MASS SURVEILLANCE

The highly complex forms of terrorism require States to take effective measures to defend themselves, including mass monitoring of communications. Unlike “targeted” surveillance (covert collection of conversations, telecommunications and metadata by technical means – “bugging”), “strategic” surveillance (or mass surveillance) does not necessarily start with a suspicion against a particular person or persons. It has a proactive element, aimed at identifying a danger rather than investigating a known threat. Herein lay both the value it can have for security operations, and the risks it can pose for individual rights.

Nevertheless, Member States do not have unlimited powers in this area. Mass surveillance of citizens is tolerable under the Convention only if it is strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions. Taking into account considerable potential to infringe fundamental rights to privacy and to freedom of expression enshrined by the Convention, Member States must ensure that the development of surveillance methods resulting in mass data collection is accompanied by the simultaneous development of legal safeguards securing respect for citizens’ human rights.

According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, it would be counter to governments’ efforts to keep terrorism at bay if the terrorist threat were substituted with a perceived threat of unfettered executive power intruding into citizens’ private lives. It is of the utmost importance that the domestic legislation authorizing far-reaching surveillance techniques and prerogatives provides for adequate and sufficient safeguards in order to minimize the risks for the freedom of expression and the right to privacy which the “indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of communications” enables. The standards related to targeted surveillance identified in the case-law of the Court have therefore to be adapted to apply to strategic surveillance.

European Court of Human Rights’ relevant case-law


- **Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary** - no. 37138/14: Hungarian legislation on secret anti-terrorist surveillance through new technologies enabling to intercept masses of data: Judgment 12.1.2016: violation

- **Liberty and Others v. United Kingdom** - no. 58243/00: Interception by the Ministry of Defence of the external communications of civil liberties organisations on the basis of a warrant issued under wide discretionary powers: Judgment 1.07.2008: violation

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1 This document presents a non-exhaustive selection of the CoE instruments and of the European Court of Human Rights’ relevant case-law. This information is not a legal assessment of the alerts and should not be treated or used as such.
- **Weber and Saravia v. Germany** - no. 54934/00: Strategic monitoring of communications, in order to identify and avert serious dangers on the national territory such as an armed attack or terrorist attacks; appropriate safeguards regarding the media freedom. Decision 29.6.2006: inadmissible (manifestly ill founded)


- **Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands**: Secret service surveillance of journalists and order for them to surrender documents capable of identifying their sources. Judgment 22.11.2012: violation

- **Kennedy v. the United Kingdom**: Proportionality and suitable safeguards in the legislation on interception of internal communications. Judgment 18.05.2010: no violation

- **Klass et autres c. Allemagne**: Lack of notification of the surveillance measures and alleged lack of legal remedy when such measures are terminated. Judgment 6.9.1978: no violation

- **Mustafa Sezgin Tanrıkulu v. Turkey**: Domestic court decision granting permission to national intelligence services, despite any legal basis, to intercept all domestic and international communications in Turkey for one and a half months with a view to identifying terrorist suspects. Judgment on 18 July 2017: Violation

Pending cases:

- **Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v. the United Kingdom (no. 62322/14)** and **10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v. the United Kingdom (no. 24960/15)**: Blanket interception, storage and exploitation of communication allegedly amounting to disproportionate interference with journalistic freedom of expression: Applications communicated to the UK Government on 5.01 and 24.11.2015: pending


- **Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom** - no. 58170/13: Alleged indiscriminate capture and sharing of vast quantities of communication data by state security services. Communicated to the UK Government on 7.01.2014: pending

- **Hannes Tretter and Others against Austria**: Extended powers given to the police authorities by the Police Powers Act allegedly interfered with the right to freedom of expression and had a “chilling effect” on all users of communication technologies such as mobile phones or e-mails. Communicated to the Austrian Government on 5.05.2013: pending
Other Council of Europe relevant resources

**Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law)**

- Report on the democratic oversight of the security services: June 2007
- Report on the democratic oversight of signals intelligence agencies: March 2015

**Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights**

- Human Rights at Risk when Secret Surveillance Spreads (2013)
- Poland: Commissioner’s Press Release about his Visit to Poland: “Poland: Slow Down and Consult on Legislation to Avoid Human-Rights Backsliding" (2016)
- Germany: Shortcomings In the Oversight of German Intelligence and Security Services (2015)
- United Kingdom: Memorandum on surveillance and oversight mechanisms in the United Kingdom (May 2016)

**Parliamentary Assembly**


**Committee of Ministers**

- Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on Risks to Fundamental Rights stemming from Digital Tracking and other Surveillance Technologies (2013)
- Recommendation no. R (87) 15 of the committee of ministers to member states regulating the use of personal data in the police sector (1987)
- Recommendation no. R (95) 4 of the committee of ministers to member states on the protection of personal data in the area of telecommunication services, with particular reference to telephone services (1995)
SUMMARY OF THE MOST RELEVANT CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AREA OF MASS SURVEILLANCE

Proportionality and safeguards of Swedish legislation on signals intelligence

Centrum För Rättvisa v. Sweden - 35252/08
Judgment 19.6.2018

The applicant is a Swedish not-for-profit organisation who represents clients in litigation against the State and otherwise, who claim that their rights and freedoms under the Convention and under Swedish law have been violated. Due to the nature of its function as a non-governmental organisation scrutinising the activities of State actors, it believes that there is a risk that its communication through mobile telephones and mobile broadband has been or will be intercepted and examined by way of signals intelligence.

Law – Article 8: The contested legislation on signals intelligence instituted a system of secret surveillance that potentially affected all users of mobile telephone services and the internet, without their being notified about the surveillance. No domestic remedy provided detailed grounds in response to a complainant who suspected that he or she had their communications intercepted. Therefore, the mere existence of the contested legislation amounted in itself to an interference with the exercise of the applicant’s rights under Article 8. The relevant legislation was reviewed as it stood at the time of the examination by the Court. The measures permitted by Swedish law pursued legitimate aims in the interest of national security by supporting Swedish foreign, defence and security policy. While States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in deciding what type of interception regime is necessary to protect national security, the discretion afforded to them in operating an interception regime was necessarily narrower. In Roman Zakharov v. Russia, the Court had identified minimum safeguards that both bulk interception and other interception regimes had to incorporate in order to be sufficiently foreseeable to minimise the risk of abuses of power. Adapting those minimum safeguards where necessary to reflect the operation of a bulk interception regime dealing exclusively with national security issues, the Court assessed the impugned interference from the standpoint of the following criteria:

(i) Accessibility of domestic law: All legal provisions relevant to signals intelligence had been officially published and were accessible to the public.

(ii) Scope of application of signals intelligence: The eight purposes for which signals intelligence could be conducted were adequately indicated in the Signals Intelligence Act. Signals intelligence conducted on fibre optic cables could only concern communications crossing the Swedish border in cables owned by a communications service provider. Communications between a sender and a receiver in Sweden were not to be intercepted, regardless whether the source had been airborne or cable-based. The National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) could also intercept signals as part of its development activities which could lead to data not relevant for the regular foreign intelligence being intercepted and read. However, the development activities were essential for the proper functioning of the foreign intelligence and the information obtained could be used only in conformity with the purposes established by law and the applicable tasking directives. Provisions applicable to the regular foreign intelligence work were also relevant to the development activities and to any interception of communications data. The Data Protection Authority had found no evidence that personal data had
been collected for other purposes than those stipulated for the signals intelligence activities. While the Police authorities were allowed to issue detailed tasking directives for signals intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Act clearly excluded the use of foreign intelligence to solve tasks in the area of law enforcement or crime prevention. Consequently, the law indicated the scope of mandating and performing signals intelligence conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity.

