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Part 3

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ)

Support for a better evaluation of the result of judicial reform efforts in the Eastern Partnership "Justice Dashboard EaP" Project

Data collection 2025

Part 3 - Condensed Version of Key findings and Analysis

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Methodology

This third part of the report has been prepared based on the replies to the CEPEJ Questionnaire for the "Justice Dashboard EaP" Project provided by the beneficiaries through their respective CEPEJ Dashboard correspondents within the 2025 data collection. The CEPEJ Secretariat collected quantitative and qualitative data, as well as comments under each question to provide additional information on the specificities of each judicial system and to contextualize the data.

The content and format of Part 3 was agreed with DG ENEST during the first cycle of data collection (2020), and it was confirmed for each cycle. The classification of indicators and content of each theme has been established by DG ENEST. Based on this, the report covers the following key topics: Efficiency, Quality, Mandate of judges and prosecutors, and Accountability. It combines quantitative and qualitative data under each theme. The analysis under each topic is accompanied by a reference to the table number from Part 1 of the report (comparative tables and graphs) and the number of the question in the EaP Questionnaire. Where necessary for data visualisation, new graphs have been created for the purpose of this Part 3.

The comparisons of data between beneficiaries with various size, economic and legal situations is a delicate task and should be approached with great caution. Moreover, the data on Ukraine needs to consider the damage to courts' infrastructure, the effect of the martial law and the staff shortage to collect and analyse data (see Part 2 Country Profile for more details). This analysis treats all beneficiaries equally and compares their data without any intention of ranking them or promoting any particular type of justice system. The focus of this report is placed on presenting data at the regional level. It should also be noted that the summary statistics (minimum, maximum, average and median values) are presented in this report as an orientation only. Indeed, the group of beneficiaries is too small for the summary to be statistically meaningful. These statistics are calculated by using quantitative data, hence excluding the "NA" or "NAP" answers. Furthermore, in case data are available only for one or two beneficiaries, the summary statistics would not be useful even as an orientation. Consequently, they are shown as "- ".

The analysis covers all beneficiaries of the Action (**Armenia**, **Azerbaijan**, **Georgia**, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**).

For more information regarding the methodology, please refer to the methodological note in the Part 1 of the report.


I. Efficiency (First instance cases)

This part focuses on first instance civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases. The total criminal cases is the sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases (used interchangeably). In 2025, as in previous data collection cycles, the case load in the EaP region was smaller for sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases than for civil and commercial litigious cases with less incoming cases. There was a considerable increase in the inflow of civil and commercial litigious cases (from the EaP Average of 1,95 cases in 2024 to 2,49 cases per 100 inh in 2025), while in total sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases it shows a decrease (from 0.97 in 2024 to 0.64 in 2025). In 2024, based on CEPEJ indicators (Clearance Rate -CR- and Disposition Time -DT-), in average in the Region, the most efficient type of cases was civil and commercial litigious cases, which continues to be the case in 2025. The EaP Average for CR was thus higher in civil and commercial litigious cases (100%) and lower in sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases (97%). The disposition time in civil and commercial litigious cases (190 days) was lower in the Region compared to the sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases (214 days). In 2025, the number of pending cases at the end of the year increased for sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases in **Armenia** and **Republic of Moldova** and for civil and commercial litigious cases in **Azerbaijan**, **Georgia** and **Ukraine** (Clearance Rates at or below 100%).. For **Ukraine**, the activity of the judiciary under war conditions, as well as authorities' work on methodological adjustments needs to be considering when reading their data within this Dashboard.

Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases


The incoming cases are all cases submitted to courts in the reference year for the first time.

CEPEJ 3.1.2 (Q52)



Compared to the EaP Average of 2,49, the highest number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases per 100 inhabitants in 2025 is in **the Republic of Moldova** (3,87) and the lowest - in **Armenia** (1,12). As of 2025, **Armenia** a showed slight increase following the reverse in 2024 (1,06). As a long-term trend, Armenia demonstrates a reverse, after three cycles of significant lead (from 5,55 in 2023 and 5,54 in 2021), due to a procedural reform. In the **Republic of Moldova,** the inflow of cases increased (from 2,49 in 2024), and in 2025 it is significantly above the EaP average (2,49). **Azerbaijan** (2,16) and **Georgia** (2,07) have figures slightly below the EaP average. **Ukraine** (3,22) shows an increase from 1,93 in 2024, again above the EaP average in 2025.

CEPEJ 3.2.2 (Q53)




Compared to the EaP Average of 0,64, the highest number of incoming sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases per 100 inhabitants in 2025 is in **Georgia**, (1,16) and the lowest is in **Azerbaijan** (0,15). **Ukraine** also shows a relatively low figure at 0,30. **Republic of Moldova** (1,15) also has figures significantly above the EaP average of 0,64. The decrease in **Ukraine** from 2,25 in 2024, needs to be read in the context of methodological adjustment efforts made by authorities for 2025 data collection. **Armenia** shows an increase from 0,37 in 2024. **Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova** also show an increase compared to 2024 (from 0,17; 0,99 and 1,10 respectively).

The standardised number of incoming first instance sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases remains comparatively low in most EaP countries. In 2025, **Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova** recorded the highest number of incoming cases per 100 inhabitants, both remaining above the EaP Average. **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** continued to register relatively low levels of incoming cases in this category. The methodological adjustment effort made by **Ukraine** for 2025 data collection in terms of case categorisation is to be considered in the analysis of 2025 data (when comparing data to 2024). **Azerbaijan** continued to report the lowest number of incoming sum of severe and misdemeanor cases per 100 inhabitants.

Pending cases - civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases


Pending cases on 31st December are the number of unresolved cases, which will be carried to the next year.

CEPEJ 3.1.2 (Q52)



Compared to the EaP Average of 1,13, in 2025, **Georgia** (1,92) continued to record the highest number of civil and commercial litigious cases per 100 inhabitants, pending at the end of the year, followed by the **Republic of Moldova** (1,36) and **Ukraine** (1,20), all above the EaP Average. Armenia (0,77) and Azerbaijan (0,40) remained below the regional average, with Azerbaijan reporting the lowest number of pending cases. Compared to 2024, the number of pending cases remained somehow **stable in Georgia and Azerbaijan**, while the **Republic of Moldova** recorded a noticeable decrease (from 1,78 to 1,36). Courts in **Ukraine** experienced a marked increase (from 0,79 to 1,20), moving above the EaP Average, while **Armenia** showed a slight decrease (from 0,82 to 0,77).

CEPEJ 3.2.2 (Q53)



Compared to the EaP Average of 0,30, in 2025, the highest number of first instance sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases pending at the end of the year per 100 inhabitants is in the **Republic of Moldova** (0.69) and the lowest number is in **Azerbaijan** (0.05). Armenia's figure (0,30) is on a par with the EaP Average, whereas Georgia (0,19) and Ukraine (0,29) remained below it.

Compared to 2024, the **Republic of Moldova** recorded a slight increase in the number of pending sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases (from 0,62 to 0,69), while **Armenia** also experienced an increase (from 0,25 to 0,30). **Azerbaijan** and **Georgia** showed slight decreases (from 0,06 to 0,05 and from 0,21 to 0,19 respectively), **Ukraine** showed a decrease (from 0,36 to 0,29), moving from above to slightly below the EaP Average.


Some of the trends observed regarding the incoming cases can also be observed for pending cases at the end of the year. As in previous years, **Azerbaijan** has the lowest number of pending cases at the end of the year per 100 inhabitants for both civil and commercial litigious cases and sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases. In 2025, **Georgia** has maintained a lower than EaP Average standardised number of pending sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases at the end of the year. The **Republic of Moldova** continued to have the highest standardised number of pending sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases, whereas Ukraine dropped just below the regional average in this category.

Clearance rate

CEPEJ 3.1.4 and 3.2.4 (Q52, Q53)

The Clearance Rate (CR) is the ratio obtained by dividing the number of resolved cases by the number of incoming cases in a given period, expressed as a percentage. It demonstrates how the courts, or the judicial system is coping with the in-flow of cases and allows comparison between systems regardless of their differences and individual characteristics. Its key value is 100%.

- A value below 100% means that the courts were not able to solve all the cases they received and, as a consequence, the number of pending cases increases.
- A value above 100% means that the courts have resolved more cases than they received (they have resolved all the incoming cases and part of the pending cases) and, as a consequence, the number of pending cases decreases.




The data shows that there are no consistent patterns in Clearance Rates in the region over the analysed period. Since 2020 and 2021, the overall tendency (illustrated by the EaP Average) was an increase of the Clearance Rates in civil and commercial litigious cases however in 2025 the trend reversed for some countries. This was evident for the **Republic of Moldova** and especially **Armenia**, where procedural changes related to small claims resulted in a temporary spike in CR for 2024. The EaP average for civil and commercial litigious cases also returned to 100%. For sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases an increase is observed in **Azerbaijan** (104%) and **Georgia** (101%) with both countries reporting above the EaP average. The **Republic of Moldova** (95%) dropped slightly below the EaP average following 3 years of consistent performance above 100%. CR for sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases became available for Armenia for the first time in 2025 and also for **Ukraine** since 2020. The trends found a reflection in the region-wide average, where the CR for this category of cases was reduced compared to 2024.

In 2025, the number of pending cases at the end of the year increased for sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases in **Armenia** and **Republic of Moldova** and for civil and commercial litigious cases in **Azerbaijan**, **Georgia** and **Ukraine** (Clearance Rates at or below 100%).

