



Declassified<sup>1</sup>

AS/Soc (2026) 17rev

10 September 2026

## Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development

### Climate action as a human and democratic responsibility

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#### Revised introductory memorandum

##### 1. Introduction

1. Climate change is not a crisis. Some of its effects are now irreversible. It is permanently altering the conditions that make the Earth habitable. The broad course of action required to limit climate disruption is known. The challenge is to take concrete, sustained action in a manner that is socially and democratically acceptable. Although the window for action remains open, it is rapidly narrowing. Rather than offering a catalogue of environmental measures, the report will examine the pitfalls that member States should avoid and the levers they should explore to make climate action possible. It will seek to clarify what the Council of Europe can contribute: using the law to organise a common response; anticipating risks to human rights, democracy and the rule of law; mobilising the Organisation's expertise and monitoring mechanisms; informing member States' decisions; and directing its action towards tangible results.

2. After setting out the scientific and economic findings, the report will examine how the climate transformation can be governed democratically, how responsibilities can be shared and how everyone can be given the means to understand, act and choose.

##### 2. Findings

3. ***The report will draw on the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6).***<sup>2</sup>Two facts are now scientifically established: human influence on the warming of the atmosphere, oceans and land is unequivocal, and every additional increment of warming increases multiple and concurrent climate-related risks. Europe requires heightened vigilance. It is the fastest-warming continent. WHO Europe recorded 200,000 heat-related deaths over the past four years in the EU and, already in 2026, 10,000 deaths related to excessive heat in five European countries.<sup>3</sup>

| Benchmark         | Key figure <sup>4</sup>                                             | Interpretation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Global warming    | <b>+1.24°C, of which 1.22°C is attributable to human activities</b> | This is the average global temperature for 2015–2024 compared with the 1850–1900 average. The main sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from human activities are: 64% from CO <sub>2</sub> combustion (coal, gas and oil), 18% from methane (agriculture and livestock farming) and 4% from nitrous oxide (fertilisers). |
| Global projection | <b>≈ +2.8 ° C by 2100</b>                                           | This is the global projection if currently implemented policies are continued. The Paris Agreement (2015) set a target of +1.5°C.                                                                                                                                                                                              |

<sup>1</sup> The Introductory memorandum was declassified by the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development at its meeting on 10 September 2026.

<sup>2</sup> The IPCC synthesises the scientific basis of climate change, impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, and climate-change mitigation. It is intended for decision makers to help them take action. The latest report was published in 2023; the next is expected in 2029.

<sup>3</sup> [www.who.int/europe/news/item](https://www.who.int/europe/news/item).

<sup>4</sup> These figures do not all have the same status. Observed warming and its attribution to human activity are based on established scientific assessment methods. End-of-century pathways depend on the policies actually implemented; planetary boundaries, for their part, constitute a scientific risk framework.

| Benchmark                         | Key figure <sup>4</sup>           | Interpretation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Warming in Europe                 | ≈ +0.5° C per decade              | Since 1979, Europe has been warming approximately twice as fast as the global average. <sup>5</sup> Its current temperature is 2.5°C higher than during the 1850–1900 period.                                                                                                                                          |
| Mitigation efforts                | – 35 % by 2035<br>– 100 % by 2070 | Mitigation effort required for a +2°C pathway. For comparison, carbon neutrality requires the individual footprint to be reduced to between 2 and 2.5 tonnes of CO <sub>2</sub> per year, whereas in 2025 it stood at 5.1 tonnes of CO <sub>2</sub> per year per inhabitant in Greece, 6.5 in France and 9 in Germany. |
| Impacts                           | Exponential                       | Approximately 30% of the world's population was exposed in 2017 to lethal heat and humidity conditions for 20 days per year. This figure rises to approximately 48% under a +2°C pathway and approximately 74% under a +3°C pathway by 2100. <sup>6</sup>                                                              |
| Planetary boundaries <sup>7</sup> | 7 out of 9 exceeded since 2025    | There are nine thresholds corresponding to nine interdependent processes that sustain life on Earth. Seven have been exceeded since 2025. Exceeding these degradation thresholds means increasing the risk of abrupt and irreversible changes to the balance of nature.                                                |

4. ***The report will not set the economy and climate action in opposition to one another.*** We can now measure the debt created by inaction, as well as the expenditure avoided and benefits generated by action. Climate action can also produce economic benefits, provided that its instruments are designed fairly and acceptably. All sources agree on one point: the economic consequences of inaction are far greater than the costs of action, and every fraction of a degree increases damage, reduces adaptation options and makes delay more expensive.

