularity, the national TV Channels remain the main source of information for 74 per cent of Ukraine's population<sup>4</sup>, and the importance of their compliance with the standards of coverage and requirements on the placement of campaign materials during the election race cannot be overstated.

Both the monitoring study performed by the coalition of civil society organisations and the monitoring carried out by the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting have identified numerous violations of the domestic legislation provisions by the broadcasters in their coverage of the Parliamentary pre-election campaign. This primarily concerns the following systemic violations: 1) the requisite details, as prescribed by the law, for releases of election-related survey findings on TV, are incomplete<sup>5</sup>; 2) no text message "This poll reflects the opinions of this audience only", which should be displayed on the screen whenever the results of an interactive audience poll are made public<sup>6</sup>; 3) violation of the electoral law principles regarding the credibility, completeness, accuracy, and objectivity of information, and impartial presentation of information in the election process coverage<sup>7</sup>. During the Parliamentary pre-election campaign, a few more violations, very dangerous in terms of their impact on voters, such as inserting the materials that contain elements of election campaigning in the TV news programmes<sup>8</sup>, dissemination of unmarked campaign materials, or campaigning during silence and election days, had reached the level of systemic ones. Indeed, some TV Channels turned into campaigning platforms for certain political forces participating in the election race. Candidates on the political parties' lists appeared, spoke or commented on any events whatsoever

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<sup>4</sup> Findings of the all-Ukrainian public opinion poll "Sources of information, media literacy, and Russian propaganda" conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Articles 67.1 and 67.2 of the Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine".

<sup>6</sup> Article 67.5 of the Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine".

<sup>7</sup> Article 66.2 of the Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine".

<sup>8</sup> Contains elements of violation of Articles 74.17 of the Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine".

in the news broadcasts (for example, when riding a combine harvester, inaugurating a new road, attending a feature film festival, etc.), beyond the news broadcasts, on talk shows, or during discussions with experts.

Still, the most dangerous violation on the part of the TV Channels, as evidenced by the research findings, is their failure to comply with the electoral law as regards balanced and unbiased coverage, and equal treatment of candidates by the media. These and other instances of violations were described in greater detail in the previous reports by the coalition of civil society organisations<sup>9</sup>.

Responding to the above violations, the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting acted according to the following options during both pre-election campaigns: notifying the broadcaster about the signs of violation of applicable laws and demanding that its operation be brought in compliance with the electoral law; notifying the Central Election Commission of the identified signs of violation; requesting clarifications from the TV Channels with respect to the identified signs of violation.

It should also be noted that during both the Parliamentary and Presidential pre-election campaigns, the regulator failed to draw up any reports of administrative offences<sup>10</sup> committed by the TV Channels in the field of pre-elections campaign. And this is despite the fact that the monitoring data from the regulator itself indicates signs of an administrative offence, as stipulated by Article 212-9 “Violation of the procedure for election campaigning, campaigning during the preparation and holding of a referendum with the use of mass media, and of the procedure for participation in the information support of elections” of the CUAO, in the actions of representatives of many TV Channels. Namely, “giving preference in television or radio news programmes, or in print media, in news agencies” products to any candidate, political party (bloc), their election programmes by the mass media or news agencies” owners, officers or officials, creative professionals. Under the CUAO, it is exactly the regulator who shall draw up reports of administrative offences in such cases. Deficiencies in the local regulations of the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting itself were named as the reason for its omissions even at the time of the Presidential elections. In April 2019, it was announced that the process of amending local acts had begun, and it was hoped that this process would have been completed by the end of May 2019; accordingly, the regulator would already be in a position to draw up reports and refer them to courts during the Parliamentary elections. However, on 11 July 2019, the regulator merely put up amendments to its regulations for public discussion.

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<sup>9</sup> The Commission on Journalism Ethics. Reports available at <http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/zvity>.

<sup>10</sup> Article 212-9 “Violation of the procedure for election campaigning, campaigning during the preparation and holding of a referendum with the use of mass media, and of the procedure for participation in the information support of elections” of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (the “CUAO”) and Article 212<sup>11</sup> “Failure to provide an opportunity to publish a response to the information disseminated about an election subject” of the CUAO.

No other actions/decisions were taken by the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting against the offending TV Channels.

Along with violations of the electoral legislation committed by the broadcasters and the signs of violations identified in their actions, discussions continued between the representatives of the regulator, the Central Election Commission, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and experts from international organisations around the capacity of the regulator or other government authorities to respond to such violations. The main points of this discussion were as follows: the regulator insisted that deficiencies in the law made any sanctions imposed by it on the media in connection with election matters either impossible or disputable in court; the NACP, addressing the issues of financial control, insisted that it should be provided with the decisions proving the campaigning nature of any particular material, in which case it would have reasons to examine the sources of funding this broadcast; the CEC noted that, since 2012, it had no authority to respond to these violations by the media. One of the key issues was the question around an agency or a structure of an agency that could provide its opinion on whether any particular, specific material/story constituted news or political promotion. It was determined finally that this should be done by the Expert Council under the regulator's Public Council. However, no systematic work was performed in this field during the pre-election campaigns.

In the opinion of contributors to the Report, any potential response by the regulator in the event of violations of the electoral legislation by the TV Channels may be based on the grounds provided by the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting" and involve initiation of inspections, with a warning issued to the respective TV Channel upon finding evidence of any violation(s)<sup>11</sup>.

Thus, by forwarding various letters to the TV Channels during the Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the regulator merely performed an awareness-raising function concerning the specifics of the media's compliance with the electoral legislation. As regards the mission of the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting, which constitutes monitoring the observance of the laws of Ukraine in the field of broadcasting<sup>12</sup>, including during the election process<sup>13</sup>, the measures taken in response to violations by the TV Channels were, in our opinion, inadequate.

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<sup>11</sup> Articles 59, 70, and 72.2 of the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting".

<sup>12</sup> Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine "On the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine".

<sup>13</sup> Article 70 of the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting".

## MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS

### TELEVISION

The Parliamentary pre-election campaign became in fact a continuation of the Presidential pre-election campaign. Even certain politicians acknowledged that. For example, Dmytro Razumkov, the leader of “People’s servant” party, referred to these Parliamentary elections as a “third round”<sup>14</sup>. Thus, all private TV Channels merely consolidated (apparently, as influenced by their owners) their previously chosen political position and continued their support of specific political forces. Only TV Channel “**UA:PERSHYI**”, which is a part of the Public broadcasting system, maintained its neutrality, although this TV Channel, similarly to the period of the Presidential pre-election campaign, generally failed to pay enough attention to the electoral topics to be able to compete with the oligarchic channels.

The political lines favoured by private broadcasters were as follows:

- **TV Channel “1+1” (owned by Igor Kolomoisky):** Having supported Volodymyr Zelenskyi during the Presidential elections, this TV Channel continued to support “People’s servant” party, the Presidential political force and, respectively, to criticise Petro Poroshenko’s “European Solidarity” party and Viktor Medvedchuk’s “Opposition platform — For life” party during the Parliamentary elections.
- **TV Channel “Pryamyi” (owned by Volodymyr Makeyenko) and TV Channel “5<sup>th</sup> Channel” (owned by Petro Poroshenko):** These TV Channels openly supported Petro Poroshenko’s “European Solidarity” party and paid much attention to the “revenge of pro-Russian forces” in Ukraine, meaning “Opposition platform — For life” party. These TV Channels also criticised “People’s servant” party in their broadcasts.
- **TV Channel “Ukraine” (owned by Rinat Akhmetov):** Dedicated most of its coverage to the “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”, and only in a positive or neutral tone at that, as well as to “Opposition bloc” party.
- **Three TV Channels, including “Inter” (owned by Dmytro Firtash and Serhii Liovochkin), “NewsOne” and “112 Ukraine” (both TV Channels are officially owned by the member of Parliament Taras Kozak, although experts say that they remain in Viktor Medvedchuk’s sphere of influence; during the Parliamentary pre-election campaign, TV Channel**

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<sup>14</sup> ‘This is a third round.’ Dmytro Razumkov votes in the elections to the Rada, available at <https://gordonua.com/ukr/news/politics/-vidbuvajetsja-tretij-tur-razumkov-progosuvav-na-viborah-u-radu-1132703.html>.

**“ZIK” was added to these channels):** Openly promoted “Opposition platform — For life” and its parliamentary candidates.

- **A group of TV Channels from Viktor Pinchuk’s holding company (“ICTV” and “STB”)** supported a pool of parties, mostly including “Fatherland” party (Batkivshchyna), but also “European Solidarity” party, “Voice” party, “People’s servant” party, “Opposition bloc” party, “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy” party and the “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”. These TV channels offered no criticism of any political forces participating in the electoral races, save for “Opposition platform — For life” party (this criticism, however, was so insignificant that it barely exceeded 0 per cent).

Given this, it was hard for voters, similarly to the period of the Presidential pre-election campaign, to obtain any unbiased information by watching only one TV Channel. To have a complete picture, they had to watch several channels.

It should also be noted that all the TV Channels paid extraordinary attention to the newly elected President Volodymyr Zelenskyi (in terms of airtime, he was way ahead of other government officials). The tenor of this coverage was mostly positive or neutral. By contrast, during the Presidential pre-election campaign, the activity of the previous President, Petro Poroshenko, was often covered in a negative tone.

