



CCJE-BU(2021)1

Strasbourg, 21 January 2021

CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES (CCJE)

Questionnaire for the preparation of the CCJE Opinion No. 24 (2021):

“Evolution of the Councils for the Judiciary and their role for independent and impartial judicial systems”

*Please in your answers do not send extracts of your legislation
but describe the situation in brief and concise manner.*

General

1. Is there a Council for the Judiciary in your judicial system?	<input checked="" type="radio"/> O yes <input type="radio"/> O no
--	---

2. What is the exact title/denomination of this body?

The exact denomination of the Italian Council for the Judiciary is Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura

3. This question should be answered by members from both legal systems with and without a Council for the Judiciary: Which department or body - for example the Council for the Judiciary (often denominated as High Judicial Council (HJC)) or Ministry of Justice (MoJ) - is responsible for or is in position to perform the following tasks? More than one institution might be involved, so more than one box can be ticked.

Defending and fostering the independence of judges and the judiciary/the rule of law	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input checked="" type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Defending judges/the judiciary against public attacks	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents

	<input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input checked="" type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Administration of the judiciary	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input checked="" type="radio"/> MoJ <input checked="" type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Selection of new judges	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC (on the basis of a legal reservation) <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> A special Judicial Appointment Body <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Selection of judges for promotion	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> A special Judicial Appointment Body <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Evaluation of judges	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input checked="" type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts (Consigli giudiziari and Comitato Direttivo at the Supreme Court) <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Evaluation of court performance	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Conducting disciplinary procedures	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input checked="" type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament

	<input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input checked="" type="radio"/> other , please specify Attorney General at the Supreme Court
Drafting and enforcing a code of ethics	<input type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input checked="" type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Public relations/media coverage for the judiciary, or individual courts	<input type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input checked="" type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input checked="" type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Providing input on legislative projects	<input type="radio"/> HJC <input checked="" type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input checked="" type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Training of judges	<input checked="" type="radio"/> HJC <input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> Association of Judges <input checked="" type="radio"/> other , please specify Scuola Superiore della Magistratura
IT, including digitalisation of the judiciary and online hearings	<input type="radio"/> HJC <input checked="" type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input checked="" type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input checked="" type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts (CED) <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
The allocation of financial resources to the judiciary including individual courts	<input type="radio"/> HJC <input checked="" type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> other, please specify

Salaries of judges	<input type="radio"/> HJC <input checked="" type="radio"/> MoJ (established by the law) <input type="radio"/> Parliament <input type="radio"/> Court Presidents <input type="radio"/> Bodies within individual courts <input type="radio"/> Judicial Administration Board <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
--------------------	--

- If there is a Council for the Judiciary in your country, has it other duties not mentioned here? Is it in a position to appoint or remove presidents of courts to and from the office? Is there additional information that would be useful to understand the role of the Council for the Judiciary within your country?

See at § 4.

- If there is no Council for the Judiciary in your country, are there other important institutions, and formal or informal rules which are necessary to understand how the judiciary functions in your country?

Legal basis

4. Please explain which legal sources regulate the following aspects of the Council for the Judiciary in your legal system

Existence of a Council for the Judiciary	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Constitution <input type="radio"/> Law <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Composition	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Constitution <input checked="" type="radio"/> Law <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Selection of members including tenure and removal during tenure	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Constitution <input checked="" type="radio"/> Law <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Tasks	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Constitution <input checked="" type="radio"/> Law <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Resources, funding, administration	<input type="radio"/> Constitution <input checked="" type="radio"/> Law <input type="radio"/> other, please specify
Independence	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Constitution <input type="radio"/> Law <input type="radio"/> other, please specify

- Are there other formal or informal rules which are necessary to understand the role and functioning of the Council for the Judiciary in your country?

