

**STANDING COMMITTEE (T-RV)**

**EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON SPECTATOR VIOLENCE  
AND MISBEHAVIOUR AT SPORT EVENTS AND IN  
PARTICULAR AT FOOTBALL MATCHES**

COUNCIL OF EUROPE



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**Standing Committee  
Consultative visit to France**

17-19 April 2015

Report by the Consultative Team  
(including the National report by France)

**Adopted by the Standing Committee  
at its 42<sup>nd</sup> meeting on 26 May 2016**

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## **Section A Visit Background and Explanation**

### **A.1 Structure of Report**

This report has four inter-related sections on:

- (A) Background and Explanation;
- (B) Safety and Security Preparations for the UEFA EURO 2016;
- (C) Legacy - Generic Advice on the Security and Services Arrangements for National and International Sports Events;
- (D) Conclusion and Summary of Recommendations.

In addition, an Action Plan to be completed by the French authorities is at **Appendix A**.

All of the advice provided is based on extensive European experience and good practice and is intended to support the French authorities in making sports venues safe, secure and welcoming to spectators.

### **A.2 Purpose of the Visit**

In June 2013, as a result of discussions between representatives of the French T-RV delegation and the Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches (hereafter described as the Standing Committee) it was agreed that a Standing Committee delegation (hereafter described as the *delegation*) should undertake a consultative visit and propose recommendations on the safety and security arrangements for the UEFA EURO 2016 to be hosted by France.

The consultative visit was primarily aimed at the arrangements for UEFA EURO 2016, but included consideration of some core elements of the national arrangements for preventing and tackling violence and disorder in connection with domestic and football events generally. EURO 2016 safety and security preparations cannot be seen in isolation from the national provisions in this area, due to the important overlapping and interlink of these two elements. Also, the early stage of the safety and security preparations for this major event at the time of the visit contributed to the extensive overview of the French system, which will be the foundation of the safety and security arrangements adopted for the EURO 2016 by state authorities and private partners.

### **A.3 Visit Itinerary**

The visit was designed to enable the *delegation* to meet with, *inter alia*, representatives of:

The Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Interior,  
Inter-ministerial Delegation for Major sports Events, hereafter described as DIGES,  
The “Préfecture de Police” of Paris,

EURO 2016 SAS (the event organising committee being a joint company, owned 95% by UEFA and 5% by the French Football Federation), hereafter described as SAS,  
French Prosecutor's Office,  
French Football Federation (FFF),  
French Professional Football League (LPF),  
LOSC Lille, and  
Football supporter representatives.

The *delegation* was also provided with opportunity to visit the football stadium in Lille and observe at first hand the safety and security operation in connection with the Ligue 1 football match between LOSC Lille and Girondins de Bordeaux played at the "Pierre Mauroy" Stadium on 19th of April 2015.

#### **A.4 Standing Committee Delegation**

The delegation comprised:

Ana Criado Contreras, Chair ad interim of the Standing Committee, Delegate of Spain and Delegation Leader;  
Christoph Lipp, German Ministry of Interior and Delegate of Germany;  
Adrian Dincă, National Football Information Point of Romania (NFIP), Delegate of Romania and Rapporteur;  
Ken Scott, Sports Grounds Safety Authority (SGSA), Delegate of UK;  
Sergey Khrychikov, Head of the Secretariat of the Standing Committee, Council of Europe;  
Marie-Francoise Glatz, Secretariat of the Standing Committee, Council of Europe;  
Floriane Cavet, Secretariat of the Standing Committee, Council of Europe.

#### **A.5 Supporting Documentation**

To assist the visit, DIGES provided the *delegation* with a National report consisting of translated extracts of relevant legislation, including the Criminal Code, Intellectual Property Code, Customs Code, Consumers Code and Commercial Code.

The Report provided information on the tournament arrangements, along with an outline of the tournament security concepts/strategies inside and outside of stadia. As with all UEFA football tournaments, the safety and security arrangements inside stadia, and other official events will fall under the auspices of the event organising committee - SAS.

The *delegation* is extremely grateful to the French authorities for providing the documentation and for the excellent organisation of the visit. The *delegation* would also like to thank all of the interlocutors for their patience and willingness to enter into meaningful and positive discussion throughout the visit.

## **A.6 Status of Report**

The *delegation* is aware that in such a short duration and within a very tight schedule, it was not possible to conduct an in-depth assessment of every aspect of the safety and security preparations for UEFA EURO 2016 and acknowledges the possibility that some questions or remarks may have got lost in interpretation or translation. Moreover, the *delegation* can only comment on what it was told and what it observed which may not necessarily be wholly indicative of the wider situation in France.

The *delegation* wishes to stress that the aim of this report is not to criticise, but to support and assist the French authorities and other relevant stakeholders through the provision of external and expert observation in the field of safety and security at sports events.

This is important as safety and security arrangements are and must remain the means of each national state. This report and any subsequent advice are not intended to undermine that core principle.

Moreover, it is neither possible nor desirable to provide definitive models of application in view of wide variations in the constitutional, judicial, policing, cultural, and historical circumstances, and the equally varied character and severity of football-related incidents and risks, among and within each country.

## **Section B UEFA EURO 2016 - Safety and Security Preparations**

### **B.1 Background Information**

Together with the World Cup and the Olympics, the European Football Championships is one of the three major global sports events. Organizing such a tournament places major demands and responsibilities on all the authorities in the host country, notably in respect of ensuring the safety and security of the participating teams and staff, visiting supporters and local communities.

UEFA EURO 2016, the 15th European Championships, will take place from 10th of June to 10th of July 2016 in 10 different venues across France (Saint-Denis, Paris, Marseille, Lille, Lyon, Lens, Bordeaux, Nice, Toulouse and Saint Etienne), involving the participation of 24 national teams and comprising 51 matches. The associated safety and security challenges are compounded by UEFA EURO 2016 being the largest ever European Championships.

It is anticipated by the host authorities that 2,5 million spectators will attend matches with over 7 million enjoying the event in 10 official fan zones (one in each venue location) accommodating between 20.000 and 120.000 people.

### **B.2 Integrated Approach to Safety, Security and Service**

Adopting an integrated, multi-agency approach to safety, security and service is imperative when hosting major tournaments and in organising the annual calendar of national and international

football events. Extensive European experience and established good practice demonstrates that this approach is crucial in helping to reduce risks associated with sport events because all three pillars are inter-related and overlap. No one agency and no element of a wider strategy can prevent or tackle safety or security risks in isolation. It is imperative, therefore, that all agencies work together to ensure that the various operations are complementary.

It is recognised that in some European languages the terms "safety" and "security" share a common definition. As a consequence, attempting to explain the three pillars can pose difficulties. However, European good practice evidences the importance of distinguishing between the two concepts. For ease of reference, therefore, the following outline definitions have been found to be useful:

"safety" is generally interpreted as incorporating measures designed to protect the health and safety of individuals in their capacity as spectators at an event or members of the wider community;

"security" is generally interpreted as incorporating measures intended to prevent or respond to criminal and anti-social behaviour inside and outside of arenas and other sports stadia;

"service" is generally interpreted as including a wide range of measures (services) designed to meet the needs of individuals in a manner that makes them feel comfortable, appreciated, welcome and active participants in an event - it also embraces a range of preventative measures like sports-related community projects and supporter engagement.

The above categories or pillars are only used for ease of reference and it is imperative to recognise that initiatives developed under one of the three headings are bound to overlap and/or impact on the other two, given the extent to which they are inter-related.

The key to successful delivery of the integrated concept centres on the adoption of a strategic approach and the need for the integrated approach to be co-ordinated effectively at national and local level.

This ethos lies at the heart of this report and its recommendations.

### **B.3 Strategic Co-ordination**

In order to ensure that a coherent and integrated safety, security and service strategy is developed and implemented effectively at international, national and local level, government-led national co-ordination arrangements need to be in place and refined in the light of national experience, emerging trends and national and international good practice.

This dynamic reinforces the need for that co-ordination to be strategic and multi-agency in character and not just event specific. This is important as event arrangements should be based on the concepts, partnership ethos, infrastructure, strategy and operational arrangements established

at a national level. Experience demonstrates that this can greatly assist in applying the arrangements to a particular football (and, where appropriate, other major sports) event.

During the consultative visit, it was clear that governmental agencies and sports bodies already co-operate in terms of event planning. In 2013, the French Government set up a high level committee, called DIGES, tasked to co-ordinate and to facilitate a multi-agency approach in respect of all the major sport events hosted in France. DIGES functions under the auspices of the French Ministry of Youth and Sports and comprises high ranking officials from the foreign affairs, education, justice, finance, defence, social affairs, work, interior, agriculture, economy and culture ministries.

DIGES will oversee also the necessary preparations for the UEFA EURO 2016, in close co-operation with the national organising committee (SAS) and the 10 local organising committees. The work of DIGES is overseen regularly by the Prime Minister, with the Ministry of Interior being the lead governmental department in respect of safety and security. An action plan for UEFA EURO 2016 was prepared with specific tasks and deadlines set for all of authorities involved. These tasks form the basis of UEFA EURO 2016 preparations and operations.

The delegation is of the view that the DIGES arrangement provides an appropriate co-ordination mechanism for strategic oversight of tournament preparations.

#### **B.4 Operational Co-ordination**

The delegation was advised that during UEFA EURO 2016, operational oversight of the event will be managed in a "Crisis Management Centre" (CMC) headed by the Ministry of Interior with representatives of all relevant bodies, including the organiser and local authorities, participating in integrated control arrangement.

In the event of an incident or emerging threat, the Ministry of Interior, in consultation with co-located partner agencies, will determine the response and the lead agency. Local crisis management cells will also be set up in each of the 10 host cities headed by the local prefect who will report to the CMC. The prefect is the representative of the Government at local level, being tasked to coordinate all the local services (police, fire, ambulance etc.).

Whilst the *delegation* acknowledges that the CMC arrangement will provide strategic leadership and accountability, it was not altogether clear of the extent to which the local prefect would be reliant upon the CMC to determine the response to emerging local safety and security risks, given the established need for early and targeted interventions to prevent the escalation of minor incidents and an increase in the risk of an inappropriate and disproportionate response arising from delay or remote decision making. This is a potentially crucial issue which is pursued later in this report (see Section B.6 below).



## **B.5 Legislative and Regulatory Framework**

An important pre-requisite for any safety and security strategy is a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework. During the visit, the *delegation* was told that existing legislative provision for tackling football violence, and associated safety and security matters was adequate and that it was not necessary to update it or customise it for UEFA EURO 2016.

However, subsequent discussions revealed that this was not entirely the case. For example, an issue frequently raised during the visit focused on concern about an insufficient number of professional stewards for UEFA EURO 2016 venues and the associated legal obligation for all individuals undertaking security activities (including stewards) to have obtained a professional certificate.

It was reported that to overcome this shortfall, a temporary legislative measure would be introduced for UEFA EURO 2016 whereby stewards would be certified on the basis a substantive reduction in the amount of training received (70 hours instead of 140). The proposed measure may represent a practical response to a challenging circumstance but it will be essential to ensure that all certified stewards are assessed as being competent to undertake effectively all of their crucial safety, security and service functions. This matter is pursued further below (see Section B.9 below).

## **UEFA EURO 2016 - Security**

### **B.6 Policing UEFA EURO 2016**

The French public order forces (police and gendarmerie) are experienced in dealing with major sports events, such as the FIFA World Cup 1998 and the annual Tour de France, which involve a large number of participants. The 1998 World Cup experienced a number of major public order incidents and it is expected that many lessons will have been learned from that experience.

It is clear that policing the UEFA EURO 2016 will require a major nationwide public safety and public security strategy. Early estimates suggest that the total costs of policing the tournament will amount to around 30 million Euros. Moreover, the demand on police resources will be exacerbated by having to simultaneously manage the Tour de France, First World War battle commemorations, and an influx of tourists visiting for their summer holidays.

In terms of public order risk, always a key consideration for policing strategists, police representatives stressed that supporters of the French national team were well behaved and unlikely to pose any risks to visiting supporters. This assessment is consistent with widespread European perceptions of the behaviour of these supporters. However, European experience demonstrates that whilst risk groups associated with domestic club sides are unlikely to attend or cause problems in stadia, they may pose a risk to visiting supporters in public spaces on occasions. This potential risk will clearly need to be closely monitored during the tournament. The *delegation* is confident that this will be the case.

Perhaps a greater risk, and certainly one that was experienced during the FIFA World Cup 1998, centres on the possibility of clashes between large groups of local youths, mainly of an ethnic minority background, and visiting supporters. Experience shows that the reasons for this could include the mass influx of foreign supporters into areas usually populated by local communities, perceptions and stereotyping of some visiting supporters as racist, provocative behaviour by some visiting supporters and more besides. The FFF and LPF recognise this and have initiated some projects to engage with and reassure local communities (see Section B.14 below) but the risk was not fully addressed by the police or public authorities in discussions during the visit.

**Recommendation 1 - The police and relevant authorities should review the potential risk of local communities clashing with visiting supporters during the tournament and take further steps to simultaneously provide reassurance to both local communities and visiting supporters that the risk is being addressed by preventative action and, in parallel, by the adoption of a zero tolerance policy towards any form of racism or other forms of discrimination.**

In terms of the tournament policing strategy, the *delegation* was advised on several occasions that police deployment and operational decisions will be based on ongoing dynamic risk assessments and graded deployment, commencing in normal uniform with protective equipment only used where necessary. This approach is welcome, though European experience evidences that such an approach will need to be accompanied by the police adopting a policy of early and proportionate targeted police intervention to prevent the escalation of minor incidents and marginalise the influence of any supporters seeking or trying to provoke confrontation. This is the primary reason why the role of the CMC, as discussed above, is a source of some concern.

**Recommendation 2 - In accordance with European good practice, during UEFA EURO 2016 policing tactics, profile and uniform should be determined on the basis of: ongoing dynamic risk analyses; graded deployment, with protective equipment used only where necessary; and early targeted and proportionate interventions to prevent the escalation of risk.**

Continuing this theme, the importance of the police liaising with supporters cannot be underestimated. Extensive European experiences at a series of major football tournaments over the last decade has established that encouraging police personnel to adopt a welcoming and friendly approach towards supporters can be an extremely effective policing tactic. It is recognised that adopting such a policy can pose challenges and frustrations for the personnel concerned, especially if this is not routine procedure, and when having to manage a diverse assortment of visiting supporters with different cultures and speaking a variety of languages. It was reassuring, therefore, to learn that the authorities will invest in the training of the police personnel in the basic usage of foreign languages, in particular English which is widely used and understood by European supporters, and that multi-lingual police officers are being identified for crowd management activities. This is a highly positive and welcoming approach.

**Recommendation 3 - Police units likely to be deployed during UEFA EURO 2016 should be encouraged to proactively interact with and adopt a welcoming and friendly manner towards supporters.**

## **B.7 International Police Co-operation**

The challenges previously mentioned regarding language and cultural differences among visiting supporters reinforces the need for host policing operations to incorporate maximum usage of visiting police delegations, experienced and expert in the character and behaviour of supporters from their respective countries.

The police and public authorities are aware of the important role that these delegations can and do play in connection with international football events and have expressed a commitment to invite such delegations to support UEFA EURO 2016 policing operations.

They also expressed a commitment to negotiate bilateral governmental and police co-operation agreements with the Ministries of Interior of participating countries setting out logistical arrangements and the tasks of visiting police delegations during UEFA EURO 2016.

According to preliminary discussions, the police authorities estimate that the size of visiting police delegations will vary from 6 up to 8 persons, comprising a head of delegation, 2 liaison officers and 3 or 5 spotters. The size of the delegations will be subject to negotiations regarding the content of the bilateral agreements and will take account of the estimated number of supporters likely to travel to the tournament, level of risk and other significant matters.

A European model agreement which provides a basis for negotiating bilateral protocols on governmental and police co-operation, including visiting police delegation arrangements, is provided at **Appendix B**.

**Recommendation 4 - The relevant governmental authorities should use the European model agreement as a basis for negotiating bilateral protocols on governmental and police co-operation, including visiting police delegation arrangements.**

The *delegation* was also informed that all the members of visiting police delegation will have to work in uniform. This might be impossible for some European countries that require their spotters to work in plain clothes for health and safety or evidence gathering purposes.

**Recommendation 5 – The relevant authorities should consider negotiating on a country by country basis the use of plain clothes foreign spotters during UEFA EURO 2016, as part of wider governmental and police co-operation bilateral agreements.**

During UEFA EURO 2016, a Police International Co-ordination Centre (PICC) will be located in Paris and tasked to gather all the necessary information regarding the tournament and disseminate it to stakeholders. Two liaison officers from each participating country will be deployed in the PICC along with other host policing partner agencies. This is a standard practice which has proven to be highly effective at previous tournaments.

The national NFIP, which forms part of the DNLH (*Direction Nationale de Lutte contre le Hooliganisme*) structure, is responsible for co-ordinating the work of a national network of 99 police officers engaged in preventing and tackling football violence and disorder across France and is highly experienced in international police co-operation. It will play the lead role in the management of the PICC. This is an appropriate and welcome arrangement, especially as it was reported that additional staffing and other resources will be allocated to the NFIP in January 2016.

During the discussions, *the delegation* was informed that the internal affairs attaches from the Embassies of participating countries will be involved in the policing operations during UEFA EURO 2016. Unless such attaches are intended to undertake consular activities, the aim and purpose of this initiative is neither clear nor established good practice. Certainly few of the attaches will be expert or experienced in football policing operations, or the character and dynamic of visiting supporters. Extensive European experience evidences that the advice provided by visiting police delegations on such matters must be considered the primary source of information, not least in respect of the ongoing process of dynamic risk assessment.

**Recommendation 6 - The proposed role of internal affairs attaches from Embassies in policing operations should be reviewed and their potential role clarified.**

In preparation for the UEFA EURO 2016, joint exercises will be performed with the German police (October 2015) and English police (November 2015) regarding the arrangements for managing visiting supporters from their respective countries. This should significantly assist, clarify and facilitate cross border co-operation during the tournament.

In March 2016, a preparatory conference will be organised by the French authorities designed to bring together the heads of visiting police delegations, national team liaison officers (TLOs) and other parties involved in policing UEFA EURO 2016.

**B.8 Counter Terrorism**

The tragic terrorist attacks in Paris in January of this year certainly added to the challenges confronting UEFA EURO 2016 preparations, not least in terms of the logistical and resource demands associated with minimising the risk of terrorist incidents during the tournament.

Guidance on this matter are included in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events, which has been adopted at the 40<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Standing Committee on 18 June 2015.

However, the authorities are fully aware that the fundamental position is, and must remain, centred on the need for stadium security officers and sports event organisers to consult their national Counter Terrorism Police Liaison Officer (or whatever national terminology is used) whenever seeking advice or assistance in respect of all counter terrorism matters.

## UEFA EURO 2016 - Safety

### B.9 Safety inside Stadia

The arrangements for UEFA EURO 2016 will reflect the norm for major tournaments whereby the public authorities will be responsible for safety and security in public places with the organiser (SAS) responsible for safety and security inside stadia and in official fans zone. Police will be able to intervene upon request. It is not clear if such interventions will be undertaken by "SIR" (Service d'Intervention Rapide) units in plain clothes - see C.2 below.

Also in accordance with standard practice at UEFA tournaments, venue stadium management will prepare the stadia before handing over responsibility to the SAS on match days who will import their own designated safety management officer to oversee safety and security during the event. Whilst this is normal procedure, it was also reported that, in some cases, SAS would also import a safety officer rather than utilise the stadium safety officer within the safety management team. If true (this may have been an interpretation issue) this would be a matter of significant concern for the *delegation*.

The reported approach is contrary to established good practice given that the designated stadium safety officer should be infinitely more expert and experienced in the stadium layout, its strengths and weaknesses, and its safety management arrangements. If, an imported stadium safety officer is deployed in the safety management team, rather than the incumbent, then the proposed arrangement should have major implications for the stadium safety certificate and the designated maximum safe capacity within the stadium and each of its sectors, given that such capacity should be based on a range of calculations and considerations, including the quality of the safety management arrangements. The proposed hand-over arrangement could have a major impact on the latter consideration in particular.

**Recommendation 7 – Clarity is required in respect of the safety certification arrangements at each venue during the tournament; the arrangements for determining the safe capacity in stadia; designation of who is legally responsible for the safety of spectators and, in particular, the role of the permanent stadium safety officer in the SAS stadium safety management team in respect of UEFA EURO 2016 matches.**

A directly related concern centres who is responsible for assessing the levels of competence of stadium safety officers and safety management teams imported into a venue if it is decided to use personnel other than those who are normally employed and who are best placed to understand the layout and safety management arrangements at the venue, which could be crucial, especially in emergency scenarios.

**Recommendation 8 – In cases where safety officers and safety management teams are to be used which are not those normally the responsible persons within the venue, a thorough review of the competence of such people should be carried out by a competent authority and if any deficiencies are identified, appropriate amendments made to the safety management**

**arrangements factor and, as a consequence, the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.**

A further major linked concern centres on key stadium personnel not having been involved in the planning of the events within their venues. As the planning and preparation is now quite detailed and involves alteration to both venues and their immediate environs it would be prudent to engage as soon as possible with those who best know the venue and its operations.

**Recommendation 9 – To ensure a fully integrated safety operation, it is advised that SAS should forthwith contact and involve senior stadium safety management personnel in their stadium preparations.**

It was mentioned on a number of occasions that difficulty was being experienced in attracting sufficient numbers of trained and experienced stewards for tournament matches at each venue. To counter this difficulty, different recruitments strategies are envisaged. Recruitments could come from private security companies, unemployed people, young local job applicants or reserve from the gendarmerie.

As previously highlighted, due to the limited time available before the start of the tournament to train new stewards, it was intended to overcome the shortfall by introducing an abridged form of training which would cut the standard number of training hours by approximately 50%. Clearly this difficult situation requires careful management to ensure that required stewarding levels are met and that the training delivered is of the highest standards and covers all key areas of spectator safety.

This is crucial imperative given that a detailed understanding of the stadium layout is especially important during the tournament as most spectators arriving at the venue will be visiting for the first time and stewards will require high levels of knowledge on the stadium and possess customer care skills to assist and direct where necessary. These skills would also be crucial in assisting in any evacuation of the stadium under both normal and emergency conditions.

It was evident during the visit from the presentations and meetings arranged that at strategic level much thought and preparation has been invested in the planning for the tournament. The successful outcome of this good work is however crucially dependent upon the execution of those preparations by fully trained operatives of sufficient numbers and levels of competence. This concern will persist until such time as the deficiencies in stewarding staffing levels have been addressed.

**Recommendation 10 –The relevant authorities should ensure that adequate numbers of stewards are employed at each venue to demonstrate compliance with the safety certificate. Further, third party evaluation of stewarding training, qualification and competence should be carried out to ensure the necessary levels of safety management are delivered at each venue. Concerns in any of the above areas should result in the appropriate alteration of the stadium management factor and a reduction in the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.**

The *delegation* is of the view that adjustments/reductions will be necessary in respect of the maximum safe capacities at each venue stadium. A key material consideration in the setting of safe capacities is the prescribed egress time for spectators both under normal and emergency evacuation conditions. During the visit to LOSC stadium there was some confusion, possibly due to language difficulties, over how safe capacity levels should be established. In this regard those responsible for the re-evaluation of maximum safe capacities should take account of the good practice set out in the Annex A of the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events.

**Recommendation 11 – Full account should be taken of the good practice set out in the Annex A of the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events) in re-evaluating the maximum safe capacity levels for each venue stadium and its sectors.**

A further related concern centres on the possibility that the number of match tickets available for sale might exceed the maximum safe capacity at some venue stadia and their component sectors. It was reported that whilst 2.6 million tickets had been advertised for sale, it was currently planned to sell only 2.5 million in recognition of the expected reduction in stadium capacities.