## **News**

**Coverage of candidates. “Opposition platform — For life” party got most of the coverage (349 min)** in the news programmes of the ten monitored channels. This coverage was largely positive or neutral and only marginally negative. “European Solidarity” party was far behind (193 min) with more neutral coverage; the third place was taken by “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party (135 min, positive and neutral tone only), the fourth — by “People’s servant” party (128 min, neutral and positive mostly, with some criticism). They were followed by the “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko” (120 minutes) and “Opposition bloc” party (105 minutes). Considerably less airtime was dedicated to the remaining political forces: “Voice” party — 78 min, “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy” party — 33 min, “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party — 25 min, “Power and dignity” party — 23 min, “Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili” party — 21 min, the “Agrarian party of Ukraine” — 15 min, “Self-Aid” (“Samopomich”) party — 9 min, “Civic position” party — 6 min. This data should only be considered in conjunction with detailed findings for any specific TV Channels.

For example, **“Opposition platform — For life” party** got most of its coverage in the news broadcasts of four TV Channels, where it was presented in positive and neutral tones. This, in particular, includes such TV Channels as “Inter” (204 min), “NewsOne” (72 min), “112 Ukraine” (16 min), “UA:PERSHYI” (13 min). No other party had such news coverage.



**“European Solidarity” party** dominated the news bulletins of two TV Channels — “Pryamyi” (38 min) and “5<sup>th</sup> Channel” (29 min). However, these figures were almost 5 times smaller than the coverage given to “Opposition platform — For life” party by TV Channel “Inter”.

**“People’s servant” party** occupied the first place only in the coverage provided by TV Channel “1+1” (20 min); however, this first place was shared with “European Solidarity” party and “Opposition platform — For life” party, who also got 20 minutes each. The difference was that the reports about “People’s servant” party broadcast by this TV Channel were mostly neutral and positive, whereas the news dedicated to the other two political forces were largely negative. Nevertheless, in terms of airtime, “People’s servant” party was given almost the same coverage as by TV Channel “1+1” on such TV Channels as “Ukraine” (23 min), “ICTV” (25 min), “STB” (20 min).

The **“Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”** got its highest coverage on TV Channel “Ukraine” (77 min), while **“Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party** led on TV Channels “ICTV” (34 min) and “STB” (28 min). **“Opposition bloc” party** received a sufficient amount of coverage on TV Channel “Ukraine” (44 min), coming second after Oleg Lyashko’s party. **“Voice” party** got no first places in any news bulletins, although it received some coverage on TV Channels “ICTV” (26 min) and “STB” (18 min), while being entirely missing from news reports of the TV Channel “112 Ukraine”. All other political forces were given comparatively little coverage in the TV news.

The TV channels repeatedly violated professional standards by broadcasting the stories that indicated hidden political advertising/advertorials (“dzhynsa”). TV Channel “Inter” was particularly conspicuous by including stories about Yuriy Boiko in almost every news bulletin (a total of 86.5 minutes of news time in the entire monitoring period). No other candidate from any political force was given so much news time by any other TV Channel. Also revealing was the story (in the 9 July news bulletin) with Nataliia Korolevska’s participation, where she drove a combine harvester and stated her opposition to the sale of land. Separate mention should be made of the news stories, involving Viktor Medvedchuk, about Oliver Stone’s pro-Russian propaganda documentary *Revealing Ukraine*. Between 1 and 9 July, six such stories were aired. TV channel “Ukraine”, as part of its news bulletins, launched the *Ukraine Elects the Rada* project; it mostly included a selection of materials that indicated hidden political advertising/advertorial (“dzhynsa”) in favour of the “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”, “Opposition bloc” party, “European Solidarity” party or “People’s servant” party. Many stories that indicated hidden political advertising/advertorial (“dzhynsa”) were also present in the news programmes of TV Channels “ICTV” and “STB”. TV Channel “NewsOne” was conspicuous for its numerous positive stories about Viktor Medvechuk and his wife Oksana Marchenko. TV Channel “UA:PERSHYI” was the only TV Channel that avoided “dzhynsa” in its news broadcasts.

## Topics

The topic of elections was not always topical in TV news. This trend prevailed from the time of the Presidential elections. In the overall thematic arrangement of news bulletins, TV Channel “1+1” had the lowest percentage of election-related topics — the topic of elections occupied an eighth place on this TV Channel after such topics as international events (related to Ukraine), crime, catastrophes and incidents, politics, environment, and international events ( not related to Ukraine).

As distinct from the Presidential elections, this topic was at the very top of the list on TV Channel “UA:PERSHYI” only. The Channel increased the number of reports about the elections; however, analysis of the campaign progress was still lacking.

It should be noted that, despite the fact that a relatively low percentage of electoral topics was detected on the news channels, the topic of elections was frequently raised there during news programmes or talk shows. And at TV Channel “112 Ukraine”, the bulk of the stories related to political topics, elections or candidates was broadcast directly after the news bulletins. They usually aired as part of programming titled *Important*, *Exclusive*, and *Episode 112*, before or after news releases. Within this programming, the activities of Viktor Medvedchuk, Chairman of the Political Council of “Opposition platform — For life” party, were given a predominant preference in coverage.

On the whole, the percentage of the airtime that the TV channels devoted to the elections (against other topics covered by a particular channel) in their prime time news was as follows:

- TV Channel “Ukraine” — 11.91%
- TV Channel “1+1” — 4.71%
- TV Channel “ICTV” — 6.74%
- TV Channel “STB” — 9.12%
- TV Channel “Inter” — 6.22%
- TV Channel “Pryamyi” — 8.95%
- TV Channel “112 Ukraine” — 6.66%
- TV Channel “NewsOne” — 7.17%
- TV Channel “UA:PERSHYI” — 13.75%
- TV Channel “5<sup>th</sup> Channel” — 8.31%

A number of hot topics were also raised during the pre-election campaign, which were intensively discussed in the expert and political circles, often becoming part of the election rhetoric of political parties and politicians running in the elections. This monitoring was focused on the following eight topics:

- the return of the Russian delegation to PACE,
- cancellation of the Independence Day Parade,
- a schism in the church (Filaret against the Orthodox Church of Ukraine),
- liberation of POWs by Viktor Medvedchuk,
- the “NewsOne” — “Russia 1” TV Channels link-up (initiated by “NewsOne”, it never took place because of a negative public reaction),
- a new lustration announced by the President’s team,
- the affair of Andrii Bohdan (Denys Bihus’s investigation into the involvement of Andrii Bohdan in a \$200m loan scam),
- Andrii Bohdan’s statement about the Russian language as a regional language for Donbas.

Among these hot topics, the **return of Russia’s delegation to PACE** led the news bulletins of the following six TV Channels: “Pryamyi” (15 min), “Ukraine” (39 min), “ICTV” (21 min), “UA:PERSHYI” (10 min), “5<sup>th</sup> Channel” (50 min), and “1+1” (20 min).

The **topic of the liberation of four POWs by Viktor Medvedchuk** was instead given priority coverage by TV Channel “112 Ukraine” (20 min), “Inter” (14 min), and “NewsOne” (16 min). At TV Channel “NewsOne”, even the **TV link-up with “Russia 1”** was relegated to a third place (6 min), behind the stories about Viktor Medvedchuk and the return of Russia’s delegation to PACE (8 min). At the same time, the topic of the TV link-up became number one on TV Channel “STB” (11 min).

None of the TV channels covered the **affair of Andrii Bohdan** (Denys Bihus’s investigation into the involvement of Andrii Bohdan in a \$200m loan scam) in their news bulletins. This raised a few eyebrows, since the “Ukroboronprom corruption affair”, linked to Petro Poroshenko, was a top news item on many TV channels during the Presidential pre-election campaign.

### ***Silence Day and Election Day***

On 20 July, during the silence day, as well as on the election day of 21 July, the media monitoring specialists recorded violations in all the monitored online media and TV Channels (except TV Channel “UA:PERSHYI”).

Instead, on 20 July, TV Channel “**UA:PERSHYI**” aired a story about candidates campaigning during silence day. This TV channel also reported on the way in which election silence is maintained in other countries. On the election day of 21 July, TV Channel “UA:PERSHYI” reported on how Ukrainians vote in various countries, on

voting progress in Ukraine, results of exit polls and the response to them by representatives of various political forces.

National private TV Channels, in breach of the electoral legislation, openly continued to support specific political forces both during the silence day and on the election day. For example, on Saturday, 20 July, TV Channel “**Inter**” transmitted from Sviatogirsk a public prayer for peace, airing comments only from representatives of one political force, i.e. “Opposition platform — For life” party, including Nataliia Korolevska, as well as a public prayer for peace from the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, interspersing it with comments by Yuriy Boiko, Serhiy Liovochkin, Nestor Shufrych and other representatives of “Opposition platform – For life” party. All of them talked about praying for peace, harmony and being supported by many people, while the presenter said that the priest had been praying for a good future government. The same segments about both public prayers were broadcast by TV Channel “**NewsOne**” owned by Taras Kozak, who is also a member of “Opposition platform — For life” party.

During the weekend, the *Put a Stop to the Revenge* telethon (in fact, a counter campaign targeted against certain political forces) was being broadcast by TV Channel “**Pryamyi**”. On 20 July, Petro Poroshenko was among the telethon guests. The talk show turned into outright campaigning in support of “European Solidarity” party and counter-campaigning against “People’s servant” party, “Opposition platform — For life” party, and Viktor Medvedchuk personally. Furthermore, in its evening news bulletin aired on 21 July, the Channel featured a news ticker containing the following calls by Petro Poroshenko, Iryna Gerashchenko and Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze: “Dear residents of Western Ukraine! Only two hours remain for you to vote to protect our European future!,” “You still have time to vote for Ukraine’s real European future! Join us!”

