EVALUATION OF RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND ALLOCATION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

EVALUATION REPORT   **2018**

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

EVALUATION OF RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND ALLOCATION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Directorate of Internal Oversight

Evaluation Division

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Voluntary contributions to the Council of Europe have increased remarkably, particularly over the last five years. In 2015, the CoE exceeded by over two million Euros its target of 50 million Euros in voluntary contributions.[1]

The evaluation assessed the resource mobilisation for cooperation activities. Cooperation activities are a key element of the reform of the CoE, and an integral part of the "dynamic triangle" (standard-setting, monitoring and cooperation) and depend largely on extra-budgetary contributions. The evaluation topic was selected with a view to take stock of the progress made in resource mobilisation, and to inform future review of resource mobilisation policies and practices. The evaluation assessed how resource mobilisation contributes to achieving the objectives of the organisation and identified possible risk areas. Data collection included document review, interviews, focus group meetings with the ODGP, a survey, four case studies and observation and open discussions with Management Boards of DG I and DG II, one meeting of Heads of Field Offices (FOs) and one meeting of Deputy Heads of FOs.

The main findings of the evaluation can be summarised under three main conclusions:

1. Through the combined effect of donor trust, and resource mobilisation efforts and tools, extra-budgetary contributions have considerably increased. They have fuelled the emergence of strong thematic sectors capable of planning and implementing cooperation activities. However, they still do not cover all the cooperation needs, and rest primarily upon the EU as the leading donor of the CoE by far, complemented by a small number of main donors. While the overall donor base is likely to remain the same, new sources could be explored within the different entities in the EU.

2. Whilst the Programme and Budget is an important programmatic document of the organisation, its link with the prioritisation of fundraising and resource mobilisation and allocation is felt to be not fully transparent by entities developing projects.

    The internal processes governing resource mobilisation prioritisation and predictability could be improved and rendered more transparent. Any agreement in processes should involve the most senior level of the MAEs.

3. The CoE has invested considerably to develop its cooperation capacity and to raise extra-budgetary resources. However, in order to reach further ambitious goals, the CoE needs to address internal administrative and structural constraints that impede the absorption capacity of the organisation which affect the likelihood MAEs of presenting new project proposals for extra-budgetary funding and the ability to deliver on them. Moreover, communication and dialogue between the MAEs and the ODGP should be strengthened.

    The current budgetary issues that the organisation is facing render the subject of resource mobilisation more important than ever.

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[1] Set by the Secretary General's 2011 Resource mobilisation strategy

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Acronyms and abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CoE	Council of Europe
Congress	Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe
DEVCO	Former European Commission Directorate for International Cooperation and Development
DG I	Directorate General of Human Rights and the Rule of Law of the Council of Europe
DG II	Directorate General of Democracy of the Council of Europe
DG NEAR	European Commission Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DIO	Directorate of Internal Oversight of the Council of Europe
EBR	Extra budgetary Resources
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
FO	Field Office of the Council of Europe
IPA	European Union Instrument for Pre-Accession
MAE	Major Administrative Entity
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OB	Ordinary Budget
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODGP	Office of the Directorate General of Programmes
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PCF	Programmatic Cooperation Framework
PGG	Programme for Good Governance
PMM	Project Management Methodology
RMDR	Division for Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations
RMDR CG	Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations Coordination Group
SG	Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VC	Voluntary Contribution

1. EVALUATION APPROACH

1.1. BACKGROUND

Since the accession of a significant number of new Member States during the 1990's, the CoE has responded to a growing need for cooperation activities, designed to support the Member or partner countries in the implementation of its standards.

Cooperation activities are designed and selected on the basis of needs identified in partnership with domestic authorities, in particular based on the results of monitoring mechanisms. The programme and budget of the organisation outlines three pillars: human rights, rule of law and democracy.

The resources of the Council of Europe, enabling the discharge of these functions, are divided into the Ordinary Budget, other budgets[2] and Extra-budgetary contributions. While the ordinary budget is financed by obligatory contributions of the Council of Europe's member States,[3] the Secretary General (SG) may accept voluntary contributions, donations and legacies to the Organisation to support CoE Programme and Budget agreed activities.[4]

1.1.1. Context

The Council of Europe's Ordinary Budget is insufficient to finance all identified needs for cooperation.[5] This gap has amplified as the Ordinary Budget is subject to a zero nominal growth policy[6], which implies a loss of real resources as the budget evolution no longer compensates for inflation, while the needs and challenges identified continue to expand.[7] The programme and budget for 2016/2017, which presents the Ordinary Budget resources, available extra-budgetary resources, and funding needs, reveals a funding gap of over 80 million Euros.[8] Therefore, extra-budgetary resources remain crucial for the organisation to be able to finance co-operation activities.

1.1.2. Resource Mobilisation Strategy

Resource mobilisation practices are primarily based on the resource management and mobilisation strategy from 2009, updated in 2011[9] and supplemented by ODGP's document on extra-budgetary

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[2] Partial Agreements, Extraordinary Budget, Pensions

[3] Financial Regulations and supplementary provisions of the Council of Europe, as adopted by the Committee of Ministers at the 1117th meeting at Deputies' level on 29 June 2011 - Article 8

[4] Financial Regulation 11: *Voluntary contributions, donations and legacies and joint financing arrangements agreed to by the Secretary General shall be allocated to the relevant budget or special account. Where they are allocated to special accounts, unspent appropriations shall be automatically carried forward to the following financial year until the termination of the activity for which they were intended, at which point any remaining balance will be allocated in accordance with the donor's instructions or by decision of the Committee of Ministers*

[5] CM(2009)10 final, Resource Management and Mobilisation Strategy, 13 March 2009

[6] SG/Inf(2014)25 Information Document, 2 June 2014, Long term budgetary sustainability and efficiency of the Council of Europe

[7] CoE, Global Challenges, The Council of Europe's response, Appeal 2016-2017, 7

[8] Appeal Document 2016-2017, Appendix 1: Global Needs, p. 64f

[9] CM(2011)65 Resource mobilisation strategy, Item to be prepared by the GR-PBA on 19 May 2011

resources presented to the Rapporteurs Group on Programme, Budget and Administration (GR-PBA) in 2014.[10] The objectives of the 2011 strategy are:

- To ensure alignment of activities funded through extra-budgetary resources with the priorities of the Organisation;
- To maximise the potential of extra-budgetary resource mobilisation;
- To ensure effective co-ordination across the Organisation;
- To streamline procedures and;
- To guarantee full transparency.

1.1.3. Internal Distribution of Roles

ODGP was created in 2011 and became fully operational in 2012. ODGP ensures that CoE priorities are translated into co-ordinated co-operation programmes by strategic programming mainly through country and regional planning (Country, Regional or Thematic Action Plans) that set out the priority actions.

Scoping interviews suggest that the period 2012-2016 should be qualified as a transition period in the distribution of roles for resource mobilisation, with ODGP taking a coordinating role as compared to previous practice when Major Administrative Entities (MAEs), in particular DGI and DGII, performed fundraising autonomously. In order to optimise internal co-operation an internal Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relation Co-ordination Group (RMDR CG) representing all MAEs was established in 2014.

MAEs are responsible for developing and implementing projects, and preparing input for reporting to the donor at programme level. **ODGP** is responsible for reporting on action plans and ensures quality control of all external reporting. The **External Offices** play an increasing role in resource mobilisation, as outlined in the Secretary General's document on 'the Council of Europe external presence review, a co-ordinated approach in resource mobilisation'.[11] They develop and maintain contacts in-country under overall coordination of ODGP/RMDR. These practices aim to ensure alignment with the organisation's priorities.

1.2. EVALUATION SCOPE AND PURPOSE

The Work Programme of the Council of Europe Directorate of Internal Oversight (DIO) for 2017, approved by the Secretary General, includes an evaluation of Resource Mobilisation in the Council of Europe (CoE). This evaluation topic was selected for its strategic relevance and the anticipated contribution of the evaluation to reform initiatives and organisational learning.

In accordance with normal evaluation practice the focus of the evaluation was developed during the scoping phase and discussions in the Reference Group.

The evaluation examined the mobilisation of financial resources from public entities (states and the European Union) for the purpose of cooperation activities of the CoE, focusing on how extra budgetary resources fulfil the CoE funding needs and possible risks identified during the scoping

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[10] GR-PBA(2014)1430 September 2014 - Extra-budgetary resources, Document prepared by ODGPROG for examination by the GR-PBA on 9 October 2014

[11] SG/Inf(2015)25 rev, Information Documents, 9 September 2015[1], Council of Europe external presence review, (June 2013 – June 2015)e

phase.[12] While the evaluation took into account the evolution of resource mobilisation since the publication of the first resource mobilisation strategy in 2009,[13] **the main focus was on the period 2014-2016**, since the latest strategic document on resource mobilisation was issued. Voluntary contributions to the CoE have increased remarkably, particularly over the last five years. Through scoping interviews with MAEs and ODGP, the evaluation team identified the need to focus on internal processes related to resource mobilisation and ventilation for cooperation activities rather than assessing the effectiveness of resource mobilisation tools and methods.

1.3. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES, CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

As a result of the initial scoping, the evaluation has paid particular attention to one of the key objectives of the Resource mobilisation strategy, which is "the alignment of activities funded through extra budgetary resources with the priorities of the Organisation".[14]

The evaluation team in consultation with the Reference Group identified the following objectives and evaluation questions (see also Concept Note in Annex 6).

Objectives	
Objective 1	Assess the internal functioning and effectiveness of resource mobilisation
Objective 2	Understand how extra-budgetary resources impact the organisation in terms of priorities and structures
Objective 3	Identify avenues to improve relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of resource mobilisation

The evaluation criteria are **relevance, effectiveness and sustainability**. The table below presents the evaluation questions (for sub-questions see Evaluation Matrix in Annex 7):

Criteria	Questions
Effectiveness	To what extent does the CoE utilize its potential in resource mobilisation abilities?
Relevance	To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation tools and methods fulfil the funding needs for the CoE's priorities and objectives?
Sustainability	To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation trends affect its absorption capacity?
	What are the risks of the CoE's resource mobilisation methods and trends?

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[12] The evaluation did not look into voluntary contributions from private entities, as these constitute a marginal part of the CoE's extra-budgetary resources, with too little data for proper evaluation analysis. The 2011 Resource Mobilisation Strategy - CM(2011)65 states that "*whilst relations with non-state actors are being developed, priority will continue to be given to increasing and diversifying partnerships with member and observer States, the European Union and relevant international organisations.*"

[13] Resource Management and Mobilisation Strategy for the Council of Europe Programme of Activities - CM(2009)10 examined by the GR-PBA on 11 March 2009

[14] Resource Mobilisation Strategy **CM(2011)65**, 27 April 2011

2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

2.1. SCOPING AND INCEPTION

The evaluation team interviewed 15 members of the Secretariat (see List of Interviewees Annex 2), and conducted an online desk research on resource mobilisation in the CoE and in other international organisations. The evaluation team prepared and finalised the **Concept Note** of the evaluation (Annex 6) including comments received from the Reference Group. The evaluation team mapped the existing data and stakeholders, sampled the stakeholders to be consulted and data to be analysed, and determined the most effective data collection and analysis methods.

2.2. EVALUATION PROCESS

The evaluation was launched on **22 February 2017** and was conducted by one DIO Evaluator, assisted by a Research Assistant. The evaluation process was accompanied by a Reference Group comprising of CoE staff representing the Office of the Director General of Programmes (ODGP), the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) and the Directorate General of Democracy (DGII). The Reference Group reviewed and commented on the terms of reference of the evaluation (contained in the Concept Note).**The first Reference group meeting** was organized on **16 March 2017** to discuss the Terms of Reference in particular the scope, objectives and evaluation questions. Following the meeting, the updated final Concept Note was distributed to the members of the group, incorporating the received comments and feedback. The draft report was sent to the Reference Group on 30 June 2017 with the request to provide comments and feedback, which were discussed at **the 2nd Reference Group meeting on 6 July 2017**. The comments of the Reference Group were integrated in the report [or presented as differing views].

2.3. DATA COLLECTION

During this phase, the evaluation team collected the necessary data based on methodology outlined in the Concept Note. Data collection included document review, interviews, focus group meetings, including with the ODGP, a survey, four case studies and observation and open discussions with Management Boards of DG I and DG II, one meeting of Heads of Field Offices (FOs), one meeting of Deputy Heads of FOs.

Document review
- Collection and review of Council of Europe public documents (budgetary documents, strategic documents, legal and regulatory documents, programme documents, evaluations, reports);
- Collection and review of public or restricted documents of donors (strategic documents, organigrammes, websites, evaluations);
- Collection and review of public documents of other international organisations, relevant to their extra-budgetary funding (budgetary documents, reports, agreements with donors, programme documents, evaluations);
- Collection and review of academic research on resource mobilisation in non-profit institutions;
- Collection and review of restricted documents produced by ODGP and the CoE staff concerned by case studies (programme documents, correspondence).

Interviews

- Semi-structured interviews with a sample of stakeholders among CoE staff, donors and other international organisations (see Annex 2 for full list of interviewees);
- The evaluation team interviewed a total of 80 persons through 74 interviews (including the 15 persons interviewed during the scoping phase), categorised as follows:
  - 64 CoE staff from Strasbourg and FOs;
  - 6 representatives of four other international organisations (OSCE, Unesco, OECD, OHCHR);
  - 10 representatives of donors including the EU, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

Focus Group meetings

- Two focus groups with seven ODGP staff members each (Programming and Resource Mobilisation staff).

Survey

- An online survey was sent to 535 CoE staff. The recipients were selected based on their divisions'/units' involvement in cooperation activities financed by extra-budgetary resources. 253 survey recipients replied and out of those 164 were involved in cooperation and completed the survey.

Case studies

- The evaluation team, in consultation with the Reference Group, selected four case studies to illustrate funding mechanisms. Two case studies concerned thematic areas (thematic angle), while two others concerned a specific country (geographic angle). These case studies illustrate the widest possible variety of situations based on several criteria (major administrative entities concerned, scope, theme, level of funding, reliance on existing CoE standards and monitoring mechanisms).
- The case studies were used to analyse different tools for funding, and to reconstitute the path of preparation, internal approval and negotiations of extra budgetary funded projects, as presented in Annex 3.

Case study	Angle
Human Rights National Implementation programmes	Thematic
Education Cooperation and Capacity Building programmes	Thematic
Immediate package of measures for Ukraine	Geographic
Council of Europe Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina	Geographic

2.4. DATA ANALYSIS AND REPORT DRAFTING

The evaluation used a gender-sensitive methodology: a nearly equal number of men and women were interviewed and surveyed by the evaluation team, and the evaluation team looked for standard differences in answers based on gender. The evaluators did not observe any significant gender variations in perceptions.

A quantitative analysis was not used to analyse interviews because:

- Given the sample of interviews (less than 100), statistical relevance would not have been ensured;

- The proportions in types of interviewees (CoE staff, donors, other international organisations) differed, and would have created a bias in the statistical results.

Instead, the team used qualitative methods.[15] Sampling was purposive rather than random so that statistics would/could not be generalized to a larger population. The evaluation team then compared the results of analysis stemming from all other sources of data in order to verify the findings.

2.5. DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATION

The CoE has a limited base of sizeable donors: the top five donors (EU, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland) represented 83% of extra-budgetary resources in 2015, while other donors provided each less than 1.5% of the CoE's extra-budgetary resources. The evaluation team met representatives of the top five donors and two donors that fall under this threshold. In addition, the evaluation encountered certain challenges in obtaining timely interviews with representatives of donors. As a result, these interviews took place very late in the process, and some interviews could no longer be accommodated before the submission of the draft report. Finally, certain donor representatives have declined requests for interviews, therefore reducing the sample of donor interviewees. However, these challenges are not considered likely to have created any substantial bias, because:

- Donor feedback was remarkably uniform and coherent, which tends to diminish the value of additional interviews;
- Interviewed donor representatives were presented with working assumptions and preliminary findings drawn from document review and interviews with the CoE, and their feedback largely confirmed these assumptions and preliminary findings as well as the relevance of the evaluation criteria and questions.

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[15] These include reconstitution of the theory of change, identification, comparison and crosschecking of recurring opinions expressed by interlocutors, respondents and reports in correlation with the respondents' point of view and interests. Data analysis consisted in identifying, categorizing and confronting patterns or themes identified in the collected data

3. FINDINGS

3.1. EFFECTIVENESS

Finding 1: Fundraising exceeded the target of 50 million Euros

Overall, the steep increase of extra-budgetary resources for the past 15 years is undoubtedly a success of the CoE. The creation of the ODGP and its work has played an important role in this success. In 2015, the CoE exceeded by over two millions its target of 50 million Euros in voluntary contributions (set by the Secretary General's 2011 Resource mobilisation strategy).

Finding 2: Resource mobilisation is not a streamlined process

The table below lists processes and documents dedicated to resource mobilisation or programming documents that are also used as important vehicles for resource mobilisation. Their respective contribution to the general increase in extra-budgetary receipts is difficult to demonstrate. Donor interviews, document review and the experience of staff directly involved in resource mobilisation suggest that the combination of the following processes play the largest part in attracting extra-budgetary contributions:

- Direct advocacy with individual donors on large projects;
- Negotiations of large funding agreements (especially framework agreements with Norway, EEA/Norway Grants, Sweden, and the EU facilities);
- Negotiation process and promotion of strategic documents such as action plans.

Table 1: Resource mobilisation Processes and Documents		
	Resource mobilisation purpose	**Programming purpose with resource mobilisation usage**
Processes	- ODGP's and thematic sectors' resource mobilisation efforts with individual donors - either generally or for specific themes - FOs' resource mobilisation efforts with individual donors (in coordination with efforts in donor HQ, coordinated by ODGP) - Negotiations of large funding agreements with donors, in particular the EU, by ODGP and the DSG/SG - Programme and budget process (including contributions on extra-budgetary needs) - Donor coordination events in partner countries, organisation of visits by PR staff and donor representatives to individual partner countries - Organisation of meetings in Strasbourg with participation of donor representatives from partner countries and HQs - Coordinated awareness raising visits to donor capitals involving relevant thematic sectors and/or heads of FOs.	- Negotiation of country action plans - Negotiation of thematic action plans

Documents	- ODGP's resource mobilisation publications - Large cooperation agreements with key donors	- Country action plans - Thematic action plans - Biennial Programme and Budget (which, since the last biennium, states extra-budgetary needs) - ODGP database of projects

Overall, the evaluation finds that resource mobilisation is not a streamlined process, but rather a collection of initiatives by several actors, which do not necessarily contradict one another, but which do not either seem to sufficiently reinforce one another. For instance, there exists an overlap between the Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina examined through the case study, and the Thematic Action Plan on the Inclusion of Roma and Travellers. Several donors confirm that action plans are a necessary condition and a motivation to fund CoE cooperation activities. However, their uneven quality is also prejudicial to their effectiveness, as emphasized by several donors, and by CoE staff including within ODGP.

Finding 3: The transition towards central coordination of resource mobilisation requires further building of trust and dialogue

The first resource mobilisation strategy of the Council of Europe in 2009[16] and the updated resource mobilisation strategy, as it appears in document CM(2011)65[17] outline the centralising approach towards resource mobilisation. When the then ODG-PROG was created in 2011, it took the lead on the implementation of this strategy, and gradually centralised resource mobilisation and donor relations functions, embodied by the Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations division for bilateral donors, and ODGP management for the EU. As mentioned in the document GR-PBA(2014)14 the "Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations Division (RMDR) has the organisation-wide responsibility to promote active extra-budgetary resource mobilisation, including overall co-ordination." The document also identifies **"Optimising internal co-ordination on resource mobilisation"** as a key area to "enhance the predictability and efficiency of the use of extra-budgetary resources".[18] This constitutes an effort to ensure the channelling of extra-budgetary resources into the priorities of the CoE as well as the need to deliver a coherent message to donors, and to ensure harmonised donor relations.

An internal **Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations Co-ordination Group (RMDR CG)[19]** including representatives of all MAEs[20] has been set up with the purpose to coordinate and advise on RMDR-related policy and action, promote best practice organisation-wide and ensure proper information

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[16] CM(2009)10final, 13March 2009, Resource Management and Mobilisation Strategy for the Council of Europe, Programme of Activities, Document prepared by the Directorate of Strategic Planning

[17] **CM(2011)65**, Resource mobilisation strategy, 27 April 2011. **GR-PBA(2011)3** , 6 May 2011[1] "*The Deputies approved the resource mobilisation strategy, as it appears in document CM(2011)65 and invited the Secretary General to proceed with its implementation."*

[18] Rapporteur Group on Programme, Budget and Administration, GR-PBA(2014)14, 30 September 2014[1], Extra-budgetary resources, Document prepared by ODGPROG for examination by the GR-PBA on 9 October 2014

[19] GR-PBA(2014)14, 30 September 2014[1], Extra-budgetary resources, Document prepared by ODGPROG for examination by the GR-PBA on 9 October 2014

[20] Representatives from the following MAEs sit on the RMDRCG: Private Office, ODGP, DG I, DG II, Court, Commissioner's Office, DPB, DPA, DPP, Assembly, Congress and EDQM

flow among the MAEs, ODGP and External Offices.[21] However, the RMDR CG does not meet more than 1-2 times a year and only two meeting summaries were available.

At their first meeting, the Group recorded the roles of the different entities in resource mobilisation:
- **RMDR** has the overall responsibility for donor relations and fundraising with all donors (except EU) and for negotiating all contracts with donors;
- **MAEs** are responsible for developing and implementing projects and reporting to the donors;
- **External offices**, under RMDR coordination develop, maintain and facilitate contact with donor representatives in the partner countries.

Fundamental information on the distribution of roles in fund-raising has thus been mentioned in a record of a meeting rather than as a part of an agreement at the level of Directors-Generals. Interviews and document review show that the transition towards centralised resource mobilisation could benefit more from high-level documented agreement on the division of roles in resource mobilisation and dialogue.

