



**CEPEJ(2023)4REV2  
Part 3**

**Strasbourg, 18/07/2023**

## **EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ)**

**Support for a better evaluation of the results of judicial reform efforts in the Eastern  
Partnership "Justice Dashboard EaP" Project**

**Data collection 2021**

**Part 3 - Condensed Version of Key findings and Analysis**

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## Methodology

This third part of the report has been prepared based on the replies to the CEPEJ Questionnaire for the "Justice Dashboard EaP" Project provided by the beneficiaries through their respective Dashboard correspondents within the 2021 data collection. The CEPEJ Secretariat collected quantitative and qualitative data, as well as comments under each question to provide additional information on the specificities of each judicial system and to better contextualize the data.

Evolutions and comparisons using 2020 data from the previous data collection, and 2018 data from the CEPEJ Evaluation cycle regarding the part on efficiency are presented.

The content and format of the document follows what was agreed with DG NEAR during the first cycle of data collection (2020). The classification of indicators and content of each theme has been established by DG NEAR. Based on this, the report covers the following key topic: Efficiency, Quality, Mandate of judges and prosecutors, and Accountability. It combines quantitative and qualitative data under each theme. The analysis under each indicator is accompanied by a reference to the table number from Part 1 of the report (comparative tables and graphs) and the number of the question in the EaP Questionnaire. Where necessary for data visualisation, new graphs have been created for the purpose of this Part 3.

The comparisons of data between beneficiaries with various size, economic and legal situations is a delicate task and should be approached with great caution. This analysis treats all beneficiaries equally and compares them without any intention of ranking them or promoting any particular type of justice system. The focus of this report is placed on presenting data at the regional level.

The analysis covers all beneficiaries of the Action (**Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine**).

For more information regarding the methodology, please refer to the methodological note in the Part 1 of the report.

## I. Efficiency (First instance cases)

This part focuses on civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases, both in first instance.

In 2021 as usual, the case load in the EaP region was smaller for criminal cases than for civil and commercial litigious cases with less incoming cases. However, based on CEPEJ indicators (Clearance Rate and Disposition Time), in average, the most efficient type of cases was civil and commercial litigious cases. Indeed, for this type of cases a trend can be observed in the region and via the EaP Averages of higher Clearance Rates and shorter Disposition Times. The same was already observed in 2020. In 2021 however it is to be noted that **Georgia** and **Ukraine** do not follow this trend and dealt more efficiently with criminal cases than with civil and commercial cases.


In 2021, the number of pending cases at the end of the year increased in all countries (Clearance Rates below 100%) for both types of cases, except in **Azerbaijan**, where CR were equal or above 100%.

When comparing data between 2020 and 2021 and looking at variations, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic must be taken in consideration. Indeed, in 2021 in most countries the capacity of courts to deal with cases increased following the ease of Covid-19 restrictions and lockdowns.

## Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases


The incoming cases are all cases submitted to courts in the reference year for the first time.

### CEPEJ 3.1.2 (Q35)



Compared to the EaP Average of 3,07, the highest number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases per 100 inhabitants in 2021 was in **Armenia** (5,54) and the lowest one was in **Azerbaijan** (1,90).

### CEPEJ 3.2.2 (Q38)




Compared to the EaP Average of 0,90, the highest number of incoming criminal cases per 100 inhabitants in 2021 was in **Ukraine** (2,31) and the lowest were in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** (both 0,16).

It is interesting to note that while the tendency is to have more incoming civil and commercial litigious cases, it is not the case for **Ukraine** which has a higher standardised number of incoming criminal cases. While **Armenia** has one of the lowest number of incoming criminal cases per 100 inhabitants, they also have the highest standardised number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases.

## Pending cases - civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases


Pending cases on 31st December are the number of unresolved cases which will be carried to the next year.

### CEPEJ 3.1.2 (Q35)



Compared to the EaP Average of 1,33, in 2021, the highest number of civil and commercial litigious cases pending at the end of the year per 100 inhabitants was in **Armenia** (2,27) and the lowest was in **Azerbaijan** (0,28).

### CEPEJ 3.2.2 (Q38)



Compared to the EaP Average of 0,29, in 2021, the highest number of first instance criminal cases pending at the end of the year per 100 inhabitants was in the **Republic of Moldova** (0,79) and the lowest number was in **Azerbaijan** (0,04).


Some of the trends observed regarding the situation of incoming cases can also be observed for pending cases at the end of the year. Indeed, in 2021 and as it was the case in 2020, **Azerbaijan** has the lowest number of pending cases at the end of the year per 100 inhabitants for both civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases. Also mirroring the situation for the incoming cases, **Armenia** has one of the lowest standardised number of pending criminal cases at the end of 2021, but the highest standardised number regarding civil and litigious commercial cases.

## Clearance rate

CEPEJ 3.1.4 and 3.2.4 (Q35 and Q38)

The Clearance Rate (CR) is the ratio obtained by dividing the number of resolved cases by the number of incoming cases in a given period, expressed as a percentage. It demonstrates how the court or the judicial system is coping with the in-flow of cases and allows comparison between systems regardless of their differences and individual characteristics. Its key value is 100%.

- A value below 100% means that the courts were not able to solve all the cases they received and, as a consequence, the number of pending cases increases.
- A value above 100% means that the courts have resolved more cases than they received (they have resolved all the incoming cases and part of the pending cases) and, as a consequence, the number of pending cases decreases.



The graphic shows that there was no stability of Clearance Rates in the region over the analysed period. Between 2020 and 2021, the overall tendency was an increase of the Clearance Rates for both civil and commercial litigious cases and criminal cases. This tendency was followed by **Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova**. It was also followed by **Armenia and Ukraine** but only for criminal cases. On the contrary, the Clearance Rates decreased for **Armenia and Ukraine** for civil and commercial litigious cases (which is the opposite of what was observed between 2018 and 2020). It must be noted that the increase of Clearance Rate is not observable on the EaP average for civil and commercial litigious cases but that the Average was impacted by the significant decrease of CR in **Armenia**.

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and related restrictions on the work of courts must be taken in consideration and can explain a decrease of the Clearance Rates between 2018 and 2020 followed by an increase between 2020 and 2021; as observed in **Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine** however do not follow this tendency.

Despite the increases noted above, in 2021, the number of pending cases at the end of the year increased in all countries (Clearance Rates below 100%) for both types of cases, except

in **Azerbaijan**. In 2021, **Azerbaijan** had the highest Clearance Rates for both civil and commercial litigious cases (103%) and for criminal cases (102%). In 2021, **Armenia** both had the lowest Clearance Rates for civil and commercial cases (87%) and for criminal cases (74%).

In 2021 Clearance Rates for civil and litigious commercial cases were higher than Clearance Rates for criminal cases in the region, except in **Georgia** and **Ukraine**.

Regarding civil and commercial litigious cases, in 2021 **Azerbaijan** (103%) and the **Republic of Moldova** (100%) had a Clearance Rate higher than the EaP Average (95%).


Regarding criminal cases in 2021, **Azerbaijan** (102%), **Republic of Moldova** (96%) and **Ukraine** (100%) had a Clearance Rate higher than the EaP Average (93%).

## Disposition time

### CEPEJ 3.1.4 and 3.2.4 (Q35 and Q38)


The Disposition Time (DT) is the indicator that calculates time necessary for a pending case to be resolved and estimates the lengths of proceedings in days. It is a ratio between the pending cases at the end of the period and the resolved cases within the same period, multiplied by 365 days. More pending than resolved cases will lead to a DT higher than 365 days (one year) and vice versa.

**Disposition time - Civil and Commercial litigious cases in first instance from 2018 to 2021 (in days)**





### Disposition time - Criminal cases in first instance from 2018 to 2021 (in days)



In 2021, like for the EaP Averages, criminal cases had higher Disposition Times than civil and commercial litigious cases in **Armenia**, **Azerbaijan** and the **Republic of Moldova** while it was the opposite in **Georgia** and **Ukraine**.

Regarding civil and commercial litigious cases, the Disposition Times increased since 2020 for **Armenia** and **Ukraine** but decreased for **Azerbaijan**, **Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova**. Regarding criminal cases, Disposition Times increased for **Armenia** and **Georgia**, but decreased for **Azerbaijan**, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**.


As for the Clearance Rate, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and related restrictions on the work of courts must be taken in consideration and can explain an increase of the Disposition Times between 2018 and 2020 followed by a decrease between 2020 and 2021; as observed in some countries and on the EaP Averages.

For civil and commercial litigious cases, the highest Disposition Time in the region in 2021 was in **Georgia** (326 days) and the lowest in **Azerbaijan** (52 days), which was already the case in 2020. For criminal cases, the highest Disposition Time in the region in 2021 was in **Armenia** (514 days) and the lowest was in **Ukraine** (52 days).