Fewer violations were registered on those TV Channels that are part of the StarLightMedia media group, such as “ICTV” and “STB”. However, in certain segments, some candidates were voicing the messages used by their political forces during the campaign. For example, in *Facts of the Week* aired on 21 July, in a segment dedicated to voting by party leaders and top politicians, Yuliya Tymoshenko ritually declared, like she did during her pre-election campaign, that people voted for the Prime Minister, while Petro Poroshenko stated that he had voted for a European future, and Andriy Parubiy — for the European Union and NATO (these were also the slogans of “European Solidarity’s” pre-election campaign). This segment also omitted certain political forces leading the race (in particular, no representatives of Opposition platform – For life” party or “Opposition bloc” party were shown).

The monitoring professionals also registered violations made by TV Channels “1+1” on 21 July, the election day, in its special news bulletin aired at 6.00 pm (i.e. before polling stations closed at 8.00pm). In particular, a news story featured Yuriy Boiko’s statement that he had voted “for everything that people told me to do,” — in fact,

thereby campaigning for himself. Sviatoslav Vakarchuk was described as being “determined to change politics”, while Petro Poroshenko said that he would “support everyone who stands for the country’s movement and our movement towards the EU and NATO”. The same statements by Yuriy Boiko and Petro Poroshenko were once again aired later, but also before 8.00pm.

On 21 July, TV Channel “5<sup>th</sup> Channel” aired a report from “European Solidarity’s” press centre before the polling stations closed. This segment included statements by Viktoriya Siumar, Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze and other “European Solidarity” party representatives about their vision of the future and the laws to be adopted, as well as about new political forces in the Parliament being capable of bringing the “Russian revenge” closer, and “European Solidarity’s” intention to combat it. In the same news bulletin (while voting still continued), a representative of “Voice” party said that his party was against the pro-Russian forces and Viktor Medvedchuk. A violation of the rules for the release of poll findings was also registered — releasing them is prohibited over the election weekend, yet a reporter mentioned in one of the segments that, according to the survey data, Yuliya Tymoshenko’s party had made it to the top five.

On 21 July, the day of voting, even before the polls closed (at 6.06pm), TV Channel “112 Ukraine” aired the following counter-campaigning statement by Vadym Rabinovych, a representative of “Opposition platform — For life” party, in its *Who?* telethon: *“At 12.00pm, a small disaster started unfolding. The turnout in Western Ukraine is growing very strong, and is at a standstill in the East. Those who support the “war party” vote aggressively, while those who wait for peace merely abstain from voting. If we fail to vote for peace in our homes, I’m afraid the result will be very sad”*. The Channel also started broadcasting a briefing from the “Opposition platform — For life” headquarters at 6.39pm, during which the party’s logos were visible.

### **Talk shows**

As with the Presidential pre-election campaign, a huge variety of talk shows were aired during the Parliamentary pre-election campaign. Most of them, rather than holding constructive debates and discussions of important social issues, were instead markedly politicised, populist and emotionally charged. The hosts were often biased against particular political forces. The talk show topics largely concentrated on either the election campaign or high profile matters that had also become part of the pre-election campaign.

Of the seven monitored talk shows, only **“Countdown”** at TV Channel **“UA:PERSHYI”** was the most neutral in its representation of the various political forces running for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Its hosts applied the same approach to all participants and put equally thorny questions to all guests. This was the only talk show where politicians’ statements were checked, in particular, by the VoxCheck reporters. Of all the political parties, only seven were represented on talk

shows by their candidates during the monitoring period, including “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party, the “Agrarian party of Ukraine”, “Self-Aid” (“Samopomich”) party, “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”, “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy”, “People’s servant” party and “Voice” party. By contrast, not a single candidate from such potentially victorious parties as “European Solidarity” or “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party has ever been invited to a talk show.

If the overall activity of political forces on various talk shows were to be looked at, candidates from “European Solidarity” party guested most frequently on the programmes of this format, attending the talk shows 42 times (*Methodological note: this is the total number of participants from each party in each episode of the show; where the same party representative guested on several episodes, all of them counted as one*), mostly because of its large presence in the “Live programme with Svitlana Orlovska and Mykola Veresen” (TV Channel “Pryamyi”), which had the highest number of airings among all the other monitored talk shows. (*Methodological note: only candidates on a party list were counted, although the studio audience might have also included representatives of the same political force who were not running in this Parliamentary elections*). Candidates from “Opposition platform — For life” were in the second place by guesting 27 times on the talk shows. “People’s servant” party was in the third place with 24 times. The fourth place went to the “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) candidates — 21 times. The fifth — to “Voice” party (18 times). They were followed by “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party (17 times), “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy” party (16 times), “Self-Aid” (“Samopomich”) party (14 times), “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko” and “Opposition bloc” party (12 times each), Anatoliy Hrytsenko’s “Civic position” party (8 times), and Igor Smeshko’s “Power and dignity” party (7 times). Other political forces were considerably less represented on the talk shows: the “Agrarian party of Ukraine” — 3 times, “Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili” party — 3 times, Nadiya Savchenko’s Platform — once.

Most talk shows on private TV Channels showed their bias in favour of particular political forces. This happened in various ways — through an imbalanced representation of political parties on the air, or the hosts’ biased attitude, or a combination of both.

- **Pulse on TV Channel “112 Ukraine”** (4 episodes aired on 25, 2, 9 June, and 16 July were monitored) and **“Ukrainian Format” on TV Channel “NewsOne”** (4 episodes aired on 26, 3, 10, 17 June were monitored) demonstrated their preference for “Opposition platform — For life”. This political force was most represented on these TV Channels’ talk shows — 11 times in the monitoring period. The range of the political forces invited to the studios of these TV Channels was quite narrow: *Pulse*, apart from the already mentioned “Opposition platform — For life”, featured candidates from “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party, “People’s servant” party,

“Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party, along with the representatives of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction who were not on the party’s list during the Parliamentary elections; *Ukrainian Format* was visited by representatives of “Opposition platform — For life”, “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party, “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party, “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”, “People’s servant” party, and “Civic position” party. On both shows, the guests often criticised the previous government, including Petro Poroshenko, as well as the newly elected President Volodymyr Zelenskyi and his team; however, the latter were unable to respond to the criticism, as they were not present in the studio.

- ***The Right to Power on TV Channel “1+1”*** (4 episodes were monitored on 27 June, 4, 11 and 18 July) preferred Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s team and “People’s servant” party — this, in particular, was obvious in the attitude of its host, Nataliya Moseichuk, who sometimes got very emotional. Altogether, parliamentary candidates from 10 political parties guested on the talk show episodes during the monitoring period, including “People’s servant” party, “European Solidarity”, “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy” party, “Opposition bloc” party and “Voice” party — 4 times each; from “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party, “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party, “Self-Aid” (“Samopomich”) party, “Power and dignity” party — 3 times each, and “Civic position” party — 1 time.
- ***Live programme with Svitlana Orlovska and Mykola Veresen’ on TV Channel “Pryamyi”*** (16 episodes were monitored, aired on 24 to 27 June, 1 to 4, 8 to 11, and 15 to 18 July) demonstrated its preference for “European Solidarity” party and Petro Poroshenko. Candidates from this political force were most frequently — 30 times — invited to the show. The range of other political forces was insignificant and, apart from “European Solidarity” party, included “Self-Aid” (“Samopomich”) party (8 times), “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko” (6 times), “Power and dignity” party (2 times), “Opposition platform — For life” party (1 time) and “Voice” party (1 time) from among those who participated in the election race. President Volodymyr Zelenskyi and his entourage were frequently criticised; however, they were unable to respond to it, as they were not present in the studio. Apart from politicians, numerous experts were invited, who generally criticised the current government and supported “European Solidarity” party. The hosts behaved aggressively, would yell at the guests or try to impose their opinion.
- From the ***People Are Against*** talk-show on TV Channel “**ZIK**” (the TV Channel whose ownership changed at the beginning of the Parliamentary pre-election campaign, and which joined the pool of TV Channels within Viktor Medvedchuk’s sphere of influence), 4 episodes, aired on 28 June, 5, 12, and 19 July, were selected for the monitoring. The guests included candidates from “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party and “People’s servant” party (5 times each), “Opposition platform — For life” party (4 times), “Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili” party and “Power and dignity” party (2 times

each), as well as “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party, Nadiya Savchenko’s Platform, “European Solidarity” party (1 time each). Unlike the show’s host, Nataliya Vlashchenko, who at all times remained neutral to everyone present in the studio, her co-host Maks Buzhanskyi (the ‘arguer’) was always biased against Petro Poroshenko, which was manifested in his critical speeches and allegations against the politician. Much criticism was levelled during the talk show at President Vladimir Zelenskyi and the new government. However, the pro-Ukrainian position in its entirety was also criticised, in particular, by such guests as Oleg Voloshyn and Gennadii Balashov, with Oleg Voloshyn introduced as a journalist, omitting the fact that he was running for Parliament from “Opposition platform — For life”. He was allowed to speak more than the others, showing his nostalgia for the USSR and advocating peace with Russia.

- The ***Freedom of Speech*** talk show on TV Channel “ICTV” (4 episodes, aired on 24 June, 1, 8, and 15 July, were included in the monitoring) was the least biased among the private TV Channels during this Parliamentary campaign, keeping the representation of political forces relatively balanced. Its host, Vadym Karpiak, maintained neutrality as well. Nevertheless, he was often too uncritical in his questions, allowing the invited politicians to promote themselves. During the monitoring period, this TV station was visited by candidates from such parties as “Voice” and “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy” (candidates from these political forces made the highest number of appearances — 10 times — on the talk show), “European Solidarity” (5 times), “People’s servant” (5 times), “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) (5 times), “Civic position” (4 times), “Opposition bloc” (8 times), “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) (2 times). However, not a single representative of “Opposition platform — For life” appeared there.

