Report
CPL(2024)46-04
27 March 2024
Local Elections in the Republic of Moldova (5 November 2023)
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (Monitoring Committee)
Rapporteur:[1] Vladimir PREBILIC, Slovenia (L, SOC/G/PD)
Summary
Following an invitation by the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, the Congress deployed an election observation mission to assess the local elections held on 5 November 2023 in the country. On the election day, nine teams visited some 115 polling stations to observe the election procedures, from opening to closing and counting.
Overall, the Congress delegation found that the 2023 local elections were conducted in a calm and transparent manner, despite challenging circumstances. The campaign was low profile and mostly focused on local issues, but also marked by widespread allegations of vote buying and illegal funding of political parties. The delegation welcomed the adoption of the 2022 Electoral Code, which addressed many previous recommendations and contributed to an orderly and efficient electoral process. The Electoral Code detailed important aspects of the process including campaign and party finance, gender quotas and provisions related to the electoral campaign.
At the same time, these elections were marked by heightened tensions due to the geopolitical situation of the country as well as legal and constitutional disputes related to the right to stand in elections. The ongoing state of emergency and the broad powers granted to the Commission for Exceptional Situations on democratic freedoms were also noted with concern.
The Congress delegation also noted areas for improvement that still need to be addressed, in particular the re-examination of the broad executive powers granted to the Commission for Exceptional Situations during election campaigns, the clarification of the complaints and appeals procedure, the lowering of the age and education requirements for mayors, the persisting media concentration and disinformation and the lack of accessibility of polling stations.
1. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities refers to:
a. Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Committee of Ministers’ Statutory Resolution CM/Res (2020)1 on the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe;
b. the principles laid down in the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ETS No. 122), which was ratified by the Republic of Moldova on 2 October 1997;
c. Chapter XIX of the Rules and Procedures on the practical organisation of election observation missions;
d. the previous Congress Recommendation 443 (2020) on the local elections in the Republic of Moldova (20 October 2019) and Report on the early local elections in seven municipalities in the Republic of Moldova (20 May 2018) (CG35(2018)22);
e. the invitation by the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, dated 24 March 2023, to observe the general local elections held in the country on 5 November 2023.
2. The Congress reiterates the fact that genuinely democratic local and regional elections are part of a process of establishing and maintaining democratic governance and that observation of grassroots elections is a key element in the Congress’s role as guardian of democracy at local and regional level.
3. The Congress acknowledges that, overall, the legal framework is conducive to holding democratic elections, and that the adoption of the 2022 Electoral Code addressed some long-standing recommendations. However, the Congress believes that the stability of the electoral framework is paramount to ensure trust in the impartiality of the electoral process and deplores the fact that changes to the right to stand for elections were adopted shortly before the elections, which caused legal uncertainty and was not in line with the Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.
4. The Congress notes with satisfaction that:
a. the 2022 Electoral Code significantly strengthened the overall legal framework and addressed longstanding recommendations on, inter alia, artificial voter migration, bussing of voters, campaign and party finance and requirements for independent candidates;
b. the Central Election Commission operated in a transparent and efficient manner, at the head of a well-trained election administration, despite limited resources and challenges in implementing the new Electoral Code;
c. the legal framework and the oversight of campaign and party finance by the CEC were successfully strengthened and the CEC pro-actively and thoroughly investigated and sanctioned violations, in collaboration with law enforcement bodies;
d. the campaign was competitive and focused on local issues and voters were able to choose between different political alternatives presented in a mostly impartial manner in the public and independent media, which is reflected in a diverse and pluralistic political landscape elected at local level;
f. overall, the election day was calm, transparent and well-organised, despite being held under difficult circumstances; voter identification and cameras worked well and seemed to be perceived positively by voters and observers alike.
5. At the same time, the Congress expresses its concern on the following issues:
a. the numerous and credible reports of electoral corruption, illegal campaign and party financing and interference of foreign and/or criminal groups with a view to distorting the will of voters in the local elections considerably strained the institutions and were detrimental to local democracy;
b. the constitutional dispute and legal uncertainty related to the right to stand for election, in connection with the amendments to the Electoral Code, did not ensure ideal campaign conditions nor provide enough time for individualised sanctions and legal remedies;
c. the state of emergency, granting wide-ranging powers to the Commission for Exceptional Situations, and the timing of its decisions, negatively affected the electoral process, in particular on the right to stand for election and on the freedom of expression;
d. the post-election period was litigious and marred by contradictory jurisprudence and decisions by the electoral administration and the courts in the validation of mandates, which created confusion and delays;
e. the persisting reports of misuse of administrative resources and of early campaigning, which unduly benefitted some incumbents;
f. the election day was marked by minor issues, including some instances of poor layout of polling stations, gatherings outside polling stations and directing of voters, and counting suffered from some procedural inconsistencies; despite some notable efforts, the accessibility of polling stations for voters with disabilities remained inadequate in most polling stations visited;
g. the higher age and education requirements for running for mayor are not in line with good practice and Congress Recommendation 375 (2015) on the Criteria for standing in local and regional elections;
h. some provisions of the 2022 Electoral Code were burdensome to implement, such as the weekly financial reports, the threshold requirements for the two rounds of elections and the monitoring by the CEC of information published by public authorities;
i. the registration of citizens de facto living abroad to vote in local elections persisted despite the lack of a genuine link with the municipality;
j. the enduring media concentration and the disinformation campaigns echoed on social media, contributed to unbalance an otherwise rather open media environment, in addition to the drastic decisions of the Commission for Exceptional Situations to ban dozens of media outlets due to national security concerns;
k. finally, despite some improvements, women remained less likely to be elected mayors, were less visible in the media and were too often placed on unwinnable seats. The same can be said for young candidates.
6. In light of the above, the Congress invites the authorities of the Republic of Moldova to:
a. continue to investigate and build capacities of the election administration and law enforcement bodies to tackle electoral corruption and increase voter awareness of prohibited activities;
b. avoid last-minute changes to the legal framework close to the campaign period and allow substantial time for consultations and for constitutional and legal disputes to be solved early enough to ensure equal campaigning conditions for all competitors;
c. re-examine the wide-ranging powers granted to the Commission for Exceptional Situations and refrain from resorting to blanket bans of political parties and to the Commission for Exceptional Situations to restrict democratic freedoms during electoral campaigns;
d. simplify the appeals and complaints procedure to reduce complexity and to ensure that all registration-related claims are handled in a timely manner before election day; at the same time, reconsider the provisions of Article 174 of the Electoral Code, that give District Electoral Commissions the competence to certify results and validate mandates;
e. implement existing legislation and regulations related to the misuse of public resources and provide for timely investigations and more dissuasive sanctions in case of violations;
f. pursue efforts to tackle election day violations and to ensure that polling stations are accessible for voters with mobility impairments;consider some adaptations to avoid overstraining Precinct Electoral Bureau members;
g. review Article 161.2 of the Electoral Code and lower the age and education requirements to stand for mayoral elections;
h. resource the Central Electoral Commission adequately to enable it to fully monitor and oversee campaign and party finance and also prevent the misuse of public resources in real time; consider removing the turnout requirements for local elections;
i. tackle the issue of media concentration and disinformation, through transparency of media ownership and stronger regulation of the online and social media by the Audiovisual Council.
j. provide more incentives to increase the participation of women and youth in the media and as heads of list for local and district elections and as mayors.
7. The Congress calls on the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to take account of this recommendation regarding the 2023 general local elections in the Republic of Moldova and the accompanying explanatory memorandum in their activities relating to this member State.
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Following an invitation by Ms Angelica CARAMAN, Chairperson of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Republic of Moldova, received on 24 March 2023, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities deployed an election observation mission to observe the general local elections held on 5 November 2023 in the Republic of Moldova. Ms Gunn-Marit HELGESEN (Norway, R, EPP/CCE) led the delegation which involved 13 Congress members and one expert from 13 countries.
2. Election observation is allowed in the Republic of Moldova. The Electoral Code (Articles 80 and 88) grants access to all stages of the process to domestic and international organisations and representatives of electoral subjects. International observers observe the electoral process at the invitation of the CEC, and are allowed to monitor the electoral process throughout the country and in all the polling stations.[4] In total, the CEC accredited 36 bodies, representing 401 international and 1092 domestic observers.
3. The Congress mission was carried out from 3 to 6 November 2023. Prior to the election day, the Congress delegation met various interlocutors and in particular, the Chairperson of the CEC, the Minister of Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court, members of the delegation of the Republic of Moldova to the Congress, representatives of political parties running in the elections, of NGOs and of the media. In addition, the delegation held briefings with the delegations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the European Parliament as well as with the representatives of the diplomatic corps in the country. A joint press conference was organised on the day following election day, to present the preliminary findings of the international election observation mission (hereafter IEOM) comprising the Congress, OSCE/ODIHR and the European Parliament.
4. On the election day, nine Congress teams were deployed to Chisinau and seven different geographical areas and assessed the electoral procedures in 115 polling stations, including the counting in nine polling stations.
5. The following report focuses specifically on issues arising out of exchanges during meetings held with Congress interlocutors in the context of the general local elections held on 5 November 2023 in the Republic of Moldovaand on observations made on the election day. The Congress wishes to thank all of those who met with the delegation for their open and constructive dialogue.
2. POLITICAL CONTEXT
6. The Republic of Moldova is a parliamentary republic. The Moldovan Constitution was adopted in 1994. The Head of State is the President of the Republic, who is directly elected every four years, on a two-round electoral system. The President holds certain functions and authority, including foreign relations and national security. Ms Maia SANDU, from the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), was elected President of the Republic of Moldova in 2020.
7. The national Parliament (Parlamentul Republicii Moldova) is a unicameral chamber, composed of 101 representatives (Article 60 of the Constitution), who are elected on closed lists every four years in a single nationwide constituency. Seats are distributed using proportional representation and different thresholds apply depending on the lists being constituted of independents, political parties or alliances of parties.
8. The last parliamentary elections were held in July 2021. The Party of Action and Solidarity, led by Ms SANDU, won the snap parliamentary elections and 63 of the 101 mandates, the Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists won 32 and the Shor party, the six remaining mandates. This was the first time in 20 years that a party received an absolute majority of votes in a parliamentary election, a majority which enabled significant legislative reform focusing on European integration, the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption.
9. The political landscape in the Republic of Moldova traditionally reflects two strongly held views, either pro-European or pro-Russian and has witnessed further polarisation since the beginning of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022. These contrasting and often inimical perspectives affect most aspects of the public life, from national to local politics, to the media and the economy. Since 2022, the Republic of Moldova had to step up measures to protect itself from cyber-attacks, hybrid warfare and interference, allegedly from the Russian Federation and attempted to reduce its strong economic dependency to the Russian Federation. An economic crisis ensued at the Autumn 2022, direly affecting a society which remains one of the poorest in the European continent, and increasing domestic tensions, especially in the two regions of the country that maintain close ties with the Russian Federation, namely the two Autonomous Territorial Units, Gagauzia (ATUG) and of the Left Bank of the Dniester (see below).
10. At local level, the last general elections were held on 20 October 2019 and turnout reached 41.68% in the first round.[5] The campaign was generally perceived as low-key and the Congress assessed the conduct of the election day as professional.[6] The main parliamentary parties, namely the Party of the Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) and the Electoral alliance of the PAS and the Dignity and Truth platform (ACUM) scored highest in both mayoral and local council elections.[7] These three subjects obtained majorities in 31 out of the 32 districts and the capital, while the Shor Party and Our Party obtained the majority in the remaining district, Orhei, and in the city of Balti. 21.83% of elected mayors were women, as well as 36.51% of local councillors and 27.08% of the district councillors, which constituted a small but significant increase compared to the 2015 elections.[8]
11. The 2019 mayoral election in Chisinau garnered significant attention because the results of an early mayoral election held in June 2018 had been overturned by court in a controversial ruling.[9] Following a hotly contested 2019 election, Ion CEBAN (PSRM) was elected mayor, with 37.78% of Chisinau voters turning out to vote in the second round. He later created his own political party, the National Alternative Movement (NAM).
12. Since the election of Ms SANDU, the Government of the Republic of Moldova has worked resolutely towards EU accession and on 23 June 2022, the European Councilgranted the country candidate status. On 8 November 2023, shortly after the local elections, the European Commission recommended that the Council open accession negotiations with the Republic of Moldova, which it did on 15 December.
13. In the framework of the EU accession, the government advocated for large-ranging reforms to strengthen the judiciary and the fight against corruption, which constitutes one of the long-standing issues facing the Republic of Moldova. The government set up in 2021, the Independent Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee, a joint independent international and national body tasked with analysing systemic corruption and improving the implementation of anti-corruption measures. Vetting of judges and prosecutors was also prioritised by the current government, in a move which was perceived by the opposition as an attempt to exercise political influence on the institutions.[10] Overall, progress has been made in several spheres including technical compliance with recommendations from the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
14. Some high-profile cases were recently investigated involving former ministers or high-level officials.[11] The most emblematic anti-corruption case concerned a vast bank fraud in 2014, also known as the “theft of the billion”, and targeted mainly Mr Ilan SHOR, a Moldovan oligarch under EU sanctions with strong ties to the Russian Federation. Following a trial that lasted nearly a decade, Mr SHOR, formerly Chairman of one of the banks involved in the scheme and alleged mastermind of the theft, was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison by the Court of Appeal in April 2023 and ordered to hand over €262 million.[12] Mr SHOR, who had established the Shor Party (six MPs), was forced into exile but remained extremely active in national and local politics through promising gifts and grants and supporting local politicians and satellite parties, including during the 2023 elections in Gagauzia.[13]
15. The political situation ahead of the local elections was marked by deepening polarisation and several dismissals and resignations among the political, administrative and judicial high-profile officials,[14] including the dismissal of former Prosecutor General Mr STOIANOGLO[15] and of the Head of the National Integrity Agency, Ms Rodica ANTOCI and the resignations of the Prime Minister Ms GAVRILIȚA and the Head of the National Anti-Corruption Centre, Mr Iulian RUSU. Furthermore, due to the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine, inflation, high energy costs, and the repeated renewal of the state of emergency (first introduced in February 2022 and regularly extended since)have increased domestic tensions.
16. In the months leading to the elections, further political tensions and legal uncertainty arose surrounding the constitutional dispute related to the right to be elected, in particular of the Shor party and its members. InJune 2023, the Constitutional Courtdeclared the Shor party to be unconstitutional. Subsequently, the Government proposed to amend the Electoral Code to prohibit certain individuals associated with banned political parties from running in elections in July 2023. The amendments started a legal dispute which continued until the eve of the election period (see section 4.2. below).
17. The new provisions were also declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on 3 October 2023 because of the absence of individualised decisions and of a possibility to appeal, allowing former Shor politicians to register for local elections.[16] The next day, the Parliament adopted new amendments, without consultations and inclusive dialogue, that contained criteria for determining the inadmissibility of members of a party declared unconstitutional. On the same day, the Commission for Exceptional Situations (CES) issued a decision prohibiting similar categories of persons from contesting elections, thereby, banning these persons from registering, as the deadline to do so was set to 6 October.
18. Overall, the 2023 elections were seen by many as a litmus test for the legitimacy of the PAS and for Ms SANDU’s Government. These elections unfolded under challenging circumstances and widespread allegations of foreign interference and hybrid warfare, at a time of decisive choices between a stronger pro-European stance or a resolutely pro-Russian one. It was also a test for the public institutions, in particular the CEC, to implement the amended Electoral Code and to show resilience when confronted with legal challenges and when handling election-related criminal activities.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
19. Local self-government in the Republic of Moldova is enshrined in the Constitution (Article 109) and is regulated by the 2001 Law on the Administrative and Territorial Organisation of the Republic of Moldova and the 2006 Law on Local Public Administration.[17] The Moldovan Constitution defines the basic principle of ‘local public administration’, including references to local autonomy and decentralisation (Article 109). It also establishes the two-tier organisation of the territory (Article 110) and Chisinau as the capital.
20. The administrative and territorial organisation comprises two levels: a first tier of 898 units of local self-government composed of 832 villages or communes (sate) and 53 cities (orase) and 13 municipalities (municipia). The second-tier is made up of 35 territorial units corresponding to the second level of local government authority: 32 districts (raion), two large municipalities, Chisinau and Balti which hold the status of second level local government and the ATUG. The relationship between subnational governments of the first and second tiers is non-hierarchical, and all first-level units of local government have identical competences, regardless of the size or population of the unit.
21. Specific provisions for the ATUG are laid down in Article 111 of the Constitution and which explicitly declares the autonomy of that region and Law 344/1994 which regulates the special status of Gagauzia and establishes its legislative assembly. While the ATUG independently determines its own political, economic and cultural affairs, the Republic of Moldova retains control over justice, foreign policy and security. The directly elected governor (Bashkan) represents the Gagauzian Government for a four-year term and also holds a position in the Moldovan Government.[18] The current governor Evghenia GUTUL (former Shor party member, now independent), was elected in May 2023 and relations between the central Government and the ATUG have soured since the election was contested by the CEC and central authorities in Chisinau.[19] The administrative centre of Gagauzia, Comrat, as well as other local units, held elections on 5 November 2023.
22. The ATU of the Left Bank of the Dniester is a territory that declared itself independent from the Republic of Moldova following an armed conflict between in 1990-92 but has not been recognised as such by Chisinau. The Government has little control over this territorial unit and since the end of the conflict, Russian peacekeepers have been deployed in this area, which remains marked by a strong pro-Russian sentiment. No local elections were held in the ATU of the Left Bank of the Dniester on 5 November 2023 and thus, this report’s findings do not apply to it.
23. Chisinau, the capital city, has the status of a municipality and, in addition, a special status within the Republic of Moldova, enshrined in Law 136/2016 on the Status of the Municipality of Chisinau. This special status is characterised by the legal provisions that regulate the administration, the functions and the autonomy of the city. The municipality of Chisinau is considered a second-level authority (comparable to a district) and comprises in addition to Chisinau, 34 other suburban localities: six towns, 12 communes and 16 villages. Each smaller entity has a separate mayor and a local council. In addition, the general mayor and 51 members of the Chisinau Municipal Council are directly elected. Balti was granted the same type of administrative structure.
24. In first level local authorities, the representative and decision-making body is the local council composed of councillors, whose number is proportional to the number of local residents. The council adopts the most important political decisions such as the local budget, by-laws, development plans, etc. Its members are elected by the citizens of the units, through a process of secret, general and direct ballot.
25. The mayor (primar) is elected directly every four years. The elections for mayors are based on a two-round majoritarian system. Mayors are the highest authority of the town/village/city/municipality with a clear political leadership role and significant executive functions such as the awarding of contracts, the execution of laws and regulations, the management of staff, etc.
26. The key responsibilities of the first level of local government encompass fire protection, construction and maintenance of local infrastructure, water and waste management, urban planning, cultural institution maintenance, and education.
