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Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)

Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia

Information note by the co-rapporteurs on their fact-finding visit to Tbilisi (10 to 13 November 2025)

Co-rapporteurs: Ms Edite Estrela, Portugal, Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group and Ms Sabina Čudić, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe

¹ Document declassified by the Monitoring Committee at its meeting on 17 March 2026.

1. Introduction

1. We visited Georgia from 10 to 13 November 2025. This was the first visit of the rapporteurs to Tbilisi since the decision of the members of the Georgian delegation to resign following the adoption of the [Resolution 2585 \(2025\)](#) on the “Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia” during the January 2025 part-session.

2. As a result of this decision, the Georgian delegation *de facto* left the Assembly and its work, despite the fact that their credentials were ratified by the Assembly. However, this decision does not affect the status of the monitoring procedure and the Monitoring Committee and ourselves have continued to follow the developments in the country closely. Since January 2025, the Monitoring Committee organised a hearing, and three exchanges of views were organised in relation to Georgia. In March, the Committee organised a hearing on “The human rights concerns in relation to the ongoing crisis in Georgia”, with Mr Marc Cools, President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Ms Nino Lomjaria, Executive Director of Georgia’s European Orbit and former Public Defender (Ombudsperson) of Georgia, Mr Ucha Nanuashvili, Founder of the Human Rights Center of Georgia, Vice-President of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and former Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, Ms Tina Bokuchava, representative of the three political forces (Coalition for Change, Unity – National Movement, and Strong Georgia), and Ms Natia Mezvrishvili, Deputy Chair of the political party For Georgia. In April, an exchange of views on the situation in Georgia and follow-up to [Resolution 2585 \(2025\)](#) was organised with Ms Salome Samadashvili, Strong Georgia, and Ms Tina Bokuchava, Unity – National Movement. During its May meeting, the Committee organised an exchange of views on “The human rights situation and challenges to civil society and media in Georgia”, with Ms Claire Bazy Malaurie, President of the Venice Commission, and Mr Michael O’Flaherty, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. Lastly, in September, the Committee held an exchange of views on “the impact of the transparency legislation on civil society”, with Ms Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency International Georgia, and Mr Dave Elseroad, Head of Advocacy and Geneva Office, Human Rights House Foundation.

3. The Assembly, in addition to the report on the challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia, debated two reports under urgent procedure, in April and October 2025.

4. Over the last year, the authorities’ policies have become increasingly isolationist and antagonistic towards the European organisations and their member States, as evidenced by the frequent and baseless attacks against members of the international community inside and outside Georgia. The Georgian authorities’ rejection of practically all forms of dialogue and their refusal to co-operate with, *inter alia*, the Venice Commission are deeply concerning. It is in this context that we undertook this fact-finding visit that had as its main aims to familiarise ourselves with the latest developments and, *inter alia* the views of the authorities on these developments. In addition, we strived to explain to the authorities the concerns and recommendations of the Assembly and to gauge their willingness to engage in an open dialogue with the Assembly with a view to addressing the key concerns and recommendations of the Assembly and international community.

5. During our visit, we met with the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament; the Chairpersons of the Legal Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, representatives of the ruling majority in Parliament (albeit on a low level), representatives of all parliamentary and extra parliamentary opposition parties, as well as civil society and members of the international community. Regrettably the representatives from the government, including the nominally independent Prosecutor General and Head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, refused to meet with us. According to the Speaker, this was a clear political message. In a welcome development, our request to meet three imprisoned political leaders of main opposition parties (Mr Nika Melia for Ahali, Mr Zurab Japaridze for Girchi-More Freedom and Mr Giorgi Vashadze, for Strategy Aghmashenebeli (Strategy Builder)) was granted². Nevertheless, we regret that our request to meet detained journalist Mzia Amaglobeli was refused by the Speaker as he disagreed with the international community’s (including the Assembly’s and Human Rights Commissioner’s) assertion that her sentencing had been disproportionate and politically motivated. The programme of our visit and the statement we made at the end of our stay are attached to this note in Appendices 1 and 2.

6. We would like to thank the Georgian Parliament for the programme and hospitality and the Council of Europe Office for the support given to our delegation in the organisation of this visit.

² In addition, we had a written exchange of views with the second co-founder of Ahali, Mr Nika Gvaramia, whose insights are also included in this note.

2. Recent developments

7. In this briefing note we will focus on the developments that have taken place in Georgia since the adoption, on 2 October 2025, of [Resolution 2624 \(2025\)](#) on “Upholding democracy and the rule of law in Georgia”. The developments that took place before its adoption are well documented in that resolution as well as in [Resolution 2600 \(2025\)](#) on “The situation in Georgia and follow-up to [Resolution 2585 \(2025\)](#) “Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia” and will therefore not be repeated here in detail.

8. Since the adoption of [Resolution 2624 \(2025\)](#) the democratic backsliding, and crackdown on civil society, independent media and opposition, has continued unabated and has in many aspects worsened. As we mentioned in our last resolution, the very existence of democracy in Georgia is in question, and the concerns and recommendations of the international community are systematically ignored.

9. On 4 October 2025, local elections took place in Georgia. The EU enlargement report published on 4 November 2025 (noted that the run up to these elections “*was marked by intense political polarisation, violence, as well as intimidation targeting civil society and independent media*” while “*the amendments to the electoral legislation favouring the ruling party, coupled with the extensive crackdown on dissent, drastically reduced the possibility of holding competitive elections*”)³ These were boycotted by most of the opposition, with the exceptions of Gakharia’s for Georgia and Lelo-Strong Georgia, because of the absence of the conditions for their democratic conduct. As mentioned in the last resolution, these elections were neither observed by the international community nor by the credible domestic observer organisations.⁴ Georgian Dream won 81.7% of the vote with a (for Georgia low) turnout of 40.9%, Strong Georgia won 6.7%, and For Georgia won 3.7% The democratic opposition parties, including those that had participated in the elections, denounced these elections as undemocratic, rigged and manipulated in favour of the ruling majority.

10. Despite their misgivings about the electoral process both Strong Georgia and For Georgia announced that they would take up the mandates they won in the local councils. The controversy and acrimonious exchanges between opposition parties about the participation in the elections underscore the differences in strategies among the opposition parties. Nevertheless, all the parties we met said that they would participate in the next national election when organised.

11. The differences were also evident when, on 20 October 2025, “For Georgia” broke with the rest of the opposition and announced that it would end its boycott of the parliament. This decision was strongly criticised by all other opposition parties. On 28 October, its 12 members⁵ took up their mandates; however, its role and manoeuvring possibilities are very limited in what is, in effect, a practically single-party parliament. We were informed by most of the party leaders we met that consistent efforts are underway, albeit far from the media and public eye, to overcome the apparent differences and agree on a joint strategy and platform to achieve their common aims.

12. A large-scale protest rally against the country’s democratic backsliding was organised on 4 October 2025, the day of the local elections. While overall peaceful a small number of protesters reportedly tried to storm the presidential palace which resulted in skirmishes between these protesters and the police guarding the presidential palace. Several interlocutors have raised questions about the small number of police guarding the presidential palace during the demonstration and the possible presence of agents provocateurs. The authorities have tried to paint these actions as a foreign instigated attempt of a violent coup d’état and have used the unrest on 4 October as a pretext for a crackdown on the daily peaceful demonstrations that have taken place on Rustaveli Avenue and around the country since December 2024.

13. Subsequently, on 16 October 2025, in an accelerated procedure, the Georgian Parliament adopted a series of amendments to the Law on Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code that substantially increased the administrative and criminal penalties for actions such as covering faces, blocking roads and participating in assemblies that officials have ordered to be terminated⁶.

³ [Georgia Report 2025 - Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood](#).

⁴ As a result of the crackdown on civil society, many domestic observer organisations could no longer observe these elections. The Georgian authorities had invited the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) to observe these elections purposefully so late as to render their observation impossible and had altogether declined to invite the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe.

⁵ This was the second tier of members on the For Georgia list as the mandates of the first 12 members on the list had been cancelled and a number of them had left the party over its decision to return to the parliament.

⁶ [Georgian Dream Adopts Harsher Penalties For Protest Offenses – Civil Georgia](#).

14. On 24 October 2025, the Georgian Public Defender (Ombudsperson) requested an urgent legal opinion of the OSCE/ODIHR on these amendments as adopted on 16 October. This urgent opinion was issued by the OSCE/ODIHR on 12 November 2025. In this opinion the OSCE/ODIHR concluded that the amendments raised “serious concerns about Georgia’s lack of compliance with international human rights obligations, especially Articles 9, 19 and 21 of the ICCPR and Article 5, 10, 11 and 18 of the ECHR and should be repealed”⁷. Despite these recommendations, on 10 December 2025 the Georgian Parliament further tightened protest rules by extending them fully to pedestrian areas, among other measures.

15. Following the adoption of these amendments, numerous participants in the daily protest have been detained. Some of them are facing long prison sentences for being charged with blocking a road for a second time.⁸ However, the daily protests are continuing, with demonstrators often using alternative means and methods to bypass the increasingly draconian legal restrictions on demonstrations.

16. On 20 January 2026, the Georgian Public Defender filed an appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding the restrictions introduced in the Law on Demonstrations and the Law on Administrative Offences. In his appeal the Public Defender cited proportionality concerns including with regard to the blanket ban on covering faces and introduction of criminal liability for blocking roads.⁹

17. On 16 October 2025, the Georgian Parliament passed a legislative package that allows individuals ‘associated’ with parties deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Georgia to be stripped of their fundamental political rights, including the right to found or join political parties or hold public office.

18. In a major escalation in the crackdown on the opposition, the ruling majority, on 28 October 2025, announced that it had appealed to the Constitutional Court to ban three key opposition movements: the United National Movement, Ahali/Coalition for Change and Strong Georgia/Lelo. The ruling party stated that it had not appealed for a ban on the For Georgia party, as it had now entered parliament, nor – at that time - for the ban of smaller opposition parties as they reportedly “*do not have significant influence due to their size and organisational structure, including the real prospect of overcoming the electoral threshold*”.¹⁰

19. While the ruling majority indicated that, at that moment, it would not yet appeal to the Constitutional Court to have the provisions in the amendments adopted on 16 October being applied to individuals associated by those parties if banned by the Constitutional Court. However, on 6 November 2025, in a further escalation just days before our visit, the Prosecutor General’s office announced that it had started criminal proceedings against several leading politicians¹¹ from practically all democratic opposition parties for Crimes against the State, in particular sabotage, assistance in hostile activities to a foreign country, financing activities directed against the constitutional order of Georgia and the foundations of national security, and calling for the violent change of the constitutional order of Georgia or the overthrow of the State government. These charges carry prison sentences between 7 and 15 years. Initially the only major opposition party whose leader was not charged by the General Prosecutor was Gakharia’s For Georgia. However, this changed on 10 November - during our visit - when the General Prosecutor charged former Prime Minister Gakharia, who lives in exile in Berlin, for abuse of power and endangering lives when being Minister of the Interior of Georgia. These charges similarly carry heavy prison sentences of up to 13 years.

20. We raised the appeal to the Constitutional Court by the ruling majority to ban practically all opposition, as well as the criminal charges levied against their leadership, with the Speaker of the parliament. The Speaker confirmed to us that the ruling majority was very serious in its pursuit of the ban of these parties and criminal charges of its leadership. This was also the unanimous opinion of the members of the international community that we met during the visit. Given the lack of independence of the judiciary, and in particular the Constitutional Court, the chance that most or all of these parties will be banned, and their leadership imprisoned, is therefore considerable. This is a clear example of the abuse of politically motivated legal proceedings to silence opposition and dissenting voices. As emphasised in [Resolution 2624 \(2025\)](#), the banning of the democratic

⁷ <https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/4/1/601503.pdf>.

⁸ [Protester Faces Up to One Year in Jail After Police Arrests Him for ‘Repeat Road-Blocking’ – Civil Georgia](#).

⁹ [Public Defender Challenges Protest-Related Restrictions, Penalties in Constitutional Court – Civil Georgia](#).

¹⁰ Several organisations have appealed to the Assembly to request an opinion of the Venice Commission on these amendments. It would be important to investigate if such a request is still relevant. If so, you could propose such a request at the next committee meeting.

¹¹ Mikheil Saakashvili (UNM), Giorgi Vashadze (Strategy Builder), Nika Gvaramia, Nika Melia (Ahali), Zurab Japaridze (Girchi), Elene Khoshtaria (Droa), Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze (Lelo-For Georgia).

opposition and imprisonment of its leadership would effectively establish a one-party dictatorship in Georgia, which would be incompatible with Council of Europe membership.

