Compilation of Good Practices with regard to deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration

2023

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I.   List of acronyms

CDCT - Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism

DDR – Deradicalisation, Disengagement and Social Reintegration

RAN – Radicalisation Awareness Network

VEOs – Violent extremist offenders

II.   Introduction

This Compilation of Good Practices is intended to provide a snapshot of current programmes aimed at deradicalising, disengagement or reintegrating individuals who have been convicted of terrorism-related offences or at risk of becoming involved in terrorism or violent extremism.

In recent years, a range of deradicalisation and disengagement programmes have been established in Council of Europe member States in response to organised terrorist and violent extremist activity. While a growing number of individuals have been investigated and prosecuted for terrorism-related offences, the often short sentences and the lack of clear concepts on how to deal with them have increased calls for more sustainable deradicalisation and disengagement programmes to be implemented to ensure that such individuals do not pose a continuing risk after their release from detention. Equally, programmes have also been developed for at-risk individuals who may be seeking or have tentatively joined terrorist or violent extremist groups, usually aimed at preventing further escalation into acts of terrorist violence. Furthermore, at the conclusion of these processes, several member States have established social reintegration programmes for deradicalised individuals and persons who have disengaged from terrorism as a means of helping them to participate in society in a peaceful, positive and pro-social manner.

At time of writing, while there is considerable evidence that many of these programmes have been successful in reducing the risk of persons re-engaging with terrorist groups and preventing further terrorist acts (some of which will be mentioned throughout this report), there also significant gaps in both the theory and practice of deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration. As such, there is a need for member States to share their good practices based on their respective experiences and knowledge.

The Compilation thus aims to support member States in developing their own programmes by learning from what is seen to be effective, or not, in other member States. Furthermore, this Compilation has been designed to support further engagement by the Council of Europe in this area, particularly as the factual basis for the preparation of subsequent follow-up activities envisaged in the Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2023-2027).

III.   Background

This Compilation of Good Practices was conceived of as the first step in a sequence of actions by the Council of Europe in supporting the development and implementation of deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration programmes.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe instructed the Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism (CDCT) in 2018 to draw up the Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2018-2022), which is centred around three thematic strands (prevention, prosecution and protection). The Strategy provides a set of concrete activities aimed at improving the capacity of member States to prevent and combat terrorism while respecting human rights, the rule of law and democracy.

At its 6th Plenary Meeting (18-20 May 2021), the CDCT decided to initiate Activity 3.1 of the Strategy by setting up an intergovernmental Working Group to collect information from member States with regards to deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration programmes.

The Committee on Counter-Terrorism Working Group on the Collection of Good Practices in Deradicalisation, Disengagement and Social Reintegration (CDCT-DDR) was established to support this task and provide direction, guidance and support to the Secretariat and expert consultants hired for this purpose.

The Working Group's activities took into account existing Council of Europe guidance and material in this regard, including the Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on dangerous offenders, Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)6 on terrorists acting alone,[1] and Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the risk assessment of individuals indicted or convicted of terrorist offences, among other relevant sources and documents.

The Working Group held several meetings between October 2021 and the completion of this document in May 2023. The Working Group was supported in this regard by expert consultants, namely Dr James Khalil and Ms Sofia Koller, in the early design and scoping of the activity. This report was prepared by Prof. Ioan Durnescu, Faculty of Social Work and Sociology at the University of Bucharest.

IV.   Main terms and concepts

The Compilation uses a number of specialised terms which have become commonplace in the area of deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration. However, the lack of clarity in terminology has 'led to political and practical action executed with largely absent theoretical frameworks or clear-cut concepts' (Koehler, 2017: 2)

It should also be noted that while the Council of Europe Counter-terrorism Strategy (2018-2022) used the term "best practices", the CDCT-DDR Working Group decided to reframe this as "good practices" given the absence of conclusive data on what is "best" in this area, notably due to the lack of rigorous evaluation methods and relatively short lifespan of many of the programmes and initiatives under consideration. This also recognises that what works in one particular context may not apply equally in other contexts, particularly given that local dynamics and capacities can often be highly influential in supporting the success of these programmes. The concept of "good practices" was defined by the Working Group as those practices that are considered by the member States as effective, sustainable, and transferable.

The main terms and concepts used within this report are further elaborated below:

Deradicalisation - in the general sense, refers to any initiative or programme that aims to reduce a risk of reoffending by addressing the way people think or the belief system that is considered associated to extremist ideologies. As a concept, "deradicalisation" is understood to be a social and/or psychological process by which an individual abandons their terrorist ideology and therefore their commitment to a terrorist group or cause. This may emerge from a change in the attitudes or beliefs. While the term "deradicalisation" has been used in many such contexts to describe the process of relinquishing terrorist views by abandoning violent extremist ideologies, certain practitioners tend not to focus on the role of ideology in the exit process, but rather see every form of (assisted) departure from terrorist activities, and associated violent extremist ideologies, as "deradicalisation" in a broad sense (see Hansen and Lid, 2020).

Disengagement - can be understood to be the process whereby a person is undertaking practical steps from being associated with terrorism activities. Disengagement is usually associated with a reduced risk

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[1] C/f Art 24: "Member States are encouraged to establish disengagement and de-radicalisation programmes for individuals at risk of becoming terrorists acting alone. Without prejudice to criminal law procedures, member States are also encouraged to consider establishing de-radicalisation programmes specifically tailored to the situation of foreign terrorist fighters, including returnees. Where appropriate, such programmes should involve family members, as well as academic experts, civil society, religious leaders and community leaders. Special consideration should be given to the particular needs of minors and individuals otherwise deemed vulnerable."

of terrorist violence as the person in question is no longer actively working with other members to achieve their ideological goals. However, "disengagement" may not necessarily involve a complete break away from a terrorist group or terrorist activities, but can be used to describe a significant temporary or permanent role change. If deradicalisation implies a psychological change, disengagement is more about a behavioural change.

Effective – the programmes are designed and implemented with clear objectives and achieve their aims within the limits of their given resources (budget, legal framework, professional capacity, etc.)

Programme – within the scope of this research, programmes are broadly considered to be any initiative, project, or set of defined activities within a broader structure (i.e. prison or probation environment) which guides individual participants towards certain intended outcomes.

Public health approach – this refers to the division between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention targets the whole population as a whole. Secondary prevention focuses more on the population at-risk. Tertiary prevention involves individuals who were already sentenced for terrorism related crimes. This report aims primarily at describing tertiary prevention programmes, as they have been presented by member State representatives and the current relevant literature. Based on data-driven research, this report also prioritises preventive measures in this area.

Social reintegration – There is no commonly accepted definition of what social reintegration means for deradicalised or disengaged persons. The Committee of Ministers Recommendation on terrorists acting alone encourages member States to "to consider setting up social reintegration programmes for de-radicalised individuals and individuals who have disengaged from terrorism with a view to re-establishing a sense of belonging to society at large."[2] Reintegration generally refers to the process by which individuals disengaging from terrorist activity adopts a new, healthy role and identity within a community. This may also involve "resocialisation", a process of implementing a range of social, economic, psychological, educational and legal measures for the purpose of social reintegration. Programmes of this nature are generally aimed at ensuring that formerly radicalised persons can live peacefully in a community (social reintegration) and are able to function as an independent person (functional reintegration). It can encompass programmes which take place during detention, prior to release and/or after the release of the individual into the community. Social reintegration can also be viewed as the "desirable and expected outcome" of successful deradicalisation and disengagement programmes.

Sustainable – programme implementation can continue efficiently in the long run, beyond the initial experimental period;

Transferable - with the necessary changes, other actors can implement the practice in different environments and contexts.

V.   Methodology

The research methodology is based on mixed methods by combining four primary sources of information: questionnaire responses, follow-up interviews with selected country representatives, research literature and brief documentation in the RAN Collection.

The questionnaire (Annex A) was agreed by the Working Group in October 2021 and is divided into five parts: current programmes, programme design and operational practices, risk assessment, monitoring and evaluation, individual needs' assessment and Risk management and thematic considerations and specific practices (transversal issues).

The analysis of the response used the thematic approach, which aimed at identifying, analysing and reporting repeated patterns (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

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[2] CM/Rec(2018)6, Art 25

The Questionnaire prepared by the Council of Europe Working Group on Deradicalisation, Disengagement and Social Reintegration (CDCT-DDR) was distributed by the Secretariat to all CDCT members on 5 November 2021 with a deadline for responses by 5 February 2022.

To date, **nineteen (19) completed questionnaires have been received.**[3]

Six follow-up interviews were carried out with experts[4] in order to clarify or add to the questionnaire responses. An interview protocol was used to guide the interviews (Annex B). However, the concrete interviews were adapted to each jurisdiction depending on the main features of the programme, the missing information and so on.

In order to identify what is missing from the current DDR programmes, a rapid literature review was conducted. A rapid literature review is a form of evidence synthesis that provides fast information for decision making. This method was used due to the time constrains and also taking into account the existing systematic reviews. The latter were preferred as the main source of research evidence considering their scientific rigour in identifying what is effective, sustainable and transferable in the DDR programmes.

In order to add and nuance the existing information collected, the RAN Collection[5] of good practices was also consulted.

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[3] Completed questionnaires were received from: Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland and Türkiye. However, several responding States do not report the existence of any particular programme or action.

[4] The six experts were coming from: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands.