(iii) **Duration of secret surveillance measures**: The Signals Intelligence Act clearly indicated the period after which a permit would expire and the conditions under which it could be renewed but not the circumstances in which interception had to be discontinued. Nevertheless, any permit was valid for a maximum of six months and a renewal required a review as to whether the conditions were still met. Although the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate was not tasked with inspecting every signals intelligence permit, it could decide that an intelligence interception should cease, if during an inspection it was evident that the interception was not in accordance with a permit. The permits concerned the collection of intelligence related to threats to national security and did not target individuals suspected of criminal conduct. The FRA continuously reviewed whether the specific personal data it had intercepted was still needed for its signals intelligence activities. In these circumstances, the safeguards in place adequately regulated the duration, renewal and cancellation of interception measures.

(iv) **Authorisation of secret surveillance measures**: While the privacy protection representative could not appeal against a decision by the Foreign Intelligence Court or report any perceived irregularities to the supervisory bodies, the presence of the representative at the court’s examinations compensated, to a limited degree, for the lack of transparency concerning that court’s proceedings and decisions. Additionally, the FRA’s signals intelligence was subject to a system of prior authorisation whereby the FRA had to submit for independent examination an application for a permit to conduct surveillance in respect of each intelligence collection mission. The task of examining whether the mission was compatible with applicable legislation and whether the intelligence collection was proportional to the resultant interference with personal integrity was entrusted to a body whose presiding members were or had been judges. Furthermore, the supervision of the Foreign Intelligence Court was extensive as the FRA, in its applications, had to specify not only the mission request in question and the need for the intelligence sought but also the signal carriers to which access was needed and the search terms that would be used. The judicial supervision performed by the Foreign Intelligence Court was of crucial importance in that it limited the FRA’s discretion by interpreting the scope of mandating and performing signals intelligence. Finally, the FRA itself could decide to grant a permit, if it was feared that the application of a permit from the Foreign Intelligence Court might cause delay or other inconveniences of essential importance for one of the specified purposes of the signals intelligence. However, such a decision had to be followed by an immediate notification to and a subsequent rapid review by the Foreign Intelligence Court where the permit could be changed or revoked. Therefore, the provisions and procedures relating to the system of prior court authorisation, on the whole, provided important guarantees against abuse.

(v) **Procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the intercepted data**: Personnel at the FRA treating personal data were security cleared and, if secrecy applied to the personal data, subject to confidentiality. They were under an obligation to handle the personal data in a safe manner and could face criminal sanctions if personal data were mismanaged. Furthermore, the FRA had to ensure that personal data was collected only for certain expressly stated and justified purposes, determined by the direction of the foreign intelligence activities through tasking directives. The personal data treated also had to be adequate and relevant in relation to the purpose of the treatment and no
more than was necessary for that purpose could be processed. All reasonable efforts had to be made to
correct, block and destroy personal data which was incorrect or incomplete in relation to the purpose.
Several provisions regulated the situations when intercepted data had to be destroyed. While it was
necessary for the FRA to store raw material before it could be manually processed, the Court stressed
the importance of deleting such data as soon as it was evident that it lacked pertinence for a signals
intelligence mission. In sum, the legislation provided adequate safeguards against abuse of treatment of
personal data and thus served to protect individuals' personal integrity.

(vi) Conditions for communicating the intercepted data to other parties: The legislation did not indicate
that possible harm to the individual concerned had to be considered, only in very broad terms
mentioned that the data could be communicated to "other states or international organisations" and
there was no provision requiring the recipient to protect the data with similar safeguards as those
applicable under Swedish law. Also the situation where data could be communicated – when necessary
for "international defence and security cooperation" – opened up a wide scope of discretion. While
those factors gave some cause for concern with respect to the possible abuse of the rights of individuals,
they were sufficiently counterbalanced by the supervisory elements.

