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Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development

Network of Contact Parliamentarians for a Healthy Environment

Minutes

of the exchange of views on "The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in environmental matters and the focus on the outcome of climate cases"

held in Strasbourg on Wednesday 17 April 2024

The Network held an exchange of views with **Ms Natalia Kobylarz**, Lawyer, *Référendaire* at the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, on the judgments delivered on 9 April 2024 by the Grand Chamber of the Court in the "climate cases".

Ms Kobylarz stressed that these first "climate" cases were unprecedented because the Court had not yet established case law principles applicable to climate change as a "common concern of humankind".

In the case of *Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland* (Elderly women for the climate and Others), four individual women and an association representing over 2 000 elderly women had alleged that Switzerland's inability adequately to mitigate the effects of climate change violated their fundamental rights to health and life and exposed them to the risk of death during heatwaves.

In the case of *Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others*, six young Portuguese nationals had alleged that the countries bound by the Convention – the 27 EU member States, plus the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Russia and Turkey – had violated several human rights after heatwaves and forest fires had led to the closure of their schools and endangered their health.

In the third case, *Carême v. France*, the former mayor of a coastal town in northern France had alleged that France had failed in its obligation to protect life by not taking sufficient steps to prevent climate change and had thereby increased the risk of future flooding in the region.

Ms Kobylarz said that the three rulings by the Court had been taken by the Court's key bench, namely the 17 judges of the Grand Chamber. The judges had looked in depth at the legal framework governing environmental issues at international and national level and had supported their reasoning with extensive documentation and scientific expertise, in particular thanks to the many contributions from third-party interveners.

She focused the remainder of her intervention on the judgment handed down against Switzerland in which the Court had held, by 16 votes to one, that Article 8 of the Convention (respect for private life) had been violated. In reaching that conclusion, the Court had taken a creative and innovative approach tailored to the particular context of climate litigation, while recognising that existing environmental case law was already extensive and could serve as a source of inspiration.

In this respect and by way of introduction, the Court had recognised that the harmful effects of climate change weighed particularly heavily on various vulnerable groups in society and raised the issue of sharing the burden between generations, including future generations who had no possibility of taking part in current decision-making processes on the matter. With regard to the legitimacy of judicial intervention, the Court had underlined

[1] The minutes were approved and declassified by the Network of Contact Parliamentarians for a healthy environment at its meeting on 4 June 2024.

the complementary role of courts and democratic processes and the shared responsibility between courts and the legislative and executive authorities. Nevertheless, it had maintained that democracy could not be reduced to the majority will of voters and elected representatives in defiance of the requirements of the rule of law. Its role therefore consisted in checking the proportionality of the general measures taken by the national legislature in the light of the Convention.

The first judicial innovation concerned the recognition of an association's standing to come before the Court on behalf of its members, who were private individuals, and complain of a breach of their right to respect for private life. Without calling into question the exclusion of general public-interest complaints (*actio popularis*) under the Convention system,[2] the Court had relaxed its case law on this point through a new "test", which it had held to have been met by the applicant association. This relaxation had been dictated by the particular nature of climate change, the evolution of society and the need to promote intergenerational burden-sharing. Drawing on the procedural principles set out in the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and derived from EU law, the Court had laid down the following criteria: 1) the association must be legally established or have standing for domestic legal action, 2) it must pursue a specific goal in defending the fundamental rights of its members or other individuals exposed in the country concerned to threats or adverse consequences linked to climate change, and 3) it must be representative and authorised to act on their behalf. In other words, associations involved in combating climate change now had the possibility of taking a kind of class action without having to demonstrate that their members were personally affected by the threats complained of.

However, the Court had held that the four individual applicants had not demonstrated, under a new test, a sufficiently intense level of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change to justify a pressing need for individual protection. Their complaints had therefore been declared inadmissible.

The second judicial innovation concerned the scope of Article 8, which now encompassed a new right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from the serious adverse effects of climate change on their lives, health, well-being and quality of life. Once again, the analysis framework had been set out very clearly by the Court, which had found it to be a matter of fact that there were sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change existed, that it posed a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights guaranteed under the Convention, that States were aware of this and capable of taking measures to address it effectively, that the relevant risks were projected to be lower if the rise in temperature was limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and if action was taken urgently, and that current global mitigation efforts were not sufficient to meet that target.