**Sociology.** Unlike the Presidential pre-election campaign, some TV Channels rectified their errors to a certain extent and began releasing their poll ratings in a more appropriate manner, including data of the audience polls conducted during talk shows. For example, during the *Freedom of Speech* talk show on TV Channel “ICTV”, the host, in contrast to the Presidential elections, started mentioning that polls only included those present in the studio (although, as before, no relevant message appeared on the screen). *The Right to Power* talk show on TV Channel “1+1” released the ratings of political forces (without mentioning the persons ordering the polls) in an almost appropriate manner, although, whenever results of online polling were announced, the show’s hosts failed to indicate that this data was not representative. On the *Ukrainian Format* talk show on TV Channel “NewsOne”, the data was sometimes released with violations, sometimes — without.

Polling results were released with violations by *Pulse* on TV Channel “112 Ukraine”, *Live programme with Svitlana Orlovska and Mykola Veresen’* on TV Channel “Pryamyi”, and *People Are Against* on TV Channel “ZIK”.



**Gender.** Representation of women on talk shows, both parliamentary candidates and experts, remained extremely low. For example, **women** guested **82 times** on all talk show, whereas **men** — **392 times**. Many talk shows aired on various TV Channels featured only male guests. Women were least represented on the *Pulse* talk show (TV Channel “112 Ukraine”).

## ONLINE MEDIA

### *Coverage of candidates*

Compared to the TV Channels, attention to political forces was spread differently in online media. “People’s servant” party got most of the coverage in the eight monitored online media outlets (385.9mn pixels; see Detailed Methodology<sup>15</sup> for the measurement technique description). This coverage was largely neutral, and only marginally positive or negative. “European Solidarity” party (377.7mn pixels) was not far behind from it with neutral coverage, although it received some positive and negative coverage as well. “Opposition platform — For life” party (229.3mn pixels) was in a third place with mostly neutral, but sometimes positive or negative coverage. “Voice” party (204.6mn pixels) was fourth with a neutral and positive tenor, “Power and dignity” party (153.3mn pixels) — fifth, also with a neutral and positive tenor. “Opposition bloc” party (119.4mn pixels) also drew considerable attention. Much less, coverage was given to the remaining political forces, such as “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party (91.8mn pixels), “Civic position” party (62.7mn pixels), “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko” (58.9mn pixels), “Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili” party (55.8mn pixels), “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) party (47.7mn pixels), “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy” party (41.7mn pixels), “Self-Aid” (“Samopomich”) party (32.6mn pixels), “Agrarian party of Ukraine” (8.8mn pixels), “UDAR” party (3.5mn pixels), and Nadiya Savchenko’s Platform (1.2mn pixels). This data should only be viewed in conjunction with detailed findings for any specific online media outlet.

For example, “People’s servant” party received its highest coverage by such online media outlet as “Gordonua.com” — largely neutral, but also positive and negative (in terms of coverage, it was almost equalled by “Power and dignity” on this website, whose founder, Dmytro Gordon, headed the latter party’s campaign headquarters), and online media outlet “Strana.ua”, where neutral tone also dominated.

European Solidarity was mostly covered on such websites as Korrespondent, Novoye Vremya, Obozrevatel, and Ukrayinska Pravda. The tone was largely neutral, with positive tone prevailing only on the Obozrevatel website.

Online media outlet “Hromadske” dedicated most of its coverage to “Opposition platform — For life”, keeping a mostly neutral tone, although some news had a negative tone. “People’s servant” and “Voice” parties took the second and third place in this media outlet, respectively.

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<sup>15</sup> R. Kuzel, O. Burmahin, *Media Monitoring Methodology*, available at [http://www.cje.org.ua/sites/default/files/library/FIN\\_UKR\\_Media%20Monitoring%20Methodology\\_Ukraine.pdf](http://www.cje.org.ua/sites/default/files/library/FIN_UKR_Media%20Monitoring%20Methodology_Ukraine.pdf).

The “Segodnya.ua” online media outlet paid almost equal attention to several political forces, including “European Solidarity”, “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”, “Opposition bloc”, “Power and dignity”.

Numerous articles that indicated hidden political advertising/advertorial (“dzhynsa”) in favour of various parties were detected in the online media in the course of monitoring.

For example, postings indicating hidden political advertising in favour of “Opposition platform — For life” and “Power and dignity” parties were identified on the “Gordonua.com” online media outlet. A news item published on 1 July under the headline “Rabinovych calls for abolishment of tax for young people and a “thirteenth pension” for the elderly” was built around the information from the party’s website and lacked any news value. Similarly, a news item from 5 July, titled “Smeshko: Pensions should make pensioners into a middle class; like elsewhere in Europe, they should contribute to their children’s tuition costs and relax”, was based on an interview given by Igor Smeshko to the same website earlier.

News about Yulia Tymoshenko published on the “Obozrevatel” online media outlet were in the same vein. For example, a news item titled “Minimum pension should be at least 3,094 hryvnias, says Tymoshenko” was published on 27 June, containing no opinions from experts and being merely borrowed from one of the TV Channel “112 Ukraine” broadcasts. Similarly, a news item posted on 29 June was based on Tymoshenko’s appearance on the TV Channel “Ukraine” and was published under the headline “Tymoshenko: Lowering utility rates and increasing people’s income are the main objectives of the Government”. On the “Segodnya.ua” online media outlet, this included a news item titled ‘Liashko demands adoption of a farming strategy,’ posted on 28 June and made on the basis of a report aired by the TV Channel “Ukraine”, or the news posted on 7 July under the headline “Muraiev: Our aim is to stop labour migration”.

The online media also violated the electoral legislation by releasing public survey findings. The “Strana.ua” online media outlet posted public ratings with violations, failing to provide full information about the polls and giving manipulative interpretation of the data, like in its “Why Ze is falling, Boyko-Medvedchuk is growing and Poroshenko is going to and fro. Findings of the first July ratings” (July 4) or “Ratings again drop for “People’s servant” party and grow for “Opposition platform — For life” party” (4 July) news reports. Reporters of this online media outlet also tend to violate other professional standards and ethics by using emotionally charged vocabulary in order to stir up the audience or by insulting and criticising certain political forces (such as in a news item titled “On the Maidan, nationalists and Poroshenko sympathisers protest in smoke against registration of Shariy and Kliuiev as parliamentary candidates’), and use anonymous sources of information.

## **Topics**

Unlike the TV Channels, the topic of elections was second to politics for the majority of the online media outlets, except for “Ukrayinska Pravda” and “Segodnya.ua”, where elections dominated. In particular, the attention paid to the elections by the monitored websites looked as follows (**Methodological caveat**: this does not include any materials in which election actors were not mentioned):

- online media outlet “Hromadske” — 27.94%;
- online media outlet “Ukrayinska pravda” — 31.79%;
- online media outlet “Segodnya.ua” — 45.25%;
- online media outlet “Gordonua.com” — 20.81%;
- online media outlet “Korrespondent” — 16.26%;
- online media outlet “Novoye Vremya” — 25.23%;
- online media outlet “Obozrevatel” — 9.76%;
- online media outlet “Strana.ua” — 29.40%.

Unlike the television space, no similar unanimity in respect of hot topics has been observed among the online media. For example, the topic of the **Russian delegation’s return to PACE** topped the news in three online media outlets — “Strana.ua”, “Segodnya.ua”, “Obozrevatel”. “Strana.ua” online media outlet also widely covered the topics of lustration, Andrii Bohdan’s statement about the Russian language as a regional language for Donbas and the “NewsOne” — “Russia 1” TV link-up; “Segodnya.ua” and “Obozrevatel” — the topics of the Independence Day Parade cancellation, and lustration.

The widest coverage of the **“NewsOne — Russia 1” TV link-up** was given by four online media outlets — “Ukrayinska Pravda”, “Novoye Vremya”, “Korrespondent” and “Gordonua.com”. The next two topics in the focus of these online media outlet’s attention were lustration and the return of the Russian delegation to PACE.

The **liberation of four POWs by Viktor Medvedchuk** led the hot topics on the “Hromadske” online media outlet. The second and third places on this online resource were respectively taken by the topics of lustration and cancellation of the Independence Day Parade.

## **Silence day and Election day**

The monitoring professionals also detected violations in the monitored online media outlets on 20 July, the silence day, and on 21 July, the election day. The majority of

these violations were associated with hidden or direct campaigning and counter campaigning. Some websites also published comments by sociologists or political strategists on the ratings of political forces, which is prohibited. Another category of reports, which may be tentatively regarded as constituting a violation, was associated with the coverage of the matters related to the future coalition, election/appointment of the Prime Minister, the Speaker and other officials.

**Hidden or direct campaigning and counter campaigning.** On 20 July, “**Obozrevatel**” online media outlet published a positive report of Sviatoslav Vakarchuk’s show that actually took place on 19 July, adding a video and a comment by Sviatoslav Vakarchuk from his Facebook page ([“Glory to Ukraine! Social media captivated by a massive performance of the Ukrainian national anthem at the Okean Elzy show”](#)).

Some online media committed violations on 21 July, the election day, when covering the manner in which various parliamentary candidates voted. These news reports contained messages used by the political forces during the pre-election campaign. For example, “**Obozrevatel**” posted positive reports about Petro Poroshenko, Borys Kolesnykov, Yuliya Tymoshenko, also accompanied by friendly photos or videos ([“Poroshenko: I voted for the EU and NATO,”](#) [“Kolesnykov: I voted for peace — hopefully, this year,”](#) [“Give this country a chance”: Tymoshenko votes and urges Ukrainians to go to the polls](#)). Incidentally, the news item about Borys Kolesnykov, containing almost the same headline and the same photo, was also posted on the “**Segodnya.ua**” online media outlet ([“Borys Kolesnykov: I voted for peace in Ukraine”](#)). Meanwhile, the “**Novoye Vremya**” online media outlet offered positive coverage of Petro Poroshenko ([“For Ukraine’s European future”: Poroshenko and his family vote in the elections](#)). “**Gordonua.com**” online media outlet also posted news in the same vein ([“Smeshko: We vote for Ukraine’s future. A video”](#) or [“For Ukraine’s future and success.” Hroisman votes in the elections to the Rada](#)).

