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CONSULTATION OF THE PARTIES TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM [CETS NO. 196] AND ITS ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL [CETS NO. 217]

10th Meeting

Tuesday, 18 November 2025, Strasbourg

THEMATIC ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5 “PUBLIC PROVOCATION TO COMMIT A TERRORIST OFFENCE” OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (CETS No. 196)

1. Introduction

1. The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196) was opened for signature in Warsaw on 16 May 2005 and entered into force on 1 June 2007. As of July 2025, the Convention has been ratified by 43 States. In addition, 5 States have signed but not yet ratified the Convention.
2. At its 9th meeting, on 12 November 2024, the Consultation of Parties to the Convention decided to devote its next assessment round to the implementation of the Article 5 of the Convention.
3. Article 5 deals with the provision of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence. The provision stipulates that:

"1 For the purposes of this Convention, "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed."

"2 Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law."
4. The Consultation of the Parties agreed on a questionnaire template for the assessment of Article 5 (see Annex I) containing a series of questions grouped under the following main headings:
 - The transposition of Article 5
 - Other issues
 - Additional information
5. This template questionnaire was distributed to the members of the Consultation of the Parties, which were asked to send in their replies by 30 April 2025. A total of 27 Parties submitted replies (see Annex II).
6. Following the decisions taken at its 9th Consultation meeting on 12 November 2024, the Consultation of the Parties examined the replies to the questionnaire and prepared the present thematic assessment report.
7. The thematic assessment report contains an analysis and synthesis of the state of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention by the responding States based on the replies received to date, as well as certain recommendations to the Parties adopted by the Consultation of the Parties.

2. Descriptive Part

8. This chapter offers a synthesis of the 27 replies received and provides a general overview of the state of implementation by responding States regarding the provisions contained in Article 5 of the Convention.
9. The Consultation of Parties notes that three States Parties (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands) have made reservations and three have made declarations (Hungary, Moldova, Ukraine) with regard to the provisions of the Convention covered by this thematic assessment report. Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands reserved their right to refuse to extradite a person charged with an Article 5 offence if the charge is deemed to be political. Hungary declared that under Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention, it interprets "danger" as "clear and present danger". The Republic of Moldova declared that in accordance with Article 14, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the offences specified in Articles 5-7 and 9 of the Convention will be under its own jurisdiction in cases mentioned in Article 14, paragraph 2, of the Convention. Ukraine declared that in accordance with Article 19, paragraph 2, of the Convention, in case of receiving of a request about extradition of a transgressor from a Party to this Convention with which the extradition treaty is not available, it shall consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition of the offenders concerning the offences set forth in Articles 5-7 and 9 of this Convention.

Article 5

10. Article 5, paragraph 2, obliges States Parties to criminalise the public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, when committed unlawfully and intentionally. According to Article 5, paragraph 1, the public provocation consists in the act of distributing, or otherwise, making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed. The provision criminalises both direct and indirect public provocation to commit terrorism, whether they explicitly advocate for terrorist acts or not. The commission of an actual terrorist offence as a result of the provocation is not required.¹
11. While the Convention allows States Parties a certain amount of discretion with respect to the definition of the offence and its implementation, it does require certain conditions to be met in each case.² One, specific intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence which is done through an unlawful and intentional provocation needs to exist. Two, the result of such an act must be to cause a danger that a terrorist offence might be committed. The significance and the credibility of the danger is to be assessed in accordance with the requirements of domestic law.
12. The term "distribution" is to be understood as active dissemination of a message advocating terrorism, while the expression "making available" refers to providing that message in a way that is easily accessible to the public.³ Whereas the Explanatory Report underlines that the term "to the public" is used to ensure that private communication falls outside the scope of this provision, its application to the online context could be understood more broadly such as through the use electronic facilities, in particular the Internet, which provides for the dissemination of messages

¹ Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 2005, para 78.

² Ibid., paras 99-100.

³ Ibid., para 102.

by e-mail or for possibilities such as the exchange of materials in chat rooms, newsgroups or discussion fora.⁴

13. At all times, State Parties should bear in mind that freedom of expression is an essential right in democratic societies, with its application extending not only to ideas and information that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive but also to those that "offend, shock or disturb", as reiterated in numerous occasions by the European Court of Human Rights.⁵

3. Analytical Part

14. This chapter focuses on identifying and providing comments on main approaches and trends in the way responding States have implemented Article 5 of the Convention.

Criminalisation of provocation to commit a terrorist offence

15. All responding Parties have confirmed having an offence of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence in their respective legislation either as a standalone offence or as a general offence of public provocation applicable to, inter alia, terrorist offences. The offence can be found in the criminal codes of the respective States, in legislation specifically dealing with different aspects of fighting terrorism, or the combination thereof (e.g. Türkiye). Exceptionally, relevant provisions may also be found in other pieces of legislation, such as that related to public speech (e.g. Monaco). A number of jurisdictions have had changes to legislation since the last round of assessment in 2014 (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Sweden) or are expecting such changes to take place in the near future (e.g. Albania, Ukraine). Few such changes were struck down by constitutional authorities of respective States due to incompatibility with other constitutional guarantees.
16. Most responding States include both direct and indirect forms of provocation within the offence structure, while for a small number inclusion of indirect provocation is not necessarily clear from the wording of the text (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway). While some have opted from dividing the two into separate offences (e.g. France, the Netherlands), others cover both aspects under one heading (e.g. Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Norway). Some States are also using the general offence of incitement in connection to terrorist offences found in the same or other pieces of legislation (e.g. Monaco, San Marino).
17. Article 5 element of "distribution, or otherwise making available" is left to the courts to assess in all responding States. The effort implies an affirmative action, with some responding States covering also suggestive behaviour, including posing questions (e.g. Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland). Forms of dissemination can be printed, broadcasted or take form of another media including social media platforms and online forums. Several States have amended their legislation over the past decade to explicitly criminalise dissemination through internet-based tools and platforms. Despite covering also messages communicated to multiple persons in settings such as meeting and conferences, States have noted difficulties with proving such cases in the absence of a video or audio trails. In case of reposted messages or content,

⁴ Ibid, paras 103-14.

⁵ Ibid, para 89.

several jurisdictions noted requiring that the perpetrator expresses the message as his or her own (e.g. Germany, Slovakia).

18. Majority of responding states require the message to be addressed to a wider audience, including through the use of online platforms and other new technologies. One responding State (France) does not require the criterion of publicity for the criminalisation of direct incitement, while reserving this requirement for indirect forms of provocation. This aspect is deduced from the type of vehicle used to distribute the message, such as mass media or Internet based platforms open to multiple users, or from the number of people to whom the message is addressed (e.g. Armenia, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Romania). Few jurisdictions have listed relying also on other factors in making the assessment, such as whether the sharing is done in such a manner that it is susceptible to being read/received by persons other than the direct recipients or that there is a likelihood that the substance of the statement is known to others than the circle of persons to whom it is addressed (e.g. the Netherlands).
19. Some jurisdictions exclude messages communicated to a limited number of people (e.g. Finland, France), as well as those shared in closed groups or through encrypted messages (e.g. Finland, Monaco, San Marino). Other jurisdictions would cover messages shared through closed groups and encrypted messages provided that, for example, the group in question has already been engaged in terrorism (e.g. Latvia, the Netherlands) or if a specific number of individuals are recipients of the messages shared in those settings (e.g. Norway). In all circumstances, the existence of the “public” requirement is always assessed on a case-by-case basis, particularly when it comes to online types of communications.
20. When proscribing “indirect provocation”, some responding States opted for detailed provisions explaining the scope of indirect provocation (e.g. France, Latvia, Moldova), while others either use a more general reference of “indirectly” or “approves” in their legal texts or do not make such distinction at all. At least one State has specifically legislated such provocation in the context of religious teachings (e.g. Denmark). Moreover, several responding States do not require demonstration of causality between the message/s being shared and the possible danger that a terrorist offence may take place when it comes to indirect provocation (e.g. France, Monaco, Romania). On the contrary, a number of others require the potential of this causality to be shown in order for the glorification messages to be understood as an Article 5 offence (e.g. Albania, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden).
21. The requirement of causality between the shared communications and the danger that a terrorist offence may be committed is addressed in a mixed manner among responding States. Some States do not require this to be demonstrated under their legislation (e.g. Armenia, Denmark, Latvia, Poland, Portugal), others view it as an element that is assumed by virtue of the gravity of the acts being provoked (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Türkiye) or the modalities in which the provocation takes place (e.g. Italy), a third category of States sees it as an element closely linked to the question of intent of the perpetrator (e.g. Norway), while a fourth category requires the likelihood that a terrorist offence may take place as a result of the provocation to be demonstrated (e.g. Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Switzerland). No State demands that the danger from a commission of a terrorist offence is tangible and imminent. If this is the case, or if a terrorist offence is committed, a number of responding States noted that the charges would be requalified to a form of participation in the commission of an offence or its attempt.