In this context, and this was the third judicial innovation, the Court had held that the States Parties now had specific positive obligations in the field of climate change. To be in line with the commitments undertaken under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2015 Paris climate agreement, and in the light of the compelling scientific advice provided by the IPCC, States needed to prevent an increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations and a rise in global average temperature beyond levels capable of producing serious and irreversible adverse effects. They also had to reduce their GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within the next three decades.

In terms of setting the targets, which had been defined at global level, the Court granted States little or no margin of appreciation. On the other hand, States had a broad margin of appreciation to determine the means to be employed, provided that they complied with the following:

- Introduce a regulatory framework that included a timeline and the overall remaining carbon budget for that timeframe (or another method of quantification of future GHG emissions).
- Set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that were capable of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant timeframes.
- Provide evidence showing whether the targets had been complied with.
- Keep the GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence and based on the best available evidence.
- Act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.

[2] In other words, the Convention does not permit individuals or groups of individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention.

In its examination, the Court also took account of the procedural safeguards enjoyed by individuals: had the decision-making procedure been appropriate? Had the views of individuals been taken into account throughout the decision-making procedure? Had appropriate inquiries and studies been carried out to strike a balance between the interests at stake? Had the public had timely access to the conclusions of the studies? Had the persons concerned been able to take part effectively in the relevant procedure and have their views considered?

Applying these criteria to Switzerland, the Court had found that there had been critical gaps in the process of putting in place the relevant domestic regulatory framework, including a failure by the Swiss authorities to quantify national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limitations. Switzerland had also failed to meet its past GHG emission reduction targets. As it had failed to act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner regarding the devising, development and implementation of the relevant legislative and administrative framework, Switzerland had not met its obligations.

Mr Moutquin thanked the speaker. He said that it had been a high-quality presentation that helped improve understanding of complex legal concepts. He also referred to his report on Mainstreaming the right to a healthy environment which would be debated in plenary on 18 April and which recommended several realistic tools to the Committee of Ministers that could usefully complement the guidance given by the judges. He wondered whether the idea which he was trying to promote of setting up environmental expertise hubs in courts – such as the institution of environmental judges in Belgium – was feasible at the Court. He also asked whether these cases might not lead to backlogs at the Court.

Ms Floridia warmly welcomed this development in case law, which would help to tackle climate change in States that were reluctant to take action, thereby offering younger generations better living conditions. She said that she needed time to digest all the valuable information that had been provided.

Mr Schennach was impressed by the clarity of the presentation and by the speaker's expertise. He came from a country where there was no legislation guaranteeing the right to a healthy environment. He wondered whether Austria's climate performance could be assessed in the light of its obligations as an EU member.

Ms Kobylarz stressed that member States needed to draw lessons from these judgments/decisions by the Court. While the Court had taken account of the specific democratic context in Switzerland, the message it had sent out was clear: what mattered was that international commitments were implemented at national level. As to the judges' expertise, she replied that there was a team of environmental law experts in the Registry that co-ordinated cases in this area, as well as a knowledge-sharing platform that disseminated knowledge in a very extensive and in-depth manner (international, national, judicial, academic, etc.). Although it was true that the judges were not experts, in her view, that was not necessary. In the climate cases, for instance, they had had access to all the necessary scientific knowledge, in particular through the third-party interveners, to take decisions in the light of the Convention.

In her view, the risk of a backlog was mitigated in several ways. Firstly, the new tests/thresholds (applicability of Article 8 and assessment of compliance with Article 8) had been set very high by the Grand Chamber. Secondly, in relaxing the criteria associations had to meet in order to bring actions, the Court clearly intended to enable those groups to act on behalf of numerous individuals. Lastly, for many years now, the Court had had working methods that enabled it to deal with large-scale systematic problems. To date, seven cases were pending before a judicial formation regarding climate issues. It would soon therefore be possible to see how the Court transposed the new case law principles in other cases where there were similarities and differences.