At the time of the fall of Fascism and the Liberation of Nazi occupation in 1945, the status of the judiciary in Italy was defined by the Judicature Act adopted in 1941. It was based on two fundamental pillars: on one hand, the explicit rejection of any form of independence of the judiciary and, on the other, the pyramidal and hierarchical structure of the judiciary, a legacy of the Napoleonic “Grande Loi” of 1810. In its Report to Parliament, the Minister of Justice Grandi spoke that way about the independence of the judiciary: "in regulating the status of

judges I naturally rejected the principle of 'self government' of the judiciary. This principle would be incompatible with the very idea of the fascist state ... it is unacceptable that within the state exist independent bodies, or autocracies or castes that are not subject to the unitary supreme power." Consistent with these principles, the Minister of Justice was the "supreme head of the administration of justice and politically responsible for the smooth and proper functioning of that administration". He exercised his oversight on all judges and prosecutors directly or through the Chief Justices. The Minister of Justice decisively influenced judges' career. He appointed the members of the Superior Council of the Judiciary that was in charge of the recruitment, assignments and transfers of judges and prosecutors. The Presidents of the Courts of Appeal and the President of the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) were appointed, like the ambassadors and prefects, by the Council of Ministers. The Minister of Justice was the sole holder of the disciplinary powers on judges and prosecutors, while the disciplinary court established within the Ministry of Justice issued simple advice for Minister's final decision.

Already in 1925 the National Association of Magistrates had been dissolved as a result of the general ban on trade union activities.

These contextual elements may help to better understand the origin and scope of the provisions of the Republican Constitution of 1948 relating to the independence of the judiciary, and the peculiar constitutional place of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura – CSM) in this regard.

The constitutional principles. The need for the judiciary to be independent of government - the so called "external" independence of the judiciary - is clearly affirmed by article 104 of the 1948 Constitution, which states: "The judiciary is autonomous and independent of all other powers." The independence of the judiciary is confirmed by article 101, which states: "Justice is administered on behalf of the people. Judges are only subject to the law."

These constitutional rules would prevent a return of control or supervision over the judiciary, not only from the government, but also by the legislature, in a setting characterized by the rule of law as the fundamental regulatory element of social life. It should be noted, moreover, that all of the above provisions refer to both the judiciary as an institution and to judges as individuals exercising public powers, demonstrating a clear vision of the need to provide the judiciary as a whole, as well as each and every single judge (and prosecutor), with specific status and protections from any undue influence. The external profile of judicial independence is reinforced by article 106 of the Constitution, which states: "The appointment of judges must be made by public competitive exam" (the Constitution provides for two possible exceptions to public competitive recruitment: the appointment, even by election, of honorary judges for all functions performed by single judges; the appointment by the CSM of full university professors of law and lawyers with at least fifteen years practice before the higher courts as judge at the Supreme Court of Cassation "for outstanding merit"). This clear constitutional directive reduces the risk of external interference in the judiciary that could be produced by alternative forms of recruitment, such as political appointment or election. The open competition, characterized by objective criteria for admission and the anonymity of the written exams seems to be the most suitable instrument to ensure not only the technical competence of future judges, but also social, political and ideological diversity within the judiciary. This diversity ultimately ensures that justice will actually be given, as solemnly stated by article 101, "on behalf of the people." Pursuant to article 107, "Members of the judiciary cannot be removed from office. They cannot be fired, suspended or transferred to other jurisdictions or functions except by decision of the Superior Council of the Judiciary for reasons and with the possibility of defense as defined by the law, or by their own consent". Judges and prosecutors are appointed for life. Judicial independence could indeed be seriously affected if they could be exempted from service or transferred without appropriate guarantees. Except in case of breaches of discipline, therefore, the magistrate can only change his/her functions and be transferred to a different court at his/her request and following specific deliberation of the CSM. The change/transfer is decided at the end of an open competition between the candidates.

Also the hierarchical structure of the judicial system has been openly challenged by the Constitution adopted in 1948, which explicitly considers the need to keep any single judge (and prosecutor) free from undue influence coming from within the judiciary. To do so, the Constitution contains specific "anti-hierarchical" rules, such as article 107, paragraph 3, which states "Judges may only be distinguished by function", and the above-mentioned art. 101 ("judges are only subject to the law"). Together, these elements define an entirely new regulatory framework, characterized by a horizontal organization, and the introduction of a democratic management of the judiciary and its members.

In this constitutional framework, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed in the Italian system by the establishment of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura – CSM), designed and structured as a true constitutional self-governing body of the judiciary. The Italian Constitutional Court in several decisions defined the CSM as "a body of constitutional rank." While it performs also administrative tasks, it remains outside the structure of the central administration of the State and doesn't belong to the government. Dealing with the functioning of courts, its principal goal is to ensure that in the performance of their duties the members of the judiciary (judges and prosecutors) will only be subject to the law.