Nevertheless, the *delegation* is concerned that a finite number of ticket sales have been agreed in advance of the maximum safe capacity being determined for each stadium. Moreover, established good practice evidences that calculation of the safe capacity can only be determined once stewarding levels and degrees of competence have been assessed. It was not clear to the *delegation* if any contingency plans are in place should sufficient numbers of competent stewards not be found, or if their competence is assessed as limited, and if there is an associated need for any reduction in maximum safe capacity, the consequence of which would mean that total capacity would be less than the 2.5 million tickets already sold.

**Recommendation 12 – The public and organising authorities should prepare contingency plans for dealing with possible scenarios in which the number of match tickets sold exceeds the modified maximum safe capacity of the relevant stadia and its viewing sectors.**

## **B.10 Stadium Safety Management**

The effectiveness of the stadium safety management arrangements determine whether or not participants and spectators can be provided with a safe, secure and welcoming environment within a stadium. One core principle of safety management centres on the efficacy of control room operations. European experience evidences the need for control room operating arrangements to ensure close and immediate contact between the stadium safety officer, the police and other agencies involved in delivering a safe event.

The *delegation* was informed that it was recognised that the SAS stadium safety management team would be responsible for safety inside the stadium but that in the event of a significant

incident within the stadium there was no standard procedure in place to hand over responsibility to the lead public body organisation, usually the police.

This apparent absence of a formal hand-over arrangement is matter of concern for the *delegation*. The potential for further confusion was also highlighted by a lack of clarity or effective line management between the SAS stadium safety manager and the head of any private security teams. The explanation provided was that the current arrangements are tried and tested and that respective personnel work well together without the need for formal arrangements. However, the importation of a SAS safety management team will require the establishment of more formal and documented arrangements. European experience demonstrates that such documentation can be provided by the introduction of what is widely described as a "statement of intent" in each stadium.

A statement of intent is not a legally binding document but rather a management document of record that both parties have committed themselves to abiding by specific areas of operational responsibility such as who is in charge of measures to monitor and control crowd movement and should take decisions to open or close gates or turnstiles. It could also include the circumstances in which the police shall take control of all or part of the stadium along with the formal procedures for handing over responsibility to the police and for the eventual return of control to SAS.

**Recommendation 13 – The relevant authorities should introduce in each football stadia a system of "statements of intent" setting out the roles and responsibilities of the SAS safety management personnel and the police, and the arrangements for transferring overall responsibility to the police in the event of an incident.**

The above lack of clarity, coupled with associated doubts about the effectiveness of communication between the SAS stadium safety manager, police and other emergency services representatives present at a stadium during an event, strongly suggests to the *delegation* that there is a need to review stadium contingency plans to ensure that good communication arrangements are in place and that the roles and responsibilities and the limitations of all agencies in emergency scenarios are clearly determined and reflected in the contingency plans.

The contingency plans, which should be prepared in close consultation with the police and other emergency services, should set out the response to all exceptional or emergency situations inside the stadium, including, but not limited to, specific risks such as public disorder and emergency safety scenarios. It is further recommended that, once determined, the contingency arrangements should be tested in multi-agency table top exercises.

**Recommendation 14 – The relevant authorities should oblige SAS stadium managers, along with the established stadium safety officer, to work closely with the police and other emergency services in developing comprehensive multi-agency stadium contingency plans.**

**Recommendation 15 – Once developed, the contingency plans in each stadium should be tested in multi-agency table top exercises designed to identify any gaps in the contingency**



**arrangements. Such exercises should involve all parties involved in the delivery of the event and incorporate a selection of differing scenarios which could occur either before, during or after a match.**

### **B.11 Entry and Searching Arrangements**

The physical extent of responsibility of SAS stadium safety managers was not clear during the visit. In many countries, the limit of responsibility is determined by the boundaries set and recorded within the safety certificate. This would usually extend to the legal boundary of ownership of the site where thereafter responsibility would rest with the appropriate authorities (i.e. local authority and police). This issue is particularly relevant where outer cordons are erected on private land within the curtilage of the club site to facilitate ticket checks and searching, and raises questions regarding who would control searching and entry at these outer perimeters. It is also linked with concerns over the primacy of responsibility between SAS and public authorities and the apparent lack of documented procedures designed to remove any ambiguity.

Indicative plans of the host stadia were displayed during the visit to demonstrate the creation of the outer physical barrier or cordon around the stadium to allow for the filtering, searching and ticket checking of spectators on arrival at the venue. Such measures help to reduce pressures in the immediate vicinity of the stadium (i.e. at turnstiles) but can themselves create additional problems if not operated and managed efficiently and effectively.

In this regard it should be ensured that an adequate number of entry and exit points are provided at the outer cordon to more than meet the expected flow of spectators and the aggregated entry and exit widths of the venue. Entry and exit points should be clearly signed and evenly distributed around the venue. The structure forming the outer cordon should also be of robust construction and be able to withstand expected crowd pressures. To ease pressure at the outer cordon, adequate, well-lit signage, in appropriate languages for the event, should be located en-route to the stadia setting out prohibited items and stadium rules.

It should be recognised that flow rates of entry to the stadium will be significantly impaired by any significant outer cordon searching process. This should be recognised in evaluating the maximum safe capacity. It should also be recognised that entry delays caused by the imposition of strict searching regimes can generate frustration and anger among spectators and heighten safety risks. This is a concern because safety should always be the top priority. It was suggested that to overcome this scenario, turnstiles would be open up to 3 hours before kick-off. However this is only likely to assist if there is an incentive for spectators to arrive early, such as pre-match entertainment and activities.

In the circumstances, it will be essential to make clear to all visiting supporters in advance of the tournament that the stringent searching regime on entry into stadia is designed to protect the safety of spectators and reduce the risk of a terrorist incident. Such messages are likely to be understood by most supporters in the light of the recent tragic events in Paris. Similarly, in view of security risks it should be made clear that there will be no weakening of the searching regime to ensure entry before kick-off.

Nevertheless, the possibility of well-intentioned and appropriate security measures generating a major safety risk cannot be ruled out and the aforementioned contingency arrangements should cover such a scenario and make clear who has lead responsibility in determining whether or not searching regimes -etc. - should be relaxed.

**Recommendation 16 - The relevant authorities should:**

- (i) review and determine the appropriate pre-entry searching regime to be applied during the tournament and the measures required to mitigate entry delays (e.g., effective signage en-route to the stadia, explanatory communications to visiting supporters, pre-match entertainment etc.);**
- (ii) consider the response to be adopted should delays on entry generate safety risks;**
- (iii) once the arrangements have been reviewed, the outcome should feature in stadium contingency plans designating responsibility for determining whether or not to weaken security checks in the event of an emerging safety scenario;**
- (iv) as with other contingency plans, the arrangements should be subject to a multi-agency table-top exercise.**

**B.12 Electronic Entry System**

The *delegation* had the benefit of visiting the LOSC stadium to witness the pre-match preparations of the safety management team and also to observe a low risk match between Lille and Bordeaux.

The stadium has a capacity of 50,000 and is around 2 years old. Limited inspection revealed that the stadium appeared to be extremely well equipped with modern safety features and provided spectators with high standards of facilities designed to enhance the customer experience.

The *delegation* observed both the senior management briefing and briefing of supervisors. In both cases the briefings were comprehensive and covered key areas. It is presumed that the good practices witnessed will be utilised by SAS in respect of UEFA EURO 2016 matches.

General inspection of the stadium with club representatives allowed the delegation the opportunity to witness the searching of spectators before entry and the operation of the Fortress electronic entry system. Discussion ensued over the backup systems in place in the event of a failure of the entry system. The delegation was informed that no such back up is in place other than the manual counting of tickets upon entry.

**Recommendation 17 – The relevant authorities should examine the potential for development of a more sophisticated and robust backup system for use in case of systems failure of the electronic entry system.**

## UEFA EURO 2016 - Services

European experience evidences that adopting a service ethos can play an essential role in reducing safety and security risks in connection with football tournaments. Providing visiting supporters and local communities with a respectful, friendly and welcoming atmosphere can have a major and positive impact on risk levels through marginalising the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation, or acting in an unacceptably provocative or anti-social manner, and generating a high degree of self-management of behaviour among supporters.

It is considered imperative, therefore, for a service-focused approach to be adopted by all agencies involved in providing a safe and secure environment inside and outside of stadia. It can also help foster enhanced co-operation between public and private authorities responsible for managing football-related events.

In essence a service approach is complementary to effective crowd management, implementation of an effective exclusion strategy, and, as such, is integral to the development of a wider integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service. This applies equally to routine national and international football events and major tournaments like UEFA EURO 2016.

### B.13 UEFA EURO 2016 - Fan zones

As indicated, it was reported that fan zones with a maximum capacity ranging from 20.000 to 120.000 are to be created in each of the host towns and cities to generate a welcoming and participatory environment for resident and visiting supporters alike.

It was reported that each location will be enclosed by a structural barrier to separate the fan zones from residents and visitors not wishing to participate in tournament festivities. As the concept of fan zones is a relatively new one for the police and municipal authorities, representatives from various agencies have visited other countries where fan zones are a more common occurrence to learn about good and bad experiences and managing the facilities effectively.

**Recommendation 18 – The relevant authorities should provide details of the learning experience from visits to other countries and explain how this will influence the planning and management of the official UEFA EURO 2016 fan zones.**

The provision of a structural boundary necessitates the need to determine the maximum safe capacity of, and the measures required to control entry and exit into, each official fan zone. The structure forming the outer cordon should be of robust construction and be able to both withstand expected crowd pressures and also prevent unauthorised entry to the site. It will be important for the safety management arrangements in fan zones to reflect the principles and practices employed in stadia. Detailed safety management structures, supported by operation manuals, will need to be developed to ensure that the facilities provide a safe and secure environment for attendees.

The *delegation* was informed that it is intended to use private security teams to manage the fan zones. Great care should be taken in the procurement of any companies to ensure that adequate

training is provided for stewards and that their competence levels are at least equal to those employed at the stadia.

In terms of safety and security in the fan zones, it was reported that behaviour will be closely monitored and subject to ongoing risk assessments. It will be made clear to all attendees, however, that the principle of “tolerance zero” will be applied in connection with any kind of incident (e.g. alcohol abuse, damage to property and provocative, violent or intimidating behaviour etc.).

**Recommendation 19 – The relevant authorities should ensure that:**

- (i) detailed plans outlining the physical arrangement of each official fan zone should be developed incorporating adequate numbers of toilets, catering facilities, screen areas, entry and exit points, and calculation of net floor space less any areas where the spectator have limited or no vision of the screen;**
- (ii) an appropriate floor space factor should be employed to determine the overall safe capacity of each official fan zone;**
- (iii) management of each official fan zone should adopt and implement integrated safety management principles with a dedicated safety management team in place to ensure the safety of spectators;**
- (iv) safety management plans, and maximum safe capacity, should be underpinned by appropriate numbers of stewards whose training and competence levels should match those required for stewards operating within the stadia; and**
- (v) contingency plans, covering possible safety and security emergencies, should be prepared and tested in multi-agency table top exercises.**

Notwithstanding the provision of official fan zones, European experience evidences that visiting supporters in particular may prefer to gather spontaneously in town or city centres rather than attend official fan zones. Such areas can usually be predicted with a high degree of certainty and it is good practice for the authorities to make safety and security preparations for such an eventuality. Supporters cannot be made to frequent official fan zones, nor should they be deprived of enjoying the venue cities like any other tourist. It should not be assumed that supporters who prefer not to take advantage of the official fan zones are acting in a risk or provocative manner.

Nevertheless, it is good practice to engage and work closely with, and to provide reassurance to resident and business communities located in the areas in which supporters can be expected to gather.

The local police should be trained to provide a welcoming and friendly reception but must remain vigilant to the possible need to intervene in the event of any emerging risks or increased tensions. The role of visiting police delegations will provide an expert and experienced source of advice and support in detecting such developments. Uniformed officers, in particular, can provide a welcome and reassuring presence for visiting supporters and should be deployed to assist host police liaise with the supporters, subject to a risk assessment by the head of the relevant delegations.

In addition to visiting police delegations, the deployment of fan embassies in venue cities can provide a highly valuable channel for communicating a wide range of important information to visiting supporters. Fan embassies represent a resource which the police should exploit as much as possible.

**Recommendation 20 – The intention of France to use fan embassies is welcomed and the authorities should be encouraged to make maximum use of them as they proved to be an efficient tool during previous major sport tournaments, in providing assistance to visiting fans.**

Once identified, appropriate safety and security preparations should be developed for potential spontaneous supporter gathering areas in city and town centres. Contingency plans for dealing with a wide range of possible safety and security scenarios should be prepared and tested in multi-agency table-top exercises.

**Recommendation 21 – The relevant authorities in venue cities should identify locations where visiting supporters may spontaneously, and innocently, gather to enjoy the atmosphere and the city. Once identified, appropriate safety and security preparations should be developed. To cater for the possibility of rival supporters gathering in close proximity, alternative back-up locations should be identified to provide separate areas for rival supporters to gather in each venue city to help reduce and respond to emerging risks.**

In terms of public viewing arrangements, extensive guidance and good practices on the preparatory and operating arrangements on large scale public viewing areas is set out in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events.

**Recommendation 22 - The relevant authorities should take account of the good practice contained in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events in finalising their preparations for organised and spontaneous fan areas and public viewing fan zones.**

In terms of encouraging host supporters to attend public events in fan zones, it is anticipated that the appeal to residents will fluctuate in accordance with the performance of French national team. However, it is to be hoped that local communities will make full use of the facilities and otherwise embrace the tournament.

#### **B.14 Community Engagement**

As part of ongoing work, LFP is clearly aware of the benefits to be derived from initiatives designed to promote closer links between football clubs and local communities. A tangible outcome of this commitment was the issue of a Guide on welcoming the public into the stadiums prepared for the current (2014-15) football season.

In terms of UEFA EURO 2016, whilst providing a safe and welcoming environment for visiting supporters is a vital component of delivering a successful tournament, it is even more important to engage and inspire local communities and encourage as many as possible to participate in the festivities. This objective is recognised by the host authorities who are committed to ensuring that local communities do not feel threatened or excluded from the tournament. The aim is to use the event to provide reassurance and promote enhanced social cohesion and integration. The decision to identify neighbourhoods likely to be engulfed by large numbers of visiting supporters and to actively recruit and train young people from disadvantaged localities to act as volunteers both in venue cities and, possibly in stadia, is an excellent initiative. However, care should be taken to ensure that volunteers are not used to compensate for the absence of fully trained stewards as this could undermine safety and effective stadium management operations.

However, not all residents in venue cities will welcome the influx of large numbers of football supporters in their communities. It is important, therefore, that steps are taken to provide reassurance and to protect their quality of life. This is recognised by the relevant municipal authorities who have identified neighbourhoods and commercial areas in close proximity to stadia hosting tournament matches, such as communities near the Lille LOSC stadium, who will require particular reassurance.

In parallel, FFF and LFP have created “Volunteers 2016 Association” for the recruitment of the aforementioned volunteers. The defined role of the recruits reassuringly makes clear that volunteers should be entrusted to undertake supportive tasks like checking accreditations, welcoming and accompanying supporters, creating a friendly atmosphere but not be expected to undertake core safety and security duties.

In terms of inclusivity, the authorities also highlighted the importance of meeting the needs of disabled supporters, notably in respect of making appropriate provision within stadiums and fan zones. It was stressed that one aim centred on the provision of universal accessibility for disabled people in all of the stadia as a legacy of UEFA EURO 2016.

**Recommendation 23 - The relevant authorities should ensure that the needs of local communities are taken fully into account in the organisation and delivery of the tournament with associated events and initiatives designed and delivered to provide all local communities with reassurance and to encourage participation in the festivities.**

### **B.15 Racism and other discrimination**

In the report provided prior to the T-RV visit, no reference was included regarding any special measures that would be adopted during the tournament for preventing and tackling racist and all other forms of discriminatory behaviour. In discussion, it was apparent that the intention was to apply the principle of zero tolerance towards any form of racism and other discrimination inside and outside of stadia. This point was stressed during meetings in the Prefecture of Paris and at the Lille LOSC stadium. Whilst it was suggested at one meeting that as combating racism and discrimination is an everyday issue, no specific measures are required for UEFA EURO 2016, it

was subsequently confirmed that a campaign against "racism, xenophobia, homophobia, anti-Semitism in sport" would be launched in May 2015.

In discussion, it was highlighted that racism is not a significant factor in respect of French football with just five incidents of racism reported in stadia last season.

However, there was scant recognition that an influx of thousands of football supporters from across Europe speaking a variety of languages, would make it extremely difficult for the police and stewards to identify behaviour, symbols or banners that were racist or discriminatory in tone. Visiting police delegations could assist in providing advice to the police and stewards on such matters, but it might also be prudent to consult Football Against Racism in Europe (FARE) about what constitutes racism and discriminatory activity in participating countries.

**Recommendation 24 – The relevant authorities, police and stadium personnel should continue to apply zero tolerance in respect of any kind of discrimination inside stadiums, fan zones and public spaces during UEFA EURO 2016 and beyond.**

**Recommendation 25 - The relevant authorities should seek advice from FARE regarding what constitutes racism and discrimination in countries participating in the tournament**

## **B.16 Tournament Media and Communication Strategy**

### Media Strategy

European experience evidences that hosting international football tournaments is usually accompanied by a widespread tendency of the national and international media to focus on negative stories (real or imagined) and remain silent on preventative and other positive events and initiatives.

All of the authorities met during the visit recognised that the tournament will be a global event and that any negative publicity would impact on international perceptions of the event and the host country. However, the importance of developing and implementing a multi-agency media handling strategy, in which spokespersons from all the main agencies share common lines and relay consistent messages, did not appear to be fully recognised during the visit. Reference was made to UEFA writing a manual on mass media communication to be used during the tournament, but European experience evidences that there is no substitute for a government-led multi-agency media handling strategy aimed at both a national and international audience. The importance of such an initiative cannot be over-emphasised and work on this matter should commence before the tournament gets underway.

**Recommendation 26 - The relevant authorities should commence work early in 2016 on developing a government-led multi-agency media handling strategy involving spokespersons from all public and private agencies involved in the tournament.**

## Communications Strategy

In terms of communication, the Ministry of the City, Youth and Sports recognises the importance of highlighting positive initiatives, such as publicising the launch of a Legal Guide on the prevention and fight against incivility, violence and discrimination in sport. The guide provides a range of information designed to raise awareness and is targeted at all stakeholders in sport, supporters included. Similarly, a publication entitled “Different but all the same in sport”, is aimed at increasing tolerance within sport.

In terms of the overseas audience, European experience demonstrates the importance of relaying a range of information to visiting supporters, including information on venue cities, fan zones, stadia rules and regulations, and, importantly, policing tolerance levels. Such communications can be presented in a friendly style to generate a positive impression of the welcome that visiting supporters will receive during UEFA EURO 2016. It is important that such information and associated publications and leaflets are disseminated in the languages of participating countries.

**Recommendation 27 – The relevant authorities should ensure that all visiting supporters are provided with essential and useful information in their own language regarding the arrangements for UEFA EURO 2016.**

## **Section C. Safety, Security and Service Arrangements for (Non UEFA EURO 2016) National and International Football Events**

### **C.1 National Co-ordination Arrangements**

Whilst DIGES is felt to provide an appropriate strategic co-ordination body for one-off major football and other sports events, it is not set up like a multi-agency National Committee designed to ensure the development and implementation of a nationwide integrated approach to safety, security and service in respect of football matches and, where appropriate, other sports events across France.

The importance and impact of major football (and other sports) events is indisputable, however such events usually require tailored safety and security measures to be put in place by the national and local authorities and their partner agencies. However, to ensure that an integrated, multi-agency approach to safety and security is adopted for domestic and lower profile international football it is recommended that a standing governmental-led structure is established to develop and oversee implementation of a comprehensive national safety and security strategy.

**Recommendation 28 - The French Government should consider extending the role and remit of DIGES, or establish an alternative government-led standing national, multi-agency co-ordination committee ("National Committee"), to oversee the development and delivery of an integrated approach to safety, security and service in respect of football matches and other sports events where appropriate.**



European experience in this matter shows that in some countries such a National Committee is established and operated as an “independent body”, whereas in others, the National Committee is subordinate to a designated governmental department or agency. In both cases, determining who has the lead role within Government is crucial as many of the challenges confronting the development of a comprehensive and integrated approach are dependent upon there being clarity in respect of ultimate responsibility. In most countries, this lead role is vested in either the Interior or Sports Ministry, depending upon their respective roles and responsibilities.

**Recommendation 29 - The French Government should provide DIGES, or an alternative national co-ordination committee, with a clear remit and terms of reference which clarifies which Government Department has ultimate responsibility on any matters where there is not unanimity within the committee.**

## C.2 Football Policing Operations

Football policing operations are overseen and co-ordinated by the DNLH who rely heavily on the work of designated local spotters and football intelligence officers.

At designated high risk matches, the “Direction départementale de la sécurité publique (DDSP)” can deploy inside stadia a special units “SIR” (Service d’Intervention Rapide), for the prevention of violence and targeted intervention in case of trouble. Each of the 16 SIR teams comprises 402 police officers and 24 gendarmerie officers. SIR personnel are specially trained and equipped to intervene inside of the stadium and are deployed in sports clothing labelled “police” or “gendarmerie”, reassuringly without firearms.

Unfortunately, the *delegation* attended a low risk match and did not have the opportunity to observe an SIR unit in action. The *delegation* acknowledges that SIR could be an efficient tool to address violence inside the stadium. However, on the basis of the discussions, the character and content of the training received by SIR personnel was not clear, neither was it apparent what added value SIR units could bring to policing football operations.

**Recommendation 30 – The relevant police authorities should evaluate the training, role and effectiveness of deploying SIR units inside stadia.**

## C.3 Exclusion Arrangements

Effective exclusion arrangements are an essential component of any comprehensive and integrated football safety, security and service strategy. Across Europe, there are wide variations in the character of the exclusion arrangements that are applied with the onus on each country to determine arrangements that reflect national circumstances and preferences.

In France, the relevant exclusions provisions are embedded in the Criminal Code which places a number of options at the disposal of the competent authorities. These include:

Judicial Banning Orders (IJS), lasting up to 5 years, imposed by the court on conviction of an offence committed in a stadium or related to a football event. The order obliges the banned person

to report to a police station during designated periods on receipt of a summons issued by "any qualified authority or person designated by the court in its decision". Breach of the order or non-compliance with a reporting summons is punishable with two years' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.

Administrative Banning Orders (IAS), lasting up to 1 year (though the maximum period may be extended to 24 months if, within the three previous years, the person concerned has been the subject of a ban), imposed by a Prefect (or in Paris, the police commissioner). The orders "restrict the freedom of movement of persons claiming to be supporters of a team or behaving as such at the site of a sports event, but whose presence is likely to give rise to serious disturbances of the peace". The order sets out the precise circumstances of the offending behaviour and the territory to which it applies. Non-compliance with the conditions of the order is punishable with six months' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000".

The Code also effectively incorporates travel bans through empowering the Prefect or Paris police commissioner to oblige banned persons to report to a police station when designated football (and other sports) events are taking place on the territory of a foreign State. Non-compliance with such orders is punishable with one year's imprisonment and a fine of €3,750.

The Ministry of the Interior is also empowered by Article L.332-15-1 to prohibit individuals or groups of supporters whose presence is likely to give rise to serious disturbances of public order from travelling to matches. Again, the order sets out the duration of the ban and the precise factual circumstances justifying it and the departure and arrival points to which it applies. Non-compliance is punishable with six months' imprisonment, a fine of €30,000 and the imposition of a one year Judicial Banning Order.

Similar powers to impose travel restrictions are invested in Prefects and the Paris police commissioner under Article L.332-16-2 of the Code. Such orders set out the duration of the prohibition, the precise circumstances in terms of fact and location justifying it, and the territory to which it applies. Again, non-compliance is punishable with six months' imprisonment, a fine of €30,000 and the imposition of a one year Judicial Banning Order.

Article L.332-18 of the Code also makes provision by decree to dissolve or suspend groups of supporters who have collectively "committed repeated acts or a single act of particular seriousness constituting damage to property, violence against persons or incitement to hatred or to discrimination against persons because of their origin, sexual orientation or identity, gender or – actual or supposed – membership of an ethnic group, nation, race or specific religion". This process involves consultation with the multi-agency National Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Violence at Sports Events, which includes members of the judiciary.