## II. Quality

### Availability - online access to courts' decisions

CEPEJ 3.8.3 (Q 84 and 85)



In 2021, all beneficiaries reported that a centralized national database of court decisions exists in their respective countries and that all three instances' decisions in civil and commercial, administrative and criminal law cases are available therein. In none of the beneficiaries the national databases of court decisions have hyperlinks to the ECHR case-law. In all countries, reportedly the data in the databases is anonymized and the case-law database is available online for free.

### Availability of ICT for case management and court activity statistics

CEPEJ 3.8.1 (Q 82-0, Q82, Q 82-1 and Q 82-2)


In 2021, only **Ukraine** reported as having an IT strategy for the judiciary.

All beneficiaries have a Case Management System (CMS) in place. The latest developments of the running CMS have been reported as follows: the **Republic of Moldova** (in the last 2 years), **Azerbaijan** (between 5 and 10 years); **Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine** (more than 10 years ago). **Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia** reported on plans for a significant change in the IT system in the judiciary, including change of CMS or other major application.

## Case management systems: deployment and status

CEPEJ 3.8.2 (Q83)


**CMS Index and composition in 2021**  
(maximum possible value: 12)



Overall in 2021, the **Republic of Moldova** (10) and **Azerbaijan** (9,5) had the highest CMS index (max 12) and **Georgia** - the lowest index (7). The CMSs are 100% deployed in all countries and in all categories of cases, with the exception of **Azerbaijan**, where the CMS deployment rate was 50%-99% in 2021. All countries, except **Georgia**, reported having tools for producing court activity statistics integrated in the CMS in 2021.


## Legal Aid

### CEPEJ 4.1.2 (Q13, Q1)



In general, these countries appear to have very modest budgets of legal aid per inhabitant. Only the **Republic of Moldova** (1,38€) has visibly more in the region. **Georgia** has reported a decrease in the implemented budget for legal aid per inhabitant, while **Azerbaijan** and the **Republic of Moldova** increased it in 2021 compared to 2020.

### CEPEJ 4.3.2 (Q1, Q86)




**Azerbaijan** (0,29 cases), **Georgia** (0,45) and **Armenia** (0,65) are below the EaP Average of 0,77 total number of cases per 100 inhabitants where legal aid was granted in 2021. Conversely, the **Republic of Moldova** (1,71) is considerably above the EaP Average. In all countries, the total number of cases per 100 inhabitants where legal aid was granted is higher in 2021 compared to 2020, partly explained by the gradual ease of Covid-19 measures.

## Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

### CEPEJ 9.1.1 (Q252, Q253, Q254 and Q256)

#### Court related mediation in 2021



Court-related mediation were reported as existing in all countries. In **Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova** court-related mediation can be ordered by the court, the judge, the public prosecutor or a public authority during a judicial proceeding. Legal aid for court-related mediation was equally available in all the countries concerned. It was not possible for **Ukraine** to provide data in this respect for 2021.


### CEPEJ 9.1.6 (Q258)

For the 2021 cycle, **Azerbaijan**, **Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova** reported some data on certain categories of cases in court-related mediation. In **Armenia** and **Ukraine**, data on number of court-related mediations was not available for 2021.

Beneficiaries	Civil and commercial cases (1)			Family cases (2)			Labour cases including employment dismissal cases (4)			Consumer cases (6)			Other cases (7)		
	Parties agreed to start mediation	Finished court-related mediations	Cases with a settlement agreement	Parties agreed to start mediation	Finished court-related mediations	Cases with a settlement agreement	Parties agreed to start mediation	Finished court-related mediations	Cases with a settlement agreement	Parties agreed to start mediation	Finished court-related mediations	Cases with a settlement agreement	Parties agreed to start mediation	Finished court-related mediations	Cases with a settlement agreement
<b>Armenia</b>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NAP	NAP	NAP
<b>Georgia</b>	12	80	29	3	19	9	3	28	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	36	10
<b>Republic of Moldova</b>	5 562	5 132	92	2 575	2 145	34	171	186	7	49	50	1	NAP	NAP	NAP
<b>Ukraine</b>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA


**Azerbaijan** reported that no court-related mediations took place in 2021 (court related mediation was introduced by the Law “On Mediation” adopted in 2019; a small number of cases were considered on a pilot basis in 2020 but none in 2021). **Georgia** reported numbers on court-related mediations in civil and commercial; family; labour; consumer and other than the listed categories of cases. The **Republic of Moldova** reported numbers for court-related mediations for civil and commercial; family; labour and consumer cases.

CEPEJ 9.1.4 (Q257 and Q1)



The EaP Average (11,2 mediators per 100 000 inhabitants) is impacted by a considerable number of mediators in the **Republic of Moldova** (36,6). This makes **Armenia** (1,9), **Azerbaijan** (2,7) and **Georgia** (3,7) to appear considerably below the region’s average. From 2020 to 2021, the total number of mediators stayed the same in **Armenia**, it increased in **Azerbaijan** (+ 40%) and **Georgia** (+ 158,5%), potentially as a result of measures to promote the mediators’ profession in these countries.

CEPEJ 9.1.8 (Q259)



In all beneficiaries, there were some other alternative dispute resolution methods in 2021, including mediation other than court-related mediation (**Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova**); arbitration (**Armenia, Georgia, Republic of Moldova**) and conciliation (**Republic of Moldova**).

## Existence of quality standards of judicial systems at national level

### CEPEJ 3.7.1 (Q42, Q43)

The existence of quality standards of judicial systems at the national level were reported by **Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine** in 2021. **Azerbaijan** reported having specialized personnel entitled to implement these standards both within courts and public prosecution services. Regarding **Georgia**, overall, the Department of Court Management of the High Council of Justice is ensuring the efficiency and quality in common courts; and court managers are implementing the quality standards in their respective court in Georgia. In **Ukraine**, the Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice for 2021-2023, approved by the President of Ukraine in June 2021, and the Prosecution Development Strategy for 2021-2023 approved by the Prosecutor General set out the framework for the quality standards respectively in the judicial and prosecution systems.

## Performance and evaluation of judges and prosecutors

### CEPEJ 3.7.10 (Q74, Q75, Q75-1, Q76, Q76-1 and Q77)

#### Quantitative performance targets for judges

There are quantitative performance targets defined for each judge reportedly only in **Azerbaijan**. In **Azerbaijan**, the Parliament and the Judicial Legal Council are responsible for setting the individual targets for judges; and, if judges do not meet the targets, it is reflected in their individual assessment.

#### Qualitative individual assessment of judges' work

All beneficiaries, except **Georgia**, reported on the existence of a system of qualitative individual assessment of the judges' work, although in **Georgia** it is done part of the annual evaluation of judges who are still on probation. In **Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova** the judicial power is responsible for setting the criteria for qualitative assessment of the judges' work. In **Armenia**, the criteria are also set in the Judicial Code, hence the Parliament plays a role in the process. In **Ukraine**, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine is responsible for this assessment.

In **Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine** judges are subjected to the qualitative individual assessment of work less frequently than annually.

### CEPEJ 3.7.11 (Q78, Q79, Q79-1, Q80, Q80-1 and Q81)

#### Quantitative performance targets for prosecutors

Only **Azerbaijan** reported having quantitative performance targets defined for each public prosecutor, which is the responsibility of the Prosecutor General. **Azerbaijan** reported that there are no consequences if prosecutors do not meet quantitative targets.

#### Qualitative individual assessment of public prosecutors' work

There are reportedly systems of qualitative individual assessment of the public prosecutors' work in all countries. In **Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine**, the respective Prosecutors General are responsible for setting the criteria for qualitative assessment of the public prosecutors' work. In **Ukraine**, the Head of the organisational unit or hierarchical superior public prosecutor and in **Armenia**, the Qualification Commission also play respectively a role in the process. In the **Republic of Moldova**, this responsibility belongs to the Prosecutors Council. In **Ukraine**, the qualitative assessment is done on an annual basis, while in **Armenia**,

**Azerbaijan**, and the **Republic of Moldova** it is less frequent than on an annual basis; in **Georgia** it is more frequent.

### Judicial system budget

CEPEJ 1.1.4 (Q1, Q2, Q4, Q5, Q6 and Q13)

Beneficiaries	Annual implemented budget in 2021 (standardised values)	
	Judicial system per capita	Judicial system as % of GDP
<b>Armenia</b>	11,0 €	0,28%
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	11,9 €	0,25%
<b>Georgia</b>	10,7 €	0,25%
<b>Republic of Moldova</b>	16,1 €	0,36%
<b>Ukraine</b>	NA	NA
<b>Average</b>	12,4 €	0,28%


Compared with the EaP Average of 12,4 € in 2021, **Georgia** (10,7 €), **Armenia** (11,0€) and **Azerbaijan** (11,9€) spent less in terms of implemented judicial system budget per capita. The annual implemented budget of the judicial system in the **Republic of Moldova** (16,1€) was considerably above the EaP Average.

