EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
COMITE EUROPEEN DES DROITS SOCIAUX





Case Document No.7

***Union nationale des footballeurs professionnels (UNFP)* v. France**
Complaint No. 247/2025

OBSERVATIONS BY FIFPRO IN COORDINATION WITH FIFPRO EUROPE ON THE MERITS

Registered at the Secretariat on 23 October 2026

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS

Collective Complaint No. 247/2025 – Union nationale des footballeurs professionnels (UNFP) v. France

Observations of FIFPRO – Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels

Submitted at the invitation of the President and on behalf of the Secretariat under Rule 32A§1 of the Committee's Rules · Hoofddorp, 23 October 2026

I. Introduction: a high-risk industry that has never been asked to meet the floor

1. Professional football is a high-risk industry. Its workers' bodies are the product it sells. Injury incidence reaches 36 per 1,000 match hours, higher than in traditional industrial occupations (KU Leuven, *Impact of Workload on Football Players' Health and Wellbeing*, 2024). The risk does not come only from the game. It also comes from how the work is organised: how many matches are played, how close together, after how much travel, and with how little rest in between.

2. That organisation is set by commercial and political interests that pull the other way. Several actors are stepping in this organisation whose commercial and sporting objectives may not coincide with the protection of players' health and safety. Every new competition, extended format and added international window adds revenue for its organiser. None of them comes with an obligation to measure what it does to the total working time of the players who carry it. The industry's economic model therefore keeps eroding the social and health and safety standards to which the States Parties have committed under Articles 2, 3, 7 and 11 of the Charter. This is not a by-product of individual decisions. It is how the system works.

3. The process continues while this complaint is pending. FIFA is studying an expansion of the 2030 FIFA World Cup from 48 to 64 teams, only four years after the 2026 edition grew from 32 to 48 teams and up to eight matches per team. It is also pursuing an expansion of the 2029 FIFA Club World Cup from 32 to 48 clubs, four years after the 2025 edition grew from 7 to 32. Each of these decisions adds matches, travel and weeks away from home to the same players' working year. None of them is made subject to binding minimum safeguards on their total working time and rest.

4. International bodies have already recognised this:

- **The European Parliament**, in its resolution of 7 October 2025 on the role of EU policies in shaping the European Sport Model (P10_TA(2025)0212), calls for proactive occupational safety and health (OSH) risk management for athletes, taking into account "match calendars and overlapping competitions" (§40). It also notes that calendars "have become more intense due to the increase in European and international matches" (§42) and calls for social dialogue as a key decision-making process (§37). **The European Commission's** forthcoming Communication on sport, which follows that resolution and the Commission's consultation on reinforcing the European Sport Model, is expected to address the same issue.

- **The International Labour Organization** made a safe and healthy working environment a fundamental principle and right at work in 2022. ILO Conventions No. 155 and No. 187 now bind all member States, France included, whether or not they have ratified them. In March 2026, the ILO Meeting of Experts on sport adopted guidelines for professional athletes. They state that "rest and recovery periods are central to managing OHS risks" and that working time, "including travel, public relations and other obligations", must be set through social dialogue. France took part in that meeting (Government's reply, point G).
- **The Council of Europe's** Revised European Sports Charter (2021) requires sport governing bodies to respect internationally recognised human rights.

5. Other high-risk industry whose work crosses borders, time zones and employers has been required to translate the general minimum standards into rules for its own sector. Seafarers (Directive 1999/63/EC, aligned with the ILO Maritime Labour Convention), civil aviation (Directive 2000/79/EC and flight-time limitations), cross-border rail (Directive 2005/47/EC), inland waterways (Directive 2014/112/EU) and road transport (Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 and Directive 2002/15/EC) all measure working time, limit it, and guarantee compensatory rest. **Professional Football, an industry with significant risk and international reach has never been asked to do the same.** That is not because its work is too specific to regulate. It is because no public authority has required it.