| Benchmark                     | Key figure <sup>8</sup>                           | Interpretation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Recorded losses within the EU | Approximately 27% of the EU budget                | Between 2021 and 2024, losses reached €208 billion, or €52 billion per year – the equivalent of 27% of the EU's 2024 budget. Floods account for 47% of the total. In 2021, losses of €44 billion were recorded in three countries, compared with a European annual average of €6.5 billion between 1980 and 2024. <sup>9</sup>                                  |
| Uninsured debt within the EU  | 80 % or more                                      | These data cover the period from 1980 to 2024. Less than 20% of these losses were covered by private insurance; the remainder is borne by victims, businesses and public budgets.                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Fall in global GDP            | A 10% to 30% decline in GDP by 2100 <sup>10</sup> | Warming close to +4°C could reduce global GDP by 10% to 23% by 2100 compared with a pathway involving no additional warming. Thus, an economy that would have reached an index level of 100 without warming would reach only 77 to 90. More recent studies based on changes in the global mean temperature estimate substantially greater effects <sup>11</sup> |

<sup>5</sup> <https://climate.copernicus.eu/esotc/2025/press-resources>.

<sup>6</sup> Mora and al., «Global risk of deadly heat», *Nature Climate Change*, 2017. This study is cited by the IPCC, but these figures do not constitute an official quantified conclusion of the IPCC.

<sup>7</sup> These boundaries concern the nine interdependent processes that sustain life on Earth: climate, biodiversity, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles (fertilisers), land-system change, the freshwater cycle, the release of novel entities into the biosphere, stratospheric ozone, ocean acidification and the presence of aerosols in the atmosphere.

<sup>8</sup> These figures do not all have the same status. Past losses are observed, while future costs are based on scenarios and models.

<sup>9</sup> European Environment Agency, [Economic losses from weather- and climate-related extremes in Europe](#), 2025.

<sup>10</sup> Order of magnitude assessed by the IPCC AR6 (2023).

<sup>11</sup> Whereas the macroeconomic estimates available at the time of the IPCC AR6 were based on the relationship between local or national temperature variations and economic activity, Bilal and Känzig (*The Macroeconomic Impact of Climate Change*, 2024) assess the global effect of an increase in the global mean temperature: an increase of +2°C by 2100 would correspond to a decline in global GDP of around 50%.

| Benchmark                                       | Key figure <sup>8</sup>                                                     | Interpretation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Global mitigation cost</b>                   | – 0.04 to – 0.09 percentage points of growth per year by 2050 <sup>12</sup> | The cost of mitigation required to maintain a +2°C pathway would reduce average annual growth by 0.04 to 0.09 percentage points by 2050 compared with current policies. This is a gross cost that does not take account of avoided climate damage or co-benefits. For example, the health co-benefits associated with improved air quality alone would amount to between €1.40 and €2.45 for every euro spent on mitigation. <sup>13</sup> |
| <b>Global public subsidies for fossil fuels</b> | <b>\$1,063 billion in 2023</b>                                              | In 87 countries accounting for 93% of global CO <sub>2</sub> emissions, budget transfers and tax advantages granted to fossil fuels reached \$1,063 billion in 2023. In 15 of those countries, this amount exceeds the national health budget by 100%. <sup>14</sup>                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <b>European action taken in isolation</b>       | <b>84% cost-effective</b>                                                   | Even if other regions or countries took no action, reducing European emissions by up to 84% would cost less than the domestic damage thereby avoided in the European economy, estimated at \$216 per additional tonne of CO <sub>2</sub> . <sup>15</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                   |

### 3. Governing a climate transformation in a democracy

5. Guiding question: which institutions, powers and checks make it possible to carry out the climate transformation democratically?

#### 3.1. *Making collective decisions in an emergency while maintaining a long-term perspective*

6. Linking the next five years to the following fifty: How can concrete objectives be set within the term of an elected office, the various levels of governance be better co-ordinated, and long-term prevention, adaptation and emissions-reduction policies be established? What minimum democratic safeguards should apply to emergency measures adopted in response to climate-related risks?

7. Preventing the authoritarian temptation: What lessons can be learned from the pandemic about decision making in a crisis? Could the climate emergency foster the belief that centralised or technocratic power would be more effective than democracy? How should this temptation be addressed?

8. Turning disasters into a collective capacity for action: How can mobilisation be sustained beyond the event itself, knowledge derived from experience be incorporated, and lasting prevention, adaptation and solidarity policies be developed?