Appendix to Ms Natalia Kobylarz's presentation on the judgments delivered on 9 April 2024 by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the "climate cases".

1/7 SEPARATION OF POWERS

Judicial intervention cannot replace or provide any substitute for the action which must be taken by the legislative and executive branches of government. However, democracy cannot be reduced to the will of the majority of the electorate and elected representatives, in disregard ofthe requirements of the rule of law. The remit of domestic courts and the Court is therefore complementary to those democratic processes.

The task of the judiciary is to ensure the necessary oversight of compliance with legal requirements. The legal basis for the Court's intervention is always limited to the Convention. The legal basis for domestic courts may be considerably wider [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 412].

The widely acknowledged inadequacy of past State action to combat climate change globally entails an aggravation of the risks of its adverse consequences, and the ensuing threats arising therefrom, for the enjoyment of human rights – threats already recognised by governments worldwide. The current situation therefore involves compelling present-day conditions, confirmed by scientific knowledge, which the Court cannot ignore in its role as a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 413].

The Court's competence in the context of climate-change litigation cannot, as a matter of principle, be excluded. Indeed, given the necessity of addressing the urgent threat posed by climate change, and bearing in mind the general acceptance that climate change is a common concern of humankind, there is force in the argument put forward by the UN Special Rapporteurs that the question is no longer whether, but how, human rights courts should address the impacts of environmental harms on the enjoyment of human rights [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 451].

The Court does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention. While other instruments can offer wider protection than the Convention, the Court is not bound by interpretations given to similar instruments by other bodies, having regard to possible differences in the content of the provisions of other international instruments and/or possible differences in the role of the Court and the other bodies [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 454].

The Court must bear in mind its subsidiary role and the necessity of affording the Contracting States a margin of appreciation in the implementation of policies and measures to combat climate change, as well as the need to observe appropriate respect for the prevailing constitutional principles, such as those relating to the separation of powers [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 457].

2/7 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is a preliminary issue for the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR").
It does not depend on the content of the positive obligations at stake.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction can only be established based on the control over:

- the territory, or
- a person <u>as such</u>.

In the current state of affairs, there are no grounds in the ECHR for the extension,
by way of judicial interpretation,
of the respondent States' extraterritorial jurisdiction,
whether it would be based on novel jurisdictional tests such as:

- "exceptional circumstances",
- "cause-and-effect", or
- "control over person's rights or interests", the latter, linked, as it may, to factors of foreseeability, knowledge, duration and capacity of the States in the field of climate change, as well as multilateral dimension of climate change and on recent developments in international law [Duarte, §§ 184-213].

Jurisdiction is separate from the question of responsibility for the impugned violations of the Convention, matter to be examined, if appropriate, on the merits of the complaint [Duarte, § 178 & KlimaSeniorinnen § 287].

Complaint concerning “embedded emissions”, although containing an extraterritorial aspect, does not raise an issue of jurisdiction, but rather one of State’s responsibility for the alleged effects of the “embedded emissions” on the applicants’ Convention rights [KlimaSeniorinnen § 287].

3/7 LEGAL STANDING / VICTIM STATUS

The ECtHR develops new and "especially high" tests for the purpose of climate change applications, to ensure, on the one hand, effective protection of the Convention rights, and, on the other hand, that the criteria for victim status do not slip into de facto admission of *actio popularis* which is not allowed under the ECHR.

For the *locus standi* of individuals:

> (a) applicant must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change; and
> (b) there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm.

The Court will have regard to: the prevailing local conditions and individual specificities and vulnerabilities; the nature and scope of the applicant’s Convention complaint; the actuality/remoteness and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on the applicant’s life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicant’s vulnerability [KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 487-88].

On the facts: applicants are considered not fulfilling the victim-status criteria under Article 34 ECHR [KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 531-35].