As a % of GDP, compared to the EaP average of 0,28%, **Azerbaijan** and **Georgia** spent less on the judicial system (0,25% of GDP, each), while the judicial system spending in the **Republic of Moldova** is higher (0,36% of GDP). **Armenia** spent 0,28% of GDP for the judicial system, on a par with the EaP Average.



## Number of legal professionals per capita

CEPEJ 2.1.2 (Q19), 2.1.8 (Q27), 2.2.2 (Q28), 2.2.6 (Q32), 2.3.1 (Q33 - 34)




In 2021, **Azerbaijan** (5,3), **Georgia** (9,3) and **Armenia** (10,2) had a lower number of judges, compared to the EaP Average of 10,4 judges per 100 000 inhabitants. **Ukraine** (10,6) had a slightly higher number and the **Republic of Moldova** (16,7) had a considerably higher number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants.

Compared to the EaP Average of 16,8 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants, **Georgia** (11,7), **Azerbaijan** (11,9) and **Armenia** (13,4) reported a smaller number, while **Ukraine** (23,6) and the **Republic of Moldova** (23,6) reported a higher number of prosecutors.

In 2021, **Azerbaijan** (28,4) reported a considerably smaller number of non-judge staff per 100 000 inhabitants compared to the EaP Average of 51,4. In **Georgia** there were slightly fewer non-judge staff: 48,7 per 100 000 inhabitants, while in **Armenia** (51,5) they were almost on par with the EaP Average. The number of non-judge staff per 100 000 inhabitants was higher than the EaP Average in **Ukraine** (58,7) and in the **Republic of Moldova** (69,4).

Compared to the EaP Average of 10,7 non-prosecutor staff per 100 000 inhabitants, there were 6,1 such staff in **Armenia**, 9,6 - in **Georgia**, 12,5 – in **Ukraine** and 14,8 in the **Republic of Moldova**.

## Lawyers per 100 000 inhabitants in 2021




Compared to the EaP Average of 95,5 lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021, there was a considerably lower number of lawyers in **Azerbaijan** (21,1). The number of lawyers in the **Republic of Moldova** (77,6) and **Armenia** (83,8) was slightly lower than the Average. **Georgia** (136,6) and **Ukraine** (158,5) had a considerably higher number of lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021.

## Trainings

CEPEJ 7.1.3 (Q4, Q6, Q142)


### Total budget for training per inhabitant covered by training institutions, court and prosecution budget between 2020 and 2021



Compared to the EaP average of 0,19€ per inhabitant in 2021, **Azerbaijan** (0,33€) and the **Republic of Moldova** (0,33€) spent more on the training per inhabitant. **Georgia** (0,09€) and **Ukraine** (0,17€) spent on this below the EaP Average. In 2021, there were decreases reported in the training budgets per inhabitant compared to 2020 in all countries, except **Ukraine**, where it stayed the same. In **Armenia** the training institution does not have a separate budget. In 2021 the overall budget named “Special training services for judges, prosecutors, judges and prosecutors included in the list of candidates and bailiffs” was equal to 743.586 euros, which is 0,25€ per inhabitant.


CEPEJ 7.2.6 (Q147 and Q147-1)

Average number of live training participations per judge/prosecutor in 2021



In 2021, judges in the **Republic of Moldova** (6,2) and **Azerbaijan** (3,3) appear to have participated in more live trainings than the EaP Average (2,8). When it comes to prosecutors, again those in the **Republic of Moldova** (3,7) and in **Georgia** (2,3) appear to have participated in more live trainings than the EaP Average (1,5).


Percentage of judges/prosecutors having attended at least one training in 2021



In the region, judges appear to participate in more trainings than prosecutors. This is visible in particular in the **Republic of Moldova** (92% of judges) and **Azerbaijan** (82%), which is considerably above the EaP Average of 73%. The percentage of prosecutors in **Georgia** (80%) and the **Republic of Moldova** (76%) having attended at least one training in 2021 are also considerably above the EAP Average of 57%.

### CEPEJ 7.3.1. (Q154-1)

#### Average number of participations in live trainings on EU Law and on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights/European Convention on



In terms of participations in live trainings on EU Law and the ECHR in 2021, judges in **Azerbaijan** (1,6) and the **Republic of Moldova** (0,9) had a higher than EaP Average participation (0,6). Prosecutors' participations in these trainings were above the EaP Average (0,4) only in the **Republic of Moldova** (0,6) and **Armenia** (0,5).

### CEPEJ 7.4.3 (Qs 155-2 and 155-3)

An annual **assessment of training needs** is reported as being done in **all beneficiaries** in 2021. The assessment of future training needs is reported as being done through courts/prosecutors' offices and other relevant judicial institutions in all countries. The target audience and previous participants in trainings are sources of the assessment of training needs in all countries, except the **Republic of Moldova**. The Ministries of Justice are also a source of identification of training needs in **Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova**. In the **Republic of Moldova**, other authorities (Legal Aid Council, Probation Inspectorate) also play a role in the judicial training needs assessment.

### CEPEJ 7.4.4 (Qs 155-4, 155-5, 155-6, 155-7)


All beneficiaries reported in 2021 as having an **evaluation of the in-service judicial training** done usually immediately after the training. The Kirkpatrick training evaluation model is reported as being used in **Azerbaijan and Ukraine**, while a combination of the Kirkpatrick and other training evaluation models is reported in **Georgia and the Republic of Moldova**. The feedback is mostly used to improve the training course (in all countries), to replace the training providers, who received negative feedback (all countries except **Georgia**), to introduce new courses (all countries except **Georgia**) and to suppress a course (**Armenia and the Republic of Moldova**).

## Gender profile of legal professions

In the following graphs concerning gender balance, the EaP Average represents the regional repartition between male and female (below are the males; above - the females).


### Judges

CEPEJ 12.1.1 (Q19)




In 2021, the % of total female professional judges was below the EaP Average of 41,2% in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** (27% and 17% respectively). In **Georgia** (54%), the **Republic of Moldova** (48%) and **Ukraine** (60%) above EaP Average is being reported. Still, the gender balance in the judges' profession remains an aspiration in these countries, although to a different extent.

CEPEJ 12.1.1 (Q19)




Compared to 2020, the presence of female professional judges increased in 2021 in all beneficiaries, except **the Republic of Moldova**, where it showed a slight decrease.

CEPEJ 12.1.2 (Q19)



Indications of a glass ceiling seem to be manifest in all countries in the 2021 data. There are less women judges in second instance courts (compared to first instance courts) in all countries. Among the highest courts, only in the **Republic of Moldova** there were 52% of women judges in the Supreme Court in 2021.

CEPEJ 12.1.3 (Q19-1)




In 2021, there were 1% female court presidents in **Azerbaijan**. Although with slight improvements compared to 2020, the distribution of male and female court presidents in 2021 could be seen as indicative of a glass ceiling in all countries even if to a different extent. The highest % of female court presidents was in **Ukraine** (37%) and the **Republic of Moldova** (30%).

## Prosecutors

CEPEJ 12.2.1 (Q28)


### Distribution of the total male and female prosecutors in 2021



The presence of total female prosecutors in **Azerbaijan** (7%) and **Armenia** (17%) is considerably below the EaP Average of 25%. Although there was a greater presence of total female prosecutors in the **Republic of Moldova** (32%), **Georgia** (34%) and **Ukraine** (37%), the gender balance in prosecutors' profession remains an aspiration in the region.


CEPEJ 12.2.1 (Q28)

### Percentage point variation of total female prosecutors between 2020 and 2021



Compared to 2020, the presence of female prosecutors increased in 2021 in all beneficiaries, except in **Ukraine**, where it showed a decrease.

### Distribution of the total male and female heads of prosecution services in 2021




In 2021, there was only one head of prosecution services in **Armenia**. Although, there was some presence of female heads of prosecution services in **Georgia** (14%), the **Republic of Moldova** (12%) and **Ukraine** (5%), the gender balance in these positions could be seen as indicative of a glass ceiling in the region (EaP average 8,3% women) (to be seen together with total male and female prosecutors, above).

### Number of judgements finding ECHR violations

CEPEJ 10.1.3 (Q262 and Q263)

### Applications allocated to an ECHR judicial formation in 2021 and % variation between 2020 and 2021




In terms of the number of applications at the ECtHR, in 2021, most were in respect of the **Republic of Moldova** (630) and **Azerbaijan** (425). Some considerable decreases were noted compared to 2020, in respect of the number for **Ukraine** (-95%) and **Armenia** (-37%).



In 2021, the ECtHR issued 194 judgements finding at least one violation of the ECHR in respect of **Ukraine** and 126 cases against **Ukraine** were considered as closed after a judgement of the ECtHR. The ECtHR issued 48 judgements finding at least one violation in respect of the **Republic of Moldova** and 40 cases in its respect were considered as closed. In respect of **Azerbaijan**, 35 judgements finding at least one violation of the ECHR have been issued; and 12 cases against **Azerbaijan** were considered as closed. There were 16 judgements finding at least one violation of the ECHR in the case of **Armenia** and 15 cases were considered as closed. In respect of **Georgia**, the ECtHR issued 12 judgements finding at least one violation and 2 cases were considered as closed.