(vii) Supervision of the implementation of secret surveillance measures: The Court found no reason to
question the independence of the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate. The supervision of the Inspectorate
was efficient, open to public scrutiny and of particular value in ensuring that signals intelligence was
performed in a manner which offered adequate safeguards against abuse. Furthermore, if the Data
Protection Authority found personal data was or could be processed illegally, it took remedial action
through remarks to the FRA and could also apply to an administrative court to have illegally processed
personal data destroyed. The supervisory elements provided by the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate
and the Data Protection Authority fulfilled the requirements on supervision in general. Moreover, the
Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice had general supervisory responsibilities in
regard to the FRA.

(viii) Notification of secret surveillance measures and available remedies: While the requirement to
notify the subject of secret surveillance measures concerned natural persons and was thus not
applicable to the applicant, and as it was, in any event, devoid of practical significance due to secrecy,
the Court found it pertinent to examine the issue of notification together with the remedies available in
Sweden. The remedies available for complaints relating to secret surveillance did not include the
recourse to a court, save for an appeal against the FRA’s decisions on disclosure and corrective
measures, remedies found to be ineffective. Furthermore, there did not appear to be a possibility for an
individual to be informed of whether his or her communications had actually been intercepted or,
generally, to be given reasoned decisions. Nevertheless, there were several remedies by which an
individual could initiate an examination of the lawfulness of measures taken during the operation of the
signals intelligence system, notably through requests to the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate, the
Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice. The aggregate of remedies, although not
providing a full and public response to the objections raised by a complainant, had to be considered
sufficient in the present context. In reaching that conclusion, the Court attached importance to the
earlier stages of supervision of the regime, including the detailed judicial examination by the Foreign
Intelligence Court of the FRA’s requests for permits to conduct signals intelligence and the extensive and
partly public supervision by several bodies, in particular the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate.

In sum, although there was scope for improvement in some areas, the Swedish system of signals
intelligence, examined in abstracto, revealed no significant shortcomings in its structure and operation,
which were proportionate to the aim pursued, and provided adequate and sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. That finding did not preclude a review of the State’s liability under the Convention where, for example, the applicant had been made aware of an actual interception.

Conclusion: no violation of Article 8

**Hungarian legislation on secret anti-terrorist surveillance through new technologies enabling to intercept masses of data. Insufficient guarantees against abuse**

**Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary – no. 37138/14**
**Judgment 12.1.2016**

This case concerned Hungarian legislation on secret anti-terrorist surveillance introduced in 2011. The applicants complained in particular that they could potentially be subjected to unjustified and disproportionately intrusive measures within the Hungarian legal framework on secret surveillance for national security purposes (namely, “section 7/E (3) surveillance”). They notably alleged that this legal framework was prone to abuse, notably for want of judicial control.

In this case the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It accepted that it was a natural consequence of the forms taken by present-day terrorism that governments resort to cutting-edge technologies, including massive monitoring of communications, in pre-empting impending incidents. However, the Court was not convinced that the legislation in question provided sufficient safeguards to avoid abuse. Notably, the scope of the measures could include virtually anyone in Hungary, with new technologies enabling the Government to intercept masses of data easily concerning even persons outside the original range of operation. Furthermore, the ordering of such measures was taking place entirely within the realm of the executive and without an assessment of whether interception of communications was strictly necessary and without any effective remedial measures, let alone judicial ones, being in place. The Court further held that there had been no violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention taken together with Article 8, reiterating that Article 13 could not be interpreted as requiring a remedy against the state of domestic law.

**Interception by the Ministry of Defence of the external communications of civil-liberties organisations on the basis of a warrant issued under wide discretionary powers**

**Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom – no. 58243/00**
**Judgment 1.7.2008**

The applicants, a British and two Irish civil liberties’ organisations, alleged that, between 1990 and 1997, their telephone, facsimile, e-mail and data communications, including legally privileged and confidential information, were intercepted by an Electronic Test Facility operated by the British Ministry of Defence. They had lodged complaints with the Interception of Communications Tribunal, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to challenge the lawfulness of the alleged interception of their communications, but to no avail.