Disposition time


CEPEJ 3.1.4 and 3.2.4 (Q52, Q53)

The Disposition Time (DT) is the indicator that calculates time necessary for a pending case to be resolved and estimates the lengths of proceedings in days. It is a ratio between the pending cases at the end of the period and the resolved cases within the same period, multiplied by 365 days. More pending than resolved cases will lead to a DT higher than 365 days (one year) and vice versa.



In 2025, civil and commercial litigious cases (190 days) have lower Disposition Times than sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases (214 days). This is the case in **Armenia, Azerbaijan,** the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine,** while it appears to be the opposite in **Georgia,** where civil and commercial litigious cases have a longer Disposition Time of 358 days. Regarding civil and commercial litigious cases, the Disposition Time increased compared to 2024 for **in Armenia and** slightly in **Georgia** while in **Azerbaijan**, **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** recorded a decrease in DT.

Regarding the sum of severe and misdemeanour criminal cases, the Disposition Time increased compared to 2024 slightly for **Armenia** and the **Republic of Moldova**, but decreased in **Georgia,** and remained consistent **in Azerbaijan.** The increase compared to 2024 for Ukraine needs to consider the war conditions under which the courts operate as well as the methodological adjustments applied by authorities. The EaP Average increased from 144 days in 2024 to 214 days in 2025.



In criminal cases, compared to 2020, the Disposition Time appears to have decreased in **Armenia**, **Azerbaijan, Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova**. For this category of criminal cases, the highest Disposition Time in the region in 2025 is in **Ukraine** (396 days) and the lowest is in **Georgia** (59 days). Compared to 2020, the EaP Average decreased from 260 days to 214 days in 2025.

II. Quality

ICT

ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

CEPEJ 3.7.2 (Q01)

Almost all the beneficiaries have fully deployed electronic case submission across all case categories. Only **Armenia** and **Georgia** do not offer this possibility in criminal cases.

ONLINE CONSULTATION

CEPEJ 3.7.3 (Q04)

Armenia, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** offer the possibility of consulting a case online.


The content available online includes case status, events/calendar, and court decisions in civil cases.


Armenia and the **Republic of Moldova** also provide access to court decisions in administrative and criminal cases.


The **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** also use the online consultation channel to provide access to case documents and notifications.

CMS

CEPEJ 3.7.5 (Q07)







All the beneficiaries have Court Management Systems (CMS).
The standard features integrated into their CMS include:

- Centralised and/or interoperable CMS databases
- Random allocation of cases
- Identification of a case between instances (unique or linked id number)
- Electronic transfer of a case to another instance/court
- Anonymisation of decisions to be published
- Access to closed/resolved cases
- Advanced search engine

None of the beneficiaries has implemented remote access to the CMS for teleworking.

WRITING ASSISTANCE TOOLS

CEPEJ 3.7.7 (Q08)

With the exception of **Armenia**, all the beneficiaries use writing assistance tools in their courts.
Templates are widely used.
Azerbaijan, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** have also implemented automatically generated text and electronic signatures.

COURT DECISION DATABASE

CEPEJ 3.7.9 (Q10)

In 2025, almost all the beneficiaries have public websites providing access to court decisions at all levels of jurisdiction, with advanced search capabilities.
Only **Georgia** could not confirm the availability of court decisions at the 1st and 2nd instance levels.
In the more advanced features, **Azerbaijan** and **Ukraine** have implemented AI-based anonymisation of published decisions.
Ukraine has also introduced an AI-based (LLM) tool for exploring court decisions, which remains unique amongst the beneficiaries.

STATISTICAL TOOLS

CEPEJ 3.7.12 (Q11)

Almost all the beneficiaries use statistical tools in their courts, but **Georgia** could not confirm the level of deployment of such tools.

In terms of functionalities, all the beneficiaries confirm the possibility of generating predefined statistical reports, but only the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** provide public access to judicial statistics through dedicated webpages.


It is important to point out that all except **Georgia** have implemented automatic consolidation of data at the national level.

In terms of available data, basic case flow data are systematically available for all beneficiaries while, with the exception all except **Georgia**, also provide many of the important indicators as age of pending cases or case per judge, amongst others.

Armenia, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** also report use of case weighing in their systems.


Legal Aid

CEPEJ 4.1.3 (Q1, Q13)



In general, the budgets for legal aid per inhabitant appear very modest in the region on a per capita basis. The **Republic of Moldova** (1,68€) and **Georgia** (1,17€) continue to have a higher budget of legal aid per inhabitant than the EaP average (0,84€) in 2025. At the same time, the budgets per inhabitant decreased in 2025 **Armenia** to 0,52€ (from 0,59 in 2024) and **Ukraine** to 0,56€. **Azerbaijan** showed a slight increase from 0,28€ in 2024 to 0,29€ in 2025.

CEPEJ 4.3.4 (Q1, Q86)




The **Republic of Moldova** (2,73) is considerably above, and **Ukraine** (1,83) is slightly above the EaP Average (1,31) of total number of cases per 100 inhabitants for which legal aid was granted in 2025. Conversely, **Armenia** (1,05), **Azerbaijan** (0,33) and **Georgia** (0,63) are below the EaP Average.

The **Republic of Moldova** continues to report the highest number of cases for which legal aid was granted per 100 inhabitants, indicating comparatively broad use of legal aid. **Armenia**, **Georgia** and **Ukraine** show a rise in the number of legal aid cases per 100 inhabitants over the last five years. Compared to 2024, there was a slight decrease from 0,39 legal aid cases to 0,33 legal aid cases per 100 inhabitants in **Azerbaijan**.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

CEPEJ 9.1.1 (Q65, Q65-1 and Q65-3)




Court-related mediation is reported as existing in all countries. In **Georgia**, court-related mediation can be ordered by the court, the judge, the public prosecutor, or a public authority during a judicial proceeding. In the **Republic of Moldova**, the legal provisions on mandatory court-mediation were abolished in 2022, although a judge still can evaluate the circumstances and propose to parties to apply for mediation. In **Azerbaijan**, in disputes arising from family and labour relations, participation in an initial mediation session is required before applying to a court. The possibility to receive legal aid for court-related mediation appears as a consistent feature in all five countries, supporting access to justice for court users in these jurisdictions.

CEPEJ 9.1.6 (Q258)

For the 2025 cycle, the availability of data on court-related mediation across the region continued to be limited, as in previous data collection cycles, preventing further insights into a regional analysis (**Armenia**, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** responded with data not available per total). Thus, **Georgia** reported numbers on court-related mediations in civil and commercial, family, labour and other cases. **Azerbaijan** started reporting cases as of the 2024 cycle and in 2025, it reported a total of 49 352 cases for which parties agreed to start mediation, of which the majority was in family cases (44,451), followed by 4,136 labour cases and 938 in civil and commercial cases. **Ukraine** provided partial data collected within a pilot project "Restorative Justice Programme Involving Juveniles Suspected or Accused of Committing a Criminal Offence" (in 190 criminal cases, in which the parties agreed to proceed with mediation and 137 agreements concluded).


CEPEJ 9.1.4 (Q66 and Q1)



The EaP Average (15,9 mediators per 100,000 inhabitants) is impacted by a considerable number of accredited/registered mediators in the **Republic of Moldova** (48). This makes **Armenia** (4), **Azerbaijan** (3,9), and **Georgia** (7,6) appear considerably below the region's average.

Compared to 2024, the number of mediators increased in all countries (except **Georgia** where it stayed the same) in 2025, reflecting ongoing efforts to promote the mediation profession, as well as to respond to the increasing demand for mediation services. The **Republic of Moldova** continues to lead significantly, showing a steady rise in the number of accredited mediators over a five-year period, yet consideration needs to be given that the number of practicing mediators is 173 (101 males, 72 females)

CEPEJ 9.1.8 (Q67-1)



In all beneficiaries, there are other alternative dispute resolution methods in 2025, including mediation other than court-related mediation and arbitration (**all countries)**. **Ukraine** reported several other e.g. settlement agreement, international commercial arbitration, negotiation, restorative justice agreements.

Performance and evaluation of judges and prosecutors

CEPEJ 3.7.1(Q46, Q 47)

System for evaluating judges and public prosecutors

Judges

A mandatory formal evaluation system regulated by law, based on qualitative and quantitative criteria is reported to be in place in all but **Georgia**, where individual evaluation of judge's work exits only during the probation period (annually, for 3 years). **Authorities** conducting the evaluation differs by country: **Armenia**: Judges' Performance Evaluation Committee, **Georgia**: High Council of Justice, **Ukraine**: High Qualification Commission of Judges), **Republic of Moldova**: Board for the Selection and Evaluation of Judges. In **Republic of Moldova**, the vetting procedure is under way with an Evaluation Commission in place.

Frequency: Regular evaluation varies: **Armenia** (every 4 years), **Republic of Moldova** (every 5 years), **Georgia** (during probationary period and temporarily appointed judges), **Azerbaijan** (at least every 3 years), **Ukraine** (regular and ad hoc under law).

The **main purposes** appear to be judicial promotion, determining training needs, professional development.

Predominant **criteria** across the region include "professional competence," "quality of judicial acts," "workload management," "integrity," "judicial ethics," and "behavior/conduct." Examples: **Armenia** uses "quality, efficiency, professionalism, and behavior." The **Republic of Moldova** applies

"professional competence, organizational competence, and integrity." **Azerbaijan** emphasizes a mix of quantitative (workload) and qualitative (ethics, quality) indicators.

Prosecutors

Authorities: In the **Republic of Moldova**, the performance of prosecutors is evaluated by the Superior Council of Prosecutors and vetting commissions; in **Armenia** and **Georgia**, by the Prosecutor General or a dedicated department; in **Ukraine**, an annual performance evaluation exists, but as of 2025, it is reported as not system-wide and it is conducted within pilot regional prosecutor's offices by procedures approved by the Prosecutor General.