6. This complaint is the first case from the sports industry ever brought under the Charter. It asks a simple question: may a State Party accept that a whole category of workers on its territory is routinely denied the protection the Charter guarantees, because the industry employing them says it is special? FIFPRO's answer is no.

II. Purpose of these observations: a national complaint about a European pattern

7. FIFPRO represents more than 70 national player unions, including the UNFP. It brings no individual grievance. Its contribution is the view across the industry: its Player Workload Monitoring (PWM) platform and Player IQ working-time records cover players at clubs and national teams in major competitions in Europe and beyond. That view shows the facts in the complaint are not French anomalies. **They are what the industry does everywhere: systematic, foreseeable, documented and acutely aware of the impact on players.**

8. This matters for the Committee's assessment in three ways:

- **It rules out the "isolated cases" defence.** The Government says the UNFP's examples are not representative. FIFPRO's data show the same pattern of hours, missing rest and shortened leave across employers, leagues and countries. A pattern representative of the working structures everywhere cannot be explained by individual choices.
- **It identifies the cause.** Breaches do not arise mainly from any one match or competition. They arise from **the accumulation of working time across competitions and across employers**: domestic league and cup, UEFA club competitions, the FIFA Club World Cup, national team windows and tournaments. Each organiser schedules its own events based on commercial interest. No one adds them up. Under the current system, the total working time or rest of a player is nobody's responsibility.

- **It shows where the duty lies.** Precisely because the risk crosses organisers, employers and borders, only the State can require it to be measured and managed on its territory. The Charter places that duty on States Parties, and the Committee has made clear it applies even where the State acts only as regulator and not as operator (*Fondation Marangopoulos v. Greece*, No. 30/2005, decision on admissibility, §14, a decision the Government itself cites at §66 of its observations).

9. FIFPRO therefore asks the Committee to examine the French framework against a single test. Does it ensure, in practice, that the *total* working time of a professional footballer employed in France, including time spent with the national team selected by the State's own delegatee, respects the limits, rest and leave guaranteed by Articles 2, 3 and 7? A national framework that cannot answer that question cannot protect the rights it has accepted.

The evidence below is assessed primarily against the rights guaranteed by the Charter. EU law and French law are relied on as relevant benchmarks for determining whether those rights are effectively protected in practice, rather than as separate grounds on which the Committee is asked to rule. FIFPRO submits that the shortcomings identified below result from three interrelated failures: the absence of rules clearly defining and allocating responsibility for players' total working time and rest across club and national-team duty; the absence of a mechanism for coordinating and assessing that cumulative workload; and the absence of comprehensive recording, inspection and enforcement. It is the combined effect of those failures that prevents the rights guaranteed by the Charter from being effectively secured.

III. The evidence: systematic working time breaches as a health and safety failure

10. Under the Charter, working time limits are health and safety measures. The Committee has set clear benchmarks under Article 2§1, which constitutes the primary standard for the present complaint. Daily working time should, in no circumstances, outside extraordinary situations, exceed 16 hours. A working week of more than 60 hours is unreasonable. Employers must record working hours, and the authorities must check that the limits are respected in practice (Statement of Interpretation on Article 2§1, Conclusions 2025). The Committee has also held, against France, that treating on-call periods as rest breaches Article 2§1 (*CFE-CGC v. France*, No. 16/2003, decision on the merits of 12 October 2004). The evidence below should be read against those benchmarks, showing that the framework created by the Charter does not secure the relevant Charter rights effectively in practice.

A. Total working time: weeks of 68 to 79+ hours, with no one responsible for the total

11. Player IQ, the player centric knowledge centre of FIFPRO, recorded in coordination with team representatives and union delegates every hour of a player's week by activity: training, supervision, travel, hotel, pre-match, match, recovery, other team duties and rest. Over five weeks at a leading European club, a first-team player worked **68 hours** in a week with a Champions League away match and a league away match. He worked **79 hours** in the following week, which had two away matches and overnight returns. Both weeks are above the 60-hour level the Committee calls unreasonable. The full five-week record is reproduced in **Annex 1**. This working pattern and structure is applicable for all mid-week / weekend competition schedules, not only UEFA Champions League competitions.

12. Over the same five weeks, the assessment applied the EU and national rules to this schedule (*Memorandum on the EU Working Time framework and its application to players*, 30 July 2026):

Standard	Requirement	Finding over five weeks
Daily rest (WTD Art. 3; C. trav. L.3131-1)	11 consecutive hours per 24 hours	Missed on at least **8 occasions**, including two nights in a row in Week 4. Several post-match nights had no meaningful rest.
Weekly rest (WTD Art. 5; C. trav. L.3132-2; Charter Art. 2§5)	24 hours + 11 hours daily rest per 7 days, or 48 hours per 14 days	Not provided in **Weeks 2 and 4**. The player worked every day, with no compensatory rest in the fortnight.
Weekly hours (WTD Art. 6; C. trav. L.3121-20)	48 hours (France: absolute weekly maximum)	Exceeded in **4 of 5 weeks**.

The parallel assessment under national law found breaches of daily or weekly rest under the law of France, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom. Under French law, the maximum weekly working time of 48 hours is an absolute limit (L.3121-20), not an average. It was exceeded in every week but one.

13. The pattern is the same across the European elite (see the exhibits in **Annex 2**). In a tournament year, national team duty takes up around a quarter of a player's season. **Achraf Hakimi, employed by Paris Saint-Germain in France**, spent 107 days with Morocco in the 2025/26 season (31.2%), 77 of them at AFCON and the FIFA World Cup. Alexis Mac Allister (Liverpool FC) spent 86 days (23.6%) across five camps, several with long-haul return travel to South America. Harry Kane (FC Bayern München) spent 80 days (21.9%) of 2026 with England, interrupting his club schedule four times. Across three seasons, 38% of Kane's appearances (74 of 196) were in UEFA and FIFA competitions on top of his domestic programme. Of two team-mates at the same club in 2023/24, the one who played at UEFA EURO 2024 spent 88% of the year in a workplace setting and had 42 days of rest and recovery. The one who did not had 79. Leading international players now spend more than 320 days a year in their working environment.

14. In legal terms, this accumulation is the heart of the matter. Players are released to the national team by their club under a regulatory system that binds the club. In France, that obligation is written into Article 13 of the FFF–LFP convention, which the Minister for Sport approves. The Court of Justice has held that where a worker has several contracts with the same employer, daily rest applies to them **taken as a whole**, because otherwise the protection would be undermined (*Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti*, C-585/19, 2021). The same reasoning applies to club and national team duty. Yet no actor records the combined total, no actor assesses the combined risk, and no player has any right to recover rest lost on international duty – particularly, the French framework does not clearly identify which actor must record the combined periods, assess the cumulative risk or ensure equivalent compensatory rest (see also **Annex 6**, ¶¶18A–18B).

15. The health consequences are documented. Injury incidence is 36 per 1,000 match hours against 3.7 per 1,000 training hours. Fixture congestion, shorter recovery periods and cumulative match load are consistently identified as risk factors. Across 1,000 players surveyed by FIFPRO, 55% reported injuries linked to overloaded schedules, 40% said a congested calendar had harmed their mental health, and 50% had their off-season cut short (KU Leuven, 2024; PWM 2022/23). In France, a UNFP study found that 82% of coaches had fielded players they knew needed rest because of pressure for results (see also **Annex 6**).

B. A culture of control that turns "free" time into working time

16. Whether time is work or rest depends on control, not on its label. The Court of Justice classifies a period as working time where the worker cannot freely dispose of their time. Being required to remain at a place set by the employer and apart from family and social life points to working time (*Jaeger*, C-151/02; *Radiotelevizija Slovenija*, C-344/19). Time spent travelling to locations set by the employer is working time (*Tyco*, C-266/14; *VAERSA*, C-110/24, 2025).