**Number of judgements finding at least one violation of the ECHR and number of cases considered closed in 2021 and variation between 2020 and 2021**



Compared with 2020, the number of judgements finding at least one violation of the ECHR increased in almost all beneficiaries; in most of them significantly. The number of cases considered as closed did not vary that much.

### III. Mandates of judges and prosecutors

#### Entry criteria to become a judge or a prosecutor


The entry criteria are general requirements that candidates need to fulfil to be shortlisted to participate in the exam to enter the judicial academy, or to be pre-selected for a procedure of recruitment to become a judge without judicial academy. Here, judicial academy should be understood as an institution responsible for training, but which also has a role in the appointment and recruitment procedure of future judges.

- **Entry criteria to become a judge**

#### CEPEJ 5.1.2 (Q90)

In all countries presented except **Ukraine**, it is possible to become a judge either via judicial academy, or outside of judicial academy. In **Ukraine** judges are only selected outside of a judicial academy.

Entry criteria via Judicial Academy to become a judge in 2021



In all countries where candidates go via the judicial academy, they must take an entry test.

All countries ask for a certain number of years of relevant work experience and a clean criminal record. **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** ask for a level of basic law studies while **Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova** ask for advanced law studies (masters or PHD).

In **Azerbaijan**, **Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova**, the candidates must also have taken a judicial/bar exam.

All countries have a citizenship criterion, and the **Republic of Moldova** also requires the candidates to have their domicile in the country.

Some countries also have an age criterion (between 25 and 60 in **Armenia**; at least 30 years old **Georgia**).


Several countries (**Armenia, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova**) require the candidates to have a command of their official languages. **Armenia** also requires the candidates to know at least one language from among English, Russian, and French, at the required level which shall be prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Council and checked through standardised test systems.

In **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan**, the candidates must have the right to vote.

**Armenia** and the **Republic of Moldova** have a medical requirement.

Finally, the **Republic of Moldova** also requires the candidates to pass a polygraph test and in **Armenia** the candidates who are male must have undergone mandatory military service or alternative service.

Entry criteria without Judicial Academy to become a judge in 2021



In **Armenia**, a candidate may be put on the list of candidates without prior attendance of the academy’s training course if s/he complies with the requirements prescribed by law and has had, for at least three years within the last 10 years, the office of a judge with relevant specialization, as well as of a judge of the Constitutional Court, a judge of an international court of which the Republic of Armenia is a member, a member of the Supreme Judicial Council (Article 111 of the JC).

In **Azerbaijan**, according to Article 93-4 of the Law on Courts and Judges, the person who meets the requirements provided by paragraph 1 Article 126 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, is prominent in the legal area, has 20 years of experience as a law practitioner and has high moral qualities, on proposal of the Judicial-Legal Council may be appointed to the high judicial posts according to the procedures provided by the legislation. They are not subject to examination and training at justice academy. The authorities noted however that in practice this is a very rarely used procedure.

In **Georgia**, candidates who are former Supreme Court judges, former common courts judges when less than 10 years have passed since their powers as judges were terminated, as well

as current and former Constitutional Court judges, are exempted from the procedure via academy of justice.


In the **Republic of Moldova**, candidates who worked in the past 5 years as judges or assistant judges at the Constitutional court, judges at international courts, prosecutors, law professors at accredited high education establishments, trainers at the National Institute of Justice, lawyers, judicial assistants, or clerks are exempted from the training at the National Institute of Justice. The above categories, with the exception of judges at international courts and judges of the Constitutional Court, pass only a graduation exam at the National institute of Justice.

In **Ukraine**, judges are only recruited outside judicial academy. Candidates must be Ukrainian citizens, be at least thirty years old and not older than sixty-five years old, have a higher legal education, at least five years of working experience in the field of law, be competent, honest and have the command of the official language in accordance with the level determined by the National Commission on the Standards of the State Language. Candidates must take an entry test.

- **Entry criteria to become a prosecutor**

*CEPEJ 5.2.2 (Q112)*

In 2021, in **Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine** there was no judicial academy to become a prosecutor while in **Armenia and the Republic of Moldova**, it was both possible to become a prosecutor via studying in the judicial academy or without.




In **Armenia** to enter the judicial academy, candidates must have basic law studies, relevant work experience, a clean criminal record and take an entry test. There are also other criteria such as being a citizen of the Republic of Armenia between the ages of 22 and 65, with a command of the Armenian language.

In the **Republic of Moldova** candidates must have Moldovan citizenship, advanced law studies, having obtained certain grades during their education, a clean criminal record and

take an entry examination. There are also other criteria which are: producing a medical certificate, knowing the official language of the Republic of Moldova, taking a polygraph test, having an impeccable reputation, not having any records of a negative outcomes of his/her professional integrity test in the past 5 years in his/her professional integrity record.

### Entry criteria without Judicial Academy to become a prosecutor in 2021



In **Azerbaijan** and in **Georgia**, candidates must have basic law studies while in **Ukraine** they must have advanced law studies. In all three countries candidates must have a clean criminal record and take an entry test. Additionally in **Georgia** they must also have a judicial/bar exam and their grades in education are also looked at.

In both **Armenia** and the **Republic of Moldova**, some of the criteria used for candidates going via judicial academy and listed above also apply to exempted candidates.

In **Armenia**, the list of candidates who are exempted to study at the Academy of Justice is established by the Article 38 (10) of the "Law on the Prosecutor's Office". For example, this concerns candidates who are Doctors of Laws with at least three years of experience in the field of law.

In the **Republic of Moldova**, candidates can be exempted from studying at the National Institute of Justice based on relevant previous work experience.


## Criteria in selection procedure for judges and prosecutors

The criteria in selection procedure are the criteria which are used to decide which individuals from the pool of pre-selected candidates are best suited for becoming judges or prosecutors.


- **Selection criteria to become a judge**

CEPEJ 5.1.6 (Q97)

### Selection criteria via Judicial Academy for judges in 2021



### Selection criteria without Judicial Academy for judges in 2021



In **Armenia**, the selection of candidates is made based on their results from the Academy of Justice. For candidates who were exempted to study at the academy, the selection is made on the results from an interview.

In **Azerbaijan**, the selection is made based on their results from the Academy of Justice and on a final interview with the members of the Judge Selection Committee.

In **Georgia**, the selection is made based on the results from the High School of Justice for concerned candidates and on an interview. Two criteria are used in this process: good faith (integrity) and competence. The characteristics of good faith are personal good faith and professional conscience; independence, impartiality, and fairness; personal and professional behaviour; personal and professional reputation. The characteristics of competence are knowledge of legal norms; ability of legal substantiation and competence; writing and verbal communication skills; professional qualities; academic achievements and professional training; professional activity.


In the **Republic of Moldova**, the selection is made based on the results from the National Institute of Justice for concerned candidates and on an interview.

In **Ukraine**, the selection is made based on the results of the selection examination managed by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine.


- **Selection criteria to become a prosecutor**

CEPEJ 5.2.6 (Q119)

Selection criteria via Judicial Academy for prosecutors in 2021



## Selection criteria without Judicial Academy for prosecutors in 2021



In **Armenia** the selection of prosecutors is made based on the results from the Academy of Justice. For candidates who were exempted to study at the academy, the selection is made on the results from an interview.

In **Azerbaijan** the selection is made through an interview. Criteria used are efficiency, the level of professionalism, the results of work and moral qualities.

In the **Republic of Moldova**, an interview is conducted both for candidates who went through the judicial academy and those who were exempted. “Other” criteria taken into consideration are: Academic/teaching and research activity; Respecting the rules of professional ethics; Ability to apply knowledge in practice; Involvement of the candidate in activities in relevant fields for prosecution.

In **Georgia**, an interview is also conducted. The candidates based on their working and moral qualities, as well as health status, must be able to perform the duties of a prosecutor or investigator of the Prosecution Service.

In **Ukraine**, the selection is made by the relevant body conducting disciplinary proceedings based on results of the qualification exam and the relevant work experience.



## Authorities responsible for the appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors

In this paragraph are presented the authorities, which are responsible for the selection, the formal appointment and the promotion of judges and prosecutors.


- **Authorities responsible for the selection of judges**

CEPEJ 5.1.8 (Q98)

In all countries except **Ukraine**, the authority responsible for the selection of judges is the High Judicial Council. In **Ukraine**, the authority responsible is the High Qualification Commission of Judges. In **Georgia**, the Parliament, along with the High Judicial Council, plays a role in the selection of the Supreme Court judges.