27. Each second-level authority (district or raion) has a council and a president. The council is also directly elected for a term of four years. The district president is the executive head of the raion and is elected by the district council for a term of four years, if supported by a majority vote of councillors.
28. The second level of local self-government oversees public order, district-wide infrastructure, including roads and local transport, construction of gas pipelines and local power facilities, coordination of sports and youth programs, maintenance of theatres and TV stations, provision of grants for cultural institutions, and management and maintenance of educational and social institutions. A substantial part of the implementation of central functions is delegated to first and second-level local authorities (for example, managing schools and hospitals). When performing delegated functions, local governments have limited autonomy and operate as an agent of central government.
29. An important feature of local politics is political migration – elected representatives changing parties after an election – affecting mayors in particular. This issue has been noted by the Congress in the past and erodes the voter’s expressed choice while questioning the independence/allegiance of local politicians. Assessing the changes in the political affiliation of the mayors elected in 2019, Promo-Lex found that this phenomenon persisted as close to 39% of mayors had changed their political affiliation or became independent/unaffiliated during their mandate. Most of them (36%) migrated to PAS.[20] Closer to the election period, these transfers were noted from the PSRM and smaller parties to the Renaissance party and were allegedly accompanied by illegal attempts to bribe potential candidates.[21] Regardless, citizens express much more confidence in local authorities than any other political institution (Parliament, Government, President), including political parties (the least trusted).[22]
30. Most Congress interlocutors expressed the need for a reform of the local self-government system, as they criticised the high number of local units and the small budget available to fulfil wide responsibilities. Some of the political interlocutors also mentioned the issue with party migration at local level as a source of uncertainty for voters, but also highlighted that political affiliation was less relevant the candidate’s personality in villages rather than in the cities, in particular Chisinau.[23]
31. The Congress delegation refers to Congress Recommendation 436 (2019) on the Monitoring of the application of the European Charter of Local Self-Government in the Republic of Moldova and its explanatory memorandum, for a more in-depth analysis of local self-government in this country.[24] The rapporteurs highlighted, inter alia, ‘a clear trend towards recentralisation, the lack of financial and human resources of local authorities, the lack of effective consultation and the absence of efficient political and institutional dialogue between the central Government and local authorities’. Since the 2019 Monitoring visit, the authorities have engaged in a post-monitoring roadmap to restore dialogue on the key issues highlighted in the report. The delegation invites the authorities to pursue the dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the roadmap, notably on more meaningful competencies and responsibilities and sources of funding and on the challenges related to the numerous changes of political affiliation.[25]
4. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
4.1. Domestic legal framework
32. Local elections in the Republic of Moldova are regulated by the Constitution, which enshrines fundamental rights, and the Electoral Code, as well as supplementary regulations, instructions and decisions of the Central Election Commission.[26] The legal framework has been modified regularly over the last 10 years, including in 2016, 2017, 2019 and 2020. However, most of these amendments did not address most international recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR, Council of Europe bodies and the Moldovan civil society.
33. On 8 December 2022, in a welcome development, the Parliament adopted a new Electoral Code, which largely retained the structure of the previous one but contained significant and wide-ranging changes. The adoption came after an extensive and transparent consultation process spanning eight months both with the public and with national and international experts and organisations.[27] The adopted Electoral Code also integrated some of the suggestions of the joint opinion the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR.[28] The CEC indicated to the Congress delegation that out of 178 recommendations put forward by international organisations, 90% had been integrated to the new Code. The joint opinion noted that the parliamentary opposition parties had however limited engagement during the initial consultation process organised by the CEC.[29]
34. The recently adopted Electoral Code addresses a significant number of previous recommendations on inter alia the composition and appointment procedure of the CEC, the conduct of election campaigns, the introduction of a rule prohibiting that the most important aspects of election law may not change within a year of elections, the creation of permanent positions for Chairpersons of District Electoral Commissions, voting rights (including voting from abroad in national elections), the rules on referendums and independent candidates, and the introduction of a gender quota for all elections. It also integrates provisions aimed at curbing vote-buying, e.g., through a ban on the transportation of voters on election day, and at improving transparency and oversight over campaign finance.
35. A review of the constitutionality of some of the provisions of the Electoral Code was requested by two MPs in February 2023 but some Congress interlocutors from the civil society noted that this request was not examined before the start of the election campaign.[30] Similarly, in September, one MP sought a review of constitutionality of the Article 160.2 of the Electoral Code which prescribes that the deadline for voters to be registered at the place of their permanent or temporary residence cannot be less than three months before the date of the first round of elections but the Constitutional Court declared the request inadmissible.
36. As a consequence of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression on Ukraine, the state of emergency was imposed in the Republic of Moldova on 24 February 2022 by Decision 41/2022 of the Parliament. It was extended every sixty days up until 30 December 2023.[31] Law 212/2004 prescribes the application of the state of emergency, which should have had limited impact on local elections. The state of emergency institutes the Commission for Exceptional Situations (CES), led by the Prime Minister, which is granted with wide prerogatives in the political and economic life of the country. Many Congress interlocutors criticised the role and prerogatives of this Commission in particular in relation to decisions to ban TV channels and websites and on the decision to cancel the registration of the Chance party (see section below) and deplored the absence of democratic control over its decisions.
4.2. Decisions of the Constitutional Court in relation to the right to stand in elections
37. On 19 June 2023, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova declared the controversial Shor party unconstitutional, resulting in an immediate ban.[32] The decision was motivated by the non-transparent financing of the Shor party in several elections since 2016. The Court’s decision also indicated that the Shor party, in collusion with or in the interest of a foreign state actor, here the Russian Federation, had undertaken or participated in activities aimed at provoking an insurrection in order to overthrow or forcibly change the constitutional order of the Republic of Moldova, in particular by creating structures (National Salvation Committee, People’s Government, People’s Court, People’s Shield) to replace the constitutional organs of the state. The Shor party ban was based on Article 41(4) of the Moldovan Constitution, which allows the unconstitutionality of a political party to be declared if the authorities prove that its aims or activities are contrary to political pluralism, the principles of the rule of law, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.[33]
38. Subsequently, the PAS presented a draft law, adopted on 31 July 2023. Law 220/2023, instituted a five-year ban from all elective offices for members of the executive body of a party declared unconstitutional and members of such party who hold an elected office at the time of the decision of the Constitutional Court, including at local level. The law (which came into effect in August 2023) amended the 2022 Electoral Code; the Law on Political Parties and the Criminal Code. More specifically, Article 16(2)(e) of the Electoral Code introduced restrictions to the right to be elected, which would apply to all Shor party members willing to run in the 2023 local elections.
39. The leader of the party, Ilan SHOR had already fled the country, but continued to influence Moldovan politics through the organisation of protests, charity work (in particular in Orhei and in the ATUG) and on social media. Several other Shor politicians remained active in both local and national Moldovan politics as independents. Following the Constitutional Court's decision, Ilan SHOR announced that he would be supporting several satellite parties (namely the Renaissance, Opportunity and Achievement and Chance parties) which registered to run in the local elections and increased fears of foreign and criminal interference in the elections. The Shor party also unsuccessfully appealed against the Constitutional Court's decision.
40. On 3 October 2023, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova admitted an appeal lodged on 26 September by former executive members of the Shor party and ruled Article 16(2)(e) of the Electoral Code unconstitutional, allowing former Shor party members to run in the local elections.[34] Grounds for the decision were mainly the absence of individualised decisions and of legal remedies. The Court also regretted the initiative of the legislator to arbitrarily increase the duration of the ban from three to five years. Two judges, including Constitutional Court President Nicolae ROSCA, formulated separate opinions. On 6 October, the Venice Commission and ODIHR published a Joint Opinion analysing the conformity of the restrictions provided by the Law with international standards, in particular with the right to stand for election, which is an aspect of universal suffrage.[35] The reasoning of the joint Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR opinion on the amendments reflected the same reasoning as the Constitutional Court’s decision.
41. The decision of the Constitutional Court occurred only a few days before the end of the registration period for the local elections (6 October) and contributed to the lack of foreseeability and legal certainty of the elections. The Government reacted promptly to the Court’s decision due to the threat of criminal activities during the campaign. In the early morning of 4 October 2023, the CES adopted Decision 86, banning candidates that were linked to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Shor party.[36] It requested the CEC to draw up a list of people that would be concerned by this disposition. The CEC prepared a list of 102 individuals, 18 of which had already submitted their registration.[37] On the same day, the Parliament adopted a revised Article 16(2)(f) of the Electoral Code in which criteria for determining the inadmissibility of members of a banned party in the electoral race were specified. In the revised Article 16, if a party is declared unconstitutional, persons who are suspected of, accused of, charged with or convicted of crimes that were cited by the Constitutional Court as an argument for declaring the party unconstitutional cannot be elected. The same applies to persons who have been excluded from previous elections on the basis of a violation of the electoral law that was invoked as an argument for declaring that party unconstitutional.[38]
42. Several Congress interlocutors from the NGOs and the parties, regretted that both the July and October 2023 changes of the Electoral Code were adopted without inclusive and open consultations. Specifically, they noted with concern that the October amendments were adopted in a rushed manner, with two parliamentary readings and the promulgation of the law happening over the course of one day, and that these were not preceded by discussions with the CEC (as prescribed by law), the opposition or the civil society.[39] Many interlocutors questioned if the balance had been reached between the need for safeguarding the democratic system and the manner used by the authorities to do so, which in the long run, could threaten democracy and trust of voters in the system. While most accepted the need to protect the Moldovan democracy, some regretted that the October changes challenged the stability of electoral law and risked being perceived as a political move.
43. The Venice Commission and ODIHR released another joint opinion on the October amendments on 16 December 2023. They welcomed that the ban was based on more individualised criteria than previously and that the personal scope of the sanctions was narrowed and linked to past individual behaviour.[40] The opinion also expressed concern that the restrictions imposed were still not in line with Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR, as they did not appear to be fully foreseeable and did not respect the principle of proportionality.[41]
4.3. Electoral system
44. The 2023 local elections aimed at electing 898 Mayors and 11 058 councillors. Mayors and councillors at local and district-levels are elected every four years (Article 156 of the Electoral Code) by universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed suffrage. The date of the general local elections is set to the last Sunday of October or first Sunday of November, as prescribed by Article 159 of the Electoral Code. The CEC must call for elections at least 70 days prior to the election day, which was done on 4 July 2023.[42] An election is declared invalid if a turnout rate of 25% the registered voters is not achieved in the first round and 20% in the second round (Article 175 of the Electoral Code). The turnout requirement in the second round was added to the Electoral Code in 2022, but the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR opinion recommended reviewing all turnout requirements to avoid a succession of failed elections.
45. Voters elect local councillors under a proportional representation system and can vote for candidates registered on closed lists compiled by political parties and alliances of parties or competing as independents. The number of councillors elected in villages/towns/municipalities depends on the size of the population (Article 11 of the Law on Local Administration). The seat distribution method used by the District Election Commissions to allocate mandates is the D’Hondt method (Article 172 of the Electoral Code).
46. Mayors are elected every four years by direct suffrage, based on a two-round majoritarian system, where if no candidate obtains 50% of the vote, a second round is organised among the two candidates with the highest number of votes in the first round. The second round must be organised within two weeks of the first round. For the 2023 elections, the second round was held in 265 municipalities on 19 November 2023.
47. At the district (or second) level, voters directly elect district councillors on closed lists or competing as independents. The seat distribution technique is similar to the one used for local councils. Subsequently, the president of each district is elected by the members of the district council. An exception is envisaged for regional elections in the ATU of Gagauzia, as the elections for the People’s Assembly and the Bashkan of Gagauzia are held separately (Article 155 of the Electoral Code).
48. All lists must comply with a minimum 40% gender quota for both sexes. There are no quotas or specific measures to represent national minorities among local and district elected representatives.[43]
4.4. International legal framework
49. The rights of citizens to vote – and to stand in elections – at periodic, genuine democratic elections are internationally recognised human rights, as stated in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that: “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives […]. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”.[44]
50. Article 25 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to vote and stand in elections: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”.[45]
51. At European level, the right of all citizens to free elections is guaranteed by Article 3 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)[46] : “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”.
52. With respect to local and regional elections, Article 3.2 of the European Charter of Local Self‑Government[47], ratified by the Republic of Moldova in 1997, sets out that local self-government shall be: “exercised by councils or assemblies composed of members freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage, and which may possess executive organs responsible to them”. The citizens’ rights to exercise their democratic choice is the foundation of political participation at local and regional levels. This principle is also enshrined in the preamble to the Additional Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self‑government on the right to participate in the affairs of a local authority, which has not yet been ratified by the Republic of Moldova.
53. In addition to the above-mentioned international treaties, soft law instruments also guide Congress observation missions including Congress Resolution 306 (2010) on the Observation of Local and Regional Elections[48] and Resolution 274 (2008) on the Congress Policy in observing local and regional elections[49] as well as the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, which specifies guidelines on the five principles underlying Europe’s electoral heritage, namely “universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage”.[50]
54. Specifically on election observation, the Congress also refers to Article 8 of 1990 the Copenhagen document which provides that: “The participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavour to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level”.[51]
55. Genuine elections to establish democratic governance cannot be achieved without rule of law and unless a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed without discrimination. Consequently, the conclusions of observation reports are also informed by issue-specific resolutions, recommendations, and opinions adopted by the Congress and the Venice Commission which each address different aspects of the electoral process. The Congress specifically addressed the following subjects through the adoption of transversal reports on: electoral lists and voters residing abroad, criteria for standing in elections, the use of administrative resources, local voting rights, elections during crisis situations, and the situation of independent and opposition candidates.[52] The Congress also incorporates the thematic work of the Venice Commission into its reports, notably their standards concerning inter alia the use of technology, campaigns, dispute resolution, gender representation, persons with disabilities, national minorities, electoral systems, and the media.[53]
4.5. Previous Congress election observation recommendations
56. Following an invitation of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, the Congress carried out a mission to observe the local elections in the country on 20 October 2019. Prior to the main mission, a reduced Congress delegation visited Chisinau from 2 to 4 October to carry out a pre-electoral visit. On election day, the delegation was divided into eleven teams and visited some 200 polling stations across the country. Technically, the elections were well prepared and administered by an overall experienced electoral staff at the level of the polling stations. The Congress acknowledged Moldovan authorities' efforts to improve the legal framework applicable to local elections, specifically amendments addressing political party financing, campaign regulations, and gender quotas.
57. However, in 2019, the delegation expressed concern about last-minute changes causing uncertainty and pressure on electoral bodies, on complex registration requirements for independent candidates, and procedural inconsistencies, especially with video cameras and ballot box sealing. Reiterating past recommendations, including from 2015, the Congress emphasised the importance of combating administrative resource misuse.
58. The report on the 2019 local elections highlighted areas for improvement, including a review of residency requirements to address challenges in distinguishing between domicile and temporary residence. It also suggested strengthening the oversight and enforcement powers of electoral management bodies, in particular on campaign finance, and taking steps to ensure media impartiality. In addition, the report recommended further measures to increase women's participation in politics, both as voters and candidates.
59. On the overall legal framework applicable to the 2023 local elections, the Congress delegation welcomed the adoption of the 2022 Electoral Code which significantly strengthened the overall legal framework and addressed longstanding recommendations on inter alia artificial voter migration, bussing of voters, campaign finance and requirements for independent candidates. It pointed out that the 40% gender quota and placement requirements applied at local level for the first time were respected by political contestants and contributed to a small but significant increase in women’s representation.
60. However, the Congress delegation believes that the stability of the electoral framework is paramount to ensure the trust of the voters and electoral contestants in the impartiality of the process and therefore the delegation expressed concern about the last-minute legal changes brought to the Electoral Code, which caused legal uncertainty. The delegation also endorsed the joint opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR regarding the October changes to the Electoral Code. The delegation also pointed out the impact of the continuing state of emergency and the wide-ranging powers granted to the CES on democratic freedoms. It recommended to avoid last-minute changes to the legal framework close to the campaign period and allow substantial time for consultations and for constitutional and legal disputes to be solved early enough to ensure equal campaigning conditions for all competitors, as well as to re-examine of the wide-ranging powers granted to the CES and refrain from resorting to blanket bans of political parties and to the CES to restrict democratic freedoms during electoral campaigns.
5. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
61. As specified in Article 17 of the Electoral Code, the Moldovan administration tasked with organising local elections is composed of four levels: the Central Election Commission (CEC), 35 District Electoral Councils of the second level (DEC II) including the Central Electoral Council of Gagauzia, 896 District Electoral Councils at local level (one per local unit except Chisinau and Balti, DEC I), and 1 958 Precinct Electoral Bureaus (PEBs).
62. The CEC is an independent body composed of nine members, one nominated by the President and the others based on the composition of the Parliament. The current CEC, led by Ms Angelica CARAMAN and composed of five women and four men, was appointed in 2021 following the early parliamentary elections and will serve a five-year term. The composition and selection process of the CEC members was modified in the new Electoral Code, but will only apply after the current CEC mandate is completed in 2026 (Article 245 of the Electoral Code).[54] Some Congress interlocutors from political parties deplored that the current composition of the CEC gave an absolute majority to CEC members supported by the PAS on decision-making and questioned their independence and impartiality. During the 2023 elections, the CEC was only composed of eight members, as delays affected the appointment of a CEC member proposed by the parliamentary opposition, which the opposition perceived as a political move.
63. The CEC manages the electoral process (Articles 18 to 33 of the Electoral Code). It is a permanent body vested with considerable competencies in organising elections and referendums, coordinating the activities of all electoral bodies and ensuring compliance with election legislation. It is also tasked with developing regulations and instructions to improve the election procedures; maintaining the State Registry of Voters and implementing civic education and voter awareness programmes. The CEC also administers the Centre for Continuous Electoral Training (CCET), in charge of training election officials. In addition, Article 59 of the Electoral Code clearly establishes the role of the CEC regarding the oversight and control over campaign and party finance.
64. The CEC also runs the State Automated Information System “Elections” (Article 13 of the Electoral Code), designed to automate and streamline procedures, to gather trustworthy real-time data and to facilitate registration of voters, candidates and observers. For the 2023 elections, it was also used to allow accredited international and local observers to submit online electoral-related observations and sources of evidence throughout the electoral period.
65. In line with Article 34 of the Electoral Code, permanent DECs II are set up by the CEC to correspond to the 32 districts of the Republic of Moldova, the ATUG and the municipalities of Chisinau and Balti.[55] DECs II are constituted of an odd number of members, of at least seven and at most 11 people. The 2022 Electoral Code rendered the appointment of the chairperson of a DEC II by the CEC permanent. The other members are appointed at least 55 days before election day as follows: two members are appointed by the relevant district court; two members by the district council and one member per political party represented in Parliament.