The Code (Article L.332-19) makes provision for members of the prohibited group who do not comply with the terms of the order (either openly or in disguise) shall be punishable with a one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000 if they have participated in non-compliance or two years' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000 if they have organised the non-compliance. These penalties increase to three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000 or five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000 respectively if the banned activity is "committed because of the victim's origin, sexual orientation or identity, gender or – actual or supposed – membership of an ethnic group, nation, race or specific religion".

Two uncertainties raised during the visit which appear to have been clarified by further study of the (English version of) the Criminal Code include the last extract above which makes clear that

any form of collaboration by members of a prohibited group is an offence irrespectively of whether this is done openly or covertly. The second centres on whether banned persons can be precluded from attending public viewing events/fan zones. Article L.332-16 of the Code makes clear that they can be prohibited from "entering or being in the vicinity of venues where such events or a public screening thereof are taking place".

Overall, the Criminal Code provides the competent authorities with a wide ranging and flexible array of exclusion options (albeit controversial for some in certain respects). This flexibility does require co-ordinated and concerted organisation, monitoring and implementation not least in respect of the role and actions of local Prefects, but the apparent reduction in football related violence and disorder suggest that the exclusion arrangements are having a significant impact on safety and security in connection with domestic football events.

**Recommendation 31 - In due course, say three years, it would be of value if the relevant authorities could prepare a report on the implementation and effectiveness of the French exclusion arrangements for distribution and consideration by the Standing Committee.**

#### **C.4 Management of Banning Orders**

It was confirmed during the visit that DNLH manages, and monitors compliance with the conditions of the various categories of judicial and administrative banning orders, with the aid of a national database of banned persons - FNIS (Fichier National des interdits de Stade).

This database is distinct from the "Fichier Stade" database set up by the Préfecture de Police of Paris to include personal details of Paris Saint Germain football team fans (including minors over 13 years old) in order to assist prevent public disorder in connection with matches featuring PSG. The purpose of this database has proved controversial and in May 2015, the French Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) suspended use of the database on the grounds that it had serious doubts about its legality of this database. A final decision on this matter is awaited. The use of databases holding personal details is a sensitive subject across Europe and whilst this matter is a purely internal issue for the French authorities, and outside the remit of the *delegation*, the outcome will be of interest to many European countries.

#### **C.5 Police Liaison with Supporters**

As indicated above, European experience evidences the potential value of effective liaison between the police and supporters. Across Europe, different approaches are applied: in some countries the police have opted to deploy specialist trained dialogue officers to participate in structured communication with supporter groups; in others the arrangements are less formal and largely focused on encouraging operational officers to proactively engage with all supporters as part of their wider duties; in others it is a mixture of the two. The aim of such dialogue is to help dispel negative perceptions among all parties, promote self-regulation among supporters, reduce the risk of significant violence and disorder through marginalising the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation, and assist in making football events safe, secure and welcoming for all concerned.

On the basis of discussions during the visit, it was apparent that the police had yet to develop any effective liaison arrangements with supporters. A number of explanations were provided, including the reluctance of supporters generally to organise into groups, unwillingness on the part of “ultra” groups to liaise with the police, and doubts among police commanders as to whether any supporter representatives willing to communicate with the police are representative, legitimate or reliable. This dynamic is by no means unique to France and in such cases, the alternative option of adopting a policing strategy which requires all front line personnel, including riot police, to interact with all supporters in an open and friendly manner as part of the crowd management duties, has proven to provide a very effective means of dialogue.

However, there are undoubted merits and positives to be derived from attempting to engage with the minority of supporters who do form groupings, so it is desirable to continue to explore this possibility.

**Recommendation 32 - The relevant authorities and police should take proactive steps to adopt established European good practice in the development and delivery of effective means for liaison with supporters.**

#### **C6 Football Authorities Liaison with Supporter**

The importance of developing effective channels of communication with supporters is not limited to the police but extends to facilitating close and regular dialogue between national and local authorities, police, clubs and supporters in order to discuss matters of mutual interest and enhance respect and mutual understanding in the process.

During the visit, representatives of the Ministry of the City, Youth and Sports expressed a desire to develop effective liaison arrangements in recognition that supporters do have a role to play and are a key element in the safety equation, not least in view of the added value which can be derived from supporter participation in event planning.

Football clubs and the football authorities, notably the FFF and LFP, have a key role to play in developing effective communication channels and networks with all categories of supporters. During the visit to Lille LOSC the *delegation* was advised that the club had ongoing communication with its supporters and that this has helped enhance the role and effectiveness of stadium stewards.

However, neither the FFF nor LFP apparently recognise the main supporter associations like the Supporters National Association (ANS) and the National Council of French Supporters (CNSF) for various reasons. On a more general point, LFP reported that, as with Lille LOSC, the focus was on individual clubs to develop liaison arrangements with their supporters. This is self-evidently the case, though the representative organisations can provide a more proactive role in promoting the concept and explaining the potential benefits.

During the visit, the perceptions expressed by those supporter representatives consulted were that the football authorities and some clubs were reluctant to engage with supporters. The delegation

has no way of knowing if this is true but the fact that both sides share negative perceptions reinforces the need for a concerted and mutual effort to make progress in this area.

The supporter representatives also expressed concern about what they perceived to be slow and inappropriate progress in clubs adopting and implementing the Supporter Liaison Concept (SLO), which is mandatory for all clubs competing in UEFA competitions. It was suggested that whilst the SLO concept had been formally introduced into France, it was not being implemented as intended, it being suggested that in many cases the persons appointed to fulfil the SLO role were stadium safety personnel, which, if true, is some way removed from UEFA guidelines.

**Recommendation 33– The football authorities and clubs should work together in exploring all options for developing improved communication links with supporters generally and, where in place, supporter representatives groups, like ANS and CNSF.**

**Recommendation 34 - The football authorities and clubs should apply the SLO concept in accordance with UEFA guidelines and ensure that all top clubs appoint SLOs, irrespective of whether or not they have qualified for UEFA competitions.**

**Recommendation 35 - In developing and implementing their supporter communication strategies, the relevant public and football authorities should take full account of established European good practices as set out in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events.**

## **C.7 Preventing and Tackling Discrimination**

It was clear throughout the visit that all parties recognise the importance of doing everything possible to prevent and tackle racism and all other forms of discrimination. In addition to the zero tolerance policy of the police and other public authorities, the football associations are also engaged in a number of anti-discrimination initiatives. For example, the LFP works in close partnership with LICRA (International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism), who have created a guide for identifying racist and xenophobic symbols displayed inside and outside of stadia. This tool assist stewards and the police recognize such symbols. The LFP also has a partnership with SOS Racism, who develops and delivers preventative initiatives in tackling racism. Moreover, the LFP and FFF are committed to increasing awareness among clubs of the importance of initiating and participating in local projects and other initiatives aimed at preventing and tackling racism and other forms of discrimination within stadia and local communities.

## **Section D Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations**

### **D.1 General Conclusions**

In conclusion, the *delegation* would like to repeat that it is impossible for a delegation coming from abroad to have a complete and detailed picture of the situation in a country on the basis of a number of meetings and first hand observations. The delegation would also like to stress out that its findings are based entirely on discussions and observations during the consultative visit.

The delegation is also mindful that safety and security at football events is a complex area, requiring a series of comprehensive arrangements and good practices customised to fit within the historical, political, legal and cultural framework of any given country. That is why there are so many variations in practice across Europe.

Most of the recommendations in this report refer specifically to the preparations for UEFA EURO 2016 and, therefore, should be classified as a priority. Those relating to the arrangements for the annual calendar of domestic and international matches could be pursued in longer time. However the *delegation* wishes to stress that all of the recommendations are interlinked and cannot be seen in isolation. To be effective, any integrated safety, security and service strategy has to maintain a good balance between all of its components, not least because European experience and good practice evidences that each component can and does have an impact on delivery of all aspects of the wider strategy.

The *delegation* would like to stress once more that the Council of Europe Standing Committee is and will remain committed to providing the French authorities further support and advice in meeting these and related challenges.

Finally, the *delegation* would like to thank once again all of the colleagues who hosted the visit for their much appreciated hospitality, support and patience throughout the visit.

### **D.2 Summary of Report Recommendations**

#### **UEFA EURO 2016 - Policing Operations**

Recommendation 1 - The police and relevant authorities should review the potential risk of local communities clashing with visiting supporters during the tournament and take further steps to simultaneously provide reassurance to both local communities and visiting supporters that the risk is being addressed by preventative action and, in parallel, by the adoption of a zero tolerance policy towards any form of racism or other forms of discrimination.

Recommendation 2 - In accordance with European good practice, during UEFA EURO 2016 policing tactics, profile and uniform should be determined on the basis of: ongoing dynamic risk analyses; graded deployment, with protective equipment used only where necessary; and early targeted and proportionate interventions to prevent the escalation of risk.

Recommendation 3 - Police units likely to be deployed during UEFA EURO 2016 should be encouraged to proactively interact with and adopt a welcoming and friendly manner towards supporters.

### **International Police Co-operation**

Recommendation 4 - The relevant governmental authorities should use the European model agreement as a basis for negotiating bilateral protocols on governmental and police co-operation, including visiting police delegation arrangements.

Recommendation 5 – The relevant authorities should consider negotiating on a country by country basis the use of plain clothes foreign spotters during UEFA EURO 2016, as part of wider governmental and police co-operation bilateral agreements.

Recommendation 6 - The proposed role of internal affairs attaches from Embassies in policing operations should be reviewed and their potential role clarified.

### **UEFA EURO 2016 - Safety**

#### **Safety inside Stadia**

Recommendation 7 – Clarity is required in respect of the safety certification arrangements at each venue during the tournament; the arrangements for determining the safe capacity in stadia; designation of who is legally responsible for the safety of spectators and, in particular, the role of the permanent stadium safety officer in the SAS stadium safety management team in respect of UEFA EURO 2016 matches.

Recommendation 8 – In cases where safety officers and safety management teams are to be used which are not those normally the responsible persons within the venue, a thorough review of the competence of such people should be carried out by a competent authority and if any deficiencies are identified, appropriate amendments made to the safety management arrangements factor and, as a consequence, the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.

Recommendation 9 – To ensure a fully integrated safety operation, it is advised that SAS should forthwith contact and involve senior stadium safety management personnel in their stadium preparations.

Recommendation 10 –The relevant authorities should ensure that adequate numbers of stewards are employed at each venue to demonstrate compliance with the safety certificate. Further, third party evaluation of stewarding training, qualification and competence should be carried out to ensure the necessary levels of safety management are delivered at each venue. Concerns in any of the above areas should result in the appropriate alteration of the stadium management factor and a reduction in the maximum safe capacity level set in the safety certificate.

Recommendation 11 – Full account should be taken of the good practice set out in the Annex A of the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events) in re-evaluating the maximum safe capacity levels for each venue stadium and its sectors..

Recommendation 12 – The public and organising authorities should prepare contingency plans for dealing with possible scenarios in which the number of match tickets sold exceeds the modified maximum safe capacity of the relevant stadia and its viewing sectors.

### **Stadium Safety Management**

Recommendation 13 – The relevant authorities should introduce in each football stadia a system of "statements of intent" setting out the roles and responsibilities of the SAS safety management personnel and the police, and the arrangements for transferring overall responsibility to the police in the event of an incident.

Recommendation 14 – The relevant authorities should oblige SAS stadium managers, along with the established stadium safety officer, to work closely with the police and other emergency services in developing comprehensive multi-agency stadium contingency plans.

Recommendation 15 – Once developed, the contingency plans in each stadium should be tested in multi-agency table top exercises designed to identify any gaps in the contingency arrangements. Such exercises should involve all parties involved in the delivery of the event and incorporate a selection of differing scenarios which could occur before, during or after a match.

### **Entry and Searching Arrangements**

Recommendation 16 - The relevant authorities should:

- (i) review and determine the appropriate pre-entry searching regime to be applied during the tournament and the measures required to mitigate entry delays (e.g., effective signage en-route to the stadia, explanatory communications to visiting supporters, pre-match entertainment etc.);
- (ii) consider the response to be adopted should delays on entry generate safety risks;
- (iii) once the arrangements have been reviewed, the outcome should feature in stadium contingency plans designating responsibility for determining whether or not to weaken security checks in the event of an emerging safety scenario;
- (iv) as with other contingency plans, the arrangements should be subject to a multi-agency table-top exercise.

### **Electronic Entry System**

Recommendation 17 – The relevant authorities should examine the potential for development of a more sophisticated and robust backup system for use in case of systems failure of the electronic entry system.



## **UEFA EURO 2016 - Fan zones**

Recommendation 18 – The relevant authorities should provide details of the learning experience from visits to other countries and explain how this will influence the planning and management of the official UEFA EURO 2016 fan zones.

Recommendation 19 – The relevant authorities should ensure that:

- (i) detailed plans outlining the physical arrangement of each official fan zone should be developed incorporating adequate numbers of toilets, catering facilities, screen areas, entry and exit points, and calculation of net floor space less any areas where the spectator have limited or no vision of the screen;
- (ii) an appropriate floor space factor should be employed to determine the overall safe capacity of each official fan zone;
- (iii) management of each official fan zone should adopt and implement integrated safety management principles with a dedicated safety management team in place to ensure the safety of spectators;
- (iv) safety management plans, and maximum safe capacity, should be underpinned by appropriate numbers of stewards whose training and competence levels should match those required for stewards operating within the stadia; and
- (v) contingency plans, covering possible safety and security emergencies, should be prepared and tested in multi-agency table top exercises.

Recommendation 20 - French authorities should consider using fan embassies, which proved to be an efficient tool during previous major sport tournaments, in providing assistance to visiting fans.

Recommendation 21 – The relevant authorities in venue cities should identify locations where visiting supporters may spontaneously, and innocently, gather to enjoy the atmosphere and the city. Once identified, appropriate safety and security preparations should be developed. To cater for the possibility of rival supporters gathering in close proximity, alternative back-up locations should be identified to provide separate areas for rival supporters to gather in each venue city to help reduce and respond to emerging risks.

Recommendation 22 - The relevant authorities should take account of the good practice contained in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events in finalising their preparations for organised and spontaneous fan areas and public viewing fan zones.

## **Community Engagement**

Recommendation 23 - The relevant authorities should ensure that the needs of local communities are taken fully into account in the organisation and delivery of the tournament with associated events and initiatives designed and delivered to provide all local communities with reassurance and to encourage participation in the festivities.

## **Racism and other discrimination**

Recommendation 24 – The relevant authorities, police and stadium personnel should continue to apply zero tolerance in respect of any kind of discrimination inside stadiums, fan zones and public spaces during UEFA EURO 2016 and beyond.

Recommendation 25 - The relevant authorities should seek advice from FARE regarding what constitutes racism and discrimination in countries participating in the tournament.

## **Media and Communication Strategy**

Recommendation 26 - The relevant authorities should commence work early in 2016 on developing a government-led multi-agency media handling strategy involving spokespersons from all public and private agencies involved in the tournament.

Recommendation 27 – The relevant authorities should ensure that all visiting supporters are provided with essential and useful information in their own language regarding the arrangements for UEFA EURO 2016.

## **Legacy - Safety and Security Arrangements for National and International Football Events**

### **National Co-ordination Arrangements**

Recommendation 28 - The French Government should consider extending the role and remit of DIGES, or establish an alternative government-led standing national, multi-agency co-ordination committee ("National Committee"), to oversee the development and delivery of an integrated approach to safety, security and service in respect of football matches and other sports events where appropriate.

Recommendation 29 - The French Government should provide DIGEs, or an alternative national co-ordination committee, with a clear remit and terms of reference which clarifies which Government Department has ultimate responsibility on any matters where there is not unanimity within the committee.

### **Football Policing Operations**

Recommendation 30 – The relevant police authorities should evaluate the training, role and effectiveness of deploying SIR units inside stadia.

### **Exclusion Arrangements**

Recommendation 31 - In due course, say three years, it would be of value if the relevant authorities could prepare a report on the implementation and effectiveness of the French exclusion arrangements for distribution and consideration by the proposed Council of Europe committee on safety and security at sports events.

**Police Liaison with Supporters**

Recommendation 32 - The relevant authorities and police should take proactive steps to adopt established European good practice in the development and delivery of effective means for liaison with supporters.

**Football Authorities Liaison with Supporter**

Recommendation 33– The football authorities and clubs should work together in exploring all options for developing improved communication links with supporters generally and, where in place, supporter representatives groups.

Recommendation 34 - The football authorities and clubs should apply the SLO concept in accordance with UEFA guidelines and ensure that all top clubs appoint SLOs, irrespective of whether or not they have qualified for UEFA competitions.

Recommendation 35 - In developing and implementing their supporter communication strategies, the relevant public and football authorities should take full account of established European good practices as set out in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events.

## SECTION E COMMENTS BY FRANCE

➤ *In general*, the recommendations made give the impression that the state agencies are not seriously taking action with regard to the issues addressed, but quite the opposite is true: in fact, they are very much involved.

Moreover, the delegation's attention should be drawn to the ministerial directive of 24 November 2015, which seeks to increase further the stadium security measures at football matches.

Finally, after the events of 13 November 2015, vigilance, which is already at a very high level, is crucial. Regular contacts with foreign supporters are part of the key measures that will ensure maximum security without adversely affecting the significance of this football celebration.

➤ With regard to subsection A2 (*Purpose of the visit*), the purpose of the visit was, in fact, to draw up recommendations on the arrangements made for Euro 2016 and not on those put in place in connection with domestic football events. What is stated here could lead to some confusion. It is therefore suggested that the focus remain solely on Euro 2016.

➤ *Recommendation 5 states that the relevant authorities should consider negotiating on a country-by-country basis the use of plain clothes foreign spotters during UEFA EURO 2016, as part of wider governmental and police co-operation bilateral agreements.*

As for the World Cup in South Africa and Brazil, and for Euro 2012 in Poland and Ukraine, we would like foreign police officers to be in uniform, adopting a welcoming and friendly attitude towards their own nationals (cf. recommendation 3).

It is, of course, possible to use plain-clothes police spotters as well, depending on the potential risks posed by their fans. A study is being carried out on this aspect in association with the NFIPs concerned.

➤ *Recommendation 6 states that the potential role of internal affairs attachés from embassies in policing operations should be reviewed and clarified.*

As far as the DNLH is concerned, there has never been any question of including internal affairs attachés in the policing arrangements. However, it is only natural that they should be kept informed of any problems associated with their nationals.

➤ *Recommendation 20 states that France's intention to use fan embassies is to be welcomed and that the authorities should be encouraged to make maximum use of them as they have proved, in previous major sport tournaments, to be an efficient way of providing assistance to visiting fans.*

A study is already underway with the FSE and "fan embassies" to provide an interface with visiting fans. The report implies that this resource is not being exploited, which is not the case at all.

The head of the DNLH travelled to the Belfast conference on 3 July 2015 to give a presentation, in particular on EURO 2016.

The interministerial director responsible for major sports events (DIGES) held talks with the head of the "fan embassies" project for EURO 2016 on 23 November 2015.

The DNLH will take part in the seminar to be held in Paris by FSE on 3 and 4 March 2016.

➤ *Recommendation 23 states that the relevant authorities should ensure that the needs of local communities are fully taken into account in the organisation and delivery of the tournament and that associated events and initiatives should be organised to provide local communities with reassurance and encourage participation in the festivities.*

The Ministry of Community Affairs, Youth and Sports has set up the “Tous prêts !” (“All aboard”) programme, a joint initiative with the French Football Federation to support organised activities throughout the country.

The aim is to ensure that Euro 2016-related events are organised throughout France. They should be part of an educational, citizen-based and sustainable approach and involve as many people as possible on the basis of the principles of Pleasure, Respect, Engagement, Tolerance and Solidarity (French acronym: PRETS).

The scheme has been up and running since 1 July 2015. Details of all the events can be found on <http://tousprets.sports.gouv.fr/>

➤ *Recommendation 27 states that the relevant authorities should ensure that all visiting fans are provided with essential and useful information in their own language regarding the arrangements for UEFA EURO 2016.*

The fan portal was launched on the France.fr website on 11 December 2015. It will be expanded and updated from February to June 2016 and be available in ten languages by February 2016. Information leaflets for fans have been prepared to supplement the details provided on the website. Their format is currently being finalised and they will be put online between February and May 2016 (a first series in February and a second in May). They will also be available for French fans on the ministry’s website (“Ethics” section, “Supporters” tab), which was also launched on 11 December 2015).

All the information arrangements were spearheaded by the sports ministry and were based on data specially compiled for the June 2016 competition by several ministries (including the Justice, Economic and Interior ministries) and Football Supporters Europe (FSE).

The practical information available includes the formalities to be observed when going through French Customs, the various types of accommodation during the competition, access to mobile telephony and the Internet during the competition, key information on Euro 2016, the presence of police officers from each country taking part in the competition to advise and assist fans, and the presence of fan embassies.

The information will be supplemented by a EURO 2016 Fan’s Charter of Values (it will be drawn up from March 2016).

A presentation on this subject was given by the representative of the Sports Directorate at the Standing Committee’s last session in Strasbourg on 10 December 2015. The Committee also passed on to members the preliminary links to the fan portal.

The representative of the Sports Directorate will let the Standing Committee have the updated links and leaflets at the end of February 2016 and then in early May 2016 so that the Committee can once again pass this information on to all the delegations of the States Parties to the 1985 Convention.

The portal address is:

<http://be.france.fr/fr/infosredac/supporters-euro-2016-bienvenue-france>

➤ *Recommendation 30 states that the relevant police authorities should evaluate the training, role and effectiveness of deploying SIR units inside stadiums.*

The role of the SIR (rapid intervention) units is not to maintain order. The delegation unfortunately had no opportunity to see an SIR at work during its visit.

These units were set up in partnership with the Professional Football League (LFP), and it is a shame that the Committee had no opportunity to question the LFP on this point in order to assess how relevant they are. They are made up of police officers present in the stadiums, whose main task is to work with the stewards in a “low profile” attitude.

The SIR officers are not armed and their presence as a deterrent is intended to defuse tense situations so as to avoid the need for stronger police intervention. The action they take is targeted and proportionate, in accordance with recommendation 2.

The units train on a very regular basis and their use in the stadium is a bonus for the head of security.

➤ *Recommendation 31 states that in due course, such as three years from now, it would be of value if the relevant authorities could submit to the Standing Committee a report on the implementation and effectiveness of the French exclusion arrangements.*

This is something that will need to be done by an interministerial body, in particular on the basis of the change in the law currently being debated in the French parliament. Draft legislation on stepping up the fight against hooliganism and improving the dialogue with supporters provides for the strengthening of the security arrangements at sports events (especially by making administrative stadium bans more effective). It was passed on first reading by the National Assembly on 4 February 2016.

➤ With regard to subsection C5 (*Police liaison with supporters*) and recommendation 32, which states that the relevant authorities and police should take proactive steps to adopt European good practice in the development and delivery of effective means for liaison with supporters, it should be pointed out that the 99 correspondents of the DNLH are in permanent contact with local supporters' groups. They are clearly identified and adopt a proactive approach with them. Admittedly, there has not really been any discussion at national level because until very recently there was no national supporters' association.

After several failed attempts, two entities have just been set up: the National Supporters' Association (ANS) and the National Council of French Supporters (CNSF).

The DNLH met the president of the ANS but this is unconnected to EURO 2016.

The Ministry of the Interior is therefore closely involved with the arrangements and the provision of prevention information for supporters (especially information on the presence of police officers from each country taking part in the competition to advise and assist fans).

In addition, communication between state agencies and supporters is one of the aims of the fan portal (described in connection with recommendation 27).

➤ With regard to subsection C6 (*Liaison of football authorities with supporters*), we would point out that the National Council of French Supporters wishes to exert influence on the governance of football clubs by seeking to become members of their boards. With the help of a number of parliamentarians, a draft law to this effect has recently been tabled. Quite apart from the danger of

their activities being politicised, the French football authorities are not in favour of this move by the CNSF.