- **Authorities responsible for the final appointment of judges**

CEPEJ 5.1.9 (Q99 and Q100)



**Armenia** and **Ukraine** have selected “Other body”. In those countries the respective Presidents are in charge of the final appointment of judges. In **Azerbaijan**, which selected “executive power”, the President is also in charge of the final appointment of judges.

In the **Republic of Moldova**, judges from first and second instance are appointed by the President of the country, while the judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Parliament.

In **Georgia**, the judges in first and second instance are appointed by the High Judicial Council while the Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Parliament.

In all countries except **Ukraine**, the responsible authority has the right to appoint some and reject some among the selected (proposed) candidates. In **Ukraine**, the responsible authority only confirms all the selected (proposed) candidates.

- **Authorities responsible for the selection of prosecutors**

CEPEJ 5.2.8 (Q120)

In **Armenia**, the authority competent for the selection of prosecutors is the Qualification Commission. The Qualification Commission consists of one deputy of the Prosecutor General, four prosecutors, three law academics and the Rector of the Academy of Justice.

In **Azerbaijan** the selection is made by prosecutorial services. A Competition Commission composed of seven members, including prominent lawyers and academics, appointed by the Prosecutor General with the involvement of the Collegial Board participates in all stages of the competition.

In **Georgia** the selection is also made by prosecutorial services and more precisely by the Selection Board of the Prosecutor General's Office.

In the **Republic of Moldova**, the High Prosecutorial Council is the responsible entity.

In **Ukraine**, the authority responsible is the body conducting disciplinary proceedings since 1<sup>st</sup> September 2021. Before then, according to the transitional regulations, relevant personnel commissions were established in the Office of the Prosecutor General to ensure the selection of prosecutors.

- **Authorities responsible for the final appointment of prosecutors**

CEPEJ 5.2.9 (Q121 and Q121-1)


In all countries except **Ukraine**, the final appointment is made by the Prosecutor General who has a right to appoint some and reject some among the selected (proposed) candidates.

In **Ukraine**, final appointments are made by the heads of public prosecutor's offices who also have a right to appoint some and reject some among the selected (proposed) candidates.

- **Authorities responsible for the promotion of judges**

CEPEJ 6.1.1 (Q132)

Authority competent for the promotion of judges in 2021



In **all countries**, the High Judicial Councils have competencies in the promotion of judges.

In **Armenia**, the Supreme Judicial Council supplements the list of candidates to the President of the Republic. Regarding the Supreme Court, judges are also appointed by the President of the Republic but upon recommendation of the National Assembly.


In **Georgia**, the election to the position of Supreme Court judge is conducted by the Parliament, upon nomination of candidates by the High Judicial Council.

In the **Republic of Moldova**, the Superior Council of Magistracy proposes the candidates as a result of the evaluation process to the President, or to the Parliament for judges of the Supreme Court.

- **Authorities responsible for the promotion of prosecutors**

CEPEJ 6.1.4 (Q137)

Authority competent for the promotion of prosecutors in 2021



In **Armenia**, the authority competent for the promotion of prosecutors is the Qualification Commission (see explanations on this Commission in the paragraph on selection of prosecutors).

In **Azerbaijan**, the authority competent for the promotion of prosecutors is the Prosecutor's General office.

In **Georgia**, the authorities competent for the promotion of prosecutors are the Career Management, Ethics and Incentives Council (created on 22 April 2019) and the General Prosecutor. The Career Management, Ethics and Incentives Council is composed of the following 16 members: the General Prosecutor; the First Deputy General Prosecutor; 3 Deputy General Prosecutors; 8 members of the Prosecutorial Council; the head of the General Inspection Unit; the head of the Human Resources Management and Development Department and the head of the Department for Supervision over Prosecutorial Activities and Strategic Development. The General Prosecutor promotes the candidates recommended by the Career Management, Ethics, and Incentives Council. He/she may decline the recommended promotion, but s/he shall provide the reasons.


In the **Republic of Moldova**, the authority competent for the promotion of prosecutors is the Prosecutor General, who acts on the proposals for promotion made by the Superior Council of Prosecutors.

In **Ukraine**, As of 1<sup>st</sup> September 2021, the procedure for transfer of a prosecutor to a higher-level prosecutor's office has been restored and the Prosecutor General issued order which approved regulations of the commission for the selection of senior staff of prosecutor's offices.

## Allocation of cases

CEPEJ 8.6.1 (Q183, Q184)

### Organisation in distribution of court cases in 2021



In all countries the distribution of court cases is ensured by a random allocation (using random algorithm).

Except in **Georgia** and **Ukraine**, there is a possibility to exclude a judge from the distribution. In **Armenia**, a judge may, in case s/he is in charge of a case of particular complexity, apply to the Supreme Judicial Council proposing to be temporarily removed from the distribution list or to have a different percentage of cases to be distributed to him/her defined. In case the SJC finds the application of the judge to be reasonable, the proposal shall be granted but for a limited period of time not exceeding six months which may be extended based on the judge's proposal, if the examination of the case of particular complexity has not ended. Other grounds for excluding a judge from the allocation are: 1. in the case of a leave — for the period of the leave and the period of the preceding ten days; 2. in the case of secondment to another court — for the period of secondment and the period of the preceding ten days; 3. in the case of temporary incapacity, participation in training courses, secondment abroad or suspension of powers — for the relevant period; 4. in the case of expiry of the term of office — three months before the expiry of the term of office; 5. in other cases provided for by the Judicial Council. In **Azerbaijan**, there is a possibility to exclude a judge due to the judge's illness, business trip or vacation, in case a higher court sends the case back to a lower court for reconsideration or under exceptional circumstances. In the **Republic of Moldova**, according to a Regulation approved by the SCM, if a judge goes on annual leave for a period exceeding half of the total duration of the annual leave for the current year, the president of the court shall, by a reasoned decision, order his/her blocking from the list of judges eligible for random allocation in 5 calendar days before going on a leave, and the judge will be included in the list with active judges for case distribution from the day of returning to work, with the exception of the Supreme Court of Justice. The president of the court may order the temporary blocking/unblocking of the judge in other justified cases, with the issuance of a reasoned decision.

For all countries, except **Georgia**, all interventions are irreversibly registered in the system.

## Organisation of reassignment of court cases

CEPEJ 8.6.2 (Q185, Q185-1, Q186, Q187 and Q188)

Beneficiaries	Reasons for reassigning a case			
	Conflict of interest declared by the judge or by the parties	Recusal of the judge or requested by the parties	Physical unavailability (illness, longer absence)	Other
Armenia				
Azerbaijan				
Georgia				
Republic of Moldova				
Ukraine				

In **Azerbaijan**, **Georgia**, the **Republic of Moldova**, and in **Ukraine**, a case can be re-assigned due to a conflict of interest declared by the judge or by the parties, a recusal of the judge at his or her own initiative or as requested by the parties, physical unavailability of the judge. Additionally in the **Republic of Moldova**, the president of a court may order the random redistribution to another judge or another panel of judges in other justified cases, with the issuance of a reasoned decision. In **Armenia**, a case can be re-assigned due to the recusal of the judge at his or her own initiative or as requested by the parties, physical unavailability of the judge or in other cases such as when the powers of the judge have been suspended, automatically or imposingly terminated.

Beneficiaries	Does the reassignment of cases have to be reasoned?		
	Yes for all reassignments	Yes for some reassignments	No
Armenia			
Azerbaijan			
Georgia			
Republic of Moldova			
Ukraine			

In **Armenia**, the **Republic of Moldova** and in **Ukraine**, all re-assignments must be reasoned while in **Azerbaijan** and **Georgia** only some re-assignments must be reasoned.

Beneficiaries	Reassignments of cases processed through the computerised distribution of cases	If yes, how are reassignments of cases processed:				
		Automatic allocation	Random allocation	By discretion of a president of a court	Other	All interventions on the system are irreversibly logged/ registered
Armenia						
Azerbaijan						
Georgia						
Republic of Moldova						
Ukraine						

In all countries, the re-assignment is processed through the computerised distribution of cases and by random algorithm. Additionally, in the **Republic of Moldova** the re-assignment can be done by discretion of the President of the Court. Taking into account the judge specialisation (insolvency, civil, criminal, adoption, administrative, investigative judges), the president of a court establishes at the beginning of the year by a general written act a limited number of judges or panels of the same specialization who are active in the system if there is a need to reassign cases. The allocation in the CMS in these specific cases is random based on limitations established by the president's act. The act issued by the president of a court can be adjusted/modified during a year due to specific circumstances.

For all countries except **Georgia**, all interventions are irreversibly registered in the system.

Data on the number of processed re-assignments in the reference year was only available in **the Republic of Moldova** (417 in total in 2021).