66. DECs II are responsible for the correct application of laws and regulations related to the conduct of elections and for supervising lower election administration bodies, reviewing complaints, distributing funds, documents and materials and registering independent candidates and lists. They also tabulate the results at district level and announce the final results and allocation of mandates. The Electoral Code also tasked the DECs II with oversight and publication of independent candidates’ financial reports.
67. District Electoral Councils of the first level (DEC I) are temporary bodies managing elections at local units’ level established by DECs II at least 40 days before election day. DECs I correspond to the 898 local units in the Republic of Moldova to the exception of Chisinau and Balti (Article 35.6-9 of the Electoral Code). They are constituted of seven to eleven members, of which two members are appointed by the relevant local council and one member per political party represented in Parliament. If political parties fail to appoint members, the remaining seats are filled by the local councils and in final instance, by the CEC from the persons entered on the Register of Electoral Officials. The responsibilities of DECs I consist mostly in establishing the PEBs and overseeing their work as well as the proper enforcement of the Electoral Code.
68. Precinct Electoral Bureaus (PEB) are temporary bodies established by the DECs II at least 25 days prior to the election day, in this case 11 October 2023, for each polling station (Article 38 of the Electoral Code). DECs set up polling stations in locations proposed by mayors, preferably on the ground floor of public buildings and adapted to the elderly and voters with disabilities. A polling station is set up for 30 to 3 000 voters, a ceiling which way be exceeded by a maximum of 10%.[56]
69. PEBs consist of five to eleven members, of which three members are appointed by the relevant local councils and the remainder are appointed by political parties represented in Parliament. Vacant seats are filled by the DECs II, on the proposal of the CEC, from among the persons included in the Register of Electoral Officials. The PEBs key responsibilities are the proper conduct of the electoral process from opening to counting and the completion of all protocols (Article 41 of the Electoral Code). On election day, PEBs report turnout and preliminary results electronically, thereby enabling the CEC to begin posting preliminary results live quickly after closing.
70. Specialised training of election officials is compulsory and the responsibility of the CEC through the Centre for Continuous Electoral Training (Article 25). Article 35 of the Electoral Code states that all members of election administration must receive training and hold a valid certificate from the CCET.[57] For the 2023 elections, the CCET, and the CEC organised certification sessions for all voluntary or new applicants and close to 1 075 people were certified. The work of the Centre has been praised by several Congress interlocutors, in particular the CEC and NGOs, but also PEB members, for the quality and adaptability of its training.
71. Overall, the majority of Congress interlocutors weresatisfied with and expressed high levels of trust in the election administration at all levels. They indicated to the delegation that the CEC worked in a transparent, professional and timely manner. However, some interlocutors from political parties voiced a different opinion, and while trusting lower levels of the administration, were not confident in the impartiality of the CEC decisions. The CEC informed the delegation that the electoral preparations had been challenging, as the new Electoral Code entered into force in January2023 and more than 40regulations and instructions had to be prepared by the CEC in that period, alongside the recruitment of DEC II chairpersons, the monitoring of information shared by public authorities,the approving of opinion polls and the new duties in the field of campaign finance. In addition, the timing of some decisions of the CESand the Constitutional Court on candidate registration significantly increased the workload of the CEC and DECsII.
72. The Congress delegation welcomed the improvements brought by the 2022 Electoral Code to the composition of the CEC and the work of the electoral administration. It noted with satisfaction that despite the challenges brought by the application of the new Code, the CEC performed its tasks professionally, at the head of a well-trained administration and within legally prescribed deadlines. At the same time, the delegation noted that some provisions of the Electoral Code were unnecessarily burdensome to implement, such as the weekly financial reports and the monitoring by the CEC of information published by public authorities. It recommended to resource the Central Electoral Commission adequately to enable it to fully monitor and oversee campaign finance and prevent misuse of public resources in real time. The Congress delegation also noted the large discrepancy in gender parity among the election administration, as more than 80% of all election workers were women, especially at PEB level where 93% were women and would like to see a more balanced administration in the future.
6. VOTER REGISTRATION
73. Moldovan citizens, who have reached the age of 18 on election day and have registered a domicile or temporary residence in the constituency at least three months before the election day, have the right to vote in local elections (Article 14 and 160 of the Electoral Code). Residence or domicile must be confirmed by the proof of ID presented by the voter. Citizens can be deprived of the right to vote by a court decision establishing a measure of legal protection for individuals suffering from certain impairments, which is not in line with international standards.
74. Voter registration in the Republic of Moldova is passive. The Basic Voters List is drawn up by the CEC from data contained in the State Register of Voters (SRV), itself automatically updated on the basis of the State Register of the Population (Article 60 of the Electoral Code). On 2 October 2023, the SRV included 3 302 399 registered voters, of which only 2 762 125 (83.6%) had a permanent or temporary residence in the Republic of Moldova. 273 112 voters on the SRV without a registered residence, including those registered abroad, and 267 162 voters residing in the ATU of the Left Bank of the Dniester, were not included in the voter list and thus not allowed to vote on election day.[58] However, it is estimated that about 900 000 Moldovan citizens reside de facto abroad, although most maintain a residence in the Republic of Moldova, allowing them to vote if they return to the country for election day, a practice not in line with Congress Recommendation 369 (2015) on Electoral lists which has been regretted by Congress delegations in the past.[59]
75. The 2022 Electoral Code includes welcomed measures to curb artificial migration of voters, i.e., voters registering in another election district to influence the results (Article 160 of the Electoral Code). Voters were only able to vote if registered in the relevant local unit for three months minimum. Therefore, voters who had moved to another constituency less than three months before election day remained registered to vote in the precinct of their previous address. Congress delegations and other observers had previously noted allegations of artificial migration, but for the 2023 elections, Congress interlocutors from the civil society expressed their satisfaction with the current regulation, despite some noting that more voter education could have been done to avoid disenfranchising some voters.
76. Article 62 of the Electoral Code provides for the transparency and public scrutiny of voters lists. Lists must be publicly displayed at the premises of polling stations no later than 20 days before election day. Voters were also given the possibility to check their registration status online by entering their ID number on a dedicated CEC website.[60] Voters and representatives of electoral contestants could request corrections, inclusions or exclusions for themselves or other voters, based on supporting evidence, and submit complaints on inaccuracies until 29 October 2023. Overall, voter registration was completed in a timely, transparent and professional manner and Congress interlocutors did not express doubts on the accuracy of voters list.
77. Out-of-country voting is not allowed for local elections, nor is it allowed for foreign residents to vote. Voting by proxy is also banned (Article 5 of the Election Code). A voter can request to vote by mobile ballot box, forhealth or other valid reasons.[61] In addition, at the polling station, a voter can also request assistance, if unable to fill in the ballot paper alone, by an attendant of his/her choice, to the exception of PEB members, party proxies and observers. Article 38 of the Electoral Code allows for specific PEBs to be established in hospitals, asylums and retirement homes for at least 30 voters and military personnel can vote at the PEB of the locality where military buildings are located. There are no specific voting rights for voters from national minorities (see below).
78. On election day, supplementary voters lists can be drawn up by the PEBs to include voters omitted from the Basic Voters List upon presentation of a certificate as well as election officials, students enrolled since more than three months, prisoners etc. Another list is available for voters who registered for mobile ballot box. In past elections, Congress delegations questioned the authenticity and motives of some voters registered on additional lists, but the Electoral Code seemed to have strengthened control over the supplementary lists and the Congress observers on election day saw no indications of this type of abuse.[62]
79. The Congress delegation welcomed the fact that the new Electoral Code and the CEC addressed issues raised during past Congress missions related to artificial voter migration and abuse of supplementary voters lists. It regretted however the inclusion of voters residing de facto abroad on the registers and recommended to pursue efforts to improve the accuracy of voters lists for local elections.
7. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION[63]
80. Moldovan citizens who are eligible to vote in a territorial unit can stand in local elections, except persons serving military duty, those sentenced to prison by a final court decision, those with criminal records for crimes committed intentionally, and those deprived of the right to hold positions of responsibility by a final court decision. Holders of public functions such as mayors, presidents of districts, ministers, heads of central public authorities and people falling under their competence must officially suspend their activities if running in elections, as clarified in the 2022 Electoral Code. On 9 October, the CEC thus notified the relevant contestants to temporarily suspend their terms of office.[64]
81. Additional criteria must be fulfilled to be elected mayor: a candidate must be at least 23 years old (reduced from 25 in the new Electoral Code) and have graduated in the general compulsory education, which is not in line with Congress Recommendation 375 (2015) on the criteria for standing in local and regional elections. One Congress interlocutor from local authorities also regretted these provisions and highlighted the fact that no such restrictions exist to run in parliamentary elections.
82. Candidate registration is conducted by the second level DECs. Candidates can be nominated by one of the 60 registered political parties or electoral blocs established ahead of elections. Independent candidates may also run in local elections but must submit support signatures amounting to 2% of the voters registered in a district divided by the number of mandates in order to run for local councillor (minimum 50 people) and to 1% of the registered voters (minimum 100 people) to run for mayor (Article 164 of the Electoral Code). The Congress had previously recommended reviewing the unnecessarily high requirements imposed on independent candidates and the delegation was satisfied to see that this recommendation was followed in the 2022 Electoral Code, now in line with international best practice.
83. A gender quota was added by the 2022 Electoral Code to all proportional elections and the CEC complemented it with a regulation on candidate placement to ensure at least four candidates of each sex for every ten positions and proposing alternatives for lists under ten candidates. The CEC warned parties that failure to comply with these requirements would lead to rejection of registration.[65] About 30 lists were asked to comply with this requirement to confirm registration.[66]
84. In total, over 60 000 citizens registered to stand in the local elections. Candidate registration was concluded in the delay prescribed by law on 13 October. The number of candidates for all positions was higher than in 2019. 36 parties nominated candidates: 3 952 candidates registered for the 898 mayoral positions, of which 30% were women; 9 496 candidates, including 45.2% of women, registered to run for district councillor and 43 948 candidates registered for local councillor. The largest numbers of candidates for mayor were nominated by the PAS (698), the Chance party (649) and the PSRM (520).[67] For the position of mayor of Chisinau, 27 candidates (five women and 22 men) registered, and for Balti 15 candidates (11 men and four women) were nominated.[68]
85. Youth participation in the 2023 local elections was also significant, as 17,7% of candidates for mayor were between 24 and 35 years old, while 19,8% of candidates for district and local councils were aged between 18 and 35.[69] Unfortunately, this was not reflected in elected mayors and councillors. One candidate mentioned to the Congress delegation the levels of online hate targeting young candidates and deplored the migration of young and qualified Moldovans abroad.
86. Promo-LEX observers reported at least 15 cases of rejection of applications for registration for the mayor and councillor races.[70] For mayor, registrations were mostly rejected on the grounds of ban on holding a public office (seven cases), insufficient number of signatures collected (six cases) or lack of documents concerning compulsory general education (two cases).
87. As publicly advertised by Ilan SHOR himself, the Shor party’s strategy to circumvent the ban was to set up or openly endorse several “plan B” satellites, with the Chance party becoming the new flagship, in case some of them would be excluded from the race. As a consequence, the Chance party managed to register a higher number of candidates and to spend more funds than well‑established parties with access to public funding, a situation which raised serious concern among nearly all Congress interlocutors. They also deplored that most candidates were parachuted without real ties to the local units and acted as spokespersons of Ilan SHOR.
88. Therefore, candidate registration proceeded at a time of legal uncertainty as the dispute related to the registration of former Shor executive members was only settled by the Constitutional Court two days before the end of registration. While registration went smoothly for nearly all lists, uncertainty persisted for the Shor party and its satellites, in particular candidates openly endorsed by Mr SHOR.
89. On 31 October, the CEC took note of complaints from law-enforcement bodies regarding illegal actions of the political party Chance during the electoral campaign and obliged nine DECs to cancel the registration of the electoral candidates for mayor and local councillors nominated by this party in the relevant districts, which was, as the CEC informed the Congress delegation, one of the most drastic CEC decision based on campaign finance violations.
90. On 3 November, the Director of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) asked the Prosecutor Office and the CEC to cancel the registration of all Chance party candidates on the grounds of “the illegal financing by the political party of electorate materials, candidate corruption, voter corruption, and other illegalities.” The financial violations allegedly amounted to several million euros originating mainly from the Russian Federation.[71] The SIS released a detailed report of their investigation.[72] On the eve of electoral silence, the CES announced the blanket ban of Chance party candidates, which amounted to close to 8 600 deregistered candidates. The CEC tasked PEBs to stamp out manually the names of the candidates/lists, as ballot papers had already been printed and dispatched.[73]
91. As a consequence of the deregistration, elections could not be held, as only one candidate (Chance) had registered in two municipalities. In 45 localities, voters were presented with only one candidate for mayor and in 21, with only one list for the local council, which impacted the competitive nature of the elections. Congress interlocutors from the civil society and political parties regretted the timing of the decisions and the involvement of the CES in local elections. While acknowledging that this case set a poor precedent, some also highlighted that the difficult circumstances did not leave a lot of choice to the authorities. Additional cancellations of the registration of candidates suspected to belong or endorsed by the Shor/Chance party, were imposed between the two rounds, most significantly in Balti.[74]
92. Overall, the Congress delegation noted with satisfaction that long-standing recommendations on candidate registration, including the removal of the higher requirements to run as independent and gender quotas, had been successfully addressed in the 2022 Electoral Code. It also welcomed the competitive nature of the campaign and the significant numbers of women and young citizens registered, while regretting the higher age and education requirements for running for mayor, which are not in line with good practice and Congress Recommendation 375 (2015) on the Criteria for standing in local and regional elections and recommended to remove these provisions from the Electoral Code. At the same time, the delegation deplored that the constitutional dispute and legal uncertainty related to the right to be elected did not ensure ideal campaign conditions nor provide enough time for individualised sanctions and legal remedies. It also noted with concern that the timing of the CES’s decisions negatively affected the electoral process, in particular on the right to be elected as a blanket ban was imposed on one competitor two days before the election day. It reiterated that the exclusion of a political actor must remain a measure of last resort, grounded in individualised evidence and accompanied by strong guarantees for legal remedies. The delegation recommended allowing constitutional and legal disputes to be solved early enough to ensure equal campaigning conditions for all competitors; re-examining the wide-ranging powers granted to the CES and refraining from resorting to blanket bans of political parties and to the CES to restrict democratic freedoms during electoral campaigns.
8. ELECTION CAMPAIGN[75]
93. The Electoral Code (Chapter 8) regulates electoral campaigns, with a view of creating a level playing field among contestants. Accordingly, the election campaign officially started on 6 October 2023, thirty days before the election day and lasted until 3 November.[76] It was followed by a period of electoral silence enforced until the closing of polling stations (Article 70 of the Electoral Code). Fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression are enshrined in the Constitution and were mostly respected during this campaign. In addition, Articles 181-2 of the Criminal Code explicitly prohibit election-related crimes.[77] For the second round, the date was set by the CEC on 6 November to organise the second round two weeks later, which allowed all qualified contestants to campaign from the moment of the CEC decision until 17 November (followed by electoral silence).
94. Contestants could only start campaigning after their registration was completed. The short duration of the campaign period was perceived by some political interlocutors as favouring incumbents. Limited instances of early campaigning were recorded in the months preceding the elections. For instance, in July, the prospective PAS mayoral candidate in Chisinau promoted his candidacy and it resulted in a warning issued by the CEC. Some Congress interlocutors from parties noted that some contestants had started printing and transporting electoral propaganda, before the beginning of the campaign period, without reporting it to the CEC.
95. The new Electoral Code, and in particular Article 70, prohibits the organisation of concerts and events for campaign purposes, the misuse of administrative resources, the use of images related to religious cults or foreign symbols, the participation of foreign personalities, the participation of civil servants in campaign events during working hours, the incitement to hatred and transportation of voters. It also regulates the equal access to facilities and billboards for all candidates, but some Congress interlocutors running in the elections regretted the complexity of the political advertising and billboard regulations. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR welcomed the clarification of banned activities including the bussing of voters and participation of civil servants. On the other hand, they questioned the need to prohibit the organisation of concerts and other social events, which could constitute legitimate campaigning activities in a democratic society and recommended to scrap this provision from the Electoral Code.
96. Overall, the electoral campaign was competitive, pluralistic, moderate in tone and rather low-key, with key political subjects competing for mayoral, district and local council races, the most visible ones being the PAS, PSRM and Chance party.[78] Voters were presented with different options on mostly local topics and contestants were overall free to campaign. In Chisinau and Balti, the campaign was more competitive than in the rest of the country. Urban campaigns were dominated by party issues and geopolitics while in rural areas, the campaign focus was on individual candidates. Infrastructures, social benefits, traffic, the environment, and, to a lesser extent, the country's foreign policy and foreign interference were the topics featuring most in the campaign.[79]
97. The most widely used campaign tool was traditional door-to-door canvassing. Candidates also campaigned through community meetings, rallies, posters, party newsletters and billboards. While most candidates made extensive use of social media, only few instances of hate and sexist speech were reported but instance of disinformation were reported closer to the election day.
98. Misuse of administrative resources was also banned, as prescribed by Article 70 of the Electoral Code and Article 181 of the Criminal Code but the campaign was marred by some allegations of abuse. A recent Electoral Code amendment and the 2023 revision of the Law 62/2022 on Advertising, taken in order to reduce incumbents' use of administrative resources obliged state institutions and local administrations to publicise only information of public interest, for which they must obtain approval by the CEC and to refrain from publishing anything that could be perceived as electoral propaganda. This requirement, while applied for the first time by the CEC, was implemented successfully but was perceived as quite burdensome. For instance, the CEC prohibited the municipalities of Balti and Chisinau from releasing pamphlets informing citizens about the results of their activities, which it perceived as campaigning. Several Congress interlocutors from political parties deplored the application of this new provision, especially before the beginning of the campaign period, and feared it would lead to arbitrary limitations.
99. Overall, domestic observers Promo-Lex reported 77 cases that could be qualified as abuse of administrative resources between 19 October and 2 November and 43 between 5 and 18 October.[80] Alleged cases concerned mainly the involvement of persons holding public office in the campaign (mainly by the PAS Government), the involvement of local administrations in electoral promotion, candidates taking credit for publicly funded projects and use of state property or civil servants to promote electoral contestants. In particular, domestic observers as well as some Congress interlocutors from parties, the media and civil society, noted the blurring of the line between PAS competitors and national authorities including the Prime Minister, the President and some other members of the Government, who allegedly participated to campaigning activities alongside local level candidates.[81] The Government made a number of public statements to increase salaries, or to start important infrastructure projects which were perceived by many Congress interlocutors from parties as electoral promises reinforcing the ruling party’s advantage or favouring the PAS’s candidates.[82] Allegations were also raised of misuse of public resources by local administrations, including by the Chance party in Orhei (city where Mr SHOR was previously elected mayor) and by the NAM in Chisinau. The CEC indicated that it sanctioned some mayors for the use of the official car or using local administration for their benefit. The Governor of Gagauzia also allegedly gave bonuses in cash at an event on 14 October 2023 organised by the Shor foundation. All allegations were refuted by the competitors.