The National Supporters' Association is also a very young organisation and officially groups together five supporters' groups. It has its origins in the "ultra" movement and has not yet demonstrated its credibility. It was involved on 30 January 2016 at the Le Havre v. Lens match, which was marked by serious incidents in the Océane stadium.

Some groups of "ultra" supporters close to the ANS and the CNSF are known to the law enforcement and criminal justice services as having committed offences. As a precautionary measure for the Council of Europe, it is suggested that the delegation employ a generic term such as "national representation of football supporters" rather than mentioning them by name.

Mentioning the supporters' associations in an official Council of Europe document would artificially legitimise them and risk placing the Ministry of the Interior in a difficult position as they would be certain to publicise the fact.

It would consequently be better to adopt a cautious approach and wait for these supporters' associations to mature. Once they have demonstrated their competence and legitimacy, they could be fully integrated into the French football landscape. As far as all the relationships that the DNLH, in particular, maintains with the entities that speak on behalf of football supporters are concerned, the reference should therefore be to supporters' associations without identifying them by name.

➤ *Also in connection with subsection C6, recommendation 33 states that the football authorities and clubs should work together in exploring all options for developing improved communication links with supporters generally and, where they exist, supporter representative groups, such as the ANS and CNSF.*

In accordance with the 1985 Convention currently being revised, the aim of the French ministry responsible for sport is to bring about a better balance between the punitive and preventive aspects of dealing with football supporters. This aim was pointed out to the delegation during its visit to the ministry on 17 April 2015.

Since April 2015, one of the ways of achieving this objective has been the launch of the EURO 2016 fan portal (as described in recommendation 27). Efforts are also underway to make this rebalancing permanent beyond the 2016 competition. This work could be speeded up in 2016 as the ministry responsible for sport has called for the draft legislation mentioned in connection with recommendation 31 to step up the fight against hooliganism to contain a prevention component aimed in particular at establishing a genuine dialogue with fans within a body spearheaded by the ministry. The draft legislation was passed by the National Assembly on first reading on 4 February 2016. The legislative process will continue in the next few weeks. Enshrining a prevention component in law has been accepted.

➤ *Furthermore, recommendation 34 states that the football authorities and clubs should apply the SLO concept in accordance with UEFA guidelines and ensure that all top clubs appoint SLOs, irrespective of whether or not they have qualified for UEFA competitions.*

With regard to this recommendation, reference can be made to the remarks on recommendation 33, which also concerns this aspect (the draft legislation referred to also contains a section on this).

➤ *Finally, recommendation 35 states that in developing and implementing their supporter communication strategies, the relevant public and football authorities should take full account of*

*established European good practices as set out in Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Event.*

The fan portal mentioned in connection with recommendation 27 and the overhaul of the Sports Ethics section with a specific tab for fans (section put online on 11 December 2015) are providing some initial answers.

The tab can be consulted at:

<http://www.sports.gouv.fr/prevention/incivilités-violences/S-investir/Garantir-a-mon-niveau-l-ethique-et-les-valeurs-du-sport/article/Je-suis-supporter>

*Clarification following the vote in the National Assembly on the draft legislation to improve the dialogue with supporters and step up the fight against hooliganism:*

The Ministry of the Interior wishes to draw the delegation's attention to the Act passed on second reading in the National Assembly on 28 April last. Part II focuses on improving the dialogue with supporters by creating SLOs in clubs, as well as a national supporters body attached to the minister responsible for sport. The purpose of Article 5, (Title II, Book II of the Sports Code), and in accordance with good European practices in this area, is to improve the dialogue with supporters by setting up a national supporters body attached to the minister responsible for sport, and having clubs appoint a person to take charge of their relations with supporters. This is the formalisation of a UEFA recommendation on engaging in a dialogue with supporters by creating the position of supporter liaison officer (SLO) appointed by a club to liaise with its supporters. It should be pointed out that the appointment must be preceded by an opinion issued by supporters' associations, which must themselves be accredited by the minister responsible for sport.

This law was enacted: LAW N° 2016-564 of 10 May 2016 strengthening dialogue with supporters and the fight against hooliganism.



**APPENDIX A**

<b>Standing Committee Consultative Visit to France April 2015</b>				
<b>Proposed Action Plan - to be completed and updated by the French Authorities</b>				
No.	Recommendation	Organisation in charge of the implementation of the recommendation	Time schedule for the implementation of the recommendations	Description of the action(s) taken and achieved results
<b>Part One - UEFA EURO 2016 Preparations and Operations</b>				
<b>UEFA EURO 2016 - Policing Operations</b>				
1.	The police and relevant authorities should review the potential risk of local communities clashing with visiting supporters during the tournament and take further steps to simultaneously provide reassurance to both local communities and visiting supporters that the risk is being addressed by preventative action and, in parallel, by the adoption of a zero tolerance policy towards any form of racism or other forms of discrimination.			
2.	In accordance with European good practice, during UEFA EURO 2016 policing tactics, profile and uniform should be determined on the basis of: ongoing dynamic risk analyses; graded deployment, with protective equipment used only where necessary; and early targeted and proportionate interventions to prevent the escalation of risk.			
3.	Police units likely to be deployed during UEFA EURO 2016 should be encouraged to proactively interact with and adopt a welcoming and friendly manner towards supporters.			
<b>International Police Co-operation</b>				
4.	The relevant governmental authorities should use the European model agreement as a basis for negotiating bilateral protocols on governmental and police co-operation, including visiting police delegation arrangements.			
5.	The relevant authorities should consider negotiating on a country by country basis the use of plain clothes foreign spotters during UEFA EURO 2016, as part of wider governmental and			

	police co-operation bilateral agreements.			
6.	The proposed role of internal affairs attaches from Embassies in policing operations should be reviewed and their potential role clarified.			
<b>Safety inside Stadia</b>				
7.	Clarity is required in respect of the safety certification arrangements at each venue during the tournament; the arrangements for determining the safe capacity in stadia; designation of who is legally responsible for the safety of spectators and, in particular, the role of the permanent stadium safety officer in the SAS stadium safety management team in respect of UEFA EURO 2016 matches.			
8.	In cases where safety officers and safety management teams are to be used which are not those normally the responsible persons within the venue, a thorough review of the competence of such people should be carried out by a competent authority and if any deficiencies are identified, appropriate amendments made to the safety management arrangements factor and, as a consequence, the maximum safe capacity level set out in the safety certificate.			
9.	To ensure a fully integrated safety operation, it is advised that SAS should forthwith contact and involve senior stadium safety management personnel in their stadium preparations.			
10.	The relevant authorities should ensure that adequate numbers of stewards are employed at each venue to demonstrate compliance with the safety certificate. Further, third party evaluation of stewarding training, qualification and competence should be carried out to ensure the necessary levels of safety management are delivered at each venue. Concerns in any of the above areas should result in the appropriate alteration of the stadium management factor and a reduction in the maximum safe capacity level set in the safety certificate.			
11.	Full account should be taken of the good practice set out in the Annex A of the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events) in re-evaluating the maximum safe capacity levels for each venue stadium and its sectors			
12.	The public and organising authorities should prepare contingency plans for dealing with possible scenarios in which the number of match tickets sold exceeds the modified maximum safe capacity of the relevant stadia and its viewing sectors.			
<b>Stadium Safety Management</b>				
13.	The relevant authorities should introduce in each football stadia a system of "statements of intent" setting out the roles and responsibilities of the SAS safety management personnel and the police, and the arrangements for transferring overall responsibility to the police in the			

	event of an incident.			
14.	The relevant authorities should oblige SAS stadium managers, along with the established stadium safety officer, to work closely with the police and other emergency services in developing comprehensive multi-agency stadium contingency plans.			
15.	Once developed, the contingency plans in each stadium should be tested in multi-agency table top exercises designed to identify any gaps in the contingency arrangements. Such exercises should involve all parties involved in the delivery of the event and incorporate a selection of differing scenarios which could occur before, during or after a match.			
<b>Entry and Searching Arrangements.</b>				
16.	The relevant authorities should: (i) review and determine the appropriate pre-entry searching regime to be applied during the tournament and the measures required to mitigate entry delays (e.g., effective signage en-route to the stadia, explanatory communications to visiting supporters, pre-match entertainment etc.); (ii) consider the response to be adopted should delays on entry generate safety risks; (iii) once the arrangements have been reviewed, the outcome should feature in stadium contingency plans designating responsibility for determining whether or not to weaken security checks in the event of an emerging safety scenario; (iv) as with other contingency plans, the arrangements should be subject to a multi-agency table-top exercise.			
<b>Electronic Entry System</b>				
17.	The relevant authorities should examine the potential for development of a more sophisticated and robust backup system for use in case of systems failure of the electronic entry system.			
<b>UEFA EURO 2016 - Fan Zones</b>				
18.	The relevant authorities should provide details of the learning experience from visits to other countries and explain how this will influence the planning and management of the official UEFA EURO 2016 fan zones.			
19.	The relevant authorities should ensure that: (i) detailed plans outlining the physical arrangement of each official fan zone should be developed incorporating adequate numbers of toilets, catering facilities, screen areas, entry and exit points, and calculation of net floor space less any areas where the spectator have			

	<p>limited or no vision of the screen;</p> <p>(ii) an appropriate floor space factor should be employed to determine the overall safe capacity of each official fan zone;</p> <p>(iii) management of each official fan zone should adopt and implement integrated safety management principles with a dedicated safety management team in place to ensure the safety of spectators;</p> <p>(iv) safety management plans, and maximum safe capacity, should be underpinned by appropriate numbers of stewards whose training and competence levels should match those required for stewards operating within the stadia; and</p> <p>(v) contingency plans, covering possible safety and security emergencies, should be prepared and tested in multi-agency table top exercises.</p>			
20.	French authorities should consider using fan embassies, which proved to be an efficient tool during previous major sport tournaments, in providing assistance to visiting fans.			
21.	The relevant authorities in venue cities should identify locations where visiting supporters may spontaneously, and innocently, gather to enjoy the atmosphere and the city. Once identified, appropriate safety and security preparations should be developed. To cater for the possibility of rival supporters gathering in close proximity, alternative back-up locations should be identified to provide separate areas for rival supporters to gather in each venue city to help reduce and respond to emerging risks.			
22.	The relevant authorities should take account of the good practice contained in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events in finalising their preparations for organised and spontaneous fan areas and public viewing fan zones.			
<b>Community Engagement</b>				
23.	The relevant authorities should ensure that the needs of local communities are taken fully into account in the organisation and delivery of the tournament with associated events and initiatives designed and delivered to provide all local communities with reassurance and to encourage participation in the festivities.			
<b>Racism and other Discrimination</b>				
24.	The relevant authorities, police and stadium personnel should continue to apply zero tolerance in respect of any kind of discrimination inside stadiums, fan zones and public spaces during			

	UEFA EURO 2016 and beyond.			
25.	The relevant authorities should seek advice from FARE regarding what constitutes racism and discrimination in countries participating in the tournament.			
<b>Tournament Media and Communication Strategy</b>				
26.	The relevant authorities should commence work early in 2016 on developing a government-led multi-agency media handling strategy involving spokespersons from all public and private agencies involved in the tournament.			
27.	The relevant authorities should ensure that all visiting supporters are provided with essential and useful information in their own language regarding the arrangements for UEFA EURO 2016			
<b>Part Two Safety and Security Arrangements for National and International Football Events</b>				
<b>National Co-ordination Arrangements</b>				
28.	The French Government should consider extending the role and remit of DIGES, or establish an alternative government-led standing national, multi-agency co-ordination committee ("National Committee"), to oversee the development and delivery of an integrated approach to safety, security and service in respect of football matches and other sports events where appropriate.			
29.	The French Government should provide DIGEs, or an alternative national co-ordination committee, with a clear remit and terms of reference which clarifies which Government Department has ultimate responsibility on any matters where there is not unanimity within the committee.			
<b>Football Policing Operations</b>				
30.	The relevant police authorities should evaluate the training, role and effectiveness of deploying SIR units inside stadia.			
<b>Exclusion Arrangements</b>				
31.	In due course, say three years, it would be of value if the relevant authorities could prepare a report on the implementation and effectiveness of the French exclusion arrangements for distribution and consideration by the proposed Council of Europe committee on safety and security at sports events.			
<b>Police Liaison with Supporters</b>				

32.	The relevant authorities and police should take proactive steps to adopt established European good practice in the development and delivery of effective means for liaison with supporters.			
<b>Football Authorities Liaison with Supporter</b>				
33.	The football authorities and clubs should work together in exploring all options for developing improved communication links with supporters generally and, where in place, supporter representatives groups.			
34.	The football authorities and clubs should apply the SLO concept in accordance with UEFA guidelines and ensure that all top clubs appoint SLOs, irrespective of whether or not they have qualified for UEFA competitions.			
35.	In developing and implementing their supporter communication strategies, the relevant public and football authorities should take full account of established European good practices as set out in the Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events			

## MODEL BILATERAL AGREEMENT

on the bilateral arrangements of co-operation between the organising and a participating country in connection with a major international football tournament

The ..... *name of the host State* and the ..... *name of the visiting State*, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”, acknowledge the exceptional international importance of ..... *name of the event-organised in.....name the country where the event will take place*, and declare their intention to jointly cooperate in respect of the safety and security arrangements in connection with the event in accordance with the areas of co-operation set out in this bilateral agreement.

### I. Human Resource Support

*(name of the visiting State)* declares its willingness to support the *(name of the host State)* during the *(name of the event)* by deploying a police delegation to provide advisory and support activities, including the exchange of information and advice on the behavior of visiting *(name of visiting State)* supporters regarding any threat to public safety and public order posed by them, in particular by performing the following functions: *(provide details of the composition and role of the visiting police delegation and the specific tasks which will be performed by them)*.

The *(name of the host State)* should provide the *(name of the visiting State)* with:

- accreditation
- police accompanying officers (cicerones)
- an overview of the operational plans and integration into the local policing operations
- appropriate measures to ensure the safety of members of the visiting police delegation

The police *(name of the visiting State)* may be deployed in uniform but not possess or carry firearms or other protective equipment during their deployment in *(name of the host State)*.

The police *(name of the visiting State)* can be in possession of hand held cameras to gather evidence, if relevant, on supporters throughout the period of their deployment. Any materials obtained will be shared with the police *(name of the host State)*.

The police *(name of the host State)* shall arrange for representatives of the visiting police delegation to visit host cities and venues event sites no later than six weeks before the start of the event in order to prepare for their deployment.

The police *(name of the host State)* shall pay for accommodation, meals (or subsistence), internal travel costs and other facilities/necessary equipment made available locally whilst the visiting country shall pay for travel and salaries of the delegation members involved in the territory of *(name of the host State)*.

The *(name of the visiting State)* will provide medical insurance for its police officers during their deployment in *(name of the host State)*.

The *(name of the visiting State)* will ensure all its police officers against personal or property damage during their deployment in *(name of the host State)*.

## **II. Information exchange**

The *(name of the visiting State)* will provide the *(name of the host State)* with regular assessment focusing in particular on the number of supporters, the routes and the destinations as well as the likely behaviour in connection with the event.

The assessment will be sent:

- at least once a week, starting from the fourth week before the commencement of the event until the deployment of the visiting police delegation (*name of visiting State*);
- daily, starting from the time of the deployment of the visiting police delegation (*name of the visiting State*).

The police *(name of the visiting State)* shall provide *(where possible under national law)* the following information regarding supporters who are subject of a stadium ban *(or comparable exclusion measures)*, and who are considered by the police in *(name of visiting State)* to pose a risk to public order in connection with *(name of event)*:

- full name;
- date of birth;
- gender;
- citizenship;
- expiry date of the stadium ban.

This information shall be provided to *(name of the host State)* after the entry into force of this bilateral agreement.

..... *name of the host country* will ensure that the data on such persons:

- will be solely used for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the event
- will not constitute the sole legal basis for action undertaken by the law enforcement forces of the *(name of the host State)*
- will be removed from any data base, and not used for any purpose after, *(date of deleting the data)*.

The exchange of information, including personal data, will take place in accordance with national laws of the Parties.

The police *(name of the host State)* will regularly communicate to the police *(name of the visiting State)* any relevant information related to the event, in particular information concerning the behaviour of *(name of the visiting State)* supporters and actions performed by them.



The police (*name of the host State*) will inform the police of (*name of the visiting State*) about any (*name of the visiting State*) supporters who have been subject to measures to ensure public safety and public order in the territory of (*name of the host State*) in connection with the *name of the event*. This will include details of the offences committed and the actions taken by the competent authorities in (*name of host State*).

### **III. Movement of Supporters**

The safe movement of (*name of the visiting State*) supporters whilst in the territory of (*name of the host State*) will be within the competence of the police in the (*name of the host State*).

The police or other designated authority in (*name of the visiting State*) shall conduct observation and, when needed, ensure the safe movement of the (*name of the visiting State*) supporters as well as supporters from other countries migrating through their territory in connection with travel to (*name of event*).

Information about (*name of the visiting State*) supporters who are refused entry into the territory of (*name of the host State*) shall be exchanged with the police of (*name of visiting state*).

### **IV. Measures to control the entry of supporters in the territory of the name of the host State**

The (*name of the visiting State*) shall collect and exchange information with the police in (*name of host country*) regarding persons who reside in a Third State and who travel through their territory of (*name of visiting State*) en-route to the (*name of event*), and who are assessed by the competent police authority in the State in which they reside as posing a threat to public order in connection with the (*name of the event*).

The (*name of the visiting State*) shall undertake all possible measures, in accordance with national law, to prevent the departure from the territory (*name of the visiting State*) of any persons who has previously caused or contributed to violence or disorder in connection with a football event and who is assessed by the police in (*name of visiting State*) as posing a threat to public safety or public order during the (*name of the event*).

The (*name of the host State*) shall provide the (*name of the visiting State*) with all relevant information regarding supporters of third countries who plan to travel, or are known to have travelled, through the territory of (*name of the visiting State*).

### **V. Co-operation with the media**

The press officers of the Parties shall communicate directly in order to ensure co-operation with the media.

Each Party shall inform each other regarding designated media contact points.

The press officers of the (*name of the visiting State*), if appropriate, will be available for press and media briefings and will liaise closely with the competent authorities of the (*name of the host State*).

## **VI. Final provisions**

This bilateral agreement is not an international agreement and neither creates any new international legal commitments between the countries nor violates any existing international commitments between the *names of the host and visiting States* and other countries.

The Parties intend to apply this bilateral agreement starting from the date of it coming into force and concluding on (*with an agreed date after the event*).

The competent law enforcement authorities of Parties will make direct detailed agreements as necessary for the fulfillment of any matter not specified in this bilateral agreement.

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### Notes

If the event is organised jointly by two States, it is recommended to negotiate separate bilateral agreements and to include a statement about who is responsible for transport between the two countries.

If there is legal possibility to prevent supporters subject to exclusion measures from travelling to the event, provision for sharing related information should be included also in the bilateral agreement.

It is desirable for the bilateral agreement to also provide details of the bilateral arrangements for governmental and judicial co-operation arrangements in connection with the event.

**National Report by France**  
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## INTRODUCTION

### UEFA EURO 2016 is an exceptional event for France

The European Men's Football Championship, in which Europe's best national football teams compete, takes place every four years in a country that has submitted a bid to UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) to host the tournament.

For 2016, UEFA decided that France would organise the 15<sup>th</sup> championship.

EURO 2016 is an **exceptional** event ...

#### 1) in terms of duration

The 15<sup>th</sup> championship will be held from **10 June to 10 July 2016**.

#### 2) in terms of the number of matches

This championship will be the first to have **24 teams as opposed to 16 hitherto**.

This increase in the number of participants will not change the format of the preliminary qualifications but will mean an increase in the number of teams qualified for the final stage (24 in 2016 as opposed to 16 previously) and in the **number of matches played** (51 in 2016 as opposed to 31 in 2012).

#### 3) in terms of the larger number of sites

**The host cities:** 10 host cities – the 7 largest cities – 1/3 of the population of France.

**The venues:** 10 stadiums have been selected for Euro 2016 (Saint-Denis, Paris, Marseille, Lille, Lyon, Lens, Bordeaux, Nice, Toulouse and Saint-Etienne). The opening match and the final will be played at the Stade de France (Saint-Denis).

**Two transfer hotels** per host city.

**Fan zones** (zones organised for the public screening of all the fixtures): 10 fan zones – one per host city.

**Supporter zones:** supporter zones could be set up in the host city or in any other part of the country.

**Fan villages:** some host cities intend to create supporter reception facilities (dedicated campsites).

**Base camps** (hotel plus training facility close to an airport).

#### 4) in terms of supporter numbers and origins

**Number:** over 2.5 million spectators expected in the stadiums, several million in the supporter zones.

**Countries of origin:** not exclusively European – thousands, if not millions, of foreign supporters will be coming to France to follow the tournament.

#### 5) in terms of its international and media dimension

Over two billion television viewers over the period of the tournament.

An image of France to be conveyed to the whole world.

## **...and will have exceptional security and emergency service measures**

### **1) a sharing of responsibility between the state and the organisers**

**The Ministry of the Interior** is the government department responsible for ensuring security and maintaining order. It is represented at local level by the *préfets* who are responsible for maintaining order and civilian security in their *département*.

**The state** is responsible for maintaining order and providing emergency services outside the stadiums but can take action inside stadiums if there are serious problems which the organisers are unable to deal with.

#### **The organisers:**

► EURO 2016 SAS has responsibility for ensuring security and the provision of emergency services in the stadiums.

For the first time in the history of the championship, **UEFA will retain control of the organisational aspects, revenue and expenditure, delegating to France (the FFF) only the stadiums and security aspects.**

For the organisation of the championship, UEFA and the French Football Federation (FFF) have created a joint company (owned 95% by UEFA and 5% by the FFF), **EURO 2016 SAS**, established in Paris under French law, with its headquarters at 112 Avenue Kléber in Paris.

Jacques Lambert is chairman of EURO 2016 SAS, which is in charge of organising EURO 2016.

An eight-member steering group holds meetings once or twice a year, bringing together the stakeholders involved – UEFA, EURO 2016 SAS, FFF, the Minister for Sport representing the government and the Host Cities' Club representing the host cities – in order to deal with the strategic and sensitive issues relating to the preparation of the championship (organisation of the competition and associated events, PR).

► **The local and regional authorities** are responsible for security within the fan zones, which they will set up and run.

### **2) distribution of responsibilities between the state and the organisers**

#### **Responsibilities of the state** in the security and emergency services field:

- Risk assessment, encompassing:
  - the terrorist risk
  - the risk of public disorder
  - social risks
- Protection:
  - VIP protection
  - protection of teams
  - protection of sites (official sites, training sites, accommodation sites)
  - protection of transport
  - health protection and emergency services
- Ensuring the security of fixtures:
  - around the stadiums
  - arrangements regarding traffic on the public highway and the need to ensure public order and calm

#### **Responsibilities of the organisers** in the security and emergency services field:

- Security in the stadiums:
  - access control
  - in-stadium security by private security staff and the stewards

- Security inside the official sites, training sites and accommodation sites
- Medical and emergency services on the competition sites and privatised annexes:
  - medical and nursing facilities
  - emergency assistance facilities
- Security of supporter zones:
  - security of site facilities
  - access control

### **3) unique arrangements**

- Implementation **in advance**

It is very unusual for the central and local authorities to anticipate an event three years before it takes place. This shows the state's commitment and the fact that EURO 2016 is being taken into account at the very highest level.

- **Harmonious** central arrangements
  - regular interministerial meetings
  - an interministerial director responsible for major sports events ("DIGES") supported by a team and an interministerial monitoring group
  - a co-ordinator of Ministry of the Interior departments for major sports events, attached to the DIGES as head of the security/prevention unit
  - a security/prevention unit attached to the DIGES comprising a police officer, a gendarme and a firefighter to provide expertise, advice and assistance.
- Local arrangements **modelled** on the central arrangements
  - under the responsibility of the *préfet*, a security/prevention working party bringing together all the local and regional authorities concerned.
- Arrangements **in close liaison** with the organisers
  - contacts with EURO 2016 SAS:
    - . series of regular meetings (every two months) and working parties, one of which focuses on security and prevention
    - . the security/prevention unit works closely with the EURO 2016 SAS security director.
  - contacts with the host cities:
    - . participation in the seminars of the Host Cities' Club
    - . meaningful exchanges during each visit to the *départements*.