21. Recently we have witnessed a series of arrests and criminal proceedings levied against current and former high-level GD officials for corruption, money laundering, and abuse of office. These individuals include former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. On 12 January 2026, Mr Garibashvili entered into a plea bargain with the Prosecutor General's Office, whereby he will serve five years in prison for serious money laundering offences. These arrests are widely perceived as being part of an internal power struggle within the ruling elite. However, irrespective of the reasons for this crackdown, these arrests highlight the ongoing prevalence of widespread corruption at the highest levels of Georgian society. It is important that GRECO and Moneyval closely monitor the developments in Georgia in this respect.

22. Academia have been a source dissent and protest against the recent developments in Georgia. There are increasing reports that therefore the authorities would wish to crackdown on universities and educational institutions with a view to bringing them under their political control¹². We raised this issue with our interlocutors, including those from the international community, who all expressed their concern about the rapidly shrinking space for academic freedom in Georgia and about recent actions and policies that seem to be designed to bring the academia firmly under the political control of the authorities. On 2 December 2025, the authorities proposed a far-reaching education reform, inter alia increasing the power of the government to reorganise universities and appoint university administrators, as well as the merger of the country's two largest state universities in Tbilisi. These reforms, which are controversial and strongly criticised by stakeholders, were adopted by the Georgian parliament, via an accelerated procedure, on 4 February 2026.

23. In its recent Resolutions on Georgia, the Assembly has repeatedly expressed concern about the relentless crackdown on civil society by the Georgian authorities. We wish to underscore the pivotal role that civil society has played in the country's democratic development since its independence. One of the main vectors of this crackdown has been legislation aimed at limiting foreign funding for civil society organisations and independent media outlets, ostensibly to ensure transparency regarding foreign influence. This legislation is often referred to as 'foreign agent legislation'. The authorities have now started to enforce the controversial Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), which imposes criminal sanctions for infringements. It should be noted that, alongside the FARA, the Transparency of Foreign Influence Law, which it was supposed to replace, and which equally falls short of European standards, remains fully in force.

24. The Georgian Parliament, on 16 April and 2 June 2025, adopted the Law on Grants. This law requires international donors, including the Council of Europe and its member States, to obtain the Georgian Government's approval before providing funds or assistance to Georgian civil society organisations. Receiving an unauthorised grant will result in the local organisation being fined twice the amount received. Numerous Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been informed that they will be subjected to inspections by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the independence of which from the executive branch of government has been widely questioned. During our visit, the civil society representatives we met underscored that the cumulative effect of these laws, is impeding their proper functioning and that their very existence is currently at risk. Several CSOs have ceased their operations. Several of the larger organisations are still continuing their operations, albeit often in reduced format, but with considerable risks for their staff and volunteers.

25. On 10 April 2025, the Monitoring Committee requested an opinion on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents, the amendments to the law on grants and other laws relating to "foreign influence". In its opinion¹³ adopted during its plenary on 9 and 10 October 2025, the Venice Commission concluded that *"the legal regime established by GEOFARA risks undermining the rule of law, civic space, and democratic freedoms"* and recommended this law to be repealed. With regard to the Law on Grants, the Venice Commission considered that the amendments *"provide no clear and objective criteria for refusal and contain insufficient safeguards, thereby leaving wide scope for arbitrary or discriminatory application. The extensive investigatory and enforcement powers of the Bureau, including the power to order immediate seizure, combined with constrained procedural timelines and disproportionate sanctions, further undermine fairness and due process"*. It therefore recommended that these amendments be repealed. Moreover, the Venice Commission also considered the amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, that introduced a blanket ban on foreign funding for broadcasters. In the view of the Venice Commission, these amendments *"undermine media pluralism and fail the standards of necessity and proportionality."* It therefore recommended that these amendments be repealed. Only with regard to amendments to the Law on Political Association of Citizens, which fully prohibit political parties from receiving in-kind support – including free lectures or seminars – from

¹² [Georgian Technical University Rector Seeks Seizure of University of Georgia Property – Civil Georgia](#).