### Specific instructions to prosecute or not, addressed to a public prosecutor

*CEPEJ 8.3.2 (Q162, Q162-1, Q162-2, Q162-2-0, Q162-3, Q162-4, Q162-4-1 and Q162-5)*

In **Armenia**, specific instructions to prosecute or not can be issued by the general prosecutor or by a higher prosecutor or head of prosecution office. Such instructions are occasional. They can be oral or written. They are reasoned and recorded in the case file. The instructions are mandatory except in cases when the subordinate prosecutor finds that they are illegal or unfounded. In that case he or she shall not follow the given instruction and must file a written objection to the superior prosecutor who gave the instruction, except in cases when it was given by the General Prosecutor. It is not possible to oppose or report an instruction to an independent body.

In **Azerbaijan**, such specific instructions can be issued by a higher prosecutor or head of prosecution office. The instructions can only be written. Such instructions are exceptional. They are reasoned and recorded in the case file. The instructions are mandatory but in case of disagreement the prosecutor can send a motivated objection to the higher prosecutor. It is not possible to oppose or report an instruction to an independent body.

In **Ukraine**, the Prosecutor General has the right to give instructions to any prosecutor. Orders of administrative nature, as well as instructions directly related to the exercise by the prosecutor of the prosecution functions, issued (given) in writing within the powers defined by law, shall be binding on the respective prosecutor.

In countries where instructions can be issued, no data was available on the number of instructions in 2021.


## Salaries of judges and prosecutors vs national average

CEPEJ 2.4.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.6, 2.4.7 (Q14, Q15)


There are significant differences among salaries of judges and prosecutors in the beneficiaries, even if the average national salaries are similar. There is a regional trend, confirmed by the EaP averages, of higher salaries for judges at the beginning of their careers than for public prosecutors at the beginning of their careers. However, at the level of the Supreme Court judges and prosecutors have similar annual gross salaries.

- **Average salaries of judges**


### Judges' salary - Ratio with average gross annual national salary in 2021



### Average gross salary of professional judges at the beginning of career between 2020 and 2021




In all countries, the average gross salary at the beginning of the career of judges has increased or remained similar between 2020 and 2021. In 2021, this salary was equal or above the EaP Average of 22 157€ in **Azerbaijan** and **Ukraine**. **Ukraine** reported the highest average gross salary in the region, with no notable increase compared to 2020. For **Georgia**, the data for 2021 shall not be considered an increase, as the amounts reported included bonuses, previously unreported.



In all countries, the average gross salary of judges at the highest instance has increased or remained stable between 2020 and 2021. In 2021, this salary was equal or higher to the EaP Average of 53 099€ in **Ukraine** only. However, it must be noted that the salaries of judges in **Ukraine** at the end of career are considerably higher than in the rest of the region which impacts the EaP Average. In **Ukraine**, judges' salaries seem to be in place since assumably the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” and some laws of Ukraine on the activities of judicial authorities” of 2019.


- **Average salaries of prosecutors**






- **Average salaries of prosecutors**

**Average gross salary of prosecutors at the beginning of career between 2020 and 2021**



In all countries, the average gross salary of prosecutors at the beginning of their career has increased or remained stable between 2020 and 2021. In **Azerbaijan**, the important increase is due to a presidential decree. In 2021, this salary was equal or higher to the EaP Average of 12 079€ in **Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine**.

**Average gross salary of prosecutors at the Supreme Court between 2020 and 2021**




In **Azerbaijan** there was a significant increase of the salary of prosecutors at the highest instance between 2020 and 2021 following a presidential decree. In **Georgia** and in the **Republic of Moldova**, the salaries remained stable. In **Ukraine**, the salaries increased between 2020 and 2021. In 2021, the salary of prosecutors at the highest instance was higher than the EaP Average of 30 809€ in **Azerbaijan** and in **Ukraine**.

## IV. Accountability

### Councils for judges in 2021: appointments and composition

CEPEJ 11.1.2 (Q266)

#### Composition of the councils for judges in 2021



All countries have a Council for the Judiciary, their sizes vary from 10 members in **Armenia**, to 15 in **Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova** and 32 in **Ukraine** (see particularity below).

The composition of councils for judges is as follow:

**Armenia:** the Supreme Judicial Council shall be composed of 10 members, including five judges of all levels (a chairperson of a court or a chairperson of a chamber of the Court of Cassation should not be represented) with at least 10 years of experience, elected by the General Assembly of Judges; as well as 5 members from among academics that in Armenia could be academics in legal field and/or other prominent lawyers holding only Armenian citizenship, having the right to vote, with high professional qualities and at least 15 years of professional work experience, elected by the National Assembly by at least three fifths of votes of the total number of Deputies.

**Azerbaijan:** the Judicial Legal Council is composed of 15 members: the Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Court, one person appointed by the President of country, one person appointed by Milli Majlis (parliament), a judge appointed by the Constitutional Court, two judges of the cassation court selected by the Supreme Court from among the candidates by the associations of judges, two judges of the Court of Appeal selected by the Judicial

Council from among the candidates offered by the associations of judges, a judge of the Supreme Court of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR) selected by the NAR Supreme Court from among the candidates by the associations of judges, two judges from first instance courts, selected by the Judicial Council from among the candidates offered by the associations of judges, a person appointed by the head of the relevant executive body (Ministry of Justice), a lawyer appointed by the Collegial Board of the Bar Association, a person appointed by the General Prosecutor's Office. The Minister of Justice and the President of the Supreme Court are *ex officio* members of the Judicial Legal Council.

**Georgia:** the High Council of Justice (HCJ) consists of 15 members: 8 judge-members - by the Conference of Judges; 5 non-judge members - by the Parliament of Georgia and one non-judge member - appointed by the President of Georgia from among the Academics, lawyers or other Civil Society representatives with high professional experience and reputation. The chairperson of the Supreme Court is an *ex officio* member of the HCJ.

**The Republic of Moldova:** The Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) was composed of 15 members until September 2021 (reflected in the graph above); and 12 members subsequently, due to legal amendments which entered into force towards the end of the year. At the end of 2021, the composition the SCM was as follows: 3 *ex officio* members (the Prosecutor General, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Minister of Justice); 6 members - by the General Assembly of Judges from among judges and 3 members - by the Parliament through a competition among academics.

**Ukraine:** Authorities reported that in Ukraine there are the High Council of Justice (competent for judges and prosecutors) and the Council of Judges of Ukraine (competent only for judges). The *High Council of Justice* has 21 members who serve a four-year term full-time (at least judge members, excluding the chair of the Supreme Court); 10 members - by the Congress of Judges from among judges or retired judges, 2 are appointed by the President of Ukraine, and 2 each - by Parliament, by the Congress of Advocates, by the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecution Employees (AUCEP) and by the Congress of law schools and scientific institutions. The chair of the Supreme Court is an *ex officio* member. The *Council of Judges* has 32 members: 11 judges from local general court, 4 judges from local administrative courts, 4 judges from the courts of appeal for civil, criminal and administrative offences, 2 judges from administrative courts of appeal, 2 judges from commercial courts of appeal, one judge from each of the higher specialised courts and 4 judges from the Supreme Court. The Council of Judges is voted for by the Congress of Judges.

## Councils for judges in 2021: responsibilities

### CEPEJ 11.1.4 (Q273 and Q274)

**Armenia:** The Supreme Judicial Council has a key role in the selection of judges and court chairpersons, in secondment of judges to another court, in giving consent for initiating criminal proceedings against a judge, in disciplinary proceedings and in the termination of judges' powers. It is also competent in case of evident breach of the independence or the impartiality of a judge. It was reported that the Supreme Judicial Council publishes information about its activities.

**Azerbaijan:** The Judicial Legal Council ensures the organisation and operation of courts, the independence of judges and court system; it proposes the number of judges per court, decides on the selection, evaluation, promotion, transfer, and disciplinary measures against judges and implements self-governance functions of the judiciary. In case it is evident there is a breach of the independence or the impartiality of a judge, a judge must apply to the Council.

The Council reportedly publishes activity reports, as well as its decisions, which are required to be reasoned.

**Georgia:** The High Council of Justice is competent regarding appointments and dismissals of common court judges (other than the chairperson and judges of the Supreme Court); it determines the composition of the Qualification Examination Commission, and the specialisation of judges of appellate courts and district/city courts; it approves the staff list and structure of the personnel of the Office of the High Council of Justice, the salary of the Council's members, the salaries and job titles of the officials and auxiliary personnel of the Council, as well as the structure and staff size of the administrative office of Georgian general courts (other than the Supreme Court), prepares and approves the procedure for the organisational work of common courts, approves the procedure for the appraisal of employees of the offices of the Council, district/city courts and appellate courts, conducts disciplinary proceedings against common court judges in the prescribed manner and within the scope of its powers, and it formulates proposals for judicial reforms. The HCJ is competent when it is evident that there is a breach of the independence or impartiality of a judge. It publishes its activity reports and decisions, which must be reasoned; and it is accountable to the Conference of Judges of Georgia.