## **Security and emergency services management appropriate to the event**

- A specific approach to maintaining public order, with the following aims:
  - allowing people to have a good time
  - incorporating security and emergency services in an overall national harmonious and consistent approach
  - using internal and external communication to explain the approach adopted and get people on board.
- Adopting proven European experiences:
  - activating the NFIPs
  - having foreign police officers (uniformed and plainclothes) to reassure foreign supporters and deter troublemakers
- Using the legal regulations to keep problem supporters away
- Pooling experience
- **Devising** general concepts that can be further developed and adapted on the ground.

## **Supporter involvement**

### **◇ Taking supporter federations into account in the Euro 2016 preparations**

This concerns in particular Football Supporters Europe (FSE) and the supporters of the French football team, overseen by the FFF.

Here, it should be noted that there is a very clear commitment by the Ministry of Sport to engage in dialogue with supporters, so as to pursue the discussions already initiated. Several activities have received the backing of the Ministry of Sport (e.g. the Supporters' Congresses of 17 April 2014 and 11 February 2015). In addition, supporters have shown a real desire to organise themselves so as to offer a credible voice in discussions with the public and sports authorities.

### **◇ Framing a genuine supporter reception policy**

This is closely linked to the above, especially with regard to drawing on the know-how of FSE, which is fully familiar with the specific expectations of each country's supporters.

The Ministry of Sports will set up a working group, from May 2015, to develop a Welcoming Guide for supporters (both on paper format and in dematerialised form), together with all stakeholders, including FSE and OFAJ (French-German Office for Youth). The aim is to offer the best possible information to supporters.

**This guide aims to present France (organisation, specificities) and also the legal framework regarding supporters' activities and will recall the rights and duties of each supporter.**

### **◇ Ensuring that French fans are aware of the national legal framework applicable to supporters**

Available resource: the legal guide to preventing offensive behaviour, violence and discrimination in sport.

The Ministry of Sport has updated the above-mentioned legal guide. The idea is to provide to sports stakeholders (including supporters) full, updated and readily accessible legal information on the legal definitions and consequences of behaviour contrary to the values of sport.

The guide contains ten thematic factsheets and five focus factsheets (dealing, amongst other things, with the criminal-law consequences of racism, homophobia and sexist behaviour in sport) to ensure that each sports stakeholder fully understands what constitutes offensive behaviour, violence and discrimination in sport and the specific legal consequences of such conduct.

**I. UEFA EURO 2016 is an event  
in which the everyday measures implemented by France  
to deal with supporters will apply**

**I.1 Measures based on a highly structured legal framework**

**I.1. a. The legislative provisions in force**

◊ **Criminal-law provisions on the security of sports events** (Appendix 1)

For several years, France has had a **very specific and full set of laws and regulations** to combat violence at or in the vicinity of sports events.

a) Criminal-law provisions

Acts of violence committed by spectators outside or during sports events are covered by the provisions of criminal law. Articles 222-7 to 222-14-2 and 222-44 to 222-48-1 of the Criminal Code define and punish acts of violence, according to the seriousness of the incapacity to work caused to the victim and the circumstances in which the acts were committed.

Numerous aggravating circumstances, albeit not specifically relating to offences committed in stadiums, are set out in the statutory definitions of the offences. With regard to violence perpetrated inside or outside sports venues during sports events, the following circumstances (not exhaustive) are specified: more than one perpetrator, use or threatened use of a weapon, manifest drunkenness or being manifestly under the influence of narcotics, deliberate concealment of all or part of the face to avoid identification.

b) The provisions of the Sports Code

In addition to the criminal-law provisions, the Sport Code defines as criminal offences behaviour posing a threat carried out at a sports venue in the course of or at a public screening of a sports event, likely to cause or involve serious disturbances of the peace.

In this connection, the following are subject to penalties:

- bringing in flares, fireworks or weapons (within the meaning of Article 132-75 of the Criminal Code) (Article L.332-8 of the Sports Code);
- bringing in alcoholic beverages (Article L.332-3 of the Sports Code);
- entering a sports venue whilst under the influence of alcohol (Articles L.332-4 and L.332-5 of the Sports Code);
- incitement to hatred or violence against a referee, a sports official, an athlete or any other person or group of persons (Article L.332-6 of the Sports Code);
- bringing in or wearing signs or symbols evoking a racist or xenophobic ideology (Article L.332-7 of the Sports Code);
- throwing of projectiles jeopardising the safety of the persons at a sports venue (Article L.332-9 of the Sports Code);
- disrupting the holding of a competition or conduct detrimental to the safety of persons or property through entry into the competition area (Article L.332-10 of the Sports Code).

c) Stadium bans and penalties for not complying with such bans

- Judicial stadium ban (Article L.332-11 of the Sports Code)

Persons found to have committed offences defined in Articles L.332-3 to L.332-10 of the Sports Code may be subject to a stadium ban. This additional penalty makes it possible to keep away from sports venues those supporters whose behaviour disrupts matches. It is a move which is perfectly suited to the problem



of hooliganism, complementing the penalties ordinarily handed down (imprisonment, fine, community work, etc).

The ban may be for a maximum period of five years. Those persons subject to such a ban are ordered by the courts, when sports events are taking place, to comply with a summons issued by any qualified authority or person.

This additional penalty is also applicable to offences of intentional violence defined in Articles 222-11 to 222-13 of the Criminal Code, offences of destruction or damage defined in Articles 322-1 to 322-4, 322-6 and 322-11 of the Criminal Code, and the offence of obstruction defined in Article 433-6 of the Criminal Code, where such offences have been committed at a venue in which a sports event is taking place, or outside the said venue, and were directly linked to a sports event

Article L.332-13 of the Sports Code provides for two years' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000 in the event of a violation of a judicial stadium ban.

- Administrative stadium bans (Article L.332-16 of the Sports Code)

Outside the framework of court proceedings, persons whose behaviour constitutes a threat to public order may be banned by the relevant administrative authority from entering or being in the vicinity of venues where sports events are taking place or being publicly screened, in the conditions set out in Article L.332-16 of the Sports Code.

Failure to comply with orders issued by the administrative authority is punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €3,750.

◇ Security outside sports venues

Disruption occurring outside sports venues is also punishable.

In addition to violence, damage and obstruction, reference may be made to the following (non-exhaustive) list of punishable conduct:

- participation in an unlawful assembly whilst carrying a weapon (Article 431-5 of the Criminal Code);
- participation in an unlawful assembly following an order to disperse (Article 431-4 of the Criminal Code);
- unlawful concealment of the face during demonstrations on the public highway (Article R. 645-14 of the Criminal Code);
- participation in a group established to commit violence or wilful damage (Article 222-14-2 of the Criminal Code);
- obstruction of road traffic (Article L.412-1 of the Highway Code).

In connection with aggravated violence, wilful damage or obstruction and in application of Article L.332-11 of the Sports Code, a judicial stadium ban may also be imposed when the offence has been committed outside a sports venue but was directly linked to a sports event.

◇ Criminal-law provisions in the economic and financial field (Appendix 2)

a) Protection of intellectual property rights

- In the Intellectual Property Code (Articles L.335-2 et seq.)

The main criminal-law provisions applicable in the field of counterfeiting are to be found in the Intellectual Property Code. These provisions establish as offences both the act of counterfeiting itself (on any material) and acts to facilitate the infringement of a protected work or to disseminate a counterfeit object.

Counterfeiting is punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €300,000 (five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000 where the acts were committed by an organised criminal group). In application of the provisions of ordinary law, legal entities are liable to punishment and shall be punished by specific additional penalties.

- In the Customs Code (Article 215, Articles 414 et seq.)

Counterfeiting also constitutes a customs offence provided for in the Customs Code, which is in addition to the offence of counterfeiting provided for in the Intellectual Property Code.

The classification of an offence as a customs offence shall result in the application of the provisions of the Customs Code and the jurisdiction of the customs authorities to investigate, identify and prosecute such offences.

b) Unlawful sale of tickets

- Habitual resale of tickets without the authorisation of the issuer

Habitual resale of tickets without the authorisation of the issuer, including via the Internet (Article 313-6-2 of the Criminal Code), is an independent offence related to fraud. It is punishable by a fine of €15,000. This is a recent introduction to legislation and is a means of making the ticketing distribution network fully secure and of punishing such practices.

- Unauthorised resale of tickets in the vicinity of the official sites

Unauthorised street trading of goods in violation of the regulations on law enforcement in such places is an offence punishable by six months' imprisonment and a fine of €3,750 (Article 446-1 of the Criminal Code) and the additional penalty of the confiscation or destruction of the item used or intended to be used to commit the offence, or the proceeds thereof (Article 446-3 of the Criminal Code).

Such actions are punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000 when accompanied by assault or threats, or when committed by a group

Legal entities declared criminally responsible for this offence also incur a fine of €18,750 and the penalties provided for in Article 131-39 of the Criminal Code.

- Other applicable definitions of the offence

Unauthorised street trading is also punishable under Article L.442-8 of the Commercial Code. The penalty in that case is a misdemeanour fine of €1,500 (€3,00 if a similar offence had previously been committed) and the additional penalty of confiscation or destruction of the item which was used or was intended to be used to commit the offence or of the proceeds of the offence.

Lastly, it should be noted that the conduct of the seller of the tickets at issue may also constitute other criminal offences, in particular obtaining by false pretences, punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €375,000 (Article 313-1 of the Criminal Code), or deception, punishable by two years' imprisonment and a fine of €300,000 (Article L.213-1 of the Consumer Code), in the event of fraudulent practices committed to the detriment of the purchaser.

c) Corruption at sports events and sports betting

- Active and passive corruption by the parties involved in sports events on which sports betting takes place

Article 445-1-1 of the Criminal Code extends the offence of active corruption committed by persons not fulfilling a public service role (provided for under Article 445-1 of the Code) to instances of the manipulation of sports events on which sports betting takes place. This is punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

Article 445-2-1 extends the offence of passive corruption committed by persons not fulfilling a public service role (provided for under Article 445-2 of the Code) to instances of the manipulation of sports events on which sports betting takes place. This is punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

- On-line sports betting and gambling

Law No. 2010-476 of 12 May 2010 on the opening to competition and the regulation of the on-line gambling sector provided for a limited opening up of the on-line gambling sector, with strict control of the operators concerned via a new on-line gambling regulatory authority (ARJEL).

A specific offence was therefore established relating to the unlawful organisation of on-line betting and gambling (punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €90,000). These penalties are increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €200,000 where the offence is committed by an organised criminal group. Legal entities can be declared criminally responsible.

There are further offences that have been established in the event of advertising to promote a betting or gambling site which has not been authorised by virtue of an exclusive right or the accreditation provided for under Section 21 of the law, or failing to comply with the legal provisions (punishable by a fine of €100,000).

**I.1.b Implementation of these provisions: a harmonised and situation-specific criminal-law response.**

**◇ A harmonised criminal-law response at national level**

A good deal of thought has been given to the specific problem of incidents occurring in connection with sports events, resulting in the drafting of several consolidated documents for the prosecution services:

- a methodological guide on offences within sports venues has been regularly updated since 2005;
- dispatches of 27 October and 19 November 2009 contain instructions for prosecutors on the criminal-law policy to be pursued in this connection.

With regard to economic and financial offences:

- the circulars of 9 August 2004, 3 January 2007, 14 April 2008, 6 August 2010 and 29 July 2014 on combating counterfeiting drew attention to the relevant legal provisions and underlined the need to adapt the criminal-law response to the type of unlawful conduct in question;
- the circular of 7 May 2009 on relations between the customs and judicial authorities informed judges of the availability of practical technical factsheets, accessible via the website of the Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons (DACG);
- the circular of 9 June 2010 outlined the law of 12 May 2010 on the opening to competition and the regulation of the on-line gambling sector, providing prosecutors with guidelines on criminal-law policy in this field.

With regard to both security problems and economic and financial offences, **specific instructions** will be given for the organisation of Euro 2016:

- between now and the beginning of Euro 2016, the DACG will hold a series of meetings with prosecutors to alert them to the issues at stake, identify the particular difficulties relating to the event and co-ordinate the implementation of practical tools. The first meeting was held on 16 October 2014;
- the DACG will issue a specific criminal-law policy circular for Euro 2016 to all principal state prosecutors.

**◇ Presence of the prosecution service at sports venues hosting matches posing a potential risk**

A member of the prosecution service is on duty in the operational command post within the sports venue itself during matches posing a potential risk of trouble in towns hosting professional football fixtures.

His or her role is to:

- ensure that there are appropriate police arrangements actually in place;

- ensure the proper functioning of the ID control operations ordered by the prosecutor;
- in the event of serious disturbances constituting criminal offences, assume direct leadership of the police action;
- ensure the judicial response is commensurate with the situation.

◇ **A diversified criminal-law response, commensurate with the seriousness of incidents**

A report is written by the police on each incident and submitted to the prosecutor.

The prosecutor, on call via a round-the-clock telephone hotline throughout France, will then decide what action is to be taken.

**The criminal-law response will depend on the seriousness of the incident.** Alternative measures to prosecution (caution, awareness course, fines, etc) may be ordered by the prosecution service for less serious incidents.

With regard to the most serious incidents (violence, wilful damage, carrying a weapon, etc), the criminal-law policy is very strict. The identified perpetrators are brought before the courts, where necessary following assignment of the case to an investigating judge. The immediate summary trial procedure is a means of providing a rapid response to the most violent behaviour, with due regard nonetheless for the rights of the defence.

In addition to instances of hooliganism, particular attention is focused on specific offences which could disrupt the organisation and holding of a major sports event such as **the counterfeiting of fan merchandise or trafficking in entrance tickets.**

◇ **Help and support for victims**

French criminal-law procedure makes **special provision for victims** of offences, who are offered protection arrangements. A voluntary-sector network set up in each judicial district provides them with moral support and advice in the steps they have to take.

◇ **The network of justice correspondents**

**At national level a judge from the Criminal-Law Policy Office of the Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons** monitors and co-ordinates the action taken to combat sport violence and hooliganism. In addition, a **judge from the Economic and Financial Law Office** fulfils the same role in respect of economic and financial offences (violations of the right to intellectual property, unlawful sale of tickets, sports corruption, sports betting).

They have the support of a **network of correspondents in the offices of the public prosecutors and principal state prosecutors.** These channels will be fully used for the organisation and supervision of Euro 2016.

**At international level**, the Ministry of Justice also has contact points in many countries through its **liaison judges** (located in Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, the United Kingdom and the United States). They may be called upon to facilitate exchanges of information when foreign supporters are involved, either as perpetrators or victims, in an offence committed in France during EURO 2016.

**I.2 Measures based on highly organised arrangements**

**I.2.a Inside stadiums**

The rule established by the Law of 21 January 1995 is that security inside the stadium is the responsibility of the organiser and security outside the stadium is the responsibility of the state.

The state's security services take action in the stadium only when the organisers are unable to deal with a serious public order problem.

In practice, the division is much more flexible. There is ongoing co-ordination between the organisers and the security and emergency services. It is for this reason that the security services, police or gendarmerie, and the emergency services are permanently present inside the stadium.

#### ◇ Measures taken by the organiser

- Appointment of a **stadium manager** (EURO 2016: **site manager**), whose role is to co-ordinate all the activities taking place in the stadium where the matches are played.

- Appointment of an **organisation and security director** (EURO 2016: **stadium security director**), who is responsible for organisational matters and security in the stadium.

- Recruitment of **stewards**:

Stewards are staff whose duties include reception, controls and security.

Their status may differ: club employees or staff of a specialised security company contracted by the club (EURO 2016: the security companies will be employed by EURO 2016 SAS).

They must hold a professional card and have been given appropriate training.

They are under the authority of the stadium security director and overseen by team leaders and a supervisor.

They have several roles:

\* **reception and control**: welcome, guide and assist spectators, check tickets.

Stewards must also observe the behaviour of spectators to respond to their needs, identify abnormal situations and take action if necessary. They also have a role in the control of car parks;

\* **security**: this role must not under any circumstances be equated with that of the law-enforcement agencies. It has a preventive aim, designed to deal with minor incidents (emergency assistance stations, surveillance);

- **pat-down searches**:

. either by private security staff who are also authorised to carry out pat-down searches subject to certain conditions (application to the National Council for Private Security Activities, two-years' experience for surveillance and security officers);

. or by members of the organiser's security staff who will be assigned exclusively to this task. They do not hold a professional private security officer's card but must obtain accreditation following training.

- for EURO 2016, **2,000 voluntary workers**, belonging to an association of volunteers, will assist and guide the public.

- drawing up a list of and displaying **prohibited items**

- holding **security meetings**:

The organiser will arrange security meetings with the services of the state to discuss the expected attendance, possible risks, supporters' transport arrangements, transport of teams, etc.

- having a **Security Command Post**:

This command post (CP) will bring together all those involved in organising the security services and emergency services for the event.

- managing **accreditations**:

Accreditations will be in the form of access passes issued to a person with a role in the organisation of the match. The aim is to limit the number of people present in the stadium on match days, outside the areas used by spectators, to those with a role in the organisation of the fixture.

## ◇ Measures taken by the state

### ► **Emergency services**

#### **“ORSEC” Plan:**

In order to protect the population against the effects of a catastrophe, a major accident or an attack, the *préfets* in *départements* have an emergency response plan known as the ORSEC Plan.

For events in which there are large numbers of people (in a stadium, any other venue or away from any predetermined site), this plan deals with the organisation of emergency assistance and support for the people affected. ORSEC is an inter-departmental and multi-risk crisis management procedure. It places all the stakeholders involved under the sole leadership of the *préfet*.

So as to make these measures even more appropriate, sports venues such as large stadiums also have special ORSEC provisions setting out the measures specific to the premises, particular organisation and constraints of stadiums (evacuation for example is a difficult measure to implement).

#### **Prevention measures specific to each stadium**

Sports venues are classified as establishments open to the public, the regulations of which are adapted to the public who go there and the type of activity. The security committees which are responsible for implementing those regulations examine the situation of the establishment during periodic visits and when building or extension works are carried out. They issue recommendations to the operators of sports venues to ensure that they comply with security standards and submit an opinion to the competent regulatory authority for the establishment (i.e. granting authorisation to open, having the power to close it down).

#### **Emergency assistance station contingency arrangements**

For Euro 2016, the stadium perimeter will be significantly larger than that designated for league matches or the Coupe de France. Accordingly, contingency arrangements have been made for a facility to be established near the stadiums (with financial support from the state to the *département* fire and emergency services – SDIS).

At each stadium there will be a command post fully equipped in line with the relevant standards and directives (Interior Ministry memorandum of September 2014).

The anticipated contingency facility will comprise 72 fire service personnel and 18 fire engines. This will make it possible to respond to incidents in which there are large numbers of victims or the explosion of a dirty bomb (CBRNe effects).

The stadiums will be filled to capacity but will be subject to the UEFA security/safety rules which are more stringent than those of the FFF (particularly as regards emergency assistance stations and medical facilities).

### ► **Security:**

#### **Police resources contingency arrangements**

\* The security arrangements for the match comprise an external dimension (see below) and intervention in the stadium itself. In the event of a crisis or public disturbance which the organiser is unable to deal with, the state security services will be required to act under the authority of the *préfet*. Contingency arrangements are therefore drawn up for intervention by a local detachment from the *département* Directorate of Public Safety, reinforced by mobile squads.

#### \* specialist prevention unit: **Rapid Intervention Section**

For certain matches at which there is a potential risk of trouble, within the stadium the *département* Directorate of Public Safety (DDSP) has a Rapid Intervention Section (SIR) whose role is to prevent any disorder and provide initial response support to the stewards.

There are 16 SIRs, comprising 402 police officers and 24 gendarmes specially trained and equipped to respond in stadiums. These police officers or gendarmes wear sports clothing and are unarmed. They are identified by the word “police” or “gendarmerie” on their clothing.

## Presence in the CP of one representative of the security services and one of the emergency services

### Arrangements for holding persons detained for offences committed in the stadium.

The police services may decide to investigate those people detained by the police or handed over by the organiser's security staff. Depending on the layout of the venue, they will be dealt with in a police facility located within the stadium or, in the absence of such a facility, at a police station outside the stadium to which they will be taken in a police vehicle.

#### I.2.b Outside stadiums

##### - At central level: the National Anti-Hooliganism Division (DNLH).

The DNLH was set up in October 2009 as a steering and co-ordination body. It has a three-fold role:

- \* to co-ordinate intelligence capabilities with the security stakeholders in the field;
- \* to identify more effectively individuals posing a potential risk so as to be in a position to detain them and take punitive action, both administratively and through the courts;
- \* to provide enhanced support to the *préfets* in terms of arrangements for maintaining public order and identifying troublemakers.

##### - Assessment of the match risk

The DNLH systematically carries out an assessment for League 1 matches and informs the relevant *préfet* how sensitive the match is, so that the security arrangements put in place are commensurate with the actual threat.

##### - Establishing a security unit

Depending on the level of threat to public order, the DDSF, under the authority of the relevant *préfet*, may establish a security unit.

This security unit comprises a "traffic" section (avoiding disruption to users and facilitating the movements of team supporters, match officials and the authorities) and a "public order" section designed to manage spectators and control supporters' movements.

For the latter, the security unit may, depending on the risk of confrontation between supporters, keep a close watch on supporters from the time they arrive (by bus, train, etc) until they leave. The aim is to avoid any encounter between opposing supporters.

Since 2010, the cost of such a security unit has had to be paid for by the match organisers. The cost estimated by the Professional Football League for the 2012-2013 season was €5,752,937, double that in the first year of billing (2009-2010).

This surveillance of supporters posing a potential risk may go beyond *département* level and take on a national dimension, either by enhanced surveillance of rail transport by the Central Border Police Directorate or by surveillance of motorway service stations where supporters might come into contact or arrange to meet for a fight (*gendarmerie nationale*).

##### - Presence of spotters

The DNLH has spotters and hooliganism correspondents in each *département*, who are in contact with clubs and supporters' associations.

The DNLH includes the **national football intelligence unit** and relies on its network of international correspondents to exchange operational intelligence. As a result, spotters are used to monitor foreign supporters during international matches.

The purpose of employing spotters at international matches is to identify those supporters who pose a potential threat and those who are subject to a judicial or administrative stadium ban.

**- Monitoring of incidents: stadium bans**

These stadium bans are either administrative (ordered by the *préfet*) or judicial (ordered by a judge). See the regulations (above) and the statistics (below).

**- The Paris Inter-departmental Events Safety Management Service (STADE)**

This dedicated unit of 15 officers has a very special role. It is responsible for maintaining the peace at the Parc des Princes and the Stade de France in the *Île de France* region. It makes preparations for and covers all sports and cultural events. As such it deals in real time with any arrests made during these events, recommends administrative stadium bans, monitors compliance with judicial and administrative stadium bans, deals, on its own initiative or not, with judicial investigations involving supporters, monitors Parisian supporters travelling within France or abroad to Paris-Saint-Germain fixtures, and collects, analyses and transmits intelligence.

**- Lastly, the organisers may be required to act to assist with guidance and reception.**

\*  
\* \*

**II. Successful supporter-management measures implemented by France on a day-to-day basis**

The partnership with the football authorities – primarily the Professional Football League, the FFF and clubs – and anti-discrimination associations has helped ensure the continuing decline in violence at many of France’s sports venues.

Improved security arrangements in stadiums, the disciplinary penalties imposed by the Professional Football League and systematic arrests have produced convincing results. All the administrative measures, such as travel bans and specific decrees issued by *préfets*, have helped prevent violence between supporters. It is as a result of the proactive action of the state services that violence has been contained.

Violence in football is primarily caused by a minority of persons with links to the “ultra” movement, who are totally unreceptive to dialogue and have no hesitation in challenging authority and government.

Systematic application of the available legislative and judicial resources, coupled with joint action by the public authorities and the football bodies, is the only effective way of combating violence in connection with sports events. The French system, which has been studied by foreign police forces, has shown itself to be effective. But it is not robust and requires the active involvement of all stakeholders.