The Council adopts all measures affecting the *status* of judges (from recruitment through public competition, to assignment and transfer procedures, promotions, up to termination of service). It also provides for the recruitment and management of the activity of honorary magistrates. Moreover, it has the task of judging the disciplinarily relevant conduct held by the magistrates. The latter competence is attributed to him by law no. 195 of 1958 which generally governs the constitution and powers of the Council itself.

The CSM is articulated into advisory commissions, which are currently nine, each composed by six members, four judges/prosecutors and two non-magistrates (lay-members). The advisory commissions, each of which is entrusted with a specific matter, prepare the files and formulate proposals for subsequent deliberation by the Plenary Assembly (called Plenum). Most of the time, the Plenary Assembly is presided over by the Vice President (unless the President of the Republic chooses to chair it), and includes all the members of the CSM. The Disciplinary Section also operates within the Council, which is responsible for judging the behavior of magistrates subjected to disciplinary actions. The Disciplinary Section is made up of six members, four magistrates and two lay members, including the Vice President of the CSM who presides over it. In the disciplinary area the CSM acts as a judicial body. Its decisions are therefore subject to appeal to the Court of Cassation (Corte di cassazione- Sezioni Unite civili).

In the new constitutional framework, the powers of the Minister of Justice remain significant. Article 110 of the Constitution states in this regard that "Subject to the powers of the CSM, the organization and operation of services related to justice are conferred to the Minister of Justice". According article 107 "The Minister of Justice has the power to set in motion disciplinary action". The Minister of Justice is the only minister to be expressly mentioned in the Constitution. The Constitution stresses in this way - once again – the important place it entrusts to the judiciary and its status.

The MoJ is responsible for the recruitment and management of staff (clerks, assistants, bailiffs, marshals, etc.), and the regulation of the legal professions (lawyers, notaries). He is also in charge of providing the financial and material resources needed for the daily work of courts and tribunals, including local supplies, facilities, digital networks and technical support.

While is CSM's duty to appoint the chief justices, Minister's agreement is also needed to do so. However, if the Minister doesn't concur with CSM's proposal, the latter can in any case proceed. The Minister of Justice can obtain information on the functioning of the courts and on the professional behavior of judges. He can also order inspections and administrative investigations, in order to perform its official duties in the field of administrative management

and disciplinary matters. He relies in that regard on the General Inspection Service, which is composed by 28 judges and prosecutors seconded at the Ministry of Justice.

Composition and Membership

5. The composition of the Council for the Judiciary:

- How many members are there?

The members are 27.

- Are there ex-officio members?

Yes, there are: The President of the Republic, The President of the Supreme Court (*Suprema Corte di cassazione*), The Attorney General at the Supreme Court (*Procuratore Generale della Repubblica presso la Suprema Corte di cassazione*)

- How many members must be judges? Do they need specific qualifications or experiences, must they come from different court systems or instances?

2/3 of the members must be magistrates (16 members: 12 judges and 4 prosecutors) and 1/3 are appointed by the Parliament in joint session (8 members: university professors and lawyers who have been practicing for at least fifteen years)

- Can/must non-judges be members of the Council? Please specify (number, qualification/specific functions)

Yes, they can.

Four members of the Council are prosecutors who work in the General Prosecutors at the Courts of Appeal or the Public Prosecutors at the Courts; eight members are chosen among full university professors and lawyers who have been practicing for at least fifteen years

6. Please describe the procedure of appointment:

- The non ex-officio members, whose number has been set at twenty-four, are elected 2/3 by all the magistrates and 1/3 by Parliament meeting in joint session. The elected office has a duration of four years, with the prohibition of immediate re-election. Of the sixteen members elected by the magistrates (so-called toga or stipendiary members), two are chosen among those who perform legitimacy functions at the Court of Cassation, ten from the judges of merit (at the Courts of Appeal or Courts), four among the prosecutors (who work in the General Prosecutors at the Courts of Appeal or the Public Prosecutors at the Courts). The eight members elected by the Parliament (so-called lay members) are chosen from university professors in law and lawyers who have been practicing for at least fifteen years.

7. How is integrity and independence of members ensured in the selection process and during their time on the Council?

In order to guarantee maximum autonomy and independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive powers, the Superior Council is chaired by the President of the Republic, who in Italy embodies the national unity and is not government's leader.