Frequency: Republic of Moldova: every 5 years (ordinary evaluation), plus extraordinary evaluations (e.g. for promotion, discipline). **Armenia**: "semi-annual and annual." Georgia: every 2 years. **Ukraine**: annual in selected offices as a pilot only.

Purpose: In at least 2 counties (**Armenia**, **Georgia**) the evaluation's main purpose appears to be for promotion and "official incentives," with additional goals including compliance with the position held and identifying professional training needs.

Criteria:

Prevalent criteria are: professional competence, organisational competence, quality of procedural documents, compliance with internal service rules, efficiency and performance in court hearings, and integrity. For instance, the **Republic of Moldova** lists three groups of criteria (Professional competence, Organizational competence, Integrity); **Armenia** uses measures such as money recovered, indictments, and verdicts; **Georgia** and **Ukraine** focus on quality of work, workload, and assessment of supervisor.

Judicial system budget

CEPEJ 1.1.4 (Q1, Q3, Q6, Q7, Q8 and 9-0)


Beneficiaries	Annual implemented budget in 2025 (standardised values)	
	Judicial system per capita	Judicial system as % of GDP
Armenia	20,5 €	0,24%
Azerbaijan	15,1 €	0,23%
Georgia	19,5 €	0,22%
Republic of Moldova	27,3 €	0,39%
Ukraine	19,0 €	0,33%
Average	20,3 €	0,28%

Compared with the EaP Average of 20,3 € in 2025, **Azerbaijan** (15,1 €), **Ukraine** (19€) and **Georgia** (19,5€) spent less in terms of the implemented judicial system budget per capita, while the **Republic of Moldova** (27,3 €) spent more. **Armenia** (20,5 €) is almost on a par with the EaP Average. As a % of GDP, compared to the EaP average of 0,28 %, **Georgia** (0,22%), **Azerbaijan** (0,23%) and **Armenia** (0,24%) spent less on the judicial system, while the judicial system spending in **Ukraine** (0,33%) and the **Republic of Moldova** are slightly higher (0,39% of GDP).

Per capita increases in judicial system budgets implemented over the last 5 years are reported by all but **Ukraine** which is indicative of continuous commitments to judicial systems' financing in these countries. In **Ukraine** it decreased from 22€ in 2022 to 19 € in 2025.

Number of legal professionals per capita

CEPEJ 2.1.2 (Q 31), 2.2.1 (Q34), 2.3.2 (Q35), 2.4.1 (Q40)




In 2025, **Azerbaijan** (6,6) and **Georgia** (9,3) have a lower number of **judges** compared to the EaP average of 10,2 judges per 100 000 inhabitants. **Ukraine** (11,1) and the **Republic of Moldova** (13,4) continue to have a higher number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants. **Armenia** (10,3) is almost on a par with the EaP Average.

Compared to the EaP average of 16,0 **prosecutors** per 100 000 inhabitants, **Azerbaijan** (9,8), **Georgia** (12,0), and **Armenia** (11,8) report a smaller number, while **Ukraine** (22,6) and the **Republic of Moldova** (24,0) report a higher number of prosecutors.

Azerbaijan (30,5) reports a considerably smaller number of **non-judge staff** per 100 000 inhabitants compared to the EaP average of 51,7. So does **Georgia**, slightly (46,9). The number of non-judge staff per 100 000 inhabitants is higher than the EaP average in **Armenia** (53,8) **Ukraine** (58,3) and considerably so in the **Republic of Moldova** (69,0).

Only the **Republic of Moldova** (22,6) is above the EaP average of 12,2 **non-prosecutor staff** per 100 000 inhabitants. **Armenia** (7,9), **Azerbaijan** (8,0), **Georgia** (11,4), and **Ukraine** (10,9) have figures below the EaP average.

The **Republic of Moldova** continues to lead in terms of the number professionals per 100 000 inhabitants, reflecting resource allocation patterns in its judicial system. **Ukraine** and **Armenia** also show significant numbers, while **Georgia** approaches the EaP averages across several categories.
CEPEJ 2.8.1 (Q 48)




Compared to the EaP Average of 106,7 lawyers per 100 000 inhabitants in 2025, there is a considerably lower number of lawyers in **Azerbaijan** (27,7). The number of lawyers in the **Republic of Moldova** (91,9) and **Armenia** (97) are below the average. **Georgia** (138,1) and **Ukraine** (178,8) have a considerably higher number of lawyers per 100 000 inhabitants in 2025.

Overall, **Georgia** and **Ukraine** continue to lead in terms of the number of lawyers per capita in the region, followed by **Armenia** and the **Republic of Moldova**. **Azerbaijan** remains significantly below the regional average, although it showed increases over the last five years.


Trainings

CEPEJ 7.1.3 (Q7, Q8, Q10 and Q1)




Compared to the EaP average of €0,33 per inhabitant in 2025, **Azerbaijan** (€0,43) and the **Republic of Moldova** (€0,65) spent more on judicial training per inhabitant. **Georgia** (€0,15) and **Ukraine** (€0,10) spent considerably less than the EaP Average. In 2025, there was an increase only in the **Republic of Moldova** in the training budgets per inhabitant compared to 2024. In **Armenia**, the training institution still does not have a separate budget, remaining consistent with previous years. Overall, the data appears to show a varied approach to investment in judicial training across the region, which in general remain modest and on decrease compared to 2020.

CEPEJ 7.2.5 and 7.2.8 (Q73, Q74 and Q75)



Regionally, there are more participations per judge than per prosecutor in trainings (similar to 2024) in all but **Georgia** in 2025. Thus, in 2025, **judges** in the **Republic of Moldova** (5,3) participated in more live trainings than the EaP Average (2,4). For **prosecutors**, those in the **Republic of Moldova** (4,3) also participated in more live trainings than the EaP Average (1,7).


CEPEJ 7.2.8 (Q75)



From the data available in 2025, in the **Republic of Moldova** more judges participated in trainings (98% of judges and 88% of prosecutors). In **Georgia** more prosecutors (83%) than judges (26%) participated in trainings.

CEPEJ 7.3.4 (Q83 and Q84)

Percentage of judges/prosecutors who attended a live training in ECHR in 2025



In terms of participations in live trainings on European Convention on Human Rights in 2025, judges in **Armenia** (88%) have a higher than EaP Average participation (34%). Prosecutors' participations in these trainings are above the EaP Average (29%) also in **Armenia** (55%). In the **Republic of Moldova** (24% of judges and 24% of prosecutors) participated in live trainings on European Convention on Human Right. A considerably lower than the EaP Average participation was reported by **Georgia** (2% for judges and 8% for prosecutors) in 2025.

CEPEJ 7.4.1 (Qs 86 and 87)

An annual **assessment of training needs** is reported as being done in **all beneficiaries** in 2025. The assessment of future training needs is reported as being done through courts/prosecutors' offices in all countries. Trainers, the target audience and previous participants in trainings are also among sources of the assessment of training needs in all countries. In addition to the above, the Ministries of Justice are also a source of identification of training needs in **Armenia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine**. In the **Republic of Moldova and Ukraine**, other authorities (Bar Association, lawyers, donors, civil society) also play a role in the judicial training needs assessment. **Georgia** reported also on identification of future training needs based on the results of prosecutors' performance appraisals, ensuring that in-service training addresses specific areas for professional development and specialisation.

CEPEJ 7.4.2 (Qs 88, 89, 90 and 91)

All beneficiaries reported in 2025 as having an **evaluation of the in-service judicial training.** It is reportedly done immediately after the training in all, **except Ukraine** (where it is done 3-6 months after the training is delivered. In **Georgia** it is also done 3-6 months after the training delivery and a year or more after the training is delivered. A combination of the Kirkpatrick and other training evaluation models is reported in **Georgia**, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**. In **Armenia** a survey is used for this purpose and in **Azerbaijan** an anonymous survey is submitted at the end of the training. The **feedback** is mostly used to improve the training course and to introduce new courses (in all countries), to replace the training providers (all countries, except **Georgia**), to prepare a training evaluation report with recommendations (in **Georgia, the Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**) and to suppress a training course (in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan**).


Gender profile of legal professions

In the following graphs concerning gender balance, the EaP Average represents the regional repartition between male and female.

Judges

CEPEJ 2.9.1 (Q31)

Distribution of the total male and female judges in 2025




In 2025, the percentage of total female professional judges remains below the EaP average of 44,6% in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** (34% and 29% respectively, although both show increases compared to 2024). In **Georgia** (54%), the **Republic of Moldova** (52%) and **Ukraine** (54%), the percentage of female judges is above the EaP average. In all countries, the representation of female judges has shown an increase compared to 2020. E.g. it doubled in Azerbaijan from 14% in 2020. Nevertheless, in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan**, although showing increases compared to 2020, the underrepresentation of female judges highlights a continued challenge in achieving gender parity in these judiciaries.

CEPEJ 2.9.1 (Q31)


Compared to 2020, the presence of female professional judges in 2025 has shown notable increases in all beneficiary countries, except **Ukraine** (which showed a 0,1 percentage points) and Georgia (0,6 percentage points variation), to be seen in connection with data above. **Azerbaijan** saw the highest increase with a notable 14,3 percentage points variation, indicating a commitment to improvement in gender balance. **Armenia** experienced a significant rise of 7,1 percentage points. In the **Republic of Moldova**, there was an increase of 2,5 percentage points.

