

Strasbourg, 2 November /novembre 2023

CDDG(2023)15 Addendum

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE / COMITE EUROPEEN SUR LA DEMOCRATIE ET LA GOUVERNANCE (CDDG)

Replies to the questionnaire on new technologies and the different stages of the electoral process

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Résultats du questionnaire sur les nouvelles technologies et les différentes étapes du processus électoral

Secretariat Memorandum prepared by the Directorate General of Democracy and Human Dignity Democratic Governance Division / Note du Secrétariat établie par la Direction générale de la démocratie et de la dignité humaine Division de la gouvernance démocratique

INDEX

ALBANIA3
ARMENIA4
AUSTRIA8
AZERBAIJAN9
BELGIUM10
BULGARIA12
CROATIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
ESTONIA
GERMANY23
GEORGIA25
GREECE
HUNGARY
ICELAND
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBURG
MALTA
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY41
POLAND
PORTUGAL
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA46
SAN MARINO
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
SLOVENIA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UKRAINE
UNITED KINGDOM

ALBANIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

Albania started its first pilot project on electronic voting for the very first time on the April 25, 2021, Parliamentary Elections. In that electoral process, one electoral zone in Tirana, the capital city, voted by means of an electronic voting and counting standalone device, a touch-screen solution. The pilot project was also conducted further on in the mayoral by-elections of March 6, 2022, in the Municipality of Vora (mainly a rural area) in 44 polling stations. Both projects were very successful.

In the Local Government Elections of May 14, 2023, the Central Elections Commission of Albania considerably broadened the project's application in three municipalities, Elbasan, Kamza, Vora, in 402 polling stations. Again, the outcome was extremely positive.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

The Central Elections Commission uses nationwide biometric and electronic identification of voters. While our electronic voting equipment is also used for vote recording and counting, and there is a paper-slip printing of the ballot choice for the voters' confirmation. Within 6 months after the election date, the CEC Albania verifies, and audits 100% of the ballot slips, and the accuracy of the system is at 100%.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Albania has not used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

The set of CEC Regulatory Commission decisions on Electronic-Voting

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation is yet to be applied as it requires legislative action.

specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

To be protected against cyber-attacks, all electronic voting machines are not connected online, and only after the voting is closed a modem transmits the voting data to a data center.

ARMENIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

In the Republic of Armenia, the electronic voting procedure is currently implemented exclusively at the national level during National Assembly elections and for specific eligible groups. Specifically, only voters who are located outside the territory of the Republic of Armenia on the day of the election and are on diplomatic service at diplomatic or consular missions of the Republic of Armenia, as well as their family members residing abroad who have the right to vote, are eligible to participate in electronic voting. Additionally, military servants on longterm assignments or studying in foreign countries are also eligible to participate in electronic voting.

The Procedure of electronic voting is prescribed by article 62 of the RA Electoral Code, according to which: "Electors who are on diplomatic service in diplomatic or consular representations of the Republic of Armenia, as well as members of their families residing abroad with them and having the right to elect, in case of being outside of the territory of the Republic of Armenia, on the voting day, may participate in elections of the National Assembly by voting electronically in the manner and within the time limits prescribed by the Central Electoral Commission. The Central Electoral Commission is obliged to establish such terms for electronic voting that would ensure the free expression of the will of voters and the secrecy of voting. Electors voting electronically give their votes only to political parties running in elections.

Electronic voting may be held after the end of the time limit established for registration of the electoral lists for the political parties running in elections of the National Assembly, but no later than 5 days before the voting day.

The provisions of this Article also extend to military servants seconded for a long period of time to or those studying in foreign states."

To comply with the provisions of the law, the Central Electoral Commission adopted a decision (17.06.2016, N32-N) and implemented an electronic voting system in the form of a website.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

In the Republic of Armenia, electronic voting, as described in point "a", is utilized in accordance with the legal requirements of the country. However, it is important to note that electronic calculation of voting results within polling stations has not been employed in Armenia. Instead, the results recorded in the protocols by the precinct electoral commissions are entered into the "Elections" automated system, which calculates the final election outcome. It should be emphasized that none of the electronic processes implemented in the electoral procedures in Armenia have been discontinued.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

In the Republic of Armenia, the process of recording and counting votes in polling stations has never involved the use of electronic means or tools. After the voting results are summarized in the precincts, the data from the protocols, which are compiled in the specified order by the Central Electoral Commission, are entered into a computer using a designated software program. The tabulation of voting results by precincts is then generated and printed using a special computer program specified by the Electoral Commission. This procedure is defined by Article 73 of the Election Code in the following manner:

"The territorial electoral commission enters (as prescribed by the Central Electoral Commission) the data of protocols on the voting results in the electoral precinct into a computer by means of special software. The software ensures reasonable guarantees against errors generated by incorrect data input. The territorial electoral commission, regularly but no less than every 3 hours, prints the tabulation of the voting results. The tabulation certified by the signatures of the territorial electoral commission chairperson (deputy chairperson) and the secretary and by the seal of the commission shall immediately be posted at the commission in a place visible to all. The territorial electoral commission completes the entry into a computer of data of protocols on the voting results in electoral precincts no later than within 20 hours after the end of voting. The territorial electoral commission tabulates the voting results according to electoral precincts, as well as total results."

Article 8 of the Electoral Code also states:

"During elections of the National Assembly, the Council of Elders of Yerevan, the Central Electoral Commission — no later than the day following the voting, starting at 00:00 — carries out tabulation of voting results by electoral precincts and service areas of territorial electoral commissions. The Central Electoral Commission finalizes the tabulation of preliminary voting results and posts them on the website of the Commission, with the possibility to download no later than within one hour following the receipt of the latest information from the electoral precinct on the voting results, but no later than within 24 hours following the end of the voting.

During elections of the National Assembly, the Council of Elders of Yerevan, the Central Electoral Commission posts - following the adoption of the decision

based on election results, but no later than within one hour after the end of the sitting —the final tabulation of voting results by electoral precincts and service areas of territorial electoral commissions on the website of the Commission with the possibility to download."

Due to the specified provisions of the legislation in 2007, an internal (local) network independent of the Internet has been introduced between Central Electoral Commission and Territorial Electoral Commissions. An automated System, "Elections" software, was developed and introduced which is still in use today, naturally being adapted to the current legislation as necessary. The software runs only on the internal network established between the CEC and the TEC.

On the day of voting, the territorial electoral commissions (TEC) collect information about the number of participants as of that time through a telephone call, and this information is entered into the Automated System "Elections" by the precinct electoral commissions. The data is promptly stored in the central repository of the CEC, and tabulation is conducted based on this data both at the CEC and the TECs. As stipulated by the Election Code, at the specified times, the information is published on the CEC's website, categorized by marzes (regions), communities, and precincts, as well as in the TECs.

As already mentioned, precinct electoral commissions submit the hard copy of the protocol on the voting results to the territorial electoral commission. In the territorial electoral commission, this information is entered into the Automated System "Elections", which is immediately maintained in the CEC database and published in real-time on the CEC website. Both the CEC and the TEC carry out tabulation via the Automated System "Elections", which is also published. During the National Referendum, elections of the National Assembly and the Council of Elders of Yerevan, the voting results received by the TECs, are published on the website of the Commission and in the media center of the CEC per regions (Marzes), communities or administrative regions and candidates. During the local elections, after the tabulation in the TECs, the voting results are published in real-time on the CEC website.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

In the Republic of Armenia, electronic voting has been implemented since 2011, exclusively for the National Assembly elections. The introduction of the electronic voting system by the CEC was carried out in accordance with international standards and practices available at that time while also ensuring compliance with the principles of confidentiality as established by both international norms and Armenian legislation.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

RA Electoral Code - constitutional law.

The decision of the Central Electoral Commission of 17.06.2016 N 32-N «On defining electronic voting procedure and time frame at elections of the National Assembly for voters who are on diplomatic service in diplomatic or consular

representations of the Republic of Armenia, as well as for members of their families, residing abroad with them and having the right to vote».

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

As of now, no changes are expected.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

Most of the recommendations of the CM/Rec(2017)5 were taken into account when introducing and implementing e-voting.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

According to Article 8.1 of the Electoral Code:

"The website of the Central Electoral Commission is the following: <u>www.elections.am</u>. The website of the Central Electoral Commission provides information about the activities of both the Central Electoral Commission and the territorial electoral commissions, including the meeting schedule, agenda, live broadcast of the meetings, video recordings, and decisions. Information is posted on the website of the Central Electoral Commission in an open data and accessible format."

On the CEC website, information is mostly published in an accessible format. Tabulations of the voting results are also available, with the possibility to download in the form of Excel tables. In addition, almost all sections of the website have the ability to search, filter, and export.

The CEC website has its own simplified version, which has the ability to change font sizes and colors. Here, the information is published in the simplest way and is intended for people with visual impairments and citizens with limited mental ability.

News and announcements are also published on the website with audio clips. It is planned to carry out live broadcasts of CEC sessions with sign language interpretation.

According to Article 10 of the Electoral Code:

"During the elections, the voters with mobility difficulties who are unable to vote at their precinct center can, no later than 12 days before the voting day until 14:00, submit an application to the authorised body on temporary withdrawal from the list of electors by place of registration and on being included in the list of voters according to their preferred location, indicating the number of polling station accessible for the voters with mobility difficulties.

The authorised body shall, within a 3-day period following the receipt of the application, temporarily remove the data of the elector from the list of electors by place of registration and add them to the list of electors of the electoral precinct by place of residence. The authorised body provides the applicant with a relevant statement of information thereon. The forms of the application and the statement of application are established by the Central Electoral Commission.

In case of submitting an application on behalf of another person, the applicant is obliged to submit power of attorney.

The Central Electoral Commission publishes the list of polling stations accessible to voters with mobility difficulties."

On the CEC website, on each election page, the list of accessible precincts established for that election is published, with an interactive map and filtering options according to different accessibility.

Cyber security

The implementation and strategy of cyber security of the CEC are under constant development and improvement.

Currently, one of the important points of the CEC cyber security is the backup part of the CEC Data Center, which consists of two parts: the first is local automatic archiving, and the second is periodic archiving on an external drive. The third unit of the reserve part is under implementation, and the fourth vital block is in the design stage.

The third block is the new server to be introduced, which will perform both the local automatic archiving part of the second block and will be the backup automatic replacement block of the essential part of the entire server sector (Blade system).

As well as new network equipment, which will replace the equipment serving the local network of the CEC administrative building and will significantly increase the security level of internal network vulnerabilities.

AUSTRIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

No. In Austria, e-voting is not used and is currently not considered in any way.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

In general, the use of ICT only comes into play when transmitting and tabulating the provisional results from Provincial Electoral Boards to the Federal Electoral

Board in Austria. Local electoral boards may use computers to electronically collect information about the voters present at the respective polling station ("Abstimmungsverzeichnis") but eventually have to print out all this information. Irrespective of these examples, all stages of the electoral process are paper-based and final results are always determined by electoral boards on the basis of physical records (minutes).

Following the 2023 Austrian electoral reform, broader use of ICT in elections is expected from 1 January 2024 onwards, e.g., by implementing the technical possibility to check one's own right to vote in the Central Electoral Register by using a qualified electronic signature.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The guidelines are known to the responsible actors and were taken into consideration. However, given the overall limited area of use of ICT in the electoral cycle, no actual reference to the Guidelines has been of relevance yet.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/a

AZERBAIJAN

Question 1 : Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

no

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Yes (information attached with the title of "Use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the election-related processes in Azerbaijan.")

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The general concept of the Council of Ministers CM(2022) 10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes has been taken into account while updating the State Automated Information System (SAIS).

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

The following legal tools are the basis of the use of ICT to be used in the electoral processes:

- Extract from the Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the use of information and communication technologies

- Order of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on establishing "Elections" State Automated Information System

- Instruction on the rules for the usage of the State Automated Information System during elections (referendum)

- Rules on installation and use of web cameras in election precincts

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/a

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/a

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/a

BELGIUM

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

For the elections in 2024, we will use an electronic voting system in Flanders (60%), Brussels, and the German-speaking region.

In Wallonia, there will be paper voting and an electronic system that will aid in the counting offices.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/a

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Yes, in Belgium, the results are collected on a cantonal level. A canton consists of several municipalities. In the headquarter of the canton, the results coming from the polling offices are transmitted to the central national level. Centrally all the results are collected, totalized, and published to the public. The system we use for this transmission is called "Martine".

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The system for transmission of the results was built in 2017-2018. Good practices known in these periods were taken into account. Those good practices were requirements in the tender (2015) for the candidate suppliers. The electronic voting system was built in 2010-2012. New systems need to comply with the current good practices in IT.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

In Belgium, the federal authority is competent for federal, European, and regional elections. The regions are competent for local elections on their territory (electronic voting is not used in the Walloon Region except in the 9 German-speaking municipalities). There are, therefore, different legislations (these legislations are, however, largely similar in terms of principles).

For the Federal, European, and regional elections: https://elections.fgov.be/sites/default/files/documents/Loi_Wet_07.02.2014 VoteElectronique_ElektronischStemmen.pdf

For the local elections in the Flemish Region : https://vlaanderenkiest.be/regelgeving/het-digitaal-kiesdecreet-van-25-mei-2012-dkd

For the local elections in the Brussels-Capital Region:

https://elections2018.brussels/sites/default/files/2018-01/Ord-vote-electrcoord-CVL-17.01.2018-(4).pdf

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

In a tender for new systems, there is always a requirement to comply with actual known good practices.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

In a tender for new systems, there is always a requirement to comply with actual known good practices.

Existing systems will be tested and analyzed frequently. Improvements for (cyber)security, accessibility, ... are implemented to guarantee that our systems are up to date.

BULGARIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

According to the Bulgarian Election Code, the Central Election Commission¹ of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted a procedure for experimental machine voting for the first time in the conduct of the elections for members of the European Parliament from the Republic of Bulgaria in March 2014. From March 2014 until May 2021, machine voting had limited use in national and local elections. After amendments to the Election Code in May 2021, at the polling station, both at national and local level elections, the voter shall vote by a ballot for machine voting, except for 2 cases:

 The first case: Machine voting shall not be carried out in polling stations in the country with fewer than 300 voters, when voting with a mobile ballot box, in polling stations in medical establishments, elderly homes, and other specialized institutions for the provision of social services, in polling stations on vessels flying the Bulgarian flag, as well as in polling stations outside the country for the formation of which less than 300

¹ Central Election Commission website: <u>https://www.cik.bg/</u> Replies to the questionnaire on new technologies and the different stages of the electoral process and implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)5 Standards for E-voting and CM(2022)10 Guidelines on the use of ICTs [CDDG(2023)15 Addendum] applications under Art. 16, para. 1 of the Election Code has been submitted or in which less than 300 voters voted in the last elections;

• The second case: Where, due to the occurrence of overwhelming external circumstances, the machine voting appeared to be compromised, the section election commission shall immediately notify the regional election commission and the Central Election Commission. The voting shall continue by paper ballots).

Voting by a ballot for machine voting shall be equivalent to voting by a ballot paper. A voter, who votes by a ballot for machine voting, shall not vote by a ballot paper. The relevant rules applicable to the voting by a ballot paper shall apply to the voting by a ballot for machine voting.

After these amendments to e-voting, in the elections for members of the National Assembly (Parliament) in July 2021, the voters use only a ballot for machine voting (with the exception of the two cases mentioned previously).

In December 2022, with new amendments to the Election Code, the voter may choose to vote by a paper ballot or a machine voting ballot. Those two options are used in practice in the elections for members of the National Assembly (Parliament) on April 2023.

Date	Type of elections	Voting means	Voting activity
4 th April 2021	Parliament	paper ballot	50,61 %
11 th July 2021	Parliament	machine voting ballot	42,19%
21 st November 2021	President and Vice President	machine voting ballot	34,84%
2 nd October 2022	Parliament	machine voting ballot	39,41%
2 nd April 2023	Parliament	paper ballot or machine voting ballot	40,69%

Table. Total voting activity in elections

At this moment, the legislation of the Republic of Bulgaria does not regulate the use of machine voting in referenda.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes,

consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

According to art. 57, para 1, item 33 of the Election Code, the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Bulgaria determines the requirements for the organization and technology of the computer processing of the voting data and for the issuance of a final ballot with the election results, including by machine voting, not later than 55 days before the election day and shall assign the implementation to "Information Services" (a single member joint-stock company (EAD) with public participation)².

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

The Bulgarian Election Code shall provide for conditions, organization, and procedures for conducting the elections in the Republic of Bulgaria, including machine voting. The decisions of the Central Election Commission and other materials connected with the use of electronic voting machines for the elections for members of the National Assembly (Parliament), held in July 2021, may be found only in the Bulgarian language: https://www.cik.bg/bg/ns11.07.2021/machine_voting

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

According to art. 57, para 1, p. 49 of the Election Code of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Central Election Commission issue, together with the Commission for the Protection of Personal Data, guidelines on the processing and safeguarding of personal data throughout the election process.

The portal of the Central Election Commission (CEC): <u>https://www.cik.bg/</u> has a hyperlink to the Youtube profile of the Commission: <u>https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1IbhR8-YZCyo0o6NfbEdAQ/videos</u>

There are some video clips for all voters (with sign language for individuals who are deaf), for example:

² "Information Services" EAD website: <u>https://www.is-bg.net/en/1</u> Replies to the questionnaire on new technologies and the different stages of the electoral process and implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)5 Standards for E-voting and CM(2022)10 Guidelines on the use of ICTs [CDDG(2023)15 Addendum]

- <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ex8BmwuPBj4</u> Voting process for voters with disabilities with subtitles (for the election on 2nd April 2023)
- <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0GNcEuigcmE</u> The voting process with the machine with subtitles (for the election on 2nd April 2023)
- <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Heoce8KvKsM</u> The voting process with a paper ballot with subtitles (for the election on 2nd April 2023)
- <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C5C6vh0mHGA</u> Voting process for voters in quarantine/isolation (for the elections during the COVID-19 crisis)

CROATIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

No

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

The constitutional and legal framework of the Republic of Croatia has foreseen direct elections – it does not envisage e-voting and e-counting.

According to Article 45, paragraph 3 of the Constitution: In elections for the Croatian Parliament, the President of the Republic of Croatia and the European Parliament and in decision-making procedures by national referendum, suffrage shall be exercised in direct elections by secret ballot, wherein voters who do not have registered domicile in the Republic of Croatia shall vote at polling stations in the premises of diplomatic-consular offices of the Republic of Croatia in the foreign countries in which they reside. All the relevant legislation for elections held in Croatia (i.e., parliamentary, presidential, local, European) derives from this basic approach: direct elections.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

IT support, i.e., electronic tools in an electoral cycle, are used in (1) the preelection period, (2) on election day, and (3) in the post-election period.

IT support covers i.a. (1) the entry of lists of candidates, cross-checking of personal data, and issue of decisions on the validity of candidacies; creation of decisions relating to lower level commission appointment and polling station committee appointment as well as the creation of decisions relating to polling stations; ordering and distribution of ballot papers, minutes and voting boxes; entry of authorised observers and generating a list of them which is then distributed to polling stations; (2) creation of provisional data on voter turnout and results on election day; (3) generating (summarising) of final results and election IT analysis. Some systems are being used during the whole process, such as the digital overview and review of costs of lower-level commissions. The use of IT support contributes to the uniformity of procedures and documentation produced as well as to the transparency and predictability of practice. Nevertheless, all final documentation is drafted on paper.

Additionally, the State Electoral Commission maintains a vivid web page that is updated on a daily basis with new information for public and election participants during election time.

With respect to e-voting, do note that according to Croatian Constitution, all votes are cast personally on paper ballot papers at the polling station. All votes are counted manually by the polling station committee, after which paper minutes are produced. It is only then, when the results are entered into the IT system, that the consolidation, i.e., the transmission of votes, starts.

The IT system is provided by a company co-owned by the state of Croatia and the City of Zagreb, and it has been providing IT support to the Commission since the beginning of the digitalization of electoral processes. The company is a holder of several ISO certificates, and the system is regularly audited by the National Information Systems Security Bureau. After each election, an analysis is conducted in order to identify areas of improvement for further elections, which are then pursued.

We would also like to stress that the State Electoral Commission supervises (i.a.) electoral campaign financing where a special IT system for financing supervision has been established, enabling election participants to enter their financial reports and supporting documentation into the IT system. The financial reports are then made public on the Commission website, and the Commission report on the conducted financial supervision of campaign financing is published on the said website, as well. Such conduct provides for a transparent overview of election campaign financing. We feel that this supervision is closely linked to the conduct of elections, so it was worth mentioning, although it is not directly linked to e-voting

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The Council of Ministers CM (2022) 10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes have not been directly in use when designing the IT support, but it can be concluded that the IT support as it corresponds to the requirements of the Guidelines.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

1. Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette, No 56/90, 135/97, 8/98, 113/00, 124/00, 28/01, 41/01, 55/01, 76/10, <u>85/10</u> and 5/14)

2. Law on the Election of the President of the Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette, No. 22/92, 42/92, 71/97, 69/04, 99/04, 44/06, 24/11 and 128/14)

3. Act on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (Official Gazette, No. 116/99, 109/00, 53/03, 167/03, 44/06, 19/07, 20/09, 145/10, 24/11, 93/11, 120/11, 19/ 15, 104/15, 48/18 and 98/19)

4. Act on the Election of Members of the European Parliament from the Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette, No. 92/10, 23/13 and 143/13)

5. Local Elections Act (Official Gazette, No. <u>144/12</u>, <u>121/16</u>, <u>98/19</u>, <u>42/20</u>, <u>144/20</u>, and <u>37/21</u>)

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

Given our constitutional framework, explained in question 1, no amendments of relevant legislation are foreseen regarding e-voting.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

Given our constitutional framework, explained in question 1, there was no implementation of CM/Rec(2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/r

CZECH REPUBLIC

Question 1 : Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

No. In the Czech Republic, no electronic means are used for casting or counting votes.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

Although, since 2007, there has been a continuous discussion on the introduction of e-voting possibilities, the Czech Republic ranks maintaining the integrity and trust of citizens in elections in the first place. We are especially concerned about risks such as cybersecurity, data manipulation, lack of qualified personnel, high entry costs, and keeping secret voting.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

On the basis of Electoral laws, the Czech Statistical Office (Český statistický úřad/ČSÚ/ further referred to as "CSO") ensures that a binding system is drawn up for the identification and processing of the results of the elections and/or the results of the votes in the national referendum and that the relevant software is drawn up for the purpose of processing and providing the results of elections and referendums.

The processing of election results in the Czech Republic combines the traditional "manual" processing methods using modern technologies. This ensures transparency and ongoing and retrospective control of the whole process. In addition, the system is independent of the current level of functionality of the web interface.

The basis is the manual counting of votes by precinct election commissions (further referred to as "PEC"), thereby eliminating the potential threat of affecting results during computer processing. In addition, the PEC is fully independent of the CSO, its members can be nominated by contestants, and thus citizens' control of the elections is ensured. Nor does the CSO have access to the ballot itself. These remain sealed and archived after the elections for possible judicial review and control.

It is the responsibility of the PECs to correctly calculate and record the data collected. They write the results of the vote in the form or insert them in the CSO's Auxiliary Programme and print out the Record. The Auxiliary Programme does not count votes or election results but makes it easier for the Commission to create the Record, as it contains control links and thus reduces the risk of error. The correctness of the Record will then be confirmed by the members of the Electoral Commission with their signatures.

The signed Record is forwarded by the PEC to the CSO at the designated receiving point (pick-up point). It will only check the formalities of these documents, store the data in a processing system that is completely separate from the public internet network, and publish copies of the received results to the PECs. On this basis, the members of the PEC can verify that the results of the vote have been obtained in the statistical databases in the form in which they were taken over. This is another important element in controlling the transparency of the electoral process.

The overall results of the elections are processed by the central office of the CSO. Data taken from the pick-up points are almost immediately published on the presentation website of volby.cz, which is completely separate from the processing itself and performs the role of an imaginary online bulletin board. Here the voting results are accessible from the lowest level of districts to the country-wide data, including in open data format. They also allow the PECs to check that the results have been published in accordance with their Records.

The CSO also sends the results of the election via a special dedicated line to the media who had previously subscribed to this service. In the event of a failure of the presentation site of volby.cz, whether due to technical defects or bad intentions, users can obtain continuous information via television, radio, and news servers.

In the event of truly extreme events, such as a full-scale power outage, the CSO is also prepared for the possibility of complete processing of election results without the use of computer technology or with its minimum.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

n/a

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

The Czech Ministry of the Interior has prepared a draft law on the administration of elections (Electoral Administration Act, further referred to as "EAA"), which is to become a means of reform of the electoral administration, including in the

sense of its computerisation. However, computerisation will only concern the administration of elections and not the voting itself. The aim of the Government is to make it easier for voters to obtain voting absentee cards and to modernise the management of elections.

In particular, the EAA will, among other novelties, <u>establish an information</u> <u>system for the management of elections</u>, enabling in particular:

- The creation of a single electoral roll and thus the abolition of territorial jurisdiction for the issue of voters' absentee cards³; the possibility to vote on the voting absentee card will also be introduced for municipal elections, which will be applicable in municipalities with more than one district
- > Electronic submission of lists of candidates
 - > An online delegation to the district election commissions, and
 - > Electronic collection of signatures on petitions supporting candidatures.

This information system will be part of the critical infrastructure.

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

DENMARK

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

No

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

According to the Danish Constitution, voting should be private/secret, and we cannot ensure that e-voting would be. There is also the issue with election security, as e-voting machines are at risk of being hacked.

³ The absentee card allows voting outside the constituency in which the voter is registered. *Replies to the questionnaire on new technologies and the different stages of the electoral process and implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)5 Standards for E-voting and CM(2022)10 Guidelines on the use of ICTs [CDDG(2023)15 Addendum]*

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Yes. The municipalities enter the results of the vote count in an electronic system and send them electronically to Statistics Denmark (which acts on behalf of The Ministry of the Interior and Health).

The collection of signatures for new political parties to be eligible for the election is also electronic. This means voters must register their endorsement on a website.

Most municipalities use digital electoral rolls.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

No

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/r

ESTONIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

Internet voting; national level.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/a

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Voter lists at polling stations are fully electronic (voter lists used over the Internet). For elections management and vote tabulation, and results transmission, an elections information system (VIS3) is used.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

Riigikogu Election Act:

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/514122020002/consolide

As stipulated by the law:

The National Electoral Committee establishes by a resolution:

1) the technical requirements for ensuring the general principles for holding electronic voting;

2) the description of the organisation of electronic voting.

The State Electoral Office:

1) approves the information security policy of the electronic voting system, the electronic voting protocol suite, and the technical guidelines for the electronic voting system;

2) organises the resolution of incidents hindering electronic voting pursuant to law;

3) approves the schedule and scope of testing the electronic voting system and the results of the testing and publishes a report on the results;

4) organises the auditing of the electronic voting system in the course of which an information systems auditor audits the testing of the electronic voting system, the integrity of the system, and the compliance of the acts of the State Electoral Office with law, with the resolutions of the National Electoral Committee, adopted on the basis of subsection 3 of this section and with the electronic voting documentation.

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

The Election Act has been updated regularly to reflect the requirements for ivoting.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

The National Election Committee has issued Technical Requirements for Ensuring the General Principles of Electronic Voting, which heavily draws from the recommendation. <u>https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/327012021006</u> (In Estonian, Google Translate can do a decent translation).

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

The cybersecurity (monitoring, DDOS protection, etc.) for the vote collection service is provided by the State Election System Authority. An I-voting application does increase voting accessibility, including support for screen readers. The main measure to guarantee secrecy and freedom of vote is the possibility to re-cast the Internet vote as many times as the voter desires or to re-cast the vote by casting the paper ballot.

GERMANY

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

The Federal Returning Officer is responsible for the preparation and conduct of Bundestag and European Parliament elections only. We can, therefore, answer your questions only concerning these elections. In accordance with current legislation, e-voting is presently not possible in the above elections. To our knowledge, there are no plans to introduce online voting at the present time, given the legal, factual and dangerous situation presented below.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

Preliminary information: The Federal Returning Officer has to consider and apply the federal electoral legislation currently in force when complying with her duties. However, she does not evaluate the provisions of federal electoral legislation. It would be incumbent on the legislators or the body which would issue such an ordinance, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, to make any amendments in this case.

It must however be said that there are good reasons, from a legal and technical viewpoint, for not conducting Bundestag or European Parliament elections as online elections.

In keeping with electoral provisions, Bundestag and European Parliament elections must, among others, be public in nature. According to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, this means that it must be possible for the public to scrutinise all essential parts of the electoral process. Every citizen should be able to check the essential steps, from casting the votes to determining the election result, without "any special knowledge" being required. This is not possible in online elections at present, as voters cannot verify in online voting whether their votes have been recorded correctly and included into the result correctly. Voters could only see that they had voted for a specific nomination. They could not monitor the further stages of data processing. Voters would have to trust that the technical systems work properly. According to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, this is however not sufficient for verifying that the procedure was carried out correctly. The principle that elections must be public in nature would in fact be guaranteed only if the votes would at the same time be recorded non-digitally as well, for example by printing the completed ballot paper.

Additional new challenges emerge from online elections, especially concerning the security of elections. Given the potential vulnerability of electronic systems, Bundestag or European Parliament elections could be held online only if any manipulation through cyber attacks could be ruled out completely. It would still be necessary to establish each voter's identity in a reliable manner and check their eligibility to vote to avoid any misuse. It would also have to be ensured that eligible voters without internet skills could participate in the election without restrictions.

To sum up, online voting poses legal and practical difficulties to which no satisfactory solutions have been found. We do not know of any online voting software having obtained sufficient certification from German authorities. For this reason, national elections can currently not be conducted online in Germany.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Elections in Germany are organised in a federal and decentralised manner. This means that various agencies (= electoral bodies) at different levels take part in the organization and conduct of elections. Each level is responsible for itself and not bound by orders. Their individual duties are laid down in the legal provisions especially of the electoral laws and regulations. Due to the federal system, the organization and IT landscape of the electoral bodies is heterogeneous. Therefore, the Federal Returning Officer cannot answer the question completely for all electoral bodies.

Generally, all electoral bodies use information technology to support the organization and conduct of an election. There are cases, especially at the level of municipalities, where information technology is employed, for example:

- subdividing the municipality into polling districts

- compiling the voters' registers
- managing the applications for postal voting
- recording the results of the counts in the polling districts, etc.

The results of the counts are transmitted by secured electronic means from the municipalities via the districts or constituencies and the Länder to the Federal

Returning Officer so that the Federal Returning Officer can rapidly determine a provisional election result for the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany already in the night of the election. The Länder uses a centrally provided platform of the Federal Returning Officer for that purpose. The implementation was subject to the strictest information security requirements. The election results are presented to the public in real time on the website of the Federal Returning Officer.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

A centrally provided platform of the Federal Returning Officer is used to transmit the results from the Länder to the Federal Returning Officer. This platform already meets several guidelines requirements, basically or in full. Mention is made above all of no. 1, no. 4 (requirements met through a complete concept of rights and roles, and full logging), no. 5 (through a service level agreement), no. 6 (involvement of the IT security and data protection units into the development, implementation, and operation of the platform), no. 8 (regular reviews by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and BFIT-Bund, a federal agency monitoring the accessibility of information technology), no. 9 (continuous risk and IT security management) and nos. 10 to 12 (flexible organisational and contractual measures).

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

- judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 3 March 2009 (file references: 2 BvC 3/07 and 2 BvC 4/07)

- Article 38 paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG)
- Federal Elections Act (BWG)
- European Elections Act (EuWG)

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

GEORGIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

The CEC of Georgia has devoted significant effort to implementing pilots and observing their results in practice. The GEA's unwavering dedication to improving the election environment has resulted in the proposal to pilot technological innovations starting in 2018. Since then, it was the successful effort of these pilot regimes undertaken almost every year (6 pilot projects in total) that led legislators to the approval of the legislative reform, which was adopted upon consensus taken by the end of 2022 aiming to implement electronic technologies for the Parliamentary Elections throughout the country by 2024. 2024 Parliamentary Elections will be mostly conducted through the utilization of election voting technologies, including 90% of voters casting their votes using electronic devices.