8. How is the President and/or Vice-President of the Council selected and appointed?

The President of the Council is, *ex officio*, the President of the Republic. Art. 104 of the Constitution provides that the Council elects a Vice President among the members designated by Parliament. The latter replaces the President in case of absence or impediment and exercises the functions delegated by the President. He then chairs the Presidential Committee (composed of the President of the Court of Cassation and the Attorney General at the same), which is assigned the task of promoting the activities of the Council, implementing its resolutions and managing the budget. The Vice President is a "two-faced" body; he represents the Council before the President and the President at the Council and plays a leading role in the planning and direction of the Council's work. The Presidential Committee, as specified in art. 8, paragraph 1, of the Internal Regulations, "promotes the activities of the Council and implements its decisions". It arises - as a collegial body and independently of the faculties available to its members individually - upstream and downstream of the Council's work but does not assume its external representation.

9. What is the term of office for a member of the Council?

The term of office is four years.

10. May a member be removed from office against his/her will and, if so, under what circumstances?

Members of the Council cannot be removed from office against their will. Members elected from among judges and prosecutors continue to be subject to disciplinary rules and may be dismissed following disciplinary proceedings.

Resources and management

<p>11. Which body provides funding for the Council for the Judiciary?</p>	<p><input type="radio"/> MoJ <input type="radio"/> Parliament</p> <p>X <input type="radio"/> other, if so specify. Financial and accounting autonomy is guaranteed to the Superior Council of the Judiciary. The sums allocated by law in the state budget for the year 2021 to the functioning of the CSM totaling 48.503.008,50 euros.</p>
<p>12. Is the administration of the Council for the Judiciary independent from other branches of government?</p>	<p>X <input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no The CSM is a constitutional body as it is expressly enshrined in the Constitution, which sets forth its composition (Art. 104) and its duties (Art. 105). The Council's relations with the Government are based on the principles of autonomy and</p>

	<p>independence of the Judicial Order and especially involve aspects linked to the organization and good functioning of the justice-related services that Art. 110 of the Constitution assigns to the responsibility of the Minister. The CSM is called upon to express its opinion on the bills proposed by the government concerning the judicial system and the administration of justice; it can also make proposals to change judicial districts and on all matters concerning the organization of justice-related services.</p> <p>Also, the Council's relations with the Parliament are based on principles of autonomy and independence: the CSM can send to the Parliament, through the Minister, an annual Report on the state of justice, highlighting problems and setting forth proposals.</p>
--	---

Relations within the Council for the Judiciary and within the judiciary

13. Have there been any severe internal conflicts within the Council for the Judiciary that have seriously affected its functioning? If yes, what was the character of these conflicts and have they been solved?

14. Have there been conflicts between the Council for the Judiciary and the judiciary? Have judges felt that the Council for the Judiciary did not represent their interests? If yes, why and has the conflict been solved?

The CSM has often been criticized, even by the members of the judiciary, for the criteria and methods followed in the appointment of the chief justices. The CSM followed up in this field also the requests received by the Presidents Napolitano and Mattarella. This effort translated into the rationalization of the CSM's discretion and practices, in application of the principles of meritocracy and efficiency provided for by the Constitution and the "Consolidated Law on Judicial Management" of 2015. The need to reward merit was again recently emphasized, without consideration for the possible membership of the candidates to the various associations of magistrates. The need to rationalize and speed up the procedures aimed at filling vacant posts has also been repeatedly reported.

Relations with other branches of government, governmental bodies, civil society and media

15. Have there been conflicts between the Council for the Judiciary and the executive or legislative? If yes, what was the character of these conflicts and have they been solved?

In the past there have been disputes between the Government and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, even resulting in proceedings before the Constitutional Court, on the nature and methods of cooperation, especially in a "hinge" sector between the protection of the independence of the judiciary and the efficiency of the judicial system: the appointment of chief justices. The Constitutional Court (decision no. 379 of 1992) established that the relations

between the CSM and the executive power must be based on the principle of "loyal collaboration", which implies repeated consultation activities, with a final decision, in the event of persistence of disagreement, of the CSM.

16. What legal and political means may the Council of Judiciary in your judicial system employ if it feels that its constitutional role has been infringed?

The CSM can appeal to the Constitutional Court for conflict of attributions between State powers (Conflitto di attribuzioni tra poteri dello Stato – art. 134 Cost.). In the past, for instance, such a proceeding was initiated by the CSM against the Minister of Justice (regarding his intervention in the appointment of chief justices), the Court of Auditors (with reference to the Court of Auditors' claim to subject the financial management of the CSM to control) and administrative judges (who exercise judicial control over the acts adopted by the CSM in matters other than disciplinary issues).