100. Moreover, the campaign was impacted by widespread and numerous allegations of vote buying and electoral corruption by satellite parties of the Shor party, including Chance and Renaissance parties, as well as independent formerly or closely affiliated with this party. These instances were investigated by law enforcement bodies, as well as the CEC, and led to the de-registration of the Chance party and other contestants (see section below). The CEC suspected vote-buying in 11 instances, with an additional 16 cases reported by the General Inspectorate of Police.[83]
101. The deregistration of the Chance party candidates created some tensions at the very end of the campaign period but the timing, on the eve of silence day, prevented major reactions. However, some Congress interlocutors from political parties, authorities and civil society, mentioned that the Shor party had forecasted the ban and had placed replacement candidates and shared updated voting advice via messaging apps.
102. The Congress delegation welcomed the integration in the Electoral Code of bans on several election-related abuses that had been noted as sources of concern in past missions and on clarifications regarding the campaign period applicable to the second round. It also noted with satisfaction that the campaign was competitive and mostly focused on local issues. It however pointed out with concern the numerous and credible reports of electoral corruption and interference of foreign and/or criminal groups with a view to distort the will of voters in the local elections and the persisting reports of misuse of administrative resources during the campaign and of early campaigning, which unduly benefitted some incumbents. The delegation recommended pursuing investigations and building capacities of the election administration and law enforcement bodies to tackle electoral corruption, in parallel to implementing existing legislation and regulations related to the misuse of public resources and providing for timely investigations and more dissuasive sanctions in case of violations.
9. CAMPAIGN AND POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE
103. Campaign finance is regulated through the Electoral Code, the Contravention Code, the Criminal Code, the Law on Political Parties and the CEC Regulation on the financing of initiative groups and electoral campaigns. Chapter 5 of the Electoral Code prescribes the fundamental principles regarding the funding of campaigns: integrity, transparency, liability and equal opportunities. The legal framework provides for clear oversight and sanctions by the CEC and in-depth reporting by political contestants. The recent changes brought to the legal framework addressed many recommendations by the Congress, the Venice Commission, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the OSCE/ODIHR to improve oversight over campaign finance.
104. Political contestants can receive both private and public support, under certain conditions established by Chapter 5 of the Electoral Code and by the Law on Political Parties. Public support for electoral campaigns comprises budget allocations, free broadcasting time and interest-free loans in amounts set by the CEC. Public funds are allocated among parties based on results in national and local elections, as prescribed by Article 27 of the Law on Political Parties.[84] Parties receiving public funds must report to the CEC during campaigns and biannually to the Court of Accounts. According to a CEC decision, as of January 2023, 35 political parties received MLD 48 980 700 (approx. € 2 638 107).[85]
105. Private sources of funding include membership fees and donations including those collected during recreational, cultural, sports events or other mass events organised by the party, provided that they are recorded in the established manner. Donations can be both monetary and in nature and all donations in cash must also be accounted for. Donations from citizens under 18, foreign or anonymous donors, public authorities and legal entities that have been awarded public contracts in the last three years are prohibited (Article 26 of the Law on Political Parties). Caps on donations from individuals were considerably decreased by the 2022 Electoral Code from 200 times to six times the average monthly salary (about € 3800), but not more than 30% of their annual income (10% of their annual income for people holding public offices) and for legal entities from 400 to 12 salaries (€ 7600).
106. Article 54 of the Electoral Code lays down the compliance requirements for accounting and reporting. Accordingly, the CEC exercises financial oversight over contestants' income and expenditures. Campaign activities must be funded through a dedicated bank account, which must be opened within three days after registration.[86] Financial reports must be submitted to the CEC weekly. Independent candidates report expenses to the respective DECs.[87] All financial reports must be published by the CEC (or DEC for independents) within a day of receipt. A dedicated Control and Oversight Division was established within the CEC, to which eight staff were assigned. However, according to several Congress interlocutors, the CEC’s division was still understaffed, due to added responsibilities by the 2022 Electoral Code.
107. For the 2023 local elections, the campaign expenditure ceiling was set at MLD 24 per voter (€ 1.26). It meant that, for instance in Chisinau, the ceiling for all campaign expenses of an electoral competitor was slightly over MLD 15 million (approximately € 786 200). The most active electoral subjects, PAS and PSRM, spent respectively MLD 9.47 million (approximately € 500 000) and MLD 5 million (€ 260 000). The Chance party, excluded from the race, reported a budget of MLD 3.73 million (€ 190 000). The MAN, Our Party and Renaissance party spent between MLD 2.5 and 3 million each. In total, political contestants reported over MLD 36 million in expenses (€1.87 million), but gaps between contestants’ resources were quite visible during the campaign. Funds were used mainly for preparing promotional materials, video spots and campaign meetings.
108. Throughout the election period, the CEC thoroughly investigated the financial reports and repeatedly asked for corrections and clarifications when amounts indicated in financial reports did not match amounts reflected in bank account statements. On 27 November 2023, the CEC published its analysis of the last 30 reports submitted as of 3 November. Four parties were issued a warning for not opening a dedicated bank account, 14 were asked to provide a corrected report, and three were fined a total of MLD 100 000 (approx. €5 000) for exceeding the ceiling of cash donations and other source of funding violations.[88] On 12 December, the CEC gave its final decisions in relations to the first round of the elections and 17 parties were asked to provide corrections, four were warned to submit their reports, one was sanctioned for not submitting the right documentation and three were asked to submit information on bank movements.
109. Most Congress interlocutors, from political parties and the civil society alike, strongly welcomed the CEC’s efforts to reinforce transparency and oversight over campaign and party finance. At the same time, some Congress interlocutors from the political contestants pointed out the high reporting requirements for the weekly financial reports and issues related to the opening of dedicated bank accounts.[89] They also noted the challenge for smaller parties to abide by all the new provisions. Reporting of independent candidates, handled by the DECs II, also raised some concern, as most independents stated that they had not spent any funds (exempting them from submitting reports) despite reports from observers that they had in fact spent money on campaign activities. In addition, failures of the reporting system and the short-staffed CEC division led to some delays in the publication and analysis of reports. For instance, on 17 October, the CEC website contained only 17 weekly reports of the 36 registered political parties, but the CEC acknowledged issues related to the electronic reporting system and no sanctions were imposed.[90]
110. Attempts to illegally finance political parties and campaigns have rhythmed the Moldovan political landscape since the last few years and have increased dramatically in 2022/2023. These attempts were often accompanied by strong suspicions of interference from the Russian Federation in local politics but the origin of these funds remained obscure and well camouflaged. Nearly all Congress interlocutors deplored the numerous, persistent and widespread allegations of vote buying and electoral corruption emanating from Shor party satellites. The CEC repeatedly warned the Chance party to submit corrected financial reports to no avail and fined the party after no dedicated bank account was opened in the first two weeks of campaigning. Several Congress interlocutors from the authorities, parties and the civil society have questioned how inactive or recent political parties, such as the Chance and Renaissance parties, could gather funds to launch large-scale campaigns and highly suspected a large quantity of foreign funds to be entering the country to corrupt candidates and the will of voters.
111. In addition to the lack of financial reporting, public statements to bribe voters or promise gifts by Ilan SHOR and associates further gave the impression of a wide-scale strategy to influence voters. Ilan SHOR publicly announced funding local infrastructural projects and pension supplements from his private funds to municipalities that would elect his supporters. Additional promises included cheaper gas, road and street repairs, transfer to agricultural producers and repayment of loans. On 31 October, the SIS invited the CEC to remove mayoral candidates of the Chance party running in Balti and Orhei after they promised voters money from Ilan SHOR’s projects paid by foreign sources.[91] The SIS also investigated many instances of corruption of other contestants through bribes, gifts and undeclared donations. For instance, in September, Ms Alina SPATARU, Chairperson of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and former MP, was allegedly proposed money ($1.5 million) by Ilan SHOR himself in Israel to support his satellites.[92]
112. Numerous investigations by law enforcement bodies, including the Police, the National Anti-corruption Centre, the Anti-corruption Prosecutor and the SIS, have highlighted the extent of the electoral corruption. On 4 October, the police and anti-corruption agencies raided the offices of the Chance and Renaissance parties in 70 places, to stop the illegal smuggling of over 1 900 foreign bank cards issued in the United Arab Emirates that were allegedly distributed to these parties’ contestants.[93] On 26 October, another 60 searches were conducted by police forces.[94] On 3 November, the SIS estimated to over MLD 200 million (€ 10 million) the money channelled by supporters of the Shor party to destabilise the electoral process, of which MLD 90 million (€4.5 million) were given to the Chance party.[95] The successful strategy of the Shor party to support a high number of satellite candidates and to diversify its activities in order to manipulate the vote and instigate distrust in the process, made it more difficult for the CEC and DECs to check the accuracy of the financial reports. As a result of the investigations, the CES decided to deregister the Chance party based on the report of the SIS and several warnings by the CEC regarding significant campaign finance violations.[96] As of finalisation of this report, investigations were still ongoing with a view to limit such violations in the 2024 presidential elections.[97]
113. The Congress delegation noted with satisfaction that the legal framework and the oversight of campaign and party finance by the CEC were successfully strengthened, including the thresholds for donations. It welcomed the efforts of the CEC to pro-actively and thoroughly investigate and sanction violations, in collaboration with law enforcement bodies and the willingness of most parties to cooperate with the CEC and correct their reports. However, the delegation noted with concern that the numerous and credible reports of illegal campaign and party financing considerably strained the institutions. It pointed out also that the weekly reporting requirements seemed burdensome for many competitors[98] and that the election administration remained understaffed at CEC and DEC levels to handle all reports in a timely manner. Therefore, the Congress delegation recommended to resource the Central Electoral Commission adequately to enable it to fully monitor and oversee campaign finance and prevent misuse of public resources in real time and to train political subjects, including independents, to use the reporting templates. It also recommended to continue to investigate and build capacities of the election administration and law enforcement bodies to tackle electoral corruption at all levels of government.
10. MEDIA
114. Article 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova guarantees the freedom of thought and opinion, as well as freedom of public expression by word, image or any other means. General media legislation includes the 2010 Law on Freedom of Expression, the 2018 Audiovisual Media Services Code (AMSC) and the 2023 Law on Access to Information in the Public Interest. In the 2023 Press Freedom Index, the Republic of Moldova ranked 28th out of 180, a significant improvement on its ranking of 40th in 2022 and one of the freest countries in Eastern Europe.[99] According to a 2021 research by the Thomsons Reuters Foundation, social media and search engines are the two most popular sources of news and information for Moldovans.[100] A high proportion also use TV, although younger adults are much less likely to do so. Trust in the media is low, but the public broadcaster and local independent media are considered by the respondents of this survey as the most trustworthy.
115. The media landscape in the Republic of Moldova is diverse and pluralistic but highly polarised.[101] Political and economic interests often overlap with editorial lines and several oligarchs, including Mr PLAHOTNIUC and Mr SHOR, owned large media conglomerates leading to high levels of media concentration. Some Congress interlocutors from the media deplored the strong influence of Russian disinformation on Moldovan media, the financial difficulties facing independent and investigative media and the lack of local media, leaving certain areas of the country underreported. Some limited instances of SLAPPs or verbal attacks on journalists have been recorded in the past year.[102]
116. The public broadcaster is Teleradio Moldova. The current management of the public service broadcaster TeleRadio-Moldova (TRM) and the broadcasting regulator Audiovisual Council (AVC) were appointed in 2022.
117. By September 2023, the Audiovisual Council had registered 64 local, national and regional TV services and 58 radio stations.[103] The main private TV channels are Prime, Canal 2, Pro TV Chisinau, Publika TV, Jurnal TV and TV8. The printed press has declined but key newspapers Ziarul de Garda, Moldova Suverena and Timpol have vibrant online pages. In addition, major media outlets such as TV6, NTV Moldova and Prime TV are perceived to be politically biased, especially during election campaigns. TV6, which is linked to Ilan SHOR, became very influential over the last few years.
118. Article 89 of the Electoral Code outlines general principles for media coverage of elections, affirming media institutions' right to cover elections without interference and granting authorised journalists access to electoral proceedings on par with observers. The Electoral Code, supplemented by a CEC regulation, stipulates fair, balanced and impartial media coverage of contestants’ campaigns in public and commercial broadcasting. Contestants should be granted access to political advertising under equal conditions. Media outlets are prohibited from publishing/broadcasting political advertising, unless within the conditions of transparency established by the CEC. The CEC adopted a decision on 28 July 2023 which clarified the coverage of the elections by mass media institutions. It provided that free airtime is granted to all competitors (five minutes on TV and 10 minutes on the radio) and paid airtime must be provided to all candidates under the same conditions.[104]
119. In addition, since January 2023, Law 62/2022 on Advertising, in complementarity with the Electoral Code, also prohibits subliminal, misleading, immoral, discriminatory, or sexist political advertising, which may cause panic, or may incite violence or dangerous actions capable of harming the health or threatening the security of people. The CEC was tasked with monitoring the application of this provision of this law and reported limited violations.
120. Teleradio Moldova broadcasted eight debates in Chisinau with 21 out of 27 candidates participating, including three women. The debates were aired between 23 October and 2 November, and each candidate was given 11 minutes. By CEC regulation, debates must be broadcasted at prime time and media outlets must ensure that hate speech, misinformation sexism and messages denying genocides are not spread during the debates organised on their channels. Invitations of contestants and if the case, their refusals to appear, must be public.[105] In a positive development, more competitors participated in televised debates in Chisinau, compared to the local elections of 2019, but some candidates still refused to attend these debates, notably incumbent mayor Ion CEBAN. For the first time, the public broadcaster also organised radio and TV debates in Edinet, Orhei, Soroca, Comrat, Ungheni, Cahul and Balti.
121. Some instances of hate speech were reported between candidates on television and online based on their political affiliation. Sexist, discriminatory and dehumanising language was also used by Ilan SHOR. In five cases, politicians and supporters of the PAS were the target of negative associations with mental disabilities by candidates and opinion leaders. Although these messages do not indicate hatred or discrimination, they do promote stereotypes and prejudices.[106]
122. Social and online media still suffer from under-regulation and disinformation. Several investigations before and after the elections have showed the extent of the online influence of the Shor party, among others. An investigation showed that Mr SHOR allegedly spent USD 200 000 on online influence campaigns on META despite him being placed on the US Sanctions List. These adds were seen allegedly 40 million times via 108 Facebook pages. Disinformation on social media was also noted by the SIS as it investigated the creation of many short-lived anonymous profiles to promote some political formations, specifically the Chance party. A deepfake video of President SANDU resigning and calling for voters to choose their candidates, was released online on the eve of the elections and was seen 1 million times on Facebook.[107]
123. The AVC monitored compliance and media coverage during the campaign and complaints could be addressed to the Council, in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Code and the AMSC or it could act ex-officio. In August 2023, media outlets had to register with the Audiovisual Council to confirm that they would cover the campaign. From 22 September, media outlets had to submit weekly reports on their broadcasting and the Audiovisual Council started publishing weekly reports on the quantitative and qualitative monitoring of 25 TV stations and 17 radio stations.[108] The AVC applied in total 35 public warnings and 55 fines in the total amount of MLD 459 000 (approx. €23 000) for inter alia topics not being clearly marked as campaigning, imbalanced coverage and not registering as an outlet covering the campaign.[109]
124. The OSCE/ODIHR conducted a media monitoring of the campaign and concluded that, overall, the monitored media provided sufficient and diverse information to enable voters to make an informed choice, especially thanks to the numerous debates. It noted however, that all six TV stations monitored by the observers displayed some bias and that the general state of the media is undermined by the control of businessmen linked to political parties.[110] The IEOM noted that the suspension of many media outlets was a source of concern and that ‘the restrictions to freedom of speech do not appear proportionate to the violations committed under international human rights law’.[111]
125. The Independent Journalism Centre of Moldova, which also conducted media monitoring during the campaign, stated that most stations provided fair access to election candidates and presented them accurately. Representatives of the central public administration were usually portrayed positively by many stations, to the benefit of PAS candidates. Their report on ten monitored stations found that five channels provided access to the news programmes to most of the electoral competitors, presenting them neutrally and impartially. However, the other five channels were assessed to have shown some bias.[112]
126. On 16 December 2022, the CES suspended six TV stations, namely Primul, RTR Moldova, Accent TV, NTV Moldova, TV6 and Orhei TV, under the state of emergency, citing the need to protect the national information space, prevent disinformation, address inaccurate coverage of national events and the war in Ukraine, and allegations that individuals and entities under US and UK sanctions controlled these stations. Subsequently, on 30 October 2023, six additional TV stations, namely Skyline, Prime, TV audience, ITV, Canal-2 and Сanal-3, alongside 31 online news pages, were suspended based on similar grounds. The AVC could have taken legal action against TV stations and had already fined some for inaccurate reporting but was bypassed by the Commission’s decisions.[113] These decisions of the Commission were perceived by many interlocutors from the media and civil society as disproportionate and vague, as the AVC had not decided on such drastic measures. On 31 October, the Ombudsman of the Republic of Moldova asked for additional information to be brought to the case by the CES and the SIS and to identify less intrusive alternative measures, which have a rational connection with the legitimate goal pursued, in particular, ensuring compliance with standards in the field of freedom of expression.[114]
127. Overall, Congress interlocutors from the media and the civil society were satisfied with the recent changes to the legal framework but mentioned remaining issues related to online platforms, concentration of media ownership, and the absence of mechanisms to address misinformation from online/print outlets. They also noted an improvement in the media coverage of the campaign, which they perceived as less biased than in previous elections. They also welcomed the organisation of TV debates but regretted the passivity of many politicians and their unwillingness to participate in debates or to make use of the free airtime. Some journalists deplored that a few candidates chose not to reply directly to the press. Promo-Lex noted some cases of insults and defamatory language were used both on traditional and social media, particularly targeting institutions, the Chance party and the PAS members. Other observers also noted a bias against Ion CEBAN in some outlets. Many media and civil society interlocutors condemned the decisions of the CES to ban TV channels and websites, mentioning that it lacked legal justification and could easily be sidestepped.