CEPEJ 2.9.2 (Q31)



Indications of a glass ceiling continue to be evident in almost all countries in the 2025 data. There are fewer women judges in second instance and Supreme Courts compared to first instance courts in particular in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan**. In **Armenia**, women make up 35% of judges in first instance and 34% in second instance courts, with 25% at the Supreme Court level. In **Azerbaijan**, female judges constitute 34% in first instance courts, dropping to 16% in second instance and 11% in the Supreme Court. **Georgia** shows comparatively higher female representation: 58% in first instance, 51% in second instance, and 32% in the Supreme Court. In the **Republic of Moldova**, there is 54% female representation in first instance courts, 47% in second instance, and 40 % in the Supreme Court. **Ukraine** reports 55% women in first instance courts, 51% in second instance courts, and 39% in the Supreme Court. Despite minor year-on-year fluctuations, the trend of underrepresentation of women in higher courts remains visible to varying degrees in all countries.

CEPEJ 2.9.3 (Q33)




The distribution of male and female court presidents in 2025 continues to indicate the presence of a glass ceiling in all countries, with some notable variations compared to 2024. The highest percentage

of female court presidents is observed in the **Republic of Moldova** (44%; also 44% in 2024) and **Ukraine** (39% vs 38% in 2024). In **Azerbaijan,** the percentage of female court presidents stands at 6% (an increase from 2% in 2023 and a decrease from 7% in 2024), in **Armenia** at 11% (a decrease from 16% in 2024 and from 21% in 2023), while **Georgia** shows 21% (same as in 2024 and an increase from 17% in 2023) of female representation in this role.

Prosecutors
CEPEJ 2.10.1 (Q36)


Distribution of the total male and female prosecutors in 2025



The presence of total female prosecutors in **Azerbaijan** (12%) and **Armenia** (27%) is below the EaP average of 29% in 2025. Although there is a greater presence of total female prosecutors in the **Republic of Moldova** (34%), **Georgia** (36%), and **Ukraine** (38%), the gender balance in the prosecutors' profession remains an aspiration in the region in 2025.

CEPEJ 2.10.3 (Q38)

Distribution of the total male and female heads of prosecution offices in 2025




Regionally, there remains a very low presence of female heads of prosecution offices. In 2025, there was no female head of prosecution office in **Azerbaijan** and only one female head of prosecution office in **Armenia**. Although, there was some presence of female heads of prosecution offices in **Georgia** (8%), the **Republic of Moldova** (10%) and **Ukraine** (6%), the distribution of genders in these positions could be seen as indicative of a glass ceiling in the region (to be seen together with total male and female prosecutors, above).

Number of judgements finding ECHR violations

CEPEJ 10.1.3 (Q51-1)


Applications allocated to an ECHR judicial formation in 2024 and % variation between 2024 and 2025



In terms of the number of applications at the ECtHR, in 2025, the highest numbers were in respect of **Ukraine** (2 299), showing a decrease by 19% compared to 2024 and **Azerbaijan** (569), showing a 5% decrease. **Armenia** also saw an increase by 5%, with the number of applications rising to 189 in 2025. **Georgia** had a considerable increase by 28%, reaching 194 applications in 2025. The **Republic of**

Moldova also showed a significant increase by 29%, with 468 applications in 2025. On average, the EaP region saw an 8% increase in applications (compared to a 5% increase in 2024 and a 17% increase in 2023), given a growing number of applications to the ECtHR in some of these countries.

CEPEJ 10.1.3 (Q51-2), 10.1.4 (Q51-4)



In 2025, the ECtHR issued 160 judgments finding at least one violation of the ECHR in respect of **Ukraine** and 97 cases against Ukraine were considered as closed after a judgment of the ECtHR. In respect of **Azerbaijan**, 43 judgments finding at least one violation of the ECHR have been issued, and 7 cases were considered as closed. The ECtHR issued 45 judgments finding at least one violation in respect of the **Republic of Moldova** and 34 cases in its respect were considered as closed. There were 22 judgments finding at least one violation of the ECHR in the case of **Armenia** and 21 cases were considered as closed. In respect of **Georgia**, the ECtHR issued 8 judgments finding at least one violation and 7 cases were considered as closed.


III. Mandates of judges and prosecutors

Entry criteria to become a judge or a prosecutor


The entry criteria are general requirements that candidates need to fulfil to be shortlisted to participate in the exam to enter the judicial academy, or to be pre-selected for a procedure of recruitment to become a judge without judicial academy. Here, judicial academy should be understood as an institution responsible for training, but which also has a role in the appointment and recruitment procedure of future judges.

- **Entry criteria to become a judge**

CEPEJ 5.1.2 (Q93)



Thus, in **countries** where entry into profession is done through a Judicial Academy (**Armenia**, **Georgia**, the **Republic of Moldova**), citizenship, a clean criminal record, basic law studies are among entry criteria. Also, all candidates in these countries are required to take an entry test. **Armenia** and **Georgia** also require candidates to fulfil the requirements of years and relevance of previous work experience. Advanced law studies (masters or PhD) are required in **Georgia** and **the Republic of Moldova. Armenia** and **Georgia** require candidates to fulfil the age criteria (between 25 and 60 in **Armenia**; and to be at least 30 years old in **Georgia)**. **Armenia** also requires the candidates to know at least one language from among English, Russian, and French, at the required level which shall be prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Council and checked through standardised test systems. Discernment, knowledge of Romanian language, specific medical certificate are among other criteria in the **Republic of Moldova**. Additionally, the candidates entering the National Institute of Justice to become judges must file declarations of assets and interests, which are subject to verification and control by the National Integrity Authority.




Certain commonalities are observed in all five countries. In terms of Professional Experience and Qualifications: **all countries** require significant professional experience in the legal field. For instance, **Armenia** requires at least three years, **Azerbaijan** requires more than five years of professional experience in the legal profession, and **Ukraine** requires five years in the field of law. Candidates must fulfil the requirement of citizenship and have a clean criminal record in **all countries**.

Experienced professionals: **Georgia** exempts former Supreme Court judges, former common courts judges with 18 months experience and current Constitutional Court judges from Judicial Academy training. In the **Republic of Moldova**, even exempt candidates (except for certain judges) must pass a graduation exam at the National Institute of Justice. In **Armenia**, candidates with extensive legal experience are eligible for the judicial candidate list if they meet the legal requirements, either at least eight years of professional work experience in the past ten years, or an academic law degree, together with the required teaching or scientific experience. Such candidates proceed directly to the interview stage for qualification assessment as per the established procedure.

Ukraine specifies an age range (30 to 65 years) for candidates, or language requirement (it requires candidates to command the official language at a specific level, as well as an examination of the personal moral and psychological qualities of candidates for the position of judge.

- **Entry criteria to become a prosecutor**


CEPEJ 5.2.2 (Q112)



In both **Armenia** and the **Republic of Moldova**, candidates can become prosecutors either through studies at the judicial academy (**Armenia**: Academy of Justice; **Republic of Moldova**: National Institute of Justice) or, under certain legal pathways, without academy training if alternative criteria are met. Shared requirements include possession of a law degree, citizenship, a clean criminal record, and successful completion of an entry test or examination.

In **Armenia**, candidates must be citizens between the ages of 22 and 63 and demonstrate command of the Armenian language. A clean criminal record is required; an individual convicted of an intentional crime is ineligible for appointment as prosecutor, even if the record has been expunged or removed. While relevant legal work experience is not generally necessary for entry to the academy, at least two years of professional experience as a lawyer is required for candidates seeking appointment as prosecutors within specialised units on confiscation of property of illegal origin. All candidates must pass an entry test and submit to verification of integrity and asset declarations.

In the **Republic of Moldova**, applicants must be Moldovan citizens, possess advanced legal education (bachelor's and master's degree or equivalent), a clean criminal record, and pass an entry examination. Further requirements include a medical fitness certificate, knowledge of the state language (Romanian), no records of negative results in professional integrity testing over the past five years, and submission of a declaration of assets and personal interests.




In **all countries**, candidates must have a clean criminal record and their respective countries' citizenship. In **Azerbaijan** and **Georgia**, candidates must have basic law studies, while in **Armenia**, **the Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** advanced law studies are reported as required. Candidates undergo training and a final assessment after internship in **Georgia**. In **Armenia**, candidates from among experienced legal professionals can be exempted from the training at the Justice Academy. Similarly, **in the Republic of Moldova**, this kind of candidates can be exempted from studying at the National Institute of Justice based on relevant previous work experience (they, nevertheless, pass the judicial exam).


Criteria in selection procedure for judges and prosecutors

The criteria in selection procedure are the criteria which are used to decide which individuals from the pool of pre-selected candidates are best suited for becoming judges or prosecutors.

- **Selection criteria to become a judge**

CEPEJ 5.1.6 (Q99)





Commonalities for all countries include relevance of work experience and its duration, interviews and a series of other criteria, as specified below.

In **Armenia,** the selection of candidates is made based on their results from the Academy of Justice. For candidates who were exempted from studying at the academy, the selection is made on the results from an interview while considering the relevance and duration of previous work experience.

In **Azerbaijan,** candidates for judicial office are selected based on a test examination, a written examination, and an interview organized by the Selection Committee of Judges. After appointment, judges undergo training at the Justice Academy of the Ministry of Justice for professional preparation.


In **Georgia**, the selection is made based on the results from the High School of Justice for concerned candidates and on an interview, relevance, duration of the previous work experience and performance appraisals are also considered. Two criteria are used in this process: good faith (integrity) and competence. The characteristics of good faith are personal good faith and professional conscience; independence, impartiality, and fairness; personal and professional behaviour; personal and professional reputation. The characteristics of competence are knowledge of legal norms; ability of legal substantiation and competence; writing and verbal communication skills; professional qualities; academic achievements and professional training; professional activity.