9. Strengthening grid resilience against compound threats: How can member States integrate climate adaptation with energy security?

#### 3.2. *Redistributing decision-making power*

10. Making citizen participation a genuine power of influence: What can citizens' assemblies and the first Global Citizens' Assembly on the climate and ecological crisis teach us? Under what conditions do forms of participatory democracy improve the quality and acceptability of decisions? How can token consultations or consultations with no follow-up be avoided?

11. Involving young people from the moment choices are defined: How can we move from occasional consultation to meaningful youth participation in setting priorities, developing policies and monitoring their implementation? What resources, rights and responsibilities should they be granted in decisions whose consequences will unfold throughout their lives?

<sup>12</sup> Order of magnitude assessed by the IPCC AR6 (2023).

<sup>13</sup> Markandya and al. (2018) published in *The Lancet Planetary Health*.

<sup>14</sup> [Lancet Countdown 2025](#), indicator 4.3.2.

<sup>15</sup> Bilal and Känzig, [Does Unilateral Decarbonization Pay for Itself?](#), 2025.

12. Bringing economic interests under democratic control: How can lobbying be regulated and conflicts of interest prevented when economic actors defend a model whose climate, health and social costs are borne by society as a whole? What concrete powers should be given to citizens, workers and directly exposed populations to rebalance their influence in relation to lobby groups?

### 3.3. *Guaranteeing the conditions for informed debat*

13. Debating technical solutions without postponing action: While technological innovations may contribute to the transition, how can excessive confidence in future solutions be prevented from being used to sideline transformations that are already necessary? How can techno-solutionism be debated without falling into climate scepticism?

14. Making science a democratic common good: How can the independence of research, public access to data and pluralistic expertise be guaranteed, while leaving democratic institutions explicitly responsible for making trade-offs? How can it be ensured that debate focuses on methods, priorities and the distribution of efforts rather than on the strategic denial of facts?

15. Protecting the public sphere against the manufacturing of doubt: How can organised and funded strategies aimed at manufacturing doubt and delaying climate action be identified? How can freedom of expression be protected without allowing it to justify opaque funding and algorithmic manipulation?

16. Shielding environmental defenders and climate whistleblowers: How can member States establish effective protection mechanisms for environmental human rights defenders, scientists, and investigative journalists facing legal intimidation, or physical threats (including persecution in high-risk regions or conflict zones)?

## 4. **Guiding climate action and assuming responsibility for it**

17. Guiding question: What principles, obligations and accountability mechanisms can guide climate action that takes account of inequalities, the living world and future generations?

### 4.1. *Inequalities create climate vulnerability*

18. Climate risk as an interaction between hazard, exposure and vulnerability<sup>16</sup>: How can implementation of the Council of Europe Strategy on the Environment 2025–2030 – particularly by linking the work of the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion (CDADI) on the disproportionate effects of the environmental crisis with the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement's work on inclusive disaster risk reduction – produce a common understanding of the way inequalities determine who is exposed to climate hazards?

19. The potential of the European Social Charter to provide an objective assessment of climate inequalities: How does the Charter make it possible to identify and legally characterise the social determinants of climate vulnerability – employment, housing, income, social protection and access to essential services? How can the targeted questions provided for in reporting procedures, together with collective complaints, be used to document structural problems, develop common standards, organise dialogue with States, social partners and civil society, and guide corrective measures?

20. Local and regional authorities as a fully-fledged level of understanding and action: How does the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities draw on the representation of local and regional authorities, comparison of their experiences and monitoring of the European Charter of Local Self-Government to make inequalities visible and examine whether local climate responsibilities are accompanied by sufficient powers, resources, autonomy and solidarity mechanisms?

21. Protecting persons displaced in the context of climate change, environmental degradation and conflict-related environmental harm: How can Council of Europe standards and mechanisms better protect the human rights and social rights of persons displaced by disasters, environmental degradation, destruction of critical infrastructure or conflict-related environmental damage ?

### 4.2. *Making responsibilities effective*

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<sup>16</sup> Conceptual framework for Part II of the IPCC reports.

22. Making the *KlimaSeniorinnen* judgment a common accountability framework: How can the positive obligations identified by the European Court of Human Rights be turned into a roadmap for assessing whether the climate action of States Parties to the Convention is coherent, effective and timely? To what extent can the advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 23 July 2025 concerning States' obligations in respect of climate change inform the execution of the *KlimaSeniorinnen* judgment?