[5] RAN Collection Archive available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-collection-archives_en

VI.   Findings

Section I - Current programmes

Like any correctional programme, DDR programmes do not operate in a vacuum. On the contrary, they operate in very concrete and sometimes very demanding social, psychological and institutional contexts, such as prisons, probation services, municipalities and so on. The way they are designed, planned, resourced and implemented determine often their performance. This is the reason the first section of the Findings will look at these macro-level aspects, such as strategies, legislation, types of programmes, multi-agency co-operation and types of target groups.

a.   Programme scope and context

As one of the main findings, most of the questionnaire responses received are from States that have implemented or are implementing programmes relating to deradicalisation, disengagement or social reintegration. The very few that have not reported such programmes are countries perceived by the State authorities as having little or no terrorism related activities.

National Policies and Strategies
In many jurisdictions, the programmes are widely based on **national policies or strategies** (see, for example **France, Finland, and Georgia**), while in others, they are more based on the initiatives of different institutions, mainly from the criminal justice system.

Good practices

In **France**, the National Plan for Preventing Radicalisation empowers the Prison Administration Directorate, Ministry of Justice, to develop a dedicated strategy to face the security challenges posed by the risk of violence, in prison and once the inmate is released, based on a radical ideology and the risk of proselytism by detainees. The strategy is based on the identification, assessment and handling of detainees convicted of acts of terrorism and common law offenders suspected of violent radicalisation in relation to extremist ideology in a mixed detention regime. The cornerstone of the French strategy, prompted by the national plan, is the creation of **five Radicalisation Assessment Units** (QER) to determine the ideological exposure, the risk of violent action and the degree of proselytism of the detainee. Seven **Radicalisation Disengagement Units** (QPR) work on the disengagement of radicalised detainees through a multidisciplinary approach based on both collective and individualised interviews and activities.

In **Portugal**, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (ENCT), approved by the Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 7-A/2015, of 20 February, advocates for an Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation, Violent Extremism and Recruitment to Terrorism (initially called PAPREVRT and more recently renamed PRET). Within this Plan, there is a Program aimed at promoting what is generically referred to as "exit and disengagement strategies". This Programme focuses on the application of measures to promote and support exit strategies in four essential aspects - flexible multi-disciplinary intervention, inter-institutional and articulated co-operation process, integrated and shared vision of the problem and, whenever possible, a case-by-case approach with detailed and personalised use of the already existing resources, and rehabilitation and reintegration mechanisms.

The National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism adopted by **Switzerland** in 2017 provided the Conference of Cantonal Justice and Police Directors (KKJPD) the legal ground to commission the **Swiss Competence Center for Correctional Services (SKJV)** to elaborate **guidelines for disengagement work**.[6]

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[6] More information about these guidelines can be found here: https://www.skjv.ch/de/unsere-themen/praevention-von-radikalisierung.

The co-ordinating role for the implementation of these strategies is allocated to the intelligence service, national police, ministries of justice or ministries of interior or inter-ministerial commissions.

In some countries, these policies or strategies are monitored closely at both national and local levels.

Good practice

In **Finland,** the P/CVE work is guided by National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2019-2023.

Preventive work is developed, co-ordinated and led by the National Co-operation Group, in which members represent the key national, regional and local authorities and NGOs. The Ministry of the Interior appoints the members and leads the work of the National Co-operation Group The state of the implementation of the National Plan is evaluated annually. In Finland, four cities have set up local co-operation networks.[7]

Legislative Frameworks

When it comes to the legislative framework governing **the implementation** of the programmes, the responding States mainly refer to **criminal law and specific legal instruments regulating prison and probation services**. At the implementation level, most programmes are based on penal codes, penal enforcement codes, prison law or ministerial orders and regulations. Usually, the latter are very detailed and prescriptive.

Good practice

In **Poland,** relevant programmes would be governed by Order no. 19/16 describes in detail how the 'therapeutic treatment' should be designed and performed in the penitentiary institutions, including in-ward and out-ward activities, schooling etc.

To a lesser extent, several responses also highlighted a key role for social services, health authorities and educational institutions, mainly in relation to more local actions. However, some responses state that there is no legislative basis for some of these programmes as they are effectively outsourced and independently operated by non-governmental organisations.

Generic or Specialised Programmes

Our analysis shows that programmes can be situated within various methodological frameworks. Whereas some programmes are **specifically tailored** to address issues related to deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration (including programmes aimed at preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) or specific terrorism-related recidivism prevention programmes), others are part of, or expansions to, **broader sets of policies and programmes,** such as the protection of children, public education, or as part of various projects run by prison and probation services (see later in this report the Anchor Model in **Finland**, the programmes in **Poland and Romania**).

Due to the low number of persons sentenced for terrorist-related offences in their jurisdiction, some respondents stated that there are **no specific programmes available** for this group (see **Estonia, Portugal, Romania** etc.).

However, in some cases, programmes for high risk offenders or for those involved in organised crime are adapted to work with those sentenced for terrorism related crimes. (see ENTRÉ in **Sweden** below).

Good practices

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[7] For more information, please see the National action plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 2019–2023 : Government resolution 19 December 2019 - Valto (valtioneuvosto.fi)

An example as such is SONEKO[8] in **Austria** which is based on a New Zealand model of '**family conference model**' that brings around the participant all the relevant figures, such as parents, siblings, partners and so on. Based on this reintegration model, the probation service could identify the resources and the risks within the personal system of the participant. All these activities are performed based on the person's consent.

In **Portugal,** for example, as there is not a significant number of radicalised persons in prison or on probation, there are no dedicated programmes for such a group. However, **generic programmes** are in place for offender rehabilitation and reintegration.

MAPPA (Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements) is used to facilitate the co-operation between prison and police authorities to manage offenders who have committed violent crimes, such as sexual offences, domestic violence or violent extremist crimes.

ENTRÉ in **Sweden** is a programme adapted from another programme designed to work with organised crime offenders.

The scope of these programmes also varies widely in terms of geographical coverage, with programmes covering **local, national or even international levels**. In the latter case, some responses noted that such programmes are monitored/supported within the framework of projects funded or implemented by international organisations (see, for instance, International Organization for Migration (IOM) in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**).

Good practice

In **Germany**, the programmes are designed and funded at the federal level by different ministries (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry for Family Affaires, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth) but the implementation is mostly done at the States level.

For example, since 2017, the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) funds pilot projects in the thematic area of "Prevention and deradicalisation in prison and probation service" in the Federal program "Live Democracy!". Up to € 740,000.00 per year for each pilot project can be made available from federal funds to finance the pilot projects.[9]

Even among the specialised programmes we have a wide diversity. As such, the nature and scope of the programmes vary from **very broad perspectives** (i.e. where the programmes may include multiple aspects of deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration) to more **specific approaches**, aiming at dealing with one or more of those domains in particular (for example, DERAD in **Austria** is a faith-based intervention that focuses more on the counter-narrative work).

Good practice

An interesting alternative for the programme-based interventions is the '**individual trajectory**' approach that can be found in the **Wallonia-Brussels Federation (**as well as in other States such as **Germany)**. This is a tailor-made individual approach that intervenes in all areas of life. Several actors are automatically involved in such a trajectory. Support including security and socio-prevention aspects should be provided with a long-term perspective and continuity. Because of the importance of the living environment, the trajectory takes close account of the person's living context and may rely on local/family partners. In the construction of the trajectory, the following non-exhaustive areas can be proposed: psychosocial guidance, training and job placement, (specialised) psychological follow-up, possibly trauma clinic, dealing with possible addictions, involvement of the social context, opportunity to involve people who

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[8] SONEKO can be also considered a method of working rather than a programme per se.
[9] The specific funding amounts are also published on the program website*: https://www.demokratie-leben.de/projekte-expertise/projekte-finden?tx_tbsprojektfinder_liste%5Baction%5D=list&tx_tbsprojektfinder_liste%5Bcontroller%5D=Projekt&cHash=192aab72e2dd08fe6e4d2139eb8f2f87.*

offer an "alternative discourse" to violent extremist ideas such as religious reference counsellors and other supportive figures.

b. The context of delivery

Prevention work is usually located in police departments. However, in most cases, police play a co-ordinating role and involve many local partners: social services, health services, education institutions, NGOs etc. States usually meets the costs of these activities.

Alternative ways of organising prevention services are within the municipalities (**Norway** – the mentoring scheme) or educational institutions (**Georgia**). In both cases, co-operation with other stakeholders is crucial.

Good practice

Exit activity by the police in Finland[10]
The National Bureau of Investigation co-ordinates the so-called **Exit** activity of the police. Exit activities by the police focuses on two crime areas: organised crime and violent extremism.

In both areas, voluntary Exit participants are provided with help and support in escaping the influence of an environment that is harmful to them and their close ones. Being a voluntary Exit participant means that the person is not required to give any account of any crime they may have committed or be aware of. This protects the person and those around them against any threat or violence. The aim is to remain objective: the police genuinely want to help through Exit.

The support includes assessing personal safety, making arrangements for safety, improving social conditions, or reinforcing a non-criminal identity. Sometimes a new working and living environment can be arranged. The police are assisted in this work by a non-governmental organisation, HelsinkiMission, through their Aggredi programme which provides social guidance and psychosocial support. This partner organisation was selected because of its strong experience and particular expertise in violent and gang crime.

Those wishing to participate in Exit are evaluated comprehensively, and individual exit plans are made for them and implemented together with the participant. Exit work is highly confidential, and any information processing related to the participants is always done on a case-by-case basis and in agreement with the participant.

However, most tertiary prevention programmes are delivered within the prison context (e.g, DERAD and PSYBEG in **Austria**; PPRV in **France**), in probation, or in non-prison establishments (e.g. PAIRS in **France**). Where prison and probation work together, the programmes are delivered in both environments (e.g. **Sweden**).

