

PROJECT DARKTOOLS

Rolf van Wegberg

THIS HIDDEN SITE HAS BEEN SEIZED

and controlled since June 20

by the Dutch National Police in conjunction with the Bundeskriminalamt, Lietuvos Policija, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the European Agency for Criminal Investigation (Europol), under the authority of the Dutch National Prosecutor's Office and the Attorney General's office of the Federal State of Hesse (Germany).



TNO innovation
for life

The Dutch National Police have located Hansa Market and taken over control of this marketplace since June 20, 2017. We have modified the source code, which allowed us to capture passwords, PGP-encrypted order information, IP-addresses, Bitcoins and other relevant information that may help law enforcement agencies worldwide to identify users of this marketplace. For more information about this operation, please consult our hidden service at politipecvh42eav.onion.

PROJECT DARKTOOLS

- › Capability building for INTERPOL member countries on dark net policing:
- › *Dark Web Capability Roadmap* – (third-party) solutions mapped to specific capabilities
- › *Dark Web Crawling* – ‘state of the onion’
- › *Blockchain Analytics* – ‘follow the crypto’
- › *Dissemination* – research output and (law enforcement) training

PROJECT DARKTOOLS

- › Capability building for INTERPOL member countries on dark net policing:
- › *Dark Web Capability Roadmap* – (third-party) solutions mapped to specific capabilities
- › ***Dark Web Crawling*** – ‘state of the onion’
- › *Blockchain Analytics* – ‘follow the crypto’
- › *Dissemination* – research output and (law enforcement) training

TNO DARKWEB RESEARCH PROGRAM

- › Applied scientific research following a four stage process:
- › *Monitoring the Dark Web* – longitudinal measurements since 2012
- › *Sense-making* – from measurements into insights
- › *Actionable intelligence creation* – evidence-based interventions
- › *Dissemination* – research output and (law enforcement) training

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF INTERVENTIONS

- › Types of interventions
- › Effect-types
- › Crime displacement?
- › Desistance?
- › Prevention?

INTERVENTIONS

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Operation Marco Polo



Operation Onymous





Operation Bayonet



Agora BMR Evolution Hydra Pandora Silk Road Silk Road 2

SOSKA & CHRISTIN (2015)





OPERATION BAYONET



MEASURING THE IMPACT OF OPERATION BAYONET

- › Distinction between Operation Bayonet and previous interventions
- › Crime displacement as intended effect – sting-operation
- › New methodology – vendor angle
- › Investigating business continuity management of (reputable) vendors

MEASUREMENTS ON DREAM MARKET

- › Dump of usernames, registration dates and user type (July – September 2017)
 - Filtering on newly registered vendors ($n=220$)
- › Cross-check on Grams (vendor-search engine) - information on historic vendor 'behavior'
 - PGP-key
 - Previous activity on markets
 - Username(s)

USERBASE OF DREAM MARKET



Figure 1: Daily new users on Dream Market in 2017




Figure 2: Users on Dream Market in 2017

MIGRATION PATTERNS TO DREAM MARKET




Figure 3: Breakdown of newly registered vendors on Dream Market ($n=220$)

MIGRATION OVER TIME




Figure 5: Cumulative number of newly registered vendors on Dream Market per origin on date (n=220)

CHANGES IN VENDOR BEHAVIOR?




Figure 4: Breakdown of evasive strategies of migrated vendors to Dream Market ($n=131$)

CHANGES IN VENDOR BEHAVIOR OVER TIME




Figure 6: Cumulative number of evasive measures by newly registered vendors on Dream Market on date ($n=53$)


TAKE-AWAYS

- › New methodology – inherent limitations (comparability, reproducibility, generalizability)
- › Changes in vendor behavior
- › First look into incentives stemming from reputation and business continuity-management

BEYOND – STATE OF THE ONION

- › Fragmentation in the dark market ecosystem – single vendor shops
- › Significant portion of ‘banned products’ have niche platforms:
 - Child sexual abuse
 - Red rooms
- › Significant portion of (cybercrime) ‘facilitators’:
 - Hosting
 - Wiki/forums

New .onions scraped in 2019 week X (n=286)



OUTLOOK

- › Interventions aimed at criminal ‘capabilities’:
 1. Technologies, e.g., bitcoin mixers
 2. Anonymity, e.g., infiltration and/or undercover activities
 3. Security, e.g., misconfigurations in .onion domains

QUESTIONS?

THIS HIDDEN SITE HAS BEEN SEIZED
and controlled since June 20

by the Dutch National Police in conjunction with the Bundeskriminalamt, Lietuvos Policija, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Europol, under the authority of the Dutch National Prosecutor's Office and the Attorney General's office of the Federal State of Hestia (Germany).

rolf.vanwegberg@tno.nl

TNO innovation
for life

The Dutch National Police have located Hansa Market and taken over control of this marketplace since June 20, 2017. We have modified the source code, which allowed us to capture passwords, PGP-encrypted order information, IP-addresses, Bitcoins and other relevant information that may help law enforcement agencies worldwide to identify users of this marketplace. For more information about this operation, please consult our hidden service at politiepvvh42eaw.onion.