23. Strengthening parliamentary climate accountability: How can the Parliamentary Assembly support regular parliamentary review and exchange of good practice concerning the adequacy, coherence and implementation of national climate frameworks, taking into account the requirements identified in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and relevant international obligations clarified by the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 23 July 2025, without duplicating existing judicial or treaty-monitoring mechanisms?

24. Addressing the blind spot of corporate climate responsibility: How does the ICJ's advisory opinion reshape this discussion? Should Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 on human rights and business be revised in the light of that opinion; advances in knowledge that make it possible to trace emissions to the main producers and document delaying strategies; the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct; and European experience of due diligence?

25. From punishment to reparation: To what extent can ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law strengthen the detection, prosecution and punishment of the most serious environmental offences where they are attributable to legal persons or have a transnational dimension? Without conflating liability regimes, how can the principles of cessation, reparation and non-repetition recalled in the ICJ advisory opinion help develop the opening created by the Convention towards restorative justice?

#### 4.3. *Guaranteeing long-term habitability conditions*

26. Ensuring consistency between climate action and biodiversity: How can the Bern Convention and the Council of Europe Landscape Convention be mobilised to assess the effects of climate policies on species, habitats, soils, landscapes and living conditions, thereby preventing the displacement of harm and maladaptation? How does their work on ecosystems, nature-based solutions and public participation help strengthen health, access to water, security, livelihoods and adaptive capacity?

27. Pursuing intergenerational equity: What added value would come from supplementing the Environment Strategy Action Plan with "futures literacy", informed by Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2565 (2024), Safeguarding human rights for future generations, and the ICJ advisory opinion, enabling member States, before any major environmental decision, to examine its long-term effects, identify irreversible damage and the risks and costs passed on to future generations, compare possible solutions and make the reasons for their choices public?

28. Giving the Council of Europe a compass: What added value would a stand-alone convention on the right to a healthy environment offer compared with an instrument limited to human rights in climate action? Could an independent monitoring mechanism combining periodic assessments, country visits, contributions from civil society, recommendations and follow-up by a committee of the Parties help establish common standards and provide the Court and domestic courts with specialised guidance?

### 5. **Giving everyone the means to understand, act and choose**

29. Guiding question: How can everyone be enabled to understand climate issues, participate in the implementation of climate action and make an informed democratic choice—notably through voting—about the policies that will determine future living conditions?

#### 5.1. *Connecting knowledge, emotion and the capacity to act*

30. Understanding the actual conditions required to move to action: Why do information and awareness-raising not automatically lead to changes in practices? How can greater account be taken of the role of income, housing, work, mobility, infrastructure, available time and social norms in each person's capacity to act?

31. Recognising the diversity of ways of taking action: How can low-impact practices that are not necessarily presented as environmental be made visible, particularly those arising from local cultures, collective solidarity or modest living conditions? How can social differences in environmental behaviour be taken into account without minimising either the environmental footprint of the wealthiest people or their capacity to take action to reduce it?

32. Educating without creating powerlessness: How can young people be provided with age-appropriate information, eco-emotions be recognised and eco-anxiety be addressed without minimising the risks or presenting disaster as inevitable? How can young people be enabled to experience collective action, observe its results and thereby build lasting confidence in their capacity to act?

*5.2. Making well-being and the benefits of action desirable*

33. Building a popular narrative of climate action: How can we move from an abstract, technical or guilt-inducing environmentalism to an environmentalism “at the level of everyday life”, rooted in daily experience, health, safety, material living conditions and attachment to places? How can it be shown that protecting the climate and the living world also means preserving homes, landscapes, heritage, know-how and the resources on which our common future depends?

34. Measuring well-being: How can it be explained that certain human-development indicators may continue to improve even as the climate, biodiversity and ecosystems on which their long-term continuation depends deteriorate? How can measurements of income, production, health and education be supplemented by measurements of the quality of social relationships and living environments, available time, territorial resilience and the risks passed on to future generations?

35. Making the human and economic cost of inaction understandable: How can global assessments be translated into consequences that people can understand—health, insurance, housing, food, employment, taxation, assets and public services? Why do certain climate policies, particularly tax policies, ultimately become accepted practices while others trigger widespread rejection?

*5.3. Turning climate concern into democratic power*

36. Giving voting a climate dimension: How can citizens be enabled to identify the climate, social and territorial consequences of programmes put to the vote? What independent and accessible tools could facilitate comparison by showing not only the stated objectives, but also the proposed measures, distribution of efforts, necessary funding and expected consequences for living conditions?