**The Republic of Moldova:** The Superior Council of Magistracy is competent regarding the selection, training, evaluation, ethics, and disciplinary liability of judges; it also has certain duties regarding declarations of income and property and declarations of personal interests of judges; finally, it has certain tasks regarding the administration of courts, notably as regards budgetary matters. The Council is competent when it is evident that there is a breach of the independence or impartiality of a judge. It publishes its activity reports and decisions, which must be reasoned.

**Ukraine:** The High Council of Justice has competences in respect of judicial appointment; violations of incompatibility requirements by judges or prosecutors; considering complaints against decisions of the relevant body on bringing judges or prosecutors to disciplinary responsibility; dismissal of judges; consent to detain judges or hold them in custody; suspension of judges from the administration of justice; ensuring judicial independence; transfer of judges from one court to another. Information on the activities of the High Council of Justice, including decisions taken, are reportedly published on its official website: <https://hcj.gov.ua/> The Council of Judges is competent in respect of measures to ensure the independence of courts and judges, improvement of the organizational support for courts operation; the legal protection of judges, social security of judges and their families; oversee the organization of operation of courts; exercise supervision over compliance with legislation on conflict of interests in the activity of the judges.

## Councils for prosecutors in 2021: appointments and composition

CEPEJ 11.1.2 (Q266)

### Composition of the councils for prosecutors in 2021



**Georgia**, the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine** have councils for prosecutors. In **Ukraine**, there are the High Council of Justice (competent for judges and prosecutors – see above) and the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine. **Armenia** has a Board (see explanation below). There was no council for prosecutors in 2021 in **Azerbaijan**.

**Armenia:** The prosecution service does not have a Council. Instead, it has a Board composed of 18 prosecutors. It is composed of the Prosecutor General, who acts as a chairperson, the Deputy Prosecutors General, the heads of the structural subdivisions of the Prosecutor General's Office and of the Prosecutor of the city of Yerevan. Members are not elected but are members *ex officio* for the duration of their respective mandates as prosecutors.

**Georgia:** the Prosecutorial Council has 15 members, of which 7 are non-prosecutors. As of 2021, the procedure for the latest selection of non-prosecutorial members of the Prosecutorial Council was as follows: the Conference of Prosecutors - 8 members from among prosecutors. The Parliament - 2 members (MPs), one from the parliamentary majority and another from the MPs not belonging to the parliamentary majority; the High Council of Justice - 2 members (judges). The Parliament - one member (lawyer), nominated by the Minister of Justice; and one member (lawyer), nominated by the Georgian Bar Association; and one member (representative of the civil society), nominated by the non-commercial legal entity Civil Development Society. The Council is competent when it is evident that there is a breach of the independence or impartiality of a prosecutor.

**The Republic of Moldova:** the Superior Council of Prosecutors was composed of 15 members until September 2021 (see graph above), and 12 members – subsequently, due to legal amendments. At the end of 2021, the composition of the Council is as follows: 3 *ex officio*

members: the President of the Superior Council of Magistracy (including interim), the Minister of Justice (including interim) and the Ombudsman; 5 members - by the General Assembly of Prosecutors from among the prosecutors in office, by secret, direct and free vote (one member from among the prosecutors of the General Prosecutors Office, four members from the ranks of prosecutors from the territorial and specialised prosecution offices); and 4 members - by competition from civil society, as follows: one by the President of the Republic, one by the Parliament, one by the Government and one by the Academy of Sciences of Moldova.

**Ukraine:** For the High Council of Justice (competent both for judges and prosecutors) – see above. The Council of Prosecutors is composed of 13 members, including: two representatives (prosecutors) from the Office of the Prosecutor General; four representatives (prosecutors) from regional prosecutor's offices; five representatives (prosecutors) from district prosecutor's offices; two representatives (academics) appointed by the Congress of Representatives of Law Schools and Research Institutions.

### Councils for prosecutors in 2021: responsibilities

#### *CEPEJ 11.1.4 (Q273 and Q274)*

**Armenia:** The Board discusses only fundamental issues related to the organisation of the activities of the Prosecutor's Office. The public is informed of the Board's decisions, which are reasoned. There was no specific provision in the law with regard to Board's competence in case of pressure on prosecutors reported for 2021.

**Georgia:** The Council is competent, inter alia, to select a candidate for the post of Prosecutor General, to conduct disciplinary proceedings against the First Deputy Prosecutor General and Deputies of the Prosecutor General, to decide on the issue of applying a disciplinary sanction or prematurely revoking it in relation to a member of the Prosecutorial Council elected by the Conference of Prosecutors, to hear a report of the Prosecutor General, First Deputy Prosecutor General or Deputy Prosecutor General on the activities of the Prosecution Service (except for individual criminal cases), to issue recommendations to the attention of the Prosecutor General and decide on matters of early termination of its membership. The Council publishes its decisions, which must be reasoned. The Prosecutorial Council is competent in case of a pressure on a prosecutor.

**The Republic of Moldova:** the competences of the Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP) include the selection, promotion, training, evaluation, ethics, developing a draft Code of Ethics for prosecutors, approving its own budget and submitting it to the Ministry of Finance, participating in the development of the budget and strategic development plans for the prosecution service, establishing disciplinary liability of prosecutors, appointing prosecutors to the Council of the National Institute of Justice. SCP publishes its activity reports and decisions, which shall be reasoned. The SCP is competent in case of a pressure on a prosecutor.

**Ukraine:** The High Council of Justice does not carry out disciplinary procedures against prosecutors. The body that carries out disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors is the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, which is a collegial body that, in accordance with the powers provided for by Law, determines the level of professional training of persons who have expressed their intention to take up the position of a prosecutor and decides on the disciplinary liability of prosecutors, transfer and dismissal of prosecutors. The information on the activities of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, including its decisions, is published on its official website: <https://rpu.gov.ua/ua/krada/normosnovu.html>

## Codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors

CEPEJ 8.5.1 (Q172, Q173, Q 173-1)

There are codes of ethics applicable to all **judges** in all five countries. **All countries**, except **Armenia**, reported that regular updates to their respective codes are being done.

Beneficiary	Hyperlinks to texts of ethics codes for judges
Armenia	<a href="#">Code of Ethics in Armenian</a>
Azerbaijan	<a href="#">Code of Ethics in Azeri</a>
Georgia	<a href="#">Code of ethics in Georgian</a>
Republic of Moldova	<a href="#">Code of ethics in Romanian</a>
Ukraine	<a href="#">Code of ethics</a> in Ukrainian

The following principles are contained in all Codes of ethics in **all five countries**: adherence to judicial values (independence, integrity, impartiality); relationship with institutions, citizens and users, extrajudicial activities, information disclosure and relationship with press agencies, political activity, association membership and institutional positions. As listed in the EaP Questionnaire, the following were reported as missing in the Code of Ethics for judges in **Ukraine**: gift rules, competences and continuing education, provisions on conflict of interest.

CEPEJ 8.5.2 (Q174, Q175 and Q 175-1)

There are codes of ethics applicable to **prosecutors** in **all five countries**. All, except **Armenia** and **Georgia**, reported having regular updates to their respective codes.

Beneficiary	Hyperlinks to texts of ethics codes for prosecutors
Armenia	<a href="#">Code of ethics in Armenian</a>
Azerbaijan	<a href="#">Code of ethics in Azeri</a>
Georgia	<a href="#">Code of ethics in Georgian</a>
Republic of Moldova	<a href="#">Code of ethics in Romanian</a>
Ukraine	<a href="#">Code of Ethics in Ukrainian</a>

All of the following principles, as listed in the EaP Questionnaire, are reported as being part of the codes of ethics in **all five countries**: adherence to judicial values (independence, integrity, impartiality); relationship with institutions, citizens and users; competences and continuing education; extrajudicial activities; conflict of interest information disclosure and relationship with press agencies; political activity, association membership and institutional positions and gift rules.

## Assets declarations

- **Judges**

*CEPEJ 8.7.1 (Q190 and Q192)*

In **Armenia** the assets declaration by judges is a requirement of the Judicial Code; in **Azerbaijan**, this is applicable based on the Law “On Approval of Procedures for Submission of Financial Information by Public Officials”, Law “On combating corruption” (it was still not implemented in 2021 though, explained by the lack of approval of the financial information declaration form). Judges in **Georgia** are required to submit a declaration based on the Law “On Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service”. Judges in the **Republic of Moldova** are required to submit a declaration of assets based on the Law on “Declaration of assets and personal interests”. In **Ukraine** this is provided for in the Law "On the Judicial System and Status of Judges".

*CEPEJ 8.7.2 (Q193, Q194, Q195 and Q196)*

**Armenia, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine** require judges to declare assets, financial interests, sources of income, liabilities, and gifts. In addition to these, judges in **Armenia** shall also declare their expenditures and judges in the **Republic of Moldova** shall declare conflicts of interests. **Azerbaijan** does not require judges to declare gifts.