For the locus standi of NGOs as a “vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change” (as representatives of affected individuals, not as a victim as such). Association must be:

> (a) lawfully established in the jurisdiction concerned or have standing to act there;
> (b) able to demonstrate that it pursues a dedicated purpose in accordance with its statutory objectives in the defence of the human rights of its members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction concerned, whether limited to or including collective action for the protection of those rights against the threats arising from climate change; and
> (c) able to demonstrate that it can be regarded as genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats or adverse effects of climate change on their lives, health or well-being.

It is not required that the individuals represented by the association be themselves considered direct or potential victims.

On the facts: Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz is granted *locus standi*

3/7 LEGAL STANDING / VICTIM STATUS cont’d

In the case of Mr. Carême, who has moved out from the city of Grande Synthe, the Court finds no reason to question the hypothetical nature of the risk relating to climate change affecting the applicant (area assessed by a domestic court as being at “a very high level of exposure” to climate risks and, owing to its immediate proximity to the coast and the physical characteristics of its territory, the municipality was exposed in the medium term to high and increased risks of inundation and an increase in episodes of severe drought, with the effect not only of a reduction and degradation of water resources, but also significant damage to built-up areas, given the geological characteristics of the soil; with these concrete consequences of climate change being inevitable and likely to have their full effect on the territory of the municipality by 2030 or 2040).

Having regard to the fact that the applicant has no relevant links with Grande-Synthe and that, moreover, he currently does not live in France, the Court does not consider that for the purposes of any potentially relevant aspect of Article 8 – private life, family life or home – he can claim to have victim status under Article 34 of the Convention as regards the alleged risks linked to climate change threatening that municipality. This is true irrespective of the status he invoked, namely that of a citizen or former resident of that municipality. The same considerations apply as regards the applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of the Convention.

Holding otherwise, and given the fact that almost anyone could have a legitimate reason to feel some form of anxiety linked to the risks of the adverse effects of climate change in the future, would make it difficult to delineate the actio popularis protection – not permitted in the Convention system – from situations where there is a pressing need to ensure an applicant's individual protection from the harm which the effects of climate change may have on the enjoyment of their human rights [Carême v. France, §§ 76-84].

4/7 APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLES 2 (RIGHT TO LIFE) & 8 (RIGHT TO PRIVATE LIFE) IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT

In order for Article 2 to apply to complaints of State action and/or inaction in the context of climate change, it needs to be determined that there is a "real and imminent" risk to life. However, such risk to life in the climate-change context must be understood in the light of the fact that there is a grave risk of inevitability and irreversibility of the adverse effects of climate change, the occurrences of which are most likely to increase in frequency and gravity.

Thus, the "real and imminent" test may be understood as referring to a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to life, containing an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant.

This would also imply that where the victim status of an individual applicant has been established, it would be possible to assume that a serious risk of a significant decline in a person's life expectancy owing to climate change ought also to trigger the applicability of Article 2 [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 513].

Having regard to the causal relationship between State actions and/or omissions relating to climate change and the harm, or risk of harm, affecting individuals, Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life [KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 519 & 544].

In the circumstances of the case, the Court finds it appropriate to examine the applicant association's complaint from the angle of Article 8 alone, having regard to the principles developed also under Article 2, which to a very large extent are similar to those under Article 8 and which, when seen together, provide a useful basis for defining the overall approach to be applied in the climate-change context under both provisions [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 537].

Given the above, the Court finds it unnecessary to analyse the issues pertinent to the threshold of applicability of Article 2. [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 536].

5/7 POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN RESPECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate protection should carry considerable weight in the weighing-up of any competing considerations [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 542].

As regards the State's commitment to the necessity of combating climate change and its adverse effects, and the setting of the requisite aims and objectives in this respect, the nature and gravity of the threat and the general consensus as to the stakes involved in ensuring the overarching goal of effective climate protection through overall GHG reduction targets in accordance with the Contracting Parties' accepted commitments to achieve carbon neutrality, call for a reduced margin of appreciation for the States.

As regards the choice of means designed to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, including operational choices and policies adopted in order to meet internationally anchored targets and commitments in the light of priorities and resources, the States should be accorded a wide margin of appreciation [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 543].