37. Making electoral commitments verifiable: How can long-term climate objectives be translated into precise commitments accompanied by deadlines and indicators that can be understood within the timescale of an elected term? How can citizens, parliaments and civil society monitor their implementation, identify discrepancies between announcements and decisions, and require elected representatives to account for them?

38. Safeguarding the integrity of democratic debate on climate action: How can member States protect electoral and public debate against deliberately deceptive practices, covert influence, opaque financing, greenwashing and manipulative information campaigns, while fully safeguarding freedom of expression, political pluralism and legitimate disagreement concerning the choice, timing, costs and distributional effects of climate policies?

**6. Provisional timetable of activities, hearings and visits in 2026**

39. In accordance with Resolution 2553 (2024), Strengthening a youth perspective in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly, a youth perspective will be incorporated at every stage of the report's preparation. The thematic debate organised during the fourth part-session of 2026, with the participation of the Advisory Council on Youth (CCJ), will constitute the first stage. Young people will subsequently be involved in the hearings, workshops, exchanges of views and visits until the report is considered by the Assembly. The timetable will be supplemented as work progresses, and progress on the report may be followed on the Parliamentary Network for a Healthy Environment [website](#).

| Venue and date                                                                                             | Activities, hearings, visits                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Athens, 5 June 2026</b>                                                                                 | Exchange of views between the network and Alexandra Palt, a researcher specialising in leadership and ethics, focusing on the evolution of narratives and communication strategies regarding environmental issues, followed by a practical workshop designed to test the proposed approach.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <b>Strasbourg, 25 June 2026,<sup>3rd</sup> part of the session / Paris, 10 September 2026</b>              | Exchange of views <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Between the network and Sumeyra Arslan, climate engagement and policy adviser at the International Network for Children's Rights (CRIN), and</li> <li>• Between the committee and Michel Forst, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the recognition of the right to a healthy environment at the Council of Europe.</li> <li>• Between the committee and Emilie Tamo, representative of the CCJ</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| <b>Strasbourg, 1 October 2026 (4<sup>th</sup> part of the session)<br/>Thematic day on the environment</b> | Plenary session: general policy debate with youth representatives and adoption of the report 'Europe, the fastest-warming continent: accelerating climate action with young people'<br>Joint meeting of the committee and the network: hearing of the applicants in the <i>KlimaSeniorinnen</i> case, exchange of views with the Commissioner for Human Rights.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| <b>Antalya, November 2026</b>                                                                              | Participation in COP31 and organisation of a side event on ' <i>Climate, Democracy and Accountability: The Role of Democratic Governance in Implementing Climate Action</i> ', in partnership with the Congress and the Florence Convention.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| <b>Paris, 3 December 2026*</b>                                                                             | Committee meeting: hearing with Pierre Rosanvallon, professor at the Collège de France; Professor Laurent Neyret, author of ' <i>Liberté, égalité et habitabilité</i> '; Linda Steg, professor of environmental psychology at the University of Groningen, Netherlands; and Mario Herberz, behavioural scientist at the University of Geneva, Switzerland.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| <b>Paris, 4 December 2026*</b><br><b>Strasbourg, first part of the 2027 session</b>                        | Network meeting: visit to the climate exhibition at the Cité des Sciences et de l'Industrie<br><br>Committee and/or Network meeting: hearings with the Chair of the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention or a representative of the Bern Convention's Biodiversity and Climate Group; the Chair of the 13th Conference on the Implementation of the Florence Convention; and Elisabeth Lambert, a researcher at the CNRS, on her study 'States' obligations and the right of individuals to be protected against the serious effects of global warming', presented to the Committee of Permanent Correspondents of EUR-OPA, the European Social Charter and the Register of Damages in Ukraine. |
| <b>Paris, 20 March 2027</b>                                                                                | Hearing with three lead authors of the IPCC AR6 Working Group II synthesis report, ' <i>Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability</i> *': Nathalie Hilmi (Monaco Scientific Centre), Diana Reckien (University of Twente, Netherlands) and Lisa Schipper (University of Bonn, Germany)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <b>XX May 2027</b>                                                                                         | Hearing with Mia Petra (Finland), former member of the PACE, lobbyist, and an economist                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <b>Strasbourg, xx June 2027 (3<sup>rd</sup> part-session)</b>                                              | Committee debate on the preliminary draft report                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>Strasbourg, xx October 2027 (4<sup>th</sup> part-session)</b>                                           | Adoption by the committee and the plenary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| <b>26 January 2028</b>                                                                                     | Expiry of the referral                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |