

DECLASSIFIED¹

AS/Mon (2025) 02 REV 2

27 January 2025

amondoc02 REV 2_2025

or. Engl.

Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)

Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia

**Information note by the co-rapporteurs on their fact-finding visit to Tbilisi
(14 to 16 January 2025)**

Co-rapporteurs: Mr Claude KERN, France, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and Ms Edite ESTRELA, Portugal, Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group

¹ Document declassified by the Monitoring Committee at its meeting on 27 January 2025.

1. Introduction

1. The rapporteurs, Mr Claude Kern (France, ALDE) and Ms Edite Estrela (Portugal, SOC) visited Georgia from 14 to 16 January 2025, in the midst of the deep social and political crisis that ensued following the announcement by the ruling majority that would pause all efforts to open accession negotiations with the European Union until 2028 and therewith de facto suspending Georgia's EU integration process, against its explicit election promise that it would be the guarantor of rapid EU accession. The key objectives for this visit were to gain a better understanding about the ongoing crisis and possibilities for its resolution, as well as the extent to which the authority's ruling majority are willing, in real terms, to honour Georgia's membership obligations. Mr Claude Kern's mandate ended on 23 January 2025, after his participation in this visit.

2. In the context of the extremely tense and polarised environment, and evident risk that our visit would be instrumentalised for domestic political purposes, we made it clear at the start of our visit, as well as during all the meetings we had, that we were on a regular monitoring visit, which should not be considered as political support for the legitimacy or the views of the interlocutors we met². This was respected by all our interlocutors. During this visit we met with, inter alia, the Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Parliamentary Speaker Shalva Papuashvili, deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Lasha Darsalia, Minister of Interior Vakhtang Gomelauri, Public Defender Levan Ioseliani, Chief Prosecutor Giorgi Gabitashvili, Head of the Special Investigation Service Karlo Katsitadze, representatives of all five political parties and coalitions that passed the 5% threshold to enter parliament, as well as members of the diplomatic community and representatives of civil society organisations and the media in Georgia. You will find in appendix the programme of the visit.

3. We would like to thank the Georgian Parliament for the programme and hospitality and the Council of Europe Office for all support given to our delegation.

2. Recent developments

4. On 27 June 2024, the Assembly adopted [Resolution 2561 \(2024\)](#) on "Challenges to democracy in Georgia". In this Resolution, the Assembly expressed its deep concern about *"the country's commitment to international democratic norms and Euro-Atlantic integration, and about its willingness to honour its membership obligations and accession commitments to the Council of Europe"*. Noting that the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections would be a de facto referendum on Georgia's democratic trajectory and foreign alignment, the Assembly reiterated its commitment to co-operation and dialogue with all forces and civil society in Georgia *"to reverse the recent backsliding and to uphold the honouring of Georgia's membership obligations and commitments to the Council of Europe"*.

5. Parliamentary elections took place in Georgia on 26 October 2024. Regrettably, these elections failed to comply with European norms and standards for democratic elections in several aspects.

6. The joint preliminary statement of the International Election Observation Mission, of which the Assembly was a part, highlighted that the elections *"unfolded amid entrenched polarization in an environment marred by concerns over recently adopted legislation, its impact on fundamental freedoms and civil society. Contestants could generally campaign freely while campaign rhetoric and imagery was highly divisive. Reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign. This, coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution"*. With regard to the conditions of parties to participate in the elections, the joint statement furthermore noted that there was *"a significant imbalance in financial resources and advantage of incumbency contributed to an already uneven playing field. The polarized media environment and instrumentalization of private outlets for political propaganda affected impartial news coverage, hindering voters' ability to make an informed choice. Effectiveness of campaign finance oversight was undermined by limited enforcement, and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalization of the oversight body."*³

7. In the context of the disputed results of these elections, the findings of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission which observed the post-election proceedings regarding the election complaints handling process are especially of concern: *"Overall, the handling of post-election day complaints by election commissions and courts undermined the right to due process, failed to provide an effective remedy, and did not comprehensively address widespread concerns about the integrity of election results"*⁴. The manner in which the election complaints have been handled by the Court raises serious questions about the

² [Announcement](#) of the visit | 10 January 2025.

³ IEOM [preliminary conclusions](#).

⁴ [Georgia, Parliamentary elections, 26 October 2024: Final Report | OSCE](#)

independence of the judiciary and the political control over it, confirming concerns already raised in the last Monitoring report to the Assembly. This deprives the citizens of an impartial and trusted arbiter that could have helped de-escalate the crisis that broke out after the elections.

8. As a result of the serious shortcomings noted, the report of the PACE Ad Hoc Committee that observed these elections, prepared by its Chair M. Iulian Bulai, expressed its deep concern about the *“correctness of the election results, namely whether the election results truly reflect the will of the voters. Additionally, serious doubts persist regarding whether the electoral environment provided the necessary conditions for a fair election, enabling voters to make an informed choice free from intimidation and undue pressure.”*⁵

9. Widespread popular protests broke out following the announcement of the results of the elections. The Georgian opposition, as well as the President of Georgia, Ms Zourabichvili, refused to recognise the outcome of these elections, citing widespread electoral fraud, including through intimidation of voters and violations of the secrecy of the vote. On these grounds, the President of Georgia, as well as several individual MPs, challenged the results of the elections, and the legality of the mandates of all 150 MPs, before the Constitutional Court.

10. The incumbent parliamentary Speaker convened the first meeting of the parliament for 25 November 2024. The legality of this convocation was questioned as, according to the legal provisions, the first task of the newly convened parliament is to recognise the powers of the new MPs on the basis of information provided by the Central Election Commission (CEC). However, provisions also explicitly state that *“the decree of the Parliament recognizing the powers of MPs shall not include the name of a person, the legality of whose election as an MP has been appealed to the Constitutional Court of Georgia.”* As President Zourabishvili had challenged the legality of the election of all 150 MPs before the Constitutional Court, and the Parliament must recognise the credentials of at least two-thirds of all 150 MPs to begin its work, a number of constitutional scholars have argued that the parliament could not have been convened before the Constitutional Court had ruled on the appeals, which it only did on 3 December when it rejected them. This in turn has led to questions about the legality of the decisions taken by the newly convened parliament including its call for Presidential elections on 14 December 2024.⁶

11. Following the 2017 Constitutional reforms, starting from 2024, the President of Georgia shall be elected by indirect elections through an election panel. According to legal provisions, this *“Election Panel shall be comprised of 300 members: 150 members of the Parliament; all members of the supreme representative bodies of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia (20) and Ajara (21); members of municipality representative bodies – Sakrebulo nominated by political parties according to the set quotas. The quotas shall be defined by the CEC in accordance with the law adhering to the proportional geographic representation principle, and according to the proportion of the results of local self-government elections held under the proportional system, not later the 2nd day after calling Presidential Elections. If parties fail to use the quota within the period determined by the law, or the number of nominated members of the Election Panel is less than the quota set, in such a case, to fill up the number of the Election Panel members to 300, by decision of the CEC, the set quotas shall be changed and the unused vacancies shall be distributed between other parties based on the sequence of election results”*. As a result of these provisions, the election panel is fully controlled by Georgian Dream, which has 224⁷ representatives on the election panel.

12. On 27 November 2024, the ruling majority nominated Mikheil Kavelashvili as candidate for the Presidency. Mr Kavelashvili is a former professional footballer and MP elected into the new parliament on the list of Georgian Dream. He is known for his hardline positions and often anti-western rhetoric and was one of the initiators of the controversial law on transparency of foreign influence. On 14 December 2024, Mr Kavelashvili, who ran unopposed, was elected President unanimously (224 votes) by the election panel. The legitimacy of his election is not recognised by Ms Zourabichvili and the opposition in Georgia, nor, judging from the protests, by a significant proportion of the population, who still consider Ms Zourabichvili to be the legitimate President of the country.

13. The situation escalated and dramatically changed on 28 November 2024, following the ruling majority’s announcement that it would pause all efforts to open accession negotiations with the European Union until 2028, therewith de facto suspending Georgia’s EU integration process against explicit elections promises to the contrary. These protests, during which initially also violence by protesters was witnessed, were increasingly

⁵ [Doc. 16079](#) § 77.