As in the prevention field, programmes are often delivered with the **support of other institutions,** organisations, or places of worship. Apart from NGOs, agencies such as employment service, schools, health care, social services, police and the security services are often invited to partake. In some countries, NGOs involved in the deradicalisation, disengagement or social reintegration programmes are previously approved by the authorities (see **Poland**). The State remains responsible for funding these activities, usually via the Ministry of Justice budget.

Good Practice

An example of a non-prison-based programme is **France's PAIRS programme (*Programme d'accompagnement individualisé et de réaffilitaion sociale*)** that provides comprehensive and

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[10] For more information, please see: https://poliisi.fi/en/exit-activity

individual support for radicalised people on their way out of violent ideology by identifying all the factors that led to the changeover, as well as the breaking points. It allows the emergence of the potential of the people being monitored to promote their professional integration by encouraging a space for dialogue in which the person finds their individuality.

This intervention aims to support disengagement from violent radicalisation and prevent the risk of violence while promoting social reintegration. It is individual, as it is supported by a modulated approach depending on the person (from 3 to 20 hours per week with the possibility of housing) and evolves during the follow-up as a result of the re-assessment. A multidisciplinary team that includes educators, psychologists, insertion counsellors, experts in Islamic studies and others is responsible for this type of intervention.

The PAIRS system exists in the form of day centres in four cities in France: Paris, Marseille, Lyon and Lille and is therefore aimed at people placed under court supervision in an open environment.

Research box

The most recent systematic reviews (see Morrison et al, 2021; McBride et al, 2022) argue that the involvement of the *community* and **non-State actors** seems to be crucial in achieving successful reintegration. Interventions such as educational initiatives, restorative justice, inter-group dialogues, victim reconciliation and so on appear to facilitate the peacemaking process in the community.

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c. Multi-agency approach

By and large, countries describe their **approach** to deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration as **multi-agency and multi-disciplinary.** At the local level, the implementing bodies often co-operate with **actors from civil society organisations, social workers, and health and education professionals.**

Regarding actors involved in these programmes, **prison and probation services** are often mentioned as supervising or implementing bodies, alongside other entities such as governmental bodies, law enforcement and/or intelligence agencies.

In **Sweden**, for example, a specialised department within the Swedish Prison and Probation Service (SPPS) deals with the programme (ENTRÉ), a one-to-one cognitive-behavioural programme for violent extremism.

For preventive services, educational institutions (**Georgia**), municipalities (**Norway, Netherlands, Belgium)** and NGOs seem to play also a central role (see DERAD in **Austria** or Deaconess Foundation[11] in **Finland**).

An interesting example is offered by **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, where the International Organization of Migration is actively involved in designing and implementing reintegration, resocialisation and rehabilitation programmes together with local partners (including security services, health services and educational institutions).

In some countries (see **Portugal**), the internal security system co-ordinates all preventive and counter-terrorism services.

Regarding resocialisation, social integration and related aspects, responses indicate that these programmes can be supplemented or supported by local government, social services, job centres, NGOs or religious entities (see **Poland, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands** etc.).

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[11] More information about the activities of Deaconess Foundation in relation to Exit work can be found here: https://www.hdl.fi/en/exit/

Good practice

Anchor Model in Finland
Anchor work refers to multi-professional co-operation targeted at children and adolescents under 18 years of age to promote their wellbeing and prevent crime. It also seeks to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. Anchor work is carried out by multi-professional teams consisting of professionals from the police, social services, health services and youth services. The purpose of Anchor work is to provide young people and their families with individualised and comprehensive support at an early stage and, if necessary, to refer them to the services, care and support provided by other experts.

Anchor work is organised at a local or regional level, so that it meets the needs and special characteristics of the area, but it builds on shared national principles and objectives. Multiprofessional co-operation is based on permanent structures that have been jointly agreed. The responsibility for national guidance and development rests with the national co-ordinator, together with the national steering group.[12]

A more complex picture is described by federal States, where the federal government have different roles in relation to the States or landers/cantons (see **Germany** and **Switzerland**). Generally speaking, it seems that the federal governments are adopting policies and strategies, that are later implemented or adapted at the State level, depending on local priorities, traditions or institutional architecture. Funding very often follows the same route (see **Germany,** where different ministries co-fund federal and State-level programmes).

Good practice

A useful example of local multi-agency co-operation comes from **Wallonia-Brussels** where there is a Network for dealing with violent extremism and radicalism. Created by the Government of the Wallonia-Brussels Federation in January 2016, this offers citizens and professionals help and support in preventing any form of violent extremism or radicalism. Two specific services make up this system: the Network's Resource and Support Centre and the Centre for Help and Care for anyone concerned by Violent Extremism and Radicalism.

The Network also includes the *Service des équipes mobiles de l'Enseignement obligatoire*, which intervenes at the request of and in support of the directors of schools or PMS centres (Psycho-medical and social centres), in case of problems related to the phenomena of extremism and violent radicalism, and the radicalism referents appointed within the general administrations of the Ministry of the Walloon-Brussels Federation (Youth Aid, Houses of Justice, Education, Culture, Sport), in order to provide adequate responses to the actors in their sector.

In several jurisdictions, there is an express duty to co-operate between institutions as stipulated in anti-terrorism strategies or legislation such as penal codes (**Belgium**, see box) and various laws, including penitentiary and penal codes (**Netherlands**). This duty to co-operate often pertains to specific roles and functions within the system as well as provide a specific basis by which certain institutions and professionals have to share or exchange information.

Good practices

An example of comprehensive inter-agency co-operation comes from **Belgium** where the inter-agency and inter-disciplinary approach is regulated by the law. In this context, local integrated security cells (*cellules de securite integrales et locales* - CSIL) are required to work together to remove the threats.

The threats are identified by a co-ordination unit – called CUTA (Co-ordination Unit for Threat Analysis). The same unit manage the **Common Database** (CDB) that is an instrument for real-time information sharing of all unclassified information regarding individuals and organisations that are involved or are likely to be involved in terrorist activities.

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[12] For more information, please visit: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/164528

The law and the Penal Code in Belgium (Art. 548) allows agencies working together on a case to **waive the professional secrecy**.

However, as mentioned by one respondent, the representatives of these agencies called to work together need 'first to get to know each other and then to build up trust among them … We also have some **guidelines** to help us better understand each other's roles.' (Belgium). In other words, the human dimension of the inter-agency co-operation should be highlighted in relation to DDR work.

In the **Netherlands**, the multi-agency approach to radicalisation (MAR), a multidisciplinary case table hosted by the custodial services, went through a data protection impact assessment to make sure that data is handled in a proper way and in line with GDPR standards. Furthermore, the Penitentiary Law regulates at art. 18b the obligation of the specific institutions of the criminal justice sector to share certain information in case there is a risk of an inmate to commit a serious violent or sex offence.

In some States, the legal framework for co-operation is provided by joint ministerial circular for comprehensive approach to violent radicalism and terrorism (see **Wallonia-Brussels Federation** where four ministries signed such a joint circular in 2019).

Good practice

For a clear and effective **management of information, Austria** has designed a process map followed by clear instructions on what, when and to whom information should be transferred:

The following events or incidents concerning the radicalised offenders must be reported immediately to the Co-ordination Unit for the Prevention of Extremism and Deradicalization (Ref. No.: 2022-0.101.334) as well as to the responsible State Office for State Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (LVT) and the State Security Intelligence Service (DSN) in identical copies:
- self-appearance
- detention with restriction/without restriction
- any transfer to another correctional institution
- inpatient stay in a hospital
- any unguarded departure from the correctional institution
- in the case of the granting of release, the one-time notification of the beginning, the expected duration and the termination of this measure
- application for and decision (notice) on serving the term of imprisonment in electronically monitored house arrest (frontdoor and backdoor)
- suspicion of judicially punishable acts
- administrative offences

- security measures according to § 103 StVG
- Attempts at radicalisation towards other persons or signs indicating a radicalisation
- results of the dismissal conferences according to § 144a StVG
- dismissal
- conditional release (incl. resolution)
- deprivation of liberty (from pre-trial detention)
- postponement of execution of sentence according to § 133 StVG
- transfer to home country for execution of sentence
- temporary waiver of execution of sentence according to § 133a StVG

The following type of information regarding radicalised inmates should be collected and disseminated to the relevant institutions:

- All external contacts are known and monitored, especially visits, telephone calls and correspondence.
- The social environment is known
- Behaviour, personality and habits
- Educational background
- Contacts and friendships among inmates
- Mental condition of the inmate
- Health condition of the inmate

In some European jurisdictions, local municipalities play an integrative and co-ordination role (see **Netherlands, Belgium**, **Denmark**). In their case, mayors or their representatives are responsible for co-ordinating the DDR actions at the local level.

Good practice

A good example of local co-operation is provided by **Germany,** where multi-agency response is facilitated by a mechanism called **case conference**. In this direction, case-conference units are active in all federal States to put together representatives of all agencies and organisations relevant for each individual case.

For a better co-ordination, the federal authorities organise **focal points** for different themes such as right-wing extremism, Islamic terrorism etc. For example, the focal point for Islamist terrorism is the Ministry of Interior. The Advice centre for radicalisation, located in the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, is another example as such.

Research box

Morrison et al (2021) stress that involving religious institutions, civil society, and other non-State actors could enhance **legitimacy** of DDR programmes. Moreover, Grip et al (2019) stress that while some interventions may work very well in some jurisdictions, they may not travel very well in others. They give as an example the radio programmes used very effectively in Mali, Niger and Chad which could not work so well in highly digitalised countries.

d. Target groups and participants

Regarding the groups targeted by the preventive programmes (secondary prevention), responses show that they are mainly composed of persons **identified as 'at risk' of involvement in violent extremism** and/or **persons with a history of violent extremist behaviour**. While the former group may be referred to a preventive programme by family, friends, colleagues, educators or others, the latter group may be more likely to be involved through prison and probation services.

For instance, in **Germany**, counselling services exist to provide advice and education on radicalisation in general, as well as how to best deal with a concrete case of radicalisation in the community. In **Türkiye**, in order to prevent recruitment and raise awareness in society about terrorism and terrorist organisations,

under the co-ordination of Counter Terrorism Department of the TNP (Turkish National Police), youth between the ages of 14-25 considered at-risk are the main target audience. Under the co-ordination of Counter Terrorism Department of the Turkish National Police, the Public Awareness and Prevention Activities Offices operate in many Turkish provinces to conduct activities. Stakeholder institutions, such as the Ministry of Youth and Sports, provide support to the programme, while law enforcement officers also work to co-ordinate and secure actions such as excursion activities, sports activities and cultural activities.

The target group for the **Norwegian** programmes is quite large:

  • Individuals who are regarded to be vulnerable for recruitment to radicalisation,
  • Individuals who are radicalised or in a radicalisation process,
  • Individuals who want help to leave an extreme group,
  • Individuals convicted according to the terrorist legislation.

In **France**, for example, people can be referred to the programme if they are considered at risk of being radicalised or identified as radicalised but reachable through the programmes.

Individuals who have been indicted or convicted of terrorist offences were described by most of the respondents as the primary target group for their tertiary prevention programmes. Sometimes the definitions are quite broad to include, for instance, 'individuals with connections to terrorist organisations or violent extremism milieus' (see **Sweden**).

Good practice

For research purposes, the **European Database of Terrorist Offenders (EDT)** was established in the **Netherlands** to include comprehensive judicial information on European terrorist and violent extremist offenders since 2012 onwards. This database includes information on developmental, individual, biographical and contextual factors that can help researchers (among others) to perform empirical analyses of using primary data in order to disentangle certain types of profiles, lists of risk and protective factors and so on.

More information can be found in the paper by Alberda et al (2021).[13]

While most responses do not indicate a specific ideological orientation, others suggest that the programmes are aimed at specific groups, such as ideological groups, or based on age or particular profiles, such as juvenile delinquents.

Regarding **participation** in these programmes, most responses indicate that the persons involved participate on a **voluntary and/or consensual basis**, with or without particular conditions attached. For instance, in certain States, participation is voluntary. Still, it may be possible for judicial authorities to require participation as a prerequisite for early release or prison privileges (see **Austria, Estonia, France, and Romania**). For example, case conference is mandatory in **Austria** for any decision related to conditional release.

However, other responses note that participation in such a programme can be required as part of a criminal sentence and situations where an individual can be mandated or referred to these programmes by competent authorities, such as the courts (**Austria, France**).

Research Box

According to Basra and Neumann (2020), while the focus has remained on ideologies similar to those espoused by Al-Qaida, ISIL(Da'esh) and associated movements, there has been lately an uptick in research

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into deradicalisation and disengagement for **violent far-right or ethnonationalist ideologies**. This may reflect a rising concern in Europe towards this type of violent extremism.

Voluntary participation, including in the prison context, seems to enhance motivation and facilitate positive outcomes. It seems that programmes that work with mandated participation face **challenges** such as: high drop-outs, negative therapeutical alliance, diverted resources to deal with non-compliance and poor attendance, resistance to cognitive and behavioural change, reinforcement of extremist attitudes and grievances (Cherney et al, 2021).

To conclude on the general context of the DDR programmes, we can speculate that programmes that operate on solid legislative and institutional framework have a clearer structure, more transparent mechanisms of inter-agency co-operation, are better resourced and, therefore, enjoy more sustainability. From the interviews and the survey, we could draw the conclusion that multi-agency co-operation is facilitated by this sort of overarching structure.

As a recent trend, it seems that more and more local municipalities take responsibility for the security and safety of their citizens. Nonetheless, these initiatives usually are implemented within larger national or federal DDR strategies or legislation. Having the local municipalities involved in this type of activities seems to suggest that DDR enjoy the more general social trend of 'Think globally and act locally.'

In line with this observation, we can conclude that many examples offered in this section may travel well between member States. However, the wide variety of local traditions and institutional architecture suggest that these examples could be emulated rather than just copied from one jurisdiction to another.

Unfortunately, there is no solid research evidence that can document what type of context is more inducive of high performance in DDR activities. However, most respondents estimated that clear legislation and transparent mechanisms of inter-agency co-operation could contribute to effective interventions. Besides strategy and legislation, respondents suggested also that direct human contact and inter-personal co-operation should be strengthened in order to make the co-operation smooth and effective.

The target groups covered by the DDR programmes are quite diverse. However, the tertiary prevention DDR programmes seem to favour those who were sentenced of terrorism related crimes or those who are radicalised or at risk of radicalisation while serving a prison sentence for other crimes. In most of these initiatives, prisons seem to play the front line role while probation services following shortly. As mentioned above, more and more non-justice actors are getting involved in the DDR work, such as local municipalities, social services, educational institutions etc. As of the moment, the role of these institutions is usually defined at the local level. However, in the future some guidelines on how their role could be shaped in the multi-agency co-operation framework could be useful.

Section II - Programme design and operational practices

a. Aims and objectives

The aims of these programmes are largely consistent among responses, focusing on the overall goal of preventing further engagement with violent extremism (and/or violent extremist groups), reducing the risk of recidivism, and enhancing pro-social[14] behaviour among participants.

As such, the particular objectives of these programmes range from focusing on addressing the **participants' background and needs** (including autonomy, responsibility, socialisation, and (re-)integration), **mitigating the effects of marginalisation and isolation** (by promoting personal networks, community activities, or enhancing positive life experiences), to a broader **prevention and security aim** (exit from violent extremism and the prevention of violent acts / recidivism).

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[14] "Pro-social" is to be understood as behaviour that is in line with mainstream norms and values of the society at any given point in time.

Three types of programmes could be identified among the respondents:

1. Those primarily focusing on disengagement;
2. Those focusing on deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration;
3. Those which have a broader aim to strengthen civic equality and integration (see **Estonia, Georgia, Poland, Romania**);

In several European countries, the main focus of these programmes is in the first category, aiming to support individuals in disengaging from violence, extremist behaviours, or association with violent extremist groups or organisations.

Good practices

In **Spain**, a prison-based programme aims at stopping violent behaviour without challenging the religious and ideological foundation of extremist ideas.

The primary aim of **PAIRS in France** is disengagement and distancing from terrorism. Deradicalisation (pursued via debates, religious or secularism workshops and so on) is only a by-product of the disengagement activities.

However, it seems that many European programmes belong to the second category, focusing on supporting sentenced individuals to distance themselves from the violent radical ideologies and networks while accepting universal human rights and democratic values.

At the same time, many of these programmes aim to strengthen personal support networks, and enhance positive life prospects and plans.

Good practices

An example of such a comprehensive programme is Sweden's **ENTRÉ** programme. ENTRÉ targets violent and violent extremist-affiliated high-risk offenders. The main objective is to prevent recidivism in crime by identifying and visualising individual risks and needs, reducing criminal and violent behaviour, enhance offender pro-social activities, offer support to leave and giving practical support for desistance from violent extremist-milieus.

The Correctional Service in **Norway** is implementing a programme that includes religious guidance as part of the reintegration process.

Although there are no structured programmes available for working with VEOs in **Belgium**, the 'disengagement trajectories' include both educational and vocational interventions alongside alternative or counter-narratives on religion or ideology.

Research box

According to the study conducted by Basra and Neumann (2020) on Extremist Offender Management in 10 European Countries, there has been a shift away from a deradicalisation model towards one favouring disengagement, though they note the difference in practice can be minimal.

All three objectives – deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration - are recognised by the literature as legitimate ones when working with radicalised VEOs. However, some consider that disengagement is a more realistic and less ethically challenging objective than deradicalisation (Silke, 2011). Allowing the State to interfere with personal freedoms of thought and religion is considered problematic by some experts (Koehler, 2017). Somewhere in between those who support deradicalisation and those who support disengagement, are those who noticed that, in practice, programmes tend to impact on attitudes and behaviours at the same time (Marsden, 2017; Khalil et al., 2019).

b. Methodology

Only a few countries refer to the use of a specific methodology in the programmes (for instance, the cognitive-behavioural based treatment programme (CBT) or the "risk-needs-responsivity" model). Most of the programmes presented have **no explicit or clear theory of change.**

Different methods are mentioned by the respondents for working with people sentenced for violent extremist offences:

- Social diagnostic, risk assessment, biographical reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration work (**Austria**).
- Diagnosis, individualised care plan, individual and collective intervention methods (**France**).
- Individual and group interventions aiming at psycho-behavioural change (**Romania**).
- Cognitive, emotional and behavioural work (**Türkiye**).

Many respondents mentioned the multi-disciplinary approach as a critical one for assessment and intervention delivery. ENTRÉ in Sweden is a good example of a complex programme (see next page).

Table 1. The ENTRÉ model

ENTRÉ, in **Sweden**, is an individual CBT-based treatment program, originally created by the SPPS for convicted individuals with violence problems and connections to organised crime or criminal networks. The programme has been adapted for violent extremism and is based on a clear theory of change.