Before covering the whole country with electronic technologies for 2024, an immense general rehearsal has been implemented, and a clear example of this is the recent large-scale technological intervention in ten municipalities across the country, arranged on April 29, 2023. 91% of the voters had the opportunity to cast their votes through electronic technologies during By/Extraordinary elections, and the rest of the voters, 9%, used traditional means of voting, during which ballot papers were digitalized and uploaded to the Google platform for more transparency. It should be noted that the use of this technology also eliminates cybersecurity risks since the voting machines are never connected to any network.

Electronic technologies will be used at all levels of elections, local and national. The election legislation regulates that voting utilizing electronic technologies will not be applied abroad, accordingly, traditional voting will be conducted for the voters residing abroad.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

As noted above, the Central Election Commission of Georgia organized largescale technological intervention in ten municipalities across the country on April 29, 2023. The CEC utilized voting technology that enabled voters to cast their vote using Poll Count Optical Scanners (PCOS). This technology was chosen in accordance with international e-voting standards and recommendations and allowed for swift and precise result tabulation while retaining the paper ballots for manual recount purposes. It's important to mention that this technology preserves the tradition of voting habits since voters still receive a paper ballot and mark their choices on it. The use of this technology also eliminates cybersecurity risks since the voting machines are never connected to any network. To verify voters and prevent multiple voting, the CEC applied the voter verification (VIU) device, which assisted PEC members in verifying voters on the unified voters list. Combining these two machines at a polling station ensured that voters were properly verified for eligibility and that the voting procedure-maintained vote secrecy while also streamlining the vote counting and tabulation process.

Upon the voter verification process, the voter received the individual slip printed from the voter verification device, and slips signed by the voter were collected during the day and represented another tool to verify the final number of voters who cast a vote. The number of slips printed from the VIU came into compliance with the number of voters at the PICOS.

It is important to note that implementing voting devices with a paper trail is not unique to Georgia and has been adopted by many countries around the world. The use of paper trails serves as a backup system in case of any technical failures or potential hacking attempts during the voting process. It allows for the possibility of manual recounts and audits, which can increase the transparency and accuracy of the election results.

Furthermore, paper trails provide voters with a tangible way to confirm that their vote has been recorded accurately, which can help to build trust in the electoral process. This is particularly important in contexts where there is a history of electoral fraud or where there may be concerns about the integrity of the election.

An additional aspect is quick vote tabulation, results transmission, and announcement of preliminary election results. To achieve the mentioned goal, the CEC of Georgia used additional technology, namely the transferring of the preliminary data on election results from the PECs to the CEC, bypassing the DECs using tablets. The novelty was implemented for the very first time in election history.

The auditing of election results served a crucial role in fostering public trust in the electoral process and enhanced acceptance of election technologies. While there are various mechanisms that can reinforce confidence in the results of electronic elections, mandatory audits of the election results represent a particularly potent tool. By verifying the accuracy of the vote count conducted through electronic technologies, such audits can greatly strengthen confidence in the integrity of electronic elections.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The CEC consistently takes action to incorporate the recommendations and guidelines provided by international organizations into its operations. It should be noted that while organizing the By/Extraordinary Elections of April 29, CEC took guidance from the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission joint opinion on the proposed amendments to the Election Code and the Law of political associations of citizens, as these recommendations were issued particularly on the legal amendments allowing the conduct the elections through electoral technologies. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers' CM (2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes were also taken into

consideration within the timeframe given and current electoral legislation, for instance:

N7: Member States should ensure transparency of the election and of the ICT solutions used, which also includes providing observers with access to documentation and to the processes, ideally in a language familiar to them.

N10: Member States should build and retain the necessary capacity to assess, introduce and manage the use of ICT solutions in the electoral process.

When introducing ICT into any part of the electoral cycle, it is essential that Member States have the necessary administrative and technical capacity and related resources, including financial resources, to plan, implement and run the technology successfully and in a sustainable way.

Administrative and technical capacity essentially requires a skilled labour force, which should be continuously trained, equipped with the necessary tools and resources, and, most importantly, given enough time to focus on their tasks.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

Please see the link on the relevant legislative and regulatory framework

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

On December 22, 2022, amendments were introduced to the election legislation concerning the integration of electronic technologies in the Parliamentary Elections across the country by 2024. The forthcoming Parliamentary Elections will incorporate voting technologies, with 90% of voters casting their votes electronically, while the remaining 10% will employ traditional voting methods. It is important to highlight that the legislators initially stipulated a minimum of 70% electronic voting, but the Central Election Commission (CEC), through its legal act (<u>CEC ordinance</u>), established various criteria and determined that the upcoming 2024 elections will utilize electronic technologies for 90% of the voters.

In accordance with the legislative amendments and the criteria established by the CEC, the consolidation of polling stations has taken place. Specifically, this consolidation applies to polling stations where electronic voting technologies will be implemented, and these stations are designated for 3 000 voters. Additionally, the consolidation includes polling stations with a voter count exceeding 300 and located within a 20-kilometer radius of the election district they serve.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

CM/Rec(2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting is implemented by the CEC, namely:

Universal suffrage:

1. The voter interface of an e-voting system shall be easy to understand and use by all voters

Replies to the questionnaire on new technologies and the different stages of the electoral process and implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)5 Standards for E-voting and CM(2022)10 Guidelines on the use of ICTs

[CDDG(2023)15 Addendum]

2. The e-voting system shall be designed, as far as is practicable, to enable persons with disabilities and special needs to vote independently.

Free suffrage:

16. The voter shall receive a confirmation from the system that the vote has been cast successfully and that the whole voting procedure has been completed.

The e-voting process, in particular the counting stage, shall be organised in such a way that it is not possible to reconstruct a link between the unsealed vote and the voter. Votes are, and remain, anonymous.

Secret suffrage:

19. E-voting shall be organised in such a way as to ensure that the secrecy of the vote is respected at all stages of the voting procedure.

26. The e-voting process, in particular the counting stage, shall be organised in such a way that it is not possible to reconstruct a link between the unsealed vote and the voter. Votes are, and remain, anonymous.

Transparency and observation:

34. Any observer, to the extent permitted by law, shall be enabled to observe and comment on the elections, including the compilation of the results

Reliability and security of the system:

42. Before any e-election takes place, the electoral management body shall satisfy itself that the e-voting system is genuine and operates correctly.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

The primary challenge in implementing electronic technologies is mitigating the associated risks of cyber-attacks. To address this concern, the CEC made a deliberate decision not to connect electronic devices to the Internet, which provided significant assurance that these devices would remain secure. By avoiding vulnerability to cyber-attacks, foreign interference, and potential result manipulation, Georgian Election Administration was able to ensure the highest level of security. The only aspect of the recent elections where internet involvement was considered was the transmission of results from the Polling Stations (PECs) to the Central Election Commission (CEC) using tablets. The main focus in this regard was on timely and accurate result delivery.

During the By/Extraordinary Elections held on April 29, 2023, a thorough approach was taken to uphold and guarantee the secrecy of votes at every stage. A special form of the envelope was developed to securely insert the colored/marked ballot papers into the envelope before they were inserted into the voting device. Although a few technical shortcomings were identified, the CEC is actively working to address and improve them for future elections. Additionally, efforts were made to ensure ballot papers were accessible for individuals with visual impairments, and all election materials, including the ballot papers, were translated into ethnic minority languages.

GREECE

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

Electronic voting is not a means of exercising the right to vote in Greece. Voting takes place on paper ballots, which are enclosed in an envelope and placed in the ballot box. Electronic voting has not been implemented but is provided for in the Constitution of Greece. More specifically, Article 51(4) provides for the possibility of adopting electronic voting, following an interpretation, as the right to vote may be exercised by another appropriate means, by a law passed by a two-thirds majority of the total number of deputies.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Electronic means are used to transmit the results. The judicial representatives transmit the informal results of the polling stations to which they have been designated, using electronic devices (PC, tablets, and mobile phones) and through a Secure Transmission System (SRT), in order to transmit the result as quickly as possible and thus to inform the citizens. In addition, the judicial representatives fill in the form of electoral result which is transferred by a competent employee of the relevant municipality to the nearest municipal branch, where these forms are digitalised (scanned) and transmitted to the Ministry of the Interior through the Electoral Results Transmission Subsystem of the Integrated Information System for Electronic Transfer of Documents (IRIDA 2.0). Also, technology is used for the submission and verification of applications for registration in the special electoral registers of non-residents and the special electoral registers of residents abroad, for the sending and receipt of electoral material, the determination and finalisation of polling stations, the declaration of candidatures by the political parties and the verification of the conditions by the Supreme Court. The Ministry of the Interior has an integrated information system with individual applications supporting the above.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

n/r

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/r

HUNGARY

Question 1 : Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

No

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

The legislature has not deemed it a priority.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Paper-based minutes are recorded by the electoral administration using an internal network program. Also, the manually counted votes get double-checked by scanners

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

n/a

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/r

ICELAND

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

In Iceland, a new elections act entered into force on 1 January 2022. The new legislation assumes the use of electronic electoral registers in all elections and referendums. (elections to the Althingi (parliament), presidential elections, municipal elections and referendum). For the electoral register to be used, it needs to be via computer that is connected to the internet. The electronic electoral register has not yet been used in elections, but the preparation is ongoing. It is not clear at this point whether the electronic electoral register will be used in the Presidential Elections in 2024. <u>Elections Act (stjornarradid.is)</u>. At this point in time, there is no discussion on having anything else electronic in relation to elections in Iceland.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Candidates and political parties can collect declarations of support from voters electronically on forms or through an interface provided by Registers Iceland.

The transmission of voting results is sent via e-mail to the National Electoral Commission from the senior electoral commissions.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

No

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

See here in English: Elections act (stjornarradid.is)

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/r

LITHUANIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

The answer: There is no usage of e-voting in Lithuania right now. However, the Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania has launched a public procurement for a feasibility study on internet voting on May 12, 2023.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

The answer: There are no legislative frameworks established for this kind of practice.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

ICT is used in all stages of the electoral cycle except the Legal framework. EMB has its own information system that guarantees the digitization of the election process.

The purpose of the System:

Collect and manage data and documents of:

- Voters
- Candidates
- Election Commissions
- Voting Results
- Accounting
- Political Party Financing

Deliver e-services to voters, election participants, and organizers

Publish election data

The information system consists of these subsystems:

 Voters list management subsystem – the management of voters lists at all levels of election commissions.