⁶ According to legal provisions, the elections for the President should take place within 45 days after the first meeting of the new parliament.

⁷ In practice this meant that all members of the electoral panel were members of Georgian Dream, as the opposition parties refused to appoint their quota.

met with police brutality and retaliation against protesters and opposition, which only galvanised the protests and resulted in a complete breakdown of trust in the political institutions of the country in the eyes of the Georgian society, which compromises their legitimacy. This is clear from the ongoing demonstrations and protests, which show no sign of slowing down and are largely society-driven (by trade unions, civil society and youth organisations, civil servants, economic actors, etc.) and spontaneous. They have turned into a social movement in favour of the country's European direction and for an end to the polarised, radical zero-sum political environment. This movement is neither controlled nor led by political opposition parties, which are equally regarded with caution by some part of the demonstrators. As a result, the space for manoeuvring by exiting political parties is limited, and any solution to the ongoing crisis needs to involve and include these social actors and civil society.

14. This is all the more important as all four opposition parties that passed the threshold for entering parliament have announced that they will not do so. Three of these opposition parties, namely "Coalition for Change", "Unity-National Movement", and "Strong Georgia" have asked the Central Election Commission to cancel their party list and requested that the parliament invalidate their mandates. While making it clear that it does not recognise the legitimacy of the new parliament and will not participate in its proceedings, former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia's "For Georgia" party reportedly did not formally ask for its lists to be cancelled or its mandates revoked. The CEC cancelled the three respective lists on 26 November 2024 and the Georgian parliament is set to decide on the revocation of the mandates at its February 2025 Session. We regret that the decision of the combined democratic opposition not to enter the new parliament has removed an important institutional mechanism - the parliament - for resolving the ongoing social and political crisis in Georgia. For that reason, the Assembly, irrespective of the merits or the grounds for such a decision, has always been rather cautious and sceptical about boycotts of parliamentary institutions.

15. This is further compounded by the fact that, on 13 December 2024, nine MPs from Georgian Dream that form the People's Power faction announced that they would leave the Georgian Dream majority and enter into opposition on the ground that, even if "there are no fundamental disagreements with the majority" the country needs a "healthy opposition". While their nature as genuine opposition is questioned in Georgia, they were recognised as the opposition in Parliament and provided with the reserved posts and other privileges for opposition parties.

16. There is currently a complete political stalemate in which neither side is willing (or able) to move from their position. The core demands of the opposition and civil society are the immediate organisation of new elections and the release of all arrested protesters. Many explicitly reject any form of domestic or international mediation beyond these core demands, citing their experience with the failed agreement brokered by former EU Council President Charles Michel following the 2020 elections, from which Georgian Dream withdrew soon after it was signed, as an ominous example. For its part, the ruling majority maintains that it represents the will of the people and therefore has the mandate to implement policies and decisions as it sees necessary for the country, without consultation or need to address the interests and aspirations of other stakeholders. It has dismissed demands by the EU for legal and political reforms as political blackmail and makes no secret of its desire to disband the opposition, which it considers to be foreign-funded representatives of an undefined global war party aiming to draw the country into an all-out war with the Russian Federation.

17. In these circumstances, the crisis of trust and legitimacy of the political institutions can only be resolved by the Georgian society itself. Normally in a democratic society, the most appropriate response to such a deep social and political schism would be to refer the matter to its citizens through democratic elections. However, it is clear that new elections, without first resolving the many shortcomings and deficiencies in the electoral environment that were noted by domestic and international elections observers, would not resolve anything. The first step should therefore be the start of an inclusive process involving all stakeholders and social actors, including the ruling majority, opposition and civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral environment that is conducive to genuinely democratic new elections. It is important to note in this context that there will be local elections in 2025 in Georgia.

18. As mentioned, the protests have been marred by the police brutality and disproportional use of force against largely peaceful demonstrators and journalists. Protesters, journalists, as well as opposition and social leaders, have been violently attacked by often unidentifiable policemen (as special units reportedly do not wear identification numbers on their uniform), and in many cases have needed urgent hospital treatment. The police violence has been strongly condemned by international and national actors including the Ombudsperson, who has described the police violence and treatment of detainees from the demonstration as amounting to inhuman

treatment and torture.⁸ This police brutality has increasingly been accompanied by reports of violent attacks by so called “titushky” (civilian masked thugs) with the police idly standing by. This, together with a lack of condemnations of these practices by the authorities and questions about the effectiveness of the investigations into these practices, has resulted in a worrisome sense of impunity for such behaviour that the authorities urgently need to address.

19. In addition, there have been numerous arrests of opposition and protest leaders and searches of their offices and houses, reportedly often on questionable legal grounds. In total, more than 400 persons have been arrested for their participation in the demonstrations. Many of these arrests have taken place on the basis of provisions in the controversial code of administrative offences⁹ which allows for hefty fines and administrative detentions of up to two weeks, and which is vulnerable to political abuse. Unfortunately, parliament recently adopted amendments that have increased its scope and severity of punishments (see also the next section below). In light of these concerns, on 23 December 2024, the President of the Assembly requested an urgent opinion of the Venice Commission on the compliance with Council of Europe standards of the Georgian law on Administrative Offences, in particular with reference to freedom of assembly.

20. There has been an increase of criminal charges being brought against demonstrators as well as opposition leaders and civil personalities supporting and participating in the protests, and recently also against journalists and media representatives. The validity of the charges, which carry lengthy prison sentences, are questioned by many interlocutors we met. These persons, approximately 40 in number, remain in pre-trial detention, which is allegedly often renewed without valid legal grounds. We met two arrested persons in prison in order to have a better understanding of their cases. These developments have raised questions about politically motivated prosecution and the abuse of judicial powers to repress or retaliate against dissent and protest.¹⁰ In a joint statement on 18 December, several leading NGOs have accused the authorities of pre-planning the police brutality as a means to disband the protests and discourage citizens to participate in them.¹¹ Some of these accusations were later given credence by a high-level whistle-blower from the Ministry of the Interior.¹² On 26 December 2024, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) issued a report that concluded that prosecution and courts had manipulated criminal charges and delayed criminal proceedings as a tool to “repress” protests.¹³

21. The police brutality and oppression and retaliation against protesters, journalists and political representatives is of serious concern and prevents any dialogue to resolve the crisis. They have been strongly condemned by the international community, including the Council of Europe. In addition, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany as well as the Baltic states and Ukraine have imposed sanctions on several members of the Georgian Dream leadership for their responsibility in the brutal suppression of the protests. On 10 December we issued a statement¹⁴ condemning the police violence and expressing our concern about possible politically motivated administration of justice. Reportedly, in light of domestic and international outcry, police behaviour has become somewhat more restrained.

22. Unfortunately, there seems to be no end in sight of the current crisis. Many interlocutors fear that the situation will get worse before it will get better, with a serious risk that the current socio-political crisis could trigger an economic crisis.

3. Problematic Legislation

23. The ongoing developments have overshadowed the issue of several pieces of legislation that have been recently adopted, including after the elections.

3.1. Law on Administrative Offences

⁸ [Liveblog: Resistance | Public Defender Reports 226 Cases of Mistreatment and 157 Injuries in Detention Visits – Civil Georgia](#).

⁹ In its most recent report on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia ([Doc. 15497](#)), the Assembly concluded that “this law dates from the Soviet era and its complete revision is long overdue. Many of its provisions have already been judged as unconstitutional by Georgia’s Constitutional Court, while reportedly several other provisions would suffer the same fate if challenged before it. As a result, the legal framework allows for overbroad application of administrative detention, as well as excessively high fines, and is vulnerable to abuse.”

¹⁰ Civil Georgia | 23 January 2025. [Watchdog Says Criminal Code is Used Punitively Against Protesters – Civil Georgia](#).

¹¹ [CSOs: MIA Pre-planned Brutal Methods for Crackdown on Protesters – Civil Georgia](#).

¹² [Former MIA Official Reveals MIA and Special Tasks Department Methods of Protests Handling – Civil Georgia](#).

¹³ [Watchdog Says Criminal Code is Used Punitively Against Protesters – Civil Georgia](#).