128. The Congress delegation welcomed the efforts of the AVC to regulate the traditional media and to impose sanctions when violations were recorded. It also noted with satisfaction the amendments banning sexist, dehumanising and discriminatory speech, but the proper implementation of such amendments will require more practice. The delegation was pleased to see that voters could choose between different political alternatives mostly presented in an impartial manner in the public and independent media. It however regretted the enduring media concentration and the disinformation campaigns echoed on social media, which contributed to unbalance an otherwise rather open media environment, in parallel to the drastic decisions of the CES to ban dozens of media outlets which seemed disproportionate. The delegation recommended to tackle the issue of media concentration and disinformation, through transparency of media ownership and stronger regulation of the online and social media by the Audiovisual Council. It also reiterated that the European Court of Human Rights emphasised the particular importance of the free circulation of information and opinions during the electoral period. Therefore, the Congress delegation recommended identifying less drastic measures than resorting to the wide-ranging powers of the CES to ban TV or online outlets in cases of disinformation.
11. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN ELECTIONS
129. While gender quotas have been in use for national elections, the 2023 local elections were the first occasion in which mandatory 40% quotas were applied to all lists for district and local councils. The CEC specified the placement requirements which ensured at least four candidates of each sex for every ten positions (Article 68.3 of the Electoral Code). Financial incentives also encourage parties to nominate women in local elections, as 7.5% of public funding is allocated to parties in proportion to the women actually elected in local elections (Article 27 of the Law on Political Parties).
130. Political contestants successfully applied the 40% quota.[115] Women accounted for 30% of the candidates for mayors, 45% of candidates for district and Chisinau/Balti councils, and 47.9% of candidates for local councils.
131. The political representation of women has increased in recent years in the Republic of Moldova. The president is a woman, and six out of 17 (35%) Government ministers are women. Women hold 39 MP seats (38%), and before the 2023 elections, 23% of mayors, 27% councillors of districts/Chisinau/Balti councils and 37% of local councils were women.[116] Following the 2023 elections, these figures increased slightly: 24% of mayors, 33% of district/Chisinau/Balti councillors and 40% of local councillors are women.[117]
132. However, women’s participation in local politics is still undermined by several factors. In general, women are often placed in less favourable positions on candidate lists, occupying less winnable positions. Only 18% of candidates for district/Chisinau/Balti councils who were placed first on the list were women, while 59% of candidates placed 10th were women. Women were also more represented in smaller communities than larger cities, remained underrepresented among mayoral candidates and as mayors and were more subject to prejudice and stereotypes. Promo-LEX was informed of 11 cases of discriminatory speech in which gender prejudices and stereotypes were used.[118] Women were less visible in TV debates, as only 14% of debates had at least one female participant and their interventions were often shorter. Most political parties did not include in their platforms any policies for the promotion of women. Finally, while the Electoral Code provides for quotas of candidates, no quotas are applied to the allocation of mandates and women can be replaced by their male colleagues.
133. The Congress delegation welcomed the fact that the 40% gender quota and placement requirements applied at local level for the first time were well respected by political contestants and contributed to a small but significant increase in women’s representation. However, it stressed that efforts needed to be pursued to ensure women are more represented in decision-making positions or placed on winnable seats of lists and recommended to provide more incentives to strengthen the participation of women and youth in the media and as heads of list for local and district elections and as mayors.
12. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES IN ELECTIONS
134. The Republic of Moldova is a multi-ethnic country where interethnic relations are generally characterised as stable, harmonious and peaceful.[119] The main ethnic groups in the country are Moldovan, Romanian, Russian and Ukrainian, as well as Gagauz, Bulgarian, Roma and Jews.[120] Romanian is the official language and Russian is considered the language of interethnic communication.Article 3 of the Electoral Code enshrines the equality between ethnic groups in electoral processes and states that ‘Citizens of the Republic of Moldova have the right to elect and be elected regardless of their race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social origin’. There are no quotas for the participation of ethnic groups or special voting rights at local or national levels.
135. The Council of Europe’s Fifth Opinion on the Republic of Moldova’s adherence to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities found that overall, national minority representatives feel that they are less capable of influencing politics than the majority population. In 2020, there were 100 representatives of national minorities employed in 30 levels of public administration.[121] With regard to elections, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention asked the authorities to ensure that ballot papers and relevant voter information are produced in both Romanian and languages spoken by persons belonging to national minorities, especially those who have a co-official status in territorial administrative units. Officials of the ATUG have complained that Article 73.7 of the Electoral Code refers to Romanian as the only language used for ballot papers, but the second part of the article provides for ballot papers to be printed in other languages upon the request of local authorities to facilitate the participation of national minorities in the polls. The CEC indicated on its website that out of the 7 669 667 ballot papers printed, 6 068 878 were in Romanian and the rest in Russian.[122] The CEC also informed the delegation that no request had been received to print ballots in another language. The CEC also published videos and voter information in Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian languages.
136. In the 2023 elections, candidates could campaign using the Russian language without restrictions, to the note-worthy exception of some debates organised on public media which were held exclusively in Romanian in a change from previous elections.[123] The participation of Roma voters in the 2023 campaign was limited due to them being more subjected to illiteracy, lack of formalised residence, vote-buying, internal migration and an estimated 25% of the Roma population lacking identity documents.[124] The IEOM was aware of five Roma candidates for town and village councils, of which two were women. [125]
13. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS
137. Articles 91 to 101 of the Electoral Code outline the procedures for dealing with complaints on the organisation of elections. Voters and contestants have the right to challenge the actions, failures to act and decisions of election bodies to the higher electoral body and the actions of electoral opponents to the body in charge of registration of the opponent. The AVC considers complaints related to election media coverage (see above). Complaints related to party and campaign finance are lodged with the CEC, except those related to independent candidates for councillors and mayors, which are submitted to the respective DECs. The existing legal framework categorises election-related cases into three forms: disputes, administrative offences as subject of criminal liability under the Contravention Code and offences under the Criminal Code.
138. The revised Electoral Code contains detailed regulations related to complaints and appeals and addressed many past recommendations by international observers. Appeals on decisions on complaints can be submitted to the competent first instance court, and then to the higher-level court. The Chisinau Court of Appeal is also the competent first instance court for complaints against the decisions of the CEC. The deadline for submitting all complaints and appeals is three days, and decisions must be taken within three days.
139. The CEC maintained a public register of appeals. 126 appeals were recorded in this register and corresponding decisions were attached. 73 of the appeals were submitted before the election day, while the remaining 52 were submitted on or after the election day. Notably, documents submitted in the form of notifications or applications were not uniformly published in the registry.[126] Before the campaign, most cases related to the registration of candidates, alleged early campaigning and misuse of administrative resources by electoral contestants.
140. International observers ENEMO analysed 21 decisions published on the registry of the Court of Appeal Chisinau.[127] In four cases the court ruled in favour of candidates and obliged the respective electoral bodies to reconsider their decisions. ENEMO highlighted the delays in the processing of candidate registration appeals and the different forms of documents (notifications, requests, complaints/appeals) used to submit complaints, arguing that ‘a system with numerous submission formats puts a considerable administrative burden on electoral bodies’.
141. Congress interlocutors noted that deadlines for submission and processing of complaints were generally respected, at the notable exception of the ones submitted on election day. Because of the overlap of the campaign period with an ongoing complaints and appeals process related to candidate registration, ENEMO observers asserted that the legal framework did not offer an effective remedy that would ensure a level playing field in line with international standards. Regarding the complaint procedures introduced for candidates whose registration was denied by the DECs because of past membership to the Shor party, the DEC decisions could be appealed directly to the Chisinau Court of Appeal. The CEC informed the Congress delegation that out of the 21 prospective candidates who were rejected by the DECs on those grounds, four had lodged appeals and in only one case, the Court admitted the appeal and sent back the case to the DEC Orhei for re-examination.
142. The CEC adopted Decision No. 1575 on 10 November, dealing with recount requests submitted between 7 and 9 November. The decision rejected 77 requests for lack of evidence or essential information. The CEC found errors in the ballot papers but considered them insignificant for a recount. The decision was appealed nine times to the Chisinau Court of Appeal, which upheld the CEC's decision. On 14 November, the CEC rejected four recount requests on the grounds of late filing and missed deadlines, with one appeal rejected by the Chisinau Court of Appeal. Furthermore, on 18 November, the Supreme Court partially upheld two appeals and ordered recounts, while declaring five appeals inadmissible (see also post-electoral developments section).
143. The Congress delegation noted with satisfaction the improvements brought by the Electoral Code to the election-dispute resolution mechanisms. However, the delegation pointed out that the constitutional dispute and legal uncertainty related to the right to be elected did not ensure ideal campaign conditions nor provide enough time for individualised sanctions and legal remedies. It recommended to simplify the appeals and complaints procedure and to reduce complexity and to ensure that all registration-related claims are handled in a timely manner before election day.
14. ELECTION DAY[128]
144. On election day, nine teams comprising a total of 19 Congress observers from 13 Council of Europe member States were deployed to observe voting procedures throughout the country in randomly selected polling stations from 7:00 to 21:00. Congress observers were part of a larger international election observation mission in partnership with the OSCE/ODIHR and the European Parliament of more than 230 ODIHR long and short-term observers and 12 European Parliament delegation members. More than 1 350 questionnaires were filled on Election Day in more than half of the polling stations countrywide. Questionnaires were analysed to cross-check observations and to identify potential systemic shortcomings. The Congress teams observed procedures in 115 polling stations throughout the country.
145. Overall, the Election Day observed was calm, well-organised and peaceful, in particular opening and closing. Throughout the day, the PEB members showed high-level of professionalism and most of them indicated to the delegation that they had received some updated training. The delegation witnessed the overwhelming number of women members of PEBs and concluded that parity in decision-making and administration of the vote could be reinforced. Congress observers also welcomed the numerous presence of domestic observers and party representatives, despite the presence of the latter being perceived as intimidating in two instances.
146. Opening procedures were assessed very positively by all Congress teams (a finding reflected as well by all IEOM observers). PEB members were ready on time and all the necessary materials had been delivered. Video cameras were installed and functional and very few cases where the SAISE network was not working were solved before the opening of polling stations. PEB members had been assigned clear tasks and domestic observers and representatives of parties were present in all polling stations visited.
147. The voting procedures were also assessed overwhelmingly positively by Congress and IEOM observers (99%), but minor procedural inconsistencies were noted. Some polling stations were quite small, making organisation of the voting process difficult. Congress observers also noted some issues with lay-out or poor positioning of ballot boxes in some polling stations (suitable lay-out noted in 80% of IEOM observations) and instances of the secrecy of the vote not being entirely respected, due to the set-up of polling stations or voters folding their ballots outside of the booth.
148. Congress observers witnessed in several instances gatherings in the vicinity of polling stations, one instance of suspected bussing of voters and a few instances of external people directing voters. Group voting was noted in 22 cases by IEOM observers, in most cases family members voting together. Congress teams reported very few polling stations equipped with ramps or independent access for voters with mobility issues, a problem repeatedly highlighted in previous reports, but welcomed the efforts put in place to provide support to voters with visual impairments. Overall, the IEOM observers noted that only 34% of polling station’s premises were independently accessible. Overcrowding was reported in 4% of IEOM observations, due to limited space and poor queue management.[129]
149. The delegation was satisfied to see that the SAISE system to check the ID of voters worked well in polling stations observed. In some cases, voters were refused to vote at a polling station, because they had the wrong address or for reasons based on their registration status. The video cameras were also operational in most polling stations visited, but some observers commented that occasionally, the cameras installed to monitor the ballot boxes had a broader view of the premises, potentially compromising the secrecy of the vote.
150. Counting of votes was carried out very efficiently in polling stations observed by the Congress teams. However, there were some breaches of procedure such as failure to display publicly the protocols. The delegation pointed out the tiredness of PEB members, due to the long hours of operation of the polling stations and the stamping out Chance party candidates from the ballot papers on the day before the election day. This led PEB members to sometimes skip procedural steps during counting, to finish less late. The Congress delegation observed such procedural mistakes, in particular related to signing the protocols in advance, in a few polling stations. The IEOM observers also observed issues such as problems with reconciliation of the result protocols and nine cases of pre-signing of the protocols before filling in the figures.[130]
151. Domestic observers Promo-Lex observed the election day procedures in all polling stations in Chisinau and Balti and in hundreds of polling stations throughout the country.[131] They reported 25 cases that could be qualified as acts of electoral campaigning to influence the voter’s choice. They found that video cameras did not record the counting in about 5% of polling stations. Throughout the day, they observed 71 incidents related to the interruption of filming, 88 cases related to errors on the electoral registers, 120 cases of violations of secrecy of the vote, including photographing ballot papers which were mostly addressed by PEB chairpersons, 128 cases of group voting, 58 cases of gatherings of unauthorised persons within 100 meters of the polling stations and some other anomalies.
152. According to information shared by the General Police Inspectorate with the CEC, by 19:00, 220 cases of violations or incidents had been reported. Of these suspected cases, 65 cases related to electoral agitation, 50 to the organised transportation of voters, four to the display of the electoral display, 11 to reasonable suspicion of voter corruption, 27 to photographing of ballot papers and 60 cases constituted other violations of the process. Two cases were examined as violations to the Criminal Code, one on damage to the ballot and one on preventing the free exercise of the right to vote.[132] In addition, at the closing of the polling stations, the CEC indicated that the electronic system had been targeted by cyber-security incidents which they successfully blocked.[133]
153. Regarding the second round, Promo-Lex deployed static or mobile teams of observers to all polling stations and identified the presence of unauthorised persons at the polling stations became the main violation observed by their teams (31 cases), followed by the photographing of ballot papers (25 cases).[134] They analysed these results as worrying indications of a deeper negative phenomenon of influencing/buying voters. They assessed the conduct of voting procedures as well-organised. The General Police Inspectorate informed the CEC that 140 cases of violations or incidents were registered until the polling stations were closed: 26 cases related to the prohibited electoral agitation, 45 to organised transportation of voters;five toreasonable suspicion of voter corruption, 27 cases to photographing the ballot paper and another 37 incidents regarding violations of the electoral process.[135]
154. Overall, the delegation noted with satisfaction that the election day unfolded in a calm, transparent and well-organised manner, despite being held under difficult circumstances. During its observations, the delegation only observed some minor issues, including some instances of poor layout of polling stations, gatherings outside polling stations and directing of voters and counting suffered from some procedural inconsistencies. It deplored that, despite some notable efforts, the accessibility of polling stations for voters with disabilities remained inadequate in most polling stations visited. The delegation recommended to pursue efforts to tackle election day violations and to ensure that polling stations are accessible for voters with mobility impairments; as well as to consider some adaptations to avoid overstraining PEB members.
15. TURN-OUT, RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS[136]
155. Turnout for the first round of the 2023 local elections amounted to 41,4%, representing 1.147 million voters out of the 2 762 125 voters registered to vote in local elections.[137] Because of the inclusion of citizens living de facto abroad on the electoral rolls, real turnout can be considered slightly higher. Women were more represented among voters (55.4%) and close to half of the voters were above 56 years old. Young voters from 18 to 25 only represented 6% of the voters and only 3.6% of elected mayors are aged 23 to 30 years old.[138]
156. The CEC announced that, in 623 settlements, mayors had been elected by simple majority in the first round, including in Chisinau, and that a second round would be held in the remaining 265 cities and villages. In another eight communities, elections were declared invalid as the turnout was under 25% of registered voters.[139] The second round of elections saw a lower turn-out with only 36.73% of voters availing of the opportunity to vote. In three units, only one candidate for mayor or councillor was registered and these candidates were deregistered as members of the Chance party. Therefore, the CEC announced partial elections would be scheduled for 3 March 2024 in the commune of Cealîc in Taraclia District and in the communes of Chioselia Rusă and Cotovscoe in the ATUG. On 19 November, the CEC ordered repeated voting in the eight units where turnout was under 25%. On 3 December, the CEC organised a second round of voting in Aluatu, and turnout did not reach the necessary 20% of registered voters. Therefore, on 17 December, the CEC held a third round in this unit.
157. Overall, the 2023 local elections resulted in a pluralistic but fragmented political landscape. In mayoral races, the PAS won 32.5% of the mayoral seats (291), the PSRM 16%, Independents 13%, the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM) 5.3%, the Liberal Democratic Party 3.8% and the Renaissance Party 3%. Ion CEBAN (NAM), incumbent mayor of Chisinau, was re‑elected in the first round with 50.6% of the votes. Overall, the PAS scored better in the centre and south of the country, while the PSRM remained in power in its stronghold of the north.[140] However, the PAS did not manage to win races in Chisinau, Balti and all 11 bigger municipalities.
158. In Balti, Alexandr PETKOV, the candidate of Our Party and Alina CORSICOVA, an independent candidate allegedly close to Ilan SHOR, were qualified for the second round. However, the DEC cancelled Ms CORSICOVA’s registration and the second round was held between Mr PETKOV and the candidate from the PSRM who had scored third in the first round. Mr PETKOV won the second round with 59.8% of the votes. Ms CORSICOVA challenged her de-registration to the Balti Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court to no avail.[141] She had become the favourite in the race after the DEC of Balti refused the registration of Marina TAUBER, former Shor party MP[142] and the CEC cancelled the registration of Chance party Victoria SAPA, following corruption reports by the SIS.[143]
159. In the elections to the 32 district councils, the PAS won the largest number of votes in 19 out of 32 raioane(eight more than in 2019 – 357 councillors in total), but it failed to win an independent majority in any of them. The PSRM won in all seven districts of the north and Basarabeasca. The Renaissance party, Our Party, the European Social Democratic Party (PSDE) and the PDCM scored the highest in one district each. After coalition talks were held in January 2024, the PAS secured a ruling coalition in 18 districts, the PSRM in eight, the PDCM in three and the PSDE in two districts.[144] Coalitions were even formed between PAS and PSRM in six districts to elect a president, which led to the exclusion of several PSRM district councillors.[145]
160. For the Council of Chisinau, the NAM led by re-elected mayor Ion CEBAN, and the PAS won an almost equal number of seats, 20 each out of 51 seats. The PSRM received six seats, the PCRM two seats and the Renaissance, Our Party and Dignity platform, one seat each. Since the elections, the relationship between Mr CEBAN and the PAS-led central Government have soured, especially as Mr CEBAN accused it of financial and political pressure, while the Government accused CEBAN of manipulation and proximity with the Russian Federation. A journalistic investigation released on 19 December identified alleged irregularities in the finances of the NAM party and a case is pending in court.[146] In Balti, out of the 35 mandates, Our Party won 11, the PSRM nine and the PAS six.
161. In local councils, the political landscape was also marked by a victory of the main two competitors, PAS and PSRM. The PAS was awarded 8 872 mandates, the PSRM 6 775, the PSDE 3 925, the PCDM 3 012, the Liberal Democratic Party 2 607, the Dignity Platform 2 031, the PCRM 1 810 and the Renaissance party 1 565. Other locally relevant parties also won mandates.