¹³ [Georgia - Opinion on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents, the amendments to the Law on Grants and other Laws relating to "foreign influence" - Venice Commission of the Council of Europe](#).

legal entities or associations in Georgia or abroad, the Venice Commission concluded that they “*fall within the permissible national margin of discretion of a country.*”

26. It is regrettable that the authorities, who had declined to meet and cooperate with the Venice Commission during the preparation and adoption of this opinion, dismissed this opinion and its recommendations in its entirety. Prime Minister Kobakhidze reportedly told journalists that “*The Venice Commission is one of the most frivolous European structures [...] It has turned from a legal expertise centre into an ordinary body serving the interest of the global war party [...] We cannot take their conclusions seriously.*”

27. On 4 November 2025, the European Commission adopted its 2025 annual Enlargement Package. Its report on Georgia stated that it witnessed “*serious democratic backsliding, with a rapid erosion of the rule of law and fundamental rights being severely restricted*” and *restrictive laws targeting activists, civil society and independent media, threaten the survival of democratic foundations*”. It therefore concluded that. “*The basic foundations of democracy were significantly undermined during the reporting period. The Georgian authorities’ attack on democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms through hostile rhetoric, constant spreading of disinformation, intimidation, repressive actions and legislative measures is a drastic setback for the country’s democracy. Civil liberties, the principle of checks and balances, and democratic decision-making have been eroded*” as a result of which “*Georgia does not have a viable path to the European Union unless conditions change dramatically. It is now a candidate country in name only.*”

28. Already since the start of the protests in December 2024, there have been reports of participants in the demonstrations, and journalists who covered them having long lasting health problems and other side effects after been sprayed by the water cannons that were being used to disperse the protests. For more than a year, CSOs and others have been asking the authorities to provide information about the any chemicals mixed into the water. The authorities denied initially that any chemicals were mixed into the water that was sprayed by the water cannons. This issue was brought to the foreground on 1 December 2025, when the BBC published the results of an investigation which concluded that there was evidence to suggest that a First World War chemical compound named camite may have been used in the water cannons.

29. This report has sparked a storm of reactions both inside and outside Georgia. Although the authorities decried it as fake news distributed by deep State actors, a former Georgian Minister of the Interior confirmed that his ministry had previously purchased camite but ceased using it in 2012. The Prime Minister later admitted that chemicals indeed had been mixed into the water that was used by the water cannons to disperse protesters, but he denied that this had been camite or a similar agent. Although police forces are permitted to use chemicals for crowd control under international law, provided they are considered proportionate and have only short-term effects, the use of chemical warfare agents such as camite raises serious human rights concerns. Therefore, the Monitoring Committee has asked the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe to investigate the alleged use of prohibited chemical agents and their human rights implications during the police dispersal of the protest in Georgia.

30. On 17 December 2025, the Georgian Parliament disbanded the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Personal Data Protection Service, transferring their functions to the State Audit Service, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. This is a sign that executive power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of Prime Minister Kobakhidze, as he consolidates his power within the Georgian Dream party.

31. Also, on 17 December, the Georgian parliament abolished the right of the sizeable Georgian diaspora to vote abroad. Voting in elections, referendums and plebiscites can now only take place within Georgia’s State borders. Some observers have interpreted the sudden changes to election legislation as a sign that the authorities may be considering calling new elections after cracking down on opposition parties and their leadership.

32. On 19 December 2025, Zurab Japaridze (Girchi – More Freedom) was released from prison after serving his sentence for refusing to appear before the Tsulukiani Commission. However, on 22 December, the Tbilisi City Court set a 30,000 GEL bail bond and ordered him to surrender his passport in connection with the aforementioned ‘sabotage’ case. On 2 January, Mr Japaridze announced that he would pay the bail. In a separate development, Mr Nika Maleia was sentenced to an additional 18 months in prison for throwing water at a judge during a heated hearing about his controversial arrest. On 23 January 2026, Mr Giorgi Vashadze (Strategy Aghmashenebeli) was released from prison after serving his sentence for refusing to appear before the Tsulukiani Commission, as was Nika Gvaramia on 12 February 2026. Like Mr Zurab Japaridze, both men also have been charged in the so-called ‘sabotage’ case. The Tbilisi City Court has set a 30,000 GEL bail bond

and ordered both men to surrender their passports in relation to this case. Consequently, their interaction with the international community, including our Assembly, is severely limited.

33. On 11 December 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Georgia had violated Articles 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment), 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) during the violent dispersal of protests in Tbilisi on 20 and 21 June 2019. The Georgian authorities construed this judgement as additional grounds for their decision to charge former Prime Minister Gakharia, who was Minister of the Interior at the time.