On election day: electronic data exchange among polling stations, ensuring the possibility for voters to vote at any polling station of the same constituency

- The organization of elections subsystem the management of election organization and control processes such as:
 - registers of elections, parties, members of commissions, observers, representatives, candidates,
 - seat allocation of members of parliament and municipal councils.
- Election Day data transmission subsystem (The Wizard of Election Day):
 - Transmission of final voting results from the manual counting at polling stations directly for publishing on the website of CEC.
 - Identifying arithmetical errors in counting
- Political parties and political campaign financing control subsystem the management of political campaigns, political party financing, and funding of monitoring information management processes.
- Electronic public services subsystem (Portal VOTER PAGE) provides electronic services for voters and candidates such as:
 - to find and change their polling station
 - to apply for postal voting
 - to register for voting abroad
 - signature collection for candidates and parties

Replies to the questionnaire on new technologies and the different stages of the electoral process and implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)5 Standards for E-voting and CM(2022)10 Guidelines on

the use of ICTs [CDDG(2023)15 Addendum]

- signature collection for national referenda
- the electronic journal with all important figures and events
- History of individual participation in the election (where and when he/she voted or his donation to a certain candidate);
- User-relevant election schedule events and reminders;
- Actual and historical election data, reports on various aspects: election results, information on candidates, political campaigns finance data, etc.;
- The map of boundaries of electoral districts;
- All e-services in a one-stop shop: the submission of e-documents and receipts, signatures collected for a nominated candidate, etc.
- Data publishing subsystem subsystem for publishing information about elections, referendums, their progress, and results.
- Estimates, payroll, and accounting subsystem the management of personnel and payroll administration and local/regional accounting.
- Administration subsystem the management of user rights, parameters of subsystems, jobs generation (create voters list, generate candidate data for publishing, and others), administration of the electronic journal of election
- Training Subsystem training and certification of voters, election observers, members of polling station commissions
- Complaints and Notifications Subsystem submission and administration of complaints at all levels of commissions.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Yes, we have used these Guidelines for forming the strategy of ICT of the CEC of Lithuania year 2023-2030. In addition, Guidelines were used to prepare requirements for feasibility studies study of internet voting.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

The new Electoral Code was amended in 2022, but there is no relevant legislative and regulatory framework in it. The working group for drafting the electoral code postponed the adoption of articles related to online voting until a consensus between different stakeholders was reached.

LUXEMBURG

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

No

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

In the context of a country like Luxembourg, where the number of voters remains below three hundred thousand, the investment required to set up, deploy and continually update a security-proof electronic voting system for each type of election is always considered likely to outweigh the expected benefits of adopting such a system. Consequently, it was deemed preferable to focus more on postal voting, in order to make it more accessible to voters.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

YES :

- Maintaining and updating electoral rolls: electoral rolls are drawn up and updated in digital form based on the national register of natural persons (electronic register).
- Exchange of electoral rolls: electoral rolls are exchanged between member states and at the national level in digital format, using secure electronic exchange platforms.
- Electoral roll applications: electoral roll applications can be submitted over the Internet via a secure electronic platform.
- Absentee ballot requests: absentee ballot requests can be submitted via the Internet using a secure electronic platform.
- Convening letters, polling station minutes, candidate registration forms, witness registration forms, appointments of polling station members,

circulars to local authorities, etc.: conversion of texts into digital form. conversion of texts into digital form.

- Validation and dissemination of unofficial election results: the regularity of unofficial results is checked and validated using a computer program. The unofficial results are then published on the government website.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The Centre des technologies de l'information de l'État (CTIE) is the Luxembourg administration in charge of IT services for the Luxembourg government, ministries and administrations. It offers a wide range of services (network infrastructure, hosting, platforms, generic and customized software solutions, etc.) and is responsible for implementing the security of the State's IT infrastructures. In the context of electoral processes, the CTIE is usually responsible, on behalf of the governmental centralizing office setup for each elections, for managing the IT systems enabling the capture (tabulation) and validation of votes and the calculation of unofficial results. The CTIE is also responsible for disseminating unofficial election results.

To guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the information it processes, CTIE has set up an information security management system (ISMS) aligned with ISO 27001 and 27002 standards. In this context, CTIE has put in place a set of organizational (segregation of duties, incident management, training, etc.) and technical (physical controls, identity and logical access control management, dedicated and hardened IT equipment, cryptographic solutions, etc.) measures to ensure information security at all levels.

An internal audit department carries out regular, independent audits of IT systems and associated processes, to verify their compliance with ISMS policies and the overall security level of services offered by CTIE. Finally, dedicated teams work to ensure the usability and accessibility of the websites and solutions offered by the CTIE, in line with the law of May 28, 2019 on the accessibility of websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies, which transposes Directive (EU)2016/2102.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

Amended	Electoral	Law	of	February	18,	2003
(https://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/recueil/elections/20230506)						

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/a

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/a

specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/a

MALTA

Question 1 : Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

Maltese electoral legislation does not allow for the possibility of e-voting in any election (local, national, or European Parliament) or referendum. However, electronic counting of votes is used for all elections. Moreover, the Electoral Commission of Malta is looking into the possibility of using e-counting also should a referendum be called.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Votes are not recorded, but scanning of votes and consolidation/tabulation and transmission of voting results form an integral part of the e-counting system in Malta.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

n/a

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

The General Elections Act (CAP. 354 of the Laws of Malta). This may be viewed at <u>https://legislation.mt/eli/cap/354/eng/pdf</u>.

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

Legislative changes were made prior to the introduction of e-counting in Malta.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/a

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/a

NETHERLANDS

Question 1 : Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

n/a

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

From approximately 1970 to 2007, voting was done in the Netherlands using a voting machine. The use of the voting machine was not mandatory. A limited number of municipalities continued to vote on paper. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 2006, a discussion arose about voting machines. Voting secrecy could not be sufficiently guaranteed with voting machines. The reliability and transparency of the counting of votes were also at stake.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

The Electoral Council makes software available that can be used in the election process, Supporting Software Elections 2020 (OSV2020). The OSV2020 program has recently been technically updated and supports political parties, municipalities, and central electoral committees in creating and determining lists of candidates, adding up election results, and calculating the distribution of seats. OSV2020 is the successor to OSV that was used up to and including 2019 to support elections.

The process of determining the election results and the distribution of seats must be transparent and verifiable. The Elections Act stipulates that if the central electoral committee uses software to calculate the result, it will make public which software is used. The Electoral Decree contains the conditions that the central electoral committee must meet when using software to calculate the result.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

n/a

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/a

NORWAY

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

n/r

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

Elections:

Norway does not currently plan to introduce any electronic means in the casting of votes in elections. Internet voting pilots were carried out in a limited number of municipalities in 2011 and 2013 (more <u>info</u>). We use scanners to count the votes.

The Election Act Commission has considered all stages of Norwegian elections and discusses e-voting (both at the polling station and internet voting) in their report from 2020. The majority of the Commission concludes that it is important to gain more knowledge about electronic voting to be able to make good assessments of the opportunities and risks associated with electronic voting. However, these members find that the security of electronic voting over the Internet is not good enough to introduce such a way of voting in Norway at present. <u>The Election Act Commission's report is translated into English</u>.

As part of the follow-up of the Election Act Commission's report, Oslo Economics, and Norwegian Computing Center have conducted a <u>knowledge gathering on</u> <u>electronic voting</u>, published in May 2023, on assignment for the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. The CM/Rec(2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting forms the basis for the criteria against which electronic voting systems are assessed. The conclusion of the knowledge gathering is that the main risks with introducing electronic voting are security, whereas the main advantages are the availability for voters with special needs and voters living abroad. The report of the knowledge gathering will be translated into English.

Referenda:

Electronic voting has been used in some local non-binding advisory referendums in Norwegian municipalities and counties but without any assistance from the national electoral management body. In 2023, the Directorate of Elections is assigned the task of developing an electronic voting system that can be used for local non-binding advisory referendums. The background for developing such a system is a governmental initiative to hold a local referendum about municipality division in one specific municipality. Whether the referendum will be conducted depends on a law amendment that the parliament will decide on in 2023. It is not decided if an electronic voting system for local referendums will be made available for all municipalities or counties to use.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

The Norwegian election process is highly digitalised. All municipalities and county municipalities use the electronic election administration system, EVA, provided by the Norwegian Directorate of Elections. In the <u>bill with the Governments proposal for a new Election Act</u> (a translated version in English will be published soon), the use of a national election administration system (i.e., EVA) is proposed to be established by law. The modules in EVA are used in multiple areas:

- Election preparation by counties and municipalities
- Electronic mark-off in the electoral register when the voter casts a vote (using paper ballots). Data for the electoral register is provided by The Norwegian Tax Administration.
- Ballot counting using optical scanners
- Election settlement
- Results are reported from EVA to a national website (valgresultat.no) and to national and local media.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The election administration system (EVA) fulfills most of the recommendations in the Guidelines. As the system is not used by voters, recommendations aimed at interface or usability for voters are not applicable.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

An act relating to parliamentary and local government elections (Election Act): <u>https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2002-06-28-57</u>

Regulations relating to parliamentary and local government elections (Election Regulations): <u>https://lovdata.no/dokument/SFE/forskrift/2003-01-02-5</u>

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/a

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/a

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

The Internet voting pilots were evaluated, and the reports were made public. See the answer to question 1

POLAND

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

In the territory of the Republic of Poland, both during elections and referenda at the national, regional, and local levels, there is a personal vote at a polling station where the voter receives a paper ballot on which he/she marks his or her vote manually. The same rules apply to circuits established abroad and on Polish seagoing vessels. In the cases specified in the Electoral Code, it is also possible to vote by post and by proxy in the country; however, these voting methods are also based on paper voting. Currently, there is no possibility of electronic voting (e-voting) in Poland. There will be many negative opinions about this method of voting in the public space due to fears of cyberattacks and failure to ensure the secrecy of voting.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

The system of determining voting results in Poland is based on paper protocols drawn up by the relevant electoral commissions. Electoral authorities also use, only as a subsidiary, the IT system "Support of Electoral Authorities (WOW)", which is created by the National Electoral Office, which supports the National Electoral Commission. This system is used in accordance with statutory competencies by all electoral authorities involved in the electoral process, including precinct electoral commissions. The WOW IT system is not used to determine voting results but is only a "calculator" counting data from paper protocols of electoral commissions. This system also verifies the correspondence of the data in the draft voting protocol and in the voting protocol and verifies the correct number of committee members for a given circuit, along with the required quorum. The IT system "Support of Electoral Authorities (WOW)" checks all arithmetic conditions set by the National Electoral Commission in order to verify the correctness of determining the voting results. In case of errors, the system informs the operator about them, listing specific exceeded conditions, and generates an error report, which is printed. The report contains accurate information identifying the protocol and a detailed description of the conditions that have not been met. The competent constituency electoral commission may decide that it is necessary to re-determine the results of voting by the precinct electoral commission, including drawing up a new record of voting in the

precinct. As can be seen from the above, both the voting and the determination of the voting results are based on paper documents from the elections, and the IT system "Support of Electoral Bodies (WOW)" is used only as an auxiliary.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

n/r

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

As indicated above, the National Electoral Office as the owner of the IT system "Support of Electoral Authorities (WOW)," is obliged to comply with internal regulations and guidelines regarding ICT solutions, which are consistent with the guidelines of CM (2022) 10- final Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the use of information and communication technologies (ICT);

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

Referring to the question regarding the expected regulatory or legislative changes, I would like to inform you that no draft amendment to the Act of January 5, 2011 - Electoral Code (Journal of Laws of 2022, items 1277 and 2418 and 2023, item 497) in this respect is not processed in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

Referring to the implementation of the CM/Rec(2017)5 recommendations regarding electronic voting (e-voting), I would like to inform you that due to the fact that there is no electronic voting method in Poland, these recommendations are not implemented.