17. How does the Council for the Judiciary in your judicial system interact with anti-corruption bodies?

In the area of corruption prevention, Italy's approach changed with the creation, in 2012, of the National Anti-corruption Authority (ANAC), which in recent years has seen its role and powers increase. ANAC is an independent authority. It is also responsible for the supervision and regulation of public contracts, a competence complemented by the collection of data on public procurement and on companies operating in the public sector. ANAC is also the recipient of reports of offenses committed in public administrations. The CSM has often asked ANAC for the preventive opinions required by law on public procurement contracts.

18. How does the Council for the Judiciary in your judicial system interact with NGOs?

The CSM cooperates where appropriate with national and international NGOs to carry out its institutional tasks.

19. How does the Council for the Judiciary in your judicial system interact with associations of judges?

Associations of judges participate in the election of the 16 elected member magistrates of the CSM. The code of ethics of the National Association of Magistrates, however, reaffirms that once the magistrate is elected to representative bodies, he / she works without an imperative mandate with regard to electors or associated groups. The associations also promote a constant internal and external debate on the activity and choices of the CSM.

20. How does the Council for the Judiciary in your judicial system interact with media?

The CSM has an office for institutional communication, whose activity is addressed to the media and, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Vice-President and the individual members, includes the functioning of the Council's Website and, where appropriate, the use of other means of telematic communication identified by resolution adopted by the Plenary Assembly. The CSM has also a Press Office, which is vested with the powers provided for by art. 9 of the law of 7 June 2000, n. 150. The organization, the structure and the equipment of the Press Office are established by a specific resolution approved by the Council. The Council adopts also a resolution

containing the guidelines for the coordination and respective activities of aforementioned offices.

21. What, if any, is the role of the Council for the Judiciary in the vetting of judges?
The CSM submits every judge to a professional evaluation every four years. There are seven levels of seniority (ranks). To obtain the promotion to the superior rank, the candidate can present copies of his decisions/sentences and other documents he/she deems pertinent and useful to assess his/her professional skills. The Superior Council of the Judiciary examines also the statistics related to the candidate's judicial activity throughout the four-year period, compares these data with the data of other judges and prosecutors working in the same jurisdiction, and considers the report made on candidate's work and training activities by a local auxiliary body consisting of the Chief Justice, the District Attorney General and a number of local judges – not less than five - elected by their peers. In this way, the assessment is based as much as possible on documents and verifiable data, and the influence of the highest hierarchies is mitigated by the intervention of lower level magistrates in the decision-making process.
The Minister of Justice can obtain information on the courts' functioning and the professional behavior of judges. He can also order inspections and administrative investigations, in order to perform its official duties in the field of administrative management and disciplinary matters. He relies in that regard on the General Inspection Service, which is composed by 28 judges and prosecutors seconded at the Ministry of Justice.

Challenges, developments

22. Does the Council for the Judiciary in your judiciary face particular challenges? If so, what is the character of these challenges? These challenges might have arisen – among other reasons - because of political and economic developments, societal changes, corruption, the Covid-19 pandemic or technological challenges such as the digitalisation of the judiciary.

In 2019, the CSM faced integrity issues following serious allegations related to the appointment of high-level prosecutors, formulated following a criminal investigation that led to the resignation of five members of the CSM. New elections were held to replace some of these members. Disciplinary proceedings have been initiated. In addition, the National Magistrates Association has expelled one of the magistrates who in the past was the Association's President. Concerns raised by that criminal investigation prompted the Government to propose, on 7 August 2020, a draft law for the reform of the CSM, which provides for an increase in its members, the establishment of 19 territorial constituencies and the creation of a new disciplinary committee. The reform project also introduces new rules to increase transparency in the appointment of senior judges and prosecutors, with the possibility of introducing a draw for the selection of candidates for the CSM.

23. Has the role of the Council for the Judiciary in your judicial system changed in recent years? If so, how?

There have been no significant changes in recent years.

24. Have there been reforms concerning the Council for the Judiciary in your judicial system recently? If so, what were the objectives of these reforms and have they been successful?

No significant reforms have been adopted in recent years. See what is stated in the previous paragraph 22.

25. In case your judicial system does not have one, is there a discussion to introduce a Council for the Judiciary? If so, what are the arguments made in favour and against the introduction of a Council for the Judiciary. Do you think that there are challenges in your judicial system a Council for the Judiciary might help to solve? Is it likely that such a Council will be introduced?