22. Beyond the implementation of the Article 5 offence in national legislation, a number of responding States noted introducing or expecting to introduce substantively related offences. For example, the French Penal Code criminalises intentionally extracting, reproducing and transmitting data that publicly glorifies acts of terrorism or directly incites to such acts. Germany criminalises sharing or obtaining material that serves as guidance for committing a serious violent offence endangering the State. Slovakia, on its end, criminalises acquisition and sharing of knowledge and skills relates to production, storage, transport or use of explosives, firearms, nuclear weapons, and other material or substance for the purpose of terrorism. Italy is similarly expected to soon introduce criminalisation of possession of materials for terrorist purposes and dissemination by any means of communication, including electronic communication, of instructions for the manufacturing of explosive materials.

Use of Article 5 criminalisation and types of sanctions

23. Nearly all responding States confirmed having used provocation to commit a terrorist offence as a charge in the last 10 to 15 years, with variations in the number of cases. Few jurisdictions highlighted that this criminal activity might also be subsumed within another broader terrorist offence if perpetrated concurrently with other types of punishable activities (e.g. it would be part of a charge of participation in a terrorist group or association).
24. Sanctions for the offence are in principle custodial, with a possibility for application of suspended sentences or serving the sentence at home under electronic surveillance. Several responding States also envisage as alternative or complementary punishment fines, community service, suspension of certain rights, and confiscation of material. When an offender is a minor, sanctions may also include time spent in an educational facility with participation in a disengagement program (e.g. Portugal). It is worth noting that legislation of certain responding States envisages stricter fines if the provocation is committed via electronic means or is aimed at influencing vulnerable individuals, such as minors (e.g. Belgium and France).

Ancillary offences and liability of legal entities

25. Most States confirmed that general criminal law provisions on ancillary offences apply to the offence of public provocation under Article 5. In addition to the standard offence of complicity and attempt, several jurisdictions noted applicability of a broader type of offences, such as participation in a criminal association (e.g. Italy, Moldova, Monaco).
26. Criminal liability of legal entities is provided in the legislation of most responding States but has not been tested to date. A number of responding States also noted the civil liability of online providers in case they fail to provide competent authorities with information leading to the suspicion that a criminal offence posing a threat to the life or security of one or more persons has been committed, is in the process of being committed or is likely to be committed according to the EU Digital Services Act. In a minority of jurisdictions, only natural persons can be held criminally liable (e.g. Türkiye). Nevertheless, administrative measures or financial penalties may apply to legal persons.

Foreign elements in cases (jurisdiction, recidivism)

27. Article 5 offences increasingly feature foreign elements, particularly facilitated by the online sharing and access to information. Understanding this context the responding States have noted having different mechanisms for assuming jurisdiction over cases. These would include the traditional active or passive nationality principle, if the activity would involve a national or resident or if it would impact country nationals (both natural and legal persons). Jurisdictions equally noted the ability to impose jurisdiction in case State security or interests are impacted by such actions (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Switzerland). Lastly, those responding States that have universal jurisdiction in their legislation have also noted the ability of applying this jurisdictional basis for crimes for which it is envisaged (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Sweden). The highest judicial instance of at least one responding State clarified that to assume jurisdiction the mere fact that a message posted on the internet from abroad is accessible in a specific country is not sufficient to give its court's jurisdiction. Elements that would help establish jurisdiction would include the fact that the posted message is in the language spoken in that particular country, as well as that its content treats that country and its people (France).
28. When considering criminal processing of individuals with priors in other jurisdictions, beyond the application of the EU Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings, use of information on previous conviction for the same or similar activities in other States appears to be a possibility in majority of responding States, but not an obligation. In this context, such information can be used when discussing preventive detention and/or the severity of the sanction.

Safeguards

29. Safeguards related to the obligation to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms are embedded in the legislation of responding States, either through constitutional guarantees or specific pieces of legislation. Courts of a number of responding States have pronounced themselves specifically with regard to the delineation between freedom of expression and criminal, terrorist actions, as well as on the implication of certain measures imposed by the State on the enjoyment of such rights either in the context of reviewing legislation or its application to specific cases (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Denmark, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Switzerland). In a few instances, national courts have required legislative amendments or imposed conditions on enforcement to align with freedom of expression standards (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany).