To assess whether a State has remained within its margin of appreciation, the Court will examine whether the competent domestic authorities, be it at the legislative, executive or judicial level, have had due regard to the need to:

> (a) adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame, or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions, in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments;
> (b) set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames undertaken in national policies;

(c) provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant GHG reduction targets;
(d) keep the relevant GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and
(e) act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 550].

Shortcomings in one particular respect alone will not necessarily entail that the State would be considered to have overstepped its relevant margin of appreciation [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 551].

5/7 POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN RESPECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE cont'd

Mitigation measures must be supplemented by adaptation measures [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 552].

State must implement procedural safeguards, such as that:

(a) relevant information held by public authorities must be made available to the persons concerned & the public, allowing them to assess the risk to which they are exposed; and
(b) procedures must be available through which views of persons concerned & the public can be taken into account in the decision-making process [KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 553-54].

Failure to comply with mitigation obligations would suffice for the Court to conclude that the State failed to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention without it being necessary to examine whether the ancillary adaptation measures were put in place [KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 555].

In the circumstances of the case, the Court finds a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on the following grounds:

There were some critical lacunae in the Swiss authorities' process of putting in place the relevant domestic regulatory framework, including a failure by them to quantify, through a carbon budget or otherwise, national GHG emissions limitations. Furthermore, the State had previously failed to meet its past GHG emission reduction targets.
By failing to act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner regarding the devising, development and implementation of the relevant legislative and administrative framework, the respondent State exceeded its margin of appreciation and failed to comply with its positive obligations in the present context [KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 558-74].

6/7 APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 6 IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT

Article 6 does not guarantee a right of access to a court with power to invalidate or override laws enacted by Parliament. This means that Article 6 cannot be relied upon to institute an action before a court for the purpose of compelling Parliament to enact legislation. However, where domestic law does provide for individual access to proceedings before a Constitutional Court or another similar superior court which does have the power to examine an appeal lodged directly against a law, Article 6 may be applicable [KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 594, 600 and 609].

The notion of imminent harm or danger cannot be applied without properly taking into account the specific nature of climate change-related risks, including their potential for irreversible consequences and corollary severity of harm. Where future harms are not merely speculative but real and highly probable (or virtually certain) in the absence of adequate corrective action, the fact that the harm is not strictly imminent should not, on its own, lead to the conclusion that the outcome of the proceedings would not be decisive for its alleviation or reduction. Such an approach would unduly limit access to a court for many of the most serious risks associated with climate change. This is particularly true for legal actions instituted by associations. In the climate-change context, their legal actions must be seen in the light of their role as a means through which the Convention rights of those affected by climate change, including those at a distinct representational disadvantage, can be defended and through which they can seek to obtain an adequate corrective action for the alleged failures and omissions on the part of the authorities in the field of climate change [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 614].

The Court reiterates the important role of associations in defending specific causes in the sphere of environmental protection, as well as the particular relevance of collective action in the context of climate change, the consequences of which are not specifically limited to certain individuals. In so far as a dispute reflects this collective dimension, the requirement of a "directly decisive" outcome must be taken in the broader sense of seeking to obtain a form of correction of the authorities' actions and omissions affecting the civil rights of its members under national law [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 622].

On the facts, the Court finds that the applicant association has demonstrated that it had an actual and sufficiently close connection to the matter complained of and to the individuals seeking protection against the adverse effects of climate change on their lives, health and quality of life [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 621]. Individual applicants have not demonstrated that their action against the State alone would have created sufficiently imminent and certain effects on their individual rights in the context of climate change (dispute had a mere tenuous connection with, or remote consequences for, their rights relied upon under national law) [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 624].

In the circumstances of the case, the Court finds a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, because the domestic courts had not engaged seriously or at all with the action. They had not provided convincing reasons as to why they had considered it unnecessary to examine the merits of the complaints. They had not carried out a sufficient examination of the compelling scientific evidence concerning climate change and the urgency as regards the existing and inevitable future impacts of that change on various aspects of human rights. Nor had they addressed the issue of address the issue of the standing of the applicant association, an issue which had warranted a separate assessment irrespective of the domestic courts' position as regards the individual applicants' complaints [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 627-40].