17. Football has built a deep-rooted culture of control that reaches into time described as free. It applies at club level and, often more intensely, in national team camps that last for weeks. Common practices include:

- team hotel stays the night before home matches as well as away matches, often in remote locations chosen to limit movement;
- curfews, compulsory team meals at set times and dietary protocols;
- bans or limits on visits by family and friends;
- official club or national team clothing in the hotel, during travel and in public;
- disciplinary codes with fines attached to conduct in "free" time;
- assigned shared rooms;
- security staff controlling access and exit;
- ad hoc meetings, video sessions and activations at short notice;
- continuous medical and load monitoring, wellness questionnaires and sleep tracking.

18. Each of these may serve a team purpose. Taken together, they keep the player at the employer's disposal and prevent the player from using the period freely for personal purposes. That is the very situation the Committee condemned in *CFE-CGC v. France*: time under the employer's constraint cannot be counted as rest. In congested weeks, every hotel night and overnight return eats into the 11-hour daily rest and the weekly rest period. Isolated restrictions become multiple, systemic breaches. The French framework does not define, record or inspect any of this time and does not ensure any systematic assessment of those periods.

C. Annual leave: shortened, then interfered with

19. Article 2§3 guarantees at least four weeks of paid annual leave. The Committee's case law requires at least two weeks of it to be taken uninterrupted in the year it is due, consistent with ILO Convention No. 132. The Court of Justice describes leave as a right to *actual* rest, "to rest and to enjoy a period of relaxation and leisure" (*Pereda*, C-277/08), and allows no derogation. The relevant questions is whether the leave provided is genuine and effective, including whether the player can use it for rest, relaxation and leisure without employer-directed work.

20. Leave is shortened. After the 2026 FIFA World Cup, off-season breaks among the players monitored ranged from **11 to 25 days**, and re-training periods from 2 to 13 days. Within high-risk groups few reached the minimum set by medical and performance experts. In FIFPRO's *Medical Position Statement on Minimum Player Workload Safeguards* (June 2025, **Annex 4**), a panel of 70 medical and high-performance experts reached consensus on at least four weeks between seasons free of any club or national team travel, training or media commitments, including a two-week

"blackout" with no contact from club or national team, followed by a re-training period of at least four weeks before competition.

21. What remains is interfered with. FIFPRO holds several 2026 off-season programmes issued by top-five league clubs to first-team players (amongst several others); for one specific programme extracts are reproduced in redacted form in **Annex 3**. It opens by telling him to "use this off season to rest and recover, whilst also preparing for the upcoming season". After one week of "regeneration", it prescribes **14 pitch conditioning sessions and 12 gym sessions in under four weeks**, specified to the second, the set and the watt. One drill requires a 25-metre shuttle in 10 seconds with 10 seconds' rest. A bike session reads "40 sec work (Gear 6, 100 RPM/350 Watts)". The programme ends with the instruction to "ensure return to country" the day before pre-season. A GPS vest is supplied. The player should join the first-team squad in the tracker's app, enter an athlete ID so that his "data will be automatically shared after each session you sync", and tag sessions to "coach created" plans. The data cover distance, high-speed running, sprints, accelerations, maximum speed, "strain" and step balance, which the guide notes may indicate "a potential or historical injury".

22. This is not an exception. Player unions and high-performance staff report that detailed off-season plans with GPS or app-based reporting are now standard at club and national team level. Fitness tests on the first days of pre-season, comparison with data recorded during the break, and competition for selection leave players no real choice. **In practice, the club continues to set, schedule and monitor the player's physical work throughout his leave.** Under the Charter, that is not leave.

23. This practice reaches every player in Ligue 1 and Ligue 2, not 12% of them. Every professional player has an off-season, and every club prepares its players for the next one. Interference with annual leave therefore defeats on its own the Government's claim that only some 175 players are concerned (§25 below). The wider point is this: health and safety standards have been systematically ignored in football. The industry has never identified its specific risks or the protections they require. Once it does, it becomes clear that the group of exposed workers changes with the risk. Accumulated load and lost rest weigh most on international players. Leave interference affects all players. Night work and long hours affect every minor in a professional squad.

IV. The Government's arguments do not answer the complaint

24. The Government does not dispute that the calendar has intensified. Its defence rests on reducing a structural problem to isolated cases and moving responsibility to others. Each argument fails.

1. "Only a minority of players is concerned"

25. The Government says around 175 of 1,379 players (12.6%) at 7 of 54 clubs are affected, and that the Charter is therefore applied to "the great majority" of workers. This argument fails for six reasons:

- **Charter rights are not subject to a threshold.** A State does not meet Article 2 by protecting most workers. The Committee's test is whether the right is effective for the workers concerned.
- **The exposed group depends on the risk.** OSH law starts from the risk, not from a head count. A proper risk assessment identifies, for each hazard, the workers exposed to it:

minors for night work and excessive hours, international players for accumulated load and lost rest, all players for leave interference, unrecorded travel and hotel time. Each of these groups is entitled to protection. Article 15 of the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC requires particularly sensitive risk groups to be protected against the dangers that specifically affect them.[1]

- **The Government's "minority" is one such risk group.** Its scope is set by the State's own delegatee. These are the players the FFF selects for the France national teams, and selection is a power the State itself delegated (Government's observations, §26).
- **The breaches are not confined to that group.** Interference with annual leave, unrecorded travel and hotel time, and unregulated night work arise in domestic football too, at every club (§23).
- **The group is not fixed.** The minority the Government describes is a share of the workforce, renewed each season, not a fixed group of a few individuals.

2. "The cause lies with FIFA and UEFA; the State has no influence over the lex sportiva"

26. The lex sportiva does not rank above the Charter. The Court of Justice has repeatedly held that sport, as an economic activity, is subject to the law (*European Superleague Company*, C-333/21, 2023; *FIFA v. BZ (Diarra)*, C-650/22, 2024; *ROGON v. DFB*, C-428/23, 2026). Private rule-making cannot set aside mandatory protection for workers on a State's territory. Those judgments do not themselves determine the content of France's obligations under the Charter, but they reinforce the proposition that sporting autonomy cannot, as such, justify the absence of effective worker protection.

Nor can the Government rely on FIFA and UEFA to protect players as workers. FIFA and UEFA are private associations whose role is to regulate, organise and administer football. Their autonomy as rule-makers is not a public mandate to safeguard players' employment rights. Neither organisation's statutes name the protection of workers as an objective. The Court of Justice made this point expressly in *FIFA v. BZ (Diarra)*. It held that "the protection of workers is not among the objectives of FIFA, as defined in its Statutes", and that FIFA had not been "entrusted by the public authorities with any particular mission in that area" (C-650/22, judgment of 4 October 2024, §99). Those are the very rule-makers whose calendar decisions the Government says lie beyond its influence. They have no mandate to protect workers, and they do not claim one. The club remains the player's contractual employer and participates in a regulatory system under which the player is released for national-team duty. Yet the French framework does not clearly allocate responsibility

[11] **The Government's argument also gets the logic of protective law backwards.** Health and safety rules are not reserved for risks that affect a majority. They target the group facing the highest and most systematic exposure, precisely because that group cannot protect itself. Road transport is the clearest example. Millions of people hold a driving licence and all of them drive with some risk. The EU rules on driving time and rest periods (Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 and Directive 2002/15/EC) do not cover all of them. They apply to professional drivers of heavy goods vehicles and buses. This is the group exposed to the highest systematic risk of fatigue, and the group where commercial pressure pushes drivers and employers alike far beyond safe limits: delivery deadlines, competition between operators, and pay linked to distance and speed. The legislature did not ask what share of licence holders were affected. It asked where the risk was greatest and where economic incentives made it unmanageable without binding rules. Professional football presents a similar configuration, though without the public safety concerns attached to road transport. The players most exposed to accumulated workload are those whose clubs and national teams compete on several fronts. For them the commercial value of every additional match is highest, and the pressure on players, coaches and employers to exceed safe limits is strongest (§15). That they are a minority of the workforce in comparison to all registered football players is not a reason to leave them unprotected. It is the reason binding protection is needed.

for recording and assessing the cumulative workload resulting from club and national-team activities. By leaving the working conditions of players employed in France to FIFA, the State leaves those workers without the protection the Charter requires. Only the State holds that duty. It cannot pass it to bodies that the Court of Justice has found do not have it.

27. The Government also has more influence than it claims:

- It **approves** the FFF–LFP convention, including the Article 13 obligation to release players for every international match on the FIFA calendar.
- It **grants and renews** the delegation, most recently on 22 December 2025, and can attach conditions to it.
- It **regulates the employers.** The club is the primary employer and remains responsible for the total working time of its players, including national team duty. French clubs are not passive in the international system. Through their European representative body, European Football Clubs (EFC), they negotiate with FIFA and UEFA the payments they receive for releasing their workers, including the FIFA Club Benefits Programme (USD 355 million for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, agreed in the FIFA–EFC memorandum of understanding) and the FIFA Club Protection Programme, which compensates clubs when players are injured on national team duty. Employers who are paid for the secondment of their workers cannot disclaim responsibility for the working time it creates, and the State that regulates them cannot either.
- The Code du sport already requires federations to ensure that athletes have **recovery time** that protects their health (L.231-5 and R.231-2). The Government cites this duty (§§20 and 121) but shows no instance in which it has checked or enforced it.

The Committee does not ask France to legislate for FIFA. It asks whether France ensures that work performed by employees *on French territory* respects the Charter, whoever set the fixture.

3. "The legal framework is in place; the complaint concerns only its application"

28. That is exactly what the Charter is about. Its aim is to protect rights "not merely theoretically, but also in fact" (*International Commission of Jurists v. Portugal*, No. 1/1998, decision of 9 September 1999, §32). The Government sets out the provisions of the *Code du travail* but does not show how any of them are applied to the actual working pattern of a footballer. Nothing defines whether team travel, hotel stays or national team camps count as working time. No employer is required to record a player's hours. Nothing provides for the sum of club and national team working time. Nothing provides for compensatory rest after international duty. Without a definition and a record, the limits cannot be inspected, and a limit that cannot be inspected is not effective.

29. Other sectors prove the point. Road transport, civil aviation and seafaring did not become safe through the general principle that work must not endanger health. They became safe when that principle was turned into defined limits, defined rest and mandatory records: daily and weekly driving limits checked by the tachograph, flight-time limitations and guaranteed days free of duty for aircrew, minimum rest hours and logbooks at sea. A general principle is not enough if it is constantly overridden for economic and political reasons. That is the position of professional football in France and across Europe today.

4. "No player has ever gone to court"

30. The absence of litigation shows the framework does not work. It does not show that it does. The Government's own law **requires** every professional player to be employed on a fixed-term contract (Code du sport, L.222-2-3). A worker whose next contract, selection and career depend on the employer he would sue is in no position to bring an individual claim. Players fear not only stigma and retaliation by their club. They also face an intensely competitive labour market, in which a player who steps back is replaced by a competitor, within a career that typically lasts only a few years. The 82% figure (§15) shows that the same pressure acts on coaches (see **Annex 6**).

31. Players have nonetheless spoken out, repeatedly and in public, about the calendar and the absence of safeguards. The complaint itself reproduces numerous player testimonies, as the Government acknowledges (§50 of its observations), and leading players across Europe have made the same points publicly (see **Annex 5**, including FIFPRO's player video). What players will not do, individually, is sue the employer on whom their career depends. The collective complaint procedure exists for exactly this kind of structural failure, which individual remedies cannot reach.

5. "The State carries out controls"

32. The Government's submissions show that it has not grasped the invisible impact of the competition calendar or how work in this industry is structured. It treats overload as a matter of match numbers in UEFA and FIFA competitions alone. It says nothing about travel, hotel stays, national team camps, the accumulation of club and national team duty, or interference with leave. It is therefore no surprise that its inspections have not examined working time effectively.