In **Armenia**, judges shall make the declaration at the beginning of the term, at the end of term, annually, as well as when there is a significant change in the items to be declared. In **Azerbaijan**, judges shall make the declaration at the beginning of the term and annually. In **Georgia** and in the **Republic of Moldova**, judges shall make the declaration at the beginning of the term, at the end of the term and annually. In **Ukraine**, judges were required in 2021 to make a declaration only when there was a significant change in the items.

The spouse, the children, and other family members shall make declarations in all five countries. The partners of judges are concerned by the declaration only in **Azerbaijan** and the **Republic of Moldova**. Adult children are concerned by the declaration only in **Azerbaijan**.

In **Azerbaijan, Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova**, the members of the family of a judge submit the same declaration as the judge.

- **Prosecutors**

*CEPEJ 8.7.5 (Q203 and Q205)*

In **Armenia**, prosecutors are required to submit the declaration of assets by the Law “On public service”. In **Azerbaijan**, the provisions of Law “On Approval of Procedures for Submission of Financial Information by Public Officials”, the Law “On combating corruption” and the "Rules of work organization at the Prosecutor General's Office" require the prosecutors to submit assets declarations. In **Georgia**, the Law “On Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Public Service” is applicable to prosecutors. The provisions of the Law “On the declaration of assets and personal interests” and the Law “On the Prosecution Office” require prosecutors in the **Republic of Moldova** to submit declarations. In **Ukraine** this is to be done based on the Law "On Prevention of Corruption".



CEPEJ 8.7.6 (Q206, Q207, Q208 and Q209)

In respect of items to be declared, prosecutors in **all five countries** are required to declare assets, financial interests, sources of income and liabilities. In addition to the above, gifts are to be declared by prosecutors in **Armenia, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**. Other items are required to be declared in **Armenia** (expenditures), the **Republic of Moldova** (conflicts of interests) and **Ukraine** (full list provided in comments to this Question in Part 1. Comparative Tables).

In all five countries the prosecutors are required to make the declarations at the beginning of the term of office. In all, except **Azerbaijan**, the declarations are reportedly due also at the end of the term of office. In addition to the above, **Ukraine** requires a declaration when there is a significant change in the items. Each country has supplementary requirements as to the moment of declarations. Thus, prosecutors in **Georgia** submit it annually, during the term in office, and depending on the date of submission of the last declaration, twice or once after leaving the office, until the end of the next year. In **Armenia**, in case of doubts about any significant changes in the property (increase in property, reduction in liabilities or expenses) within 2 years after termination of official duties, the Commission shall be entitled to require from the declarant official to submit a situational declaration on property and income (The law “On corruption prevention commission”). Prosecutors in **Azerbaijan** and the **Republic of Moldova** submit declarations also annually.

The declarations concern spouses and children of prosecutors in **all five countries**. In **Azerbaijan** and the **Republic of Moldova**, this obligation extends to adult children; in **Armenia** and the **Republic of Moldova** – to partners. Other members of the families are concerned as well, as follows: persons under the declarant official’s guardianship or curatorship, any adult person jointly residing with the prosecutors in **Armenia**; parents in **Azerbaijan**, the members of the family which are financially/otherwise supported by prosecutors respectively in the **Republic of Moldova** and **Ukraine**.

In **Azerbaijan, Georgia,** and the **Republic of Moldova** the same declaration of assets apply to prosecutors’ family members.

Number of criminal cases against judges/prosecutors

CEPEJ 8.4.2 (Q171)

Beneficiaries	Number of criminal cases against judges or prosecutors in 2021					
	Judges			Prosecutors		
	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced
Armenia	4	2	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	1	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	0	0	1	0	0
Republic of Moldova	4	2	4	19	6	2
Ukraine	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA


In 2021, in respect of **judges**, **Armenia** reported 4 initiated criminal cases, 2 completed and 0 sanctions pronounced (vs 5 initiated, 3 completed and 0 sanctions in 2020). There was 1 such case reported in **Azerbaijan** with no sanctions pronounced (vs. 0 on all in 2020). In the **Republic of Moldova**, 4 cases were initiated and 4 sanctions were pronounced (vs NA data in 2020). Zero cases were reported by **Georgia** in both 2020 and 2021. There was no data available in this respect for **Ukraine** in 2020 and 2021.

In respect of **prosecutors**, there were 0 cases reported in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** both in 2020 and 2021. In 2021, **Georgia** reported 1 initiated criminal case, and 0 sanctions pronounced (vs 2 initiated, 2 completed and 2 sanctions in 2020). In the **Republic of Moldova**, there were 19 initiated cases, 6 completed cases; 2 sanctions were pronounced (vs. NA data in 2020). There was no data available in this respect for **Ukraine** for both 2020 and 2021.

### Number of disciplinary cases against judges/prosecutors


CEPEJ 8.9.5 (Q237, Q238, Q239, Q246, Q247 and Q248)

**Total number of initiated and finalised disciplinary proceedings and number of sanctions pronounced against judges in 2021 (per 100 judges)**



The highest number of initiated disciplinary proceedings in 2021 per 100 judges among the beneficiaries was in **Georgia** (48 in 2021 vs 46 in 2020). In **Armenia** there were 14 such cases (vs 16 in 2020); in the **Republic of Moldova** – 8 (same in 2020), **Ukraine** - 4 and in **Azerbaijan** – 3 (vs 2 in 2020) per 100 judges. The highest number of completed cases per 100 judges was in **Georgia** – 14 (vs 1 in 2020). In the **Republic of Moldova** and **Armenia** – there were 4 cases in each (vs 8 and 4, respectively in 2020), in **Ukraine** – 3 and in **Azerbaijan** 2 (vs 1 in 2020). In terms of the number of sanctions against judges, there were 4 such sanctions per 100 judges in **Armenia** (same in 2020), 2 – in **Azerbaijan** (vs 1 in 2020), 2 – in **Ukraine** (vs 3 in 2020); and 1 – in the **Republic of Moldova** (vs 3 in 2020).

**Total number of initiated and finalised disciplinary proceedings and number of sanctions pronounced against prosecutors in 2021 (per 100 prosecutors)**



The highest number of initiated disciplinary proceedings in 2021 per 100 prosecutors among the beneficiaries was in the **Republic of Moldova** (8 vs 12 in 2020). In **Azerbaijan** – 4 (2 in 2020), in **Ukraine** – 3; in **Armenia** and **Georgia** there were 2 such proceedings in each (vs 2 and 6 respectively in 2020). 7 disciplinary cases have been completed in the **Republic of Moldova** (same in 2020), 4 in **Azerbaijan** (vs 2 in 2020); 3 in **Georgia** (vs 5 in 2020), 2 in **Armenia** and in **Ukraine**, each (same in 2020). There were 4 sanctions pronounced in **Azerbaijan** (vs. 2 in 2020), 2 in **Armenia** and **Georgia**, each (vs.1 and 2 respectively in 2020), and 1 in the **Republic of Moldova** and in **Ukraine** each (vs 3 and 1 respectively in 2020).

## Number of procedures for breaches of rules on conflict of interest against judges/prosecutors

CEPEJ 8.8.7 (Q224 and Q233)

Beneficiaries	Number of procedures for breaches of rules on conflict of interest against judges and prosecutors in 2021					
	Against judges			Against prosecutors		
	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Republic of Moldova	1	NA	NA	0	0	0
Ukraine	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Regarding procedures for breaches of rules on conflict of interest in respect of **judges**, there was only 1 case reported as initiated in the **Republic of Moldova**. **Armenia**, **Azerbaijan** and **Georgia** reported zero such cases for 2021. In respect of **prosecutors**, zero cases were reported by four countries. The data in this respect was unavailable for **Ukraine**. Regionally, a similar level of data (close to zero) was noted for 2020, with the exception of **Georgia**.

## Number of proceedings against judges and prosecutors due to violations/discrepancies in their declaration of assets

CEPEJ 8.7.9 (Q202 and 215)

Beneficiaries	Declaration of assets for judges and prosecutors in 2021: number of proceedings against judges and prosecutors due to violations/discrepancies in their declaration					
	Proceedings against judges			Proceedings against prosecutors		
	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced	Number of initiated cases	Number of completed cases	Number of sanctions pronounced
Armenia	7	7	2	1	1	0
Azerbaijan	NAP	NAP	NAP	NAP	NAP	NAP
Georgia	9	9	4	0	0	0
Republic of Moldova	12	NA	NA	24	NA	NA
Ukraine	NA	NA	NA	20	18	10

Regarding the proceedings against judges and prosecutors due to violations/discrepancies in their declarations of assets, data was reported by **Armenia**, **Georgia** and partially by the **Republic of Moldova**. **Ukraine** reported data on such proceedings only against prosecutors. Compared to 2020 (when only the **Republic of Moldova** provided data on these categories), the data availability improved only to a certain extent in 2021.