¹⁴ [Statement](#) by the co-rapporteurs | 10 December 2024.

24. We already highlighted the problematic nature of the law on administrative offences, and its application, in the previous section. As mentioned in the 2022 report on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia, the Georgian Law on Administrative Offences “*dates from the Soviet era and its complete revision is long overdue. Many of its provisions have already been judged as unconstitutional by Georgia’s Constitutional Court, while reportedly several other provisions would suffer the same fate if challenged before it. As a result, the legal framework allows for overbroad application of administrative detention, as well as excessively high fines, and is vulnerable to abuse.*”¹⁵ The Assembly therefore recommended that this law would be replaced by a completely new law that would be fully in line with European rule of law standards. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. On the contrary, the law has been amended a number of times to increase its scope as well as the severity of the punishments it foresees for infractions.

25. On 13 December 2024, the authorities hastily adopted a series of amendments to the Law on Administrative Offences that significantly increase fines and penalties for various violations, including for the new restrictions that were introduced by amendments to the Law on Assemblies that were adopted at the same time. In the light of the problematic nature of the law and the fact that it is widely seen as being used to discourage and repress protests, the President of the Assembly requested on 23 December 2024 an urgent opinion of the Venice Commission on the entire Law on Administrative Offences as amended, in particular in relation to the right of freedom of Assembly and Expression.

3.2. Amendments to the Law on Assembly and Law on Civil Service

26. On 13 December 2024, the authorities very hastily adopted a series of amendments to the Law on Assemblies that were widely criticised for limiting the right to freedom of Assembly. The adoption of these amendments, as well as those on other laws, were criticised by the Public Defender (Ombudsperson) for the hasty manner, without consultation, in which they were rushed through, as well as for the fact that the amendments generally failed to meet Human Rights standards.¹⁶

27. At the same session, parliament adopted a number of amendments to the Law on Civil Service. According to these amendments, both low and mid-level positions now also become de facto political appointees and protections against political dismissal are removed, in effect bringing the civil service under the full control of Georgian Dream and creating an important deterrent to civil servants that support the protest. According to civil society and trade union representatives we met during our visit, these amendments have led to a wave of dismissals of civil servants who had been critical of the authorities suspension of the EU accession process.

3.3. Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence

28. To date, no sanctions have been applied to NGOs that have refused or failed to register as foreign agents. However, there have been frequent threats that this situation could change soon, which is feared by civil society. The stigmatisation of NGOs classified as foreign agents and persons connected to them is already evident, as noted during the elections, and is increasingly used in a derogatory manner in the authorities’ rhetoric against NGOs and protesters, as well as opposition parties.

29. According to the opinion of the Venice Commission on this law, it is fundamentally flawed, undermines freedom of expression and association, and harms political pluralism and democracy, and should therefore be repealed in its entirety. This is also the position of a considerable part of the international community, including the Assembly in its resolution on “Challenges to Democracy in Georgia”¹⁷.

3.4. Law on Protecting Family Values and Minors

30. On 25 March 2024, the ruling majority tabled two draft constitutional laws on “protecting family values and minors”. These draft laws prohibit – *inter alia* – any activities or gatherings that are seen as promoting or popularising same sex relationships or gender re-assignment; restrict marriage to “genetically” heterosexual couples and limit the adoption or fostering of minors to heterosexual adults; and prohibit any decision by any authority or individual person that would directly or indirectly restrict the use of terms defined by gender. These proposals are of grave concern as regards their incompatibility with international human rights standards, and in particular the European Convention on Human Rights. On 16 April 2024, the Monitoring Committee requested an opinion of the Venice Commission on these draft constitutional laws. As the ruling majority did

¹⁵ [Doc. 15497](#) § 119.

¹⁶ [Public Defender Says Rump GD Parliament Legislates without Consultation, Limits Human Rights – Civil Georgia.](#)

¹⁷ [Resolution 2561 \(2024\)](#) § 2.

not have the required majority to adopt these laws as constitutional laws, it proposed - on 4 June 2024 - practically the same legislative package as ordinary legislation. This legislative package was adopted, with the opposition boycotting the vote, in the third reading on 17 September 2024. The bill was signed into law on 3 October 2024 by the Speaker of the Parliament after President Zourabishvili had refused to sign the law.