Phases in Entry program

Phase I		
Alliance Motivation Assesment Case formulation		

Phase II — Exploration and change of criminogenic needs within six themes

Phase III — Maintain behavioral changes, Support for continued change

4-6 sessions

25-35 sessions

2-3 sessions

- Adjusted to the client according to the Risk-Need-Responsvity principle
- 25-40 sessions
- 1-2 session a week
- 60-90 minutes per session
- Assignments between sessions
- Treatment length - 8 months
- Completers/dropouts

Kriminalvården

Model of Change for VE clients

Extremist Motivations

Meaningfulness/Ideology

Injustice/Politics

Social

Personal

Increased risk of violent extremism

Entry program

Identity & self image
Attitudes & values
Aggression & violence

Relations & associates

Social situation

Theme of choice

Themes- & criminogenic needs

Motivations to change

Ideological

Emotional

Practical

Individual risk factors

Decreased risk of violent extremism

Kriminalvården

> **Research Box**
>
> Most of the studies and systematic reviews stress the importance of a **clear and explicit theory** behind these programmes (see Morrison *et al* (2021), pp. 43-44). There theories should be theoretically sound and empirically validated. The programme theory is helpful in guiding the practitioners in their daily activities and in supporting evaluators to measure what was set to be influenced by the programme.

c. Activities

The activities included in the programmes are also largely consistent among countries. These activities are either **individual, group or (rarely) community-focused** and largely have the following areas: mentoring/counselling, sports, artistic pursuits, psychological or social support, professional development (including employment and work-related activities), and, less frequently, participation in various workshops, or debates.

Based on only a few responses that provided detail on the content or objective of such workshops, we could conclude that they usually include discussions on religious, political, ideological or cultural matters (see PAIRS in **France**).

Usually, these activities are based on assessment, intervention plan, or work concept.
Many respondents mentioned multi-disciplinary, multi-agency, individualisation and flexibility principles in one way or another.

It is worth noting here the existence of some **innovative methods** of working with VEOs such as photolanguage,[15] audio-visual media, bibliotherapy, film-debate (**France**), debates (**Romania**), etc.

In some countries, these activities are part of **comprehensive programmes**, such as ENTRÉ in **Sweden**. In this case, the programme covers topics such as personal identity, resilience, cognitive restructuring, emotions, violent behaviour, family relationships etc.

> **Research box**
>
> Research suggests that the prevalence of **mental health issues** especially among returnees and female VEOs is significant. Therefore, the programmes should consider granting more attention to mental health, burn out, trauma and PTSD. Alcohol and substance misuse could be also important targets for intervention in this context (see Copeland and Marsden, 2020 for a full review of evidence).
>
> Often neglected, **practical help**, in particular help in getting employment was found to be very effective in supporting social reintegration in **Northern Ireland** (Grip et al, 2019). Literature reviews and our own observations during this micro-study seems to suggest that sometimes the legislation is hampering the social reintegration of formers by imposing employment restrictions or allowing banks not to allow opening bank account.
>
> States should be encouraged to use seed-funding or microloans to facilitate small-scale businesses and mitigate social barriers (Grip et al, 2019).

d. Actors involved

Concerning the groups and actors involved in the activities above, most responding States rely on **various configurations of professionals**, most frequently mentioning law enforcement and security professionals, psychological or mental health professionals, social workers, religious or spiritual representatives, and academic experts.

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[15] "Photolanguage" refers to a conversation technique that uses photography as therapeutic cards or as conversation starter.

However, only a few responses note a role for **former terrorists** (including former - or disengaged extremists who have not been convicted of terrorist-related offences) in these programmes (**Bosnia and Herzegovina, Portugal, Türkiye).** A handful of representatives mentioned other actors, such as ethnic minorities or youth (see **Georgia**)

Research box

Morrison et al (2021) suggest that involving **families and friends** may be also beneficial for the success of the programmes. However, this can be useful only when they are of pro-social orientation. Involving **'formers'** could be beneficial especially for 'cementing and protecting their own disengagement process' (Morrison et al (2021), p.6). However, we should note here that the topic is still controversial for both researchers and practitioners. More research should be conducted to learn when, how and in what circumstances they can make a positive difference.

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e. Risk assessment

The responses indicate that the use of risk assessment procedures differs among countries. While some responses mention **specialised risk assessment tools** (such as the Violence Risk Assessment Protocol - VERA-2R and DYRIAS screener – in **Austria;** VERA- 2R in **the Netherlands** and **Sweden** or RDA in **Türkiye**), most responses do not specify the exact tool or methodology used in these situations. The tools mentioned explicitly by the respondents belong to the category of structured professional judgement tools and are mainly focused on the estimation of risk and less on the deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration. However, they could be used in both ways to a certain extent. Most of these tools cover different risk factors around beliefs and attitudes, context and intent, history and capability, commitment and motivation. With only a few exceptions they do not cover protective factors or strengths that can be used in the DDR interventions.

For some, **generic risk assessment tools** are used for all sentenced individuals, as part of the prison or probation intake procedure (see OASys in **Estonia**). In some countries, assessment is conducted following a strict procedure. For example, **in Italy**, at first the prisoner is assessed using structured professional judgement, followed by screening. In certain cases, this is followed also by full scale risk assessment. The same applies in **Sweden**, where first generic risk assessment tools are used while VERA-2R is employed only to deepen the assessment.

Screening tools for early signs of radicalisation were developed in some countries to prepare staff to intervene and prevent escalation (see European Project "TRAinTRAINING" in **Italy**).

In **Germany**, depending on the aim of the assessment, the DDR professionals are using either VERA2-R or TRAP-18 – for security purposes – and other diagnosis tools for the reintegration purposes.

Research box

According to Basra and Neumann (2020), the existing assessment tools are quite similar to each other. The main difference between them seems to consist in the amount of attention each tool dedicates to ideological aspects.

Most recent systematic reviews cited in this report seem to suggest that apart from the factors associated to radicalisation, deradicalisation and disengagement are also affected by other factors such as disappointment, disillusionment, fear of retaliation, loss of status, burnout and so on. It may be useful to revisit the existing risk assessment tools to bring them more in line with the new research findings. Gendered factors should be also reconsidered.

f. Individual needs' assessment

Several countries refer to needs' assessment as being **included in the broader risk assessment process** of concerned individuals.

Good practice

An interesting example is **Estonia,** where the generic risk/needs assessment tool (OASys) is used by both prison and probation services. This can contribute to better prison-probation co-operation and prevent confusion and evaluation fatigue from the participants.

Nonetheless, needs assessments, separately or as part of a risk assessment, appear to be a regular feature of these programmes and are considered by many States to be a vital aspect of these programmes. Furthermore, the needs assessment is part of the prison or probation procedures before designing the intervention plans (**Austria, Estonia, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Sweden).**

Several States consider needs assessments as necessary for the identification of personal (mainly psychological aspects as well as educational, economic, health-related or material factors) or contextual factors (including social relations, family or community networks, etc) which may have been instrumental in leading participants into violent extremist or terrorist milieus or which may be relevant in the deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration process.

Good practice

In **France**, for example, the diagnosis of the needs has to take place within three months. It should include information from the probation service, the perspective of the client and their family or relatives, and an assessment done by a multi-disciplinary team. Based on this comprehensive assessment, a management programme with individualised modules is set in motion.

In terms of the outcome of these needs assessments, several respondents note that they can help determine when and how to apply appropriate measures. Additionally, the outcome may help build **trust** between the actors involved, particularly between participants and programme staff.

In most of the cases, the needs assessment, together with the risk assessment, form the basis of the **individual plan of intervention**.

Good practices

As mentioned above, in **Germany**, special diagnosis tools are used for the purpose of assessing the reintegration needs. These tools are distinct from security-focused risk assessment tools, such as VERA2-R or TRAP18.

An example of such diagnosis tool was developed in a EU funded project called icommit.[16] The tool – called DesistKit – uses playing cards to encourage a collaborative approach in needs assessment.

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g. Risk management

Most responses mention that they implement risk management strategies, often under the supervision of (or in co-operation with) penitentiary and security services. However, responses did not provide detailed information on this point, and **no specific protocols were described**.

Good practices

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[16] More details can be found here: https://multiagencyco-operation.eu/

An exception to this general observation is the response from **Austria**, which describes the risk management procedure as involving risk assessment with VERA-2R, regular case review with the whole team and an independent correctional judge who regularly monitors the cases and take part in the case conferences. This allows for a good individualisation of the conditional release conditions. The Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service (DSN) participates in this **multi-eye procedure**.

In **Germany**, the Advice Centre on Radicalisation under the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees provides **guidelines** for managing the risk posed by radicalised individuals. A tool (called **the goal achievement and progress assessment tool**) is used to assess the needs and plan for the risk management actions in **Germany**.

It seems that **multi-disciplinary and multi-agency co-operation** plays a vital role in the risk management procedures in many member States (**Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, and Sweden**). In most cases, risk management is part of the **individual plan of intervention**.

Research box

Morrison et al (2021) identified *security* as one of the main themes, noting that security risks are seen as potential barrier to successful deradicalisation and disengagement. When individuals feel threatened or feel their physical safety is at risk, this can act as a deterrent to change and present a risk of re-engaging in terrorism. They note that certain groups regularly threatened or attempted to coerce former members, which can lead to significant psychological stress among disengaging terrorists. The authors concluded disengagement and deradicalisation programmes always need to have concrete protective measures for disengaged and former terrorists.

Based on the data collected in this section, it seems that most European DDR programmes have as a primary aim either disengagement or both disengagement and deradicalisation. As seen in the Research box above, in practice this divide is not that clearly cut. Besides these two traditional aims, more and more programmes take on board more positive objectives such as improvement to wellbeing or social reintegration. However, in order to support this development, States could integrate these aims into the definitions of success. Looking at the vast majority of evaluation reports, one can see that in most cases the success is currently defined in terms of reducing reoffending or reducing terrorist reoffending. By maintaining only these success indicators, the programme's other objectives may be ignored and not rewarded.