33. The Government cites 73 interventions by the labour inspectorate and URSSAF since 2017, of which 18 concerned Ligue 1, Ligue 2 or National. That is about two inspections a year across three professional divisions, on topics ranging from equality to collective bargaining. The Government does not say that any of them looked at players' working or rest time, or what it found. Under Article 3§3 and Article 2§1, the authorities must check "that the working time limits are respected in practice". On the Government's own figures, they do not.

6. "Withdrawing the delegation would be disproportionate"

34. No one has asked for withdrawal. The Government builds a false choice between doing nothing and taking the most drastic step. Between the two lie the ordinary tools of a regulator:

- conditions in the delegation contract and the FFF–LFP convention;
- a regulatory definition of working time for travel, hotel stays and camps;
- a duty on employers to record players' working time across club and national team duty;
- targeted labour inspection;
- support for a sectoral collective agreement under Articles 17 and 18 of Directive 2003/88/EC.

The Government addresses none of them.

7. "Any solution must be European, or French clubs will lose out and players will leave"

35. Obligations under the Charter are national obligations; that is how the Charter works. The "competitive distortion" argument is the classic case for lowering social standards in a race to the

bottom, and preventing that race is precisely what minimum standards are for. Shipping, aviation and road haulage are as international and competitive as football. Each of them complies with binding national rules transposing common standards. FIFPRO's evidence shows that breaches occur across Europe. A finding against France does not put France at a disadvantage. It sets the standard others must meet. France's participation in the ILO meeting and in EU working groups (point G) shows the Government knows the problem. Knowing a problem and doing nothing about it does not reduce the State's responsibility. It increases it. At the same time, FIFPRO and FIFPRO Europe very much invite the French Government to work towards an international solution to the risks set out in these observations. A solution of this kind would complement France's obligations under the Charter rather than replace them. The breaches arise from the accumulation of working time across competitions, employers and borders. They can therefore be addressed most effectively through common minimum standards agreed at European and international level, in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee, the FIFA Global Social Dialogue Platform and the competent intergovernmental forums, with a required implementation into national collective agreements. France is well placed to lead that effort, and FIFPRO and FIFPRO Europe stand ready to work with the French Government to find these solutions together. However, the employment contract under which players are contracted by a club and seconded to a national team is national contract. In this case a French employment contract.

8. "Injuries have many causes, and players want to play more"

36. OSH law does not require a single cause. It requires known risk factors to be assessed and reduced at source (Framework Directive, Article 6(2); ILO Convention No. 155). Match congestion and lack of recovery are among the best-documented of those factors (§15). A worker's willingness to work more cannot waive rules on health and safety, any more than a lorry driver can agree to drive without rest (see also **Annex 6**, Section H). Calendar expansion is driven by commercial and political interests, not by what players want. Otherwise national team competitions, where players earn comparatively little, would not be a fast-growing part of the calendar.

37. Players have in fact been clear that they want binding calendar safeguards (**Annex 5**). But their individual wishes are not the test. Players are competitive. They will protect their place in the team, as examples to return to the field after a head injury show too often. Football does not leave that decision to them: concussion protocols, including the national recommendations the Government itself annexes (Annex 1 to its observations), give medical staff the authority to overrule the player for health and safety reasons. The same logic applies to workload. It is for the industry collectively, and for the State, to set common minimum safeguards, so that responsibility does not rest on individual players, medical staff or coaches under competitive pressure.

9. "Professional sport is not a dangerous occupation under Article 2§4"

38. The Committee's list of dangerous occupations is not exhaustive. The fact that it has not yet ruled on professional sport is not tacit approval. It is the reason this complaint exists. An industry with injury rates above those of traditional industrial work, recognised by the ILO as exposing athletes to risks "often greater than those in many other professions", fits the purpose of Article 2§4. In any case, Articles 3 and 11 apply to all sectors whatever their classification.