31. The opinion¹⁸ of the Venice Commission on the legislative package was adopted on 25 June 2024. It regretted that the introduction of such a proposal, which touches “upon highly sensitive issues”, was launched during a period of mass protests and strong social tensions, especially in the run-up to the elections, despite the concerns raised by the international community. It concluded that *“in light of the well-established ECtHR case-law on the matter and previous Venice Commission opinions, the Commission considers that the compliance of the provisions at stake with European and international standards cannot be established for the reasons set out above and the mere proposal of adopting this text risks to (further) fuel a hostile and stigmatising atmosphere against LGBTI people in Georgia. The Commission thus recommends the Georgian authorities to reconsider this legislative proposal entirely and to not proceed with its adoption”*.

3.5. Amendments to the electoral legislation

32. Local elections will be organised in Georgia in 2025. On 11 December 2024, Georgian Dream tabled amendments to the electoral code that increase the number of members in the city councils elected via majoritarian elections at the cost of those elected under the proportional system. It also removed the 40% threshold to be elected in the majoritarian races. These measures are widely considered to be aimed at ensuring Georgian Dream majorities in most, if not all, city councils in the next local elections. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe has expressed serious concerns about these amendments, which would be a partial return to the pre-2017 situation regarding local self-government in Georgia.¹⁹

¹⁸ [CDL-AD\(2024\)021](#).

¹⁹ [Proposed amendments to the Electoral Code in Georgia: Statement by the Council of Europe Congress - Congress of Local and Regional Authorities](#).

Programme of the fact-finding visit to Tbilisi (14 to 16 January 2025)

Co-rapporteurs: Mr Claude Kern, France, Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Ms Edite Estrela, Portugal, Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group

Secretariat: Mr Bas Klein, Deputy Head of Secretariat, PACE Monitoring Committee

Main focus of the visit:

- Political developments following the parliamentary and presidential elections.
- Parliamentary oversight and checks and balances
- State of affairs regarding controversial legislations: Law on Protecting Family Values and Minors; Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence; Amended Law on Administrative Offences
- Police Brutality and disproportional use of force

Tuesday, 14 January 2025

- 14:30 Briefing by the Deputy Head of the Council of Europe Office (*)
- 15:00 Roundtable with CSOs on the political developments following the parliamentary and presidential elections, including on their impact on the system of checks and balances, including police brutality and arrests of protesters (*)
- 17:00 Meeting with the CSOs on the state of affairs regarding controversial legislations: the Law on Protecting Family Values and Minors; Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence; Law on Administrative Offences; amendments to electoral code; etc (until 18:00) (*)

Wednesday, 15 January 2025

- 09:00 Meeting International Community (*)
- 10:30 Meeting with Mr Shalva PAPUASHVILI, Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia
- 11:45 Meeting with Mr. Lasha DARSALIA, Deputy Minister of foreign Affairs
- 14:30 Meeting with Mr. Levan IOSELIANI, Public Defender
- 15:30 Meeting with Members of the Ruling Majority and members of the Parliamentary Delegation of Georgia to PACE
- 16:45 Meeting with Mr. Vakhtang GOMELAURI, Minister of Interior
- 18:10 Meeting with Mr. Karlo KATSITADZE, Head of the Special Investigation Service
- 19:30 Dinner hosted by H.E. French Ambassador Ms Sheraz GASRI

Thursday, 16 January 2025

09:00 Meeting with the leadership of the Coalition for Change

10:00 Meeting with the leadership of Unity-National Movement

11:00 Meeting with the leadership of Strong Georgia

12:00 Meeting with the leadership of the For Georgia Party

15:00 Meeting with detained protestors Zviad TSETSKHLADZE and Andro CHICHINADZE

16:15 Meeting with Mr. Giorgi GABITASHVILI, Chief Prosecutor of Georgia

17:30 Meeting with Mr. Irakli KOBAKHIDZE, Prime Minister of Georgia

Friday, 17 January 2025

Departure of members of the delegation

(*) Meetings to be organised by the Council of Europe Office in Tbilisi