Some news reports campaigning for “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party have also been identified. For example, on 20 July, both the “**Gordonua.com**” ([“Prykhodko attacked during a show in Vinnytsia”](#)) and “**Korrespondent**” ([“Anastasiia Prykhodko attacked during a show”](#)) online media outlets published reports of Anastasiia Prykhodko’s aborted show in Vinnytsia. And this is despite the fact that the show took place on 19 July. These websites, along with the information about the incident, provided photos and videos from Anastasiia Prykhodko’s Facebook page, featuring Fatherland’s logos.

**Sociology.** In the course of the monitoring, violations associated with the release of public ratings were also detected. The electoral legislation prohibits releasing them during the silence and election days. Still, on 21 July, i.e. the election day, the “**Obozrevatel**” online media outlet published a report titled [“People’s servant mono coalition — predictions from sociologists,”](#) which begins with the following phrase: “The presidential party “People’s servant” has a chance to win a majority in the

Verkhovna Rada and form a mono coalition”. The report publishes comments by sociologists on the percentage of votes that various parties were expected to win in this election. The text is also accompanied by a photo with the logo of “People’s servant” party.

The “Obozrevatel” online media outlet also violated the electoral legislation by releasing exit poll results (which is prohibited until the polls are closed at 8.00pm). In particular, at 3.18pm on 21 July, a news report titled [“We’ve done everything right” — Vakarchuk’s team responds to poor exit poll performance](#) was published, which cited an anonymous source (thereby violating the standard of credibility) in “Voice” party to inform that, according to the party’s internal polls, it was going to win 6 to 8 per cent of the votes. Furthermore, the same source, reportedly “close to the party leader Sviatoslav Vakarchuk”, commented on the “unofficial exit poll data from various news agencies”.

**Reports concerning a potential coalition, future appointments, etc.** On the election day, certain websites carried statements made by the representatives of various political forces concerning the future coalition, as well as positions in the Government and Parliament. Despite not being about campaigning, these reports nevertheless indirectly commented on the election results. Whenever any political force promoted certain candidates for various positions specifically on the election day, this might have had an impact on the voters. For example, online media outlet “Obozrevatel” posted a report titled [“People’s servant” has already drafted a coalition agreement — what is known so far](#), in which it once again cited anonymous sources, effectively promoting the message that this party has already won (despite the vote still being in progress) and will form a coalition. A similar report was published by online media outlet “**Hromadske**”, citing an authorised source — [“Davyd Arakhamiia \(No. 4 on the “People’s servant” list\) on a coalition agreement that is 70 per cent ready](#)”.

**Divisions in the country, deeper regional contradictions.** The media monitoring specialists also detected certain reports posted on online media outlet “**Strana.ua**” capable of instigating deeper contradictions and animosity between regions. For example, on the election day of 21 July, this online media outlet posted an article under the headline [“We must stop the revanchists.” Poroshenko and Co launch a campaign against the people of Eastern Ukraine](#). By using emotionally coloured vocabulary (which is typical of this media outlet), “Strana.ua” offered manipulative interpretation of Petro Poroshenko’s call to vote made to the residents of Western Ukraine: “Today, on the day of the elections to the Rada, a full-fledged campaign has been unfolding in the camp of Ukraine’s ex-President Petro Poroshenko and his supporters, directed against the voters in the south-east. Both the former President and his supporters among bloggers urge only western Ukrainians to come to the polls. Thereby hinting that the votes of other Ukrainians are a “threat”. At the same time, this online media outlet failed to mention that a similar appeal — in this

instance, to the residents of eastern Ukraine — by Vadym Rabinovych, a representative of “Opposition platform — For life” party, had been aired by TV Channel “112 Ukraine”. Instead of drawing attention to the fact that both politicians had no right to engage in counter-campaigning on the election day, this media outlet decided to discredit Petro Poroshenko, provoking regional confrontation as well.

## GENDER

Gender equality means equal visibility, empowerment, responsibility and participation of both women and men in all spheres of public life, including the media.

Recommendation CM/Rec(2013)1 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers to member States on gender equality and media stresses that the media are centrally placed to shape society's perceptions, ideas, attitudes and behaviour. They should reflect the reality of women and men, in all their diversity.

As rightly noted in Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)1 on preventing and combating sexism, it is important to encourage the promotion of positive images of women as active participants in social, economic and political life.

Like in the Presidential elections, the media continued to favour men during the Parliamentary elections, despite changes in the society and women's growing contribution to politics.

The absence of women in political media discourse illustrates well the lack of gender parity in politics. Since the monitoring covered the activities of such entities as the President, the Office of the President, the Prime Minister, the Government, mayors and chairmen of district state administrations, the Central Election Commission, as well as 16 parties, whose representatives were mostly men, this has had a corresponding impact on the monitoring outputs.

### **National TV Channels**

The media can either hinder or accelerate structural changes aimed at achieving gender equality. This inequality becomes even more pronounced when it comes to the presence of women in the media content, both in terms of quality and quantity.

According to the monitoring data for the period between 22 June and 21 July, men were given overwhelmingly more prime time — 80 per cent — on the national TV Channels compared to women, while women — only 11 per cent.

For the entire monitoring period, only 238 news segments on 10 national TV Channels contained opinions from women, as opposed to 1,403 news segments in which men were presented.

Furthermore, the media would generally avoid naming contributors of these news items. On the whole, 5,955 news reports were processed during the monitoring, of which 9 per cent (529 reports) were authored by men, 15 per cent (905 reports) — by women, 9 per cent (536 reports) had mixed authorship, and 67 per cent of the news items (3,985 reports) were without indicated authorship.



The monitoring also revealed an imbalance in the representation and a lack of meaningful participation of women as representatives of political forces. For example, the audience of the *Live* talk show aired on Pryamyi on 27 June 2019 saw no women among the guests, when nine male politicians invited to the studio discussed fighting for seats in the Verkhovna Rada. Other monitored talk shows were also not notable for their gender balance.

## **Online media**

Findings of the online media monitoring are largely the same — gender imbalance during the parliamentary elections was also identified there. For example, eight online media outlets represented women's opinions only in 9 per cent of their news reports, whereas 91 per cent of the news items featured male speakers.

Findings of the online media monitoring also show that 5 per cent of new items were contributed by men, 4 per cent — by women, with 1 percent having mixed authorship, and an absolute majority — 90 per cent — without indicated authorship. The online media should indicate authorship, so that their readers could be aware of the gender perspective in these reports.

## **Instances of sexism**

Sexism in the media contributes to shaping an environment where “everyday” sexism is tolerated and regarded as insignificant. It is manifested as follows:

- sexual, sexualised and racist images and representation of women, men, girls and boys;
- disparaging or derogatory coverage of women's looks, clothing and behaviour, rather than a balanced and informed discussion of their views and opinions;
- coverage and portrayal of women and men in clichéd roles in the family or community;
- reproduction and perpetuation of gender stereotypes in respect of victims of gender-based violence;
- imbalanced representation and inadequate engagement of women in various professional and informative roles (experts, commentators), particularly women from minority groups<sup>16</sup>.

On 26 June 2019, in a [TSN news bulletin aired on TV Channel “1+1”](#), its presenter Dasha Shchaslyva asked Andrii Bohdan, Head of the Presidential Office: “What kind of women do you like?” The banner “Candid Bohdan” was displayed on the screen

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<sup>16</sup> Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on preventing and combating sexism (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 27 March 2019 at the 134<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Ministers' Deputies).

during the entire segment. The plot was complimentary, contained sexism and would have been more appropriate for society column than the news.

Furthermore, on 5 July 2019, an interview with Arseniy Yatseniuk, leader of “People’s Front” party, taken by Dmytro Gordon, was posted on the online media outlet “Gordonua.com” in its news section under the headline [“Yatseniuk: I told Poroshenko, ‘Petro, you’ll be the next! Don’t do it’”](#), during which the interviewer inappropriately asked the politician about his attitude to Yuliya Tymoshenko, leader of “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) party:

- Did you like her as a woman?
- I like my wife.
- This is a standard response.
- She impresses me with her charisma.

Online media outlet “Strana.ua” featured messages that were offensive and disparaging to women in its article posted on 27 June 2019 under the headline [“Worked as a whore, but no one married him”. Deputy Chief Editor of the online media outlet “Strana.ua” Kriukova urged future members of Parliament not to act like member of Parliament Lin’ko”](#). The article was about Svitlana Kriukova, Deputy Chief Editor of online media outlet “Strana.ua”, giving a piece of advice to prospective deputies of the Verkhovna Rada. Her direct sexist speech was used by the online media outlet “Strana.ua” in its “News” section.

At the same time, it can be noted that the journalistic community is becoming selectively gender sensitive. For example, on 8 July 2019, Dmytro Razumkov, leader of “People’s servant” party, gave the following [comment on TV Channel “STB”](#): “We have the most beautiful girls. Although today it is sometimes perceived as some kind of sexism...” Journalist Emma Antoniuk interrupted the politician and rightly noted, “We are not jewellery, we are human beings and have the right to be ugly”. The segment also mentioned the recent “I’m not a brand” flash mob on social media, held in response to the sexist remarks made about women by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi.