In the **Republic of Moldova,** the selection is made based on the results from the National Institute of Justice for concerned candidates, relevance and duration of previous work experience, integrity checks run through the National Integrity Authority, the National Anticorruption Centre and the Intelligence and Security Service, as well as an interview. Other criteria include *inter alia* participation in non-formal education activities, projects or initiatives and knowledge of one of the official languages of the Council of Europe.

In **Ukraine**, the selection is based on the results of a qualification assessment managed by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, which evaluates competence, professional ethics, and integrity. The selection process includes initial examination, special background check, and assessment according to criteria established by law.

- **Selection criteria to become a prosecutor**

CEPEJ 5.2.6 (Q118)





In **Armenia** the selection of prosecutors is made based on the results from the Academy of Justice. For candidates who were exempted to study at the Academy, the selection is made based on the results of an interview.

In **Azerbaijan**, candidates for prosecutor positions are selected through an annual competitive examination process organized by the Prosecutor General's Office. Eligibility requires a higher legal education, Azerbaijani citizenship, fluency in the state language, and a clean criminal record. Test and written exam results are considered. In **Georgia,** prosecutors are selected mainly via a competitive internship or appointment process, requiring higher legal education and a clean criminal record.

Candidates are evaluated through written exams, interviews, and assessments of skills and experience.
In the **Republic of Moldova,** an interview is conducted both for candidates who went through the judicial academy and those who were exempted. Candidates entering the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) must file declarations of assets and interests, which are subject to verification and control by the National Integrity Authority. Additionally, selection criteria include inter alia the NIJ graduation average, professional experience, ethics, teaching experience, knowledge of foreign languages.

In **Ukraine**, candidates for prosecutor positions must be citizens, have higher legal education, command the state language, and meet integrity and health requirements. Selection involves passing a qualification examination (including anonymous testing and practical assignments), undergoing a special background check, and ranking. Appointment follows competition among candidates in the reserve, with trainees completing special training and an internship before final.

Authorities responsible for the appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors

In this paragraph are presented the authorities, which are responsible for the selection, the formal appointment and the promotion of judges and prosecutors.


- **Authorities responsible for the selection of judges**

CEPEJ 5.1.8 (Q101)

In all countries, except **Ukraine**, the authority responsible for the selection of judges is the High Judicial Council. In **Ukraine**, the authority responsible is the High Qualification Commission of Judges. In **Georgia**, the Parliament, along with the High Judicial Council, plays a role in the selection of the Supreme Court judges.

- **Authorities responsible for the final appointment of judges**

CEPEJ 5.1.9 (Q102 and Q103)



In Armenia, Azerbaijan, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**, the Presidents of these countries are in charge of the final appointment of judges. In **the Republic of Moldova**, all judges at all court levels are appointed by the President. In **Georgia**, district/city court and Court of Appeal judges are appointed by the High Judicial Council, while Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Parliament. In **Azerbaijan**, the Milli Majlis/parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, upon the recommendation of

the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, appoints the judges of the Supreme Court, and the courts of appeal.

In three out of five countries, the responsible authority has the right to appoint some and reject some among the selected (proposed) candidates. In Azerbaijan and **Ukraine**, the responsible authority only confirms all the selected (proposed) candidates. In the **Republic of Moldova**, the President can reject (with reasoned refusal) and cannot reject the same candidate twice.

- **Authorities responsible for the selection of prosecutors**

CEPEJ 5.2.8 (Q120)

In **Armenia**, the authority competent for the selection of prosecutors is the Qualification Commission, which is composed of one deputy of the Prosecutor General, four prosecutors, three law academics and the Rector of the Academy of Justice. In **Azerbaijan –** by the Prosecution Services together with State Exam Centre Officials. In **Georgia**, since December 2023, the Career Management, Ethics, and Incentives Council is responsible for the selection procedure of prosecutors. In the **Republic of Moldova,** the Superior Council of Prosecutors, through its Selection and Evaluation Board, is the responsible authority. In **Ukraine**, the authority responsible is the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors.

- **Authorities responsible for the final appointment of prosecutors**


CEPEJ 5.2.9 (Q121 and Q122)

In all countries, except **Ukraine**, the final appointment is made by the Prosecutor General who has a right to appoint some and reject some among the selected (proposed) candidates.

In **Ukraine**, final appointments are made by the heads of public prosecutor's offices who only confirms all the selected (proposed) candidates.

- **Authorities responsible for the promotion of judges**

CEPEJ 6.1.1 (Q130)




In **all countries**, the High Judicial Councils have competencies in the promotion of judges.

Judges of **Armenia**'s Court of Cassation are appointed by the President upon recommendation of the National Assembly, which elects candidates nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council. In **Azerbaijan**, the Judicial Legal Council is the authority in charge of judges' promotion. In **Georgia**, the promotion of district court judges to courts of appeals is conducted by the High Judicial Council. The election to the position of a Supreme Court judge is conducted by the Parliament, upon nomination of candidates

by the High Judicial Council. In the **Republic of Moldova**, the Superior Council of Magistracy proposes the candidates as a result of the evaluation process to the President of the country. In 2025 the vetting process continued in the judiciary. In **Ukraine** the promotion of judges is conducted by the High Judicial Council and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine.

- **Authorities responsible for the promotion of prosecutors**


CEPEJ 6.1.4 (Q135)



In **Armenia**, the authority competent for the promotion of prosecutors is the Qualification Commission (see above). In **Azerbaijan**, the authority competent for the promotion of prosecutors is the Prosecutor's General Office. In **Georgia**, the authorities competent for the promotion of prosecutors are the Career Management, Ethics and Incentives Council and the General Prosecutor. The General Prosecutor promotes the candidates recommended by the Career Management, Ethics, and Incentives Council. He/she may decline the recommended promotion but shall provide the reasons thereof. In the **Republic of Moldova**, the authority competent for the promotion of prosecutors is the Prosecutor General, who acts on the proposals for promotion made by the Superior Council of Prosecutors. In **Ukraine**, the following are reported as being involved in the process of promotions together with the High Prosecutorial Council: Prosecutor General, heads of regional prosecutor's offices, Deputy Prosecutor General - Head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office.

Allocation of cases

CEPEJ 8.4.1 (Q158 and Q159)



The random allocation of court cases (using random algorithm) is reported as being in place by all countries. No country reported having in place specific allocation procedures for priority cases.

In all countries, except **Ukraine**, there is a possibility to exclude a judge from the distribution. In **Armenia**, a judge may, in case s/he is in charge of a case of particular complexity, apply to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) proposing to be temporarily removed from the distribution list or to have a different percentage of cases to be distributed to him/her. In **Azerbaijan**, there is a possibility to exclude a judge due to the judge's illness, business trip or vacation. In the **Republic of Moldova**, according to a Regulation approved by the SCM, if a judge goes on annual leave for a period exceeding half of the total duration of the annual leave for the current year, the President of the Court shall, by a reasoned decision, order blocking of a judge's availability from the list of judges eligible for random allocation in 5 calendar days before going on a leave, and the judge will be included in the list with active judges for case distribution from the day of returning to work, with the exception of the Supreme Court of Justice. The President of the Court may order the temporary blocking or unblocking of a judge's availability in the case management system in other justified cases, through a reasoned decision.

All countries report all interventions as being irreversibly logged/registered in the system.

Organisation of reassignment of court cases

CEPEJ 8.4.2 (Q159, Q160, Q162, Q163 and Q164)

Beneficiaries	Reasons for reassigning a case			
	Conflict of interest declared by the judge or by the parties	Recusal of the judge or requested by the parties	Physical unavailability (illness, longer absence)	Other
Armenia				
Azerbaijan				
Georgia				
Republic of Moldova				
Ukraine				

In **all countries**, a case can be reassigned due to the recusal of the judge requested by the parties and due to the physical unavailability (illness, longer absence). In **all countries, except Armenia,** a case can be re-assigned due to a conflict of interest declared by the judge of by the parties. Other reasons for case reassignment in **Armenia** are specified in the Judicial Code and include among others, secondment or transfer of a judge to another court, participation in the examination of the case in question in the past or the suspension of judge's power. In the **Republic of Moldova**, the court president may order the random redistribution of the file to another judge or another panel of judges in other justified cases, with the issuance of a reasoned decision.

Beneficiaries	Does the reassignment of cases have to be reasoned?		
	Yes for all reassignments	Yes for some reassignments	No
Armenia			
Azerbaijan			
Georgia			
Republic of Moldova			
Ukraine			

In **all countries**, except Georgia, all re-assignments must be reasoned. In **Georgia** only some re-assignments must be reasoned, and they concern recusal issues, envisaged by criminal, civil and administrative procedure coded and as specified in the "Rule on Electronic Case Allocation System".

Beneficiaries	Reassignments of cases processed through the computerised distribution of cases	If yes, how are reassignments of cases processed:				
		Automatic allocation	Random allocation	By discretion of a president of a court	Other	All interventions on the system are irreversibly logged/ registered
Armenia						
Azerbaijan						
Georgia						
Republic of Moldova						
Ukraine						

In all countries, the re-assignment is processed through the computerised distribution of cases and by random algorithm. In **Armenia**, the redistribution of cases for judges absent due to long-term incapacity or childcare leave is decided by the court president upon a justified request to ensure timely case examination, while cases during short absences or regular vacations generally are not redistributed except for urgent matters. In appellate and cassation courts, case reassignment and judge replacement follow specific procedures involving software tools or court presidents, with detailed rules outlined in the Supreme Judicial Council's decision of 2021. In the **Republic of Moldova**, considering the judge's specialisation (insolvency, civil, criminal, adoption, administrative, investigative judges), the president of a court establishes at the beginning of the year by a general written act a limited number of judges or panels of the same specialisation who are active in the system if there is a need to reassign cases. The allocation in the CMS in these specific cases is random based on limitations established by the president's act. The act issued by the president of a court can be adjusted/modified during a year due to specific circumstances. In **all countries,** all interventions are reportedly irreversibly registered in the system.
Data on the number of processed re-assignments in the reference year was available only in **the Republic of Moldova** (totals: 21 765 in 2025, 23 712 in 2024, 18 166 in 2023 and 17 094 in 2021).

Specific instructions to prosecute or not, addressed to a public prosecutor

CEPEJ 2.3.6 (Q39, Q39-1)

In **Armenia**, a superior prosecutor may issue written instructions to a subordinate prosecutor, including instructions to initiate, not initiate, or terminate criminal prosecution. Such instructions are legally binding unless the subordinate prosecutor considers them illegal or unfounded, in which case they must submit an objection to the superior of the issuing prosecutor. Instructions are given on an exceptional basis and must be issued in writing, either on paper or electronically.

In **Azerbaijan**, a higher-ranking prosecutor may give written instructions to a subordinate, including those on prosecuting, terminating, or referring a case, provided these are lawful and justified. These instructions are mandatory, but the subordinate may submit a written objection if viewed as unlawful or unfounded. If confirmed by the superior, execution is required, with responsibility for legality borne by the issuer. All instructions must be formalized in a procedural manner; arbitrary or politically motivated instructions are prohibited.


Georgia, the **Republic of Moldova**, and **Ukraine** report that specific instructions to prosecute or not, directed to an individual prosecutor, are prohibited by law. In all three, decisions to prosecute are reserved exclusively for the individual prosecutor, with no apparent exceptions for hierarchical or administrative intervention.


Salaries of judges and prosecutors vs national average

CEPEJ 2.6.2, 2.6.4, 2.6.6, 2.6.8 (Q4, Q45)

There is a regional trend, confirmed by the EaP averages, of higher salaries for judges than for public prosecutors both at the beginning of their careers and at the highest level. Differences in the average national salaries between these countries are also more pronounced in 2025 (compared to 2020).


- **Average salaries of judges**






The average gross salary (in €) at the beginning of the career of judges has increased between 2020 and 2025, perhaps the most prominently in **Armenia** and **Georgia**, where it was above the EaP average of 31 812€ in 2025. Conversely, in **Ukraine**, the average gross salary (in €) at the beginning of the career of judges shows a decrease compared to 2020. **Georgia** reported the highest average gross

salary in the region at 46 317€, followed by **Armenia** with 38 541€. These salaries in **Ukraine** (18 933€) and in the **Republic of Moldova** (19 774€) continue to be considerably below the EaP Average.




In all countries, the average gross salary of judges at the highest instance has increased between 2020 and 2025, more prominently in **Armenia, Georgia** and **the Republic of Moldova**. In 2025, this salary was higher than the EaP average of 61 568€ in **Armenia (**62 084**€**) and considerably higher in **Ukraine**. **Ukraine** reported the highest average gross salary at 103 696€, followed by **Armenia** with 62 084€, and **Georgia** with 57 154€. In the **Republic of Moldova,** the salary of a judge at the highest instance (36 394€) is considerably below the EaP Average. The average gross salary of judges in **Ukraine** at the end of the career impact the EaP average significantly.


- **Average salaries of prosecutors**



- **Average salaries of prosecutors**



In all countries, the average gross salary of prosecutors at the beginning of their career has increased between 2020 and 2025, rather prominently**,** indicating a general trend of salary increases for prosecutors across the region. In 2025, this salary was higher than the EaP average of 18 151€ only in **Armenia** (26 235**€**) **and Ukraine** (19 664**€**). **Armenia** reported the highest average gross salary at 26 235**€,** followed by **Ukraine** with **19 664**€, **Georgia** with 15 759€ and **Azerbaijan** with 13 417€. The salaries of prosecutors at the beginning of the career in **Azerbaijan, Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova** (15 682€) are rather below the EaP Average.




In **Azerbaijan**, there was a reported decrease in the salary of prosecutors at the highest instance between 2020 and 2025. The salaries increased between 2020 and 2025 in **Georgia** and **the Republic of Moldova**. In **Georgia** (37 321€) it is almost on a par with the EaP Average (37 341€). In **Ukraine**, the salaries show a considerable increase (53 914€), making it the only country with salaries considerably above the EaP Average.

IV. Accountability

Councils for judges in 2025: appointments and composition

CEPEJ 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 (Q222 and Q223)



All countries have a Council for the Judiciary, with sizes in 2025 ranging from 10 members in **Armenia**, 12 in the **Republic of Moldova**, 15 in **Georgia**, 15 in **Azerbaijan**, 32 in **Ukraine** (see country particularity below).

Armenia: The Supreme Judicial Council is composed of 10 members. Five are judges (of at least 10 years' experience, representing all court levels), elected by the General Assembly of Judges. Five are academic lawyers or other prominent lawyers (Armenian citizens only, with at least 15 years of professional experience, high professional qualities, and voting rights), elected by the National Assembly by a minimum three-fifths majority. Members serve a 5-year non-renewable term. A judge member may not act as chairperson of a court or chamber of the Court of Cassation.

Azerbaijan: The Judicial-Legal Council consists of 15 members. The composition: three judges from the cassation instance, three from the courts of appeal, three from first instance courts (all elected by

the conference of judges), a judge appointed by the Constitutional Court, one appointed by the Parliament, one by the executive authority, one lawyer from the Bar Association, one legal scholar from the National Academy of Sciences, and one representative of the legal community elected by the conference of judges, making a 10 judge to 5 non-judge members. Members must have higher legal education and over ten years' legal experience. Term of office is 5 years.

Georgia: The High Council of Justice consists of 15 members (10 judges and 5 non-judges). Judge members are elected by the Conference of Judges, representing all courts. More than a half of the members elected by the Conference of Judges of Georgia may not be a chairperson of a court, his/her first deputy or a deputy, or the chairperson of a judicial panel or a chamber. The non-judge members of the Council are elected by the Parliament and the President of Georgia. In particular, the Parliament elects five members of the Council on a competitive basis. The President of the Supreme Court is an ex officio member. Members serve a 4-year renewable term.

Republic of Moldova: The Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) has 12 members: 6 judges (4 from first instance courts, 1 from courts of appeal, 1 from the Supreme Court of Justice), elected by the General Assembly of Judges; and 6 non-judge members, appointed by Parliament with a three-fifths majority. The selection criteria for the 6 non-judge members of the Superior Council of Magistracy require candidates to have a high professional reputation, personal integrity, at least 10 years' experience in law, political science, economics, or psychology, no current employment in legislative, executive or judicial bodies, and no political affiliation. All candidates are subject to pre-vetting (integrity evaluation) by an Evaluation Commission. In 2025, the SCM was fully functional. The term of office is 6 years.

Ukraine:
There are the High Council of Justice (HCJ)—for judges and prosecutors—and the Council of Judges (for judges). The HCJ is composed of 21 members (ten elected by the Congress of Judges, two appointed by the President, two each by the Parliament, Congress of Advocates, Conference of Prosecutors, and Congress of Law Schools/Research Institutions; Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is ex officio member). To be elected to HCJ, a candidate must be a citizen of Ukraine, at least 35 years old, command the state language, hold a law degree, have at least 15 years' legal experience, and meet criteria of political neutrality, professional reputation, and integrity. Membership is incompatible with political activity, certain public or business roles, and active legal practice; members must comply with ethical and anti-corruption standards and cannot have unexpunged convictions or unresolved incompatibilities. Members serve a 4-year non-renewable term. The Council of Judges is elected at the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, with candidates proposed by participating judges; new elections are held every two years.

Councils for judges in 2025: responsibilities

CEPEJ 11.1.6 (Q227)

Armenia: The Supreme Judicial Council draws up and approves lists of candidates for judges, proposes candidates for judicial appointments and court chairpersons, decides on secondment of judges, consents to criminal prosecution or deprivation of liberty of judges, conducts disciplinary proceedings, decides on the termination of judges' powers, approves estimates of expenditures for itself and the courts and submits them to the Government, forms its staff, acts as a court in disciplinary and other prescribed cases, adopts secondary regulatory legal acts, and exercises other powers as prescribed by the Judicial Code. The Council is competent in cases of evident breach of the independence or impartiality of a judge and publishes its activity reports and reasoned decisions.

Azerbaijan:
The Judicial-Legal Council resolves issues regarding the organization of the judicial system, ensures the independence of judges and the judicial system, organizes selection and evaluation of candidates for vacant judicial positions, decides on transfer, promotion, disciplinary liability, and termination of judges' powers, approves regulations concerning court management and case distribution, submits proposals for appointments and awards, supervises the execution of its decisions, conducts professional development, adopts acts of a normative nature, and implements self-governance functions of the judiciary. The Council is competent in cases of breach of independence or impartiality and publishes activity reports and reasoned decisions.

Georgia: The High Council of Justice is responsible for ensuring the independence and efficiency of the courts and individual judges, appointing and dismissing judges, organizing judicial qualification examinations, determining judicial specialisation, approving personnel structure, conducting disciplinary proceedings against judges, formulating proposals for judicial reform, adopting relevant regulations, and fulfilling other objectives determined by law. The HCJ is competent in cases of breach of independence or impartiality, publishes its activity reports and decisions, which must be reasoned, and is accountable to the Conference of Judges.


Republic of Moldova: The Superior Council of Magistracy is responsible for the selection, training, evaluation, ethics, and disciplinary liability of judges, administers court management by examining and proposing draft court budgets, decides on the appointment, promotion, transfer, removal and disciplinary measures for judges and court presidents, approves regulations for selection and evaluation, manages judicial training, cooperates with civil society and the media, adopts normative acts, and maintains personnel files for all judges. The Council acts in cases of breach of independence or impartiality, publishes activity reports and reasoned decisions on its official website.

Ukraine: *The High Council of Justice* decides whether a judge or prosecutor has violated incompatibility requirements, considers complaints against disciplinary decisions, makes proposals to appointing authorities, and may engage judicial self-government bodies, institutions and specialists for auxiliary and advisory functions. Its approved decisions and activity information are published on its official website. The *Council of Judges* ensures the independence of courts and judges, improves organizational support for court operations, protects legal and social interests of judges, oversees court operation, supervises compliance with conflict-of-interest legislation, and performs other functions determined by law. Its reports and reasoned decisions are published on its official website.

Councils for prosecutors in 2025: appointments and composition

CEPEJ 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 (Q222 and Q223)

Georgia, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** have councils for prosecutors. In **Ukraine**, there is the High Council of Justice (competent for both judges and prosecutors – see above) and the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine. **Armenia** has a Board (see below). There was no council for prosecutors in **Azerbaijan**.



Armenia: The prosecution service does not have a Council. Instead, it has a Board comprising the Prosecutor General (chairperson), Deputy Prosecutors General, the heads of the structural subdivisions of the Prosecutor General's Office, and the Prosecutor of the city of Yerevan. Members are not elected but serve ex officio for the duration of their respective mandates as prosecutors. The same person may not chair the Board for more than two consecutive terms.

Azerbaijan: A Collegium functions within the Prosecutor General's Office, appointed as per national law.

Georgia: The Prosecutorial Council consists of 15 members, 7 of whom are non-prosecutors. Selection procedures include: 8 members elected by the Conference of Prosecutors (prosecutors), 2 MPs elected by the Parliament (one from the majority, one from the opposition), 2 judges elected by the High Council of Justice, 1 member nominated by the Minister of Justice and elected by Parliament, and 2 representatives from civil society and academia elected by Parliament. The Council is competent to address breaches of prosecutorial independence or impartiality. The term of office for Prosecutorial Council members is four years, with restrictions on consecutive terms.

Republic of Moldova: The Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP) in 2025 was composed of 11 members: 1 elected from the Prosecutor General's Office, 4 from territorial and specialised

prosecutor's offices, the Minister of Justice, 4 civil society representatives, and the President of the Superior Council of Magistracy. The Ombudsman and the Prosecutor General ceased their activity as ex-officio members in 2024. The Minister of Justice will cease activity as ex-officio member from 1 January 2026. All members undergo pre-vetting by an Evaluation Commission.

Ukraine: The High Council of Justice remains competent for both judges and prosecutors. The Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine in 2025 consists of 15 members: 2 prosecutors from the Office of the Prosecutor General, 1 from the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, 5 from regional prosecutor's offices, 5 from district prosecutor's offices (elected at the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors), and 2 academics appointed by the Congress of Representatives of Law Schools and Research Institutions. Terms and eligibility are governed by relevant constitutional and statutory amendments.

Councils for prosecutors in 2025: responsibilities

CEPEJ 11.1.5 and 11.1.6 (Q 227)

Armenia:

The Board discusses fundamental issues related to the organisation of the activities of the Prosecutor's Office's. Its decisions are reasoned and made public. There is no specific provision regarding the Board's competence in cases of pressure on prosecutors reported for 2025.

Georgia: The Prosecutorial Council is competent inter alia to select a candidate for the Prosecutor General, conduct disciplinary proceedings against the First Deputy Prosecutor General and Deputies of the Prosecutor General, decide on disciplinary sanctions or their premature revocation for members elected by the Conference of Prosecutors, hear reports on the activities of the Prosecution Service (except individual criminal cases), issue recommendations to the Prosecutor General, and decide matters of early termination of membership. Decisions are reasoned and published. The Prosecutorial Council is competent in case of pressure on a prosecutor.

Republic of Moldova: The Superior Council of Prosecutors safeguards the independence and impartiality of individual prosecutors, ensures appointment, transfer, promotion, and imposition of disciplinary sentences. Its competences include elaborating and approving regulations for its activity and boards, selection procedure and career management for prosecutors, organizing competitions for positions including General Prosecutor, examining appeals, proposing appointments and dismissals, participating in oath-taking, establishing the number of prosecutors, appointing to the Council of the National Institute of Justice, approving training strategies, presenting opinions on admission and curricula, approving and developing budgets and strategic plans, and drafting the Code of Ethics for prosecutors. Decisions and activity reports are reasoned and published. The SCP is competent in cases of pressure on a prosecutor.

Ukraine: The Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine resolves issues of internal activity of the prosecutor's office, makes recommendations on the appointment and dismissal of prosecutors from administrative positions, cooperates with the Office of the Prosecutor General, organizes measures to ensure independence and improve organizational support, provides explanations on compliance with conflict of interest legislation, considers issues of legal and social protection of prosecutors and their families, addresses appeals and reports on threats to independence, submits proposals and requests on operation and funding of prosecutorial self-government bodies, organizes implementation and supervises decisions of prosecutorial self-government bodies, and exercises other powers prescribed

by law. Information on activities and reasoned decisions are published on its official website. The Council is competent in cases of pressure on prosecutors.

Codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors

CEPEJ 8.2.1 (Q144 and Q145) There are codes of ethics applicable to all **judges** in:

Beneficiary	Hyperlinks to texts of ethics codes for judges
Armenia	Code of Ethics in Armenian
Azerbaijan	NA
Georgia	Code of ethics in Georgian
Republic of Moldova	Code of ethics in Romanian
Ukraine	Code of ethics in Ukrainian

The following principles are reported as being included in the Codes of ethics for judges of the **countries** concerned (with exceptions noted below): adherence to judicial values (independence, integrity, impartiality); relationship with institutions, citizens and users; competence and continuity education (except **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan**); extrajudicial activities; conflict of interest; information disclosure and relationship with press agencies; political activity; association membership and institutional positions; and gift rules (except **Ukraine**).

CEPEJ 8.2.2 (Q146, Q 147)

There are codes of ethics applicable to **prosecutors** in:

Beneficiary	Hyperlinks to texts of ethics codes for prosecutors
Armenia	Code of ethics in Armenian
Azerbaijan	NA
Georgia	Code of ethics in Georgian
Republic of Moldova	Code of ethics in Romanian
Ukraine	Code of Ethics in Ukrainian

All of the following principles are reported as being part of the codes of ethics applicable to prosecutors in **the countries** concerned (with noted exceptions): adherence to judicial values of independence, integrity, impartiality (except **Ukraine**); relationship with institutions, citizens and users; competences and continuing education; extrajudicial activities (except **Ukraine**); conflict of interest information disclosure; relationship with press agencies; political activity, association membership, institutional positions and gift rules.

Assets declarations

- ***Judges***

CEPEJ 8.6.1 (Q167)

In **Armenia,** the assets declaration by judges is a requirement of the Judicial Code and the Law on Public Service; in **Azerbaijan**, this is applicable based on the Law “On Approval of Procedures for Submission of Financial Information by Public Officials”, Law “On combating corruption”. Judges in **Georgia** are required to submit a declaration based on the Law “on Fight against corruption”. Judges in the **Republic of Moldova** are required to submit a declaration of assets based on the Law on “the Status of judges”, Law on “Declaration of assets and personal interests” and the Law on “the National Integrity Authority.” In **Ukraine** this is provided for in the Law "on the Judicial System and Status of Judges" and the Law "On Prevention of Corruption".

CEPEJ 8.6.2 (Q168, Q169, Q170 and Q171)

The legislation in **all EaP countries** require judges to declare assets, financial interests, sources of income, and liabilities. In addition to these, judges in **Armenia** judges must submit a declaration of expenses and a declaration of interests. The declaration of interests includes information on the participation or representation of commercial organisations, membership in non-commercial organizations, information on trust management of shares, and other data. Judges in the **Republic of Moldova** shall also declare income obtained by the subject of declaration, family members, spouse in the country and abroad (real estate, movable goods, financial assets, parties/shares in the social capital of an economic agent, liabilities, services procured during the declaration period, personal interests. **All countries** require judges to make the declaration at the beginning of the term of office and also at the end of the term of office. An annual submission of declarations is reported by all countries. In **Armenia** and **Ukraine**, judges shall submit declarations as well as when there is a significant change in the items to be declared.

The spouse, children, and other family members shall make declarations in all five countries. The partners of judges are concerned by the declaration only in the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**. Adult children are concerned by the declaration only in **Azerbaijan** and **Ukraine**. Other family members are concerned by the declaration in all countries, as follows: in **Armenia** - people under the declarant official's guardianship or curatorship, any adult person jointly residing with the declarant official 183 and more days in the declared year; in **Azerbaijan** – parents living with the judge; in **Georgia** - stepchildren, or a person permanently residing with the judge; in **the Republic of Moldova** - persons who are financially supported by the judge; in **Ukraine** - any persons (including partners, adult children), as of the last day of the reporting period, are considered to be persons who cohabited with the declarant as of the last day of the reporting period (provided that they cohabited with the declarant for 30 calendar days preceding the last day of the reporting period) or in total for at least 183 days during the year preceding the year of filing the declaration: cohabited; were connected by a common household; had mutual rights and obligations with the declarant (except for persons whose mutual rights and obligations are not of a family nature), including persons who cohabited with the declarant but were not married.