Further methods of interventions are being introduced into the field of DDR. Many of them are inspired from adjacent fields such as psychotherapy, social work, pedagogy, and so on. This movement seems to be encouraged by the increased co-operation between different agencies and different disciplines. Apart from the professionals, some programmes have also started to involve "formers" or so-called 'experts by experience'. Due to the novelty and controversies surrounding such an approach (and the potential security risks), some jurisdictions are still hesitant to take this route.

Most comprehensive specialised programmes (e.g. PAIRS, ENTRÉ etc.) cover a wide variety of activities such as counselling, vocational and educational training, religious debates, sport and so on. To help individuals to navigate through the social and bureaucratic maze, more and more programmes have introduced mentoring schemas. As mentioned by the respondents, more should be done to offer individuals practical help and support to overcome reintegration obstacles. Almost all respondents stressed that all these activities should be tailor-made and offered based on thorough risk and needs assessment.

In many cases, once the risk assessment was conducted the issue of risk is sent to the backstage. The data obtained in this study seems to suggest that risk management procedures are still to be developed further.

Section III - Monitoring and evaluation

Regarding monitoring and evaluation, most responding States seem to have some form of mechanism in place. Some responses indicate that no evaluation has taken place as their respective programmes have not yet completed their trial phases (**Austria**).

Some responses note that this is carried out through an **internal process**, where reports and impact indicators are transferred to relevant central authorities (for instance, to national multi-agency committees or a designated national co-ordinator) that are then responsible for the follow-up (**Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Italy**).

Good practice

In **Finland,** the projects funded via government grants typically need to integrate a section on monitoring and evaluation, where the applicants have to explain how these two activities will be performed.

The University of Helsinki from Finland is also currently part of a large consortium that is developing evaluation methodologies for VEO work (Project Indeed, co-funded by EU).

More and more countries are using **external evaluation**, where monitoring and evaluation are carried out by, or through the assistance of independent actors (such as academic experts, NGOs, international organisations, etc.).

Good practices

A valuable example of independent evaluation is the one conducted by the **French Institute of International Relations** on the PAIRS project, which shows, among others, that none of the PAIRS participants has reoffended in the follow-up period. For more, visit: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/hecker_djihadistes_un_jour_toujours_2021.pdf

In **Germany**, many DDR programmes were externally evaluated and found to be successful in preventing reoffending or promoting desistance. Some good examples of this include the following:

1.   https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Abschlussbericht-Evaluation-Beratungsstelle-Hessen.pdf

2.   https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Evaluation-KOMPASS_BFG_66_Heft1.pdf

3.   https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Beitragsreihe/beitrag-band-12-evaluation-beratungsstellen-deradikalisierung.html;jsessionid=5B42D611877E7CEC7AFEA2653F7A4E3B.intranet262?nn=410570

4.   https://www.hsfk.de/publikationen/publikationssuche/publikation/erfahrungen-aus-der-evaluationsplanung-eines-aussteigerprogramms

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However, it should be noted that several responses show that these processes are not necessarily exclusive, and some programmes use both methods for the purpose of evaluation.

Research box

Evidence regarding programme assessment and efficacy is 'still of patchy quality' (Morrison et al (2021), p. 43) and more efforts are needed to identify the weight of the factors associated with successful DDR, to

unravel the importance of the contextual factors and so on. The evaluation research itself needs further advances in terms of agreeing on the success definition and the most reliable evaluation designs (hence the relevance of the Indeed Project).

There are available good guidelines for evaluating DDR programmes, such as Koller (2019) which describes multiple ways to approach evaluation: summative evaluations which tends to focus on results, formative evaluations which aim to use findings to change ongoing measures, as well as broader impact evaluations which focus on the intended changes in the target group as well as the long-term individual and societal changes.

Zeuthen's systematic review (2021) looked at the availability of evidence on the effectiveness of these programmes, and particularly looked at evaluations of specific programmes in terms of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes. However, the author observes that there is a very limited selection of literature looking at what does not work, potentially due to data constraints but also possibly due to limited interests in looking at the shortcomings of such programmes. The author also identifies the need for improving evaluations of such interventions, meaning that they need to be more nuanced and detailed in their assessments of the conditions for success, the underlying assumptions and theory of change, as well as identifying exactly who is being reintegrated, what their role in a terrorist or violent extremist group was, and their individual rehabilitation needs (Zeuthen (2021), p.15).

The paper also notes that there is a need to disaggregate analysis of different intervention components, such as financial or material support, provision of psychological support and mentoring, and the provision of education and/or vocational training to support reintegration. These known gaps in the research could help to inform where greater emphasis should be placed in research and in the implementation of similar programmes in the future.

Although in its infancy, it seems that more and more administrations have started to embrace data-driven policies and practices. More and more independent or mixed evaluations are being conducted and published so they can be consulted by the public and it seems that the findings published so far are largely encouraging.

However, more should be done to enhance the quality of research and evaluation. Defining success, identifying the components correlated with better outcomes, clarifying the facilitating contexts and so on are only a few significant questions that await their immediate answers.

Good practice

A good example of this kind of mixed approach to evaluation is **Netherlands** where such activities are carried out either by scholars (sometimes on the basis of a request from the government) or by different inspection bodies and then often made available publicly.

- TER-team:
    - Re-Integratie van delinquenten met een extremistische achtergrond: evaluatie van de Nederlandse aanpak. - Universiteit Leiden
- National Support Unit Extremism (LSE):
    - Evaluatie Forsa en Familiesteunpunt | Publicatie | Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (nctv.nl)
    - RapportageeffectevaluatieLSE.pdf (landelijksteunpuntextremisme.nl) (also available at: Onderzoek wijst uit: Programma's LSE dragen positief bij aan de aanpak van radicalisering - Landelijk Steunpunt Extremisme)
- Dutch Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI)
    - Evaluatieonderzoek Interventies voor deradicalisering en disengagement binnen de Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen | Rapport | Rijksoverheid.nl
- Inspection Justice and Security (Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid):
    - 2019: Rapport De Terroristen Afdelingen in Nederland | Rapport | Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (inspectie-jenv.nl)

> o   2022: Rapport Vervolgonderzoek naar de terroristenafdelingen in Nederland | Rapport | Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (inspectie-jenv.nl)
> - Recidivism monitor:
>   o   Factsheet 2022: https://repository.wodc.nl/handle/20.500.12832/3195
>
> *Note: Links currently only available in Dutch.*

Section IV - Thematic considerations and specific practices

a. Human rights

Most countries describe human rights considerations as a **key concern** in the implementation of the programmes.

Responses refer to several rights, particularly religious freedom, and associated practices and beliefs (**Austria, France, Italy**). However, responses indicated that these considerations relate to both the rights of the individuals targeted by the programmes and to the rights of the wider public who might be threatened by terrorist activity.

Several respondents mentioned voluntary participation, explicit consent, confidentiality or respect for human dignity as essential rights of the participants in the programmes (**Austria, Norway, Romania, Türkiye**).

Related to privacy considerations, data protection and access to information are also important to consider.

> **Good practice**
>
> In **Portugal**, access to information is based on the principle of need-to-know, and all those involved in the programme must sign confidentiality agreements.

Other issues, including gender dimensions, discrimination and marginalisation, are often considered when relevant.

As mentioned by several respondents, failing to attend to these principles would sabotage the aims of a deradicalisation, disengagement or social reintegration programme towards plurality, diversity, and inclusion. Specific responses note that failure to address these aspects or **ignoring the impact of these issues can lead to further radicalisation.**

Although human rights were mentioned as essential in implementing the DDR programmes, most of the respondents stated that there are no special regulations or procedures to observe them when it comes to working with VEOs. Most of them stated that the generic mechanisms such as prison ombudsman, inspections or the judiciary are called to ensure human rights compliance.
Staff training was also mentioned several times as a way to ensure that human right standards are quite high on the agenda when working with VEOs (**Austria, Sweden, Finland**).

> **Good practice**
>
> An exception to this rule comes from **France**, where all measures initiated for the people deprived of liberty could be check for their constitutionality (though this is not authomatic). Furthermore, there is an independent administrative authority (**Controleur general des lieux de privation de liberte**) which carries out visits and studies on the treatment of inmates.

> **Research Box**

The academic literature is quite limited in describing how human rights should be better upheld withing the DDR work. Topical papers address different concrete human rights and their implications for DDR work. Basra and Neumann (2020), for example, recounted several arguments in favour and against mandating or referring individuals to DDR interventions. The authors note that the offenders themselves are not always conscious of their own perspectives and that there is no harm in trying all possible interventions to rehabilitate terrorists. On the other hand, they note that interventions require the offenders to actively participate, and that it may be a waste of resources to try to force someone who is not willing to change their views or behaviours to take part in a programme.

While academic literature may be limited, a key document in this area comes from a joint project *Protecting Human Rights in Prisons while Preventing Radicalization Leading to Terrorism or Violence: A Guide for Detention Monitors* by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and Penal Reform International (PRI) (OSCE, 2021). While primarily aimed at detention monitors, this document also provides concrete and effective guidance on the main human rights issues that can emerge in a prison context when dealing with violent extremist offenders. It identifies a number of key risk areas, such as: risks and needs assessments, prison regimes, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, and broader issues related to recruitment and training of staff. With regards to rehabilitation and reintegration, the guide looks specifically at deradicalisation and disengagement programmes, emphasising the importance of voluntary participation and informed consent, as well as efforts to avoid actions which infringe on freedom of conscience, religion and expression. The guide recommends that targeted interventions should not focused on changing an offender's religion, political stance, beliefs or ideology.

b. Gender

In many jurisdictions, specialists working in the DDR field suggest that all interventions are tailored made and therefore they take into account the specific needs of all individuals. While this may be true to a certain extent, one must acknowledge that DDR staff should be aware of the specific needs of different subgroups in order to make sure that they are not overlooked or ignored entirely (see the Research box for some example of how gender plays an important role in radicalisation and deradicalisation).