In this context, it is important to implement education and training strategies, as well as tools for journalists and other media professionals, to detect sexism, promote positive and non-stereotyped portrayal of women and men in the media, and facilitate gender-sensitive communication. These additional measures should be supported with adequate resourcing.

## SOCIAL NETWORKS

Given the growing influence of social media during the elections, the monitoring team assessed their role in the election process. The Facebook social network was selected for monitoring. In early 2019, it was used by 13 million Ukrainians (according to a survey carried out by “PlusOne”). The network is one of the essential communication channels in Ukraine. This applies both to business and political segments. The monitoring team focused on the Facebook pages of the 10 highest rated parties and their official leaders:

“People’s servant”, Dmytro Razumkov;  
“European Solidarity”, Petro Poroshenko;  
“Opposition platform — For life”, Yuriy Boiko;  
“Fatherland”, Yuliya Tymoshenko;  
“Voice”, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk;  
“Power and dignity”, Igor Smeshko;  
Oleg Lyashko;  
“Civic position”, Anatoliy Hrytsenko;  
“Opposition bloc”, Oleksandr Vilkul;  
“All Ukrainian Union “Freedom” (Svoboda), Oleg Tyagnybok.

A quantitative analysis of the topics of the posts and the audience’s reactions on the posts (i.e. the number of comments, reposts, and the sum of all responses) was performed. A qualitative analysis was also performed according to the following indicators:

- 1) the campaign strategy on Facebook;
- 2) incitement of hatred and hate speech;
- 3) information for the voters and voters’ education;
- 4) sponsored stories and paid political advertising;
- 5) disinformation (discrediting the opponents).

### Monitoring findings

- **Across the social network, most of the parties emphasised personal and political qualities of their leaders, rather than their ideologies or agendas** (“People’s servant”, “Voice”, “Power and dignity”, “Civic position”; to a less extent “European Solidarity”, “Opposition bloc”). The party “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko” had no dedicated page in any social network. In rare cases, the parties concentrated their attention on the strong personalities of other party members, rather than on those of party leaders. Some political forces were trying — mostly haphazardly — to bring to the voters’ attention their party lists (“European Solidarity”, “People’s servant”, “Opposition platform — For life”, “Voice”, “Power and dignity”, “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom”

(Svoboda). “Opposition platform — For life” and “Opposition bloc” parties focused less on their leaders’ personalities and more on their pro-Russian course and discrediting the current Government and opponents.

- **The parties and their leaders actively used short videos, streaming, interactive surveys, which were well appreciated by social networking algorithms**, as well as other advanced methods of voters’ engagement. “People’s servant” and “Voice” parties used the advantages of this format the most efficiently, building informal ‘peer-to-peer’ communication and sharing entertainment content. “Voice” party also used sign interpretation for its campaign videos. Other parties and candidates had built up downward communication that is traditional and alien to social networks.
- **None of the parties involved in the election race had engaged in comprehensive voters’ education on how to make an informed choice** by explaining, for example, the Verkhovna Rada’s powers and operating modalities. Their pages contained clarifications about the respective party, its place on the list, and warnings against “fake” candidates and provocations. Some political forces were posting tips on how to change the place of voting, how not to spoil the ballot paper, etc.
- **Parties and their leaders failed to offer holistic concepts of the country development on their Facebook pages and largely avoided ideological messages**. Their messages were mostly populist: cut utility rates, raise wages, negotiate peace. **The main split occurred along the “Europe vs Russia” line**. The most emphatic messages about the country’s future were made by “European Solidarity” party, “Voice” party (the pro-European vector), as well as by the pro-Russian “Opposition platform — For life” and “Opposition bloc” parties. The latter focused on social issues (“following an agreement with Russia, we will raise pensions and cut utility rates”). “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda) and “Voice” parties declared that they would fight the oligarchs. “Power and dignity” party, along with “Opposition bloc” party, promoted Ukraine’s non-aligned status.
- **Paid posts were actively promoted by the websites, primarily targeting those regions that were regarded as their electoral base**. Advertising mostly contained campaigning messages, information about the campaign progress, and programme highlights, which may be generally regarded as populist.
- **More than half of the parties and their leaders used hate speech and tried to discredit their political opponents**. Ex-President Poroshenko took the brunt of the criticism (“Opposition platform — For life”, “Opposition bloc”, “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna), “Power and dignity”, Oleg Lyashko, “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda), “Civic position”, “People’s voice”). The impersonal “old policies” was sometimes the object of the criticism (“Voice” party). The new President Volodymyr Zelenskyi was gradually becoming a target for discrediting (Oleg Lyashko, “Opposition platform — For life” party, “Opposition bloc” party). Parties or politicians would

occasionally criticise each other, such as ongoing attempts by “Opposition platform — For life” and “Opposition bloc” parties to discredit each other.

- **The campaign’s main newsbreaks were associated with the relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation**, such as the initiative by the TV Channels “NewsOne” and “Russia 1”, broadcasts of the latter being restricted in Ukraine, to hold a TV link-up with the Russian Federation; Russia’s return to PACE; possible release of captured sailors; cancellation of the military parade, etc.
- **Certain parties and their leaders** (“Opposition platform — For life”, “Opposition bloc”) **were aggressively disseminating messages that resonated with the narratives of Russian propaganda**, such as “the civil conflict in Ukraine”, “it was Poroshenko who started the war”, or narratives focused on discrediting the Ukrainian Government, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, etc.
- **Four party leaders (Dmytro Razumkov, Igor Smeshko, Oleg Lyashko, and Oleg Tyagnybok) kept their personal accounts** without using public pages. Personal accounts do not allow posting advertisements and make it impossible to see who and from which country maintains the page. Thus, tracking the funding sources for the candidates’ advertising, its target audience and content has been made difficult. This is an indication of a low transparency culture.

## INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE RUSSIAN EXTERNAL INFORMATION INFLUENCE IN THE UKRAINIAN MEDIA

The monitoring was based on the key narratives of Russian propaganda, as identified through analysis of the “fake” news debunked by the “StopFake” project (<https://www.stopfake.org/>) over the last four years.

This categorisation was performed by Yevhen Fedchenko, “StopFake’s” co-founder, in his article “Kremlin Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures by Other Means” (Estonian Journal of Military Studies), published in 2016 (<https://bit.ly/2lpBVIV>). Following an analysis of a sample of 500 untrue materials — examples of the Kremlin’s propaganda — 18 common topics were identified.

A subsequent study performed by the project experts in 2018 (<https://bit.ly/2SvbMqr>) confirmed these narratives. They included the following:

- “Ukraine as a “fascist state”,
- “Ukraine as a “failed state”,
- “Russia is not an invader and has never launched any military attacks against Ukraine”,
- narratives aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian Armed Forces,
- territorial disintegration of Ukraine or “territorial claims” by neighbouring countries,
- fake legitimisation, using representatives of foreign governments, international organisations or foreign media, of the Crimea annexation and occupation of Donbas,
- decline of Western support for Ukraine — the West’s “Ukrainian fatigue”,
- stories about the EU disintegration, the collapse of the United States and of the entire West, the alleged ongoing “civil war” in the Western countries, their insignificance in world geopolitics.

The list was expanded with the latest narratives, such as discrediting Ukraine’s local church, depicting Russia as a defender of traditional values and as a nation entitled to its sphere of influence, the need to “negotiate peace with Russia”.

### General trends

News reports indicative of Russian influence mostly appeared on “NewsOne”, “112 Ukraine”, and “Inter” TV Channels, as well as on “Strana.ua” and “Korrespondent” online media outlets. More rarely and irregularly — in other online media outlets.

- **Using Russian websites and news agencies as sources of information, including for international and Ukrainian news**, where it would have made more sense to use primary sources from the relevant country. They often promote narratives of Russian propaganda.

- **Unbalanced presentation of Russian opinions on events in Ukraine by some media.**
- **News on local events in Russia, imposing the Russian agenda.** Consumers of this information are being continuously captured within the Russian information field.
- **Messages that are resonant of the Russian propaganda narratives were relayed in the form of quotations from members of the campaigning parties,** including “Opposition platform — For life” and “Opposition bloc” parties.
- **The widespread narratives that appeared in the Ukrainian media most frequently:**
  - The idea that **“we need to negotiate with Russia and the Donbas pseudo-republics”**. The Russian Federation is painted as a “peacemaker” rather than the aggressor nation (it is alleged that Ukraine “should stop the policy of war” pursued by those who “do not want peace” and are “guilty of bloodshed”). Among others, this idea was promoted by producer Oliver Stone in his documentary *“Revealing Ukraine”*, regarded by experts as a piece of propaganda.
  - **Discrediting the Orthodox Church of Ukraine** (“schism”, “non-canonical”, “The OCU seizes temples and forces believers to turn to it”, “The OCU is an element in Poroshenko’s campaigning”).
  - **Discrediting the Ukrainian authorities**, including the newly elected President Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
  - **Legitimising the occupation of Donbas and Crimea** — the occupation authorities of the so-called DPR and LPR were presented as political entities with whom “direct negotiations” were needed, while Russian servicemen in Donbas were referred to as “separatists”.
  - **“Russia is not present there” (“Russia is not an invader and has never launched any military attacks against Ukraine”)**. Stories or news segments about events on the front line where Russian servicemen were called “separatists”, “enemy” or “fighters”, avoiding references to the aggressor nation or naming the opposite party at all.

## ADHERENCE TO THE CODE OF ETHICS OF THE UKRAINIAN JOURNALIST

During the period of monitoring, **150 instances of violation of the Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist** by the monitored media were identified.

These violations were transferred in the form of complaints to the Commission on Journalism Ethics<sup>17</sup>, as a self-regulatory body for journalists and editorial staff, for its assessment of compliance with the Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist during the coverage of Parliamentary elections.