162. Overall, the period following the elections was marked by a series of election-related disputes and contradictory decisions, which often reached the Supreme Court. In total, the CEC received 52 complaints after the election day.[147] The CEC ordered 20 recounts following the first round and nine recounts following the second round of the local elections, and no substantial deviations were noted.[148] In Corjova, the unit with the highest turnout, the CEC investigated instances of phantom voters.[149] According to Promo-Lex, DECs I received 16 contestations which concerned mainly actions during counting and tabulating, the stamp to withdraw the Chance party, and the right to be elected. The DECs II received at least 79 complaints (in particular in Edinet and Chisinau), most related to the invalidation of the election legality, to the right to stand in elections or to the counting of the votes.
163. As this was the first time the Electoral Code was applied, certain limitations on its application during the post-electoral period were noted by domestic observers. From 10 November onwards, DECs were tasked to validate the results and mandates, a responsibility previously granted to the courts previously). This new responsibility led to contradictory decisions and double interpretations between local courts and the election administration which did not reinforce the trust in the impartiality and professionalism of both actors. The litigious situation had been envisaged by the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR in the joint opinion of 2022. In fact, the opinion mentioned that DECs could be entirely comprised of political representatives, calling into question their objectivity. The opinion also highlighted that the process for adjudicating complaints could be made clearer, more in line with good practice, to avoid conflict of jurisdiction and to make it impossible for appellants/authorities to pick the appeal body.
164. Following the decisions of DECs, some electoral subjects appealed to the courts, which overturned certain decisions related to elections. In Orhei, PAS candidate Sergiu STANCIU submitted a complaint to the CEC against Ms Tatiana COCIU, elected mayor with 63% of the vote in the second round. Ms COCIU, a member of the Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova party, was supported by Shor and Chance affiliates.[150] The DEC I dismissed the appeal on 14 November, but the CEC invited the DEC to re-examine its decision on 28 November. The decision was confirmed, and Mr STANCIU was found unsuccessful. On 1 December 2023, the Supreme Court, in a final and irrevocable decision, declared inadmissible the appeal filed by Mr STANCIU.
165. On 24 November 2023, the Bubuieci (Chisinau municipality) DEC ruled in favour of the PAS candidate’s complaint and invalidated the mayoral mandate of Leonid UMANET of the NAM party, giving the seat to the PAS candidate who had scored second. The decision requested the de‑registration of the candidate due to his inability to prove his general secondary education, with the Ministry of Education failing to find supporting documents.[151] This decision went against two previous decisions of the same authority on this case that confirmed Mr UMANET’s right to run. NAM party leader Ion CEBAN accused PAS of deliberately excluding NAM candidates, defended UMANET’s qualifications, and highlighted that the deadlines for challenging a registration had expired by the time the PAS candidate submitted his third complaint. The Congress of Local Authorities of Moldova considered that this case represented an abuse of power by the election administration and deplored the fact that it jeopardised the foreseeability of their decisions. The NAM challenged the decision in courts. Before all appeals were finalised, the CEC called for new elections to be held without a NAM candidate in Bubuieci on 11 February 2024, which was perceived as politically motivated and contested in courts by the MAN. The Congress delegation will carefully monitor the next steps in this case.[152]
166. Overall, at least 41 of the contestations on the registration of candidates concerned the decision of the CES to deregister the Chance party, as the Chance party had challenged the ban in every DEC II. The situation was thus particularly complicated for DECs II, which were faced with large numbers of appeals. On 4 November, the Chisinau Court of Appeal considered the request of the Chance party leader Alexei LUNGU but the proceedings were stopped on the same day, as the CES requested the review of exception of unconstitutionality of Article 225 of the Administrative Code. The Constitutional Court discarded this request in its decision of 9 November, four days after the vote.[153] The decision of the CES to cancel the registration of the Chance party was overturned by the Chisinau Court of Appeal on 12 December.[154] The Government appealed to the Supreme Court arguing in favour of the protection of national security from organised criminal groups trying to influence the political life, as the party is suspected of having received over € 10 million from the Russian Federation.[155] On 22 December, the Supreme Court rejected the decision of the Court of Appeal and sent it back for re-trial with another panel of judges.[156] This situation created tensions between the Government and the judiciary, as the Prime Minister publicly named and “shamed” the judges of the Court of Appeals, which was followed by concerned reactions by the Association of Judges.[157] Domestic observers Promo-Lex regretted the delays in the decisions to rule on the legality of the Chance party ban, in particular from the Constitutional Court, which created some uncertainty and negatively impacted the period between the two rounds of elections.[158]
167. The Congress delegation welcomed the fact that most competitors accepted the results of the elections. It regretted that the constitutional dispute and legal uncertainty related to the right to be elected did not ensure ideal campaign conditions nor provide enough time for individualised sanctions and legal remedies. It also noted with concern that the post-election period was litigious and marred by contradictory jurisprudence and decisions by the electoral administration and the courts in the validation of mandates, which created confusion and delays. It recommended simplifying the appeals and complaints procedure to reduce complexity and to ensure that all registration-related claims are handled in a timely manner before election day. At the same time, it recommended reconsidering provisions of Article 174 of the Electoral Code, which give District Electoral Commissions the competence to certify results and validate mandates. It also recommended reconsidering the need for turnout requirements in local elections, to avoid repeating elections.
16. CONCLUSIONS
168. Overall, the Congress delegation observed competitive elections, which were efficiently managed by a well-trained and transparent election administration. On election day, Congress observers witnessed a calm and transparent Election Day, marked by minor inconsistencies such as gatherings near polling stations and procedural shortcuts during the counting and some other non‑systematic incoherencies.
169. The Congress delegation welcomed the various improvements brought in by the adoption of the 2022 Electoral Code which contributed to guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process, including as regards prohibiting voter migration, bussing of voters and hate speech and more systematic investigations launched in cases of violations of campaign finance provisions. The delegation also noted with satisfaction that the Code also reduced requirements applicable to independent candidates and established a 40% gender quota, which contributed to a more open ballot, but deplored that it still set age and education requirements for mayoral candidates that are higher than the ones necessary to be elected at national level.
170. However, the Congress observers noted with concern the numerous reports of electoral corruption which negatively impacted the periods before, after and during the electoral campaign, in particular related to the ban of the Shor party in June 2023 and the de-registration of the Chance party in November 2023. Confronted with these challenging circumstances, the Government resorted to two late modifications of the Electoral Code and to the CES, to prevent these parties from running in elections, but the timing and the lack of individualised decisions and potential legal remedies created substantial constitutional and legal uncertainty. While the Congress delegation acknowledges the risks associated with the participation of political competitors who do not respect the legal framework applicable to elections, it reiterates that the exclusion of a political actor must remain a measure of last resort, grounded in evidence and accompanied by strong guarantees for legal remedies. Otherwise, such decisions can be perceived as arbitrary or politically biased and can ultimately undermine the trust of voters in democratic institutions and processes.
171. Based on the existing electoral standards and observations made on Election Day, some other areas of improvement were identified by the Congress delegation, including the presence of voters living de facto abroad on registers, the higher age and education requirements to become mayor, the complexity of the complaints and appeals processes, the high levels of media concentration and disinformation, the misuse of administrative resources and last but not least, the lack of accessibility of polling stations.
APPENDIX I
CONGRESS ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
Local elections in the Republic of Moldova - 5 November 2023
(2-7 November 2023)
FINAL PROGRAMME
Thursday 2 November 2023
Various times Arrival of the Congress Delegation in Chisinau
|
Friday 3 November 2023 |
08:00 – 08:20 Briefing for the Delegation by Ms Stéphanie POIREL, Head of the Statutory Activities Division of the Congress
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
08:20 – 08:30 Briefing for the Delegation by Ms Gunn Marit HELGESEN, Head of Delegation
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
08:30 – 08:45 Briefing for the Delegation by the Congress expert, Ms Brid QUINN
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
08:45 – 09:15 Briefing with Mr Falk LANGE, Head of the Council of Europe Office in Chisinau
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
09:30 – 10:30 Meeting with Ms Veronica MIHAILOV-MORARU, Minister of Justice, Mr Eduard SERBENCO, Secretary of State, Mr Ion GLAVAN, Adviser to the Minister of Justice, Ms Irina TODOS, Adviser to the Minister of Justice and Ms Stela BRANIȘTE, Head of the international relations division
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Interpretation EN/RO
10:30 – 11:00 Coffee Break
11:00 – 12:00 Briefing with representatives of the diplomatic corps of countries represented in the Congress delegation
· Ms Stella AVALLONE, Ambassador, Austria
· Mr Graham PAUL, Ambassador, France
· Mr Lorenzo TOMASSONI, Ambassador, Italy
· Ms Katarina FRIED, Ambassador, Sweden
· Mr Edward INGLETT, Deputy Head of Mission, United-Kingdom
· Mr Jānis MAŽEIKS,Ambassador, EU Delegation
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
12:00 – 13:15 Lunch break
13:30 – 14:30 Meeting with Ms Angelica CARAMAN, Chairperson of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Republic of Moldova
Venue: CEC meeting room, 3rd floor, Vasile Alecsandri Str., nr. 119, Chişinău
Interpretation EN/RO
15:00 – 15:45 Meeting with Mr Nicolae ROŞCA, President of the Constitutional Court
Venue: Europe Room, Strada Alexandru Lăpuşneanu 28, Chişinău
Interpretation EN/RO
16:00 – 16:15 Introduction by the Heads of delegation of the International Election Observation Mission, with Ms Corien JONKER, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Ms Gunn Marit HELGESEN, Head of delegation of the Congress, and Mr José Ramón BAUZA DIAZ, Head of delegation of the European Parliament
Venue: Loft Lounge, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
16:15 – 18:00 Joint briefing by the Core Team of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to Moldova for the Congress and European Parliament delegations
· Legal framework – Ms Smaranda SĂNDULESCU, Legal Analyst
· Political Overview and the Campaign – Mr Dimash ALZHANOV, Political Analyst
· Media Landscape and Campaign in the Media – Ms Elma ŠEHALIĆ, Media Analyst
· Election Administration and Election Day Procedures – Mr Rashad SHIRINOV, Election Analyst
· Security– Mr Peter MARRON, Security Expert
Venue: Loft Lounge, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
18:00 – 18:30 Briefing by the ODIHR EOM LTO teams based in Chisinau
Venue: Loft Lounge, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Saturday 4 November 2023
08:30 – 09:00 Briefing for the Delegation by Ms Gunn-Marit HELGESEN, Head of Delegation
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
09:00 – 10:00 Briefing with representatives of coalitions of domestic election observers and other NGOs
· Promo-Lex Association, Mr Ion MANOLE, Executive Director, Mr Nicolae PANFIL, Programme Director
· Legal Resources Center for Moldova (CRJM), Mr Ilie CHIRTOACA, Executive Director
· Association for Participatory Democracy, (ADEPT) Mr Igor BOTAN, Executive Director
· National Democratic Institute (NDI), Mr Martin ANGEBY, Senior Resident Country Director
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Interpretation EN/RO
10:00 – 10:15 Coffee Break
10:15 – 11:15 Panel with media representatives
· Teleradio Moldova, Mr Cornel CIOBANU, Deputy-Director-General
· Independent Journalism Center, Ms Nadine JOGU, Executive Director
· Association of Independent Press, Mr Petru MACOVEI, Executive Director
· Ziarul de Garda (newspaper), Ms Alina RADU, Chief Executive Officer
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Interpretation EN/RO
11:20 – 12:20 Meeting with Ms Maria GALIT, member of the Delegation of the Republic of Moldova to the Congress, and Mr Alexandru OSADCI, Secretary of the delegation as well as Ms Olga URSU, Deputy Mayor of Chisinau, Mr Mihai CEBOTAR, Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the City Hall of Chisinau
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
13:00 – 14:00 Lunch break
14:00 – 14:45 Meeting with Mr Artur MIJA, Secretary General of the State Chancellery and Secretary of the Party of Action and Solidarity
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Interpretation EN/RO
14:50 – 15:35 Meeting with representatives of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova: Mr Adrian LEBEDINSCHI, Member of Parliament, Ms Elena BELEACOVA, Member of Parliament; Mr Ludovic FLOREAC, Advisor
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Interpretation EN/RO
Venue: Jasmine room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
15:35 – 15:50 Coffee Break
15:50 – 16:35 Meeting with Mr Vasile BOLEA, Renaissance party, candidate for mayor of Chisinau
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Interpretation EN/RO
16:45 – 17:30 Meeting with Ms Oxana MANOLI, Youth delegate of the Republic of Moldova to the Congress, and candidate for the district council of Telenesti for the European Social Democratic Party
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Interpretation EN/RO
17:35 – 18:00 Technical briefing with the Congress secretariat for the Election Day
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
18:00 – 18:30 Technical briefing with interpreters and drivers for Election Day
Venue: Begonia Room, Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Sunday 5 November – Election Day
06:15 Deployment of nine teams
23:30 Late night debriefing
Venue: Radisson Blu Hotel, Mitropolit Varlaam St 77, Chişinău 2012
Monday 6 November 2023
Various times Departure of the Congress Delegation
09:00 Final joint meeting of heads of delegations to discuss the preliminary statement with the Congress delegation, the OSCE/ODIHR and the Delegation of the European Parliament
Venue: ODIHR EOM Office, 76 Alexei Mateevici St., MD-2009 Chişinău, Moldova
15:00 Joint Press Conference to present the preliminary conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission with Mr Vladimir PREBILIC, Deputy Head of Delegation
Venue: Courtyard by Marriott Hotel, 21/A Arborilor Street, Chişinău
Delegation
Congress members
Ms Gunn Marit HELGESEN, Norway, R, EPP/CCE, Head of Delegation
Mr Vladimir PREBILIC, Slovenia, L, SOC/G/PD, Deputy-Head of Delegation
Ms Dusica DAVIDOVIC, Serbia, R, SOC/G/PD
Ms Carla DEJONGHE, Belgium, R, ILDG
Mr Joao Manuel ESTEVES, Portugal, L, EPP/CCE
Mr Jani KOKKO, Finland, L, SOC/G/PD
Mr Alberto MAZZOLENI, Italy, L, ECR
Mr James MOLONEY, Ireland, L, ILDG
Ms Randi MONDORF, Denmark, R, ILDG
Mr Benoit PILET, France, L, ILDG
Mr Andreas RABL, Austria, L, ILDG
Ms Karin THOMASSON, Sweden, R, SOC/G/PD
Mr Peter THORNTON, United-Kingdom, R, ILDG
Expert
Ms Brid QUINN(Ireland), Member of the Congress Group of Independent Experts
Congress Secretariat
Ms Stéphanie POIREL, Head of Statutory Activities Division
Mr Guillaume LOISEAU, Co-Secretary to the Monitoring Committee
Ms Mathilde GIRARDI, Election observation Officer
Ms Martine ROUDOLFF, Assistant, Local and Regional Election Observation
Mr Sandro WELTIN, Photographer
APPENDIX II
CONGRESS ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
5 November 2023 – Local Elections in the Republic of Moldova
DEPLOYMENT PLAN
|
Congress teams |
Composition of the Congress teams |
Area of Deployment |
|
Team 1 |
Gunn Marit HELGESEN Stéphanie POIREL Sandro WELTIN Interpreter: Aliona ANGHEl |
Chisinau 1 (center and western surroundings: Durlesti, Codru, Truseni, Vatra, Straseni) |
|
Team 2 |
Carla DEJONGHE Benoit PILET Interpreter: Rozalina BERESTEANU |
Chisinau 2 (center and eastern surroundings: Botanica, Bacioi, Sangera, Chetrosu, Mereni, Colonita, Stauceni) |
|
Team 3 |
Andreas RABL Martine ROUDOLFF Interpreter: Silvia VOLOH |
East – Criuleni (Dubasari district, Orhei, Molovata) |
|
Team 4 |
Dusica DAVIDOVIC Brid QUINN Interpreter: Maria CRECIUN |
Southeast- Aneii Noi, Stefan Voda, Causeni |
|
Team 5 |
James MOLONEY Guillaume LOISEAU Interpreter : Aliona GURITANU |
Southwest - Ialoveni, Cimislia, Hincesti, Leova |
|
Team 6 |
Peter THORNTON Mathilde GIRARDI Interpreter: Victor BISTRITCHI |
North - Donduseni, Edinet, Briceni, Oçnita, Riscani |
|
Team 7 |
Alberto MAZZOLENI Randi MONDORF Interpreter: Angela GUTU |
North East- Balti, Telenesti, Floresti, Soldanesti |
|
Team 8 |
Joao ESTEVES Karin THOMASSON Interpreter: Dana CODREANU |
West - Nisporeni, Ungheni, Calarasi |
|
Team 9 |
Jani KOKKO Vladimir PREBILIC Interpreter: Elena BULGAR |
Gagauzia (Comrat) and Besarabesca |
APPENDIX III
PRESS RELEASE
Local elections in the Republic of Moldova: A well-organised election process, despite challenging circumstances
At the invitation of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe deployed a mission to observe the local elections held on 5 November 2023 throughout the country. The Congress mission was led by Gunn Marit Helgesen (Norway, EPP/CCE) and involved 19 Congress observers including 13 Congress members, one expert and five members of the Secretariat from 13 countries.
The deployment on the ground on election day was preceded by preparatory meetings on 3 and 4 November in Chisinau with the Minister of Justice, the President of the Constitutional court and the Chair of the CEC. The Congress delegation further met media representatives, domestic and international observers, as well as candidates and representatives of various political parties. A briefing with the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Core Team was organised together with the delegation from the European Parliament.
On election day, nine Congress teams were deployed to different districts across the country. “We saw a calm, orderly and transparent election day from opening to counting, with some minor procedural issues. We welcome the revision of the Electoral Code which closed some previously identified legal loopholes and addressed our recommendations notably on campaign finance, independent candidates and gender quotas”, said Gunn Marit Helgesen.
“While we welcome the pro-active efforts of the authorities to address electoral corruption, a new approach is needed if the state of emergency is extended again, with specific attention given to the timing and application of restrictions. We look forward to ongoing political dialogue with Moldovan authorities to implement those recommendations.”, stated Vladimir Prebilic (Slovenia, SOC/G/PD), Deputy-head of delegation at the joint press conference with OSCE/ODIHR and the European Parliament on 6 November 2023.
The Congress draft report and recommendation will be submitted for adoption at the 46th Congress session in March 2024.
[1]. L: Chamber of Local Authorities / R: Chamber of Regions.
EPP/CCE: European People’s Party Group in the Congress.
SOC/G/PD: Group of Socialists, Greens and Progressive Democrats.
ILDG: Independent Liberal and Democratic Group.
ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists Group.
NR: Members not belonging to a political group of the Congress.
[2] Debated by the Chamber of Local Authorities during the 46th Session on 27 March 2023 and adopted by the Congress on 27 March 2024 (see document CPL(2024)46-04, explanatory memorandum), rapporteur: Vladimir PREBILIC, Slovenia (L, SOC/G/PD).