Issues with application

30. States have identified several challenges in the implementation of Article 5. These include: (i) difficulties in monitoring the growing content online; (ii) challenges with accessing data held abroad; (iii) challenges with balancing the right to freedom of expression and national security; (iv) handling with borderline content that cannot be criminally processed; (V) accessing and securing evidence in the encrypted communications settings and user identification; (iv) concerns about emerging technologies such as immersive virtual environments (e.g. Metaverse), which may challenge current enforcement mechanisms.

31. Some jurisdictions use institutional responses, such as dedicated platforms for engagement with technology providers (e.g. KODEX), and support from inter-governmental coordination platforms like Europol. Despite these efforts, enforcement may be made difficult by the content in which such messages appear (e.g. private communication), need for cooperation with the private sector, and the advancement of new technologies.
32. One State expressed interest in further clarification of the concept of “private communication” under the Explanatory Report to the Convention, particularly in the context of closed online forums and encrypted groups given that they generate real and significant risks of violent mobilisation.

4. Conclusion

33. It follows from Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), that:

“Every treaty in force is binding upon the Parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”

Article 27 of the aforementioned Vienna Convention further stipulates that:

“A Party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. [...]”

The extent to which a State Party observes these two basic binding principles of international treaty law are at the very core of the assessment of the implementation of any international treaty, including the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No 196).

34. Being an instrument of public international law, the Convention, insofar as it is not considered to be self-executing, requires to be transposed into the domestic law of the Parties. The transposition of its provisions is indeed deemed necessary due to the legal obligation it imposes on Parties to provide for the criminalisation of certain terrorist activities, as well as the application of human rights obligations and various procedural and other safeguards.
35. That said, the Convention does not require Parties to harmonise the way in which they transpose the provisions of the Convention in their domestic law, nor does it require Parties to adapt their domestic legal systems to each other in any specific way. The purpose of the Convention is, in other words, not to ensure that all Parties introduce exactly identical provisions in their domestic law, but that they transpose the provisions of the Convention in such a manner that they are able to effectively cooperate with each other on the basis of the Convention in good faith and for the realisation of its stated aims, cf. the aforesaid Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
36. Against this background, the Consultation of the Parties notes with satisfaction that of the 27 replies submitted to the questionnaire, all have reported having an offence within their respective legislation that criminalises provocation to commit a terrorist offence. Where such an

offence is located and whether it is covered by one or multiple legal provisions is likely to vary, which overall does not hinder the ability of States to cooperate with each other.

37. Some developments have been observed since the last review of the implementation of Article 5. A certain number of countries no longer require a causality between the deeds and the danger of a terrorist offence taking place to be demonstrated, and the notion of the message being addressed to the “public” has been developed in a way to cover various modalities of communication through the internet or disposed of altogether. Moreover, a number of States have introduced or are expecting legislative changes that also allow for criminalisation of sharing, obtaining or possessing material that serves as guidance for committing a serious violent offence.
38. The offence has also been applied across responding States, followed namely by custodial sentences. Responding States have also reported paying due attention to individual human rights in these cases, with higher instance courts intervening on several occasions to either confirm the approach of the State authorities or limiting their potential reach.
39. Lastly, responding States expressed confidence in assuming jurisdiction in any case concerning provocation to commit a terrorist offence that would have a link or impact on their respective jurisdiction. In terms of recognising each other’s previous efforts in case of repeated offenders, this aspect seems to be unhindered when it comes to proceedings within the countries of the European Union and more theoretical at this time when one of the States in question is a non-EU member State.
40. On the basis of its analysis on the state of implementation of the aforementioned provisions of the Convention, the Consultation of Parties makes the following recommendations:
41. The Consultation of the Parties invites *all Parties* to develop practices that would ensure the applicability of the framework set up Article 5 to ongoing and future changes to the modalities of communication.
42. In this regard, the Consultation of the Parties underlines the importance of ensuring that Article 5 continues to be implemented in full accordance with the safeguards noted in Article 12 of the Convention, namely the respect of the right to freedom of expression and privacy, and application of the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.
43. The Consultation of the Parties also invites the Parties to continue engaging with online platforms and service providers, including through cross-border cooperation, in efficiently identifying and processing terrorist content.