7/7 MEASURES OF REDRESS

Having regard to the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, the Court considers itself unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the present judgment.
Given the differentiated margin of appreciation accorded to the State in this area, the Court considers that the respondent State, with the assistance of the Committee of Ministers, is better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. It should thus be left to the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State, the adoption of measures aimed at ensuring that the domestic authorities comply with Convention requirements, as clarified in the present judgment [KlimaSeniorinnen, § 657].

List of presence / Liste de présence

(The names of members who took part in the meetings are in bold / *Les noms des membres ayant pris part aux réunions sont en caractères gras)*

Member States / *États Membres*

Albania / *Albanie*			
Andorra / *Andorre*			
Armenia / *Arménie*	Mr/*M.*	**Armen Gevorgyan**	EC/DA
Austria / *Autriche*	Mr/*M.*	**Stefan Schennach**	SOC
	Ms/*Mme*	**Agnes Sirkka Prammer**	SOC
Belgium / *Belgique*	Mr/*M.*		ALDE
Bosnia and Herzegovina / *Bosnie-Herzégovine*	Mr/*M.*	Saša Magazinović	SOC
Bulgaria / *Bulgarie*			
Croatia / *Croatie*	Ms/*Mme*	Zdravka Bušić	EPP/CD
Cyprus / *Chypre*			
Czechia /T*chèquie*			
Denmark / *Danemark*			
Estonia / *Estonie*			
Finland / *Finlande*	Ms/*Mme*	**Minna Reijonen**	EC/DA
France	Ms/*Mme*	Liliana Tanguy	ALDE
Georgia / *Géorgie*			
Germany / *Allemagne*	Ms/*Mme*	**Franziska Kersten**	SOC
Greece / *Grèce*	Mr/*M.*	George Papandreou	SOC
Hungary / *Hongrie*			
Iceland / *Islande*	Mr/*M.*	Bjarni Jónsson	UEL

Ireland / *Irlande*	Mr/*M.*	Thomas Pringle	UEL
	Ms/*Mme*	Róisín Garvey	SOC
Italy / *Italie*	Mr/*M.*	Stefano Maullu	EC/DA
	Ms/*Mme*	**Aurora Floridia**	SOC
Latvia / *Lettonie*	Mr/*M.*		SOC
Liechtenstein	Mr/*M.*	**Peter Frick**	ALDE
Lithuania / *Lituanie*	Mr/*M.*	Arminas Lydeka	ALDE
Luxembourg	Mr/*M.*	Paul Galles	EPP/CD
Malta / *Malte*			
Republic of Moldova / *République de Moldova*			
Monaco			
Montenegro / *Monténégro*	Mr/*M.*	**Miloš Konatar**	SOC
Netherlands / *Pays-Bas*	Ms/*Mme*	**Saskia Kluit**	SOC
	Ms/*Mme*	Carla Moonen	ALDE
North Macedonia / *Macédoine du Nord*			
Norway / *Norvège*	Ms/*Mme*	Linda Hofstad Helleland	EPP/CD
Poland / *Pologne*	Ms/*Mme*	Danuta Jazłowiecka	EPP/CD
Portugal	Mr/*M.*	Pedro Cegonho	SOC
Romania / *Roumanie*	Ms/*Mme*	Maria Gabriela Horga	EPP/CD
	Ms/*Mme*	Alina Stefania Gorghiu	EPP/CD
San Marino / *Saint-Marin*			
Serbia / *Serbie*			
Slovak Republic / *République slovaque*			
Slovenia / *Slovénie*	Mr/*M.*	Dean Premik	ALDE
Spain / *Espagne*			
Sweden / *Suède*			
Switzerland / *Suisse*			
Türkiye	Mr/*M.*	Sevan Sivacioğlu	NR
Ukraine	Ms/*Mme*	**Yuliia Ovchynnykova**	ALDE
United Kingdom / *Royaume-Uni*	Baroness	Doreen E. Massey	SOC