Interviews confirm that several sectors continue to engage in resource mobilisation and continue fundraising on their own instead of working in accordance with recommended practice of submitting what they consider are the most important projects and funding needs to ODGP for follow up. Staff working in the cooperation sectors have claimed in interviews that they feel that they have more certainty to actually receive funds for their projects in that way. They say that they have the substance knowlegde required to convince donors and that they cannot always rely on ODGP to put sufficient effort in raising funds for their request.

ODGP has recently (Feb 2018) disseminated a "Guidance on Communication with Donors". This document is an important step towards clarifying respective roles and explains that ODGP does not require MAEs to stay out of donor relations but rather requests them to "promote organisation-wide priorities instead of individual preferences" and to coordinate the process with ODGP.[22] This approach should prevent competition for funds between the CoE cooperation sectors and persuade donors to provide more un-earmarked funding.

Also benchmarking with similar organisations (see examples UNDP and OSCE in box below[23]) suggests that decentralised fundraising efforts can be beneficial, where one body operates a coordinating role. ODGP's natural role should therefore be that of a hub and a facilitator/ coordinator.

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[21] GR-PBA(2014)14

[22] ODGP, Guidance on Communication with Donors, as distributed by ODGP 13 Feb 2018

[23] *Marc Perrin de Brichambaut,* Six Years as OSCE Secretary General:*,* An Analytical and Personal Retrospective, 2011, p. 40. https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/11/PerrindeBrichambaut-en.pdf

[23] OSCE, Project Management Manual, 2010, 78

[23] OSCE, Project Management Manual, 2010, p. 40

[23] UN, (JIU/REP/2014/1), An analysis of the resource mobilization function within the United Nations, 2014

Example UNDP

Resource mobilisation is not the sole responsibility of any one individual; a corporate approach is applied, coordinated and supported centrally, with field application. UNDP provides guidance and principles for managing partnerships to ensure that the approaches of global, regional, and country programmes are in line with the strategic plan. Country offices, in collaboration with the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy and regional bureaux can prepare tailored resource mobilisation strategies to assist with the implementation of programmes, themes or geographic focus.

Example OSCE

The OSCE does not have an organisation wide resource mobilisation policy or fundraising function at Secretariat level. The Secretariat may help to identify potential donors, but field operations are expected to negotiate their activities with the various ministries of their host countries and seek extra-budgetary funding on their own. Projects funded by extra-budgetary resources have to be relevant to the mandate and consistent with and complementary to the Unified Budget (UB). Therefore, funds can only be received for approved projects. The most common form of fundraising is by sharing the approved *Project Proposal* with the embassies of the OSCE participating States in the host country, with the delegations in Vienna or directly with Capitals, and offices of other international organizations. For larger projects, fundraising meetings either in the host country or in Vienna can be organized. The Director of the Department of Management and Finance is authorized to accept pledges on behalf of the Secretary General.

Finding 4: To be more effective, resource mobilisation processes require stronger internal partnership

Interviews and survey results show that the common opinion in the organisation is that to reach the best basis for resource mobilisation, the capacities and competency of ODGP should be complemented with programme implementation experience and thematic experience of MAEs. ODGP does not have recourse to a strong proportion of staff with previous programme implementation experience or thematic expertise, operates with complex and rather centralised processes and is therefore usually not in a position to provide the required subject-matter expertise to explain the programme logic of a proposed intervention, despite the dedication of its staff. Similarly, the thematic sectors (MAEs) sometimes lack fundraising or strategic programme management expertise.

Likewise, case studies, interviews, and direct observation of discussions show that resource mobilisation is mostly effective when it can rely on **Field offices** with project staff that have knowledge of the substance, and of the priorities and capacity of their respective sector. Some Heads and Deputy Heads of FO are actively involved in:
- Identifying opportunities for funding which could be of interest to ODGP, DGI, DGII, the PACE or the Congress;
- To a lesser extent, promoting proposed projects originating from Strasbourg, with the donors in the field.

The role of FOs in resources mobilisation has increased with the decentralisation process, however not equally in all field offices. On average, 23% of the respondents involved directly in presenting CoE activities and 20% of those negotiating the funding and content of potential projects to donors, come from the field.

The survey[24], interviews and case studies show that projects are best promoted by the joint effort of ODGP, which ensures internal coordination and matches projects with donor priorities, and the sectors themselves, which possess the expertise to answer substantial questions and back up the choice of programme components. Case studies show that this applies to both pre-designed projects in need of funds (either with bilateral donors or in the past with EU Delegations), and projects to be designed under large financial envelopes such as EU facilities. The good practice example on the Horizontal Facility illustrates this trend (see box).

Good practice: Pre-launch of the EU Horizontal Facility in Montenegro
At the end of the negotiation process of the Horizontal Facility in January 2016 (in addition to the video conferences held in Strasbourg with DG NEAR, the FOs, and the main administrative entities of the CoE) the FO in Montenegro facilitated a pre-launch meeting between the EU Delegation, the relevant authorities of Montenegro, and experts from DGI and DG II. This initiative has facilitated the finalisation of the programme design, improved the visibility of the programmes which was important for the donor, and built ownership with the beneficiary.

From a donor perspective, interviewees express appreciation for the coordinating role of ODGP, which acts as an indispensible single contact point and facilitates resource mobilisation, but also emphasize their wish to involve the future implementers of the projects at programming phase. As several interviewees put it, "One can better promote a product that they know". This point of view was already presented in 2010 by the Task Force on External Funding, an ad-hoc reflection group setup within the CoE.[25] ODGP has recently involved the thematic sectors in more discussions with several donors, with good results clarifies in their 'Guidance on Communication with Donors' that "Wherever possible ODGP/RMDR invites colleagues form other services to participate in and support strategic communication with donors".[26]

Finding 5: To be more effective, resource mobilisation processes require more predictability[27]

ODGP is almost unanimously accepted by CoE staff and donors alike as a legitimate coordinator. However, the legitimacy and effectiveness of this role would benefit from clearer rules on the process as well as on the substance of programmes and project priorities. ODGP does not have an

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[24] The survey was send to CoE staff from all MAEs working with cooperation; see Survey Q6 in Annex 5

[25] CoE Agenda 2020, Task Force on External Funding (TAFEF), Final report (as presented to DSG in 2010) Extra-budgetary Funding for the Council of Europe Budget Programme: Proposals for a pro-active and focused resource mobilisation strategy

[26] ODGP, Guidance on Communication with Donors, as distributed by ODGP 13 Feb 2018. However, according to ODGP, MAE staff is involved as they find appropriate, although increasingly major bilateral donors state that they do not wish to meet with project/programme staff

[27] See also Action Plan decentralisation Audit: "ODGP formalise and communicate on any decisions (even if ad-hoc or temporary) within its remit which impact on the drawing up of project budgets and the negotiation of cooperation projects."

explicit mandate to set funding priorities and arbitrate competition for extra-budgetary resources within the organisation.[28]

The Programme and Budget forms the basis for resource mobilisation. From the MAEs' perspectives the process starts with submitting proposals to the SG at the preparation stage of the Programme and Budget to outline priorities.

In preparation of the Programme and Budget 2018-2019 the MAEs were requested in January 2017 to submit their proposals in February. The request stated that proposals should:[29]

- Follow the existing structure by pillar/sector/programme;
- Consist of a brief description of the priorities foreseen for each programme under your authority (including: Challenge, Council of Europe added value, Council of Europe objective, priority action, shift in emphasis if any, link to UN SDGs);
- Where relevant, action should address the challenges identified in the Secretary General's annual reports on the State of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Europe;
- Cover budgetary aspects (indicate budgetary variations foreseen for each programme line while remaining within the overall 2017 budgetary envelope;
- Identify a list of lesser priority activities;
- Review and identify measures which could improve efficiency and effectiveness within MAE.

In a next step, ODGP requests MAEs to provide proposals for extra-budgetary funding concerning actions outside cooperation documents like action plans, **"that would constitute an essential complement for achieving the SG's priorities".**[30] ODGP explains that these proposals will be assessed in detail and that the DSG will take the final decision on proposals eligible in the Programme and Budget.

ODGP clarifies that proposals directly taking into account to the following criteria will be prioritised to the extent possible:

- SG priorities;
- SG's annual report;
- Council of Europe instruments;
- Results of monitoring mechanisms and judgments of the ECtHR;
- Clear description of the resulting outcome and impact;
- Size that allows for effective fundraising and impact.

However, these guidelines are not sufficient to guarantee any predictability for MAEs. The overwhelming majority of interviewees in the CoE, including in ODGP, is concerned that there are no clear criteria for ODGP to choose one project, or one sector over another in mobilising extra-budgetary resources. The exact procedure of the assessment could be more transparent.

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[28] Decentralisation Audit, p, 10 (Executive Summary): "The mandate of ODGP has not been reviewed even though there have been a number of structural developments since 2012. The support and coordination function of ODGP could be reinforced by enhancing communication with operational entities, providing more regular feedback on decisions and results emanating from the various contributions operational entities were asked to provide and discussing issues of concern in the framework of the Cooperation Governance Board. Following on from this, PO is recommended to review, with a view to strengthening the support and coordination function of ODGP in the light of developments and lessons learned since 2012"

[29] MEMO DPB2017/5 Preparation of the Programme and Budget 2018-2019, 17 January 2017

[30] MEMO ODGP/2017/35/VT, 7 March 2017

Interviews and focus groups show that ODGP staff use different criteria depending on the cases (estimate of the implementation capacity of the entity concerned, estimate of donor appetite for the projects, considerations about which entities require more promotion, etc.). In addition, ODGP at times considers the amount of work invested into the preparation of projects as a testimony to the capacity and readiness of the sectors to implement future projects. These shortcomings create misunderstandings or dissatisfaction: if 41,7 per cent of survey respondents report to be satisfied (6.7% very satisfied and 35% fairly satisfied) with the outcomes of approaching ODGP with projects for funding, this leaves 23.3% dissatisfied (for the reamining 35% this question was not applicable, see Survey Annex 5, Q8). The reasons to explain this dissatisfaction concentrate around the lack of information and criteria for promoting one or the other project with donors, ODGP's capacity to process draft projects and provide timely feedback, as well as cumbersome formats imposed by donors for proposals.

In addition, ODGP launches organisation-wide requests for contributions to the priority setting and programme design under action plans and EU facilities. Whereas ODGP tends to perceive such processes as a gesture of openness giving all sectors a fair and equal opportunity to be a part of the resource mobilisation process, for the thematic sectors, however, consultation without some indication (e.g. by communicating donor profiles) as to which projects stand a chance of funding means more work – it does not make up for either co-decision or a need for more predictability.

Interviews, document review and focus groups show that two distinct processes contribute to the lack of clarity:
- Resource mobilisation for individual projects;
- Thematic and geographic distribution of funds under large funding agreements with donors.

With donors, the negotiation process is based on their pre-existing priorities, and goes into much detail regarding programming, such as staffing issues and activities. Most of the thematic sectors are not aware of the foreseen processes, as shown by interviews and case studies: instead they respond to ODGP's requests for contributions as they arrive (see Annex 3 for case studies). As regards the EU, the multiplication of counterparts (EUDs, central DGs in Brussels, permanent representation), transition processes within the EU (restructuring and creation of DG NEAR), as well as the stark difference between previous experience of decentralised negotiations of JPs with EUDs and centralised negotiations with DGs DEVCO and NEAR, have blurred the understanding of CoE staff, and further reduced the predictability of resource mobilisation. As the examples PCF and Horizontal Facility show (see box below), the organisation has learned by doing and the process has been perceived as less cumbersome with the Horizontal Facility. Also, the design and negotiation of the PGG (follow up to the first phase of the PCF), and the joint priority setting and programming process for the upcoming EEA/Norway Grants, show that the flow of communication has become clearer, and less resource-intensive. For instance, for the Programme for Good Governance (PGG), political-level discussions about the priorities of the programme have helped clarify the focus upfront.

Examples: PCF and Horizontal Facility

For the **PCF**, the main priorities (both geographic and thematic) proposed by the CoE were not pre-decided, and ODGP conducted a wide consultation: this resulted in a compilation of proposals which, altogether, exceeded the funding capacity of the facility. ODGP (advocated by all thematic sectors), and the donor, maintained a wide focus, and made relatively even-handed cuts. In the end, the PCF contained many small or medium projects. If one disaggregates the PCF by theme and country, it amounts to rather modest funding as compared to classical EU-funded projects. It is now challenging to measure the results of these projects, and even more so to attribute impact.

The **Horizontal Facility** was more focused from the onset. While it created some frustration as thematic areas, or countries, were left out, the CoE staff experienced the preparatory process as less cumbersome and more predictable. One can reasonably expect easier reporting and impact assessment.

EU funding through the facilities has the appearance of considerable budgetary envelopes. However, when broken down according to themes and countries, on a yearly basis, it remains under the funding level of classical EU projects with other implementers. Focusing these envelopes on key priorities therefore makes sense, but there is a case to argue that the sectors and countries left out of these envelopes could be negotiated directly with EU Delegations, as used to be the case before the launch of the facilities.

As interviews show, another issue is the MAEs' limited awareness of **donor priorities**. A large number of sectors lack the necessary information to plan their future focus, and projects. This sometimes leads to two scenarios, both prejudicial to the effectiveness of resource mobilisation:

- Some thematic sectors have invested their scarce human resources in developing programmes which may not stand high chances of funding, hence "wasting" precious resources;
- Some (and sometimes the same as a result of previous experience) have refrained from investing human resources in programme development, and have rather waited for ODGP's offers for funding - but ODGP cannot be expected to fundraise without a vision of what the thematic sectors have to offer.

In fact, as some tools such as the donor maps already exist, this information on donor priorities should be communicated uniformly and transparently across the organisation in a more systematic way. An ODGP staff member explained that the procedure at this time is to send the relevant part of the donor map to the sector that prepared a proposal. This is however not sufficient to ensure that thematic sectors have a clear vision of which projects are likely to be funded.

Conclusions on Evaluation Question 1: To what extent does the CoE utilize its potential in resource mobilisation abilities?

The evaluation team found that ODGP has been successful in mobilising extra-budgetary resources in recent years. There are two factors that hamper the CoE's use of its potential in resource mobilisation abilities: weak internal partnerships and the lack of predictability.

On internal partnerships, some problems were identified on the lack of clarity, on roles and responsibilities and problems concerning internal coordination. Overall, it was found that there are

internal tensions and uncertainties that may hamper the future success of fund-raising. The roles of the different parts of the CoE need to clearly defined and the mandate of the ODGP has to be clearly and officially expressed. The recently distributed document concerning "Guidance on Communication with Donors" introduced by the Secretary General in a Senior Management Meeting is expected to improve clarity in this respect.

On predictability, more intensive communication is needed between the ODGP and the MAEs to clarify what programme areas and which projects stand a chance of receiving funding. One way of doing that is to better communicate the donor maps. Whereas the above-mentioned document clearly states that un-earmarked funds are a priority, criteria for distribution of these funds remains unclear. The following section expresses the need for a clear policy on prioritisation of projects. This would also improve predictability for MAEs.

3.2. RELEVANCE

Finding 6: The mobilisation of extra-budgetary resources is essential for the "dynamic triangle" of the Council of Europe

With the election of Secretary General Jagland in 2009 and the implementation of his reform programme for the CoE, the political will to further develop cooperation programmes continued to increase. From a chiefly intergovernmental, headquarter-based organisation, the CoE progressively transformed to develop its added value, resting upon a "dynamic triangle" of standard setting, monitoring and cooperation.

Given that the OB is largely used to finance statutory obligations including standard setting and monitoring, extra-budgetary resources have, and will continue to be a major source of funding of the cooperation pillar. This makes resource mobilisation paramount to the CoE's "dynamic triangle" and to the implementation the Secretary General's reform, particularly in the context of the zero nominal growth policy concerning the OB since the biennium 2014-2015.[31] While statutory activities increased, with the adoption of new standards and their relevant monitoring mechanisms, the budget financing them has decreased in real terms.

Finding 7: Where donors have identified mutual relevance between their and the CoE's priorities which are based on the dynamic triangle, the CoE saw a steep increase in extra-budgetary contributions.

Not only is resource mobilisation essential for the dynamic triangle, but also the other way around, the dynamic triangle is essential for successful fundraising.

As set out in the CoE Appeal document 2016-2017, the CoE's unique approach of combining political dialogue, standard setting, monitoring and co-operation are "proven methods to bring about reform and advance our common interests and values."[32] The significance of this approach is confirmed in the evaluation through interviews with donors as well as CoE staff, which emphasise that the dynamic triangle is a comparative advantage that has successfully triggered donor support and enabled a rapid growth in external resources. Almost all bilateral donors mentioned that their major incentive to fund CoE programmes is that these are meant to assist in the implementation of CoE standards, and are usually based on monitoring findings.

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[31] SG/Inf(2014)25, Information Document, Long term budgetary sustainability and efficiency of the Council of Europe, 2 June 2014
[32] CoE, Appeal Document 2016-2017, p. 5

The reputation of excellence, combined with trust in the ethics of the CoE staff and in the transparency of the CoE processes, has been a clear advantage in mobilising resources with those decision makers among donor structures who are well aware of the CoE's characteristics, methods and "dynamic triangle". These are usually permanent representations, embassies with significant experience in cooperating with the CoE, as well as some desk officers in the capitals.

However, both CoE and donor interviews suggest that many decision makers in donor structures are not well aware of the CoE's mandate, methods or indeed the "dynamic triangle". In large and/or centralised donor structures, this reduces the CoE's ability to attract contributions from some bilateral donors. One donor mentioned, "through practice I have come to appreciate the CoE, but also found that very few of my colleagues understand the CoE".

The issue is particularly important as regards the **EU**, the CoE's largest donor with 66% of total extra-budgetary receipts in 2016. The CoE cannot always fully convey the specific methodologies of the CoE to all decision makers in the EU, particularly in the European Commission. The perception about mutual relevance, which is stated in many strategic documents, varies a lot in EU delegations in the partner countries, as documented by interviews conducted under this and other evaluations.[33] A significant number of CoE interviewees confirm that they consider it difficult, and not always possible, to match donor and CoE specific priorities in given countries and thematic areas.
All interviewees - from the CoE, the EU, bilateral donors or other international organisations - concur to emphasize the importance of promotion efforts of the CoE's activities with a larger number of donor decision makers, in particular within the EU, which has an extremely complex structure for awarding funding.

Finding 8: As more themes are funded by extra-budgetary contributions, CoE cooperation needs clearer priorities.

Virtually all thematic sectors implement, or have implemented cooperation programmes funded by extra-budgetary contributions.[34] How relevant is this development, and does the relative weight of these sectors in terms of extra-budgetary funding fit with the organisation's priorities?

The evaluation finds that resource mobilisation suffers from a too broad range of priorities. The entire Programme and Budget is considered as priority for fundraising. This lack of focus has a negative impact both on the effectiveness of resource mobilisation tools and practices, internal procedures and distribution of funds as well as on donors' willingness to fund CoE cooperation activities. Therefore, the evaluation clearly identifies the need to develop a policy on setting priority areas for fundraising.

Interviews with donors and CoE staff, as well as document review and focus groups show that the main administrative entities face difficulties in setting priorities for programmes to be financed by extra-budgetary resources at their own level. Priorities mainly exist at sector level, or at country level through the action plans. The country action plans encompass projects, which are divided into two or three phases based on sequencing requirements led by ODGP. While this constitutes a first step towards prioritisation at country level, it does not make for clear, long-term ranking of priorities at the organisational level, because action plans do not exist for all countries, and because,

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[33] All strategic documents, starting with the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations and ending with the 2014 Statement of Intent for the cooperation between the CoE and the European Commission in the EU enlargement region and the eastern partnership and southern Mediterranean, clearly demonstrate the mutual relevance of the EU and CoE values and core objectives

[34] Based on survey results, at least 21 divisions implement/have implemented cooperation activities funded by extra-budgetary resources, see Survey Annex 5

according to interviewees in the CoE and among donors, their content, quality and timing vary too much. Moreover, there is no document presenting clear geographic prioritisation, either overall (e.g. priority countries for cooperation) or by theme (e.g. priority countries for given themes).

Without clear indications on the priority areas for resource mobilisation, the actual distribution of funds might point to funding trends. The table below illustrate the distribution of extra-budgetary resources in comparison to the ordinary budget in 2016. Especially the Rule of Law (RoL) pillar sticks out in this comparison. This pillar receives the highest level of EBR (40%) and the lowest level of OB (8%). Additionally, in the Appeal Document, indicating the funding needs per pillar, RoL has the highest estimated need and the highest amount of funding secured (32% compared to 23% for Human Rights and 18% for Democracy).

The relatively high amount of funding secured under the Rule of Law pillar can be explained by the EU facilities, largely funding this pillar. This rapid evolution is understood by many, donors and staff alike, as a lack of long-term vision for cooperation activities. Meanwhile, the main donors of the CoE have clear, long-term priorities, delineated through multi-year strategies. Consequently, with funding priorities remaining broad and lacking clear hierarchy, **donor priorities do not derail the CoE from its priorities, but influence their relative weight.**

Table: Distribution of Resources[35]

EB Distribution per Pillar 2016

HR ■ RoL ■ Dem ■ AP level and no-specified

OB Distribution per Pillar 2016

HR ■ RoL ■ Dem ■ Others

Appeal Doc - estimated need EB

HR ■ RoL ■ Dem

Appeal Doc -(un)secured funds

■ secured ■ unsecured

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[35] Based on ODGP, Voluntary Contribution, Facts and Figures 2015, p.12 and Appeal Document 2016-2017, p. 64-65

In particular, for **geographic priorities** we observe widely varying levels of funding for country strategic documents for cooperation. The case studies (Annex 3) on the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) action plan (54% of the needs funded as of June 2017) and the Immediate Package of Measures for Ukraine (fully funded) illustrate this trend.