In relation to specific gender dimensions, responses suggest that comparatively few women appear to participate in such programmes. This seems to be the reason the gender dimension was not up to now recognised as an important one.

However, this perception seems to be changing in some jurisdictions.

Good practices

In **France,** the attempted attack on Notre Dame in 2016 by women jihadists shifted the perspective on gender and terrorism. It prompted the creation of two dedicated units for women: a radicalisation disengagement unit in September 2021 and a radicalisation assessment unit in January 2022. These units pay more attention to gender issues such as parenthood, body image and trauma. The gender factor is built in now in every stage of the interventions, from the assessment to sustainable reintegration.

Currently approx. 70 women have been interviewed by a researcher in France to better understand the gender perspective in the VEO work.

In the **Netherlands**, three research studies have also been launched to evaluate the gender dimensions in the DDR interventions.

More and more training is available in different jurisdictions to assist DDR staff become more sensitive to the gender dimension (**Austria**). Guidelines are also published for staff to act in the same direction.

Good practices

In **Belgium** a **special guideline** was developed for DDR staff to work with mothers and babies returning from Syria.

Gender mainstreaming is one of the guiding principles of the federal programme 'Live Democracy!' **in Germany**. According to this programme, gender issues should be taken into account in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the programmes. Currently there are several research projects looking at how the gender mainstreaming process is integrated in the existing counselling programmes.

To make sure that female needs are properly attended by staff, some prison systems in Europe have developed special wings or sections to deal exclusively with women (**Netherlands, France**).

Research box

Research is replete with evidence that women were or still are active in different right wing groups (AN, KKK), religious network (Hezbollah, ISIS, Hamas), revolutionary groups (FARC) or other single-issue groups. They usually take different roles and functions within these groups. Often, their DDR trajectories share many features with their male counterparts. However, they tend to differ also in some aspects: e.g. how women perceive they are able to manage their own appearance in the society, the history of abuse and trauma, the parenthood experience and so on (see more in Pearson et al, 2017; Jankuloska, 2021; Chabrol et al, 2020).

Gender issues have not been the main subject of any of the main systematic reviews primarily used. However, Zeuthen review (2021) noted that almost all of the interventions included in the review were focused on men, while only one programme on women and children was discussed.

The Council of Europe (2016) also notes that there is limited knowledge about female extremist offenders in prison settings, and that their profiles within extremist organisations can vary widely.

Eggert (2020) notes that the literature on gender in this area is highly limited and that many mainstream publications do not take gender issues into account. However, the author highlights the role of gender as important for a number of reasons: gender perspectives can help practitioners to develop strategies that address the needs and situation of both male and female participants in such programmes, while also looking at the different pathways former members have taken to exit terrorist and violent extremist movements. This draws on research showing how terrorist groups have used gender tactically to recruit and retain new members, drawing on narratives of masculinity and femininity to attract adherents to the cause. Eggert (2020) also notes that stereotyped portrayals of men's and women's roles in terrorist organisations continue to be widespread and that while women tend to be viewed as victims of terrorism or potential counters to violence, men tend to be presented as perpetrators and supporters of violence, whereas the reality is that both men and women can be victims, perpetrators or opposed to violence. As the gender ideologies of terrorist groups can play a significant and complex role in radicalisation and recruitment, it follows that a gender-sensitive approach may be valuable for successful deradicalisation and disengagement, and that gender aspects need to be comprehensively taken into account in such interventions.

c. Preventing further social exclusion and involving the community

Some respondents described concrete actions or active measures taken by the prison administrations to prevent post-prison marginalisation and social exclusion.

Good practices

The **Austrian** prison administration, for example, is implementing the **principle of normalisation** to counteract the adverse side effects of imprisonment, such as loneliness, inactivity, martyrdom and so on. Radicalised inmates are segregated only from the other inmates who are considered vulnerable to radicalisation.

To support the principle of normalisation in practice, prison administration in Austria pursues the actions such as:
- Inmate work
- Education and training measures
- Respectful treatment, no unequal treatment
- Housing with "ordinary" inmates who are not vulnerable to radicalisation
- Purposeful security considerations, no over- or under-protection
- In case of Islamism, possibility of contact with non-Muslims
- No stigmatisation, isolation or overprotection
- intensive passive supervision
- Discussion groups
- Sports, etc.

For a more practical illustration of this principle, please see Annex 3 for a case study with Mr C.

In France, workshops, debates, conferences, and documentaries are used to raise awareness and counteract discrimination and exclusion.

An important role in this context is also played by the family and the community. Social reintegration in particular can depend significantly on these two factors.

Good practice

Counselling centres are working with families and relatives of those radicalised or at risk of radicalisation in **Germany.** At least one such centre exists in each federal State of Germany.

While most of the respondents mentioned working with family in the context of holistic approach, not the same applies to the community involvement where most of the respondents went quiet. However, social reintegration is a two-way process: the offender needs to make some symbolic positive steps towards the community, while the community needs to be inclusive and avoid stigmatisation and marginalisation. Obstacles in the social reintegration process were mentioned several times in the respondents'   accounts.
An important example in this direction is the impossibility of some former convicts to open up a bank account in Belgium.

Good practices

An interesting example of working with the community comes from **Germany** where different projects work with the communities where most of radicalised individuals are coming from to r**aise their resilience in the face of radicalisation and to increase security in general**. In these primary and secondary prevention initiatives, violent extremism is not the central topic as such. The focus is usually more generic on subjects like how to live together or how to grow stronger together.[17]

In the Netherlands, some local municipalities employ **buddies** to accompany former prisoners to navigate the post-release difficulties.

Efforts towards victim reconciliation seems to play an important role in preparing the communities to receive back those who served their sentences.

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[17] The following two initiatives may serve as good examples of such work:
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/publikationen/2022/final-report-moderad.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7; and
https://www.bamf.de/EN/Behoerde/Kooperationsnetzwerk/kooperationsnetzwerk-node.html

Good practices

Powerful examples of such victim reconciliation initiatives and community involvement come from **Belgium,** where films and documentaries have been produced to highlight the importance of these programmes**:**

1. *Il nous reste les mots* (We still have the words), a joint book written as a dialogue between the father of a victim and that of a terrorist in the aftermath of the Bataclan attack (available at: https://www.lisez.com/livre-de-poche/il-nous-reste-les-mots-apres-le-bataclan-dialogue-entre-le-pere-dune-victime-et-celui-dun-terroriste/9782221265567)

2. A support group bringing together parents of the Paris, Brussels and Nice attacks and parents of the perpetrators or foreign terrorist fighters. The article 'Beyond our tears' speaks about this experience and also about the documentary based on it (available at: https://www.rtbf.be/article/au-dela-de-nos-larmes-comment-vivre-apres-les-attentats-au-coeur-de-ce-documentaire-11113403).

3. The documentary can be also found in Vimeo at: https://vimeo.com/774159386

Research box

Several systematic reviews (see Morrison et al, 2021) stress that more should be done to support released inmates to overcome the obstacles in the reintegration process, such as: the fear of retaliation, the lack of bank accounts etc.

In a similar vein, Zeuthen (2021) argues that the current literature and overall knowledge base in this area is quite limited, due to both the relative recency in which the field emerged as well as difficulties in accessing and producing reliable data. As such, there may be a need to invest in post-exit data collection focusing not only on recidivism, but also other reintegration factors such as economic, social and political reintegration.

d. Sustainability

Most of the DDR programmes are implemented in solid institutional contexts, such as prison or probation services. For the DDR programmes that run in this environment the problem of sustainability is not that acute, as the respondents seem to suggest.

However, some of the programmes are implemented within community or third sector context. As one respondent put it, they run like pilot projects. In this case, sustainability can be critical. Usually, the programmes in this context live in cycles of 2-3 years or even shorter, as the funding streams are designed. Unfortunately, there are examples of DDR programmes in Europe that died out even without being properly evaluated. In this respect, most respondents agreed that there is not yet a solution for this risk. In many ways, this is still 'work in progress', as one of the **German** respondents suggested.

Good practices

A partial solution could be the one experienced in **France**, where, parts of the staff involved in the previous DDR programme (RIVE) were later employed by the new DDR programme (PAIRS) once the former project was discontinued.

Other different sustainability solutions were discussed during one recent **RAN** event (RAN Rehabilitation 4th of April – Time and DDR work) such as:
- prepare transition in due time;
- transfer expertise to other programmes or organisations;

- refer cases to other organisations;
- develop a support system around the clients etc.

Section IV has covered the so-called transversal issues that are important for all criminal justice or social inclusion interventions.

As other vulnerable groups, those sentenced for terrorism related crimes have experienced trauma, abuse and other grievances. For many of them, these tragic events have constituted the triggers of their radicalisation. In this context, treating them unjustly or ignoring their rights would only deepen their radicalisation. This is one of the reason more and more administrations pay attention to human rights in and outside prison establishments when working with this population. In doing so, most of them rely on the general human rights monitoring instruments, such as ombudsman, monitoring committees and so on. However, some countries have introduced specialised human rights practices for this group, such as extensive staff training or practice guidelines.

The same applies to the gender dimension. Many specialists are of the opinion that delivering tailor-made interventions imply indirectly that gender is considered. However, experience and research conducted in the last five to ten years seem to suggest that women display gender-specific needs and responsivity which demand special attention. For this reason, some countries have introduced special procedures and structures to deal with women in a more gender-sensitive manner. Further training and guidelines could be also helpful in this direction.

Preventing social exclusion and promoting community integration are important objectives for any DDR intervention. In spite of this observation, not many respondents were in the position to provide examples of programmes or interventions that act in this sense. Applying the normalisation principle, involving 'buddies' and mentors or working with the communities to enhance their resilience are examples of such initiatives that bring the communities closer to the issue of radicalisation and social inclusion.

Powerful examples of victim reconciliation come from Belgium where people involved directly or indirectly in the terrorist attacks either as victims or perpetrators come together and give voice to their strong emotions.

As mentioned by most of the respondents, sustainability is still an unsolved problem for the initiatives that are conducted outside the State structures, such as NGOs, third sector, religious cults etc. Short funding cycles of 2-3 years cannot ensure continuity and growth.

VII. Conclusions

Based on a rapid review of relevant literature, a comprehensive survey, insights from the RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network), as well as a limited number of interviews, it can be concluded that notable advancements have been observed in the field of deradicalisation, disengagement, and social reintegration (DDR) programmes among the member States of the Council of Europe.

However, it is important to acknowledge that this progress is not uniformly distributed across all member States. From this standpoint, two distinct categories of States emerge: those that have experienced significant levels of terrorist activity, where DDR programs have rapidly evolved (e.g., France, Germany, Norway, Belgium, among others), and those where terrorist incidents have been minimal, resulting in less emphasis on DDR programs. Recent acts of mass violence in Europe and beyond exemplify the necessity for all countries, regardless of the intensity of terrorist activity on their national territories, to establish policies, strategies, legislation, and infrastructure to effectively address this phenomenon.

The first category of States has already developed complex DDR programs that can serve as exemplary models for other States, should the need arise.

However, it is crucial to underscore that while there are considerable similarities among DDR programmes in Europe, caution must be exercised when transferring ideas from one specific context to another. As

highlighted by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), various strategies for policy transfer exist. In the context of DDR, emulation appears to be the most suitable approach, involving the transfer of fundamental principles rather than intricate details of penal policies or ideas. For instance, the principle of local implementation of DDR programs can be best achieved by involving local municipalities in certain countries and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in others. In countries characterised by a strong central authority and limited decentralisation of power at the local level, it is likely that local municipalities will have minimal contributions to offer in terms of delivering or co-ordinating DDR programmes.

This report aims to provide Council of Europe member States with valuable ideas and principles that can be adapted to create or enhance their own policies and practices, thereby fostering individual deradicalisation, disengagement, and social reintegration, ultimately leading to the strengthening of public safety. Simultaneously, this Compilation aspires to serve as a catalyst for further advancements and progress in areas such as evaluation, research, gender mainstreaming, and sustainability.

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Annex A – Questionnaire

Note: In case there are multiple programmes or processes within your jurisdiction falling within the scope of this questionnaire, please specify in your answers which programme your response is related to.

Additional links or supplementary material may also be provided where suitable.

I.   Current programmes

1.   Are there any programmes aimed at deradicalisation, disengagement, resocialisation and/or social reintegration established or operating in your jurisdiction? *(Please specify whether the programme focuses on one or more of these components)* If no, please provide additional relevant details.

2.   In what context are these programmes delivered? *(e.g. prison and probation services, educational institutions, volunteer programmes, etc.)*

3.   Which entities are primarily responsible for these programmes? *(I.e. the lead institutions, whether State institutions, non-governmental organisations, etc.)*

4.   Are there other key stakeholders or partners involved in the supervision, monitoring, oversight or management of the programme? *(e.g. State institutions such as law enforcement entities and judicial bodies, civil society, NGOs, specific communities, etc)* In brief, please also describe their respective roles and functions.

5.   Are there any relevant legal provisions governing the operation of these programmes? *(If possible, please provide the relevant provisions translated in English and/or French)*

6.   What are the main target groups for participation in these programmes?

7.   Are there any conditions, eligibility criteria or other entry requirements for these programmes? Please also specify whether participation is voluntary or whether eligible persons can be assigned, obliged or referred to a programme by competent authorities.

II.   Programme design and operational practices

8.   What are the main aims and objectives of these programmes?

9.   Is there a specific methodology or intervention logic used to achieve those aims and objectives? Please provide details.

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10.   What type of activities are regularly included in the programme? *(Mentoring and psychological support, employment-related skills workshops, sports and recreational activities, etc)*

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11.   Please select whether the following groups or actors are involved in the regular activities of these programmes:

☐ Law enforcement and security professionals

☐ Psychological or mental health professionals

☐ Local community representatives

☐ Religious or spiritual representatives

☐ Former or disengaged terrorists

☐ Academic experts

☐ Others: _____
Please provide any relevant additional details or examples on their respective role or function in these activities:

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III.   Risk assessment, monitoring and evaluation

12.   Do these programmes include the use of risk assessments to ensure the safety and security of staff members, participants, and the broader communities involved in this process? If so, please provide further details.

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13.   Do these programmes include monitoring and evaluation mechanisms? If so, please specify.

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IV.   Individual needs' assessment and Risk management

14.   Do these programmes include the use of individual needs' assessment to identify the personal circumstances of participants, including, *inter alia,* psychological needs, health-related needs, or social needs? If so, please provide further details.

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15.   Do these programmes include any risk management strategies or risk management protocols? If so, please provide further details as appropriate.

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V.   Thematic considerations and specific practices

16.   Where relevant, how do these programmes take into account human rights considerations? Do these programmes conduct any relevant human rights reviews or analysis?

17.   Do these programmes aim to address matters related to the gender or sexuality of participants in the design and/or implementation of the programme? If so, please specify.

18.   Do these programmes have practices aimed at addressing issues relating to racism, intolerance and/or discrimination? If so, please specify.

19.   Do these programmes have any practices aimed at addressing the risk of stigmatisation and marginalisation of participants? If so, please specify.

20.   Do these programmes include any practices aimed at building or ensuring trust between, *inter alia*, participants and members of staff, State-related institutions, or the programme itself? If so, please specify.

21.   Are there any other relevant practices or lessons learned that you wish to highlight and share with other member States?

Please indicate whether you would be willing to provide follow up data on request: Yes ☐ / No ☐

If yes, please provide the name, position and contact details of your national expert:

Annex B – The Interview protocol

This interview protocol is a maximal one. Depending on the missing information from each jurisdiction, it will be adapted and shortened to save as much time as possible. The aim is for each interview to last less than an hour.

1.   Could you please briefly describe the existing deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration programmes in your jurisdiction?

2.   What are the main objectives of these programmes? (e.g. deradicalisation, disengagement, social reintegration)

3.   What are the main activities envisaged? (e.g. vocational training, employment etc.)

4.   Is there a concrete legislative framework that regulates the programme implementation?

5.   What are risk/needs assessment tools or methods are used in practice?

6.   How does the inter-agency co-operation work?

7.   Does the programme have a monitoring and evaluation component? How? What results?

8.   How is the sustainability of the programme ensured?

9.   Is there a mechanism to ensure human rights compliance of the programme?

10. How is the gender perspective introduced in the programme?

11. How are affected or local communities involved? Are there any other actors involved in the programme? In what capacity?

12. Any advice for the future development in the deradicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration field?

Annex C – Case study

Case study - Mr C/Austria

As an example of a kind of success story in applying the principle of normalisation in practice, we have Mr C, a 25-year-old Chechen national who entered Austria in 2019. Mr C fled Chechnya because he had videos of regime critics on his cell phone, he was therefore detained there several times and according to his own statements was tortured.

Mr C was sentenced in Austria to 3.5 years imprisonment for § 278b StGB (Islamism) and 3g Verbotsgesetz (National Socialism). He distributed Islamic State propaganda videos via messenger services. He explained in a meaningful way that young people could still be educated well in the sense of the Islamic State (IS) and that enemies of God should not be trusted, and he tried to win young people over to the IS. In addition, he distributed national socialist content via messenger services, according to his statement, "for fun". Mr C was assessed as someone who was considered strongly radicalised.

During his time in prison, Mr C was intensively involved in rehabilitation activities. More than 20 talks with psychologists took place, Mr C underwent forensic individual therapy and many talks with the NGO DERAD association took place.

Mr C showed impeccable conduct and began training as a metal technician in the prison. In further conversations with the DERAD association, he visibly distanced himself from radical ideas, and there was no longer any evidence of hatred toward non-Muslims. The following statements, taken from the case-conference, by Mr C. are noteworthy (translated from German):

   – *...However, he sees something positive in his imprisonment. He is learning the German language and has "become a real man" in prison. He is grateful for his prison mate. This is an older Austrian with whom he gets along well and is learning German. He has also started an apprenticeship, attends vocational school and does a lot of sports. He skypes with his family once a month.*
   – *…He said that imprisonment had given him a new perspective on life, as he had been able to maintain intensive contact with Austrians and non-Muslims for the first time.*

In the risk assessment, Mr C is considered to be at low risk of committing violent acts. It is assumed that he clearly distances himself from the radical Islamist ideology of the IS and rejects extremist violence. In the case of Mr C, a conditional release with the simultaneous requirement of instructions is quite likely and reasonable. If Mr C were to serve his full prison sentence, the authorities would no longer be able to exert any influence in the form of instructions, and the risk of Mr C slipping back into the "old" environment would be higher.

The case of Mr C shows that rehabilitation measures can be effective and that a multiprofessional approach is necessary. Even low-threshold interventions, such as mere contact with non-Muslims or education and training, can make a decisive contribution here. The concrete deradicalisation work by DERAD is achieved through faith-based interventions, psychotherapies help with psychological problems, and respectful interaction between officers and inmates does the rest. In the penal system, efforts are made to normalise the penal system while maintaining security for the population, especially in the case of terrorists, so that stigmatisation and isolation do not fuel radical thinking.