**II.1 Infrastructure, attendance and sensitive matches**

**II.1.a Infrastructure and attendance**

Stadium capacity has increased by **7%** in League 1 and fallen in League 2.

Average attendances increased significantly between the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 seasons: **+10%**.

The average match attendance in League 2 in 2012-2013 was the third highest in the last ten seasons. The increase between the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 seasons was **13%**.

**II.1.b Sensitive matches**

**248 matches** (173 in League 1 and 75 in League 2) were classified as posing a potential threat in the 2013-2014 season, bringing the ratio of sensitive matches in Leagues 1 and 2 to one in three.

This is why administrative measures have been taken to prevent serious disturbances of the peace in the organisation of the most sensitive matches. For example, in this League 1 and League 2 season, **8**



**ministerial decrees** prohibited travel by visiting supporters and **32 decrees** issued by *préfets* placed restrictions on their travel arrangements.

## **II.2 Incidents observed:**

### **II.2.a Professional football**

**641 persons were arrested** in the context of League 1 and League 2 matches (55.8% in the stadium, 37% outside the stadium, and 7.2% following judicial proceedings), i.e. a slight reduction of 4% compared with the previous season.

It is in connection with League 1 matches that the fall has been the most significant, with a decrease of 12.6% in the number of arrests compared with the previous season, whereas over the same period there was an increase of 57% for League 2. These arrests primarily concerned the top two teams promoted to League 1.

**Acts of violence account for most arrests: 33.4%** of all arrests in the context of League 1 and League 2 matches (29.7% in the stadiums, 49.1% outside the stadiums, and 21.2% following judicial proceedings).

While arrests for violence increased by 15.6% compared with the previous season, they have remained relatively stable this season; however, at the same time, offences involving insults and obstruction have increased by **31.8%**.

An increase in the use of **fireworks** over the whole season compared with the previous season resulted in an increase of over two points in the number of subsequent arrests, accounting for **17.16%** of all the arrests made in the stands. There has been a reduction in the use of flares and smoke bombs and an increase in the use of bangers.

**167** arrests were made by the Rapid Intervention Sections (SIRs) at sports venues following identification of the troublemakers, an increase of 35% compared with the previous season. Arrests by the SIRs account for 26% of all arrests in stadiums. Bearing in mind that these SIRs have a direct link with only 15 of the 40 championship clubs, the results obtained by these units show their effectiveness in this respect.

**Table of incidents for the 2013-2014 season**

Incidents	League 1	League 2
Number of incidents	304	120
Number of interventions	199	79
Fireworks	1148	398
Projectiles thrown	218	100
Banners displayed	101	163
Laser pointers	50	11
Arrests	524	117

Source LFP

### **II.2.b Amateur football**

The increase in the number of amateur football matches presenting a potential risk of disorder has required particular monitoring of matches in all divisions throughout France.

It mainly concerns antisocial behaviour and violence that has been brought into the stadiums, not a radicalisation of supporters. **35 amateur football fixtures** have been classified as posing a potential threat. Usually reserved for professional matches, special security services have therefore had to be on hand for these matches, involving many police officers.

Action by the police has proved to be essential in order to prevent serious disturbances of the peace during sports events. This action has meant that several thousand football matches have been able to go ahead without trouble each season throughout France. An agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and the

FFF will shortly establish close relations between the two in order to combat more effectively traditional hooliganism and antisocial violence imported into football grounds.

### **II.3 Stadium bans**

As an immediate response by the administrative authorities to deal with objectionable behaviour by supporters at football matches, the number of administrative stadium bans is almost completely in line with the trend observed in incidents in and around sports venues.

The reduction in the number of these incidents was therefore reflected by an almost 17% fall in the number of administrative stadium bans on the last day of the championship compared with the previous year, which had already shown a 19% decrease compared with the year before that.

Accordingly, at the end of the 2013-2014 season, i.e. on the 38<sup>th</sup> day of the championship, **315 persons were subject to a stadium ban (205 administrative bans and 110 judicial bans).**

## APPENDIX 1

### Legislative texts – Offences applicable to security at sports events

- **Offences and penalties provided for in the Criminal Code**
  - **Acts of violence**

#### **Article 222-7**

Acts of violence causing an unintentional fatality shall be punishable by 15 years' imprisonment.

#### **Article 222-8**

The offence defined in Article 222-7 shall be punishable by 20 years' imprisonment where it is committed:

1. against a minor under 15 years of age;
2. against a person whose particular vulnerability, due to age, sickness or infirmity, to a physical or psychological disability or to pregnancy, is apparent or known to the perpetrator;
3. against a natural or legitimate ascendant or the adoptive father or mother;
4. against a judge or prosecutor, a juror, a lawyer, a public or ministerial official, a member or official of the International Criminal Court, a member of the gendarmerie, an officer of the national police force, customs or prison administration or any other person holding public authority, a firefighter (whether professional or volunteer), the appointed caretaker of a building or group of buildings or an agent overseeing, on behalf of the landlord, the security and surveillance of a residential building in pursuance of Article L.127.1 of the Construction and Housing Code, in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, when the status of the victim is known or apparent to the perpetrator;
  - 4a. against a teacher or any member of staff working at a school, a person employed by a public transport operator, any other person carrying out a public service role or a health professional in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, where the status of the victim is apparent or known to the perpetrator
  - 4b. against the spouse, the ascendants and direct descendants, or any other person who habitually resides in the home of the persons referred to in paragraphs 4 and 4a., on account of the duties carried out by these persons;
5. against a witness, victim or party claiming damages in civil proceedings, either to prevent him or her from reporting the facts, filing a complaint or making a statement before a court, or on account of such reporting, complaint or statement, or on account of his or her filing a statement before a national court or the International Criminal Court;
  - 5a. because of the victim's actual or supposed membership or non-membership of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion;
  - 5b. because of the sexual orientation of the victim;
6. by the spouse, cohabitee or civil partner of the victim;
  - 6a. against a person in order to force him or her to enter into marriage or civil partnership or on account of his or her refusal to enter into the said marriage or civil partnership;
7. by a person holding public authority or fulfilling a public service role in the exercise of or while exercising his or her duties;
8. by two or more acting as perpetrators or accomplices;
9. with premeditation or malice aforethought;
10. with the use or threatened use of a weapon.

The penalty incurred shall be increased to 30 years' imprisonment where the offence defined in Article 222-7 is committed against a minor under the age of 15 by a legitimate, natural or adoptive ascendant or by any other person having authority over the minor.

The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 governing the period of unconditional imprisonment shall be applicable to the offences defined in the present article.

**Article 222-9**

Acts of violence causing mutilation or permanent disability shall be punishable by ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000.

**Article 222-10**

The offence defined in Article 222-9 shall be punishable by 15 years' imprisonment where it is committed:

1. against a minor under 15 years of age;
2. against a person whose particular vulnerability, due to age, sickness or infirmity, to a physical or psychological disability or to pregnancy, is apparent or known to the perpetrator;
3. against a natural or legitimate ascendant or the adoptive father or mother;
4. against a judge or prosecutor, a juror, a lawyer, a public or ministerial official, a member or official of the International Criminal Court, a member of the gendarmerie, an officer of the national police force, customs or prison administration or any other person holding public authority, a firefighter (whether professional or volunteer), the appointed caretaker of a building or group of buildings or an agent overseeing, on behalf of the landlord, the security and surveillance of a residential building in pursuance of Article L.127.1 of the Construction and Housing Code, in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, when the status of the victim is known or apparent to the perpetrator;
- 4a. against a teacher or any member of staff working at a school, a person employed by a public transport operator, any other person carrying out a public service role or a health professional in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, where the status of the victim is apparent or known to the perpetrator
- 4b. against the spouse, the ascendants and direct descendants, or any other person who habitually resides in the home of the persons referred to in paragraphs 4 and 4a., on account of the duties carried out by these persons;
5. against a witness, victim or party claiming damages in civil proceedings, either to prevent him or her from reporting the facts, filing a complaint or making a statement before a court, or on account of such reporting, complaint or statement, or on account of his or her filing a statement before a national court or the International Criminal Court;
- 5a. because of the victim's actual or supposed membership or non-membership of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion;
- 5b. because of the sexual orientation of the victim;
6. by the spouse, cohabitee or civil partner of the victim;
- 6a. against a person in order to force him or her to enter into marriage or civil partnership or on account of his or her refusal to enter into the said marriage or civil partnership;
7. by a person holding public authority or fulfilling a public service role in the exercise of or while exercising his or her duties;
8. by two or more acting as perpetrators or accomplices;
9. with premeditation or malice aforethought;
10. with the use or threatened use of a weapon.

The penalty incurred shall be increased to 20 years' imprisonment where the offence defined in Article 222-9 is committed against a minor under the age of 15 by a legitimate, natural or adoptive ascendant or by any other person having authority over the minor.

The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 governing the period of unconditional imprisonment shall be applicable to the offences defined in the present article.

**Article 222-11**

Acts of violence causing a total incapacity to work of more than eight days shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000.

**Article 222-12**

The offence defined in Article 222-11 shall be punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000 where it is committed:

1. against a minor under 15 years of age;
2. against a person whose particular vulnerability, due to age, sickness or infirmity, to a physical or psychological disability or to pregnancy, is apparent or known to the perpetrator;
3. against a natural or legitimate ascendant or the adoptive father or mother;

4. against a judge or prosecutor, a juror, a lawyer, a public or ministerial official, a member or official of the International Criminal Court, a member of the gendarmerie, an officer of the national police force, customs or prison administration or any other person holding public authority, a firefighter (whether professional or volunteer), the appointed caretaker of a building or group of buildings or an agent overseeing, on behalf of the landlord, the security and surveillance of a residential building in pursuance of Article L.127.1 of the Construction and Housing Code, in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, when the status of the victim is known or apparent to the perpetrator;

4a. against a teacher or any member of staff working at a school, a person employed by a public transport operator, any other person carrying out a public service role or a health professional in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, where the status of the victim is apparent or known to the perpetrator

4b. against the spouse, the ascendants and direct descendants, or any other person who habitually resides in the home of the persons referred to in paragraphs 4 and 4a., on account of the duties carried out by these persons;

5. against a witness, victim or party claiming damages in civil proceedings, either to prevent him or her from reporting the facts, filing a complaint or making a statement before a court, or on account of such reporting, complaint or statement, or on account of his or her filing a statement before a national court or the International Criminal Court;

5a. because of the victim's actual or supposed membership or non-membership of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion;

5b. because of the sexual orientation of the victim;

6. by the spouse, cohabitee or civil partner of the victim;

6a. against a person in order to force him or her to enter into marriage or civil partnership or on account of his or her refusal to enter into the said marriage or civil partnership;

7. by a person holding public authority or fulfilling a public service role in the exercise of or while exercising his or her duties;

8. by two or more acting as perpetrators or accomplices;

9. with premeditation or malice aforethought;

10. with the use or threatened use of a weapon.

11. at a school or educational establishment or the premises of an administrative authority, and outside such establishments or premises when students or the public are entering or leaving, or shortly before or afterwards;

12. by an adult acting with the assistance of a minor;

13. on public transport or within premises designed for accessing such means of transport.

14. by a person acting while manifestly under the influence of alcohol or of narcotics;

15. by a person deliberately concealing all or part of his or her face in order to avoid being identified.

The penalty incurred shall be increased to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000 where the offence defined in Article 222-11 is committed against a minor under the age of 15 by a legitimate, natural or adoptive ascendant or by any other person having authority over the minor. The penalty shall be increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €100,000 where the offence is committed in two of the circumstances enumerated under paragraphs 1 et seq. of the present article. The penalty shall be increased to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000 where it is committed in three of these circumstances.

The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 governing the period of unconditional imprisonment shall be applicable to the offences defined in the previous paragraph.

### **Article 222-13**

Acts of violence causing an incapacity to work of eight days or less or causing no incapacity to work shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000 where they are committed:

1. against a minor under 15 years of age;

2. against a person whose particular vulnerability, due to age, sickness or infirmity, to a physical or psychological disability or to pregnancy, is apparent or known to the perpetrator;

3. against a natural or legitimate ascendant or the adoptive father or mother;

4. against a judge or prosecutor, a juror, a lawyer, a public or ministerial official, a member or official of the International Criminal Court, a member of the gendarmerie, an officer of the national police force, customs or prison administration or any other person holding public authority, a firefighter (whether professional or volunteer), the appointed caretaker of a building or group of buildings or an agent

overseeing, on behalf of the landlord, the security and surveillance of a residential building in pursuance of Article L.127.1 of the Construction and Housing Code, in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, when the status of the victim is known or apparent to the perpetrator;

4a. against a teacher or any member of staff working at a school, a person employed by a public transport operator, any other person carrying out a public service role or a health professional in the exercise or on account of his or her duties, where the status of the victim is apparent or known to the perpetrator;

4b. against the spouse, the ascendants and direct descendants, or any other person who habitually resides in the home of the persons referred to in paragraphs 4 and 4a., on account of the duties carried out by these persons;

5. against a witness, victim or party claiming damages in civil proceedings, either to prevent him or her from reporting the facts, filing a complaint or making a statement before a court, or on account of such reporting, complaint or statement, or on account of his or her filing a statement before a national court or the International Criminal Court;

5a. because of the victim's actual or supposed membership or non-membership of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion;

5b. because of the sexual orientation of the victim;

6. by the spouse, cohabitee or civil partner of the victim;

6a. against a person in order to force him or her to enter into marriage or civil partnership or on account of his or her refusal to enter into the said marriage or civil partnership;

7. by a person holding public authority or fulfilling a public service role in the exercise of or while exercising his or her duties;

8. by two or more acting as perpetrators or accomplices;

9. with premeditation or malice aforethought;

10. with the use or threatened use of a weapon.

11. at a school or educational establishment or the premises of an administrative authority, and outside such establishments or premises when students or the public are entering or leaving, or shortly before or afterwards;

12. by an adult acting with the assistance of a minor;

13. on public transport or within premises designed for accessing such means of transport.

14. by a person acting while manifestly under the influence of alcohol or of narcotics;

15. by a person deliberately concealing all or part of his or her face in order to avoid being identified.

The penalty incurred shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000 where the offence defined in the first paragraph is committed against a minor under the age of fifteen years by a legitimate, natural or adoptive ascendant or by any other person having authority over the minor. The penalty shall also be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000 where the offence causes a total incapacity to work of eight days or less, and is committed in two of the circumstances enumerated under paragraphs 1 et seq. of the present article. The penalty shall be increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €100,000 where it is committed in three of these circumstances.

#### **Article 222-14**

Habitual acts of violence committed against a minor under the age of fifteen years or against a person whose particular vulnerability, due to age, sickness, disability, a physical or psychological disability or to pregnancy, is apparent or known to the perpetrator shall be punishable by:

1. 30 years' imprisonment where such acts caused the death of the victim;

2. 20 years' imprisonment where they caused mutilation or permanent disability;

3. 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000 where they caused a total incapacity to work in excess of eight days;

4. 5 years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000 where they did not cause a total incapacity to work in excess of eight days.

The penalties provided for in the present article shall also apply to habitual acts of violence committed by the spouse, cohabitee or civil partner of the victim. The provisions of Article 132-80 shall apply to this paragraph.

The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 governing the period of unconditional imprisonment shall be applicable to the cases defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

**Article 222-14-1**

Where they are committed by an organised group or with malice aforethought, acts of violence with the use or threatened use of a weapon against a police officer, a member of the gendarmerie, a staff member of the prison administration or any other person holding public authority, a civilian or military firefighter or an employee of a public transport operator in the exercise of, while exercising or on account of his or her duties shall be punishable by:

1. 30 years' imprisonment where such acts caused the death of the victim;
2. 20 years' imprisonment where they caused mutilation or permanent disability;
3. 15 years' imprisonment where they caused a total incapacity to work in excess of eight days;
4. 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000 where they did not cause a total incapacity to work in excess of eight days.

The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 governing the period of unconditional imprisonment shall be applicable to the offences defined in this article.

Total incapacity to work shall be determined, at the request of the victim or the accused, by a medical expert in accordance with the arrangements laid down in Articles 157 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

**Article 222-14-2**

Any person who is knowingly part of a grouping, even where the latter is formed temporarily, with a view to the preparation, established by one or more material facts, of intentional acts of violence against persons, or the destruction of or wilful damage to property shall be punished by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

**Article 222-44**

I.- Individuals convicted of the offences provided for in the present chapter shall also incur the following additional penalties:

1. prohibition, pursuant to the conditions set out under Article 131-27, of exercising a public office or of exercising the professional or social activity, in the exercise of which the offence was committed, or, for the offences provided for in Articles 222-1 to 222-6, 222-7, 222-8, 222-10, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 222-14, paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 222-14-1, Articles 222-15, 222-23 to 222-26, 222-34, 222-35, 222-36, 222-37, 222-38 and 222-39, of exercising a commercial or industrial occupation, of running, administering, managing or controlling in any capacity, directly or indirectly, on his or her own account or on that of others, a commercial or industrial undertaking or a commercial company. Those prohibitions may be imposed cumulatively;
2. prohibition of holding or carrying a weapon requiring a licence, for a maximum period of five years;
3. suspension of driving licence for a maximum period of five years; this suspension may be limited to driving other than in the exercise of one's professional activity; in the cases provided for in Articles 222-19-1 and 222-20-1, this measure may not be suspended, even partially, and may not be limited to driving outside the exercise of a professional activity; in the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 to 6 and the last paragraph of Articles 222-19-1 and 222-20-1, the maximum period of suspension shall be ten years;
4. cancellation of the driving licence, together with prohibition, for a maximum period of five years, of any application for the issue of a new licence;
5. confiscation of one or more vehicles belonging to the convicted person;
6. confiscation of one or more weapons belonging to the convicted person or which are freely available to him or her;
7. confiscation of the item which was used or was intended to be used for the commission of the offence, or of the proceeds thereof.
8. in the cases provided for in Articles 222-19-1 and 222-20-1, the prohibition on driving certain motor vehicles, including those for which a driving licence is not required, for a maximum period of five years;
9. in the cases provided for in Articles 222-19-1 and 222-20-1, the requirement to complete a road safety awareness course, at the offender's expense;
- 9a. the obligation to complete a course on awareness of the dangers of the use of narcotics, pursuant to the conditions set out in Article 131-35-1
10. in the cases provided for in Articles 222-19-1 and 222-20-1, the immobilisation, for a maximum period of one year, of the vehicle used by the convicted person in committing the offence, if this vehicle belongs to him or her;

11. confiscation of the animal used to commit the offence;
12. prohibition, permanent or temporary, of owning an animal;
13. in the cases provided for in Articles 222-19-1 and 222-20-1, confiscation of the vehicle which the convicted person used to commit the offence, where he or she is the owner thereof. Confiscation of the vehicle is mandatory in the cases provided for in paragraph 4 and the last paragraph of those articles and in the cases provided for in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the said articles in the event of a further similar offence or if the person concerned has already been convicted in a final judgment for one of the offences provided for in Articles L. 221-2, L. 224-16, L. 234-1, L. 234-8, L. 235-1, L. 235-3, and L. 413-1 of the Highway Code or for the minor offence referred to in the said Article L.413-1. The court may, subject to a decision with special reasons, not impose this penalty;
14. in the cases provided for in paragraph 2 and the final paragraph of Articles 222-19-1 and 222-20-1 of this Code, the prohibition, for a maximum period of five years, of driving a vehicle which is not equipped, either by an accredited professional or the constructor, with an electronic alcohol detector/vehicle immobiliser, approved in accordance with the provisions set out in Article L.234-17 of the Highway Code. Where this prohibition is ordered at the same time as cancellation or suspension of the driving licence, it shall apply, for the duration laid down by the court, following the period of enforcement of that penalty;
15. completion, at the expense of the persons concerned, of a domestic and sexist violence prevention programme.

Any conviction for the offences provided for in paragraphs 1 to 6 and the last paragraph of Article 222-19-1 shall result in the automatic cancellation of the driving licence with the prohibition of any application for a new licence for a maximum period of ten years.

II.- In the event of conviction for the crimes or offences committed with a weapon provided for in Sections 1, 3, 3b and 4 of this chapter, the handing down of the additional penalties set out in paragraphs 2 and 6 of I shall be mandatory. The duration of the penalty provided for in paragraph 2 of I shall be increased to a maximum of 15 years.

Nevertheless, the court may, subject to a reasoned decision where sentencing is by a criminal court dealing with offences of medium gravity, decide not to hand down these penalties, taking into consideration the circumstances of the offence and the personality of the perpetrator.

#### **Article 222-45**

Individuals convicted of the offences provided for in Sections 1, 3 and 4 shall also incur the following penalties:

1. forfeiture of civic, civil and family rights, pursuant to the conditions set out in Article 131-26;
2. prohibition, pursuant to the conditions set out in Article 131-27, of the holding of public office;
3. prohibition, permanent or for a period of up to ten years, of the exercise of a professional activity or engagement in voluntary work involving regular contact with minors;
4. the obligation to complete a citizenship course, in accordance with the conditions provided for in Article 131-5-1;
5. the obligation to complete a responsible parenting course in accordance with the provisions provided for in Article 131-35-1.

#### **Article 222-46**

Individuals convicted of the offences set out in Section 2 of the present chapter shall also incur the additional penalty of publication or dissemination of the decision provided for in Article 131-35.

#### **Article 222-47**

In the cases provided for in Articles 222-1 to 222-15, 222-23 to 222-30 and 222-34 to 222-40, a court may order an additional penalty of prohibition of entry to a specified area, pursuant to the conditions set out in Article 131-31.

In the cases provided for in Articles 222-23 to 222-30, where the offences are committed against minors, in paragraph 6 of Articles 222-3, 222-8, 222-10, 222-12 and 222-13, in Article 222-14-4 and in Articles 222-34 to 222-40, a prohibition, for a maximum period of five years, of leaving the territory of the French Republic may also be imposed.



**Article 222-48**

Any foreigner convicted of any of the offences provided for in Articles 222-1 to 222-8 and 222-10, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 222-14, Articles 222-23 to 222-26, 222-30, 222-34 to 222-39 and Article 222-15 in the cases referred to in the second paragraph of that article, may be prohibited from entering the territory of the French Republic either permanently or for a maximum period of ten years, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 131-30.

**Article 222-48-1**

Individuals convicted of torture or acts of savagery or the offences defined in Articles 222-23 to 222-32 may also be sentenced to social and judicial supervision in accordance with the arrangements laid down in Articles 131-36-1 to 131-36-13.

Individuals guilty of the offences defined in Articles 222-8, 222-10, 222-12, 222-13, 222-14 and 222-18-3 may also be sentenced to social and judicial supervision, in accordance with the arrangements laid down in Articles 131-36-1 to 131-36-13, where the offence is committed either by the spouse, cohabitee or civil partner of the victim, or by the latter's former spouse, cohabitee or civil partner, or against a minor aged 15 years or under by a legitimate, natural or adoptive ascendant or by any other person having authority over the victim.

For the offences referred to in the preceding paragraph committed against a minor aged 15 years or under by a legitimate, natural or adoptive ascendant or by any other person having authority over the victim, social and judicial supervision shall be mandatory in proceedings relating to misdemeanours, where there have been habitual acts of violence, except where a suspended prison sentence has been handed down with probation or if the criminal court considers, in a decision with special reasons, that such a measure is not necessary; in proceedings relating to serious offences, the Assize Court shall deliberate specifically on whether to impose social and judicial supervision.

**Article 222-48-2**

In the event of conviction for a crime or offence provided for in Sections 1, 3 or 3a, committed by the father or mother against his or her child or the other parent, the court may order the total or partial withdrawal of parental responsibility, pursuant to Articles 378 and 379-1 of the Civil Code. If the proceedings are before the Assize Court, the latter shall decide on the matter without the assistance of the jury.

- **Wilful damage**

**Article 322-1**

Destroying, defacing or damaging property belonging to other persons shall be punishable by two years' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000, except where only minor damage has ensued.

Drawing, without prior authorisation, inscriptions, signs or images on façades, vehicles, public highways or street furniture shall be punishable by a fine of €3,750, or by community service where only minor damage has ensued.

**Article 322-2**

The offence defined in the first paragraph of Article 322-1 shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000, and the offence under the second paragraph of Article 322-1 by a fine of €7,500 and community service where the property destroyed, defaced or damaged is:

1. (abrogated)
2. a register, a record or an original document of a public authority.

Where the offence defined in the first paragraph of Article 322-1 is committed on account of the owner or user of the property's membership or non-membership, actual or supposed, of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion, the penalties incurred shall also be increased to three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000.

### **Article 322-3**

The offence defined in the first paragraph of Article 322-1 shall be punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000, and that defined in the second paragraph of the same article by a fine of €15,000 and community service:

1. where it is committed by two or more acting as perpetrators or accomplices;
2. where it is facilitated by the state of a person whose particular vulnerability, due to age, sickness, infirmity, a physical or psychological disability or to pregnancy, is apparent or known to the perpetrator;
3. where it is committed against a judge or prosecutor, a juror, a lawyer, a public or ministerial official, a member of the gendarmerie, an officer of the national police force, customs or prison administration or against any other person holding public authority or discharging a public service role in order to influence his or her conduct in the exercise of his or her duties;
- 3a. where it is committed against a spouse, an ascendant or direct descendant or against any other person who habitually resides in the home of those mentioned in paragraphs 3, on account of the duties or status of those persons;
4. where it is committed against a witness, victim or party claiming damages in civil proceedings, either to prevent him or her from reporting the facts, filing a complaint or making a statement before a court, or on account of such reporting, complaint or statement;
5. where it is committed in a residential building or premises used or designed for the safekeeping of funds, securities, goods or equipment, by entering such premises by deceit, breaking in or climbing in;
6. where it is committed in a location classified for national security purposes;
7. where it is committed by a person deliberately concealing all or part of his or her face in order to avoid being identified;
8. where the object destroyed, defaced or damaged is intended for public use or decoration and belongs to a public corporation or a person discharging a public service role.

Where the offence defined in the first paragraph of Article 322-1 is committed against a school, educational or recreational establishment or a vehicle used to transport children, the penalties incurred shall also be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000.

The penalties shall be increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €100,000 where the offence defined in the first paragraph of Article 322-1 is committed in two of the circumstances provided for in paragraphs 1 et seq. of the present Article.

### **Article 322-3-1**

The act of destroying, defacing or damaging shall be punishable by seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €100,000 when it relates to:

1. a listed or classified building or movable item pursuant to the provisions of the Heritage Code or a classified private archive document, pursuant to the provisions of the same Code;
2. an archaeological find discovered in the course of an excavation or by chance, an area in which archaeological activities are taking place or a place of worship;
3. a cultural item belonging to the public movable domain or which is exhibited, conserved or stored, even temporarily, either in a *Musée de France*, a library, a media library or archive, or in a location belonging to a public corporation or a private individual carrying out a public interest role, or in a place of worship.

The penalties shall be increased to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000 where the offence provided for in the present article is committed in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 322-3.

The fines referred to in this article may be increased up to the equivalent of half the value of the item destroyed, defaced or damaged.

### **Article 322-4**

Any attempt to commit the offences referred to in this section shall be subject to the same penalties.

### **Article 322-6**

Destroying, defacing or damaging property belonging to other persons through an explosive substance, a fire or any other means liable to create a danger to other persons shall be punishable by ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000.

Where this is a fire in a forest, woodland, heathland, bush, plantations, or on land used for reforestation belonging to another person, and takes place in conditions such as to expose people to bodily harm or to cause irreversible environmental damage, the penalties shall be increased to 15 years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000.

#### **Article 322-11**

Any attempt to commit the offence provided for in Article 322-6 shall be punishable by the same penalties.

#### - **Obstruction**

#### **Article 433-6**

Obstruction consists of forceful resistance to a person holding public authority or discharging a public service role acting, in the exercise of his or her duty, for the enforcement of laws, orders from a public authority or court decisions or warrants.

#### **Article 433-7**

Obstruction shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

Obstruction committed by a group shall be punishable by two years' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.

#### **Article 433-8**

Armed obstruction is punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000.

Armed obstruction committed by a group shall be punishable by ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000.

#### **Article 433-9**

Where the person guilty of obstruction is serving a custodial sentence, the penalties imposed for the misdemeanour of obstruction shall, as an exception to Articles 132-2 to 132-5, be consecutive to, and not run concurrently with, the sentences being served by the person concerned or those handed down for the offence for which he or she was imprisoned.

#### **Article 433-10**

Direct incitement to obstruction, whether expressed through shouting or public speeches, or by the display, distribution or communication in any other way of writings, words or pictures shall be punishable by two months' imprisonment and a fine of €7,500.

When the misdemeanour under the previous paragraph is committed via the press or broadcasting, the specific legal provisions governing those matters shall be applicable for determining the persons who are responsible.

#### - **Participation in an armed assembly**

#### **Article 431-4**

Continuing wilful participation by an unarmed person in an unlawful assembly subsequent to official orders to disperse shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

The offence defined in the first paragraph shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000 where committed by a person who deliberately conceals all or part of his or her face to avoid being identified.

#### **Article 431-5**

Wilful participation in an unlawful assembly whilst carrying a weapon shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000.

Where a person carrying a weapon has wilfully continued to participate in an unlawful assembly subsequent to official orders to disperse, the penalty shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000.

Where a person carrying a weapon deliberately conceals all or part of his or her face to avoid being identified, the penalty shall also be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000.

**Article 431-6**

Direct incitement to obstruction, whether expressed through shouting or public speeches, or by the display, distribution or communication in any other way of writings, words or pictures shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

Where the incitement is acted upon, the penalty shall be increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €100,000.

- **Unlawful concealment of the face during demonstrations on the public highway**

**Article R645-14**

Any person who deliberately conceals his or her face at or in the immediate vicinity of a demonstration on the public highway so as not to be identified, in circumstances raising fears of disturbances of the peace, shall be punished by the fine laid down for fifth-class petty offences.

A repeat of the petty offence defined in the present article shall be punishable in accordance with Articles 132-11 and 132-15.

The provisions of the present article shall not apply to marches in the context of local traditions or where there is legitimate justification for covering the face.

- **Offences and penalties defined in the *Code de la route* (Highway Code)**

**Article L.412-1**

Placement or attempted placement on a public highway, with the intention of hindering or disrupting the passage of traffic, of an item obstructing the passage of vehicles, or the use or attempted use of any means of causing such an obstruction shall be punishable by two years' imprisonment and a fine of €4,500.

Any person guilty of one of the offences defined in this article shall also be punished by an additional penalty of suspension, for a maximum period of three years, of his or her driving licence, a suspension which may be restricted to the driving of a vehicle outside professional activities.

When an offence defined in this article is committed by means of a vehicle, its immobilisation and impoundment may be ordered in the conditions defined in Article L. 325-1 to L. 325-3.

The offences defined in this article shall by operation of law be punishable by the loss of half of the maximum number of points on the driving licence.

- **Offences and penalties defined in the *Code du sport* (Sports Code)**

**Article L.332-1**

The organisers of profit-making sports events may be required to provide a safety management service in the conditions defined in Article 23 of Law No. 95-73 (General Principles and Programming Act) of 21 January 1995.

**Article L.332-2**

The companies referred to in Article 1 of Law No. 83-629 of 12 July 1983 governing private security activities shall supervise access to venues in which a sports event is organised at which the attendance will be more than 300 spectators in the conditions defined in Article 3-2 of that law.

**Article L.332-2-1**

When a CCTV system has been fitted at a venue where a sports event is taking place, the persons responsible for its operation, in pursuance of the authorisation issued by the *préfet* in application of Article 10 of Law No. 95-73 (General Principles and Programming Act) of 21 January 1995, and the organiser of the sports event shall ensure, prior to the holding of the said event, that the CCTV system is working properly.

Any person who fails to comply with the obligation set out in the first paragraph shall be punished by a fine of €15,000.

**Article L.332-3**

The introduction or attempted introduction into a sports venue by force or by fraud, in the course of or during a public screening of a sports event, of alcoholic beverages within the meaning of Article L.3321-1 of the Public Health Code shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €7,500.

The provisions of the first paragraph shall not be applicable to those persons authorised to sell or distribute such beverages in pursuance of the third to sixth paragraphs of Article L.3335-4 of the same Code.

**Article L.332-4**

Entering a sports venue while under the influence of alcohol in the course of or during a public screening of a sports event shall be punishable by a fine of €7,500. Any perpetrator of this offence who commits violence causing complete incapacity to work lasting up to 8 days shall be punished by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

**Article L.332-5**

Entry or attempted entry to a sports venue by force or by fraud while under the influence of alcohol in the course of or during a public screening of a sports event shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

**Article L.332-6**

In the course of a sports event or during a public screening of such an event at a sports venue, the incitement, by any means whatsoever, of spectators to hatred or violence against a referee, a sports official, an athlete or any other person or group of persons shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

**Article L.332-7**

The introduction, wearing or display at a sports venue, in the course of or during a public screening of a sports event, of badges, signs or symbols evoking a racist or xenophobic ideology shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

Attempted commission of the offence defined in the first paragraph shall be punishable by the same penalties.

**Article L.332-8**

The introduction, possession or use of flares or fireworks of any kind or the introduction without legitimate reason of any item capable of constituting a weapon within the meaning of Article 132-75 of the Criminal Code into a sports venue in the course of or during a public screening of a sports event shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

Attempted commission of the offence defined in the first paragraph shall be punishable by the same penalties.

The court may also order confiscation of the item which was used or was intended to be used to commit the infringement.

**Article L.332-9**

The throwing of projectiles jeopardising the safety of the persons at a sports venue in the course of or during a public screening of a sports event shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

Use or attempted use as a projectile of movable or immovable fittings from the sports venue shall be punishable by the same penalties.

**Article L.332-10**

Disruption of the holding of a competition or conduct detrimental to the safety of persons or property through entry into the competition area of a sports venue shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

**Article L.332-11**

Any person who commits one of the offences defined in Articles L. 332-3 to L. 332-10 and L. 332-19 of this Code shall also be punished by the additional penalty of a ban for a period of not more than five years on entering or being in the vicinity of a venue where a sports event is taking place. Any person on whom this sentence is imposed will be ordered by the courts, when sports events are taking place, to comply with a summons issued by any qualified authority or person designated by the court in its decision. That decision may impose an obligation to comply with a summons when certain sports events, designated by it, are taking place on the territory of a foreign state.

That additional penalty shall also be applicable to any person who commits one of the offences defined in Articles 222-11 to 222-13, 322-1 to 322-4, 322-6, 322-11 and 433-6 of the Criminal Code when that offence was committed at a venue where a sports event was taking place or, outside the venue, was directly linked to a sports event.

**Article L.332-12**

When a person is convicted of a further similar offence which is one of those mentioned in Article L.332-11, the additional penalty defined in that article may also be imposed.

**Article L.332-13**

Any person who, in violation of the ban for which Articles L. 332-11 and L. 332-12 provide, enters or goes to a venue where a sports event is taking place or the surrounding area, or who, without legitimate reason, fails to comply with a summons to attend when sports events are taking place shall be punished by two years' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.

**Article L.332-14**

When the convicted person is of foreign nationality and has his or her home outside France, the court may, if the seriousness of the acts committed justifies it, impose, in place of the additional penalty defined in the first paragraph of Article L.332-11, a prohibition of entry to French territory for a maximum period of two years.

**Article L.332-15**

In conditions specified by decree in the *Conseil d'Etat*, the *préfet* of the *département* or, in Paris, the metropolitan police commissioner shall convey to sports associations and companies and to approved sports federations the names of those persons on whom the additional penalty has been imposed in application of Articles L. 332-11 to L. 332-13.

He may convey those names to the supporters' associations mentioned in Article L.332-17.

The names of the persons mentioned in the first paragraph may also be conveyed to the authorities of a foreign country when it is hosting a sports event in which a French team is participating.

**Article L.332-16**

When, through his or her overall conduct on the occasion of sports events, through the commission of a serious act on the occasion of such an event, as a result of his or her membership of an association or a de facto grouping which has been dissolved in application of Article L.332-18, or as a result of his or her participation in activities - prohibited in application of the same article - organised by an association whose activity has been suspended, a person constitutes a threat to public order, the representative of the State in the *département*, or, in Paris, the metropolitan police commissioner, may, through an order giving reasons, impose on him or her a ban on entering or being in the vicinity of venues where such events or a public screening thereof are taking place.

The order, valid throughout French territory, determines the type of sports events concerned. It is valid for a maximum period of 12 months. However, that period may be extended to 24 months if, within the three previous years, the person concerned has been the subject of a ban.

The representative of the State in the *département* or, in Paris, the metropolitan police commissioner may also, through the same order, order the person who is the subject of the ban to comply with a summons to attend issued by any qualified authority or person designated therein when the sports events which are the subject of the ban are taking place. The same order may also provide for an obligation to comply with a summons to attend when certain sports events, designated therein, are taking place on the territory of a foreign State.

Failure by the person to comply with any of the orders adopted in pursuance of the foregoing paragraphs shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €3,750.

The *préfet* of the *département* or, in Paris, the metropolitan police commissioner, shall convey to sports associations and companies and to approved sports federations the names of the persons who are the subjects of the ban to which the first paragraph refers. He or she may also convey them to the supporters' associations mentioned in Article L.332-17.

The names of the persons mentioned in the first paragraph may also be conveyed to the authorities of a foreign country which is hosting a sports event in which a French team is participating.

A decree of the *Conseil d'Etat* shall determine the arrangements for application of this article.

#### **Article L.332-16-1**

The Ministry of the Interior may, by order, prohibit individual or group travel by persons claiming to be supporters of a team and behaving as such at the site of a sports event, but whose presence is likely to give rise to serious disturbances of public order.

The order sets out the duration, which is limited, of the measure, the precise factual circumstances justifying it and the departure and arrival points to which it applies.

Any of the persons concerned who do not comply with the order adopted in application of the first two paragraphs shall be punished by six months' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.

In the case defined in the foregoing paragraph, imposition of the additional penalty of a stadium ban, as provided for in Article L.332-11, for a period of one year shall be compulsory, unless a decision to the contrary with special reasons is taken.

#### **Article L.332-16-2**

The representative of the State in the *département* or, in Paris, the metropolitan police commissioner may, by order, restrict the freedom of movement of persons claiming to be supporters of a team or behaving as such at the site of a sports event, but whose presence is likely to give rise to serious disturbances of the peace.

The order sets out the duration, which is limited, of the measure, the precise circumstances in terms of fact and location justifying it, and the territory to which it applies.

Any of the persons concerned who do not comply with the order adopted in application of the first two paragraphs shall be punished by six months' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.

In the case defined in the foregoing paragraph, imposition of the additional penalty of a stadium ban, as provided for in Article L.332-11, for a period of one year shall be compulsory, unless a decision to the contrary with special reasons is taken.

#### **Article L.332-17**

Approved sports federations, as well as supporters' associations, those associations approved by the Minister responsible for Sport whose purpose is to prevent violence on the occasion of sports events and any other association whose purpose is to combat racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism and which have been registered for at least three years at the time of the offence may exercise the rights granted to parties

claiming damages (*parties civiles*) in respect of offences mentioned in Articles L. 312-14 to L. 312-17 and L. 332-3 to L. 332-10.

#### **Article L.332-18**

Any association or de facto grouping whose purpose is to support a sports association mentioned in Article L.122-1, and whose members have together, in the context or on the occasion of a sports event, committed repeated acts or a single act of particular seriousness constituting damage to property, violence against persons or incitement to hatred or to discrimination against persons because of their origin, sexual orientation or identity, gender or – actual or supposed – membership of an ethnic group, nation, race or specific religion, may be dissolved or have its activity suspended for a maximum period of 12 months by decree, following consultation of the National Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Violence at Sports Events.

Representatives of the associations or de facto groupings and the club management concerned may submit their observations to that committee.

The members of the committee are:

1. Two members of the *Conseil d'Etat*, including the chairperson of the committee, appointed by the Vice-President of the *Conseil d'Etat*;
2. Two members of the judiciary, appointed by the First President of the Court of Cassation;
3. One representative of the French National Olympic and Sports Committee, one representative of the sports federations and one representative of the professional sports leagues, appointed by the Minister responsible for Sport;
4. One person chosen for his or her competence in relation to violence at sports events, appointed by the Minister responsible for Sport.

The conditions in which the committee operates are laid down in a decree of the *Conseil d'Etat*.

#### **Article L.332-19**

Participation in the – open or disguised – maintenance or reconstitution of an association or grouping which has been dissolved in application of Article L.332-18, or participation in the activities which have been prohibited in application of that same article for an association whose activity has been suspended, shall be punishable by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

Organisation of the – open or disguised – maintenance or reconstitution of an association or grouping which has been dissolved in application of Article L.332-18, or organisation of the activities which have been prohibited in application of that same article for an association whose activity has been suspended, shall be punishable by two years' imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.

The penalties defined in the first and second paragraphs shall be increased to three years' imprisonment and a fine of €45,000 or five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000 respectively in the event that the offences on the grounds of which the association or grouping was dissolved or its activity suspended were committed because of the victim's origin, sexual orientation or identity, gender or – actual or supposed – membership of an ethnic group, nation, race or specific religion.

#### **Article L.332-20**

Legal entities declared, in the conditions defined in Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code, to have criminal responsibility for the offences defined in [Articles L. 312-14, L. 312-15, L. 312-16, L. 332-8, L. 332-9 and L. 332-10](#), in the second paragraph of Article L.332-11 and in [Article L.332-19](#) shall be punished by, in addition to the fine determined in accordance with [Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code](#), the penalties defined in Article 131-39 of that same code.

The prohibition mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 131-39 of the Criminal Code relates to the activity in the exercise of which, or while exercising which, the offence was committed.



**Article L.332-21**

Individuals who or legal entities which commit offences defined in Article L.332-19 shall also be punished by the following penalties:

1. Confiscation of the movable and immovable property belonging to, or used by, the maintained or reconstituted association or grouping;
2. Confiscation of the uniforms, badges, emblems, weapons and any equipment used or intended to be used by the maintained or reconstituted association or grouping.

## APPENDIX 2

### Sports events

#### Criminal-law provisions in the economic and financial field

##### Intellectual Property Code

###### **Article L.335-2**

Any publication of writings, musical compositions, drawings, paintings or other printed or engraved material produced in whole or in part notwithstanding the laws and regulations governing authors' ownership shall constitute counterfeiting, and any counterfeiting shall constitute an offence.

Counterfeiting in France of works published in France or abroad shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €300,000.

The sale, exportation, importation, transshipment or possession for the aforementioned purposes of counterfeit works shall be punishable by the same penalties.

Where offences defined in this article are committed by an organised criminal group, the penalties shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

###### **Article L.335-3**

Any reproduction, performance or dissemination of a work of the mind, by any means whatsoever, in violation of the author's rights as defined and regulated by law shall also constitute counterfeiting.

The violation of any of the rights of an author of software as defined in Article L. 122-6 shall also constitute an infringement.

The recording of all or part of a cinematographic or audiovisual work on premises where cinematographic works are screened shall also constitute counterfeiting.

###### **Article L.335-4**

Any fixation, reproduction, communication or making available to the public, on payment or free of charge, or broadcasting of a performance, a sound recording, a videogram or a programme without the authorisation, where such authorisation is required, of the performer, of the sound recording or videogram producer or of the audiovisual communication enterprise, shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €300,000.

Any importation, exportation transshipment or possession for the aforementioned purposes of sound recordings or videograms without the authorisation, where such authorisation is required, of the producer or the performer shall be punishable by the same penalties.

Failure to pay the remuneration due to the author, the performer or the sound recording or videogram producer for private copying or for public communication or for the broadcasting of sound recordings or videograms shall be punishable by the fine laid down in the first paragraph.

Failure to pay the advance deductions provided for in the third paragraph of Article L.133-3 shall be punishable by the fine defined in the first paragraph.

Where offences defined in this article were committed by an organised criminal group, the penalties shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

###### **Article L.335-8**

Legal entities declared, in the conditions defined in [Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code](#), to have criminal responsibility for the offences defined in [Articles L. 335-2 to L. 335-4-2](#) shall be punished by, in addition

to the fine determined in accordance with [Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code](#), the penalties defined in [Article 131-39](#) of that same code.

The prohibition mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 131-39 relates to the activity in the exercise of which, or while exercising which, the offence was committed.

Legal entities declared to have criminal responsibility may also be ordered, at their own expense, to withdraw from commercial circuits the items deemed to be counterfeit and anything which was used or was intended to be used to commit the offence.

The court may order the destruction, at the convicted party's expense, or the handover to the injured party of the items and objects withdrawn from commercial circuits or confiscated, without prejudice to any damages.

#### **Article L.343-4**

Infringement of the rights of the producer of a database as defined in Article L. 342-1 shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000. Where the offence was committed by an organised criminal group, the penalties shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

#### **Article L.343-6**

Legal entities declared, in the conditions defined in Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code, to have criminal responsibility for the offences defined in this chapter shall be punished by, in addition to the fine determined in accordance with [Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code](#), the penalties defined in [Article 131-39](#) of that same code.

The prohibition mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 131-39 of that same code relates to the activity in the exercise of which, or while exercising which, the offence was committed.

The court may order the destruction, at the convicted party's expense, or the handover to the injured party of the items and objects withdrawn from commercial circuits or confiscated, without prejudice to any damages.

#### **Article L.521-12**

Legal entities declared, in the conditions defined in [Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code](#), to have criminal responsibility for the offence defined in the first paragraph of [Article L.521-10](#) shall be punished by, in addition to the fine determined in accordance with [Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code](#), the penalties defined in [Article 131-39](#) of that same code.

The prohibition mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 131-39 of that same code relates to the activity in the exercise of which, or while exercising which, the offence was committed.

Legal entities declared to have criminal responsibility may also be ordered, at their own expense, to withdraw from commercial circuits the items deemed to be counterfeit and anything which was used or was intended to be used to commit the offence.

The court may order the destruction, at the convicted party's expense, or the handover to the injured party of the items and objects withdrawn from commercial circuits or confiscated, without prejudice to any damages.

#### **Article L.615-14-3**

Legal entities declared, in the conditions defined in [Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code](#), to have criminal responsibility for the offence defined in [Article L.615-14](#), shall be punished by, in addition to the fine determined in accordance with [Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code](#), the penalties defined in [Article 131-39](#) of that same code.

The prohibition mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 131-39 of that same code relates to the activity in the exercise of which, or while exercising which, the offence was committed.

Legal entities declared to have criminal responsibility may also be ordered, at their own expense, to withdraw from commercial circuits the items deemed to be counterfeit and anything which was used or was intended to be used to commit the offence.

The court may order the destruction, at the convicted party's expense, or the handover to the injured party of the items and objects withdrawn from commercial circuits or confiscated, without prejudice to any damages.

#### **Article L.623-32-2**

Legal entities declared, in the conditions defined in Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code, to have criminal responsibility for the offence defined in [Article L.623-32](#), shall be punished by, in addition to the fine determined in accordance with [Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code](#), the penalties defined in [Article 131-39](#) of that same code.

The prohibition mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 131-39 of that same code relates to the activity in the exercise of which, or while exercising which, the offence was committed.

Legal entities declared to have criminal responsibility may also be ordered, at their own expense, to withdraw from commercial circuits the items deemed to be in infringement and anything which was used or was intended to be used to commit the offence.

The court may order the destruction, at the convicted party's expense, or the handover to the injured party of the items and objects withdrawn from commercial circuits or confiscated, without prejudice to any damages.

#### **Article L.615-14**

1. Any person who has knowingly infringed the rights of the owner of a patent as defined in Articles L. 613-3 to L. 613-6 shall be punished by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €300,000. Where the offence was committed by an organised criminal group or via a public on-line communication network, or where the acts relate to goods dangerous to human or animal health or safety, the penalties shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

#### **Article L.716-9**

Any person, who, for the purpose of selling, supplying, offering for sale or hiring goods presented under a counterfeit trademark,

- a) imports, exports, re-exports or transships goods presented under a counterfeit trademark;
  - b) produces on an industrial basis goods presented under a counterfeit trademark;
  - c) gives instructions or orders to commit the acts defined in (a) and (b);
- shall be punished by four years' imprisonment and a fine of €400,000.

Where the offences defined in this article were committed by an organised criminal group or via a public on-line communication network, or where the acts relate to goods dangerous to human or animal health or safety, the penalties shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

#### **Article L.716-10**

Any person who

- a) possesses, without legitimate reason, imports or exports goods presented under a counterfeit trademark;
- b) offers for sale or sells goods presented under a counterfeit trademark;
- c) reproduces, imitates, uses, attaches, removes, modifies a trademark, a collective mark or a collective certification mark in violation of the rights conferred by its registration and the prohibitions which ensue therefrom. The offence defined in the conditions defined in this (c) shall not be constituted where prescription assistance software enables, if the prescriber so decides, a

prescription to be written using the international non-proprietary name, in accordance with the rules of good practice set out in Article L.161-38 of the Social Security Code;

- d) knowingly delivers a product or provides a service other than that which is required of him under a registered trademark;

shall be punished by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €300,000.

The infringement, under the conditions defined in (d), shall not be constituted if a pharmacist exercises the faculty of substitution provided for in Article L.5125-23 of the Public Health Code.

Where the offences defined in (a) to (d) were committed by an organised criminal group or via a public on-line communication network, or where the acts relate to goods dangerous to human or animal health or safety, the penalties shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000, the penalties shall be increased to five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000.

## **Customs Code**

### **Article 215**

1. Any person who is in possession of or transports goods dangerous to public health, safety or morality, counterfeit goods, goods prohibited in pursuance of international agreements or goods subject to international fraud and to an illegal market damaging the legitimate interests of lawful trade and the Treasury, specifically designated in decrees of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, shall, as soon as required to do so by customs officers, produce either receipts proving that those goods were lawfully imported into the customs territory of the European Community or purchase invoices, manufacturers' invoices or any other kind of proof origin issued by persons or companies lawfully established within the customs territory of the European Community.

2. Any person who has been in possession of or has transported, sold, assigned or exchanged the said goods, and any person who has drawn up the proofs of origin shall also submit the documents referred to in paragraph 1 above whenever required to do so by customs officers within three years after the date on which the goods left their possession or from the date on which the proofs of origin were issued.

3. These provisions shall not be applicable to goods which are proved by those in possession thereof, those transporting them or those who have been in possession thereof or who have transported, sold, assigned or exchanged them, through production of their accounts, to have been imported, possessed or acquired within the customs territory before the date of publication of the decrees mentioned above.

Any person in possession of goods designated for the first time by the decree to which paragraph 1 above refers may, within a period of six months after publication of the decree, declare them in writing to the customs service.

Having verified that this declaration is accurate, the service will authenticate it, and it will be acceptable as proof.

### **Article 414**

Any act of smuggling and any undeclared importation or exportation of goods in the category of those prohibited or taxed at high rates within the meaning of this code shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment, confiscation of the smuggled items, confiscation of the means of transport, confiscation of any items used to conceal the smuggling, confiscation of the assets and funds which are the direct or indirect proceeds of the offence, and a fine of between one and two times the value of the smuggled items.

The prison sentence shall be increased to a maximum term of five years and the fine may rise to three times the value of the smuggled items when the smuggling, importation or exportation relates to goods used for two purposes, civil and military, and the movement of which is restricted by European regulations.

The prison sentence shall be increased to 10 years and the fine may rise to five times the value of the smuggled items if the smuggling, importation or exportation relates to goods dangerous to public health, morality or safety which appear on the list issued by decree of the Minister responsible for customs, or if it is committed by an organised criminal group.

#### **Article 419**

1. The goods concerned in Articles 215, 215 bis and 215 ter are considered to have been imported by smuggling in the event that no proof of origin is produced, none of the documents defined in those same articles have been presented, or the documents presented were false, inaccurate, incomplete or inapplicable.

2. They shall be seized, wherever they may be, and the persons concerned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 215, in Article 215 bis and in Article 215 ter shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of Article 414 above.

3. If they were aware that the person who issued the proofs of origin to them could not validly do so or that the person who sold, assigned, exchanged or entrusted the goods to them was unable to justify their lawful possession, the persons in possession and those transporting the goods shall be sentenced to the same penalties, and the goods shall be seized and confiscated in the same conditions as above, whatever proofs may have been produced.

#### **Criminal Code**

##### **Article 131-39**

Where the law so provides against a legal entity, a felony or misdemeanour may be punished by one or more of the following penalties:

1. dissolution, where the legal entity was created to commit a felony, or, where the felony or misdemeanour is one which carries for individuals a sentence of imprisonment of three years or more, where it was diverted from its purpose in order to commit it;
2. prohibition of the exercise, direct or indirect, of one or more social or professional activity, either permanently or for a maximum period of five years;
3. placement under judicial supervision for a maximum period of five years;
4. permanent closure or closure for a maximum period of five years of the establishments or of one or more of the establishments of the enterprise used to commit the offences in question;
5. disqualification from public tenders, either permanently or for a maximum period of five years;
6. prohibition, either permanently or for a maximum period of five years, of offering securities to the public and of having their securities admitted to negotiations on a regulated market;
7. prohibition of the drawing of cheques, except those allowing the withdrawal of funds by the drawer from the drawee or certified cheques, and prohibition of the use of payment cards, for a maximum period of five years;
8. confiscation in the conditions defined in, and as determined by, Article 131-21;
9. posting of a public notice of the decision or dissemination of the decision in the print media or via any form of communication to the public by electronic means;
10. confiscation of the animal used to commit the offence or against which the offence was committed;
11. prohibition, either permanently or for a maximum period of five years, of owning an animal;
12. prohibition for a maximum period of five years of the receipt of any public assistance from the state, local or regional authorities, the establishments although groupings, and any financial assistance paid by a private individual responsible for a public-service task.

The additional penalty of confiscation shall also be imposed ipso jure for felonies and misdemeanours punishable by a prison sentence of more than one year, with the exception of press misdemeanours.

The penalties under (1) and (3) above are not applicable to legal entities under public law capable of being considered to have criminal responsibility. Nor are they applicable to political parties or associations, or to unions. The penalty defined in (1) is not applicable to institutions representing workers.

**Article 313-1**

Obtaining by false pretences is the act of deceiving an individual or a legal entity by the use of a false name or a fictitious capacity, by misuse of a genuine capacity or by means of fraudulent practices, and thereby persuading that person, to his or her own detriment or to the detriment of a third party, to transfer funds, securities or any property whatsoever, to provide a service or to consent to an act incurring or discharging an obligation.

Obtaining by false pretences shall be punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €375,000.

**Article 313-6-2**

The sale, offer for sale or display with a view to sale or to assignment, or the supply of means with a view to the sale or assignment of entrance tickets to a sports, cultural or commercial event or to a live performance, on a habitual basis and without the permission of the producer, the organiser or the holder of the event's or performance's exploitation rights shall be punishable by a fine of €15,000. That fine shall be increased to €30,000 in the event of a further similar offence.

For the purposes of application of the first paragraph, any ticket, document, message or code, in any form and on any material, attesting that the right to attend the event or performance has been obtained from the producer, organiser or owner of the exploitation rights shall be considered to be an entrance ticket.

**Article 445-1**

Any person who, at any time, directly or indirectly, without being entitled to do so, makes offers, promises, gifts or presents or offers advantages of any kind to any person who, without being a public official, a person responsible for a public service role or a holder of a public elective mandate, exercises, within the ambit of his or her professional or social activity, a management position or occupation for an individual or legal entity or for a body of any kind, either for him or herself or for others, in order to obtain the performance or non-performance of, or because he or she has performed or refrained from performing, any act within the ambit of his or her activity or position or facilitated through his or her activity or position, in violation of his or her legal, contractual or professional obligations, shall be punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000, the amount of which may be increased to twice the proceeds derived from the offence.

The same penalties shall apply to any person who consents to any person referred to in the first paragraph who solicits, without being entitled to do so, at any time, directly or indirectly, offers, promises, gifts, presents or advantages of any kind, either for him or herself or for others, for performing or having performed, or for refraining from or for having refrained from, an act referred to in the said paragraph, in violation of his or her legal, contractual or professional obligations.

**Article 445-1-1**

The penalties defined in Article 445-1 shall be applicable to any person who promises or offers, without being entitled to do so, at any time, directly or indirectly, presents, gifts or advantages of any kind, either for him or herself or for others, to a party involved in a sports event on which sports betting takes place, in order for that person to act or refrain from acting in a way which alters the normal and fair conduct of that event.

**Article 445-2**

Any person who, without being a public official, a person responsible for a public service role or a holder of a public elective mandate, exercises, within the ambit of his or her professional or social activity, a management position or an occupation for an individual or legal entity or for a body of any kind, and who solicits or accepts, without being entitled to do so, at any time, directly or indirectly, offers, promises, gifts, presents or advantages of any kind, either for him or herself or for others, in return for performing or having performed, or for refraining from or for having refrained from, any act within the ambit of his or her activity or position or facilitated by his or her activity or position, in violation of his or her legal, contractual or professional obligations, shall be punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €500,000, the amount of which may be increased to double the proceeds derived from the offence.

**Article 445-2-1**

The penalties defined in Article 445-2 shall be applicable to any party involved in a sports event on which sports betting takes place who, in order to change or distort the result of sports betting, accepts presents, gifts or advantages of any kind, either for him or herself or for others, for acting or refraining from acting in a way which alters the normal and fair conduct of that event.

**Article 446-1**

Unauthorised street trading is the offering, putting on sale or displaying for sale of goods or the exercising of any other occupation in a public place in violation of the regulations on law enforcement in such places.

Unauthorised street trading shall be punishable by six months' imprisonment and a fine of €3,750.

**Article 446-2**

When unauthorised street trading is accompanied by assault or threats, or when it is committed by a group, the penalty shall be increased to one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.

**Article 446-3**

Any individual who commits the offences defined in this chapter shall also be punished by the additional penalties below:

1. Confiscation of the item which was used or was intended to be used to commit the offence or of the proceeds of the offence;
2. Destruction of the item which was used or was intended to be used to commit the offence or of the proceeds of the offence.

**Consumer Code**

**Article L.213-1**

Any person who, whether or not he or she is a party to the contract, has deceived or attempted to deceive the contracting party by any means or procedure, even through a third party,

1. about the nature, type, origin, essential qualities, composition or contents of any goods;
2. about the quantity of items delivered or their identity through delivery of a good other than the specific item which was the subject of the contract; or
3. about the fitness for use, the risks inherent in use of the product, the controls carried out, ways of using the product or the precautions to be taken;

shall be punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a fine of €300,000

The amount of the fine may be increased, in proportion to the advantages derived from the violation, to 10% of average annual turnover, calculated on the basis of the last three annual turnovers known on the date of the offence.

**Commercial Code**

**Article L.442-8**

It is prohibited for any person to offer products for sale or to offer services using, in unlawful conditions, the public property of the state, local authorities or their public establishments.

Breaches of the prohibition set out in the above paragraph shall be investigated and recorded in accordance with the conditions defined in Articles L. 450-1 to L. 450-3 and L. 450-8.

Officials may deposit, on the premises which they determine and for a period which may not exceed one month, the products offered for sale and the goods which made possible the sale of the products or the offer of the services.



That deposit shall give rise to the immediate establishment of an official record. This shall include an inventory of the property and goods deposited and an indication of their value. It shall be notified within five days of its completion to the public prosecutor and to the party concerned.

The court may order confiscation of the products offered for sale and the goods which made possible the sale of the products or the offer of services. The court may order the perpetrator to pay to the Treasury a sum corresponding to the value of the products deposited, in cases in which no attachment has been carried out.

#### **Article R442-2**

Violations of the provisions of Articles L. 442-7 and L. 442-8 shall be punishable by the fine defined in paragraph 5 of Article 131-13 of the Criminal Code for fifth-class petty offences.

Commission of a further similar offence shall be punishable by the fine defined in paragraph 5 of Article 131-13 of the Criminal Code for commission of a further similar fifth-class petty offence.

#### **Law No. 2010-476 of 12 May 2010 on the opening to competition and the regulation of the on-line gambling sector**

#### **Article 9**

Any person who, by any means whatsoever, emits or disseminates a commercial communication not in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 5 and Article 7 shall be punished by a fine of €100,000. The court may increase the amount of the fine to four times the amount of the advertising expenditure on the unlawful operation. The associations whose official purpose is to combat addiction and which have been lawfully registered for at least five years on the date of the offence may exercise the rights of parties claiming damages (*parties civiles*) in respect of infringements of Article 7. The same rights may be exercised by the consumers' associations mentioned in Article L.421-1 of the Consumer Code and the family associations mentioned in Articles L. 211-1 and L. 211-2 of the Code on Social Action and Families.

#### **Article 56**

I. Any person who has offered or made available to the public an on-line facility for betting or gambling without having been granted the accreditation mentioned in Article 21 or an exclusive right shall be punished by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €90,000. Those penalties shall be increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €200,000 if the offence is committed by an organised criminal group.

II. In the first paragraph of Article 1 of Law No. 83-628 of 12 July 1983 on games of chance, the sum of €45,000 shall be replaced by the sum of €90,000, and the sum of €100,000 shall be replaced by the sum of €200,000.

III. The first paragraph of Article 3 of the Law of 21 May 1836 prohibiting lotteries shall be worded as follows:

“Violation of these prohibitions shall be punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of €90,000. Those penalties shall be increased to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of €200,000 if the offence is committed by an organised criminal group.”

IV. Any individual who has committed the offence defined in paragraph I shall also be punished by the following additional penalties:

1. Forfeiture of civic, civil and family rights in the conditions defined in Article 131-26 of the Criminal Code;
2. Confiscation of the movable and immovable assets, separately or jointly owned, which were used directly or indirectly to commit the offence or which are the proceeds thereof, including the property or

effects gambled or included in a lottery and the furniture or movable effects with which the premises are equipped or decorated, with the exception of the items capable of being used for restitution;

3. Display or dissemination of the decision delivered in the conditions defined in Article 131-35 of the Criminal Code;

4. Permanent closure, or closure for a maximum period of five years, of the enterprise's establishments or of one or more of its establishments which were used to commit the offences;

5. Prohibition, determined in accordance with Article 131-27 of the Criminal Code, either of exercising a public office or of exercising the professional or social activity, in the exercise of which, or while exercising which, the offence was committed, or of exercising a commercial or industrial occupation, of running, administering, managing or controlling in any capacity, directly or indirectly, on his or her own account or on that of others, a commercial or industrial enterprise or a commercial company. Those prohibitions may be imposed cumulatively.

V. Legal entities declared, in the conditions defined in Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code, to have criminal responsibility for the offence defined in paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished by, in addition to the fine determined in accordance with [Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code](#), the penalties defined in paragraphs 1, 4, 8 and 9 of Article 131-39 of that same code. They shall also be punished by the prohibition, for a maximum period of five years, of any applications for the accreditation defined in Article 21 of this law or for the authorisation for which Article L.321-1 of the Code on Internal Security provides, and, if applicable, the withdrawal of such accreditation or authorisation if the legal entity holds it at the time of the trial.

#### **Article 57**

I. Any person who advertises, by any means, to promote a betting or gambling site which has not been authorised by virtue of an exclusive right or the accreditation defined in Article 21 shall be punished by a fine of €100,000. The court may increase the amount of the fine to four times the amount of the advertising expenditure on the unlawful activity.

Any person who, by any means, disseminates to the public, for the purposes of promoting on-line gambling sites lacking the accreditation defined in Article 21, the odds and returns offered by those unauthorised sites shall be punished by the same penalties.

The chairperson of the on-line gambling regulatory authority may apply to the president of the Paris *tribunal de grande instance* for an urgent interim order for any measure permitting the cessation of all advertising to promote a betting or gambling site which has not been authorised by virtue of an exclusive right or the accreditation defined in Article 21, or which contravenes part II of book III of the Code on Internal Security.

### APPENDIX 3

Contributions to this document were made by:

- the Ministry of the Interior
- the Ministry for Cities, Youth and Sport
- the Ministry of Justice
- the security/emergency services and general affairs units of DIGES
- the French Football Federation (FFF)
- the French professional football league (LFP)
- EURO 2016 SAS

*Written by Luc PRESSON, Inspector General of the national police force, co-ordinator of the work of the Ministry of the Interior relating to major sports events, and head of the security/emergency services unit reporting to the interministerial director responsible for major sports events (DIGES).*

Programme of the visit  
[Document T-RV (2015) 10 rev2]  
Available in French only

**EURO 2016**  
**visite consultative du Conseil de l'Europe**  
**17-19 avril 2015**

**jeudi 16 avril**

Arrivée de la délégation du Conseil de l'Europe en France (délégation composée de 8 personnes dont un interprète, liste nominative ci-dessous).

**vendredi 17 avril**

7h15 **accueil délégation** à l'hôtel Ibis 77 rue de Bercy Paris 12

7h30-8h00 transfert de l'hôtel IBIS 77 rue de Bercy vers la préfecture de police

8h15-9h30 **Préfecture de police de Paris**  
*Jean-Paul KHIL, préfet, secrétaire général de défense et de sécurité de Paris,*  
*Christophe DELAYE, cabinet du préfet de police,*  
*Christine LACLAU, direction du renseignement,*  
*Laurent SIMONIN, directeur de l'ordre public et de la circulation,*  
*Olivier SZAFRAN, direction de la sécurité de proximité de l'agglomération*  
*parisienne,*  
*Anne BROSSEAU direction de la police générale.*

9h30-10h00 transfert vers ministère de l'intérieur

10h00-10h30 **Cabinet ministre intérieur** (salle DGPN)  
*François MAINSARD ,*  
*Yann LE GOFF conseillers police du cabinet ministre*

10h30-11h00 **Direction générale de la police nationale** (salle DGPN)  
*Michel BESNARD, préfet, chef unité coordination des grands événements (DGPN)*  
*Luc PRESSON, inspecteur général de la police nationale, coordonnateur du*  
*ministère de l'intérieur pour les grands événements sportifs,*  
*Antoine BOUTONNET, commissaire de police, chef DNLH - DCSP*

11h00-11h30 **Direction générale de la gendarmerie nationale** (salle DGPN)  
*Colonel Bernard PONS délégation interministérielle aux grands événements*  
*sportifs,*  
*Colonel Christophe JEANJEAN, centre de prospective et de gestion des crises,*  
*Capitaine Bruno BESNIER centre de prospective et de gestion des crises.*

11h30-12h00 **Direction générale de la sécurité civile et de la gestion des crises**  
(salle DGPN)  
*Philippe LE MOING-SURZUR, Sous-directeur de la planification et de la gestion*  
*des crises*

12h00-12h30 (réservé)

12h30-13h00 transfert vers Ligue de Football Professionnel 6, rue Léo Delibes Paris 16

13h00-14h00 déjeuner – buffet (salon LFP)

14h00-14h30 **FFF** (salle du conseil d'administration 4e étage LFP)

*Cécile **COUELLE**, responsable du service réglementation et gestion de la sécurité des rencontres,*  
*Matthieu **ROBERT**, chargé de mission vie des clubs et actions citoyennes et sociales*

14h30-15h00 **LFP** (salle du conseil d'administration 4e étage LFP)

*Jean-Pierre **HUGUES**, préfet, directeur général de la LFP,*  
*Benjamin **VIARD**, responsable du service stades de la LFP,*  
*Olivier **GERARDIN**, chargé d'études au service stades de la LFP.*

15h00-15h30 **EURO 2016 SAS** (salle du conseil d'administration 4e étage LFP)

*Ziad **KHOURY**, directeur de la sécurité EURO 2016 SAS*

15h30-16h00 (réservé)

16h00-16h30 **Direction des affaires criminelles et des grâces**

(salle du conseil d'administration 4e étage LFP)  
*M **CAPIN-DULHOSTE**, sous-directeur de la justice pénale générale.*

16h30-17h00 transfert vers secrétariat d'Etat aux sports

17h00-18h00 **Secrétariat d'Etat aux sports**

*M. **ZIELINSKI**, directeur du cabinet du ministre des sports*  
*Mme **BOURDAIS**, directrice de cabinet du secrétaire d'Etat aux sports, direction des sports*  
***Florent SOULEZ** concernant les supporters de l'équipe de France*

18h00 transfert vers hôtel ibis, 77 rue de Bercy

Accompagnement : L PRESSON – G JOHANNET - A BOUTONNET

Transfert véhicule ministère de l'intérieur Renault Master (15 places + 01 place conducteur)  
immatriculation : CC 618 YR

**ATTENTION : chaque intervention est de 30 minutes : pour gagner du temps il n'y aura pas de présentation des membres de la délégation dont vous trouverez les références en fin de document, et une présentation sommaire des autorités d'accueil, 10 minutes seront consacrées à la présentation par autorité d'accueil – 20 minutes d'échanges – si des questions restent en suspens, la délégation transmettra à la DIGES pour réponse écrite de l'interlocuteur concerné.**

**samedi 18 avril**

- 8h30-9h30 **Direction des sports et la FSE** (hôtel de la délégation - salle de réunion)
- 9h45-10h15 transfert de l'hôtel IBIS 77 rue de Bercy vers gare du nord
- 10h43 départ gare du nord vers Lille
- 11h48 arrivée à Lille déjeuner à proximité de la gare (restaurants les 3 Brasseurs)
- 14h15-14h30 **accueil par le directeur du cabinet du préfet de région**  
Véhicule stationné sur les "zébras" dans la rue en face du Mac Donald qui est à la sortie de la gare de Lille Flandres transfert vers la préfecture du Nord
- 14h30-16h00 **en préfecture –**  
*Directeur de cabinet – procureur de la république – directeur départemental de la sécurité publique – commandant de groupement de la gendarmerie départemental – directeur du service département d'incendie et de secours – SAMU... - représentant des collectivités territoriales*
- 16h15-16h45 transfert vers le domaine de Luchin
- 16h45-18h00 **rencontre avec les responsables du LOSC**  
*Didier De CLIMMER, directeur général adjoint opérations*
- 18h00 transfert vers hôtel MERCURE 27 rue des tours à Lille
- Accompagnement L PRESSON - G JOHANNET - A BOUTONNET – seront hébergés au B&B Grand Stade 217 boulevard de Tournai à Villeneuve d'Asq  
Transfert véhicules ministère de l'intérieur sur Paris – véhicules préfecture sur Lille

**dimanche 19 avril**

- 09h15 départ hôtel de la délégation (Hôtel Mercure à Lille)
- 10h00 **séquence stade** : entrée N du stade face à la billetterie n°3 du stade
- 10h30-11h00 **réunion d'organisation avec les délégués L.F.P de la rencontre**
- 11h00-12 h00 **briefing organisation /Sécurité avec les superviseurs du club et les représentants des Sociétés de Sécurité + visite du stade**
- 12h00-13h30 déjeuner au stade
- 14h00-15h45 **match** – présence du DIGES
- 16h00-17h00 **débriefing en présence du DIGES-cabinet préfecture, DDSP, SDIS, PR, SAMU, LOSC...**

17h30-18h00 transfert vers gare de Lille

18h10 départ du train vers Paris

Accompagnement L PRESSON - G JOHANNET - A BOUTONNET

Transfert véhicules préfecture

**Communication :**

Chaque service concerné pourra faire une communication adaptée.

**Sigles et abréviations :**

DNLH : direction nationale de lutte contre le hooliganisme

DCSP : direction centrale de la sécurité publique

LFP : ligue de football professionnel

FFF : fédération française de football

SIRACED – PC : service interministériel régional des affaires civiles et économiques de défense et de la protection civile

PR : procureur de la république

DDSP : direction départementale de la sécurité publique

CGGD : Commandant du Groupement de gendarmerie départementale

SDIS : service départemental d'incendie et de secours

SAMU : service d'aide médicale d'urgence

DIGES : délégué interministériel aux grands événements sportifs

LOSC : Lille Olympique Sporting Club