34. On 20 January 2026, the ECtHR ruled that Georgia had violated articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 11 (freedom of assembly) of the ECHR when it convicted a protester during the March 2023 demonstrations against the so-called foreign agent's law for disobeying lawful police orders, basing its decision solely on police testimonies. The European Court also found that nothing in the case file suggested that the demonstration as a whole was intended to obstruct parliamentary work, and that the authorities had failed to demonstrate that they had "relevant and sufficient grounds to disperse the demonstration" or that this action had been "necessary and proportionate".

35. Regrettably, the assault on civil society and independent media¹⁴ is continuing in 2026. On 28 January 2026, the Georgian Dream majority announced its intention to introduce further changes to the Law on Grants and the Law on Political Unions of Citizens.¹⁵ The amendments to the Law on Grants will extend its provisions to local branches of foreign organisations, as well as to foreign organisations registered in Georgia. Additionally, the definition of a grant would be widened to include technical assistance, donations in kind and salaries paid to Georgian experts by international organisations. Breaching the Law on Grants would now result in criminal liability, with prison sentences of up to six years. The amendments to the Law on Political Unions of Citizens would bar any individual working for a 'foreign agent' from joining a political party or an "*organisation with declared party-political objectives*" for eight years. Additionally, the leader of a political party that receives foreign funding in violation of the amended Law on Political Unions of Citizens will be subject to criminal liability, with punishments ranging from fines and community service to up to six years' imprisonment.¹⁶ On 2 February 2026, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Georgian parliament to reject these amendments which are "*stifling civil society*" and are "*inconsistent with Georgia's obligations under international law to guarantee the right to freedom of association*".¹⁷ Nevertheless, the Georgian Parliament adopted these amendments in final reading on 4 March 2026.

36. On 29 January 2026, 24 countries invoked the so-called OSCE Moscow Mechanism in response to the "*deteriorating human rights situation in Georgia*". An expert mission, consisting of independent experts appointed by OSCE participating States will now be organised to investigate human rights abuses and compliance with OSCE commitments.¹⁸ The report of the expert appointed in the framework of the Moscow mechanism was published on 14 March 2026.¹⁹

3. Relations with international community

37. As highlighted in our last resolution, the ruling party's policies and attitudes have become increasingly isolationist and antagonistic towards the European organisations and their member States. This is also evident from baseless attacks and damaging accusations against members of the international community and the reaction to any criticism levelled against the government or its policies by international actors. This has led to a sharp deterioration in the authorities' relations with international actors, culminating in the unprecedented decision of the German government on 19 October 2025, to recall its ambassador for consultations.²⁰ In another example, on 14 and 15 October 2025, the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Georgia in her capacity of Chairperson in Office of the OSCE, during which she also observed the daily protests in front of the parliament and expressed her support for the principles of freedom of assembly and expression of all citizens. In response, the Georgian authorities fined her for "*blocking the road and participating in a non-authorised demonstrations and accused her of breaching international law and diplomatic principles*".²¹

38. Unfortunately, as we already noted above, this antagonism also extends to the Council of Europe. During our visit we directly asked the Speaker of the Parliament, the Chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee

¹⁴ [Georgia moves to tighten restrictive media funding laws, add lengthy jail terms - Committee to Protect Journalists.](#)

¹⁵ Commonly known as the Law on Political Parties.

¹⁶ [GD Announces New Restrictions on Receiving Grants, Party Membership, 'External Lobbying' – Civil Georgia.](#)

¹⁷ [Georgian Parliament should reject amendments stifling civil society - Commissioner for Human Rights.](#)

¹⁸ [24 Countries Invoke OSCE Moscow Mechanism on Georgia – Civil Georgia.](#)

¹⁹ [report](#)

²⁰ [Germany Recalls Ambassador for Consultations After Attacks from GD Leaders – Civil Georgia.](#)

²¹ [Georgia Fines Finnish FM Valtonen for 'Blocking Road' as Foreign Ministry Sends Protest Note to OSCE – Civil Georgia.](#)

as well as the members of the GD faction, if they were willing to cooperate with the Council of Europe and in particular with the Venice Commission in addressing the concerns on the transparency legislation as well as the Code of administrative offences. In all cases their response was negative stating that Georgia was a sovereign nation that would only implement changes if ordered by the European Court of Human Rights (unless its judgements were political). We deeply regret this attitude as it essentially reduces cooperation between Georgia and the Council of Europe to litigation before the European Court of Human Rights.