[3] Prepared with the contribution of Brid QUINN, Ireland, member of the Congress Group of Independent Experts. The report also refers to the International Election Observation mission IEOM (OSCE/ODIHR, Congress and European Parliament) Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 06/11/2023, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/557406
[4] The Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova was provided to the Congress delegation by the CEC and is available in Romanian at : https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=139332&lang=ro#
[5] See link of the CEC for the results of the 2019 elections: https://a.cec.md/ro/20-octombrie-2019-4847.html
[6] See Congress Report CG-FORUM (2020)01-04, Report on the observation of local elections in the Republic of Moldova (20 October 2019), available at: https://rm.coe.int/local-elections-in-moldova-on-20-october-2019-monitoring-committee-rap/16809f57a8
[7] In total, the PSRM won 326 seats at district level, 2 986 seats at local level and 206 mayors. The DPM won 236 seats at district level, 2 646 local councillors and 261 mayoral positions. The ACUM gained 203 seats at district level, 2 413 mandates for local councils and 172 mayors. The Shor party won 72 seats at district level, 516 at local level and 43 mayors. Other parties that were awarded mandates included among others the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (48 mayors) Our Party (24 mayors) and the Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova (10 mayors). 112 mayors, 510 local councillors and 24 district councillors were independent candidates. See for an analysis of the results: https://alegeri.md/w/Rezultatele_alegerilor_locale_generale_din_2019
[8] See Report from the CEC “Local General Elections 2019 – Gender Perspective”, 2020, available at https://www.undp.org/moldova/publications/gender-profile-2019-local-general-elections
[9] This election was observed by the Congress. See Congress Report CPL/2015(29)3FINAL, Early local elections in seven municipalities in the Republic of Moldova (20 May 2018), at: http://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016808e4a4f
[10] The OSCE/ODIHR monitored the pre-vetting of candidates for the body responsible for the appointment and discipline of judges in the Republic of Moldova and found the procedure generally objective, fair and professional, and in line with international human rights and rule of law principles. See Report on the evaluation (pre-vetting) of candidates for members of the Superior Council of Magistracy in the Republic of Moldova, 30 September 2023, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/553987
[11] In May 2023 eight top figures including former Moldovan Prime Minister Iurie LEANCA (2013-2015) and an ex-economy minister went on trial on corruption charges related to the privatisation of the country’s main airport, in relation to a company associated with the oligarch Ilan SHOR. See Radio Europa Libera Moldova, 2 May 2023, at https://www.rferl.org/a/former-moldovan-pm-charged-anticorruption-prosecutor-airport/32390472.html
[12] See Radio Europa Libera Moldova, 14 April 2023, at: https://www.currenttime.tv/a/delo-ilana-shora/32362662.html
[13] In May 2023, the officers of the National Anti-corruption Centre, together with prosecutors and police forces, conducted a criminal investigation on electoral fraud by the representatives of the Shor party to secure votes for an electoral competitor in the regional elections in Gagauzia. They raided the offices of the party and of the CEC of Gagauzia and See Anticoruptie, available at https://anticoruptie.md/ro/dosare-de-coruptie/listele-electorale-din-gagauzia-la-control-cna-a-inceput-procesul-de-examinare-a-plicurilor-cu-listele-electorale, and Ziarul de Garda, available at https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/persoane-decedate-si-oameni-aflati-in-strainatate-printre-alegatorii-care-si-ar-fi-manifestat-votul-pentru-evghenia-gutul-cna-vine-cu-detalii-despre-perchezitiile-efectuate-in-uta-gagauzia/
[14] Concerns were also expressed when Alexandru MUSTEAȚĂ—a former civil society actor, adviser to the current executive, and CEC member —was chosen to lead the Security and Information Service, although his professional experience was seen as unrelated to the security field. The President of the Constitutional Court, Nicolae ROSCA, resigned in November 2023.
[15] Alexandr STOIANOGLO is a former MP of the PDM and was Prosecutor General between 2019 and 2021. In 2021, the Supreme Prosecutorial Council suspended him for alleged abuse of power, bribery, forgery and exceeding authority. Mr STOIANOGLO filed an appeal with the Chisinau Appeal Court, which was rejected, and he was removed from office on 26 September 2023. He subsequently appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which found that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right of access to a court). In his tenure as Prosecutor General, he failed to solve major corruption cases, in particular linked to Russian oligarch Veaceslav PLATON, architect of the Russian laundromat case. Stoianoglo v. Republic of Moldova, Application No. 19371/22, judgement of 24 October 2023.
[16] See CDL-AD(2023)031, Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and ODIHR on amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova and other related laws concerning ineligibility of persons connected to political parties declared unconstitutional, 6 October 2023, available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?opinion=1145&year=all
[17] Other applicable laws include, as amended, the 2000 Law on Local Elected Officials, the 2006 Law on Administrative Decentralisation, the 2006 Law on Regional Development and the 2003 Law on Local Public Finances. The Law on Local Administration is available (in Romanian) at: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=141120&lang=ro#
[18] The pro-Russia Ms GUTUL was elected in the second round as the Shor Party candidate. Following the party's ban, she has governed Gagauzia as a political independent. Since her election, relations between the ATUG and central authorities have soured, with the Government suspecting the Russian Federation of fostering secessionist sentiments in the ATUG.
[19] See footnote 12 and 17. On 20 July 2023, the Court of Appeal of Comrat validated her election, putting an end to the legal dispute, while anti-corruption agencies were still investigating electoral fraud and corruption allegation : See Ziarul de Garda, https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=11724 The Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections, which observed the elections, stated that the Bashkan elections were marred by multiple violation of citizens’ electoral right and competitors’ rights to enjoy equal conditions.
[20] Promo-Lex Report, Observation Mission – General Local Elections 5 November 2023; Report n°3 (5-17 October 2023) available at: https://promolex.md/24334-raportul-nr-3-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023/?lang=en – See recent post-electoral examples of political migration in December 2023 https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/opt-primari-din-nordul-tarii-care-au-candidat-independent-la-alegeri-s-au-alaturat-unui-partid-asociat-fostului-deputat-fugar-ilan-sor/ and in January 2024: https://www.zdg.md/importante/video-primara-unei-localitati-din-raionul-edinet-si-mai-multi-consilieri-locali-au-aderat-la-psde/
[21] Promo-Lex Report, Observation Mission – General Local Elections 5 November 2023; Report n°1 (1 January – 4 September 2023) available at: https://promolex.md/24085-raportul-nr-1-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023/?lang=en
[22] See International Republican Institute, Centre for Insights in Survey Research- National Survey of Moldova, July-August 2023, at: https://www.iri.org/resources/national-poll-moldova-july-august-2023/
[23] See also on this topic, IPN Press Agency, 23 November 2023, “Valeriu Sainsus, on the specifics of local elections: Political colour does not matter, the person matters “, available at : https://www.ipn.md/ro/valeriu-sainsus-despre-specificul-alegerilor-locale-nu-conteaza-culoarea-8004_1101002.html
[24] See Congress Recommendation 436 (2019) on Local democracy in the Republic of Moldova and its explanatory memorandum, available at http://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680939183 .
[25] As noted during post-monitoring visits in 2022 and 2023, the question of how to regulate or to limit by law any change in the political affiliation of mayors, while ensuring fundamental freedoms and protecting elected representatives from undue pressure or intimidation, still remains unresolved. In the June 2023 visit, no new proposals have been framed on this question and State officials only reported that this action was “a subject under discussion on the parliamentary platform”.
[26] Relevant laws and codes applicable to the local elections also include, as last amended, the Law on Local Elected Officials; the Law on Political Parties; the Law on Local Government; the 2007 Law on Political Parties (last amended in 2022); the 2006 Law on Local Public Administration (amended in 2023); the 2008 Law on Assemblies (amended 2018); the 2018 Audio-visual Media Services Code (as amended in 2023); the 2022 Law on Advertising; the 2002 Criminal Code (as amended in 2023); the 2008 Contraventions Code (as amended 2023), and the 2018 Administrative Code (as amended 2022).
[27] Domestic observers Promo-Lex estimated that 20% of their recommendations, out of 168 submitted to the Parliament, were accepted in the final draft. See Promo-Lex, Report N°1, Op.cit., p.11.
[28] See CDL-AD(2022)025-e; Republic of Moldova – Joint opinion on the draft electoral code, available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2022)025-e
[29] The joint opinion also noted that the CEC maintained an online platform to receive and analyse recommendations from various stakeholders throughout the consultation procedure, but it recommended that the authorities keep seeking broad consensus with all political forces represented in Parliament during the parliamentary procedure. Op.cit.
[30] Promo-Lex Report, Observation Mission – General Local Elections 5 November 2023; Report n°2 (5 September– 3 October 2023) available at: https://promolex.md/24256-raportul-nr-2-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023/?lang=en ; p8.
[31] At time of its expiration, Igor GROSU, Speaker of Parliament (PAS) indicated that the Government had at hand the necessary tools to act in emergency cases, without the establishment of the state of emergency measure. See Moldova 1, 30 December 2023; https://moldova1.md/p/22323/starea-de-urgenta-instituita-in-republica-moldova-expira-astazi-30-decembrie
[32] The Venice Commission had prepared in 2022 an amicus curiae on this issue, at the request of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, see CDL-AD(2022)051 Amicus curiae brief on declaring a political party unconstitutional and follow-up, at https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?opinion=1115&year=all
[33] Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, control of the constitutionality of the political party "Shor", Application No. 184h/2022, judgement of 19 June 2023.
[34] Decision 16/2023 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova on the complaint of Marina TAUBER, Vadim FOTESCU, Petru JARDAN, Reghina APOSTOLOVA and Denis ULANOV, Constitutional review of Article 16 (2) of the Electoral Act, application No. 211a/2023, judgement of 3 October 2023 available at: https://www.constcourt.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=7&id=2680&t=/Media/Noutati/Curtea-a-declarat-neconstitutionala-interdictia-de-a-candida-la-alegeri-aplicata-unor-persoane-asociate-partidelor-politice-declarate-neconstitutionale
[35] See CDL-AD(2023)031, Op.cit.
[36] The CES Decision is available at: https://gov.md/ro/content/dispozitia-nr-86-din-04-octombrie-2023-comisiei-pentru-situatii-exceptionale-republicii
[37] See Interview of Ms CARAMAN on Radio Europa Libera, 10 October 2023 at: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/ce-s-a-intamplat-cu-persoanele-care-aveau-interdictia-de-a-candida-dar-au-incercat-sa-se-inscrie-in-cursa-explica-presedinta-cec/32631426.html
[38] Also ineligible are persons found guilty of infractions that led to their inclusion on international sanctions lists and whose acts are mentioned in the decision of the Constitutional Court leading to the ban of a party. See Law No. 280, 4 October 2023, for the amendment of the Electoral Code No. 325/2022, available at: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=139328&lang=ro
[39] See Interview of Ms CARAMAN, 10 October 2023, Op.cit.
[40] See CDL-AD(2023)049; Joint Amicus Curiae Brief on the ineligibility of persons connected to political parties declared, available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)049-e
[41] In 2020, in a case concerning the Republic of Moldova, the European Court of Human Rights concluded to a violation of Article 3 of Protocol N°1 stressed that the disqualification of a political party based on the unlawful use of foreign funds could only be acceptable if it was based on sufficient and relevant evidence, if the procedure before the electoral commission and the domestic courts offered sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness and if the decisions were sufficiently reasoned. See Political party “Patria” and others v. The Republic of Moldova, ECtHR Judgment, 4 August 2020.
[42] See CEC Decision on the date of local elections, 4 July 2023, at: https://a.cec.md/ro/cu-privire-la-stabilirea-datei-alegerilor-locale-generale-2751_106589.html
[43] ATUG unsuccessfully claimed national quotas back in 2013 and again in 2023, proposing different statutory amendments See IPN, Gagauzia claims quota in Moldova’s Parliament, 19 November 2013, available at https://www.ipn.md/en/gagauzia-claims-quota-in-moldovas-parliament-7965_1009195.html and See Moldova 1, “Comrat demands representative quotas of autonomy in the Parliament, the Government and the central judicial and legal bodies”, 27 May 2023, available at https://moldova1.md/p/10283/comrat-demands-representative-quotas-of-autonomy-in-the-parliament-the-government-and-the-central-judicial-and-legal-bodies
[44] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is available at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.
[45] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.
[46] Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (CETS No 009) is available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=treaty-detail&treatynum=009.
[47] The European Charter of Local Self-Government (CETS No 122) is available at https://rm.coe.int/168007a088.
[48] Observation of local and regional elections – strategy and rules of the Congress – Resolution 306 (2010).
[49] Congress policy in observing local and regional elections – Resolution 274 (2008).
[50] The Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters is available at https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor-e.
[51] The 1990 Copenhagen document is available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304.
[52] All Congress transversal reports, resolutions and recommendations in the field of elections are available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/transversal-reports-local-and-regional-elections.
[53] All Venice Commission standards are available at https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01_Coe_electoral_standards.
[54] The 2022 Electoral Code, in line with international good practice and previous recommendations, extended the number of institutions which must nominate members in addition to the Parliament and the President. The Government, the Superior Council of Magistracy and civil society organisations will also nominate members and their number will be reduced from nine to seven. CEC members will be appointed for six instead of currently five-year permanent mandates. The Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Joint opinion on the draft electoral code noted that the Government depends on the Parliament and thus, one could question the relevance of a candidate put forward by the Government in the view to depoliticise and professionalise the institution. Furthermore, the opinion called for greater clarity on the distribution of seats between parliamentary factions, on the grounds for dismissal of CEC members and on the possibility for the CEC to work when at least five members are appointed, which left a possibility of composition without any opposition representation. These provisions were kept in the final text (Articles 19 and 20 of the Electoral Code). The Congress delegation fully endorsed these recommendations but, as the composition of the CEC was still under the former system in the 2023 local elections, this point will not be explored in this report. See CDL-AD(2022)025-e, Op.cit.
[55] During local elections and referendums, the Central Electoral Council of Gagauzia performs the duties of a DEC II (Article 17 of the Electoral Code) and will therefore not be explored separately in this report.
[56] Polling stations can be set up in hospitals, retirement homes, maternity wards, etc for at least 30 voters.
[57] A transition clause was included in the Code, considering those included in the Register of Electoral Officials as of 1 January 2023 to be certified ex-officio for two-years (Article 245.5 of the Electoral Code).
[58] Information released by the CEC on 2 October 2023: https://a.cec.md/ro/numarul-de-alegatori-inclusi-in-registrul-de-stat-al-2781_107648.html ; Voters from three municipalities located on the left bank, but administratively considered part of the district of Causeni were registered to vote for district elections in polling stations dedicated to these voters.
[59] See Congress Recommendation 369 (2015) on Electoral lists and voters residing de facto abroad (2015), available at: https://rm.coe.int/electoral-lists-and-voters-residing-de-facto-abroad-rapporteur-jos-wie/1680719cfa
[60] See CEC press release on the verification platform : https://a.cec.md/ro/wwwverificacecmd-este-pagina-care-ajuta-alegatorii-2781_107840.html
[61] In this case, on election day, the PEB chairperson appoints at least two PEB members to travel with a mobile ballot box and the materials necessary for voting to the place indicated by voters. The words ‘Voted at the place of stay’ are written near their names on the Voters’ List and votes are dropped in a separate but equally sealed ballot box.
[62] See CG-FORUM (2020)01-04, Op.cit.
[63] Chapter 7 of the Electoral Code details candidate registration. In addition, Articles 162 to 167 deal specifically with candidate nomination, registration and withdrawal aspects for local elections.
[64] See CEC Press Release, 9 November https://a.cec.md/ro/concurentii-electorali-care-cad-sub-incidenta-prevederilor-ar16-2781_107707.html
[65] See Radio Moldova, CEC announces new gender quota for local elections in Moldova, 25 September 2023, at: https://radiomoldova.md/p/21625/cec-announces-new-gender-quota-for-local-elections-in-moldova
[66] Promo-Lex, Report N°3, Op.cit. p 15
[67] Promo-Lex, Report N°3, Op.cit.
[68] See CEC Press Release, 26 October 2023, available at: https://a.cec.md/ro/fiecare-al-3-lea-candidat-la-functia-de-primar-2781_107861.html
[69] The European Commission/Council of Europe Youth Partnership deemed participation of youth at the local level in the Republic of Moldova to be impressive. Its December 2022 assessment of youth participation states that of the 86 councillors on the Municipal Councils of Chisinau (51) and Balti (35), 28 are young, which represents 32.5% of the seats, up from 26.7% in 2019. Out of 10 472 mandates in local councils, 1 569 (or 14.98%) are held by young representatives. Out of 1 022 district councillors throughout the republic, 133 or 13.01%) are young. Finally, there are 898 mayors in the Republic of Moldova, of which 102 (or 11.35%) are under 35 years old. See : https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/42128013/58896112/Moldova-YouthWiki-Chapter-5.pdf/b362021c-839a-b1c9-dc11-814d958b8ae3?t=1683812036927
[70] Promo-Lex, Report N°3, Op.cit.
[71] See Agora, “The head of the SIS, with a report: the Shor Party changed its name to Chance, but the illegalities continue”, 3 November 2023 at: https://agora.md/2023/11/03/seful-sis-cu-raport-partidul-sor-si-a-schimbat-numele-in-sansa-dar-continua-ilegalitatile-ce-infractiuni-sunt-documentate-video
[72] See SIS report here https://www.sis.md/ro/content/rezultatele-unei-opera%C8%9Biuni-complexe-desf%C4%83%C8%99urate-de-c%C4%83tre-sis-%C3%AEn-contextul-r%C4%83zboiului-hibrid
[73] See Agora, “All candidates of the Chance Party, removed from the electoral races”, 3 November 2023, at: https://agora.md/2023/11/03/ultima-ora-toti-candidatii-partidului-sansa-scosi-din-cursele-electorale-recean-sa-fie-indicat-in-buletine-de-vot-retras-live
[74] In particular, the Balti Court of Appeal on 17 November, on the eve of electoral silence, upheld the decision to disqualify independent but close to Shor candidate, Arina CORSICOVA, due to undeclared funding and exceeding the spending cap.
[75] Chapter 8 of the Electoral Code outlines the rights and obligations of electoral competitors and the details regarding electoral campaigning. Article 168 conveys the application of that chapter to local and regional elections and includes a provision regarding second round campaign dates.
[76] Electoral contestants registered after 6 October could only start campaigning when their registration was confirmed by the DECs. Resultingly, some competitors started a week later on 13 October.
[77] The Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova is available at: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=140340&lang=ro#
[78] According to Promo-Lex observers, PAS was also the most active party between the two rounds of elections. Promo-Lex Report, Observation Mission – General Local Elections 5 November 2023; Report n°5 (8-16 November 2023) available at: https://promolex.md/24649-raportul-nr-5-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023/?lang=en
[79] IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Op.cit.