In all countries, **except Armenia**, the members of the family of a judge submit the same declaration as the judge.

- ***Prosecutors***

CEPEJ 8.6.5 (Q178)

In **Armenia,** prosecutors are required to submit the declaration of assets by the Law "On Public Service". In **Azerbaijan**, the provisions of Law "On Approval of Procedures for Submission of Financial Information by Public Officials" and the Law "On Combating Corruption' require prosecutors to submit assets declarations. In **Georgia**, the Law "On Fight against corruption" is applicable in this respect. The provisions of the Law "On the Declaration of Assets and Personal Interests", the Law on "the National Integrity Authority", the Law "On the Prosecution Office" require prosecutors in the **Republic of Moldova** to submit declarations. In **Ukraine** this is to be done based on the Law "On the Prosecutor's Office" and the Law "On Prevention of Corruption".

CEPEJ 8.6.6 (Q179, Q180, Q181 and Q182)

In respect of items to be declared, prosecutors in **all five countries** are required to declare assets, financial interests, sources of income and liabilities and gifts. Other items are required to be declared in **Armenia** and **Ukraine** (expenses and interests), **Azerbaijan** and the **Republic of Moldova** (personal interests).

In all five countries the prosecutors are required to make the declarations at the beginning of the term of office and at the end of the term of office. In addition to the above, **Armenia** and **Ukraine** require a declaration when there is a significant change in the items. Each country has supplementary requirements as to the moment of declarations. Thus, prosecutors in **Georgia** are obliged to do it in two months after the appointment, annually, during the term in office and depending on the date of submission of the last declaration, twice or once after leaving the office, until the end of the next year. In **Armenia,** a situational declaration of property and income must be submitted within one month in cases defined by law, or within two years after the termination of official duties if there are significant change in property, liabilities, or expenses. Prosecutors in the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** are required to submit declarations also annually.
The declarations concern spouses and children in **all five countries**. Adult children are concerned in **Azerbaijan** and **Ukraine**. In the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** this obligation extends to partners. In Armenia, it extends to people under the declarant official's guardianship or curatorship, any adult person jointly residing with the declarant official 183 and more days in the year of declaration. In the **Republic of Moldova,** it also extends to all family members who are financially or otherwise supported by the declarant. In Ukraine, it extends to other family members (same as for judges specified above). In **all countries,** except **Armenia**, the same declaration of assets applies to prosecutors' family members.

Number of criminal cases against judges/prosecutors

CEPEJ 8.1.2 (Q142)

Beneficiaries	Number of criminal cases against judges or prosecutors in 2025					
	Judges			Prosecutors		
	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced
Armenia	13	5	0	2	1	0
Azerbaijan	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Georgia	0	0	0	1	1	0
Republic of Moldova	2	5	2	2	3	3
Ukraine	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA


In 2025, regarding judges, **Armenia** reported 13 initiated criminal cases (vs 15 in 2024), 5 completed cases (vs 3 in 2024), and no sanction pronounced (vs 1 in 2024). **Georgia** reported no criminal cases against judges (same as in 2024). **The Republic of Moldova** reported 2 initiated cases (vs 3 in 2024), 5 completed cases (vs 3 in 2024) and 2 sanctions pronounced (vs 1 in 2024). Data for 2025 for **Ukraine** was reported as not available (in 2024 it reported 5 initiated cases, 4 completed cases and 1 sanction pronounced).

In respect of prosecutors, **Armenia** reported 2 initiated cases (vs 7 in 2024), 1 completed cases (vs 3 in 2024), and no sanction pronounced (same as in 2024). **Georgia** reported 1 initiated, 1 completed and no sanctions (in 2024 it reported 0 such cases). The **Republic of Moldova** reported 2 initiated cases, 3 completed cases and 3 sanctions (vs 4 initiated, 0 completed and 1 sanction in 2024). Data for 2025 for **Ukraine** was reported as not available (in 2024 it reported 12 initiated, 13 completed cases, and 3 sanctions).

Number of disciplinary cases against judges/prosecutors

CEPEJ 8.8.5 and *8.8.10 (Q208, Q209, Q210, Q217, Q218 and Q219)*

Total number of initiated and completed disciplinary proceedings and number of sanctions pronounced against judges in 2025 (per 100 judges)




The highest number of **initiated disciplinary proceedings** in 2025 per 100 judges among the beneficiaries was in **Georgia** (70,5 vs 37,1 in 2024). The **Republic of Moldova** reported 9,4 initiated proceedings per 100 judges (vs 8,5 in 2024). Ukraine had 6,9 initiated cases per 100 judges (data not available in 2024). **Armenia** had 3,4 such proceedings (vs 5 in 2024), and **Azerbaijan** had 2,6 (vs 4,6 in 2024).

The highest number of **completed proceedings** per 100 judges was in **Georgia** – 7,4 (vs 48,2 in 2024). In **Armenia** – 5,4 (vs 5,9 in 2024), Ukraine – 4,9 (data not available in 2024), Azerbaijan – 2,6 (vs. 4,1 in 2024). In the **Republic of Moldova**, there were 0 completed proceedings (vs 6,3 in 2024).

In terms of the number of **sanctions against judges**, there were 3 such sanctions per 100 judges in **Armenia** (vs 4,4 in 2024), 2,3 in Ukraine (vs 2,9 in 2024), 1,5 in **Azerbaijan** (vs 4,1 in 2024), 0 in the **Republic of Moldova** (vs 0,3 in 2024). 0 sanctions against judges were reported for **Georgia** in both 2025 and 2024.

On average in the region, the number of initiated proceedings per 100 judges increased from 13,8 in 2024 to 18,5 in 2025, completed proceedings decreased from 16,2 in 2024 to 4 in 2025, and sanctions decreased from 2,3 in 2024 to 1,4 in 2025 per 100 judges.

Total number of initiated and completed disciplinary proceedings and number of sanctions pronounced against prosecutors in 2025 (per 100 prosecutors)



The highest number of **initiated disciplinary proceedings** in 2025 per 100 prosecutors among the beneficiaries was in the **Republic of Moldova** 7,4 (vs 3,7 in 2024), followed by Ukraine – 4,3 (data not

available for 2024), Georgia – 3,6 (vs 1,4 in 2024), Armenia – 2,5 (vs 1,6 in 2024), Azerbaijan 0,3 (vs 0,5 in 2024).

The highest number of **completed proceedings** per 100 prosecutors was in the Republic of Moldova – 2,9 (vs 1,8 in 2024), Georgia – 2,7 (vs 6,1 in 2024), and **Armenia** – 2,3 (vs 1,3 in 2024). Ukraine reported 1,8 completed cases (data - not available in 2024). In terms of the number of **sanctions** against prosecutors, there were 2,9 sanctions per 100 prosecutors in the **Republic of Moldova** (vs 0,8 in 2024), 0,8 in **Armenia** (vs 0,3 in 2024), 0,7 in **Georgia** (vs 0,7 in 2024), 0,2 in **Azerbaijan** (vs 0,5 in 2024)**.**
On average in the region, the number of initiated proceedings per 100 prosecutors increased from 1,8 in2024 to 3,6 in 2025; completed decreased from 2,4 in 2024 to 2 in 2025 and sanctions increased from 0,7 to 1,1.

Number of procedures for breaches of rules on conflict of interest against judges/prosecutors

CEPEJ 8.7.7 (Q196 and Q204)

Beneficiaries	Number of procedures for breaches of rules on conflict of interest in 2025					
	Procedures against judges			Procedures against prosecutors		
	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	NAP	NAP	NAP
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Republic of Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	33	26	13	NA	NA	NA

Regarding procedures for breaches of rules on conflict of interest in respect of **judges**, there 0 procedures reported as initiated and completed in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. **Ukraine** reported 33 initiated procedures against judges, 26 completed cases and 13 sanctions in 2025. In respect of **prosecutors**, no such cases were reported in all countries. Ukraine reported this data as not available for 2025.

Number of proceedings against judges and prosecutors due to violations/discrepancies in their declaration of assets

CEPEJ 8.6.9 (Q177 and 188)

Beneficiaries	Number of proceedings due to violations/discrepancies in the declaration of assets 2025					
	Proceedings against judges			Proceedings against prosecutors		
	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced
Armenia	5	0	0	1	1	0
Azerbaijan	NAP	NAP	NAP	NAP	NAP	NAP
Georgia	7	7	0	2	2	0
Republic of Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	8	1	1	NA	NA	NA

Overall and compared to previous years, the data availability and reporting improved slightly in respect of proceedings related to assets declarations. Regarding the proceedings against judges and prosecutors due to violations/discrepancies in their declarations of assets, data was reported by **all countries**, except Azerbaijan. In respect of **judges**, **Armenia** reported 5 initiated cases and 0 completed cases. In **Georgia**, there were 7 initiated cases, 7 completed cases and no sanctions were pronounced. The **Republic of Moldova** reported 0 cases across all categories. In **Ukraine**, the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Determining the Procedure for Submitting Declarations of Persons Authorized to Perform State or Local Government Functions under Martial Law" came into

force on 12th October 2023 and restored the e-declarations. Thus, it can report this data for 2025, when there were 8 initiated cases, 1 completed and 1 sanction.
For **prosecutors**, **Armenia** reported 1 initiated case and 1 completed case with no sanction. **Georgia** reported 2 initiated cases, 2 completed cases, and no sanction pronounced. The **Republic of Moldova** reported 0 such cases across all categories. The data for prosecutors in this respect was not available for Ukraine in 2025.