The Commission examined the complaints carefully and issued **8 decisions** (5 decisions in the form of a public censure, and 3 decisions in the form of a friendly warning) in respect of such media outlets as TV Channels “1+1”, “NewsOne”, “ICTV”, “STB”, and online media outlets “Obozrevatel”, “Gordonua.com”, “Novoye Vremya”, and “Strana.ua”.

The majority of the identified instances concerned the following Articles of the Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist<sup>18</sup>:

- Article 2 (serving the interests of the authorities or owners, rather than those of the public);
- Article 6 (respecting the right of the public to have full and objective information about facts and events);
- Article 7 (information and analytical materials should be clearly separated from advertising);
- Article 9 (facts, judgments, assumptions should be clearly separated from each other);
- Article 10 (opposing viewpoints must be presented in a balanced way; opinions of independent experts should be presented as well);
- Article 11 (distorting the content by selective quoting of public opinion polls' findings).

The respective decisions of the Commission were published on its website under the “Elections” headline (<http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/elections>).

**1. TV channel “NewsOne”** — a complaint against [segment 10](#) in the 6.00pm news bulletin aired on 22 June 2019.

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<sup>17</sup> The Commission on Journalism Ethics is a self-regulatory body for journalists and editorial staff, which allows discussing and suggesting ways to resolve conflict situations based on a single standard — the Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist. The Commission deals with conflicts of ethical and professional nature that arise in the journalistic circles or between these circles and the public in connection with the performance by journalists of their professional duties.

<sup>18</sup> The Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist was adopted in 2002 at the Congress of Journalists — Signatories to the Code, and was last updated in 2013. The Code was approved on 12 December 2013 at a plenary session of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) and, a month earlier, — by a decision of the Committee of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine (IMTUU).



The news report, which was the subject matter of the complaint, manipulated the topic of the Day of Mourning by airing, just after a segment about the President Volodymyr Zelenskyi's address made on this occasion, the information about negative assessment of his activities on the part of "Opposition platform — For life" party, as well as propaganda of "Opposition platform — For life" party's policies, such as "People are waiting for specific actions from the President, not anti-war calls... The main objective of our party is to restore peace in Donbas today... The current Government, in our party's opinion, isn't different from Poroshenko's regime and does nothing to restore peace in Ukraine".

Violation of Articles 2, 6, 7 and 10. The sanction: public condemnation.

**2. TV Channel "STB"** — a complaint against segment 17 in the 10.00pm "[Vikna](#)" news bulletin aired on 24 June 2019.

The segment reported on the top ten persons on "Opposition bloc's" party list and contained the party's campaign promises. The segment contained comments of the Uzhhorod and Zaporizhzhia mayors who were running for Parliamentary elections from "Opposition bloc" party. The segment was complimentary, contained elements of hidden political advertising, and lacked any newsbreaks or balanced opinions.

Violation of Articles 6 and 7. The sanction: public condemnation.

**3. Online media outlet "Gordonua.com"** — an article posted on 25 June 2019 under the headline "[Medvedchuk says Moscow has partially lifted sanctions from Ukraine after talks with "Opposition platform — For life" party](#)".

The article contained hidden political advertising/advertorial ("dzhynsa") and open campaigning on behalf of "Opposition platform — For life" party. The news item offered no alternative viewpoints, opinions from independent experts were not presented, and information voiced by Viktor Medvedchuk was not verified.

Violation of Articles 6, 7 and 10. The sanction: public condemnation.

**4. TV Channel "1+1"** — a segment titled "[Electoral competition](#)" in the TSN news bulletin aired on 25 June 2019.

The segment was about the presentation by "People's servant" party of its majoritarian candidates in Kyiv. Other news programmes aired on this day featured no segments about Parliamentary election candidates, neither did they cover majoritarian candidates from other parties in the days before. Moreover, the segment used a number of evaluative judgments that were complimentary and were presented as facts, without being supported by any evidence. The segment also lacked views or opinions from independent experts, which is contrary to the requirements on balanced and impartial election coverage by the media.

Violation of Articles 2, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the Code. The sanction: public condemnation.

**5. TV Channel "ICTV"** — segment 6 in the "[Fakty](#)" news bulletin aired at 9:10pm on 25 June 2019.

The channel reported that “Voice” party promised to initiate changes to the Constitution of Ukraine; however, the story was presented without maintaining any balance, in a one-sided manner, failing to offer any opinions from experts in the field of constitutional law and constitutional process. The segment provided only a comment by Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, the party’s leader.

Violation of Articles 6 and 10 of the Code. The sanction: friendly warning.

**6. Online media outlet “Obozrevatel”** — an article posted on 28 June 2019 under the headline [“Fresh poll findings: “Opposition bloc” party gets into the Rada”](#).

The news item contained hidden political advertising in favour of “Opposition bloc” party. The headline of the news item contained a manipulative statement about “Opposition bloc” definitely getting into the Parliament, despite the fact that the elections were yet to take place, and the news item itself stated that the party was merely “close to the electoral threshold”. The article was accompanied by “Opposition bloc” party’s logo, the information about the poll contained no data on its sponsor, sociological sampling or polling techniques.

Violation of Articles 6, 7 and 11 of the Code. The sanction: friendly warning.

**7. Online media outlet “Strana.ua”** — an article under the headline [“‘We must stop the revanchists’. Poroshenko and Co launch a campaign against the people of Eastern Ukraine”](#).

The entire news item was based on subjective opinions of its anonymous contributors, it contained unfounded allegations that a leader of one of the parties running in the election was waging “a campaign against the people of Eastern Ukraine”.

The article also failed to meet the requirements of balance, since it provided neither comments from Petro Poroshenko’s team nor even showed any attempts to obtain such response or opinions from independent experts.

Violations of Articles 6, 9, 10 (biased and unfounded accusations). The sanction: public condemnation.

**8. Online media outlet “Novoye Vremya”** — news item about public polls, titled [“A poll by “Rating” shows that “People’s servant” party has a 50 per cent support; “Voice” party gets into the Rada”](#); [“Ukrainians are willing to see five parties in the Rada, “People’s servant” party leads with a big margin, poll findings show”](#), etc.

Violation of the requirements on the release of public poll findings in a number of news items published on “Novoye Vremya” online media outlet.

Violation of Articles 6 and 11 of the Code. The sanction: friendly warning.

At the same time, **the Commission emphasises its recommendations on avoiding elements of hidden political advertising when planning content during elections (see “Key recommendations of the Report”).**

More advice on ethical coverage of the election process can be found in the [“Elections Coverage in Ukraine” Guide for journalists and editorial staff](#).

## INFOGRAPHICS


## POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE ON TV CHANNELS

22 June – 19 July 2019



### UA: PERSHYI

#### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June - 19 July 2019



### INTER

#### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June - 19 July 2019



## ICTV

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## PRYAMYI

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June - 19 July 2019



## 5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June - 19 July 2019



## 1+1

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## NEWSONE

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June - 19 July 2019



## 112 UKRAINE

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## UKRAINE

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## STB

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE






## POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE IN ONLINE MEDIA

22 June – 19 July 2019



### OBOZREVATEL

#### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



### SEGODNYA.UA

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## STRANA.UA

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## HROMADSKE

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## NOVOYE VREMYA

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## KORRESPONDENT

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## GORDON

### POLITICAL PARTIES' COVERAGE




## TOPICS COVERED ON TV CHANNELS

22 June – 19 July 2019



### UA:PERSHYI

#### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



### INTER

#### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## ICTV

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## PRYAMYI

### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## 5<sup>TH</sup> CHANNEL

### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## 1+1

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## NEWSONE

### TOPICS COVERED




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## 112 UKRAINE

### TOPICS COVERED






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## UKRAINE

### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## STB

### TOPICS COVERED




## TOPICS COVERED IN ONLINE MEDIA

22 June – 19 July 2019



### OBOZREVATEL

#### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



### SEGODNYA.UA

#### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## STRANA.UA

### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## HROMADSKÉ

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


22 June – 19 July 2019



## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## NOVOYE VREMYA

### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## KORRESPONDENT

### TOPICS COVERED




22 June – 19 July 2019



## GORDONUA.COM

### TOPICS COVERED




## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE ON TV CHANNELS

22 June – 19 July 2019



### UA:PERSHYI

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



### INTER

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## ICTV

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## PRYAMYI

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## 5<sup>th</sup> CHANNEL

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## 1+1

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE





22 June – 19 July 2019



## NEWSONE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## 112 UKRAINE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## UKRAINE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## STB

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




## MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE IN ONLINE MEDIA

22 June – 19 July 2019



### OBOZREVATEL

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



### SEGODNYA.UA

#### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## STRANA.UA

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## HROMADSKE

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## NOVOYE VREMYA

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## KORRESPONDENT

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




22 June – 19 July 2019



## GORDON

### MONITORED SUBJECTS' COVERAGE




## TALK SHOWS

22 June – 19 July 2019



### TALK SHOWS: TOTAL

#### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOWS




- Party "European Solidarity"
- Party "Opposition platform – For life"
- Party "People's servant"
- Party "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna)
- Party "Voice"
- Party "All-Ukrainian association "Freedom" (Svoboda)
- Party "Groysman's Ukrainian strategy"
- Party "Self-Aid" ("Samopomich")
- Party "Radical party of Oleg Lyashko"
- Party "Opposition bloc"
- Party "Civic position"
- Party "Power and dignity"
- Agrarian party of Ukraine
- Party "Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili"
- Party "Public political platform of Nadiia Savchenko"

POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party "European Solidarity"	42
Party "Opposition platform – For life"	27
Party "People's servant"	24
Party "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna)	21
Party "Voice"	18
Party "All-Ukrainian association "Freedom" (Svoboda)	17
Party "Groysman's Ukrainian strategy"	16
Party "Self-Aid" ("Samopomich")	14
Party "Radical party of Oleg Lyashko"	12
Party "Opposition bloc"	12
Party "Civic position"	8
Party "Power and dignity"	7
Agrarian party of Ukraine	3
Party "Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili"	3
Party "Public political platform of Nadiia Savchenko"	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>225</b>

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

#### GENDER OF TALK SHOWS PARTICIPANTS



- Men Guests
- Men Experts
- Women Guests
- Women Experts

WOMEN		Participation**
	GUESTS	50
	EXPERTS	32
Усього		82
MEN		Participation**
	GUESTS	244
	EXPERTS	148
Total		392


\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

22 June – 19 July 2019



## TALK SHOW “PEOPLE ARE AGAINST” (“NAROD PROTY”) (TV CHANNEL “ZIK”)


### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOW



POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna)	5
Party “People’s servant”	5
Party “Opposition platform – For life”	4
Party “Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili”	2
Party “Power and dignity”	2
Party “European Solidarity”	1
Party “Public political platform of Nadiia Savchenko”	1
Party “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda)	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

### GENDER OF TALK SHOW PARTICIPANTS



WOMEN	Participation**
GUESTS	2
EXPERTS	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>

MEN	Participation**
GUESTS	27
EXPERTS	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>43</b>

\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit




22 June – 19 July 2019



## TALK SHOW “THE RIGHT TO POWER” (“PRAVO NA VLADU”) (TV CHANNEL “1+1”)

### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOW




- Party "People's servant"
- Party "European Solidarity"
- Party "Groysman's Ukrainian strategy"
- Party "Voice"
- Party "Opposition bloc"
- Party "All-Ukrainian association "Freedom" (Svoboda)
- Party "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna)
- Party "Power and dignity"
- Party "Self-Aid" ("Samopomich")
- Party "Civic position"

POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party "People's servant"	4
Party "European Solidarity"	4
Party "Groysman's Ukrainian strategy"	4
Party "Voice"	4
Party "Opposition bloc"	4
Party "All-Ukrainian association "Freedom" (Svoboda)	3
Party "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna)	3
Party "Power and dignity"	3
Party "Self-Aid" ("Samopomich")	3
Party "Civic position"	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

### GENDER OF TALK SHOW PARTICIPANTS



WOMEN	Participation**
GUESTS	3
EXPERTS	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>

MEN	Participation**
GUESTS	31
EXPERTS	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>


\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

22 June – 19 July 2019



## TALK SHOW “LIVE PROGRAMME WITH SVITLANA ORLOVSKA AND MYKOLA VERESEN” (TV CHANNEL “PRYAMYI”)


### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOW



POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party "European Solidarity"	30
Party "Self-Aid" ("Samopomich")	8
Party "Radical party of Oleg Lyashko"	6
Party "Power and dignity"	2
Party "Voice"	1
Party "Opposition platform – For life"	1
Total	48

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

### GENDER OF TALK SHOW PARTICIPANTS



WOMEN	Participation**
GUESTS	23
EXPERTS	7
Total	30

MEN	Participation**
GUESTS	64
EXPERTS	42
Total	106


\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

22 June – 19 July 2019



## TALK SHOW “PULSE” (TV CHANNEL “112 UKRAINE”)


### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOW



POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party “Opposition platform – For life”	11
Party “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna)	4
Party “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda)	4
Party “People’s servant”	2
Party “European Solidarity”	2
Party “Civic position”	1
Party “Movement of New Forces of Mykhailo Saakashvili”	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

### GENDER OF TALK SHOW PARTICIPANTS



WOMEN	Participation**
GUESTS	1
EXPERTS	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>


MEN	Participation**
GUESTS	24
EXPERTS	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>

\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit



## TALK SHOW “FREEDOM OF SPEECH” (“SVOBODA SLOVA”) (TV CHANNEL “ICTV”)


### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOW



POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party "Voice"	10
Party "Groysman's Ukrainian strategy"	10
Party "Opposition bloc"	8
Party "People's servant"	7
Party "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna)	7
Party "European Solidarity"	5
Party "Civic position"	4
Party "All-Ukrainian association "Freedom" (Svoboda)	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

### GENDER OF TALK SHOW PARTICIPANTS



WOMEN	Participation**
GUESTS	12
EXPERTS	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>

MEN	Participation**
GUESTS	43
EXPERTS	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>


\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

22 June – 19 July 2019



## TALK SHOW “UKRAINIAN FORMAT” (TV CHANNEL “NEWSONE”)


### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOW



POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party “Opposition platform – For life”	11
Party “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda)	3
Party “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”	3
Party “People’s servant”	3
Party “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna)	2
Party “Civic position”	2
	24

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

### GENDER OF TALK SHOW PARTICIPANTS



WOMEN	Participation**
GUESTS	0
EXPERTS	4
Total	4

MEN	Participation**
GUESTS	27
EXPERTS	16
Total	43


\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

22 June – 19 July 2019



## TALK SHOW “COUNTDOWN” (“ZVOROTNIY VIDLIK”) (TV CHANNEL “UA:PERSHYI”)


### POLITICAL PARTIES IN TALK SHOW



POLITICAL PARTIES	Participation*
Party “All-Ukrainian association “Freedom” (Svoboda)	4
Party “Radical party of Oleg Lyashko”	3
Agrarian party of Ukraine	3
Party “Self-Aid” (“Samopomich”)	3
Party “Voice”	3
Party “People’s servant”	3
Party “Groysman’s Ukrainian strategy”	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>

\*Total number of participants from each party having participated in the talk show during the monitored period  
When certain party representative had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit

### GENDER OF TALK SHOW PARTICIPANTS



WOMEN	Participation**
GUESTS	9
EXPERTS	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>

MEN	Participation**
GUESTS	28
EXPERTS	45
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>

\*\* When certain person had participated in several editions of the talk show, each his / her participation was calculated as 1 unit


## FACEBOOK INTERACTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR LEADERS

22 June – 21 July 2019



### FACEBOOK

FACEBOOK INTERACTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR LEADERS




22 June – 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## FACEBOOK INTERACTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR LEADERS






22 June – 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## FACEBOOK FOLLOWERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR LEADERS



## FACEBOOK ACTIVITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY LEADERS

22 June - 21 July 2019



### FACEBOOK

ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 535




Party «Voice»

Number of posts: 105



Sviatoslav Vakarchuk



22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 307




Party «Opposition bloc»

Number of posts: 31



Oleksandr Vilkul



22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 138




Party «Civic position»

Number of posts: 59



Anatoliy Hrytsenko




22 June - 21 July 2019



## FACEBOOK

### ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 0		Number of posts: 203	
Radical party of Oleg Lyashko		Oleg Lyashko	



22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK


## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 241




Party «European Solidarity»

Number of posts: 167



Petro Poroshenko





22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 244		Number of posts: 21	
Party «People`s servant»		Dmytro Razumkov	



number (units)



22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 172




Party «Power and dignity»

Number of posts: 69



Igor Smeshko






22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 251		Number of posts: 100	
<b>Party «Fatherland» (Batkivchshyna)</b>		<b>Yuliya Tymoshenko</b>	



22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES


Number of posts: 77

Party «All-Ukrainian  
association «Freedom»  
(Svoboda)



Number of posts: 149

Oleg Tyagnybok



22 June - 21 July 2019



# FACEBOOK

## ACTIVITY OF PARTIES AND PARTY LEADES

Number of posts: 439




Party «Opposition platform - For life»

Number of posts: 32



Yuriy Boiko




## GENDER OF THE MONITORED SUBJECTS ON TV CHANNELS

22 June – 19 July 2019




### GENDER OF THE MONITORED SUBJECTS ON TV CHANNELS



22 June – 19 July 2019



## GENDER OF THE MONITORED SUBJECTS ON TV CHANNELS




## GENDER OF THE MONITORED SUBJECTS IN ONLINE MEDIA

22 June – 19 July 2019




### GENDER OF THE MONITORED SUBJECTS IN ONLINE MEDIA


#### GORDONUA.COM




#### HROMADSKIE



#### KORRESPONDENT



#### NOVOYE VREMYA




22 June – 19 July 2019




## GENDER OF THE MONITORED SUBJECTS IN ONLINE MEDIA


### OBOZREVATEL




### UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA



### SEGODNYA.UA



### STRANA.UA




## AUTHORSHIP ON TV CHANNELS

22 June – 19 July 2019




### AUTHORSHIP ON TV CHANNELS

#### TOTAL



#### UA:PERSHYI






22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP ON TV CHANNELS

1+1



INTER




22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP ON TV CHANNELS

### UKRAINE



### ICTV




22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP ON TV CHANNELS

### 112 UKRAINE



### PRYAMYI




22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP ON TV CHANNELS

### 5<sup>TH</sup> CHANNEL



### NEWSONE




## AUTHORSHIP IN ONLINE MEDIA

22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP IN ONLINE MEDIA

### TOTAL



NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: **6072**

### GORDONUA.COM




NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: **1141**

22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP IN ONLINE MEDIA

### HROMADSKE



### KORRESPONDENT




NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: 563

22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP IN ONLINE MEDIA

### NOVOYE VREMYA



NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: **761**

### OBOZREVATEL




NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: **1015**

22 June – 19 July 2019




## AUTHORSHIP IN ONLINE MEDIA

### UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA



NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: **632**

### SEGODNYA.UA



NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: **743**




22 June – 19 July 2019



## AUTHORSHIP IN ONLINE MEDIA

STRANA.UA



NEWS ITEMS REVIEWED: **774**