[80] Promo-Lex documented 19 cases which they assert that by international standards can be qualified as misuse of administrative resources. These ‘include involvement of the President of the Republic of Moldova in the local general elections – 3 cases, as well as involvement of public officials in campaign activities - 16 cases’, Promo-Lex Report N°5, Op.cit, p. 4
[81] While the Electoral Code does not clearly prohibit the President and the Prime Minister from stopping their activities, the CEC Chairperson also stated that these activities took place outside of working hours. See Interview of Ms CARAMAN, IPN Press Agency, 30 November 2023, https://www.ipn.md/ro/angela-caraman-prim-ministrul-si-presedintele-nu-au-obligatia-8012_1101136.html
[82] For instance, on 5 October, Parliament adopted budget corrections of MDL 846 900 000 (approx. €44 631 630) to allocate salary increases for 170 000 public servants and one-time bonuses for teachers and police sectors but also significantly increased a small and medium grants programme of the National Fund for Regional and Local Development. In addition, the “European Village Express” project, another small grant competition, was awarded in majority to PAS mayors (59%) when the original results of the competition only awarded them 37% of the grants. The PAS candidates were perceived as taking credit in their campaign of these grants. The timing of these decisions and amounts spend were seen by the domestic observers Promo-Lex and the opposition as misuse of administrative resources for campaigning purposes. Promo-Lex, Report N°2, Op.cit.
[83] IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Op.cit. on 2 October, Mr Ilan Shor stated that starting from November, every pensioner of ATUG, Orhei and the city of Taraclia will receive MLD 1 000 (approx. €50) from his private fund. On 21 September, candidate for the League of Cities and Municipalities Mihail BAGAS, together with the MPs Irina LOZOVAN and Alexandr NESTEROVSKI, were arrested on charges of receiving illegal funding from Ilan SHOR. He was released on house arrest by the National Anti-Corruption Centre on 23 October. Ms LOZOVAN and her husband, who is a district councillor, were criminally indicted on illegal party financing charges on 10 November 2023, see Ziarul de Garda, 10 November 2023, at: https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=12841 ; see also 14 January 2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/deputatul-de-pe-banca-acuzatilor-alexandr-nesterovschi-acuzat-de-corupere-pasiva-risca-pana-la-15-ani-de-inchisoare/
[84] 30% of the total budget goes to parties based on the results of the parliamentary elections; 30% based on the results of the general local elections; 15% for presidential elections; 7.5% to parties in proportion to the women elected in the parliamentary elections; 7.5% to parties in proportion to the women elected in the local elections; and 5% based on the proportion of young people elected in both the parliamentary elections and local elections.
[85] See CEC Decision, 17 January 2023, at: https://a.cec.md/ro/cu-privire-la-stabilirea-cuantumului-lunar-al-alocatiilor-de-la-2751_102930.html
[86] According to Article 481 of the Contravention Code, infringement of campaign financing rules, the late submission or non-submission by electoral competitors of reports on campaign financing is sanctioned with a warning or a fine.
[87] To familiarise party staff with the report templates and revised legislation, the CEC conducted a training for 22 party treasurers on reporting requirements on 1 October 2023.
[88] In addition, following the 27 October CEC decision, 13 parties were warned to correct their statements and only four contestants complied and submitted a corrected report. See CEC Decision of 27 November 2023: https://a.cec.md/index.php/ro/cu-privire-la-supravegherea-veniturilor-si-cheltuielilor-concurentilor-electoral-2751_108157.html
[89] While banks cannot refuse the opening of a campaign bank account, some interlocutors mentioned difficulties and refusals from one or more banks, due to their political affiliations.
[90] IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Op.cit. p. 9
[91] See Ziarul De Garda, 31 October 2023, “Promotes misleading narratives”. SIS notifies CEC to examine Ilan SHOR’s “support” for two candidates in general local elections https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=12779
[92] Ms SPITARU allegedly kept investigating as an undercover agent. See Ziarul De Garda, 24 September 2023, Ilan SHOR admits to “financing” political parties: “I don’t think I am doing anything illegal. Like European funds, I support political projects in Moldova” at: https://www.zdg.md/en/?paged=8&cat=20
[93] Transactions using foreign bank accounts and cards are not recorded by ATMs and cannot be easily traced. See Ziarul De Garda, 5 October 2023, “New raids in the file on illegal financing of political parties”, at https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=12613
[94] See Ziarul De Garda, 27 October 2023, “The head of the General Police Inspectorate, on the searches carried out in the file on illegal financing of the Chance party: “There is a reasonable suspicion that the transactions come from the Russian Federation””, at: https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=12772
[95] See SIS report at: https://www.sis.md/ro/content/rezultatele-unei-opera%C8%9Biuni-complexe-desf%C4%83%C8%99urate-de-c%C4%83tre-sis-%C3%AEn-contextul-r%C4%83zboiului-hibrid
[96] See CEC Decision of 25 October 2023 https://a.cec.md/index.php/ro/cu-privire-la-supravegherea-veniturilor-si-cheltuielilor-concurentilor-electoral-2751_107871.html
[97] On 17 November, the CEC established a control group dedicated to investigating the Chance party’s financial reporting, which concluded that the party did not comply with the reporting requirements and asked the State Fiscal Service to keep investigating on donations. See CEC Report, published on 25 January 2024 at: https://a.cec.md/ro/rapoarte-cu-privire-la-controlul-finantarii-partidelor-politice-sisau-concurenti-15317.html
[98] This remark had previously been expressed by the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR in their joint opinion on the 2022 Electoral Code. Op.cit.
[99] See Reporters Without Borders, Moldova, available at https://rsf.org/en/country/moldova.
[100]The 2021 research by the Thomsons Reuters Foundation is available at: https://epim.trust.org/application/velocity/_newgen/assets/TRFMoldovaReport_ENG.pdf
[101] See European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), Moldova Report, 8 November 2023 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/moldova-report-2023_en
[102] See Council of Europe Platform for Safety of Journalists, at: https://fom.coe.int/fr/pays/detail/11709564
[103] See AVC figures: https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Registrul-furnizorilor-TV-Moldova-12.09.23.pdf
[104] See CEC Decision, 27 July 2023, at: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=139286&lang=ro
[105] Ziarul de Garda invited all 27 candidates for the position of mayor of Chisinau to interviews. Ion CEBAN, the incumbent, Cristina VULPE (Chance), Tatiana PLATON (Alternative force, close to Shor), Diana CARAMAN (PCRM) and Vasile COSTIUC (Home Party) refused to participate. All interviews and refusals are available at: https://www.zdg.md/stiri/candidatii-la-primaria-chisinau-care-nu-au-acceptat-invitatia-zdg-la-interviuri-electorale-cine-sunt-si-de-ce-nu-au-venit-in-studioul-podcast-zdce/ . In addition, PAS Candidate Lilian CARP regretted that candidates were not obliged to participate in these debates, see IPN Press Agency, 11 November 2023, at: https://www.ipn.md/ro/lilian-carp-candidatii-trebuie-obligati-sa-participe-la-dezbateri-7965_1100753.html
[106] Promo-Lex, Report N°.5, Op.cit.
[107] See Agora, 7 November 2023, at: https://agora.md/2023/11/07/deepfake-ul-cu-maia-sandu-care-tine-un-discurs-de-sustinere-pentru-ilan-sor-in-atentia-presedintiei-am-cerut-scoaterea-clipului-video
[108] AVC website on the elections is available at https://consiliuaudiovizual.md/elections/alegeri-locale-generale-2023/
[109] The Congress delegation noted, in comparison to the local elections observed in 2018, the monitoring by the AVC did not raise suspicion of bias in the choice of the broadcasters monitored. For a summary of the fines applied by the AVC, see Ziarul de Garda, 1 December 2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/cum-au-fost-reflectate-alegerile-locale-generale-la-tv-si-radio-ca-a-aprobat-raportul-de-bilant-35-de-avertizari-publice-si-amenzi-in-suma-de-459-de-mii-de-lei/
[110] IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Op.cit.
[111] See IEOM, Press Release “Moldova’s elections peaceful and efficient, but marred by sweeping restrictive measures amid national security concerns: international observers”, 6 November 2023 at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/557427
[112] See the three reports of the Independent Journalism Centre, “Media monitoring report on the electoral campaign for the general local elections.”, available at: https://cji.md/categorie/publicatii/monitorizare/
[113] IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Op.cit.
[114] See Anticoruptie, “The People's Advocate requests additional arguments from CSE and SIS in relation to the suspension of the six TV stations”, 31 October 2023 https://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/avocatul-poporului-solicita-argumente-suplimentare-de-la-cse-si-sis-in-legatura-cu-suspendarea-celor-sase-posturi-tv
[115] In its 3rd Report, Promo-LEX observers reported 30 cases of registration of the list of candidates for the office of councillor deviating from this rule at DEC I level, including 29 cases of non-compliance with the 40% minimum quota and one case of non-compliance with the positioning of candidates. See Promo-Lex, Report N°3, Op.Cit.
[116] ODIHR, Interim Report, Op.cit.
[117] See for figures on gender the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections Studies, “Significant progress in gender representation in local elections in 2023, but also deviations in the application of the double quota system”, 4 December 2023, at: https://alegeliber.md/progrese-semnificative-in-reprezentarea-de-gen-in-alegerile-locale-din-2023-dar-si-abateri-in-aplicarea-sistemului-de-cote-duble-4003.html and “Mayoralty in the shadow – Study on the representation of women and men in elective positions at the level of town halls”, 27 November 2023, at: https://alegeliber.md/primare-in-umbra-studiu-privind-reprezentarea-femeilor-si-barbatilor-in-functiile-elective-la-nivel-de-primarii-3998.html
[118] Promo-Lex Report, Observation Mission – General Local Elections 5 November 2023; Report n°4 (19 October – 2 November 2023) available at: https://promolex.md/24401-raportul-nr-4-misiunea-promo-lex-de-observare-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023/?lang=en
[119] Council of Europe’s Fifth Opinion on the Republic of Moldova’s adherence to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe is available at: https://www.coe.int/fr/web/minorities/republic-of-moldova
[120] See Centre for Sociological, Politological and Psychological Analysis and Investigations CIVIS (CIVIS Centre), Chisinau, 2021 available at www.civis.md
[121] Fifth Opinion on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Op.cit.
[122] See CEC press release, 25 October 2023, at: https://a.cec.md/ro/cec-a-dat-start-tiparirii-buletinelor-de-vot-pentru-2781_107846.html
[123] Two candidates for the Chisinau City Hall were asked to leave debates organised on public radio and television as they only speaking in Russian. https://newsmaker.md/ro/video-inca-un-candidat-la-alegeri-dat-afara-de-la-dezbaterile-radio-moldova-pentru-ca-a-vorbit-rusa-maine-sa-respiram-o-sa-ne-interziceti/
[124] See Ziarul De Garda, 4 November 2023, "Voting day - funeral day" - How Roma vote and how motivated they are to run for elections, at: https://www.zdg.md/stiri/video-ziua-votarii-ziua-inmormantarii-cum-voteaza-romii-si-cat-sunt-de-motivati-sa-candideze-la-alegeri/
[125] ODIHR, Interim Report, Op.cit.
[126] CEC Register of appeals is available at: https://a.cec.md/ro/contestatii-depuse-la-comisia-electorala-centrala-15254.html
[127] ENEMO, Interim Report, 30 October available at https://enemo.org/post/interim-report-ieom-to-moldova-for-the-2023-local-elections-501 and statement of findings following the second round, available at: https://enemo.org/post/enemos-international-election-observation-mission-for-the-2023-local-elections-in-moldova-presented-the-statement-of-preliminary-findings-and-conclusions-for-the-second-round-508
[128] Congress delegation members assess the conduct of elections based on a standardised election day questionnaire provided by the OSCE/ODIHR, which is filled out for every observation by Congress teams. The questionnaire covers all areas and aspects of the election day from the conduct of opening, voting, counting and closing procedures and include questions on the persons present in the polling station, the atmosphere outside and inside the polling station, election material, transparency, potential irregularities, official complaints and a general assessment.
[129] IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Op.cit.
[130] Ibid.
[131] See Promo-LEX Election Observation Mission of 2023 General Local Elections: ELECTION DAY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, 6 November 2023 https://promolex.md/24430-misiunea-de-observare-promo-lex-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023-ultimele-detalii-privind-desfasurarea-scrutinului/?lang=en
[132] Figures were not found on the CEC website on the final number of irregularities. https://a.cec.md/ro/pana-la-ora-1500-au-votat-30-dintre-2781_107960.html
[133] See Ziarul De Garda, 6 November 2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/presedinta-cec-despre-publicarea-cu-intarziere-a-rezultatelor-preliminare-ale-alegerilor-au-fost-inregistrate-incidente-de-securitate-cibernetica/
[134] See Newsmaker, 20 November 2023, at https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/na-uchastkah-bylo-mnogo-postoronnih-nablyudateli-promo-lex-rasskazali-o-narusheniyah-na-vyborah/
[135] See CEC Press Release, 19 November 2023, at: https://a.cec.md/ro/circa-314-mii-de-alegatori-au-participat-la-turul-2781_108085.html
[136] All final results are available on the dedicated CEC platform : https://rezultate.cec.md/
[137] See CEC Press Release, 5 November 2023, https://a.cec.md/ro/rezultatele-preliminare-arata-ca-la-alegerile-locale-generale-din-2781_107963.html
[138] See CEC Press Release, 6 November 2023, https://a.cec.md/ro/pe-19-noiembrie-2023-in-265-de-localitati-din-2781_107964.html
[139] The eight units are Samananca, Cunicea, Nicolaevca, Chirsova, Aluatu, Cotovscoe, Salcia and Chioselia.
[141] Arina CORSICOVA, an officially independent candidate in the mayoral elections in Balti, was disqualified from the election race due to her inclusion in the list of Russian collaborators in Moldova, for violations of Article 16(2)(f), Article 102(5) of the Electoral Code. She was also accused of using undeclared financial resources. The DEC II cancelled her registration on 17 November 2023. See Ziarul De Garda, 20 November 2023“Final decision for CORȘICOVA: Supreme Court of Justice declared inadmissible the appeal filed by Shor’s candidate in Balti, excluded from the race after the first round of elections” https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=12863
[142] See IPN Press Agency, Appeals Court rejects Marina Tauber’s application concerning non-admission in Balti election, 10 October 2023, at: https://www.ipn.md/en/appeals-court-rejects-marina-taubers-application-concerning-non-admission-8012_1100052.html
[143] See Newsmaker, 30 October 2023, at: https://newsmaker.md/ro/candidatii-lui-sor-la-sefia-primariilor-din-balti-si-orhei-victoria-sapa-si-alexei-lungu-vor-fi-exclusi-de-la-alegeri-cererea-sis-catre-cec/
[144] See Radio Europa Libera Moldova, 16 January 2023, “How the parties coalesced in districts” https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/cum-s-au-coalizat-partidele-in-raioane-dupa-locale/32775282.html and https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/ion-ceban-castiga-un-nou-mandat-din-primul-tur-la-chisinau-pas-ia-cele-mai-multe-voturi-pentru-consiliile-raionale/32672922.html
[145] Some of the PSRM councillors in Drochia were excluded from the party for supporting the PAS candidate to the election of district president. https://www.zdg.md/importante/video-primara-unei-localitati-din-raionul-edinet-si-mai-multi-consilieri-locali-au-aderat-la-psde/
[146] See Ziarul de Garda, “Ion Ceban comes with accusations against PAS, after the journalistic investigation regarding the donations received by the NAM party in the electoral campaign”, 20 December 2023 https://www.zdg.md/stiri/ion-ceban-vine-cu-acuzatii-la-adresa-pas-dupa-investigatia-jurnalistica-privind-donatiile-primite-de-partidul-man-in-campania-electorala/
[147] See CEC webpage for complaints: https://a.cec.md/ro/contestatii-depuse-la-comisia-electorala-centrala-15254.html
[148] See CEC webpage for recounts: https://a.cec.md/ro/renumararea-buletinelor-de-vot-la-turul-doi-de-scrutin-15300.html
[149] See Ziarul de Garda, 19 November 2023, https://www.zdg.md/importante/video-corjova-localitatea-cu-cea-mai-inalta-prezenta-la-vot-presedinta-cec-am-fost-informati-ca-s-ar-fi-admis-la-vot-persoane-care-nu-si-au-domiciliul-in-localitatea-respectiva-vom-verifica-aceste-inf/
[150] See investigation of Rise Moldova on Ms COCIU, “From the "black list” to the mayor's chair”, 19 December 2023 at: https://www.rise.md/articol/din-lista-neagra-in-fotoliul-de-primar/
[151] Mr UMANET is under investigation by the National Anti-corruption Centre, has a criminal record for failing to declare land.
[152] See Ziarul de Garda, 5 December 2023, “CALM addresses the state institutions and the Council of Europe: "We draw attention to the strange and confusing position of the electoral bodies"” https://www.zdg.md/stiri/deputatul-de-pe-banca-acuzatilor-alexandr-nesterovschi-acuzat-de-corupere-pasiva-risca-pana-la-15-ani-de-inchisoare/
[153] See Ziarul de Garda, 10 November 2023, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-justitie/ultima-ora-sesizarea-guvernului-in-dosarul-privind-excluderea-candidatilor-sansa-din-alegeri-declarata-inadmisibila-de-curtea-constitutionala/
[154] The Chisinau Court of Appeal had already cancelled the decision of the CES on 30 November, but the case was sent back to it by decision of the Supreme Court on 6 December.
[155] The figures advanced by the Government vary between € 10 to 50 million. See Balkan Insight, 13 December 2023 https://balkaninsight.com/2023/12/13/moldova-govt-to-appeal-as-court-scraps-ban-on-oligarchs-party/
[156] See Radio Moldova, “The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice in the case of the Chance Party”, 22 December 2023”, at: https://radiochisinau.md/decizia-curtii-supreme-de-justitie-in-cazul-partidului-sansa---190481.html
[157] See Agora, "We think otherwise." 12 December 2023, https://agora.md/2023/12/13/noi-credem-altfel-cum-a-comentat-premierul-dorin-recean-decizia-curtii-de-apel-chisinau-de-a-anula-hotararea-cse-prin-care-partidul-sansa-a-fost-exclus-din-alegeri-video and the reaction of the Association of Judges of the Republic of Moldova: 14 December 2023, at: https://ajm.md/comunicat-de-presa-referitor-la-declaratiile-presedintelui-parlamentului-igor-grosu/
[158] See Ziarul de Garda, “11 days before the second round of elections, the Constitutional Court has not decided when it will examine the Government’s application in the case concerning the cancellation of the registration of the candidates of the Chance party”, 9 November 2023, at: https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=12835