Appendix 1**Final programme of the fact-finding visit to Tbilisi (10 to 12 November 2025)**

Co-rapporteurs: Ms Edite Estrela, Portugal, Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group
Ms Sabina Čudić, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe

Secretariat: Mr Bas Klein, Deputy Head of Secretariat, PACE Monitoring Committee

Monday, 10 November 2025

- 10:00 Briefing by the Head of the Council of Europe Office (*)
- 11:00 CSO Roundtable on recent developments, including with regard to freedom of Assembly and Expression; Civil society and transparency legislation (*)
- ISFED
 - GYLA
 - Transparency International
 - Rights Georgia
 - Civil Society Foundation
 - Civil idea
 - Union Sapari
 - Georgia's European Orbit
 - IDFI
 - Equality Movement
- 13:00 Lunch time
- 14:30 Roundtable with CSOs and media experts on the media environment
- Charter of Journalistic Ethics
 - Media Development Foundation
 - Information and Social Research (CMIS)
 - Civil Society Foundation
- 15:30 Individual meetings with extra-parliamentary opposition parties (*)
- 15:30-16:30 Coalitions UNM and Unity for Change (joint meeting)
- 16:40-17:30 Lelo -Strong Georgia
- 17:40-18:10 Freedom Square
- 18:20-18:50 Anna Dolidze's for People

Tuesday, 11 November 2025

- 10:00-11:00 Meeting with **Mr Shalva PAPUASHVILI**, Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia and **Mr Nikoloz SAMKHARADZE**, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
- 11:10-11:55 Meeting with Parliamentary Faction "For Georgia"
- 12:05-12:50 Meeting with Parliamentary Political Group "European Socialists"
- 13:00-13:45 Meeting with Parliamentary Political Group "People's Power"
- 16:00-16:45 Meeting with Parliamentary Faction "The Georgian Dream"

16:55-17:40 Meeting with **Mr Archil GORDULADZE**, Chairman of the Legal Issues Committee of the Parliament of Georgia

Wednesday, 12 November 2025

09:00 Meeting with the international Community (*)

10:30 Departure for the prison for individual meetings with **Mr Nika MELIA** (Akhali), **Mr Zurab JAPARIDZE** (Girchi) and **Mr Giorgi VASHADZE** (Strategy Aghmashenebeli)

(*) Meetings organised by the Council of Europe Office in Tbilisi

Appendix 2**PACE monitors for Georgia call for an immediate end to politically motivated legal actions against opposition parties and their leadership**

19/11/2025 | [Monitoring](#)

Following their visit to Georgia from 10 to 12 November 2025, the co-rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) for the monitoring of Georgia, Edite Estrela (Portugal, SOC) and Sabina Cudic (Bosnia and Herzegovina, ALDE), urged the authorities to fully implement the Venice Commission's recommendations regarding the foreign agent legislation and the law on administrative offences. "We reiterate what the Assembly already stated in its last resolution on Georgia. The Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, the Georgian Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Law on Grants and the current Law on Administrative Offences are incompatible with European standards and norms, and as the Venice Commission concluded, they should be repealed," the co-rapporteurs underlined.

They also expressed deep concern about recent criminal charges brought against the leadership of democratic opposition parties, who could face lengthy prison sentences on trumped-up charges for crimes against the state. "These charges are clearly politically motivated and should be seen in connection with the recent appeals to the Constitutional Court to ban several major opposition parties in Georgia. Such actions have no place in a democratic society. We urge the authorities to end these actions, which would effectively establish dictatorship in Georgia," the co-rapporteurs added.

During their visit, the co-rapporteurs met with the Speaker of Parliament and members of the Georgian Dream parliamentary faction, as well as representatives of all parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition parties. They welcomed the fact that their request to meet imprisoned political leaders had been granted, but they deeply regretted the refusal by the representatives of the government to meet them, as well as the fact that their request to meet with Mzia Amaghlobeli in prison was refused by the authorities. During their visit, the co-rapporteurs emphasised their willingness to engage with the authorities to address the Assembly's demands and concerns.