Ideally, an increase in voluntary contributions without earmarking or only "light-earmarking" (at action plan or thematic level) which the resource mobilisation strategy aims for, would address these issues, by providing more flexibility to direct extra-budgetary resources towards CoE defined priorities. This approach has been successful to a certain extent, for instance with donors such as Norway and Sweden, who have made voluntary contributions under large strategic framework agreements setting overall priorities but giving the CoE great flexibility in the distribution of these resources. Action plan-level funding has also increased, reaching 42% for country action plans in 2016. However, this ratio varies a lot from country to country. It should be noted that cooperation documents that enjoy large support (such as the Immediate Package of Measures for Ukraine) can have a decisive effect on some donors' decision to provide action-plan level funding for other countries thereafter.

In addition, all donors interviewed point to the need for clearer definition of project priorities, more focus, and less dispersion, and closer scrutiny on the content of projects in the future. The current situation discourages donors from increasing the proportion of non-earmarked or soft-earmarked contributions. Several donors explain that action plans would be an encouragement to provide funding, even un-earmarked, if they were **more focused and strategic documents.**

In this context, the approach of the EU is particularly different compared to member states. While the large EU facilities were expected to provide more flexibility in programming, in reality the programming process has been characterised by protracted negotiation stages and difficulties in **matching the priorities** of the two parties. In fact, the EU, as confirmed in interviews, would prefer to finance projects outside what they see as the CoE core mandate, thus outside action plans. The evaluation of EC cooperation with the CoE, published in 2012[36], and the mid-term evaluation of the Programmatic Cooperation Framework (PCF), point to the same challenge.

Conclusions on Evaluation Question 2: To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation tools and trends fulfil the funding needs for the CoE's priorities and objectives?

The evaluation team had difficulties identifying the specific **priorities and objectives** for which resources are mobilised, therefore, was unable to pass a judgment on whether the tools and trends fulfilled the funding needs of the organisation. One reason for this is that the whole programme and budget of the organisation is taken as priority and there is no additional policy on further prioritisation for fund-raising. Another important point is that if the dynamic triangle is a selling point for fund-raising it should have a weight in defining which areas of the CoE's work should be supported by EBR. To what extent there is a ranking based on the dynamic triangle was not clear since there is no defined policy on fund-raising.

From the perspective of **trends**, if it were to be measured in terms of funds mobilised, the Rule of Law pillar has the highest priority. Is this the result of the CoE prioritisation? The funding seems to be skewed due to the fact that the CoE's donor base is limited and the dominating donor (66% of EB

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[36] Evaluation of Commission's cooperation with the Council of Europe, An assessment focussed on EU funding of Joint Programmes, Final Report, carried out by Particip GmbH, 2012, page 183-185: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2012/1311-final-report-vol2-121003-final-edits_en.pdf

projects are funded by the EU) focuses on funding cooperation activities in the Rule of Law sector. Thus, if the CoE does not set its own priorities for extra-budgetary resources and broaden the donor base accordingly, a few main donors could be seen to decide which activities are funded according to their own priorities, leaving other sectors with only limited extra-budgetary resources.

Country Action Plans, understood as one of the **tools** for fund-raising, are not considered as such by the EU, and are not considered strategic enough. They are considered as 'list of projects' by some donors. There is potential to mobilise more resources, if the dynamic triangle was more known and understood by the donor community.

3.3. SUSTAINABILITY

Finding 9: The CoE donor base is unlikely to change significantly in the foreseeable future

The donor portfolio of the CoE is limited, and reliance on a few donors has been accentuated over the past few years. In 2015, the top ten donors represented 91% of the CoE's extra-budgetary resources. The top five donors represent 83% of these resources in 2015, with the EU firmly established as the lead donor. Other donors, all bilateral, provided each less than 1.5% of the CoE's extra-budgetary resources. In 2016, the European Union (EU) is with €43.211 million (66% of total extra budgetary receipts)[37] the largest extra-budgetary contributor of the CoE, reflecting a continuous increase in the EU's contribution to the CoE's budget: In 2014, the EU contributed €23.353 million and in 2015 €28.051 million. The EU also made some voluntary contributions outside of joint programmes amounting to €2.21 million in 2015 and €2.7 million in 2016. Four main bilateral contributors follow the EU in volume of contributions in 2015: Norway (9.7%), Denmark (9%) Sweden (5.8%) and Switzerland (4.6%).[38] This trend cannot be expected to change in the foreseeable future. As long as the CoE fundraises almost exclusively with public entities, the main features of its donor base will remain firmly established: the EU remains the main donor. There is a case for expanding the EU funding base beyond DG NEAR, with other funding sources such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession, DGs Regio or Justice. Indeed, interviews and document review show that the essential part of EU extra-budgetary contributions comes from DG NEAR, but that attempts to obtain funding from other EU sources are often successful, and can distribute more evenly the donor base of the CoE. Thus, ODGP should consider freeing some capacity to review EU funding instruments, and intensify the links with relevant counterparts, as currently underway.

In order to increase sustainability and limit the reliance on the top donors, strategic documents on resource mobilisation promote obtaining large, multi-year extra-budgetary envelopes as a means to increase predictability and sustainability of donor support.[39] The EU facilities (PCF, Horizontal Facility and Neighbourhood Programme) as well as strategic agreements with main donors such as Norway or Sweden, contribute to this objective. The past three years saw an increase by 93% in the volume of multi-annual contracts and a decrease by 20% in the volume of annual contracts.[40]

While the facilities' impact in terms of predictability is positive, their ultimate effects on sustainability and reliability are less obvious, if the donor base is limited to a few donors. In the long run, these envelopes bear no guarantee of renewal and the number of donors ready, willing and able to enter into such agreements is limited. Therefore, the dependency on a small number of donors, in particular the EU might increase.

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[37] 2016 Voluntary Contributions to the Council of Europe, document provided by ODGP

[38] Joint Programmes with EU € 25 842 385.72 (49.45%) plus other voluntary contributions from the EU € 2 208 876.01 (4.23%). See VC 2015, Figure 2, p.7 and p.53

[39] GR-PBA(2014)14

[40] VC 2015, p. 23-24

A positive development, which might lead to funding opportunities, is the inclusion of the Council of Europe in the OECD DAC list of ODA-eligible international organisations with a coefficient of 40%. This means that 40% of member States' contributions to the Ordinary Budget and any non-specified voluntary contributions can be reported as ODA.[41]

Finding 10: Maintaining donor support will require stronger programme design, management, monitoring, reporting and evaluation capacity

This evaluation, in line with the findings of the DIO Review of Decentralised Evaluations,[42] finds that the CoE is an organisation that has authority, expertise, and has gained the trust and appreciation of its member states, while on the other hand, still developing expertise in state-of-the-art project management, including reporting on impact. Donors demand high **cost efficiency** in the delivery of programmes. Their opinions on the CoE's performance in this regard vary a lot: while some find the CoE reliable and efficient, others consider that there is a margin for improvement.

> **Donor quotes on result reporting:**
> "Overall the CoE is good value for money, but it needs to be shown: the CoE works on long processes, and nothing really shows in this field until change actually happens: there are very few process indicators. So by the time the impact is visible, everybody has forgotten what was done by the CoE."
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> "The CoE is too prudent in reporting success: they only report it when they are solely responsible for the achievement – which hardly ever happens given the size of CoE projects. But we donors can understand that. The CoE should say it when some change wouldn't have taken place without the CoE's programmes. Because the donors need to be able to say that to their hierarchy, to their Parliament, to their governing structure. If properly explained, they can understand how the CoE is complementary to other organisations."
>
> "Development agencies have struggled with the problem of attribution and result tracking for 40 years. The CoE came late into this reflection. It is time to catch up with reality, use and adapt the existing techniques, because we donors need to report what this is all about to our taxpayers."

Donor interviews show a unanimous desire for the CoE to conform to their expectations towards implementing agencies. In the eyes of donors, the CoE is not necessarily a very different organisation from UN agencies, the OSCE or even private consultancies implementing donor-funded projects. In practice, the CoE competes with them: it needs to demonstrate its added value, and to be as agile and cost-efficient as possible.

In addition to **programme management capacity**, donors expect the CoE to design projects around activities with high **added value.** They demand a lot of innovation in the programmes' intervention techniques, and are wary of reproduction. Several interviewees mentioned "training fatigue" or "conference fatigue". They expect the CoE to be a pioneer in designing activities, in the same way as it has pioneered legal standards and monitoring modalities. The high number of non-cost extensions

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[41] GR-PBA(2014)14
[42] See DIO, Evaluation Division, Final Report (2017) 1, Review of decentralised evaluations report 2017

to projects shows that there is room for improvement regarding efficiency. Non-cost extensions do not contribute to solidifying donor trust.[43]

One of the main donor concerns is the need to demonstrate results of cooperation activities. The document review shows that project reports still tend to mainly focus on activities. According to interviews, CoE programme managers are cautious when claiming their programme's contribution to change taking place in the legal and institutional environment or in the behaviour of target groups for two main reasons:

- In comparison with other agencies, the CoE implements modest projects with limited funding. Programme managers do not easily attribute change when so many actors, better financed than the CoE, have worked on the same thematic area;
- There is a lack of know-how in tracking results, identifying the necessary conditions for the changes which were a result of CoE programmes, and demonstrating the plausibility of programme contributions.

Some donors also regret the lack of impact reporting and evaluation at sector, or action plan (country or thematic) level, which would provide them with a better view of long-term investment and progress. This is particularly the case in areas that are not covered by monitoring mechanisms. Most donors interviewed understand that impact is difficult to measure at the level and within the lifetime of a project. However, they expect the CoE to demonstrate how the actions undertaken under CoE projects can reasonably contribute to wider impact. They also want to know about examples or stories which show the results of the projects when it comes to changing the practice and attitude of beneficiaries. Technically, this corresponds to contribution analysis. Some recent reports have gone to an extent towards this, for instance the second annual report on the PCF.

Moreover, CoE programme managers are mainly topic experts. They are often high calibre experts in their field, and are deeply committed to the values and standards they seek to implement. This is what adds value to the CoE projects and programmes. However, these specific skills are sometimes not combined with management, monitoring and evaluation skills. Their legal background and in particular their requirement to strictly base claims on strong evidence, discourages them from claiming any success for which attribution is not undisputable.

Interviews show an emerging awareness of this issue among the CoE staff, and a need for capacity building as well as for ODGP facilitation. The **Project Management Methodology** (PMM) to be fully deployed by the end of 2017 is expected to contribute to addressing this deficit. However, the following conditions need to be fulfilled:
- The programme design and indicators need to be conducive to such monitoring, reporting and evaluation;
- The PMM process needs to be linked with, and feed into evaluation;
- Staff members using the PMM need to have a strong training in result tracking and contribution analysis.

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[43] Non-cost extensions could sometimes be avoided, according to interviewees, with swifter recruitment and reduction of the launching period of projects, or the elaboration of databases of experts in the sectors which do not yet have a strong repository of experts.

Finding 11: The current donor conditions put limits on the CoE's absorption capacity

Interviews with staff involved in cooperation activities show that certain donor conditions as well as the CoE administrative environment limit the staffs' ability to deliver the work for which the CoE has the highest added value: labour-intensive expertise, advice, advocacy and coaching based on the implementation of standards and monitoring recommendations, in thematic areas which require long-term investment.

Donor quote:
The CoE needs the backup to implement projects, so it needs to invest in its field presence through the OB, not only through project staff. In fact, the CoE needs to ask itself the key questions: does it want to be a political organisation or an implementer? This is not the same thing, and it is hard to combine.

Regarding **donors**, some are considered more flexible than others and the level of conditions posed by donors varies from case to case. Interviews and survey results indicate that the flexibility of the EU is limited – with cumbersome reporting obligations and strict conditions regarding staffing, duration and choice of activities (see Survey Annex 5, Q 13).[44] Survey results show that the EU conditions on percentage of project/programme budget dedicated to human resources and the uncertainty about future funding gaps are considered the most difficult donor conditions to accommodate, and are tightly connected to the ability to retain skilled staff capable of bolstering the CoE's added value.

The concern about percentage of the project budget dedicated to human resource costs, which might be capped by the donors (EU), can also be documented in other international organisations with comparable mandates. However, comparison between the CoE projects and donors' calls for proposals for private consultancies shows that CoE project staff performs tasks, which are typically performed by private consultants that would normally be charged under the operational budget of the projects. Case study analysis as well as interviews with some donors reported that decision makers in donor agencies would be ready to accommodate different ratios if the CoE clarifies which project staff delivers operational services rather than administrative tasks. In these cases, expert project staff could be considered in the same way as long-term consultants, and fall under operational costs – as is the case for instance in EU twinning and technical assistance projects implemented by public administrations of the EU member States, or by private consulting firms.

Quote from another international organisation:
The ratio of staff versus operational budget varies a lot depending on projects. Training projects have a very high staff ratio, whereas projects based on large events have a larger operational budget.

Finally, a significant number of interviewees, expressly donors, stated that the CoE should not shy away from declining funding offers where donor or other constraints curtail feasibility and sustainability. At the same time, donor interviews show that there is indeed a **margin of negotiation** for more **flexible conditions** and soft earmarked funds, provided the CoE improves its result tracking and reporting. However, this margin is limited. The thematic sectors, as well as ODGP, in consultation, therefore need to elaborate clearer criteria on the feasibility of projects under the conditions required by the donors, and to make an informed arbitration between the costs of turning down contributions, and the risks attached to accepting projects with low feasibility.

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[44] This is in line with the perception found in all other international organisations studied and interviewed. See Annex 8: Resource Mobilisation in other International Organisations

Finding 12: Under the current internal constraints, the CoE seems to have reached its absorption capacity

Throughout the evaluation, it was striking that nearly all MAE staff working with cooperation emphasised that first and foremost internal constraints threaten their capacity to absorb further funding for cooperation. Almost unanimously, staff agreed that **internal constraints** outnumber donor conditions in this aspect. As these constraints pose serious risks on the absorption capacity of EBR, the finding cannot not be disregarded.

The main concern raised is the way in which the CoE implements its new **contractual policy**.[45] Two practical arrangements reduce the ability of the thematic sectors to dedicate sufficient and relevant staff to extra budgetary-funded projects:

- The **length of contracts** offered to project staff is usually limited to the duration covered by the funds already transferred by the donor. This means that most contracts are shorter than the projects themselves, which leads to particularly disadvantageous employment conditions and/or periods without contract during which the projects suffer from a lack of human resources, and project staff are likely to move on to another employer.
- The **recruitment process** can be long. This implies that a large number of projects operate for protracted periods of time without the intended staffing, which in itself constitutes an additional burden for already pressured implementing structures.

The ODGP and the Directorate of Human Resources now encourage the thematic sectors to hire their project staff for the entire duration of the project, regardless of the transfer schedule foreseen by the donors. Nevertheless, reports indicate this practice is not yet (entirely) in place – either because some programme managers or their hierarchy reproduce the previous practice, or because the MAEs advise against it to avoid the risk of having a legal obligation to pay project staff salaries from the OB, in case of donor withdrawal.[46]

However, even contracting projects staff for the duration of the project would not overcome the difficulties linked to the current implementation of the contractual policy. From the donors' standpoint, the CoE's added value relies mostly on the level of expertise and connection of the cooperation projects with standard setting and monitoring. Given that the OB-funded staff is a minority in implementing cooperation projects, it is paramount to recruit and retain project staff that is capable of sustaining this added value and satisfy donor demands in the long run. Nevertheless, recruiting such staff proves difficult.

In practical terms, this implies that there is a need of respecting recruitment rules and regulations; ensuring the smooth running of co-operation activities; being able to use both funds available as well as requests for advances of funds; and addressing the staff's need to have a certain degree of predictability regarding the contracts offered. Eventually, MAEs seek pragmatic solutions – offering contracts for as long as possible to avoid the risk of losing valuable staff or jeopardizing the success of a project.

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[45] The new contractual policy aims to gradually increase the percentage of staff on contracts of limited duration (reference to the contractual policy, such as year)

[46] Documentary evidence shows that donor withdrawal is extremely rare. Furthermore, since , in case of a lack of funding, the CoE's obligation would be limited to the three-month notice period before layoff, the risk posed to the organisation and the potential costs of its realisation can be considered as considerably lower than the actual cost of the current level of staff turnover

The constraints posed on the one to three **ratio of headquarter/field staff** is also often quoted as a considerable challenge. Staff ratios are applied indiscriminately of the type of project (labour intensive or resource intensive; large or small projects), whereas their implications differ a lot from case to case. Most interviewees consider that key expert staff are necessary in Strasbourg, where they can keep themselves abreast of the developments in the intergovernmental pillars of the organisation, and coordinate better with other thematic sectors. At the same time, everyone recognises the benefit of having project staff in the field – but they consider that this benefit is considerably reduced by the practical implementation of the contractual policy described above. Thus, they report that field staff should be retained long enough to reach the level of expertise and knowledge desired.

Also, field offices do not have core staff representing the thematic sectors or main administrative entities. Only few extra-budgetary projects have seen the relocation of A-grade (professional level) expert staff, for instance, in Ukraine. On these few occasions, the feedback from beneficiaries and donors was extremely positive. However, the CoE provides little incentive to such staff for field relocation. So far such experiments have been reproduced very few times, and only for the duration of projects.

Further limitations in cooperation activities repetitively brought up in interviews conducted for this evaluation concern approval processes, which may have been partly decentralised, but have not been delegated to the project level: the project staff in the field still cannot approve expenses, even planned and chartered expenses as per detailed trimestral plans. This slows down the implementation of projects and reduces efficiency.

Conclusions on Evaluation Question 3 and 4: To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation trends affect its absorption capacity? What are the risks of the CoE's resource mobilisation methods and trends?

Growth in extra-budgetary contributions and cooperation activities responds to a political direction (the Secretary General's reform) and to the essence of the work of ODGP (overseeing the cooperation side of this reform, and ensuring it is funded). However, the sustainability of this transition depends on the organisation's capacity to absorb the cooperation pillar, and the funds that support it. Internal constraints need to be carefully considered as they threaten the organisation's ability to maintain and/increase the current level of cooperation activities.

There are various risks that may affect the sustained flow of extra-budgetary resources: donor priorities may change (large envelopes may not be renewed), donors may not appreciate the continuous lack of demonstration of results in reporting or uncreative project design (always similar interventions, inefficient project management) and donors may observe that the CoE staff has reached a limit and can no longer absorb funds.

Risks that influence the absorption capacity of staff include both external and internal constraints. Internal constraints pose more risks than external ones on absorption capacity (length of contracts not matching project duration, recruitment process too long, the 'one to three ratio', A level staff not recruited in the field, inefficient approval process between headquarters and the field). Some progress has been made on the A level recruitment which should continue.

While the organisation can further seek new sources to raise funds, such as exploiting different EU funding instruments other than those of DG NEAR, it should make a priority to gradually diminish and eliminate the internal constraints while building on the positive developments of PMM and investing in results tracking and developing more innovative intervention logic.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. CONCLUSIONS

Since the start of the reform, the organisation has invested into cooperation activities, while realising savings on statutory activities and the running costs of the organisation. The creation of the Office of the Directorate General of Programmes (ODGP) in 2011 was a landmark.

Yet the greatest margin of improvement resides in the administrative and structural environment of extra-budgetary projects. Moving to the next stage of investment into cooperation activities (such as expert staff in the field, and more project experts in the main administrative entities which implement extra-budgetary projects), delegating and simplifying procedures, matching human resource management practices with the core added value of the CoE would likely be more impactful, more realistic than a major reshuffle of donor relations, at least in the short to medium term.

Since the first resource mobilisation strategy of 2009, the CoE and since 2011 the ODGP in particular, has invested considerable efforts to increase the volume of extra-budgetary contributions, and create the conditions in which they can be absorbed by the organisation. While the first objective has been mostly reached, the sustainability of this success is not guaranteed. The second objective is in the making, as the transition of the CoE to realise the potential of the "dynamic triangle" needs to be developed, and now requires fundamental policy decisions.

4.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

No.	Rec	Proposed Action
1	Prepare comprehensive resource mobilisation guidelines, which define roles and responsibilities for the entire process of resource mobilisation and allocation of resources	a) Document and seek DG-level agreement on the resource mobilisation processes. b) Mobilise resources through a partnership between ODGP (programmatic and resource mobilisation staff) and the thematic sectors in MAEs. c) When mobilising resources for specific projects, programmes, countries or priority areas, ODGP systematically invite expert representatives (e.g. relevant heads of Units/Divisions/Departments) from the MAEs for meetings with the donors.
2	Improve the effectiveness and agility of priority setting for the purpose of fundraising (effective internal co-decision mechanisms, transparency of prioritisation criteria for MAEs quick reaction to changing environment)	a) ODGP, in consultation with DG I, DG II, Congress and PACE senior management, draft a mandate for clearance by the PO for a Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations Coordination Board with senior level membership, as a real decision-making and information sharing platform on the priorities assigned to resource mobilisation efforts, meeting at least once per trimester. This board should invite experts from the relevant sectors as required. b) The Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations Coordination Board through a co-decision process (e.g. thematic retreats followed by strategic planning exercises) prepare the establishment of priorities for extra-budgetary funding, combining thematic sectors and countries. The resulting documents would build upon the Programme and Budget, Secretary General's priorities, action plans, monitoring results, evaluation results, and donor priorities. c) Clear and transparent prioritisation criteria (including feasibility criteria) and decision-making processes for draft projects, are prepared by the Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations Coordination Group. These criteria and this process should be integrated into the PMM IT platform.
3	Build strong capacity to monitor and report results to the donors, through innovative result tracking techniques which will give justice to the CoE's achievements despite the methodological difficulties inherent to the CoE's areas of work	a) Impact evaluations of thematic and country action plans are commissioned and publish, complemented by periodic (e.g. every three to five years) impact evaluations of thematic sectors b) ODGP incorporate into the PMM training a module on impact-oriented monitoring. This module should further be available to the programme managers, Heads of Units and Divisions. - Increased capacity to satisfy donor demand for impact reporting as a basis for continued extra-budgetary

		support
		- Increased ability for donors to justify voluntary contributions
		- Increased ability to link proposals for funding with past achievements
4	Widen donor base	a) ODGP, **in partnership** with representatives of the main administrative entities, intensify its advocacy with a wider base of EU DGs and funding instruments (e.g. through negotiation teams and contact points which mirror EU structures).
		b) ODGP continuously update and actively promote within the CoE the donor maps with standardized donor factsheets.
		- Sector will have better understanding of the criteria to judge their draft projects for resource mobilisation;
		- The predictability created will encourage sectors to invest more in a few select draft projects;
		- Stronger advocacy power when discussing thematic areas/potential projects with donors
5	Make a general review of the internal constraints	a) Develop an internal policy for improving the administrative and structural environment of EB projects

5. Final Action Plan

Name of Evaluation Report:	EVALUATION OF RESOURCE MOBILISATION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE		
Date of Evaluation Report:	30 March 2018	Date of Action Plan:	03 October 2018

Abbreviation	Entity
DGI	Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law
DGII	Directorate General of Democracy
MAEs	Major Administrative Entities
ODGP	Office of the Directorate General of Programmes
PO	Private Office

Rec ID	Recommendation	Management Decision	Proposed actions[47]	Justification[48]	Entity in Charge / Person responsible	Target Date
01	**Prepare comprehensive resource mobilisation guidelines, which define roles and responsibilities for the**	x Accepted Partially accepted □ Rejected □ Under	ODGP will add to the already existing guidelines on RM and on DR to ensure that they are comprehensive and clearly define roles and responsibilities		ODGP in coordination with MAEs	a) 31/12/2018

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[47] For implementing accepted and partially accepted recommendations

[48] For recommendations that are rejected, partially accepted or under consideration

	entire process of resource mobilisation and allocation of resources	consideration				
02	Improve the effectiveness and agility of priority setting for the purpose of fundraising (effective internal co-decision mechanisms, transparency of prioritisation criteria for MAEs quick reaction to changing environment)	x Accepted □ Partially accepted Rejected Under consideration	ODGP has the mandate to prepare the priorities for the biennial Programme of Activities regarding operational activities of DGI and DGII funded by extra-budgetary ressources in coordination with DPB. ODGP further prepares Country Programming Documents and Action Plans in consultation with the Directorate of Political Affairs (DPA) and other relevant MAEs. The Directors General are consulted by ODGP as concerns resource allocation. A Cooperation Governance Board comprising the Directors concerned by cooperation/ assistance activities including mobilisation of extra-budgetary resources (ODGP, DGI, DGII, DPA, DER, PACE, Congress, DLAPIL and where appropriate DPB, DGA and DC) was established at the		ODGP	Ongoing.

			initiative of ODGP. Directors are required to attend the Board's meetings in person. Rather than creating a new structure, ODGP will present the funding phases for un-earmarked contributions under Action Plans to this Board on the occasion of regular meetings to enhance transparency in the related decision making.			
03	Build strong capacity to monitor and report results to the donors, through innovative result tracking techniques which will give justice to the CoE's achievements despite the methodological difficulties inherent to the CoE's areas of work	x Accepted Partially accepted □ Rejected □ Under consideration	Evaluations of selected projects and overall APs are already foreseen by ODGP. Thematic evaluations are the competence of relevant MAEs and DIO. Means to further enhance monitoring and reporting of results to donors will be explored.		ODGP	31/12/2018
04	Widen donor base	x Accepted □ Partially accepted □ Rejected □ Under consideration	Underway as per RM Strategy of 2009, including DSG active role since November 2016.		ODGP	Permanent

05	Make a general review of the internal constraints	x Accepted □ Partially accepted □ Rejected □ Under consideration	A general review of the Organisation's administrative and structural environment, including its contractual policy, is currently underway.		PO	Ongoing

6. Annexes

ANNEX 1: LIST OF DOCUMENTS

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ANNEX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

No	DATE	NAME	POSITION	CITY / COUNTRY
1	06.02.2017	Antje Rothemund	Head of Youth Department	Strasbourg
2	06.02.2017	Matthew Barr Fredrik Holm	Head of Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations, Division Head of Central coordination and risk management, Division	Strasbourg
3	07.02.2017	Achim Holzenberger	Special Co-ordinator DGI	Strasbourg
4	08.02.2017	Tatiana Termacic	Human Rights National Implementation, Head of Division	Strasbourg
5	08.02.2017	Daniele Cangemi	Special Co-ordiantor DGII	Strasbourg
6	08.02.2017	Sarah Keating	Co-operation and Capacity Building, Head of Division	Strasbourg
7	08.02.2017	Tania Van Dijk, Vedran Majstorovic	Council of Europe Office	Belgrade/ Serbia
8	10.02.2017	Olena Lytvynenko	Deputy Head of Council of Europe Office	Kyiv/ Ukraine
9	14.02.2017	Alexander Seger	Cybercrime, Head of Division	Strasbourg
10	14.02.1017	DSG Verena Taylor Markus Adelsbach	 ODGP, Director Private Office, Advisor	Strasbourg
11	28.02.2017	Ivan Koedjikov	Head of Action against Crime Department	Strasbourg
12	06.03.2017	Nichola Howson	ODGP, Central coordination and risk management	Strasbourg
13	08.03.2017	Olsi Dekovi	Deputy Head of Council of Europe Office	Tirana/ Albania
14	10.03.2017	Tigran Karapetyan	Head of Eastern Partnership & Russian Federation Unit	Strasbourg
15	13.03.2017	Thorsten Afflerbach	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Roma Issues	Strasbourg
16	13.03.2017	Valeriu Ciolan	Special Representative of the Secretary General for Roma Issues	Strasbourg
17	20.03.2017	Irena Guidikova	Head of Division World Forum of Democracy and Intercultural Cities	Strasbourg
18	22.03.2017	François Friedrich	Head of Electoral Assistance Division	Strasbourg
19	23.03.2017	Eva Pastrana	Head of HELP Unit	Strasbourg
20	23.03.2017	Hanne Juncher	Head of Justice and Legal Cooperation Department	Strasbourg
21	24.03.2017	Claudia Luciani	Director, Directorate of Democratic Governance	Strasbourg
22	27.03.2017	Patrick Penninckx	Head of Information Society Department	Strasbourg
23	28.03.2017	Ardita Abdiu	Head of Economic Crime Division	Strasbourg
24	28.03.2017	Lejla Dervisagic	Head of Media Co-operation Unit	Strasbourg
25	29.03.2017	Hallvard Gorseth	Head of Anti-Discrimination Department	Strasbourg
26	31.03.2017	Gianluca Esposito	GRECO, Executive Secretary	Strasbourg
27	31.03.2017	Mary Ann Hennessey	Head of Civil Society Division	Strasbourg
28	31.03.2017	Timothy Cartwright	Head of Council of Europe Office	Belgrade/Serbia
29	05.04.2017	Güray Vural	Division for Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations	Strasbourg
30	05.04.2017	Leyla Zeinalova	Head of Joint Programme Support Unit	Strasbourg
31	07.04.2017	Alina Tatarenko	Democratic Governance	Strasbourg
32	07.04.2017	Silvia Ivanova	Division for Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations	Strasbourg
33	24.04.2017	Vesna Atanasova	Bilateral and Regional Co-operation and Capacity Building	Strasbourg
34	24.04.2017	Arzu Burcu Tuner	Multilateral Co-operation and Capacity Building	Strasbourg

35	26.04.2017	Matthew Johnson	Director, Directorate of Democratic Citizenship and Participation	Strasbourg
36	27.04.2017	Daniel Carsten Schmidt	Head of South East Europe and Turkey Unit	Strasbourg
37	02.05.2017	Simon Tonelli	Head of Legal co-operation Division	Strasbourg
38	02.05.2017	Tara Nagle	Directorate of Programme and Budget, Head of Division	Strasbourg
39	03.05.2017	Laurence Lwoff	Bioethics, Secretary of DH-BIO	Strasbourg
40	03.05.2017	Tania Rakusic-Hadzic	Head of Criminal Law Co-operation Unit	Strasbourg
41	04.05.2017	Marité Moras Rodriquez	Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Head of Co-operation Activities Unit	Strasbourg
42	05.05.2017	Alberto Maynar Aguilar	Division for Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations	Strasbourg
43	05.05.2017	Matthew Barr	Head of Division for Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations	Strasbourg
44	09.05.2017	Isabelle Hoffmann	Directorate General of Administration, General Ledger	Strasbourg
45	10.05.2017	Tina Mulcahey Sarah Walter	Executive Director, European Youth Centre Dep. Executive Director, European Youth Centre	Strasbourg
46	11.05.2017	Yann de Buyer	PACE, Head of Central Division	Strasbourg
47	11.05.2017	Pilar Morales-Fernandez-Shaw	Head of Department, European Division and Neighbouring Regions Division	Strasbourg
48	11.05.2017	Bozhena Malanchuk	Eastern Partnership & Russian Federation Unit	Strasbourg
49	12.05.2017	Geza Mezei	PACE, Head of Parliamentary Projects Support Division	Strasbourg
50	12.05.2017	Gaël Martin-Micallef	Elections and Political Parties	Strasbourg
51	12.05.2017	Sergueï Koutznetsov	Head of Neighbourhood Co-operation Division	Strasbourg
52	15.05.2017	Eladio Fernandez	Head of Culture, Nature and Heritage Department	Strasbourg
53	15.05.2017	Renée Moritz	DGA, Head of Section and Equal opportunities and non-discrimination advisor	Strasbourg
54	16.05.2017	Giovanni Battista Celiento	Staff Committee Chairman	Strasbourg
55	18.05.2017	Regina Jensdottir	Head of Children's Rights Division and Programme co-ordinator	Strasbourg
56	23.05.2017	Marja Ruotanen	Director, Directorate of Human Dignity and Equality	Strasbourg
57	30.05.2017	Marianne Mengus	DGA, Medical Service, Doctor	Strasbourg
58	13.06.2017	Mikhail Lobov	Head of Human Rights Policy and Co-operation Department	Strasbourg
59	15.06.2017	Sophio Gelashvili Lilit Daneghian-Bossler	Head of Justice Sector Reform – Unit 2 Head of Justice Sector Reform – Unit 1	Strasbourg
60	25.07.2017	Louise Barton	Deputy Head of Private Office	Strasbourg
61	28.07.2017	Véronique Hermann	Principal Administrative Assistant – Central Division – DG II	Strasbourg

Other International Organisations				
62	10.03.2017	Sandra Sachetti	OSCE, External Relations	
63	24.03.2017	Marietta Koenig	OSCE, External Relations	
64	27.03.2017	Anne Marie Leroux	OECD Auditor in charge of resource mobilisation audit	
65	30.03.2017	Loic Simonet	OSCE liaison officer to Brussels	
66	01.06.2017	Jean Yves Le Saux	Director, Bureau of Strategic Planning UNESCO	
67	08.06.2017	Ms Boloin	OHCHR, Donor and external relations	
Donors				
68	24.03.2017	Mirja Peterson	SIDA Head, Environment, Market Development and Eastern Europe	
69	19.05.2017	Harry De Wit	Deputy Permanent Representative Netherlands	Strasbourg
70	29.05.2017	Mr Christopher Yvon	Ambassador, Permanent Representation, UK	Strasbourg
71	30.05.2017	Mr Arnold de Fine Skibsted	Ambassador, Permanent Representation, Denmark	Strasbourg
72	30.05.2017	Mr Markus Borlin	Ambassador, Permanent Representation, Switzerland	Strasbourg
73	06.06.2017	Melanie Tankard	Permanent Representation, UK	Strasbourg
74	06.06.2017	Dariann Rieber	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark	
75	21.06.2017	Astrid Emilie Helle	Ambassador, Permanent Representation, Norway	Strasbourg
EU				
76	26.06.2017	Mathieu Bousquet	DG NEAR, EC	
77	06.07.2017	Jose Mendes Bota	EU Delegation to the Council of Europe	

ANNEX 3: CASE STUDIES

Case study 1: Education capacity building and cooperation **Sampled project: Bilateral and Regional Co-operation and Capacity Building (Horizontal Facility - HF)**	
Project title and focus	Democratic citizenship and anti-corruption measures in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo Albania: Bullying and Extremism in Education - Fight against bullying and extremism in the education system. Montenegro: Corruption in Education – Strengthen integrity and combat corruption in higher education Democratic School Culture - quality of education is improved by fostering a democratic school culture. Kosovo: Corruption in Education - Strengthen integrity and combat corruption in higher education Democratic School Culture - quality of education is improved by fostering a democratic school culture Serbia: Democratic School Culture - Fight against racism and discrimination by fostering a democratic school culture Corruption in Education - Strengthen integrity and combat corruption in higher education
Donor	Horizontal Facility, EU DG NEAR
Duration	3 years
Budget requested	€4Mio. total (6 countries)
Budget received	€2.8Mio. total (4 countries for three years)
Stakeholders	DG NEAR (HQ Brussels), EUDs, CoE HQ (ODGP and main MAEs) and CoE FOs, Beneficiaries
Project Preparation and negotiation process: benchmarks	Summer 2015 – May 2016 (~1 year) The process to be part of the HF started during summer 2015 with a mapping of recommendations of monitoring bodies linked to education by the Education division. Draft Tri-Annual Plans (TAPAS) were prepared and submitted for 5 countries (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and BiH)to DG NEAR 23 Oct 2015 Videoconferences on country specific discussion between DG NEAR (HQ Brussels), EUDs, CoE HQ (ODGP and main MAEs) and CoE FOs were scheduled throughout November. The final Action included in the TAPAS to be confirmed only once all priorities concerning all HF beneficiaries were discussed. Meanwhile ODGP request complementary information on estimated budget (HR resources), completed log frame, specific information on duration of actions in TAPAS. 11 February 2016 confirmation form ODGP to DG that budget breakdown proposals were approved by the EC. The following amounts were allocated: Theme II: Kosovo: 350 000 Montenegro: 350 000 Serbia: 200 000

|	
	Theme III: Albania: 600 000 Kosovo: 350 000 Montenegro: 350 000 Serbia: 600 000 In February request for revised budget from ODGP, asking to take into account staff ratio and that overall staff costs should not exceed 25% of the total budget while ODGP is discussing special condition of HF with the EU. HF contract signed 23 May 2016.
Staff	Requested in field were 2 staff for each programme (levels B5 and B2) Requested in the Education Department, HQ (Strasbourg): A2 (a programme manager with content knowledge who can also co-ordinate these projects), B4 (an experienced administrative assistant) B2 programme assistant, part or preferably full time. This calculation was made based on the anticipated staff ratio 3/1 in field and HQ by the end of 2017 in extra budgetary cooperation projects, HoD however underlined that this is the minimum staff required to run the projects. Preparation of HF largely done by staff member in Education Department funded on OB monthly contract.
Reporting	
Constraints /Difficulties	End of contract of staff member who was largely involved in the preparation the HF projects before start of HF – arrangement for a B5 bridge contract financed by OB (Education Department for 5 months) and prolonged only on monthly basis until start of HF project in July. Delay in negotiations of HF, expected to be signed in February 2016, signed 23 May 2016. Project proposals were prepared for 5 countries but funding was only received for 4 countries. BiH was cut.

Case study 1: Education capacity building and cooperation	
Sampled project: Bilateral and Regional Co-operation and Capacity Building (EU Joint Programme)	
Project title and focus	DGII, JP, Strengthening Democratic Culture in Basic Education (Turkey -IPA 2015) Promoting democratic culture in the educational system by applying the Council of Europe Reference Framework of Competences for Democratic Culture; Developing and promoting a framework policy of democratic competences in educational institutions at primary and lower-secondary level; Building capacities of teachers, including those teaching the new 4th grade course "Democracy and Human Rights"; Fostering a democratic school culture through partnerships between students, staff, families and the school community.
Duration	3 years
Budget requested	€4 Mio (90% EU + 10% CoE)
Budget received	Pending finalisation of negotiations
Donor	JP (EU Delegation in Turkey)
Stakeholders	ODGP, DGII, FO, Ministries in Turkey, EUD in Turkey
Project Preparation and negotiation process: benchmarks	On-going since April 2015 (Follow up project) In April 2015 reserve form sent to ODGP to initiate the internal process with ODGP In April 2016 First draft version of Description of action (DoA), during the year between the project team (staff member on consultant contract) attended several meetings in Ankara with representatives from different Ministries in Turkey and officials from the

	EUD in Turkey. 20 April 2016 Draft Summary of Action submitted to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) – on-going revision of DoA based on comments from beneficiary in May, June, July, October 2016 and April 2017. The Senior Programme Officer responsible for the Project in the MoNE was replaced by another deputy undersecretary, so that some of the already agreed items were negotiated again in Februaury 2017. 1 -2 June 2016 Head of Divison (DG II) Mission to Ankara to meet with MoNE. June 2016 Discussion on budget cuts and revised Budget with ODGP. 10-11 October 2016 visit of MoNE to Strasbourg (DG) in order to build trust of beneficiaries and explain better how the CoE works. 21 February 2017 Final DoA sent to ODGP by DG March 2017 Finalisation of DoA and negotiations with Turkey after comments from ODGP. April 2017 Message to ODGP from DGII with new version of DoA with comments from ministry. April 2017 FO Ankara sharing final version of DoA with Ministry for EU affairs. May 2017 All annexes were sent to the CFCU upon their request. July 2017 CFCU comments are expected.
Staff	Staff foreseen for Ankara: 1 full-time manager: Grade A1/A2. 1 full-time officer: Grade B5/B4. 1 full-time linguistic assistant: Grade B3. 1 part-time financial assistant: Grade B3 (50%). 1 full-time assistant: Grade B2. Staff foreseen for HQ: 1 part-time coordinator in Strasbourg: Grade B5/B4 (80%). 1 part-time project assistant in Strasbourg: Grade B3/B2 (70%). Staff makes 20.25% (€810 121) of total costs, which is below the threshold (of 25%).
Reporting	
Constraints /Difficulties	In May 2016 staff was hired as a consultant for three months to develop this project There was an IPA project before which ended in Aug 2015 after that there was no more team in the office in Ankara. Consultant continued on XB funded position for another project in Strasbourg after consulting but remained contact person for the Turkish project. Activities related to this project were not part of her objectives in the first months in her new position. Difficulties in negotiations with the beneficiary due to complex decision making lines and processes in the relevant national authorities. Communication was facilitated after mission to Ankara and visits of beneficiaries to Strasbourg.

DGII, JP, Strengthening Democracy and Child Rights in Basic Education (Turkey -IPA 2015)

Case study 2: DGI, Human Right National Implementation	
Sampled project: Continued support to criminal justice reform in Ukraine	
Project title and focus	"Continued support to criminal justice reform in Ukraine" (VC3301), Reinforcing the overall human rights protection and ensure effective implementation of the ECHR and other Council of Europe relevant instruments at the national level; Strengthening the transparency and accountability of public institutions, thereby supporting increased responsiveness in terms of responsibilities for upholding human rights and justice and furthering the democratic development of Ukraine; Increased capacity applied to implement the criminal justice reform, ensuring full compliance with relevant Council of Europe standards.
Donor	Denmark as Part of Ukraine Action Plan
Duration	01/09/2015 - 28/02/2019 (42 months)
Budget requested	
Budget received	€2.9 Mio.
Stakeholders	Denmark (MFA), DGI division Strasbourg, FO Kyiv, Beneficiaries, UNDP
Project Preparation and negotiation process: benchmarks	~1 year starting in autumn 2014 Follow-up project. Detailed engagement of the donor through the whole preparation process. The Donor was in direct contact with the CoE secretariat (MAE's group of elaborators) throughout

	the process. Agreement on the project between the Danish MFA and the CoE was developed by the Donor in line with Donor's format/requirements, and became a part to the Agreement in addition to the Project's documents. 3 missions on the side of the Donor (formulation, evaluation and assessment) including negotiations both with the CoE as an implementing agency and the potential/future project's beneficiaries and partners. Missions' comprised both the Donor's/DMFA's and CoE representatives, and external consultant's engaged by the DMFA. Each mission was followed-up by an extensive exchange between the CoE secretariat and the Donor's representative/group of consultants, including the financial one at the final stage of the process. Project team in constant contact with the donors and beneficiaries also to ensure the beneficiaries' contact with the donor and their consultants. The Project team knew during the preparation phase that the project budget was secured based on Danish strategic document which mentioned the follow up on criminal justice reform. Also work had to be coordinated with UNDP because the donor implemented another component of the "programme" with UNDP. Joint coordination, cross cutting issues, dates of steering committee meetings, for donors to come to Ukraine ODGP only involved when final version was sent to them to check budget requirements.
Staff	During preparation the time spent combined (all staff involved) amounted to approximately a total of 50% for the duration of eight months. Staff in the field is largely involved in the preparation of projects, however do not have project preparation in their objectives.
Reporting	Donor is flexible with the format as long as content is available.
Constraints /Difficulties	Heaviness of process related to donor constraints, and different approach to documents. However, the process was perceived as valuable to identify which needs really need targeted cooperation and define focus in relation to the budget. Output-based budget prepared for the donor, which is not usual CoE format. Project team is concerned that ODGP's budget structure visually gives wrong impression to donor on staff costs. ODGP has a HR chapter under which both Project manager and consultancy is mentioned. Project team considers consultancy should fall under activity budget.

Case study 2: DGI, Human Right National Implementation Sampled project: PCF	
Project title and focus	7 Project Proposals totaling € 5 Mio: Armenia: Supporting the criminal justice reform and combating ill-treatment and impunity (24 months, € 0.5 M) Azerbaijan: Application of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (36 months, € 1.4 M) Georgia: Application of the European Convention on Human Rights and harmonisation of national legislation and judicial practice in line with European Standards 24 months, (€ 0.9 M) Moldova: Supporting national efforts for prevention and combatting discrimination (24 months, € 0.5 M) Ukraine: Strengthening the Ombudsperson's Office operational capacities in preventing ill-treatment in places of deprivation of liberty in Ukraine (24 months, € 0.6 M) Support to police reform and fighting against ill-treatment and impunity (24 months, € 0.6 M) HELP "Implementation of the ECHR" (24 months, € 0.5 M)
Donor	EU DEVCO under PCF
Duration	24 -36 months
Budget requested	€5 Mio.
Budget received	€5 Mio.
Stakeholders	ODGP, DG, FO, EU (DEVCO)
Project Preparation and negotiation process: benchmarks	Five months for the project team 8 July 2014 request from OGDP to DG to develop project proposals and performance/outcome indicators within the Annual Plan of Action template until 18 August 2014. The CoE Field Offices in the EaP countries should provide advice and assistance in the needs assessment and the collection of data, especially baseline data. In august instructions from ODGP to develop activity-based budgets with deadline 19th of September Beginning of September revision of proposals based on ODGP comments, with one week deadline to send revised versions. Mid-September request form ODGP to DG to provide further information to fulfill DEVCO requirements on needs assessment, previous JPs, Gender issues, Risk analysis, Monitoring, composition of team and visibility. In DGs opinion some of this information could equally be provided by ODGP as for instance on JP projects previously implemented. ODGP transmitted narrative section of the draft document to DEVCO on 26 September including Thematic PCF Matrix, Thematic Annual Plans of Action for 2015 and a summary Work Plan. End of September request form ODGP to submit outstanding budget information and start recruitment procedures as soon as budget proposals have been agreed upon. October request from ODGP for immediate (1day) response to EU comments via ODGP on a number of project proposals. 4 November the revised draft narrative of PCF was submitted to DG DEVCO

	In November further round of 115 comments, DEVCO requesting DG to provide new detailed information on a number of issues such as needs, indicators and duplication. DG pointing out that DEVCO's comments were made on an older version and had already been addressed. Deadline to reply to DEVCO's comments very short.
	In November discussion between ODGP and DG on staff budget ratio (see below).
	8 December ODGP sent final narrative of PCF to DGs
	PCF signed on 18 December
Staff	ODPG informs DG that budget ration as per CoE decentralisation policy, as well EC requirements.
	Agreement on staff in the field, however, discussions on staff in Strasbourg as ODGP wants to cut a senior project officer (B5)
	Requested from DG and ODGPs comment:
	In the Field Offices:
	Senior Project Officer (B5) = 132 months remains
	Project Officer (B4) = 24 months remains
	Linguistic Assistant (B3) = has to be totally cancelled, not approved
	Financial Assistant (B3) = 8 months increased to 36 months
	Project Assistant (B2) = 108 months increased to 132 months
	Requested in HQ by DG:
	A2 for 36 months (overall coordination of the 7 Actions and responsible for implementation of the Moldovan Action)
	B5 for 36 months (responsible for implementation of the Azeri and Georgian Actions)
	B5 for 24 months (responsible for implementation of the Armenian and Ukrainian Actions, which cover similar topics)
	B2 for 36 months (assistant for all 7 Actions)
	ODGPs proposal for HQ:
	Project Manager (A2) = 36 months remains
	Senior Project Officer (B5) = 60 months decreased to 36 months
	Project Assistant (B2) = 36 months remains
	After involving hierarchy and several discussions, DGs request for 2 B5s was accepted.
Reporting	Universal format (1 type of reporting)
Constraints /Difficulties	Long and heavy preparation period
	DG fulfilling request form ODGP and DECVO while ODGP is negotiating the PCF with DEVCO, Request for detailed information, repetitive comments from EU, various files and format to fill in information for DEVCO.
	Staff ratio
	Short deadlines

DGI Human Right National Implementation (PCF)

Case study 3: Immediate Measure Package Ukraine 2014	
Timeframe	April – December 2014
Funds required	€ 2 500 000
Funds secured*	€ 2 680 240
Donors[49]	Norway (24%) Sweden (20%), Denmark (19%), Japan (11%), Germany (9%), Switzerland (6%), Finland (5%), Poland (1,5%), Romania, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Ireland (0,7% each), Estonia (0,4%)
Level of funding	€ 1 410 000 unearmarked funds (56%)
Sectors	1. Ensuring protection of Human Rights (€ 825 000) 1.1 Effective investigation (€ 650 000) 1.2 National minorities (€ 175 000) 2. Constitutional Reform (€470 000) 2.1 Constitutional process support (€ 50 000) 2.2 Legislative Reform concerning Public Assemblies (€ 70 000) 2.3 Local Self-government (€ 350 000) 3. Elections (€ 280 000) 3.1 Election preparation assistance (€ 75 000) 3.2. Domestic observation of elections (€ 110 000) 3.3 Media coverage of elections (€ 95 000) 4. Capacity-building of Parliamentarians (€25 000) 5. Civil Society (€ 500 000)

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[49] In addition to that, the PCF covers areas in Ukraine outside the Immediate Measure Package.

	6. Support to the Secretary General Special Advisor (€ 100 000)
	7. Commissioner for Human Rights (€ 100 000)
	8. Support of the CoE Office in Kiev and package management (€ 200 000)

*as of 4 November 2014

Case study 4: Action Plan Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 -2017					
Timeframe	2015 - 2017				
Funds required	€ 10 694 122				
Funds secured*	€ 5 807 805 (54%)				
Donors	EU (55%), Norway (21,1 %), USA (9%), UK (1,5%), HRFT (0,3%), Liechtenstein (0,2%), Croatia (0,1%), Slovak Republic (0,1%)				
Ordinary Budget	12,6%				
Level of funding	€11 488,30 unearmarked funding (=2% of secured funding)				
Sector	Total Req. €	Secured €	OB %	JP %	VC %
	Anti-Discrimination, Respect for Diversity and Social Inclusion Sector				
	2 995 098	1 112 587 (37%)	15,4	84,6	0
	Justice Sector Reform				
	3 658 723	3 118 723 (85%)	6,9	40	53
	Fighting Corruption, Economic Crime and Organized Crime				
	953 878	453 878 (48%)	10	90	0
	Freedom of expression and Information				
	464 815	364 815 (78%)	15,7	63	21,3
	Democratic Governance and Participation , Society Sector				
	2 621 609	753 114 (29%)	32,6	48,2	19,2

*as of 19 June 2017

ANNEX 4: STATISTICS VC 2016

2016 Voluntary Contributions to the Council of Europe (€)[50]	
Member States	
1	Norway	5 884 900.74
2	Sweden	2 598 196.21
3	Human Rights Trust Fund[51]	1 924 454.44
4	Switzerland	1 229 641.33
5	United Kingdom	1 041 539.34
6	France	668 912.42
7	Luxembourg	492 369.12
8	Germany	449 388.50
9	Italy	398 639.58
10	Finland	334 987.80
11	Romania	255 505.43
12	Netherlands	237 500.00
13	European Economic Area[52] (EEA)	218 550.00
14	Turkey	215 098.23
15	Poland	190 501.38
16	Ireland	165 021.10
17	Belgium	130 228.42
18	Liechtenstein	122 609.60
19	Denmark	121 212.88
20	Portugal	115 000.00
21	Monaco	83 252.46
22	Czech Republic	71 100.51
23	Estonia	66 717.48
24	Austria	66 683.98
25	Russian Federation	54 739.23
26	Bulgaria	48 423.92
27	Hungary	40 344.45
28	Croatia	23 563.49
29	Andorra	23 356.28
30	Malta	22 735.49
31	Lithuania	20 000.00
32	Slovenia	19 079.00
33	Serbia	18 829.54
34	Cyprus	14 944.08
35	Spain	14 000.00
36	Slovak Republic	12 798.61
37	Latvia	11 172.47
38	Iceland	9 250.18
39	Azerbaijan	6 192.31
40	Republic of Moldova	724.08
Total Member States		**17 422 164.08**

[50] As provided by ODGP, 28 June 2017

[51] Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom

[52] Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway

Observers		
1	United States of America	222 750.00
2	Japan	41 410.00
	Total Observers	**264 160.00**

European Union		
1	Joint Programmes	40 508 479.34
2	Voluntary Contributions	2 703 155.00
	Total European Union	**43 211 634.34**

Others		
1	Aga Khan Development Network	50 000.00
2	United Nations	43 492.00
3	Israel	39 945.00
4	Isle of Man	36 730.00
5	States of Guernsey	36 730.00
6	States of Jersey	36 730.00
7	A.G. Leventis Foundation	34 872.00
8	Gibraltar	24 000.00
9	Japan Foundation	13 665.75
10	University of Nottingham	12 639.32
11	Charta 77 Foundation	7 500.00
12	Vaclav Havel Library	7 500.00
13	Cooperative Internationale de Recherche et d'Action en matière de Communication	6 000.00
14	European Cultural Foundation	4 000.00
15	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie	2 206.97
16	International Association of Former Council of Europe Staff Members	2 000.00
	Total Others	**358 011.04**
	GRAND TOTAL 2016	**61 255 969.46**

2016 Extra budgetary resources per pillar of the Programme and Budget	
Extra budgetary resources per pillar	
Human Rights	19 247 149,12
Rule of Law	24 636 012,86
Democracy	9 944 855,53
Action Plan-level or non-specified funding	7 427 951,95
Grand Total	**61 255 969,46**

ANNEX 5: SURVEY RESULTS

Q1: Are you, or have you been involved in preparing, designing, programming, managing, reporting or negotiating extra-budgetary funded cooperation activities?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	64.8%	164
No	35.2%	89
Total		253

Q2: Are you involved directly in...

Answer Choices	Responses	
Presenting the CoE activities in general to donors?	35.7%	45
Promoting potential specific projects/programmes with donors?	46.8%	59
Negotiating the funding and content of potential projects/programmes with donors?	35.7%	45
Preparing cooperation project/programme descriptions for donors?	68.3%	86
Processing contracts with donors?	15.9%	20
Reporting to donors on project/programme results?	83.3%	105
Reporting to donors on project/programme financial management?	44.4%	56
Other (please specify)	13.5%	17
Total Respondents: 126		

Q3: What percentage of your working time do the following tasks take you (either directly or indirectly, e.g. through input to your superviser or review of colleagues' input)?

	0%	1% to 4%	5% to 9%	10% to 19%	20% or more	Total
Presenting the CoE to donors	46.8% 59	31.0% 39	14.3% 18	5.6% 7	2.4% 3	126
Promoting potential projects/programmes to donors	36.5% 46	36.5% 46	16.7% 21	9.5% 12	0.8% 1	126
Negotiating the funding of and content of potential projects/programmes with donors	50.8% 64	27.8% 35	10.3% 13	9.5% 12	1.6% 2	126
Preparing project/programme descriptions for donors	19.8% 25	21.4% 27	25.4% 32	19.0% 24	14.3% 18	126
Processing contracts with donors	67.5% 85	24.6% 31	5.6% 7	1.6% 2	0.8% 1	126
Reporting to donors on project/programme results	15.9% 20	16.7% 21	27.8% 35	21.4% 27	18.3% 23	126
Reporting to donors on project/programme financial management	34.9% 44	31.0% 39	16.7% 21	8.7% 11	8.7% 11	126
Other resource mobilisation-related task (specify below)	70.6% 89	15.9% 20	5.6% 7	3.2% 4	4.8% 6	126

Q4: How do you expect the PMM to facilitate your work in this respect? Please select up to three answers.

Answer Choices	Responses	
Facilitate communication with ODGP	29.4%	37
Reduce the work necessary for the preparation of project/programme descriptions	31.0%	39
Reduce time required for visas	7.9%	10
Reduce the amount of work necessary for financial reporting on projects/programmes	15.1%	19
Offer a platform to propose short project/programme concepts for funding	12.7%	16
Reduce the work necessary for the preparation of project reports	52.4%	66
Prompt donors to accept standard CoE project/programme documents	12.7%	16
Harmonize the formulation of project deliverables (e.g. outputs, outcomes...)	47.6%	60
Offer a platform to receive guidance on project/programme preparation	17.5%	22
Offer a platform to receive guidance on donors' expectations	12.7%	16
I do not expect the PMM to facilitate my work	13.5%	17
Other (please specify in box below)	7.9%	10
Total Respondents: 126		

Q5: Please select up to three tasks below in which you think you should be directly involved.

Answer Choices	Responses	
Promoting the CoE with donors	7.9%	10
Promoting potential projects/programmes with donors	49.2%	62
Negotiating the funding and content of potential projects/programmes with donors	44.4%	56
Preparing project/programme descriptions for donors	57.9%	73
Processing contracts with donors	4.0%	5
Reporting to donors on the results of projects/programmes	60.3%	76
Reporting to donors on project/programme financial management	18.3%	23
Other (please specify in the box below)	7.1%	9
Total Respondents: 126		

Q6: When mobilising resources for the Council of Europe co-operation activities, how would you rate the importance of the following competencies?

	not important	somewhat important	rather important	very important	no opinion	Total
Knowledge of donor priorities	0.0% 0	3.3% 4	23.0% 28	73.0% 89	0.8% 1	122
Knowledge of situation in the country/ies concerned	0.0% 0	0.8% 1	23.8% 29	73.8% 90	1.6% 2	122
Knowledge of the subject matter	0.0% 0	0.8% 1	18.9% 23	79.5% 97	0.8% 1	122
Ability to cultivate relationships with beneficiaries	0.0% 0	7.4% 9	27.0% 33	63.1% 77	2.5% 3	122
Ability to cultivate relationships with donor representatives	0.0% 0	5.7% 7	31.1% 38	62.3% 76	0.8% 1	122
Ability to publicly promote one's area of work (e.g. through academic publications, media coverage, conferences, website...)	0.8% 1	21.3% 26	38.5% 47	37.7% 46	1.6% 2	122
Knowledge of donor funding processes and procedures	0.0% 0	13.1% 16	35.2% 43	50.8% 62	0.8% 1	122
Knowledge of CoE processes and procedures as regards extra-budgetary contributions	0.8% 1	9.8% 12	32.0% 39	57.4% 70	0.0% 0	122
Ability to prepare project/programme descriptions within a short deadline	1.6% 2	6.6% 8	36.9% 45	52.5% 64	2.5% 3	122

Q7: Which information do you usually provide to ODGP in the first step to support your requests for extra-budgetary funding?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Project/programme idea (orally)	20.8%	25
Short written initial outline	51.7%	62
Full project/programme description	15.8%	19
Endorsement of beneficiary/ies	10.0%	12
Needs assessment	17.5%	21
Reference to results of monitoring	13.3%	16
Evaluation of past activities	18.3%	22
Non applicable (I have not placed such requests myself)	34.2%	41
Other (please specify in the box below)	10.8%	13
Total Respondents: 120		

Q8: How satisfied are you overall with the outcome(s) of this/these endeavour(s)?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Very satisfied	6.7%	8
Fairly satisfied	35.0%	42
Not satisfied	23.3%	28
Non applicable	35.0%	42
Total		120

Q9: What happened usually if/when ODGP has approached you with an offer for extra-budgetary funding of a project or strand of activities?

Answer Choices	Responses	
I had a project description ready for this offer, which obtained the corresponding funding	9.2%	11
I prepared a corresponding project description	34.2%	41
I had a project description ready for the offer, but it was not matching with the priorities of the donor	5.8%	7
I refused the funding offer	2.5%	3
Not applicable (I have not received or processed such offers myself)	58.3%	70
Other (please specify in the box below)	10.8%	13
Total Respondents: 120		

Q10: Have you ever refused an offer for extra-budgetary funding?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes (please explain below)	15.0%	18
No	28.3%	34
Not applicable (I have not received such offer)	56.7%	68
Total		120

Q11: Based on your experience, what are the three most frequent problems attached to extra-budgetary contributions?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Constraints on the content and priorities of the projects/programmes	12.0%	13
Constraints on the country/ies to be covered by the projects/programmes	13.9%	15
Complexity of the project/programme description	7.4%	8
Constraints on the percentage of project/programme budget for human resources	49.1%	53
Constraints on the percentage of human resources on the field	13.9%	15
Constraints on the percentage oh human resources in Strasbourg	40.7%	44
Complexity of reporting on results	16.7%	18
Burden of financial reporting	8.3%	9
Uncertainty about future funding	48.1%	52
Sequence/timing of the transfer of funds by donor	10.2%	11
Lack of flexibility to adjust project/programme content and priorities to a changing environment	27.8%	30
Lack of flexibility to transfer funds between components/budget lines of the project/programme	23.1%	25
Lack of inception period	13.9%	15
Other (please specify in the box below)	14.8%	16
Total Respondents: 108		

Q12: Based on your experience, please choose the three most difficult constraints to accommodate.

Answer Choices	Responses	
Constraints on the content and priorities of the projects/programmes	12.0%	13
Constraints on the country/ies to be covered by the projects/programmes	16.7%	18
Complexity of the project/programme description	7.4%	8
Constraints on the percentage of project/programme budget for human resources	60.2%	65
Constraints on the percentage of human resources on the field	22.2%	24
Complexity of reporting on results	17.6%	19
Complexity of financial reporting	17.6%	19
Uncertainty about future funding	51.9%	56
Sequence/timing of the transfer of funds by donor	11.1%	12
Lack of flexibility to adjust project/programme content and priorities to a changing environment	33.3%	36
Lack of flexibility to transfer funds between components/budget lines of the project/programme	20.4%	22
Lack of inception period	16.7%	18
Other (please specify in the box below)	13.0%	14
Total Respondents: 108		

Q13: Based on your experience with projects funded by external resources, please rate the following donors from not very flexible to very flexible

	Not flexible	Somewhat flexible	Rather flexible	Very flexible	Don't know	Total	Weighted Average
EU	32.4% 35	33.3% 36	15.7% 17	0.9% 1	17.6% 19	108	0.01
Norway	1.9% 2	9.3% 10	22.2% 24	15.7% 17	50.9% 55	108	0.16
Sweden	0.0% 0	4.6% 5	12.0% 13	9.3% 10	74.1% 80	108	0.09
Switzerland	2.8% 3	2.8% 3	15.7% 17	5.6% 6	73.1% 79	108	0.06
Denmark	0.0% 0	4.6% 5	15.7% 17	3.7% 4	75.9% 82	108	0.04
United Kingdom	4.6% 5	11.1% 12	8.3% 9	2.8% 3	73.1% 79	108	0.03
France	5.6% 6	0.9% 1	3.7% 4	0.0% 0	89.8% 97	108	0.00
Germany	1.9% 2	3.7% 4	14.8% 16	2.8% 3	76.9% 83	108	0.03
Turkey	8.3% 9	0.9% 1	5.6% 6	1.9% 2	83.3% 90	108	0.02
Finland	0.9% 1	0.9% 1	12.0% 13	3.7% 4	82.4% 89	108	0.04

Q14: Based on your experience, please rate the following extra-budgetary funding instruments in terms of their overall ability to attract extra-budgetary contributions

	Not successful	Moderately successful	Successful	Very successful	Don't know	Total
Country action plan	7.4% 8	25.0% 27	21.3% 23	2.8% 3	43.5% 47	108
Thematic action plan	9.3% 10	12.0% 13	15.7% 17	6.5% 7	56.5% 61	108
Trust funds	2.8% 3	8.3% 9	8.3% 9	1.9% 2	78.7% 85	108
EU Joint programmes	2.8% 3	14.8% 16	32.4% 35	26.9% 29	23.1% 25	108
EU facilities (PCF, Horizontal Facility, South Programme)	0.0% 0	17.6% 19	33.3% 36	7.4% 8	41.7% 45	108
Programme funded by single bilateral donor	1.9% 2	15.7% 17	27.8% 30	15.7% 17	38.9% 42	108
Project/programme funded by several bilateral donors	1.9% 2	13.0% 14	15.7% 17	5.6% 6	63.9% 69	108
Unearmarked funding	1.9% 2	10.2% 11	5.6% 6	4.6% 5	77.8% 84	108

Q15: Based on your experience, please rate the following extra-budgetary funding instruments in terms of overall convenience for the implementation of CoE cooperation projects/programmes

	Not convenient	Moderately convenient	Convenient	Very convenient	Don't know	Total
Country action plan	1.9% 2	20.4% 22	25.0% 27	10.2% 11	42.6% 46	108
Thematic action plan	2.8% 3	7.4% 8	23.1% 25	7.4% 8	59.3% 64	108
Trust funds	0.0% 0	3.7% 4	7.4% 8	11.1% 12	77.8% 84	108
EU Joint programmes	0.0% 0	14.8% 16	38.0% 41	25.0% 27	22.2% 24	108
EU facilities (PCF, Horizontal Facility, South Programme)	10.2% 11	20.4% 22	25.9% 28	9.3% 10	34.3% 37	108
Programme funded by single bilateral donor	0.9% 1	8.3% 9	28.7% 31	35.2% 38	26.9% 29	108
Project/programme funded by several bilateral donors	1.9% 2	17.6% 19	21.3% 23	5.6% 6	53.7% 58	108
Unearmarked funding	0.0% 0	4.6% 5	6.5% 7	21.3% 23	67.6% 73	108

Q16: In your opinion, what should be the top three objectives of future resource mobilization initiatives?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Obtaining more extra-budgetary funding	36.1%	39
Obtaining a larger proportion of unearmarked extra-budgetary funding	28.7%	31
Obtaining a larger proportion of "soft earmarked" extra-budgetary funding (e.g. at action plan or thematic level)	50.9%	55
Obtaining large extra-bugetary envelopes with bilateral donors	32.4%	35
Obtaining large extra-bugetary envelopes with the EU	43.5%	47
Obtaining more flexible conditions with donors	66.7%	72
Containing the growth of extra-budgetary funding	11.1%	12
Other (please specify)	14.8%	16
Total Respondents: 108		

Q17: You work in

Answer Choices	Responses	
DG I Strasbourg	30.6%	33
DG II Strasbourg	36.1%	39
DG I field	18.5%	20
DG II field	3.7%	4
PACE	6.5%	7
Congress	4.6%	5
Total		108

Q18: Are you a Head of Division?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	20.4%	22
No	79.6%	86
Total		108

Q19: How many externally funded projects does your Division currently manage?

Answer Choices	Responses	
0	0.0%	0
1	4.8%	1
2	14.3%	3
3	23.8%	5
4	0.0%	0
5	9.5%	2
6	4.8%	1
7	0.0%	0
8	14.3%	3
9	0.0%	0
10	0.0%	0
More than 10	28.6%	6
Don't know	0.0%	0
Total		21

Q20: Overall, how much external funding was available for your Division's project(s) in 2016?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Less than 250 000 EUR	19.0%	4
Between 250 000 and 500 000 EUR	9.5%	2
Between 500 000 and 1 million EUR	14.3%	3
Between 1 and 2 million EUR	19.0%	4
Between 2 and 4 million EUR	19.0%	4
More than 4 million EUR	19.0%	4
Don't know	0.0%	0
Total		21

Q21: What funding instruments are currently in use in your Division?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Unearmarked contribution	23.8%	5
Action plan-level contribution (country)	38.1%	8
Action plan-level contribution (thematic)	23.8%	5
EU facility/ies (PCF, Horizontal Facility, South programme)	61.9%	13
HRTF	9.5%	2
Joint programme	61.9%	13
Project/programme funded by single bilateral donor	66.7%	14
Project/programme funded by several bilateral donors contributing to the same programme	42.9%	9
Don't know	0.0%	0
Total Respondents: 21		

Q22: Which are the donors funding the project(s)/programme(s) currently operated by your Division?

Answer Choices	Responses	
EU	81.0%	17
Norway	42.9%	9
Sweden	23.8%	5
Switzerland	14.3%	3
Denmark	4.8%	1
United Kingdom	23.8%	5
France	9.5%	2
Germany	23.8%	5
Don't know	4.8%	1
Other (please specify)	33.3%	7
Total Respondents: 21		

Q23: How long has your Division (or its parent administrative unit in the past) been involved in donor-funded cooperation projects/programmes?

Answer Choices	Responses	
2 years or less	0.0%	0
3 to 5 years	9.5%	2
6 to 10 years	42.9%	9
11 to 15 years	4.8%	1
16 to 20 years	19.0%	4
More than 20 years	14.3%	3
Don't know	9.5%	2
Total		21

Q24: To the best of your knowledge, which donors have funded the projects operated by your Division (or its parent administrative unit) in the past?

Answer Choices	Responses	
EU	95.2%	20
Norway	76.2%	16
Sweden	42.9%	9
Switzerland	52.4%	11
Denmark	38.1%	8
United Kingdom	28.6%	6
France	14.3%	3
Germany	57.1%	12
Don't know	0.0%	0
Other (please specify)	28.6%	6
Total Respondents: 21		

EVALUATION OF RESOURCE MOBILISATION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONFIDENTIAL

Introduction

As set out in its Work Programme for 2017, approved by the Secretary General, the Directorate of Internal Oversight (DIO) is undertaking an evaluation of Resource Mobilisation in the Council of Europe (CoE). This evaluation topic was selected with a view to take stock of the progress made in resource mobilisation, and to inform future adjustment of resource mobilisation policies and practices.

The Work Programme states that "*the evaluation will assess fundraising for cooperation activities, including relations with donors and their expectations. The evaluation will look into how resource mobilisation contributes to achieving the objectives of the organisation and impacts its thematic and geographic focus. The evaluation will further analyse how resource mobilisation is conducted and how it affects the management and performance of cooperation activities.*" This evaluation topic was selected for its strategic relevance and the anticipated contribution of the evaluation to reform initiatives and organisational learning.

This Concept Note aims to define the scope, purpose, organisation and overall expectations of this evaluation. It presents the key evaluation questions, methodology and work plan.

Background information

Facts and figures on resource mobilisation in the CoE

Legal and strategic basis

Since the accession of new Member States after the end of the Cold War, the CoE has responded to a growing need for cooperation activities, meant to support the Member, observer or partner countries in the implementation of the CoE standards. A key element of the Secretary General's reform is an increased emphasis on co-operation through an increase in the CoE's operational capacity as part of the strategic triangle, complementing standard-setting and monitoring.[53] The development of the CoE's field presence is a key measure in the development of the CoE's cooperation capacity.[54]

Cooperation activities are designed and selected on the basis of needs identified in partnership with the domestic authorities, in particular based on the results of monitoring mechanisms. The programme and budget of the organisation outlines three priority areas: human rights, rule of law and democracy.

The resources of the Council of Europe, enabling the discharge of these functions, are divided into the Ordinary Budget and special accounts. While the ordinary budget is financed by compulsory contributions of the Council of Europe's Member States,[55] any States or organisation may donate voluntary contributions into special accounts.[56] The rule

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[53] SG/Inf(2014)34 Speaking Notes of the Secretary General to the 1206bis meeting of the Ministers' Deputies (16 September 2014) Statutory Declaration by the Secretary General and presentation of his strategic vision

[54] SG/Inf(2015)25 rev Council of Europe external presence review

[55] Financial Regulations and supplementary provisions of the Council of Europe**,** as adopted by the Committee of Ministers at the 1117th meeting at Deputies' level on 29 June 2011 – Article 8

[56] Financial Regulation 11: *Voluntary contributions, donations and legacies and joint financing arrangements agreed to by the Secretary General shall be allocated to the relevant budget or special account. Where they are allocated to special accounts, unspent appropriations shall be automatically carried forward to the following financial year until the termination of the activity for which they were intended, at which point any remaining balance will be allocated in accordance with the donor's instructions or by decision of the Committee of Ministers.*

applies to the general budget and to the partial agreements.[57] The Council of Europe's Ordinary Budget is insufficient to finance identified needs for cooperation.[58] This gap has amplified as the Ordinary Budget is subject to a zero nominal growth policy[59] which implies a loss of real resources – as the budget evolution no longer compensates for inflation, while the needs and challenges identified continue to expand.[60] The programme and budget for 2016/2017, which presents the Ordinary Budget resources, available extra-budgetary resources, and funding needs, reveals a funding gap of over 80 million Euros.[61] Therefore, extra-budgetary resources remain crucial for the organisation to finance co-operation activities.

Article 11 of the Financial Regulations provides*: "Voluntary contributions, donations and legacies to the Organisation may be accepted by the Secretary General, who may also conclude contracts with third parties for the joint financing of activities."*

Evolutions in the proportion of voluntary contributions in the Organisation's budget
Voluntary contributions to the Council of Europe have increased remarkably, particularly over the last five years: a 44% increase from €36.4 million in 2011 to €52.3 million in 2015,[62] and again a 17% increase in 2016 to approximately €61.2 million[63]. In 2015, the CoE exceeded by over two million its target of 50 million Euros in voluntary contributions (set by the Secretary General's 2011 Resource mobilisation strategy).

In comparison, the core budget resources[64] have remained rather stable: (€340 million for 2011[65], €373 million for 2014, €371million for 2015 and nearly €401 million for 2016).

The ordinary budget finances the full range of CoE activities, including but to a modest extent cooperation activities, while extra-budgetary resources chiefly finance cooperation activities. The proportion of extra-budgetary financing has grown considerably during the period.

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[57] The core budgets of partial agreements are financed by the states party to the respective agreements

[58] CM(2009)10 final, Resource Management and Mobilisation Strategy,13 March 2009

[59] SG/Inf(2014)25 Information Document,2 June 2014, Long term budgetary sustainability and efficiency of the Council of Europe

[60] CoE, Global Challenges, The Council of Eruope's response, Appeal 2016-2017, 7

[61] Annex 4 presents a table comparing extra-budgetary resources and global needs 2016 – 2017, distributed between Action Plans (thematic and regional) and other projects

[62] VC 2015, Voluntary contribution receipts 2006-2015, p.50-52

[63] Provisional data for 2016 provided by ODGP, 15.02.107

[64] Budget resources include both the Ordinary Budget and Other Budget of Partial Agreements

[65] CoE, Programme and Budget 2011

Increasing percentage of the extra-budgetary resources to the Organisation's budget.[66]

	Total [67] (€)	Ordinary Budget[68] (€)	Extra-budgetary resources[69] (€)	% Extra-budgetary resources of total
2016[70]	321 115 400	259 915 400	61 200 000	19%
2015	296 444 000	244 144 000	52 300 000	18%
2014	286 595 200	244 095 200	42 500 000	15%
2011	253 417 900	217 017 900	36 400 000	14%

While the overall increase in extra-budgetary resources corresponds to the ambition of the resource mobilisation strategy, as noted by the Secretary-General in his Information Document on Long term budgetary sustainability and efficiency of the Council of Europe, "*growth in extra-budgetary resources (…) is not without impact on the day-to-day resource use within the Ordinary Budget*".[71]

In order to alleviate this pressure, the Committee of Ministers agreed in February 2005 to charge a flat rate administrative levy on extra-budgetary resources,[72] which now constitutes 7 % of voluntary contributions as of 1 January 2014. This rate, which applies to all voluntary contributions, is particularly in line with the general conditions applicable to European Union contribution agreements with international organisations.[73] However, the administrative levy on extra-budgetary contributions cannot fully cover the costs to the Ordinary Budget of supporting such activities (i.e. the working time of staff financed by the Ordinary Budget who have to spend part of their time for the preparatory phases of project submission and for overseeing project staff).

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[66] This calculation is based on the amount of the ordinary budget as found in the respective Programme and Budget document and the amount of extra-budgetary resources as found in the ODGP, Voluntary Contribution Facts and Figures 2015. The decision to base the calculation on these figures was made based on the actual amount of voluntary contribution as found in the VC document in comparison to the amount of extra-budgetary resources in the Programme and Budget and the fact that "Other Budget" is not found disaggregated in the Programme and Budget documents before 2016-2017

[67] The total budget is calculated by adding the amount of the ordinary budget as found in the Programme and Budget document from the given year and the extra-budgetary receipts as found in the as in ODGP, Voluntary Contribution, Facts and Figures 2015, p. 6

[68] As in Programme and Budget documents in the corresponding year

[69] As in ODGP, Voluntary Contribution, Facts and Figures 2015, p. 6

[70] Provisional data for 2016 provided by ODGP, 15.02.107. See Annex 5

[71] SG/Inf(2014)25 2 June 2014, Long term budgetary sustainability and efficiency of the Council of Europe

[72] CM/Del/Dec(2005)915/11.4

[73] CM(2013)123 26 September 2013 1185 (Budget) Meeting, 19-21 November 2013, Administrative expenses levies on extra-budgetary resources

Origin of voluntary contributions

The donor portfolio of the CoE is limited, and reliance on a few donors has been accentuated over the past few years. In 2015, the top ten donors represented 91% of the CoE's extra-budgetary resources. The top five donors represent 83% of these resources in 2015, with the EU firmly established as the lead donor. Other donors, all bilateral, provided each less than 1.5% of the CoE's extra-budgetary resources.

In 2016, the European Union (EU) is with €43.211 million (66% of total extra budgetary receipts) the largest extra-budgetary contributor of the CoE, reflecting a continuous increase in the EU's contribution to the CoE's budget: the EU contributions represented 53.68% of extra-budgetary contributions in 2015, and 55% for 2014. The EU also made some voluntary contributions outside of joint programmes amounting to €2.21 million in 2015

The EU is followed by four main bilateral contributors in 2015: Norway (9.7%), Denmark (9%) Sweden (5.8%) and Switzerland (4.6%).[74]

In 2016, overall Voluntary Contributions from member states[75] decreased by 26% to €17.4 million. 38 of the 47 member states contributed in 2016.[76]

In addition, the Human Rights Trust Fund represented 3 % of extra-budgetary resources in 2015 and 2016.

Distribution of voluntary contributions

Benefiting from the highest sum of contributions are in 2015 the Eastern Partnership countries and the Russian Federation (63%) followed by South-East Europe and Turkey (24%), Neighbourhood (10%) and finally EU member states (3%). In 2015, the thematic distribution according to the organisation's three pillars was as follows: Human Rights: 38%, Rule of Law (32%) and Democracy (16%). The remaining 14% account for Action Plan-level and non-specified funding**.** In 2015, 14% (€7 410 860) of extra-budgetary contributions received by the Council of Europe in 2015 were not earmarked[77]. Not earmarked multi-annual pledges totaling €13 133 547 were made to the Council of Europe in the same period.[78] In 2014, **8%** (€3 407 585) of voluntary contributions to the Council of Europe were not earmarked.[79]

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[74] Joint Programmes with EU € 25 842 385.72 (49.45%) plus other voluntary contributions from the EU € 2 208 876.01 (4.23%). See VC 2015, Figure 2, p.7 and p.53

[75] Includes HRTF and EEA & Norway Grants

[76] Provisional data for 2016 provided by ODGP - see Annex 5

[77] According to the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), "specified" and "non-specified" contributions are accepted and understood in place of the previously used terms "earmarked" and "non-earmarked

[78] VC 2015, p. 24

[79] VC 2014, p.14

Ventilation of extra-budgetary resources by pillar and geographic area[80]

Geographical Area / Pillar	EU member states		Eastern Partnership and the Russian Federation		South-East Europe and Turkey		Neighbourhood	
	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014
Total Amount €	1 602 786	1 300 000	24 284 070	10 403 234	9 035 939	11 500 000	3 637 574	1 700 000
Human Rights	26%		38%	14%	41%	25%	8%	
Rule of Law	59%	77%	29%	39%	54%	34%	55%	
Democracy	15%		7%	14%	5%	41%	14%	
Action Plan and not-specified	0%		26%	33%	0%	0%	23%	
	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Resource mobilisation strategy, methods and tools

Strategic documents
Resource mobilisation practices are primarily based on the resource management and mobilisation strategy from 2009, updated in 2011[81] and supplemented by ODGP's document on Extra-budgetary resources presented to the Rapporteurs Group on Programme, Budget and Administration (GR-PBA) in 2014.[82] The objectives of the 2011 strategy are:
- To ensure alignment of activities funded through extra-budgetary resources with the priorities of the Organisation;
- To maximise the potential of extra-budgetary resource mobilisation;
- To ensure effective co-ordination across the Organisation;
- To streamline procedures and;
- To guarantee full transparency.

In addition, the 2014 ODGP document on Resource Mobilisation emphasized the following areas for enhancing the predictability and efficiency of resource mobilisation:
a. Optimising internal co-ordination on resource mobilisation;
b. Ensuring leverage of extra-budgetary resources;
c. Increasing predictability and flexibility of extra-budgetary resources through:
   - framework co-operation agreements;
   - creation of trust funds or similar mechanisms;

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[80] See VC 2014 and 2015 for figures
[81] CM(2011)65 Resource mobilisation strategy, Item to be prepared by the GR-PBA on 19 May 2011
[82] GR-PBA(2014)1430 September 2014 Extra-budgetary resources, Document prepared by ODGPROG for examination by the GR-PBA on 9 October 2014

- non-specified or broadly-specified funds;
- diversification of the donor base.

d. Ensuring efficient and streamlined management and reporting of extra-budgetary resources by:
  - moving towards framework co-operation agreements and non-earmarked or broadly earmarked funds to alleviate the individual reporting requirements and move towards a more standardised or streamlined model;
  - including an integrated presentation, in the biennial Programme and Budget, of both core contributions and extra-budgetary requirements.

Internal distribution of roles in resource mobilisation
ODGP was created in 2011and became fully operational in 2012, to contribute to the design and co-ordinate Council of Europe co-operation activities. ODGP ensures that CoE priorities are translated into co-ordinated co-operation programmes. ODGP ensures strategic programming mainly through country and regional planning (National, Regional or Thematic Action Plans) that set out the priority actions.

Scoping interviews suggest that the period 2012-2016 could be qualified as a transition period in the distribution of roles for resource mobilization, with ODGP taking a coordinating role in resource mobilisation. The Main Administrative Entities (MAEs), in particular DGI and DGII, who originally performed fundraising autonomously, are now required to coordinate with ODGP and to refrain from autonomous fundraising. In order to optimise internal co-operation an internal Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relation Co-ordination Group representing all MAEs has been established in 2014. Currently, ODGP coordinates resource mobilisation through several organizational units:

- **ODGP's Resource Mobilisation and Donor Relations Division (RMDR)** is responsible for resource mobilisation, except for the European Union. To this end RMDR is tasked with raising funds for co-operation programmes through proactive resource mobilization and strong donor relations. RMDR promotes the principle of framework agreements and reduced earmarking of extra-budgetary resources. As a "one=stop shop" between donors and implementing entities the RMDR Division is responsible for negotiating all contracts with donors, and organising the signature of the final agreement by the Deputy Secretary General and the donor's representative.
- **ODGP's Programming Department** is responsible for reviewing and validating all project documents (initial project proposals, logframes, revised proposals, inception reports, project progress reports, etc.)
- **ODGP's Financial Unit** advises on the budget preparation and reviews the final budget in cooperation with the Programming Division.

The MAEs are responsible for developing and implementing the projects, and preparing input for reporting to the donor at programme level. ODGP is responsible for reporting on action plans, and ensures quality control of all external reporting. The External Offices play an increasing role in resource mobilisation, as outlined in the Secretary General's document on the Council of Europe external presence review a co-ordinated approach in resource mobilisation.[83] They develop and maintain contacts in-country under overall coordination of ODGP/RMDR.

These practices aim to ensure alignment with the organisation priorities, and to provide coherent messages to donors in-country, donors in their respective capitals and Permanent Representations in Strasbourg.

Existing resource mobilisation tools
In order to maintain alignment with the organisation's priorities, extra-budgetary contributions should support priorities, fitting within the Programme and Budget as well as country and thematic Action Plans. The inclusion of extra-budgetary contributions and funding needs within these documents is conceived as a way to elicit and channel donors' contributions.

In addition, the ODGP has developed overviews of voluntary contributions for 2014 and 2015, and an Appeal document to donors.[84] Both contribute to the implementation of the objectives of the resource mobilisation strategic documents.
See **Annex 3** for an overview of resource mobilisation documents.

Absorption capacity and new cooperation agreements
Scoping interviews suggest that in some areas the CoE's capacity to accommodate extra-budgetary funds and related activities requires adjustment in both core resources and funding conditions if the volume of programmes is to further increase. Several units implementing extra-budgetary funded programmes report difficulties in accommodating the workload of these programmes within core resources, taking into account the necessary investment at preparation, implementation and follow up stages of the programmes as delineated by the CoE Programme Management Manual. The 2009 Resource mobilisation strategy states: "external funding should remain aligned with the priorities of the Council of Europe and take into account the need for human resources and the cost of overheads required for successful implementation." The Information Document on Long term budgetary sustainability and efficiency of the Council of Europe states: "Growth in extra-budgetary resources over the coming years will imply a proportional need for allocation of extra-budgetary resources for minimum co-financing *as well as an acknowledgement that the leverage of extra-budgetary resources is not without impact on the day-to-day resource use within the Ordinary Budget.*"[85] Interviewees also point to constraints attached to extra-budgetary contributions in terms of short programme design and inception, reporting and human resources.

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[83] SG/Inf(2015)25 rev, Information Documents, 9 September 2015[1], Council of Europe external presence review, (June 2013 – June 2015)e
[84] Global challenges: the Council of Europe's response 2016-2017
[85] Information Document SG/Inf(2014)25of 2 June 2014 on Long term budgetary sustainability and efficiency of the Council of Europe

In response to these challenges, the CoE has taken several measures, in particular the conclusion of longer term co-operation frameworks, which also increase predictability of resources and facilitate workforce planning. The Organisation increasingly seeks to deliver on agreed priorities rather than individual projects and activities. Country and thematic action plans are therefore a tool for pooling voluntary contributions that are not earmarked or broadly earmarked. The CoE has also privileged large cooperation agreements with its main donors including the EU.

In the period 2008 to 2015, the number of multi-annual contracts per year was multiplied by six, from five in 2008 to 33 in 2014 and 32 in 2015. Since 2012, the number of annual contracts has decreased slightly – there were 37 annual contracts signed in 2015 compared to 38 in 2014 and 40 in 2013. Also in the period 2008 to 2015, the volume of contracts increased by 464% from €2.9 million to €16.5 million.[86] Over the last three years, the overall volume of contracts marked an increase of 48%. This included an increase by 93% in the volume of multi-annual contracts and a decrease by 20% in the volume of the annual contracts.[87]

Number of contracts

Volume of contracts

Cooperation Agreements

EU[88]			
• PCF	Eastern Partnership countries	2015-17	€33.8 million
• South Programme II	Southern Mediterranean EU-Council of Europe Joint Programme towards Strengthened Democratic Governance	2015-17	€7.4 million
• Horizontal Facility	Western Balkans and Turkey	2016-18	€25 million
SIDA	Support of country action plans and co-operation documents in Eastern Europe	2015-17	€5.3 million
HRTF	Human Rights – see below	2008-2015 (ongoing)	€13 350 114
Norway	2014-15 €6.25 million in non-earmarked funding in support of country action plans and co-operation documents for Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Morocco and Tunisia	Since 2011	€20 million
The EEA and Norway Grants	co-operation activities in ten EU member states[89]	2011-2017	€4.9 million

Scope of the evaluation and evaluation questions

Scope

The evaluation will examine the mobilisation of financial resources from public entities (States and international organisations including the European Union) for the purpose of cooperation activities of the CoE.[90] While the evaluation will take into account the evolution of resource mobilisation since the issuance of the first resource mobilisation strategy in 2009,[91] the focus of the evaluation will be on the period 2014-2016, since the latest strategic document was issued.

Evaluation questions

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[88] In 2014, the Council of Europe and the European Commission signed a Statement of Intent to strengthen co-operation between the two organisations. It paved the way for the Programmatic Co-operation Frameworks

[89] Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary (payments suspended since May 2013), Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia

[90] The evaluation will not look into voluntary contributions from private entities, as these constitute a marginal part of the CoE's extra-budgetary resources, with too little data for proper evaluation analysis. The 2011 Resource Mobilisation Strategy - CM(2011)65 states that "*whilst relations with non-state actors are being developed, priority will continue to be given to increasing and diversifying partnerships with member and observer States, the European Union and relevant international organisations.*"

[91] Resource Management and Mobilisation Strategy for the Council of Europe Programme of Activities - CM(2009)10 examined by the GR-PBA on 11 March 2009

Question number	Draft question	Draft sub-questions	Criteria	Evaluation objective
1	To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation tools and methods fulfil the funding needs for the CoE's priorities and objectives?	How effective are the CoE's resource mobilisation tools, methods and practices in raising additional resources? What processes orient the ventilation of extra-budgetary resources, and how effective are they? To what extent does the CoE channel funding opportunities in accordance with its priorities and objectives as defined by CoE strategic documents and reflecting the findings of the monitoring bodies? To what extent can the CoE adjust its extra-budgetary-funded activities to a changing environment?	Effectiveness Relevance	1, 3
2	To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation trends affect its absorption capacity ?	How do extra-budgetary resources affect the operations of administrative entities in the discharge of their functions (including standard setting, monitoring and cooperation)? What administrative procedures are attached to extra-budgetary resources, and how flexible are they? How do donor relations affect the procedures attached to extra-budgetary resources and their flexibility?	Effectiveness Sustainability	1, 2, 3
3	To what extent does the CoE utilize its potential in resource mobilisation abilities?	What is the current division of labour in resource mobilisation within the CoE? To what extent do the	Effectiveness	1, 3

|		various internal stakeholders coordinate for resource mobilisation? What tools, methodologies and labour division could be explored to optimize resource mobilisation?		
4	What are the risks of the CoE's resource mobilisation methods and trends?	How predictable are the CoE's extra-budgetary resources? How vulnerable are the CoE's resource mobilisation patterns to changes in the donor community? To what extent does the CoE ensure durable donor commitment?	Sustainability	2, 3

Evaluation methodology

Scoping and inception phase

Scoping interviews and document review
The evaluation team has collected and reviewed documents provided by ODGP as well as from the internet, and conducted scoping interviews with 14 CoE officials (DSG, Private Office of the Secretary General, ODGP, DGI and DGII).
Based on the strategic documents presented in Section 2 of this concept note, and based on scoping interviews, the evaluation team has reconstructed a tentative theory of change of resource mobilisation.

Tentative theory of change of resource mobilisation in the CoE

Case studies' sampling

The evaluation will use case studies to identify and illustrate causal links between resource mobilisation policies/practices and their results, in relation with internal and external factors. Each case study will present a different situation with regards to these factors. In order to document the full landscape of resource mobilisation situations, it is important that the case studies reflect as diverse situations as possible. At this stage, scoping interviews and document review suggest that at least the following factors have sizeable effects on the performance of resource mobilisation:

- Geographic location of planned activities;
- Role of the thematic area within the CoE's "dynamic triangle" of standard setting, monitoring and cooperation (in particular whether or not the thematic area is the subject of a treaty and/or monitoring mechanism);
- Perceived urgency for intervention among donors, measured through two proxy indicators: level of media attention in a given period, and level of attention in the CoE's bodies and events (Committee of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, Commissioner for Human Rights, high level conferences…)

Other factors that might have an effect on resource mobilisation will be identified and analysed in the course of the evaluation.

Based on the basic factors identified during the scoping phase, the following case studies seem to illustrate the broadest possible variety of situations:

Case study	Angle	Concerned DG(s)	Level of extra-budgetary funding	Reliance on CoE standards and monitoring mechanisms	Level of media and CoE bodies' attention (scale 1 to 5 where 1 is lowest level)
Human Rights National Implementation programmes	Thematic	DGI, ODGP	High	High	3
Education Cooperation and Capacity Building programmes	Thematic	DGII, ODGP	High	Moderate	2
Immediate package of measures for Ukraine	Geographic	All	High	Average	4
National Action Plan for BiH	Geographic	All	Low	Average	1

Reference Group

The evaluation team will request the MAEs to appoint representatives to the Reference Group from ODGP and the DGs, including the programme officers in relation with the case studies. This Reference Group will accompany the evaluation process with feedback to the concept note and draft final report.

The evaluation team may additionally approach donors relevant for the case studies for discussing draft findings and recommendations.

Data collection phase

Case studies
Case studies will be documented through desk review, survey and interviews conducted in Headquarters. The following data will be collected for the case studies, in addition to data already collected during the scoping and inception phase:

Type of data	Data collection method
Opinion of HQ staff	In-person interviews with CoE staff in Strasbourg
Opinion of field staff	Phone/skype interviews with CoE staff in the field
Opinion of donors	Interviews with donors (permanent representations, capitals, EU Dels)
Documentary evidence	Document review where relevant (programme documents)

Focus groups
The evaluation team will organise focus groups in Headquarters to test the preliminary findings of the case studies and interviews. In addition, and subject to availability of the participants, the evaluation team will endeavour to organise focus groups with the Heads and/or Deputy Heads of Field Offices on the occasion of their general meetings in Strasbourg.

Survey
In order to check and generalise the findings illustrated by the case studies, the evaluation team will conduct a survey of all CoE staff involved in cooperation activities and resource mobilisation. The survey questionnaire will be based on the results of interviews, focus groups and case studies.

Data analysis and reporting phase
The evaluation team will analyse the data collected for case studies, cross checking at least three types of data sources for each evaluation question. The evaluation will use theory-based contribution analysis,[92] in order to test the theory of change underpinning the resource mobilisation strategy and assess the contribution of resource mobilisation in practice to the objectives and priorities of the organisation.

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[92] Delahais, Toulemonde (2012) Applying contribution analysis: lessons learned from five years of practice. Evaluation 18(3): 281-293
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.906.4574&rep=rep1&type=pdf accessed 17 February 2017

Following this approach, the analysis will cover, in particular, following aspects:
- Reconstruction of the theory of change of resource mobilisation strategies (what resource mobilisation was expected to do, and how it was expected to reach this result), including internal and external factors;
- Identification of causal links and establishment of a contribution chain (or "contribution story");
- Testing of the contribution chain with triangulated data;
- Identification of the effect of internal and external factors including variations in time;
- Development of options or scenarios for the future of resource mobilisation in a changing CoE environment.

As a result of the data analysis phase, the evaluation team will prepare a draft final report of a maximum of 25 pages plus annexes. The final report will present lessons learned, good practices, and develop options for the enhancement of resource mobilisation in the CoE.
The Reference Group will convene to discuss the draft final report, and provide comments and feedback to the evaluation team. After adjustment, DIO will send the final report to the Secretary General and stakeholders.

Evaluation work plan
Evaluation team
The evaluation team will be composed of a DIO Evaluator, supported by one Research Assistant. It is not envisaged to hire external consulting services for this evaluation.

Provisional schedule

Event	Planned Date
Start of evaluation exercise	01 Feb 2017
Date of completion of Concept Note	20 Feb 2017
Announcement of evaluation to stakeholders	20 Feb 2017
1st Reference Group meeting	16 Mar 2017
Data collection through interviews	27 Feb – 14 May
Data Collection through survey	27 April – 15 May
Data Collection through Focus Groups	15 – 30 May
Analysis of interviews and survey	16 May – 9 June
Completion of preliminary Draft Report	23 June
2nd Reference Group meeting	7 July
Submission of Final Report to SG	15 Sept

ANNEX 7: EVALUATION MATRIX

Question number	Evaluation question	Evaluation sub-questions	Evaluation criteria	Evaluation objectives	Data collection methods	Data sources	Related objective within the CoE resource mobilisation strategy (CM(2011)65)	Related policy and operational measures within the CoE resource mobilisation strategy (CM(2011)65)
1	To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation tools and methods fulfil the funding needs for the CoE's priorities and objectives?	How effective are the CoE's resource mobilisation tools, and methods and practices in raising additional resources? What processes orient the ventilation of extra-budgetary resources, and how effective are they? To what extent does the CoE channel funding opportunities in accordance with its priorities and	Effectiveness Relevance	1, 3	Semi-structured interviews Focus groups Survey (TBC) Document review	Opinion of HQ staff Opinion of field staff Opinion of donors Case studies	To ensure the alignment of activities funded through extra budgetary resources with the priorities of the Organisation. To maximise the potential of extra-budgetary resource mobilisation.	Alignment and transparency Targeting One single programme and budget channel and process Obtain ODA qualification

		objectives as defined by CoE strategic documents and reflecting the findings of the monitoring bodies? To what extent can the CoE adjust its extra-budgetary-funded activities to a changing environment?						
2	To what extent do the CoE's resource mobilisation trends affect its absorption capacity?	How do extra-budgetary resources affect the operations of administrative entities in the discharge of their functions(including standard setting, monitoring and cooperation)? What administrative procedures are attached to extra-budgetary resources, and how flexible are they?	Effectiveness Sustainability	1, 2, 3	Semi-structured interviews Focus groups Survey (TBC) Document review	Opinion of HQ staff Opinion of field staff Case studies	To streamline procedures To guarantee full transparency	Predictability and flexibility Streamline management and reporting

		How do donor relations affect the procedures attached to extra-budgetary resources and their flexibility?						
3	To what extent does the CoE utilize its potential in resource mobilisation abilities?	What is the current division of labour in resource mobilisation within the CoE? To what extent do the various internal stakeholders coordinate for resource mobilisation? What tools, methodologies and labour division could be explored to optimize resource mobilisation?	Effectiveness	1, 3	Semi-structured interviews Focus groups Survey (TBC) Document review	Opinion of HQ staff Opinion of field staff Case studies	To ensure effective co-ordination across the Organisation To streamline procedures To guarantee full transparency	Predictability and flexibility One single programme and budget channel and process
4	What are the risks of the CoE's resource mobilisation	How predictable are the CoE's extra-budgetary resources? How vulnerable are	Sustainability	2, 3	Semi-structured interviews Focus groups	Opinion of HQ staff Opinion of field	To maximise the potential of extra-budgetary resource	Predictability and flexibility

| methods and trends? | the CoE's resource mobilisation patterns to changes in the donor community?

To what extent does the CoE ensure durable donor commitment? | | | Document review | staff Opinion of donors Case studies | mobilisation | |

ANNEX 8: RESEARCH ON RESOURCE MOBILISATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Table of Concents

1. Introduction

Research confirms that "budgeting in major IOs regularly faces budgetary crisis as a result of geopolitical tensions, financial management problems within the IOs, the addition of new tasks to the portfolio of IOs without proper agreement on the financing modes or fiscal constraints within member states in times of economic downturn."[93] Comparison shows that for many international organisations, extra budgetary resources have become crucial to carry out their activities. To varying extend, voluntary contributions to the core budget are becoming ever more important in times of financial crisis and zero growth policies concerning the ordinary budget/assessed budget.[94] With an increase of voluntary contributions, many IO experience similar challenges, such as obtaining mainly restricted voluntary contributions, allowing the donor to decide how contributions are spend, which might not be aligned with priorities and core activities set by the IO (See Figure below). Also donors impose varying reporting requirements on the IO and also many IOs face a lack of donor diversity and long-term agreements. A sound and proactive research mobilisation strategy can help to handle some of these challenges.

Core and earmarked (non-core) funding to multilateral organisations in 2012[95]

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[93] Ronny Patz and Klaus H. Goetz, Managing Budget Conflicts in International Organisations: A Comparison of EU, ILO and WHO, Department of Political Science, University of Munich Paper presented at the Panel "Bureaucratic Perspectives on International Organizations", ECPR General Conference, Montreal, 26-29 August 2015 https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/93f21ccc-eefe-4e6e-924a-87f7dd3defaf.pdf, p.5

[94] Organizations of the United Nations system are funded through assessed contributions and/or voluntary contributions, and there is a wide range of funding models and terminologies. "The assessed organizations are funded through a mandatory scale of payments approved by the appropriate governing body. Additional contributions to the assessed organizations are deemed to be voluntary, although they are usually earmarked. However, for the non-assessed (or voluntary) organizations, all funding is voluntary."1 Assessed contributions are regular budget resources intended to fund the core functions, expenses that are fundamental to the existence of an organization and its institutional mandates. Voluntary contributions generally support or supplement the substantive work programmes of an organization or activities of the humanitarian relief and development agencies, and provide technical assistance to developing countries either through multilateral arrangements or through the United Nations system.2 The non-assessed organizations distinguish between core and non-core resources. Core resources are provided without any conditions to support the mandate of the organization (un-earmarked/unspecified contributions). Non-core or extra-budgetary resources are so-called earmarked/specified contributions. (See notes by the Secretary-General A/65/187 and A/67/215 on the budgetary and financial situation of the organizations of the United Nations system)

[95] OECD, 2014. p. 24

The following comparison will take a closer look at organisations within the UN (UNDP UNODC, UNESCO, UNWOMEN) having an organisational structure similar to the Council of Europe as well as the OSCE, the OECD and the World Bank.

2. United Nations

2.1 Challenges
A recent analysis of the resource mobilisation function within the United Nations (2014) has come to the following main findings:

- The ratio of non-assessed to assessed contributions has expanded significantly in recent years, plus more intensive scrutiny and demands from donors for extra reporting;
- Many non-core contributions;
- Specified contributions pose a major challenge to the imperatives of long term strategic planning, sustainability and prioritizations for the organization, fragmentation of mandates as donor's priorities may trump organizational or legislated priorities;
- Most donors base their funding decisions on their own assessment of the effectiveness of the organization;
- Dependence of most organisations on a small number of donors;
- Donors would like the organisations to absorb all the costs of mitigating risks, the latter would like to pass on to the donor at least part of the costs;
- In many organisations, due diligence process is performed by the same individuals who are mobilising resources - conflict of interest;
- Need to put in place mechanisms for exercising due diligence, transparency and accountability;
- Need for Risk management - enhanced risks with raising resources from non-state entities;
- Integrating resource mobilization targets into strategic plans leads to a more successful resource mobilization
- Lack of synergies between the tools and the programmatic and budget cycles of agencies;
- Need for training for resource mobilisation specialists - share lessons learned and good practice;
- Need for purpose oriented dialogue with donors and strengthened partnership (discuss flexible use of earmarked resources, cost of additional reporting).

2.2 Facts and Figures
The figures below demonstrate the significant increase of voluntary contribution to the UN, with and amount increasingly above the mandatory contributions since 1960 (Fig 1). Especially since the 1980s the mandatory budget has remained rather stable with a zero-growth regular budget[96], widening the gap between mandatory and voluntary funding (Fig 2). Figure 3 shows the varying dependency of the different UN organisations on voluntary contributions. Whereas for instance the ITU has a share of VC of only 3%, for instance UNICEF and UNODC are financed to 99% from VCs. More than two thirds of the

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[96] Erin R. Graham, Money and multilateralism: how funding rules constitute IO governance, International Theory (2015), 7:1, 162–194, Cambridge University Press, 2015 doi: 10.1017/S1752971914000414.

organisation have a share of over 50% of VCs. In addition, Fig. 4 indicates that an increasing amount of voluntary contributions are specified/non-core funding.

**Fig 1. UN mandatory and voluntary funding contributions 1950-69 ($US millions)**[97]

**Fig. 2 UN regular Budget and voluntary contributions to UN Organs 1986-2001 ($US millions)**[98]


Fig 3[99]

Fig.4 Trends in core and non-core voluntary contributions (billions of constant $US)[100]

2.3 Overview of current resource mobilisation strategy/policies

Within the UN there is no organization-wide resource mobilisation strategy/policy. Departments and offices develop their own procedures, based on the respective mandates, operation and needs.[101] The ability and need to attract funding vary between the different UN organisations.

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[97] Jackson, Robert. 1969. A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, Vol. I. Geneva: United Nations

[98] Alger, Chadwick 2006. The United Nations System: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO Press, p 225

[99] Ronny Patz and Klaus H. Goetz, Managing Budget Conflicts in International Organisations: A Comparison of EU, ILO and WHO, Department of Political Science, University of Munich Paper presented at the Panel "Bureaucratic Perspectives on International Organizations", ECPR General Conference, Montreal, 26-29 August 2015 https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/93f21ccc-eefe-4e6e-924a-87f7dd3defaf.pdf, p.37

[100] UN General Assembly/ECOSOC. 2011. "Analysis of Funding for Operational Activities for Development of the United Nations System for 2009" (Advanced Unedited Version 18 May 2011), UN General Assembly/ECOSOC, Geneva, 26

In most cases, resource mobilisation is a mix of centralised and decentralised strategies with a strong emphasis on coordination from the headquarters: FAO, ILO, UNEP, UNHCR, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNESCO, the United Nations Population Fund.

(UNFPA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and WHO all have an organisation-wide strategy based on which regional and country offices develop their own strategies.

A closer look on the current situation and resource mobilisation strategy will be given to UNDP, UNODC, UNESCO and UNWOMEN and more detailed on the OHCHR based on its focus on human rights.

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[101] UN, (JIU/REP/2014/1), An analysis of the resource mobilization function within the United Nations, 2014, p. 7

Organization	Existence of Strategy/policy document	Scope of strategy/policy	Structure	Budget OB/VC 2006 -2007 2008-2009 2010 -2011
UNDP	The Integrated Resource Mobilization Strategy is a part of the External Relations and Advocacy Framework of UNDP. The Framework articulates a direction for relationship-building, taking into account the changing development architecture and multilateral environment. The Integrated Resource Mobilization Strategy was approved by the UNDP Executive Group in 2012 and is currently under review with a view to alignment with the new Strategic Plan. See also UNDP webpage on funded projects including donor information: http://open.undp.org/#2017	Resource mobilization is not the sole responsibility of any one individual; a corporate approach is applied, coordinated and supported centrally, with field application. UNDP provides guidance and principles for managing partnerships to ensure that the approaches of global, regional, and country programmes are in line with the strategic plan. Country offices, in collaboration with the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy and regional bureaux can prepare tailored resource mobilization strategies to assist with the implementation of programmes, themes or geographic focus.	The Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy coordinates external relations, leads on partner relationships and advocacy, including with other member States, United Nations agencies, the private sector/foundations, regional banks and other partners, as well as on the organization's relationship with the Executive Board, and also leads the external communications functions. The Director of the Resource Partnerships Cluster and the Director of the Multilateral Affairs and UN Coherence Cluster report to the Assistant Secretary-General/Director of the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy.	
UNESCO	UNESCO has the Extra-budgetary Resource Mobilization Strategic Plan (approved by the Executive Board); the Complementary Additional Programme, which contains quantitative targets for resource mobilization; and the Comprehensive Partnership Strategy. The Policy Framework for Strategic Partnerships: A Comprehensive Partnership Strategy (see UNESCO documents 190 EX/21, Part II and 190 EX/INF.7) was presented to the Executive Board in 2012. The Board welcomed the strategy, and requested that three additional categories of partners be included, as well as targets and expected results for each category. The strategies for the three additional categories of partner were submitted to	There is an organization-wide strategy; regional and country offices have their own strategies based on the organization-wide strategy.	Within the Bureau of Strategic Planning, the Division of Cooperation with Extra budgetary Funding Sources (BSP/CFS) is responsible for the overall coordination of the resource mobilization strategy. BSP/CFS has two sections: the Section for Bilateral Government Funding Sources (BSP/CFS/BLT) and the Section for Multilateral and Private Funding Sources (BSP/CFS/MLT) (private sector, foundations, development banks and the European Union). The Assistant Director-General for Strategic Planning is acting Director of BSP/CFS and reports to the Director-General. Programme sectors, field offices and institutes are guided and supervised by the Director-General and the programme sector assistant directors-general, and are responsible for the programming, implementation and monitoring of extra budgetary programmes and projects. The Programme sectors, field offices and institutes are authorized to mobilize extra budgetary resources for approved outlines in the Complementary Additional	N/A $ 474,699 $ 348,102 / $711,973,591 $601,316,496 $577,037,538

|				
	the Board in 2013.		Programme in consultation with BSP/CFS. For extra budgetary projects generated in the field, the director of an institute or director or head of a field office may sign funding agreements after	
UNODC	The UNODC Fundraising Strategy 2012-2015 was presented to member States in 2012.			$0.16 million $0.12 million $0.10 million $343 million $489.3 million $479.7 million
UNWOMEN	The strategy was approved by the Executive Director in 2012.	There is an organization-wide strategy; regional and country offices have their own strategies based on the organization-wide strategy, but tailored to their context and needs.	The Resource Mobilization Branch, a section under the Strategic Partnership Division, is headed by a Director and a Deputy. The Director oversees the non-specified fundraising in addition to managing the section, while the Deputy oversees the specified fundraising efforts. There are three subsections: donor relations with member States; donor reporting; and private sector and foundations. UN-Women has two liaison offices: Brussels and Copenhagen. There is a dedicated person working on supporting the 17 UN-Women National Committees. A resource mobilization focal point network has been established to support decentralized responsibility for resource mobilization	

2.4 OHCHR
2.4.1 Facts and Figures

Regular budget versus voluntary contributions

Among the UN system's three pillars: development and peace and security and human rights, the latter only receives a small percentage of the resources provided to the other two pillars, amounting to slightly more than 3% of the total UN regular budget. Thus, the OHCHR heavily relies on voluntary contributions.

In 2015, 54% of OHCHR's funding came from voluntary contributions (compared with 54% in 2014, 56% in 2013 and 57.5% in 2012). The Figure below demonstrates the development of the Regular Budget and Voluntary Contributions since 2002 until 2015. Until 2008, the level of voluntary contributions to OHCHR steadily increased from US$41 million in 2002 to a peak of US$120 million in 2008. After dropping slightly in 2009 and 2010 the VC continued to increase, especially since 2013, by nearly US$10 million to reach US$121.2 million, by another 2 per cent in 2014, up to US$123.7 and again by 1.7 per cent to US$125.8 million in 2015, representing the highest amount ever received by the Office.[102]

Donor diversity

In 2015, 62 Member States made contributions to OHCHR, compared to 65 in 2014 and 70 in 2013 (68 in 2012). In total, 71 institutional donors were registered, compared to 74 in 2014 and 78 in 2013 (74 in 2012). Another 11 Member States disappeared from the list of donors, despite the High Commissioner's repeated appeals to broaden the donor base of the Office.

It is crucial for the Office to attract support from new Member States while also maintaining that of existing donors. Over the last three years, 50 Member States provided an annual contribution and 35 others contributed at least once in the same three-year period.

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[102] http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx

Based on voluntary contributions in 2015, the five biggest donors (United States of America US$16,250,000; Norway US$14,041,521; Sweden US$ 13,786,595; European Commission US$13,021,107; Netherlands US$ 9,766,646) provided more than 50% to the total of US$125,884,196. [103]

Earmarking

The chart below shows the development of unremarked versus earmarked funding in 2002-2015. The proportion of un-earmarked funding in 2015 decreased to 37 per cent of the total income received (down from 47 per cent in 2014 and 54 per cent in 2013). The earmarked contributions increased by almost US$14 million (from US$65 million to US$78.7 million). The 2015 OHCHR report states that this is the result of efforts to attract more local funding for field activities and the decision of some donors to earmark contributions, which were initially un-earmarked. At the same time, the OHCHR requires flexibility and autonomy in allocating resources and therefore seeks un-earmarked funds from donors and intends to continue using every appropriate opportunity to persuade donors to contribute more un-earmarked funding. In 2015, 44 donors provided at least part of their support free of earmarking.[104]

2.4.2 Strategy

The 2015 OHCHR report explains that the "OHCHR's ongoing funding challenges were a major factor in its decision to engage in a comprehensive review of its priorities and budget in 2014 in order to address the increasing demands it is facing in light of its limited resources. OHCHR must therefore redouble its efforts to secure additional revenue from voluntary contributions while strongly advocating for an increase of the regular budget to fully cover its existing mandated activities that are being subsidized by extra budgetary resources."[105]

The Donor and External Relation Section (DEXREL) has the mandate to obtain stable, predictable and flexible funding from Member States and other donors. However an audit in 2016 on the effective management of fundraising activities by OHCHR found that this was only partially satisfactory. It found that the OHCHR needed to (i) strengthen guidelines and coordination mechanisms on

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[103] OHCHR, Report 2015, p. 61
[104] OHCHR, Report 2015, p. 64
[105] OHCHR, Report 2015, p. 63

resource mobilization activities; and (ii) assess and ensure that the External Outreach Service (EOS) has the capacity to achieve the Office's resource mobilization goals.[106] (See table below for recommendations and management response.)

The Audit finds that, despite the fact that the OHCHR is significantly relying on voluntary contributions, their resource mobilisation strategy has yet to be finalised. A draft resource mobilisation strategy has been developed in 2012 and has been revised in 2013 and 2014. The latest draft focuses on strengthening the current funding base, broadening the traditional government donor base, enhancing engagement with the private sector and improving internal skills and capacity of the Office in fundraising. However, the draft strategies were not presented to the Senior Management Team or the Programme and Budget Review Board and needs yet to be operationalised. The Audit cautions that the lack of a clear fundraising strategy based on input from key stakeholders, and an action plan to operationalize it, may potentially have an adverse impact of the Office's fundraising activities. Furthermore, it is essential to develop a communication strategy including marketing and outreach. The lack of ability to communicate effectively may impede the ability to achieve fundraising goals. Also, the OHCHR is recommended to assess the risk relating to resource mobilisation.

In addition, the Audit identified the need to strengthen guidelines and coordination mechanisms on resource mobilisation-related activities. Resource mobilization is performed across all OHCHR services and sections. The Audit expresses that clarity of roles and responsibilities and strong coordination are essential to ensure consistency, effective collaboration and accountability.

Regarding the field offices the audit found that resource mobilisation processes were ad hoc and mostly driven by the individual initiative of the Head if the field presence. Heads of field offices indicated that there were no clear instruction and guidelines given to them to perform their activities related to resource mobilisation and expressed the need for clear roles and responsibilities.

Moreover, with regard to coordination, the audit pointed out that staff members are encouraged to undertake fundraising work in close cooperation with DEXREL according to the "Standard operation procedure on donor relation and fundraising". However, divisions and services have searched for funding for their own programmes as a result of the increase in the Office's operational requirement and the use of reserve to cover funding gaps.[107] Furhter issues identified through a staff survey were that:

- There are often divergent information communicated to Member States in the Office's needs and priorities;
- There is a need for close coordination between DEXREL and substantive divisions at Headquarters to have a consistent approach and to reduce the risk of donors earmarking contribution;
- There is a lack of teamwork and coordination in resource mobilization activities as there are different parts of the Office engaged in separate fundraising.

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[106] OIOS, Internal Audit Division Audit, of the OHCHR fundraising activities, Report 2016/2017, p.3
[107] OIOS, Internal Audit Division, Audit of the OHCHR fundraising activities, Report 2016/2017, p 5

Other concerns were raised relating to the need to ensure that EOS has adequate capacity to achieve its resource mobilization goals. According to the 2014-2017 Management Plan, OHCHR intends to expand its donor base by 30% and maintain un-earmarked contribution at 50%. However, DEXREL indicated that they were unable to dedicate capacity to widening the donor base and develop a global communication strategy, because it would be to the detriment of the existing donor base and could jeopardize the existing budgetary funds. Thus, focusing on maintaining relations with current donors and partners prevented the expansion of the donor base.

The following table summarizes the recommendation of the audit including the management response:[108]

| Rec. no.	Recommendation	Critical[1]/ Important[2]	Accepted? (Yes/No)	Title of responsible individual	Implementation date	Client comments
1	OHCHR should finalize its resource mobilization strategy with input from key stakeholders and establish an action plan for its implementation.	Important	Yes	Chief EOS	End 2017	OHCHR commits to develop a resource mobilization strategy with an associated action plan through an inclusive process, with input from key stakeholders as appropriate.
2	OHCHR should ensure that targets and goals for developing a communication strategy and overseeing its implementation are included in the Communication Section's work plan and its staff members' performance evaluations.	Important	Yes	Chief EOS	End 2017	OHCHR commits to develop a communications strategy with specific goals and targets, with a component in support of OHCHR resource mobilization ambitions, and will ensure that this is reflected in the Communications Section's and individual staff members work plans.
3	OHCHR should assess the risks relating to resource mobilization and establish measures to mitigate them.	Important	Yes	Chief EOS	End 2017	OHCHR commits to have a risk assessment framework for its outreach activities that will identify mitigation measures for a series of risks pertaining to communication and fundraising activities.
4	OHCHR should strengthen its guidelines and coordination mechanisms on resource mobilization activities.	Important	Yes	Chief EOS	End 2017	OHCHR commits to strengthen guidelines and improve coordination on resource mobilization related activities, at all levels.
5	OHCHR should assess and ensure that the External Outreach Service has the required capacity to achieve its resource mobilization goals.	Important	Yes	DHC	End 2017	OHCHR commits to assess and ensure that the External Outreach Service has the required capacity to achieve its resource mobilization goals.

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[108] OIOS, Internal Audit Division, Audit of the OHCHR fundraising activities, Report 2016/2017, p.13

3. OSCE

3.1 Facts and Figures

Also for the OSCE, extra-budgetary contributions are a valuable source of funding for projects and activities that are consistent with OSCE objectives but are not funded under the Unified Budget.[109]

The chart below displays the composition of the OSCE budget for 2015.[110]

Caused mainly by decreasing assessed contributions, total revenues decreased in recent years. (2013 €141,767 thousand; 2012: €144,823 thousand). However, in 2015 the total revenue increased by 19% to €197,037 thousand. This increase is a result of Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM)[111] receiving €58,750 thousand. (€138,287 thousand account from the Unified Budget.)[112]

The amount of extra-budgetary contributions decreased slightly: 2015: €25,5 thousand; 2013: €27,356 thousand; 2012: €25,144 thousand.[113]

The Chart below illustrates that the percentage of extra-budgetary resources to the total revenue has decreased by 8% from 2014 to 2015.[114] To address a decrease, the OSCE Secretariat (Conflict Prevention Centre) developed Repository Programmes for the Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) projects, and for Ukraine. [115]

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[109] OSCE, Audited Financial Statement, 2013, p. 10

[110] [110] OSCE, Financial Report and Financial statements and the Report of the External Auditor, 2015, p.32

[111] The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) has led to an increase in total revenue of 19%, an increase in total expenses of 25% and an increase in property, plant and equipment of 54%. Furthermore it should be noted that SMM relies heavily on voluntary contributions: 61% of its staff is seconded, 21% of its revenue is extra-budgetary and 16% of all property, plant and equipment acquired in 2015 was donated. See OSCE, Financial Report and Financial statements and the Report of the External Auditor, 2015, p.30

[112] OSCE, Financial Report and Financial statements and the Report of the External Auditor, 2015, p.31.

[113] OSCE, Audited Financial Statement, 2013, 9

[114] OSCE, Financial Report and Financial statements and the Report of the External Auditor, 2015, p.32.

[115] OSCE, Annual report 2015, p.26

**2015 Revenue by Source
(EUR'000)**

With regard to **donor diversity** in 2015, the largest four donors (EU €4 million, Germany €3.6 million, USA €2.7 million and Netherlands €2.7 million) funded more than 50% of the total of €25.5 million of extra-budgetary resources.

3.2 Strategy

Due to its decentralised structure, the OSCE does not have an organisation wide resource mobilization policy or fundraising function at Secretariat level. The Secretariat may help to identify potential donors, but field operations are expected to negotiate their activities with the various ministries of their host countries and seek extra-budgetary funding on their own. Yet, Project Manager shall not engage in pro-active fundraising until after the project has been assessed by the Secretariat and approved by the Fund Manager.[116] The most common form of fundraising is by sharing the approved *Project Proposal* with the embassies of the OSCE participating States in the host country, with the delegations in Vienna or directly with Capitals, and offices of other international organizations. For larger projects, fundraising meetings either in the host country or in Vienna can be organized.[117] Projects funded by extra-budgetary resources have to be relevant to the mandate and consistent with and complementary to the Unified Budget (UB). Therefore funds can only be received for approved projects. The Director of the Department of Management and Finance is authorized to accept pledges on behalf of the Secretary General.[118]

Only in exceptional circumstances, a field operation, institution or the Secretariat may engage in an extra budgetary project which may not fit one of its already existing programmes. However, for such interventions a Permanent Council or Forum for Security Co-operation approval is needed. In this case, a programme level objective will need to be defined by the team to reflect the longer-term benefits of the project.[119]

Also stated in the Project Management Manual from 2010 is that "the use of the UB funds to finance XB activities is strictly forbidden […] In no event should funds from the UB be used to fund XB costs, even on a temporary basis."[120] The financing and accounting of the UB and XB projects are kept

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[116] *Marc Perrin de Brichambaut,* Six Years as OSCE Secretary General:, An Analytical and Personal Retrospective, 2011, p. 40 . https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/11/PerrindeBrichambaut-en.pdf

[117] OSCE, Project Management Manual, 2010, 78

[118] OSCE, Project Management Manual, 2010, p. 40

[119] OSCE, Project Management Manual, 2010, p. 40

[120] OSCE, Project Management Manual, 2010, 78

separate in order to ensure that extra-budgetary contributions are accepted, budgeted, expended, monitored, accounted for and reported under proper authority and control.[121]

Fig.: Relationship of the XB projects to the mandate and the UB

Mandate

Unified Budget Programme
Traditional Diplomatic Work
Political Monitoring and Reporting
Unified Budget Projects

Extra-Budgetary Projects

UB and XB projects are:
- Strategically connected
- Subordinate to the executive structure's mandate
- Complementary
- Separately financed and accounted for in IRMA/Oracle.

4. OECD [122]

The Organisation is funded primarily by assessed contributions from its member countries, within the framework of a biennial Programme of Work and Budget. It also receives voluntary contributions to financially support outputs in its Programme of Work. However, these do not form part of the Budget.[123]

The OECD budget and the content of its work programme are established every two years by the OECD's governing body, the Council, based on recommendations from the Secretary General. The budget for 2016 of €370 million, further increased approximately by a third from voluntary contributions, extra-budgetary resources that are planned but variable, provided mainly by governmental bodies and institutions. All member countries contribute to the outputs funded by "Part I" of the budget, which accounts for 53% of the overall budget of the Organisation.[124]

Assessed contributions receivable from member countries at year-end 2015 have increased by €43.4 M
compared to end December 2014. Outstanding assessed contributions of non-members, including international organisations, are €831 000 higher at year-end 2015 as compared with their arrears at the end of December 2014. Total voluntary contributions receivables (current and non-current) have increased from year-end 2014 to year-end 2015 (increase of €47.7 million).[125]

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[121] OSCE, Project Management Manual, 2010, 23
[122] OECD, Financial Statement, 31 December 2015
[123] OECD, Financial Statement, 31 December 2015, p. 10
[124] OECD, SG Report to Ministers, 2016, p. 16
[125] OECD, Financial Statement, 31 December 2015, p. 10

OECD
Statement of Financial Performance
for the year ended

OPERATING REVENUES	Notes	31 December 2015 €'000	31 December 2014 €'000
Assessed contributions	19	294 325	288 798
Voluntary contributions	19	146 186	125 252
Pension contributions	16 & 19	91 818	88 174
Sales of publications	19	17 157	16 632
Other	19	21 524	19 938
Total operating revenues		**571 010**	**538 794**

In 2015, the OECD continued to strengthen its capacity to deliver value for money to its members through the progressive implementation of the recommendations in the Action Plan resulting from the Value for Money (V4M) Project.[126]

The OECD focuses on making available financing for the global Sustainable Development Goals. Reaching the target of the 2030 Agenda requires **an estimated USD 3.5 trillion per annum**. Public resources, private sector finance, remittances and innovative forms of public–private partnerships all have their role to play. The OECD engages especially with philanthropic foundations and private companies on a number of cutting-edge themes through dialogue networks, and look to policy levers such as blended finance to attract private investment into the countries and sectors most in need.

Following the Addis Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals cannot be achieved without effective mobilization of **domestic resources**. The info graphic below explains the process of effectively raising resources.

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[126] OECG, AG report 2016, p. 120

ODA can play a key role...

Supporting countries that find it hard to attract other resources

Making investment attractive in high-risk situations

Leveraging other resources

Helping countries mobilise domestic resources

Promoting policy reform

...but only if ODA is made "smart"

Fit-for-purpose in the current financial environment

Effective in mobilising other resources

Targeted where it is needed most

Foreign direct investment

Social business

NGOs, civil society

Securing investment in fragile states

Innovative Tax systems

South–South co-operation

Pooling, guarantees, equity

Potential sources of finance and knowledge

Environmental

"Smart" ODA levers

Institutional investors

Economic

Global public goods

Social

Foundations

Domestic resources

Policy reform and coherence

Remittances

Tax systems

Tax revenues

Prevention of illicit financial flows/ corruption/leakages

Trade

Investment

127

5. World Bank

External funds (EFs)[128] play an increasingly important role for the Bank to carry out its actives and helping to achieve its dual goal of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. According the budget priorities, focus is placed on managing growth of External Funds in alignment with Bank priorities to support client services and underpin financial sustainability. EFs are increasingly being integrated into the Bank's planning, budgeting and

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[127] Info graphic http://www.oecd.org/dac/tgfinfographic.htm

[128] EF are composed of three different categories (i) *Donor Funds (FY15 $904 million)*: Contributions from third parties financing activities benefitting Bank clients - primarily Bank-Executed Trust Funds (BETFs) and Externally Financed Outputs (EFOs); (ii) *Client Funds (FY15 $140 million)*: Revenue derived from Bank services benefitting the contributing client - primarily Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS) and Reserves Asset Management Program (RAMP); and (iii) *Non Operational Funds (FY15 $230 million):* Revenue derived from non-operational Bank services

provided to third parties (primarily internal WBG cost sharing and income from real estate)

reporting framework.[129] A more comprehensive work program planning is envisaged including better coordination with the mobilization and prioritisation of external funds.[130]

Following a significant growth in the last decade External Funds are now financing over 40 percent of the activities carried out by Operational units, including half of the Bank's Country Engagement (CE) work. All categories of EF grew strongly in 2014, bringing the total growth to over 13 percent for that year. For 2016 the budget envelope of $2,530 million was approved, including external funds at $3,869 million.[131]

The graph below indicates the growth of external fund by category[132]

The table below indicates the budget share by work program and funding source.

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[129] World Bank. Budget 2016, p. 19
[130] World Bank 2016, p. 6
[131] World Bank 2016, p. 15
[132] World Bank 2016, p. 20

Budget share by work program and funding source

in %[1]	BB			External Funds (CRR+BETF)[2]			All Funds		
Budget by Work Program & Funding Source	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY16	FY17	FY18
Client Engagement									
Country Engagement (CE)	20.8%	21.0%	21.5%	48.6%	48.9%	48.9%	29.3%	29.9%	30.7%
Global Engagement (GE)	2.9%	2.8%	2.8%	14.2%	14.1%	14.0%	6.3%	6.4%	6.6%
CGIAR	1.1%	TBD	TBD	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	TBD	TBD
Other Operational Activities Related to Grants	1.4%	TBD	TBD	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	TBD	TBD
Sub Total	26.3%	24.7%	24.7%	62.7%	63.0%	62.9%	37.3%	36.9%	37.6%
Cost of Running the Business				0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Program Management (PPM)	13.3%	13.6%	14.0%	0.8%	0.7%	0.7%	9.5%	9.5%	9.5%
Global Practice/CCSA Management (PPM)	7.9%	8.0%	8.0%	6.5%	6.4%	6.4%	7.5%	7.5%	7.4%
Institutional, Governance & Administrative (IGA)	38.0%	37.2%	38.2%	24.7%	24.1%	23.5%	33.9%	33.0%	33.3%
Sub Total	59.2%	58.8%	60.2%	31.9%	31.3%	30.6%	50.9%	50.0%	50.2%
Total All Units	85.5%	83.5%	84.9%	94.6%	94.2%	93.4%	88.2%	86.9%	87.8%
Centrally-managed Accounts (CMA)									
o/w Institional Programs	3.9%	3.2%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	2.2%	1.1%
o/w Earmarked Funding	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
o/w Centrally-managed Staff Expenses	28.9%	31.5%	33.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.2%	21.5%	21.9%
o/w Centrally-managed Recoveries	-22.1%	-23.5%	-25.1%	5.4%	5.8%	6.9%	-13.8%	-14.2%	-14.4%
o/w Centrally-managed Depreciation	2.8%	3.4%	3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	2.3%	2.4%
o/w Centrally-managed Flexibility	0.4%	1.1%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.8%	0.8%
Sub Total	14.5%	16.5%	15.1%	5.4%	5.8%	6.9%	11.8%	13.1%	12.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Funded by IBRD/IDA	**93.9%**	**93.6%**	**93.2%**	**0.0%**	**0.0%**	**0.0%**	**65.4%**	**63.7%**	**61.7%**

6. Benchmark - Levy on extra-budgetary resources [133]

The international organisations included in the benchmark have a % levy on extra-budgetary receipts, with the exception of the OECD which has a two-tier system similar to that in place at the Council of Europe.

As can be seen from the table hereafter, the fixed percentage levy varies from one organisation to another (ranging mostly from 3% to 13%). The UN system organisations - have different fixed percentage rates depending on the nature of the project concerned and the donor (cf. Appendix).

International organisation	Type of cost recovery system in place	Rate of % levy	Rate of staff-based levy, if applicable	Comments
OECD	two-tier system	6.3%: 3.75% for central services and 2.55% for beneficiary/recipients areas	€16,192	very similar to system in place at CoE
OSCE/ODIHR	usually expressed as fixed % of direct costs but may also be expressed as fixed sum	8% bilateral donors % institutional donor subject to negotiation 7% EU grants	NA	
WTO	fixed % levy	13%	NA	
IAEA	fixed % levy	standard rate of 7% ranges from 3% (contribution exclusively or primarily for procurement) to 12% (Junior Professional Officer Programme)	NA	no charge for extra-bugetary contributions of €10,000 or less
ECMWF	recovery of direct costs and service cost per FTE charged to externally-funded projects	recovery of direct costs 17%	NA	FTE applied rate £32,407 ie €40,797
UNITED NATIONS	fixed % levy	13% starndard	NA	the 13% is the standard rate for all UN system organizations, however, as can be seen hereafter, lower rates are usually applied
UNDP	fixed % levy	minimum 7% Trust funds/3rd party cost sharing contributions minimum 3% Programme Country Cost-Sharing	NA	
UNICEF	fixed % levy	7%	NA	background supporting documentation missing
ICAO	fixed % levy	from 3% to 13% 5%-7% for the European Commission	NA	see Appendix for details
ILO	fixed % levy	from 10% to 13%	NA	see Appendix for details
IMO	fixed % levy	from 10% to 13% reduced rate for European Commission and World Bank	NA	see Appendix for details
UNCTAD	fixed % levy	from 0% to 13%	NA	see Appendix for details
UNESCO	fixed % levy	from 5% to 13% European Commission: rates are negotiated for every agreement to reflect the costs linked to the support requirements of each project	NA	see Appendix for details
UNFPA	fixed % levy	from 3% to 12%	NA	see Appendix for details
UNIDO	fixed % levy	from 10 to 13%	NA	see Appendix for details
WHO	fixed % levy	from 0 to 13%	NA	see Appendix for details
WORLD BANK	fixed % levy	7%	NA	background supporting documentation missing

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[133] CM (2013)12326 September 20131185 (Budget) Meeting, Administrative expenses levies on extra-budgetary resources

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