Pace Committees Concerned / *Commissions de l'APCE concernées*

Political Affairs / *Questions politiques*	Mr/*M.*	**Simon Moutquin**	SOC
Legal Affairs / *Questions juridiques*			
Migration / *Migrations*	Mr/*M.*	Pierre-Alain Fridez	SOC
Equality / Égalité	Ms/*Mme*	**Edite Estrela**	SOC
Culture			

Bureau of the Committee on Social Affairs (Ex-Officio Members)/
Bureau de la Commission des Questions Sociales (Membres d'office)

Chairperson / *Président*	Mr/*M.*	**Simon Moutquin**	SOC
First Vice-Chairperson / *Première Vice-Présidente*	Ms/*Mme*	Danuta Jazłowiecka	EPP/CD
Second Vice-Chairperson / *Deuxième Vice-Président*	Mr/*M.*	Armen Gevorgyan	EC/DA

Third Vice-Chairperson / *Troisième Vice-Président*	Mr/*M.*	Pedro Cegonho	SOC

European Parliament / *Parlement Européen*

Ms / Mme Giulia Giardino, Trainee / *Stagiaire*
Ms / Mme Julia Koberle, Trainee / *Stagiaire*

Other parliamentarians present / Autres parlementaires présents

Mr / *M.* Edmunds Cepuritis, Latvia / Lettonie
Ms / Mme Andrea Eder-Gitschthaler, Austria / *Autriche*

Embassies / Permanent Representations and Delegations
Ambassades / Représentations permanentes et délégations

Ms / *Mme* Alexandra Kobelis-Szostakowska, Poland / *Pologne*
Ms / *Mme* Catarina Garcia, Portugal
Ms / *Mme* Gaëlle Taillé, France
Ms / *Mme* Aloisia Wörgetter, Austria / *Autriche*
Ms / *Mme* Katharina Enzesberger, Austria / *Autriche*
Ms / *Mme* Greta Frisk, Sweden / *Suède*

Secretariat of Delegation or of Political Group /
Secrétariat de délégation ou de Groupe politique

Ms / *Mme* Yeva Sushko, EPP/CD / *PPE/DC*
Ms / *Mme* Ana Guapo, Portugal

Secretariat of the Council of Europe / *Secrétariat du Conseil de l'Europe*

Mr / *M.* Mikael Poutiers, DGI - Secretary of the Berne Convention / DGI - *Secrétaire de la Convention de Berne*
Ms / *Mme* Tanja Kleinsorge, DGI – Head of Department Reykjavik process and the environment / *Chef de Service Processus de Reykjavik et environnement*
Mr / *M.* Roman Chlapak, Secretary of Governance Committee / *Secrétaire de la commission de la gouvernance*
Mr / *M.* Eoghan Kelly, DGI
Mr / *M.* Krzysztof Zyman, DGI

Other people present / *Autres personnes présentes*

Ms / *Mme* Natalia Kobylarz, Lawyer, *Référendaire* at the European Court of Human Rights **/** *Juriste, Référendaire au Greffe de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme*
Mr / *M.* Julien Cadieu
Ms / *Mme* Anika Wiese
Mr / *M.* Jona Berkers
Mr / *M.* Armel De Schreye

Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly / *Secrétariat de l'Assemblée parlementaire*

Ms / *Mme* Louise Barton, Director of Committees / *Directrice des commissions*
Ms / *Mme* Sofia Triantou, Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination / *Commission sur l'égalité et sur la non-discrimination*

Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development /
Commission des questions sociales, de la santé et du développement durable

Ms/*Mme* Catherine Du Bernard ..... Head of the Secretariat / *Cheffe du Secrétariat*
Ms / *Mme* Aiste Ramanauskaite ..... Secretary to the Committee / *Secrétaire de la commission*
Ms / *Mme* Jannick Devaux ..... Secretary to the Committee / *Secrétaire de la commission*
Ms / *Mme* Claire Dubois-Hamdi ..... Secretary to the Committee / *Secrétaire de la commission*
Ms / *Mme* Xenia Birioukova ..... Assistant / *Assistante*
Ms / *Mme* Özgü Tan ..... Assistant / *Assistante*

Ms / *Mme* Claudia Giorgetti ..... Trainee / *Stagiaire*