Appendix I

TEMPLATE

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5 “PUBLIC PROVOCATION TO COMMIT A TERRORIST OFFENCE” OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM [CETS No. 196]

Party to the Convention:

Name of Providing Expert:

The transposition of Article 5

- Question 1:** Please provide a description of how Article 5 has been transposed in your domestic legislation and if any changes were made to its text since 2015. If possible, please provide a translation of the exact wording of the provision(s) in question in English or French, including relevant sections on sanctions.
- Question 2:** Please provide information on the number of cases in which an Article 5 offence was applied in the last 10/15 years and the types of sanctions pronounced in those cases.
- Question 3:** Please explain what types of activity are covered under the wording “the *distribution, or otherwise making available*, of a message (...)” (see also paragraphs 102 - 104 of the [Explanatory Report to the Convention](#)) of Article 5 in practice in your jurisdiction (please provide examples from case-law). Where no case-law, please specify the scope of application under your legislation.
- Question 4:** Please explain how the recipient audience, i.e. “public” per CETS No. 196, is understood in practice in light of technological developments in the communications field since the entry into force of the CETS No. 196 and mainly whether closed and encrypted message groups and similar are covered (please provide examples from case-law). Where no case-law, please specify how this requirement is met under your legislation and also whether closed and encrypted message groups and similar mentioned before could be covered.
- Question 5:** Please specify whether it is necessary that the activity directly advocates commission of a terrorist offence or “indirect incitement” is also covered and please give examples of how this was applied in practice. For further information please refer to paragraphs 97 – 100 of the [Explanatory Report to the Convention](#).
- Question 6:** Please explain whether it would be necessary to demonstrate that the “danger that one or more such [terrorist] offences may be committed” would be real or a likelihood would suffice and provide examples on how this was demonstrated in practice, if any.
- Question 7:** Please specify if you have encountered any specific problems in the application of an Article 5 offence in practice and explain solutions implemented to overcome such problems, if any. In answering this question, please give particular note to use of the Article 5 offence to communication transmitted through the use of new technologies, including messaging in close setting and encrypted messaging.

Question 8: Please explain if your jurisdiction criminalises activity/ies beyond those covered under Article 5 of CETS No. 196 considered as public provocation to commit terrorism. Please give examples of how such offences have been applied in practice.

Other issues

Question 9: Please explain how Article 9 offences (Ancillary offences)⁶ relate to the Article 5 offence in your jurisdictions and give examples of use of such ancillary offences in the context of public provocation, if any.

Question 10: Please explain if it is possible to charge legal entities with Article 5 offence per domestic legislation and how the attribution of individual/group activity to an entity would work in this case. Please share examples from practice, if any.

Question 11: Please explain whether in your jurisdiction there are any provisions requiring previous convictions for terrorist offences from other jurisdictions to be taken into account when determining the conditions for recidivism.

Question 12: Please explain how are the Conditions and safeguards from Article 12⁷ of the CETS No. 196 observed in respect to an Article 5 offence. Specifically, please explain how the delineation between freedom of expression and an Article 5 offence is expected to be respected in practice, particularly in cases of indirect incitement. Provide examples from case-law, if any.

Question 13: Please explain in which circumstances would your country have jurisdiction to prosecute an individual/group/entity for an Article 5 offence in a case involving a foreign element, such as if the offence is considered to have been committed outside the national territory and the perpetrator is also located elsewhere but the action has relevance for the national jurisdiction.

⁶ Article 9 – Ancillary offences

1 Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law:

- a Participating as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention;
- b Organising or directing others to commit an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention;
- c Contributing to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
 - i be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention; or
 - ii be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention.

2 Each Party shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under, and in accordance with, its domestic law the attempt to commit an offence as set forth in Articles 6 and 7 of this Convention.

⁷ Article 12 – Conditions and safeguards

1 Each Party shall ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the criminalisation under Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention are carried out while respecting human rights obligations, in particular the right to freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of religion, as set forth in, where applicable to that Party, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other obligations under international law.

2 The establishment, implementation and application of the criminalisation under Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention should furthermore be subject to the principle of proportionality, with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society, and should exclude any form of arbitrariness or discriminatory or racist treatment.

Additional information

Question 14: Do you have any other comments on Article 5 or any additional information about the transposition of that provision in your domestic law, which has not been touched upon in your replies to questions above?

Appendix II**List of responding Parties
(in alphabetical order)**

1. Albania
2. Austria
3. Armenia
4. Azerbaijan
5. Belgium
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina
7. Cyprus
8. Denmark
9. Finland
10. France
11. Germany
12. Hungary
13. Italy
14. Latvia
15. Moldova
16. Monaco
17. Netherlands
18. Norway
19. Poland
20. Portugal
21. Romania
22. San Marino
23. Slovak Republic
24. Sweden
25. Switzerland
26. Türkiye
27. Ukraine