It should also be noted that since the entry into force of CM (2022) 10-final Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in Poland, no national elections or national referenda have been held.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

To sum up the above, in Poland, both voting and determination of voting results are based on paper documents, i.e., ballot papers and protocols of relevant electoral commissions. However, e.g., due to the low level of social trust in electronic voting in Poland, e-voting has not been introduced so far, and it is not planned to be introduced in the near future.

PORTUGAL

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

No

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

Electronic voting experiments and electronic voting pilot projects have been carried out. In any case, it has never been implemented in Portugal. In the opinion of this Commission, priority should be given to issues concerning the dematerialisation of the electoral process, replacing e-voting as the dominant focus on the issue of the use of new technologies.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Electors enrolment – since 1998 the elector's information is stored in a DBMS, and from 2008 the registration is fully automatic.

Tabulation and transmission of provisional voting results - poll station officers account the votes in place and transmit the results by electronic means to a central main server that tabulates and publish them.

Consolidation of the voting results – a web-based app can be used since 2005 to consolidate the results.

Randomization of the candidates lists for the ballot - a web-based app can be used.

Broadcasting time - a web based app is used to distribute the broadcasting time to the candidates lists.

Several tools have been recently developed to assist electors registration for early voting and voting in a pandemic context.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

No

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/r

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

CEC Moldova plans to use Internet voting for Referenda and all types of elections – Parliamentary, Presidential, and Local.

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

Till now, CEC Moldova hasn't used e-voting and e-counting as they did not represent one of our priorities and major needs in terms of the implementation of electronic solutions for the electoral process.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

On Elections Day, at each polling station, there are at least two SIAS "Elections" operators connected to the CEC server that verify online the identity of voters in the State Voters' Register and register their participation in elections to combat multiple voting. Also, the system provides online disaggregated data on voter participation.

Module "Observers" offer the possibility to the accredited observers to lodge notifications and follow the online resolution of these notifications.

After the tabulation of results by the Precinct Electoral Bureaus, operators introduce the data from the PEB protocol in the system. Information can be visualized in an online regime on the CEC official website in a user-friendly manner and provided disaggregated data.

Besides Elections Day, we also use a wide range of tools, for ex.:

Module "Candidates" - Online registration of candidates for General Local Elections (around 55,000 candidates) by District Electoral Councils and automatic generation of ballot papers for the elections of the Mayor and local councils of all localities.

Module "Ballot paper" - generates ballot papers (1828 different types) for local elections. Printing of all ballot papers is organized by CEC in centralized manner.

Application for preliminary registration of citizens from abroad – is not mandatory, it is only a tool to establish the major concentrations of voters abroad, the opening of polling stations outside (besides diplomatic missions and consular offices).

Electoral Officials Register - an Automated Information System that has the goal to automate the processes of preparation of the electoral infrastructure by digitalizing the processes of evidence and data management about the elected officials involved in the electoral processes. As the lower electoral bodies are not permanent, the register is used for the creation of lower EMBs for the organization of elections.

Module "Rotation" – contains the data on all elected positions (MPs, Mayors, local councilors). It is also used for tracking the assignment of the mandates for the locally elected councilors between two General Local Elections. In case a mandate of a local councilor becomes vacant, the mandate is assigned to the next person from the list of the competitor that won in the last elections.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Yes – in the process of identifying, planning, and implementation of ICT tools, including the development of the support documents such as roadmaps, concepts, and others.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

Electoral Code

https://a.cec.md/storage/ckfinder/files/New%20Electoral%20Code_ENG_20 22.pdf

Law nr. 101 on the Concept of the State Automated System Elections (SIASE) from 2008

https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=110359&lang=ro

Regulation on The State Voters Registry of Voters, approved by Central Electoral Commission Decision No 2974 of 19 November 2014

https://a.cec.md/storage/ckfinder/files/7_%20Regulamentul%20cu%20privi re%20la%20Registrul%20de%20Stat%20al%20Alegatorilor%2B.pdf

Central Electoral Commission holds the ISO 9001 certification for Quality Management Systems and ISO 27001 for Information Security Systems. In line with the requirements, several procedures have been drafted: Instruction on the

management of changes in information systems; Procedure for security risk analysis, management, and assessment; Instruction on Access to Information Resources. Continuity plan of activity and recovery in case of incidents.

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

CEC approved the Concept of the voting system by internet "e-Votare" on 27 June 2022.

https://a.cec.md/ro/cu-privire-la-aprobarea-conceptului-sistemului-de-votprin-internet-2751_102035.html

CEC has approved a decision on the creation of the Inter-institutional Working Group for the development and piloting of the Internet Voting Information System on 11 October 2022

https://a.cec.md/ro/cu-privire-la-crearea-grupului-interinstitutional-de-lucrupentru-elaborarea-2751_102716.html

On March 3, 2023, CEC presented, during a public event, the draft specifications and technical specifications for the Internet Voting Information System "e-Voting".

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

In the process of achieving the established objectives, the inter-institutional working group took into account good international practices and the principles and guidelines regarding standards for e-voting from the CM/Rec(2017)5.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity etc.

Until now, we have not used i-voting.

SAN MARINO

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

No

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

At the moment, we are doing an analysis, and we are evaluating the possibility of starting to use e-voting probably for the internal electoral procedures.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or has been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Not yet

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

none

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

none

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity etc.

n/r

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Question 1 : Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

n/r

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

The Slovak Republic does not use e-voting at all, and we do not plan to use it in the near future.

There are still too many unresolved issues mainly related to the security of voting procedure while maintaining the constitutional requirements for elections, such as maintaining the secrecy of voting while ensuring that a particular voter's ballot is counted correctly, retrospective audibility in case of suspected manipulation of voting procedure, vulnerability to cyberattacks, voter coercion, etc.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Electronic means are only used for the transmission and tabulation of voting results from the manual counting of votes at polling stations. Transmission and tabulation of voting results are done via the special electoral software created by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, which is used by electoral commissions and professional summarising units.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Since the electoral software was created and put in use a long time before the adoption of the guidelines, it was not directly used, but in general, the core principles of the guidelines are applied to the use of ICT in electoral processes in the Slovak Republic.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity etc.

Unfortunately, the relevant legislative and regulatory framework is not available in English.

SLOVENIA

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

No. In the Republic of Slovenia, e-voting has not been used (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting). The electoral legislation does not provide for the possibility of internet voting. A question on potential e-voting is not just a question of legal bases but a question of confidence and trust, which is directly connected to technical issues and cybersecurity; there must be a guarantee for the citizens that no (technical) error will occur. In Slovenia, a 2/3 absolute majority is needed for any amendment to the Electoral Law regulating the National Assembly elections. Therefore, any amendment in the direction of e-voting would necessitate a high political consensus for adoption.

However, the possibilities of digitalisation of processes supporting the elections have been examined and implemented. In the area of referenda, there is a possibility of online submission of voter support to a call for a referendum. Citizens who are eligible to vote using alternative modes of voting (e.g., by post) may apply to use such alternative modes electronically via the E-Government portal. By using such services, citizens' trust in these services and gradually also in internet elections is being built.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

See above

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

In the Republic of Slovenia, we use electronic means (ICT support) for the transmission of data between electoral committees and electoral commissions and to handle electoral data and processes such as:

- Interconnecting between the registers (automatic registering of voters, a Register of Voting Rights gathers data directly from the Civil Register, Register of permanent population, Register of Foreigners, and Register of spatial units).
- Any voter may access the data on him or her in a Register of Voting Rights online;
- The Ministry of the Interior compiles electoral registers for review in electronic form no later than 20 days after the calling of elections;
- the web publication of election-related information;
- the e-transmission of election data and supporting material between local, regional, and central electoral authorities;
- the online training of election staff and other stakeholders or the eaccreditation of observers;
- the determining, processing, transmitting, and publishing of election results;

- voter's application for using alternative modes of voting;
- on-line submission of a report on financing the election campaign and its web publication.

The unified information system used for supporting the work of the electoral bodies is called IsDVK. IsDVK - Information System makes the work of electoral bodies more efficient, streamlined, and faster. It enables:

- support at the candidacy procedure
- the online publication of candidatures, turnout, and results and
- entering and calculating election results.

It provides support for voter information, electronic data entry of candidates, and support for the establishment of voting results and their display on the website of the State Electoral Commission (DVK).

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

The Guidelines on the Use of ICT in electoral processes of 2017 served as one of the input materials for the work of the relevant working groups preparing the esolutions mentioned under question 2, a. The working groups followed a security-by-design approach and tried to find a balance between requirements such as usability, accessibility, transparency, privacy, etc., in line with the applicable legislation in order to ensure the integrity of the electoral process and enhance citizens' trust in democracy.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

As stated above, the National Assembly Elections Act does not provide for the possibility of e-voting. Article 16.b of the Referendum and Popular Initiative Act provides a legal basis for the electronic submission of support to the call for a referendum.

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

The possibility for the voters to give support (e-signature) to a candidate standing in elections has been examined.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

The implementation of this recommendation in relation to e-voting is not applicable as there is no e-voting in Slovenia.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

n/a

SPAIN

Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

n/r

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

No ICT is used neither for voting nor for casting votes or counting. Report of the Council of State on the proposals to modify the electoral regime overall (2009).

Report of the Central Electoral Board of November 16, 2016.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Yes, ICTs are used for recording votes, scanning votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results, among others:

- Public Administration (electoral issues):
- Electoral budget management
- Payment management
- Inventory of electoral material in the deposit
- Electoral Commissions:
- Management of candidacies
- Scrutiny and tabulation
- Results Dissemination:
- Transmission of provisional results via e-devices to the Data Dissemination Center
- Electoral Census: The electoral census is prepared by technological means
- Voters as members of polling stations: Polling station members are voters randomly chosen from the Electoral Census (a different lottery for every election). That lottery is organised by technological means
- Voters: Download application forms Eg. Request to vote by mail
- EMB websites
- Access to the official electoral census (e-identification)

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

As explained above, Spain has used ICTs in the different stages of the electoral process well before CM(2022)10-final. Most of the uses were included in the CM(2022)10-final Guidelines. Mainly:

the online publication of election-related information (official web pages); – the management of candidacies (app); – the e-transmission of election data between local, regional, and central electoral authorities; – the online training of election staff and other stakeholders or the e-accreditation of observers; – the determining, processing, transmitting and publishing of election results;

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/documentos/CONSTITUCION_ENG www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/documentos/LOREG_ENG Report of the Council of State on the proposals to modify the electoral regime overall (2009): https://www.consejo-estado.es/pdf/REGIMEN-ELECTORAL.pdf Report of the Central Electoral Board of November 16, 2016: http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/doctrina/acuerdos?packedargs=a nyosesion=2016&idacue

 $rdoinstruccion = 43123 \& idsesion = 889 \& template = Doctrine \% 252 FJEC_Detail$

regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered, i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

Electoral cybersecurity: Coordination Network for Security of Electoral Processes (as the mandate contained in the EU-Commission Recommendation for the EP). Formed by national authorities with powers in the electoral field and authorities responsible for monitoring and enforcing the rules for ICTs.

SWEDEN

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

No. But Swedish elections are very decentralised, with each local municipality and regional county board administration being solely responsible for implementing their own election processes within the limits of the law. Some of these levels of government, ie, some municipalities and some county board administrations, use counting machines (similar to machines used to count bank notes) in lieu of manual counting, but without scanning and/or sorting functionality. Ie the machines in use today in some municipalities only count already sorted ballots.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

One county board administration (Stockholm) performed tests using scanners that both counted and identified each ballot some 12-15 years ago. The tests were abandoned. The results were certainly good enough, but the machines were too expensive and very labour intensive, ie they didn't save either money or time using them.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Yes. Sweden uses a centralised electronic system for nearly all administrative tasks concerning our elections, and it's used in almost all steps of the processes not pertaining to the manual handling of paper ballots. Parts of the process that are still physical/manual are, for instance, that we send out paper voting cards, our use of the electoral register in the polling stations, ie, voters are manually crossed off the list on paper, and during the counting of the ballots, both the preliminary and final counting. Transmission of the electoral results, tabulation, recording of the votes, preparation of the electoral registry, managing the participating parties and candidates to be printed on the ballots, etc. etc are all parts handled by the system. The system used in Sweden is newly built and was first introduced for the elections held last year in 2022.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Yes. Initiation of the framework for the development of the new Swedish IT system for elections was started back in 2016, and while the final guidelines as we see them today weren't available back then, they align very well with quite a few already existing best practices for government software development that we follow in our processes.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

The Swedish Elections Act with all the regulations can be found here, specifically in chapters 7 – 13:<u>The Elections Act (2005:837) - Government.se</u>

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

Sweden is planning to implement an electronic electoral registry alongside the physical version for the next parliamentary election in 2026. We are in the middle of the process of exploring what, if any, changes to legislation are needed in order to facilitate this.

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

In theory, we would implement this, yes, but only when or if we would initiate an actual e-voting system.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity etc.

These kinds of issues are always on the agenda when discussing changes to the Swedish election system, regardless of whether those changes are digital in nature or not. Our goal when developing changes is, first and foremost, to have the voter in focus: what makes the process better, easier, more accessible, safer, and so on for /all/ voters is generally our top priority.

SWITZERLAND

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

Online Voting:

Binding trials on national, cantonal, and communal levels.

Parts of the electorate of three out of 26 cantons are offered online voting as a complementary option for casting their vote at the popular vote of 18 June 2023. If successful, it will also be for the national parliamentary elections of 22 October 2023.

The same three cantons aim at offering online voting in subsequent years. A fourth canton has expressed interest in offering online voting starting in 2024 as well.

The 2023 trials are the first trials conducted after a four-year pause. Novelties since 2019:

The FCh is in charge of scrutinizing the systems and procedures for online voting and, to that end appointing independent experts, in particular from academia. Formal certification is required to a far lesser degree than under the 2019 legislation (see Rec[2017]5, Appendix/VII/37);

Stronger involvement of the public (see Rec[2017]5, Appendix/VI)

Broader and easier access to documentation (incl. the full source code);

bug-bounty program;

evaluation of trust indicators and voter behaviour.

Stronger focus on collaboration with academia;

The Federal technical requirements are more precise and more restrictive. Stronger restrictions particularly apply to which responsibilities are to be born by the cantons directly as opposed to which responsibilities may be delegated; (see Rec[2017]5, Appendix/V/29 and VIII)

Stronger emphasis on the trial nature

by limiting the maximum admissible electorate to 10% of the electorate nationwide and to 30% of any cantonal electorate;

by adopting a continuously reviewed catalogue of measures containing scheduled enhancements and improvements of the system and the procedures, as well as the trial framework itself.

The FCh has adapted its legal foundation accordingly (see: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2022/336/en)

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

By the time of 2019, the cantons were able to choose between two systems for offering online voting (the system of Swiss Post and the system of the canton of Geneva). In 2019 online voting was discontinued for four years. Security flaws in the software of Swiss Post have triggered this decision, as well as delays in the project planning and unforeseen additional costs in the case of the Geneva system. In the meantime, the Confederation, in collaboration with the cantons, has restructured the trial framework (see novelties above).

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process.

Electronic counting of ballots cast on paper for popular votes (e-counting)

- National, cantonal, and communal levels.
- According to the <u>Federal Act on Political Rights</u> (art. 84), election and popular vote procedures that use technical aids require the approval of the Federal Council.
- Individual municipalities in various cantons use scanners and software to interpret and count the ballots. Approximately 15% of ballots (and rising) are counted using e-counting. The Federal Council has issued regulations on the use of e-counting systems. In particular, electronically determined results must be checked for plausibility by means of statistically relevant samples.

Beyond

- In elections, electronic means are used mainly for recording (in some cases), consolidation, and tabulation of votes and for the transmission of voting results. Voter registers are generally maintained electronically.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

Switzerland was an active contributor to drafting the recommendation. It will be taken into consideration in the further evolution of ICT usage in Swiss elections.

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to the following:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

The Swiss laws provide a legal basis for trials with online voting. The Confederation can permit the cantons to offer a part of their citizens online voting if strict requirements under federal law on security, verifiability, and transparency are met. The trials with online voting are restricted to a maximum of 10 percent of the country's electorate and to a maximum of 30 percent of a cantonal electorate. In the former legislation, these limits did not apply to systems offering "complete verifiability" that have been certified by accredited certification bodies. Under the new legislation, the restriction applies irrespectively. However, Swiss citizens living abroad, as well as citizens with a disability face are not affected by the restrictions and can always be offered online voting by the canton they are registered in.

Federal Act on Political Rights (PRA, 161.1) → art. 8a

Federal Ordinance on Political Rights (PoRO, 161.11) → Section 6a on Electronic Voting

Federal Chancellery Ordinance on Electronic Voting (OEV, 161.116)

For further information concerning the regulatory framework see:

https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/politische-rechte/evoting/versuchsbedingungen.html

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

See Question 1 (novelties)

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

Switzerland has been involved in drafting the Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5 and finds the Recommendation a very useful instrument to shape and further develop the legal, technical and 58rganizational requirements for online voting. The Recommendation has been used as a guideline and basis for the legal and technical framework, which reflects the Recommendation's principles and goals. These are for example the requirements regarding verifiability, security and transparency, vote secrecy and 58rganizational regulation such as the gradual and progressive introduction.

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity, etc.

The past two years have demonstrated the tremendous value that lies in appointing experts from academia to scrutinize online voting as well as running a bug bounty program that includes the cryptographic protocol as well as the system documentation in the scope.

As a foundation for public involvement, the revised legislation requires the publication of the full source code along with system specifications and also

documents on operational procedures. All examination reports and findings brought forward through the bug-bounty program are published.

The catalogue of measures agreed upon by the Confederation and cantons contains scheduled enhancements and improvements of the system and the procedures, as well as the trial framework itself. By means of this instrument, the Confederation and the cantons aim at ensuring that the trial phase serves as a foundation for learning lessons and that the lessons learned are translated to action on a running basis.

The OEV entails a requirement for the accessibility of the online voting portal. The online voting system currently in use has been certified compliant WCAG 2.1 AA. However, for security reasons, voters still have to vote using codes printed on paper. This requires the use of screen readers for visually impaired voters.

We are confident that the upcoming trials will lead to further valuable insights. We will gladly report on the conclusions to the CDDG.

UKRAINE

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

The Electoral Code of Ukraine (since 2020, hereinafter – the Code) establishes the guarantees regarding the rights of citizens to participate in elections, governs preparation for and conduct of elections of the President of Ukraine, Members of Parliament of Ukraine, members of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, oblast, raion, village, town, city, district councilors, village, town, city mayors.

Article 18 of the Electoral Code of Ukraine regulates using of Innovative Technologies in the Election Process.

It provides that the Central Election Commission (hereinafter – the CEC) may decide on the introduction of innovative technologies, technical means, and software during the organisation and conduct of elections in the form of an experiment or pilot project concerning:

voters voting at the election precinct with the help of technical means and software (machine-assisted voting);

counting of votes with the help of electronic vote-counting technical means;

Drawing up statements on the vote count, voting results, and final voting results using an information-analytical system.

Experiments or pilot projects shall be conducted at individual election precincts designated by the CEC simultaneously with elections being held at these election precincts in compliance with all requirements and procedures for respective

elections and voting in the manner and pursuant to the procedure prescribed by the Code.

The results of experiments or pilot projects shall be used to submit proposals for improving the legislation on the introduction of innovative technologies, technical means, and software during the organization and conduct of elections.

The results of experiments or pilot projects, as well as any information obtained during their conduct, may not be used to establish the voting results or election results or appeal against decisions, actions, or omissions of the election process participants.

The CEC should ensure that voters who vote at election precincts where experiments or pilot projects are conducted are informed that voters' participation in an experiment or pilot project has no legal effect for establishing the voting results or election results, does not create grounds and cannot be used to appeal against decisions, actions or omissions of the election process participants.

Since 2020 when the Code was taken into force, no experiment or pilot project has been implemented in Ukraine. One of the reasons is that must be adopted a special law that regulates electronic voting for organization and conduct elections in the form of an experiment or pilot project.

Furthermore, the Code and the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" do not allow to organize elections when martial law is applicable. On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a large-scale armed aggression against Ukraine. In order to repel the aggressor and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, martial law was imposed in Ukraine by the Decree of the President of Ukraine № 64/2022 as of 24 February 2022.

According to the <u>Law of Ukraine "On the All-Ukrainian Referendum"</u> (since 2021), a voter shall exercise his/her right to vote in a referendum by filling out the paper voting ballot or by electronic voting in the manner prescribed by a special law which regulates the application of innovative technologies in electronic (machine) voting. As of 2023, this law hasn't been adopted.

The <u>Law of Ukraine "On the All-Ukrainian Referendum"</u> (hereinafter – the Law) sets up the procedure of e-voting in referendum and establishment of the voting results.

For preparation and conduct of electronic voting and vote counting in the referendum, temporarily in line with the Law shall be established special precincts for electronic voting.

According to Article 116 of the Law, electronic voting can participate voters included in the voter list of the special precincts for electronic voting. E-voting is carried out by means of an automated informational and telecommunication system.

The date and time of e-voting must be the same as the date and time of traditional voting with a paper voting ballot at both regular and foreign election precincts in the respective referendum.

The CEC shall publish on its official website in an automated informational and telecommunication system information about the date and time of e-voting and an explanation of the procedure of e-voting. The issues are the subject matters of the respective referendum and other information concerning the subject matters of a referendum.

The precinct election commission of a special precinct for electronic voting as well as the commissions of other precincts shall hold a meeting where announce the results of voting are counted by using the data of automated informational and telecommunication systems. The voting results in the respective precinct shall be entered into the statement of the precinct election commission on the count of the votes at the election precinct. The statement shall be drawn up in duplicate and signed by the chairperson of the commission, deputy chairperson, secretary, and by other members of the commission.

Thereby the Law provides for the possibility of electronic voting in a referendum, but these provisions will not come into force until a special law is passed regulating electronic voting.

The provisions on supporting the people's initiative by submitting applications in electronic form will come into force after the CEC puts into operation an automated information and telecommunication system.

The CEC approved the Concept of application of the unified automated information and analytical system of the CEC (the CEC resolution N^o 447 dating 29.10.2021). The Concept defines the main approaches to the creation, development, and ensuring the functioning of the unified automated information and analytical system of the CEC, which will combine the requirements of the election and referendum legislation of the automated information system and provide a single platform and ways of its further implementation.

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

n/r

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

According to article 18 of the Electoral Code of Ukraine (the Code), the Central Election Commission, constituency and territorial election commissions (upon the decision of the Central Election Commission and if technically possible) shall ensure interaction with parties (local party organisations) and candidates on the use of innovative technologies provided for in this Code by means of electronic services in the manner prescribed by this Code. The procedure for using electronic services shall be established by this Code.

The Code gives commissions in electronic form through electronic services. If documents provided the participants of the election process to communicate with election for by the Code are submitted to election commissions through electronic services, such documents must meet the requirements of the laws of Ukraine <u>"On Electronic Documents and Electronic Document Management"</u> and <u>"On Electronic Trust Services"</u>.

Documents provided for in the Code may be submitted to the election commission in the form of an electronic document pursuant to special provisions of this Code. In such a case, the documents must meet the requirements of the laws of Ukraine <u>"On Electronic Documents and Electronic Document</u> <u>Management"</u> and <u>"On Electronic Trust Services"</u>. The person who certifies the document with his/her qualified electronic signature shall be responsible for the authenticity of copies of documents submitted to election commissions in electronic form.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) is charged with administering the state Register of Voters, an information technology system created to maintain, process, and administer voter data listed in the Law on the State Register of Voters. The CEC ensures data maintenance and functions under the law and, for this purpose, created the Service of the Administrator of the State Register of Voters.

The CEC also may introduce electronic services for submitting complaints to election/referendum commissions.

The Law of Ukraine "On the All-Ukrainian Referendum" and the Draft Law "On Local Referendum" (№ 5512 since 19.05.2021) provide procedure and terms for collecting signatures of voters by an initiative group for a referendum and a local referendum. In particular, it determines that a member of the initiative group who collected signatures shall post the voter data collected on signature sheets in support of the local referendum in electronic form, organised in a format that allows its automated processing by electronic means (machine reading) for the purpose of reuse (hereinafter referred to as electronic signature data), in the form approved by the CEC. The accuracy of the specified data presented in electronic form shall be confirmed by the member of the initiative group that collected signatures by affixing his/her own qualified electronic signature.

According to the <u>Law of Ukraine "On the All-Ukrainian Referendum,"</u> the CEC is obliged to establish an automated information and telecommunication system.

As was mentioned, the CEC approved the Concept of application of the unified automated information and analytical system of CEC (the CEC resolution № 447 dating 29.10.2021). The Concept defines the main approaches to the creation, development, and ensuring the functioning of the unified automated information and analytical system of the CEC, which will combine the requirements of the election and referendum legislation of the automated information system and provide a single platform and ways of its further implementation.

The CEC Strategic Plan for 2020- 2025 was approved by the CEC Resolution Nº102 dated 11.06.2023 and provided one of the strategic goals "Introducing new technologies in elections".

Strategic actions for this goal are:

- Introducing digital services for submission of documents to election commissions;
- Expanding online services provided by the unified information and analytical system (UIAS) "Vybory" to ease election administration;
- Introducing an electronic document management system (EDMS).

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity etc.

Preparation and conduct of elections and referendums shall be governed by <u>the</u> <u>Constitution of Ukraine</u>, the Electoral Code of Ukraine, the <u>Law of Ukraine "On</u> <u>the All-Ukrainian Referendum"</u>, the Laws of Ukraine <u>"On the Central Election</u> <u>Commission"</u>, <u>"On the State Voter Registry"</u>, other Ukrainian laws, as well as other legislative acts and the Central Election Commission acts passed in accordance therewith.

The laws meet European standards and take into account most of the recommendations of the <u>Venice Commission</u> and the OSCE. The draft laws were prepared in an open and inclusive manner.

The Electoral Code of Ukraine and the <u>Law of Ukraine "On the All-Ukrainian</u> <u>Referendum"</u> provide principles of elections and referendums for traditional paper ballot voting as well as for e-voting: Universal Suffrage, Equal Suffrage, Direct Suffrage, Free Elections, and Referendum, Voluntary participation in Elections, Voting by Secret Ballot, Personal Voting.

The Code and the Law set up the main principals of democratic elections and referendums; regulatory and organizational requirements establishment of e-voting as an additional and optional means of voting; regulate the responsibilities for the functioning of e-voting systems and ensure that the electoral management body has control over them; provide guarantees for transparency and observation of electoral process (obligation of the CEC to make public on its official website all decisions of the CEC and constituency election commissions, a list of respective permanent election precincts, indicating the territorial constituencies, information about date and time of the voting, explanation of the procedure of voting and other information).

The main provisions for ensuring the reliability and security of the e-voting system and implementation of open standards while using various technical components or services must be set up in a special law passed regulating electronic voting.

On 24 February 2022, the Russian federation launched a large-scale armed aggression against Ukraine. In order to repel the aggressor and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, martial law was imposed in Ukraine by the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 64/2022 as of 24 February 2022.

According to the Electoral Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law," no election and referendum can't be conducted in Ukraine during martial law.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and regular Russia's deliberate attacks on residential areas provoked large internal and external migration of citizens from their normal place of residence, often from the electoral district for which they are registered. Nearly 8 million people were displaced across the world, and more than 5 million people were displaced within Ukraine.

Ensuring the right and opportunity of all citizens to vote in post-war elections and referendums is the most relevant task of Ukrainian authorities.

The alternative ways of voting to ensure the right of displaced persons to vote are:

- to increase the number of foreign election precincts,
- to launch e-voting,
- to launch postal voting.

The CEC establishes foreign election precincts for the purpose of organising and conducting voting for voters residing or staying in the respective territory of a foreign state on the voting day. Foreign election precincts shall be established at Ukraine's diplomatic institutions abroad and military units (formations) deployed outside Ukraine.

One hundred-one foreign election precincts were established to organize and conduct voting in the 2019 Election of the President of Ukraine.

Nowadays, taking into account the number of displaced persons from Ukraine and voters who do not plan to return to Ukraine the first years after the war, the CEC has to establish 368 additional foreign election precincts.

E-voting is one of the ways to facilitate the participation in elections and referendums of citizens entitled to vote and residing or staying abroad, providing the electorate with a better service by offering a variety of voting channels. At the same time, it brings dangers, too, as powerful new AI and cyber tools expand the scope for pre-poll disinformation and manipulation.

The main disadvantages of e-voting in Ukraine are:

new technology unknown to the Ukrainian voter and administrative authorities,

lack of transparency tools,

ensuring trust in the system,

lack of agreed and tested standards for e-voting,

it requires the development of a new legislative regulation,

effective identification system,

ensuring the secrecy of voting,

influence on the vote - voting in an uncontrolled environment,

cyber threats and safety factors,

misinformation and manipulation,

education of servants and failure in operation,

increasing costs for the purchase and maintenance of the e-voting,

increasing security requirements for voting protection systems.

The Parliament of Ukraine, the Government, and the Central Election Commission work to ensure preparation for and conduct of post-war elections and referendums in Ukraine, taking into account the respective challenges to be faced. Particularly, it is focused on guaranteeing the vote of displaced persons within and beyond Ukraine, registration regulations for displaced voters and how to tackle risks of election frauds, implementing alternative voting methods in situations of damaged physical and electoral infrastructure; introducing necessary safeguards, material and technical support for the organization and conduct of post-war elections in Ukraine.

UNITED KINGDOM

Question 1: Does your country currently, or is it planning to, use e-voting (such as the use of electronic voting machines, computers connected via the internet, or electronic means that aid in the casting of votes and counting) in:

Elections and/or referenda?

If yes, at which level (local, regional, national, abroad, etc.)?

E-voting is not used for statutory elections or referendums in the UK. Voting is a paper-based process, either in person at the polling station, by post, or by proxy. However, e-voting is used in other sectors of the economy and society – for example, by some UK trade unions, companies, and partnerships.

E-counting has been used to count votes at Greater London Authority elections since 2000. However, following a change in the law to implement a first-pastthe-post system for the London Mayoral election, the Greater London Returning Officer, following consultation, decided that the count for the 2024 elections should be a manual process for all three contests: the Mayor, Constituency, and London-wide Assembly members.

Scottish local government elections have been counted electronically since the Single Transferable Vote system was introduced in 2007.

If e-voting and *e*-counting are not used or have been discontinued in your country, please share the reasons why.

Between 2000 and 2007, the then UK Government encouraged local authorities in England to undertake "electoral modernisation" pilot schemes to test new methods of voting and voting arrangements at local government elections. These included a range of e-voting solutions, including remote Internet voting, but also telephone voting, and the provision of "vote anywhere", electronic polling stations. The Electoral Commission evaluated the pilot schemes, concluding that while the schemes facilitated voting (although they did not have a significant impact on turnout), the level of implementation and security risk involved was significant and unacceptable. There were also concerns about the reliability and cost of e-voting. There have been no trials of e-voting in the UK since 2007, and it has not been pursued as a policy option by the UK's governments.

Question 2: Does your country use electronic means or tools in relation to any other election-related procedures, such as the recording of votes, scanning of votes, consolidation/tabulation, or transmission of voting results? If so, please provide additional detail on ICT usage in the electoral process?

Results collation software systems have been developed to support the collation of referendum vote totals (for example, at the 2016 EU referendum). Electronic collation of local vote totals may also be used by Returning Officers where these must be combined to produce the overall result – for example, at Police and Crime Commissioner elections and Combined Authority Mayoral elections – although the approach taken may vary.

If applicable, has your country used the Council of Ministers CM(2022)10-final Guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral processes? If so, please share how the Guidelines were used.

n/a

Question 3: If applicable, please provide information in relation to:

- the relevant legislative and regulatory framework;

n/r

- regulatory or legislative changes in relation to e-voting as a result of your experience or any such changes that may be envisaged;

n/r

- implementation of the CM/Rec (2017)5 recommendation on standards for e-voting;

n/r

- specific issues and/or improvements you may have encountered i.e., accessibility, secret suffrage, cybersecurity etc.

Provisions relating to e-counting at Scottish local government elections are set out in the Scottish Local Government Elections Rules (as amended).

Provisions relating to the counting of Greater London Authority votes are included in the Greater London Authority Elections Rules 2007 (as amended)

Provisions enabling local authorities to undertake electoral modernisation pilot schemes are set out in Section 10 of the Representation of the People Act 2000.