The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It did not consider that the domestic law at the relevant time indicated with sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the authorities to intercept and examine external communications. In particular, it did not, as required by the Court’s case-law, set out in a form accessible to the public any indication of the procedure to be followed for selecting for examination, sharing, storing and destroying intercepted
material. The interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 was not, therefore, “in accordance with the law”.

**Strategic monitoring of telecommunications. Sufficient safeguards regarding media freedom**

**Weber and Saravia v. Germany - no. 54934/00**

**Decision 29.6.2006**

The applicants – the first one was a freelance journalist and the second one was taking telephone messages for the first applicant and passed them on to her – claimed in particular that certain provisions of the 1994 Fight against Crime Act amending the 1968 Act on Restrictions on the Secrecy of Mail, Post and Telecommunications, in their versions as interpreted and modified by the Federal Constitutional Court in a judgment of 14 July 1999, violated their right to respect for their private life and their correspondence.

Article 8 - The Court declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible. Having regard to all the impugned provisions of the amended G 10 Act in their legislative context, it found that there existed adequate and effective guarantees against abuses of the State’s strategic monitoring powers. The Court was therefore satisfied that Germany, within its fairly wide margin of appreciation in that sphere, was entitled to consider the interferences with the secrecy of telecommunications resulting from the impugned provisions to have been necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and for the prevention of crime. **Manifestly ill-founded.**

Article 10 – The first applicant submitted that the amended G 10 Act prejudiced the work of journalists investigating issues targeted by surveillance measures. She could no longer guarantee that information she received in the course of her journalistic activities remained confidential. In the Court’s view, the threat of surveillance constitutes interference to her right, in her capacity as a journalist, to freedom of expression. The Court finds that this interference is prescribed by law and pursues a legitimate aim. As to its necessity in a democratic society, the Court notes that strategic surveillance was not aimed at monitoring journalists; surveillance measures were not directed at uncovering journalistic sources. It is true that the impugned provisions of the amended G 10 Act did not contain special rules safeguarding the protection of freedom of the press and, in particular, the non-disclosure of sources, once the authorities had become aware that they had intercepted a journalist’s conversation. However, the Court observes that the impugned provisions contained numerous safeguards to keep the interference with the secrecy of telecommunications – and therefore with the freedom of the press – within the limits of what was necessary to achieve the legitimate aims pursued. In particular, the safeguards which ensured that data obtained were used only to prevent certain serious criminal offences must also be considered adequate and effective for keeping the disclosure of journalistic sources to an unavoidable minimum. **Manifestly ill-founded.**

**Lack of notification of the surveillance measures and alleged lack of legal remedy when such measures are terminated**

**Klass and Others v. Germany**

**Judgment 6 September 1978**

In this case the applicants, five German lawyers, complained in particular about legislation in Germany empowering the authorities to monitor their correspondence and telephone communications without obliging the authorities to inform them subsequently of the measures taken against them.
The European Court of Human Rights held that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, finding that the German legislature was justified to consider the interference resulting from the contested legislation with the exercise of the right guaranteed by Article 8 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and for the prevention of disorder or crime. The Court observed in particular that powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterising as they do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions. Noting, however, that democratic societies nowadays find themselves threatened by highly sophisticated forms of espionage and by terrorism, with the result that the State must be able, in order effectively to counter such threats, to undertake the secret surveillance of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction, the Court considered that the existence of some legislation granting powers of secret surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications was, under exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and/or for the prevention of disorder or crime.

Proportionality and suitable safeguards in the legislation on interception of internal communications

Kennedy v. the United Kingdom
Judgment 18.05.2010

Suspecting police interception of his communications after he had started a small business, the applicant complained to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). He was eventually informed in 2005 that no determination had been made in his favour in respect of his complaints. This meant either that his communications had not been intercepted or that the IPT considered any interception to be lawful. No further information was provided by the IPT. The applicant complained about the alleged interception of his communications.

The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, finding that UK law on interception of internal communications together with the clarifications brought by the publication of a Code of Practice indicated with sufficient clarity the procedures for the authorisation and processing of interception warrants as well as the processing, communicating and destruction of data collected. Moreover, there was no evidence of any significant shortcomings in the application and operation of the surveillance regime. Therefore, and having regard to the safeguards against abuse in the procedures as well as the more general safeguards offered by the supervision of the Commissioner and the review of the IPT, the impugned surveillance measures, in so far as they might have been applied to the applicant, had been justified under Article 8 of the Convention.

Inadequate and ineffective guarantees against arbitrariness of the domestic system of covert interception of communications

Roman Zakharov v. Russia
Judgment 4 December 2015

This case concerned the system of secret interception of mobile telephone communications in Russia. The applicant, an editor-in-chief of a publishing company, complained in particular that mobile network operators in Russia were required by law to install equipment enabling law-enforcement agencies to carry out operational-search activities and that, without sufficient safeguards under Russian law, this permitted blanket interception of communications.

The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, finding that the Russian legal provisions governing interception of communications did not provide for adequate and effective
guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse which was inherent in any system of secret surveillance, and which was particularly high in a system such as in Russia where the secret services and the police had direct access, by technical means, to all mobile telephone communications. In particular, the Court found shortcomings in the legal framework in the following areas: the circumstances in which public authorities in Russia are empowered to resort to secret surveillance measures; the duration of such measures, notably the circumstances in which they should be discontinued; the procedures for authorising interception as well as for storing and destroying the intercepted data; the supervision of the interception. Moreover, the effectiveness of the remedies available to challenge interception of communications was undermined by the fact that they were available only to persons who were able to submit proof of interception and that obtaining such proof was impossible in the absence of any notification system or possibility of access to information about interception.

Indiscriminate capture and sharing of vast quantities of communication data by state security services

**Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom – no. 58170/13**

The applicants are three non-governmental organisations based in London and an academic based in Berlin, all of whom work internationally in the fields of privacy and freedom of expression. Their applications to the Court were triggered by media coverage, following the leak of information by Edward Snowden about the use by the United States of America and the United Kingdom of technologies permitting the indiscriminate capture of vast quantities of communication data and the sharing of such data between the two States.

The applicants allege that they are likely to have been the subject of generic surveillance by the UK Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) and/or that the UK security services may have been in receipt of foreign intercept material relating to their electronic communications. They contend that the generic interception of external communications by GCHQ, merely on the basis that such communications have been transmitted by transatlantic fibre-optic cables, is an inherently disproportionate interference with the private lives of thousands, perhaps millions, of people. **Pending**

Blanket interception, storage and exploitation of communication allegedly amounting to disproportionate interference with journalistic freedom of expression

**Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v. the United Kingdom (no. 62322/14) and 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v. the United Kingdom (no. 24960/15)**

This cases concern the allegations of the applicants – the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and an investigative reporter who has worked for the Bureau – regarding the interception of both internet and telephone communications by government agencies in the United Kingdom, and, in particular, by the Government Communication Headquaters (GCHQ), as revealed by Edward Snowden, a former systems administrator with the United States National Security Agency (the NSA). The applicants mainly complain that the blanket interception, storage and exploitation of communication amount to disproportionate interference with journalistic freedom of expression. **Pending**

Compatibility the French surveillance law with the need to protect the journalistic sources

**Association confraternelle de la presse judiciaire and others v. France - no. 49526/15**

These applications, which were lodged by lawyers and journalists, as well as legal persons connected with these professions, concern the French Intelligence Act of 24 July 2015. **Pending**