10. Annual leave and minors: the Government's own provisions show the gap

39. On leave, the Government relies on Article 259 of the *Charte du football professionnel*. For national team players, it guarantees a minimum leave of 10 consecutive business days, which may

be taken in advance. That is less than two uninterrupted calendar weeks. The provision the Government presents as proof of compliance therefore sets the guaranteed uninterrupted rest of France's most exposed players below the Charter standard. It says nothing about interference during leave (§§21–23) or compensatory mechanisms for time spent in national team camps for prolonged periods.

40. On minors, the Government confirms that 23 minors in Ligue 1 and 10 in Ligue 2 hold professional contracts in 2026/27. It also confirms that the *Code du travail* limits them to 8 hours a day and 35 hours a week, prohibits night work (between 22:00 and 06:00), and that "no derogation" exists for footballers (§§47–48 and 173–174). Those minors are fielded in professional squads that play evening kick-offs ending well after 22:00, travel overnight and stay in team hotels. On the Government's own statement of the law, any such match involves night work that the law prohibits. The Government answers only for players in training centres. It says nothing about minors in first-team squads, which is the situation the complaint concerns.

41. The medical experts in FIFPRO's Position Statement reached consensus that players under 18 require specific workload safeguards, and called for further work on players under 21 (**Annex 4**). No such football-specific safeguards exist, in France or in the competition regulations that govern its clubs. That is an astonishing gap in a high-risk industry that relies constantly on minors, not least because of their potential future value on the transfer market.

V. Conclusion: football can comply, and the State cannot look the other way

42. Compliance is possible. Seafaring, civil aviation, cross-border rail, inland waterways and road transport all run on irregular hours, constant travel, work far from home and fierce international competition. Each has shown that **national standards and an international working environment are compatible**. Each did it in the same way:

- an agreed definition of the grey areas, such as current definition of actual working time or rest away from home in rail;
- flexibility paired with guaranteed compensatory rest within a fixed period;
- mandatory recording of working time, from seafarers' logs to the tachograph.

Football already has the flexibility. It lacks the safeguards, the definitions and the recording. Compliance is possible even within professional sport. The Government itself cites the limit on the number of matches a professional rugby player may play in a season (§137 of its observations), and World Rugby has since adopted load guidelines of no more than 30 full matches a season and six consecutive match weeks. Rugby operates under the same commercial and competitive pressures as football. The difference is that limits were set. In football, no organiser has set them, and no public authority has required them. That is a regulatory choice, not a sporting necessity.


43. The tools to close that gap already exist. Articles 17 and 18 of Directive 2003/88/EC allow the social partners to adapt daily and weekly rest to football in return for equivalent compensatory rest. Paid annual leave allows no derogation. A European agreement can be made binding under Article 155 TFEU, as was done for seafarers and aircrew. In 2026, FIFA and FIFPRO agreed a Global Social Dialogue Platform, and FIFPRO Europe joined the UEFA Executive Committee. The Government cites both as signs of progress. They show the industry could agree standards, however until today violations continue to happen daily without any standards on the horizon. Equally, they do not relieve the State of ensuring that standards are actually set and meet the Charter.

44. Clubs, national associations, leagues, competition organisers and the social partners each have a part to play in agreeing and applying football-specific standards. But the State's responsibility comes first in law. It is the only responsibility the Charter makes binding: to define what counts as working time, to require that it be recorded, and to guarantee and inspect the rest due to workers on its territory. That duty rests on every State Party where these breaches occur, not on France alone. France cannot fulfil it by pointing to others, and the contributions of other actors do not displace the State's responsibility under the Charter. The breaches documented here are known, foreseeable and systematic. They are tolerated for commercial and political reasons, when every other sector has shown national standards can be met in an international setting. **Football cannot be, and should not be, above the law.** By presenting a systemic pattern as a handful of individual cases, the French State is choosing to look the other way. The Charter does not allow it to.

45. FIFPRO therefore respectfully invites the Committee to find that France has not secured the effective enjoyment of the following Charter rights, having regard to the deficiencies in the applicable framework, coordination mechanisms and enforcement described above:

1. **Article 2§1**, because the framework does not ensure that the total working time of professional footballers is reasonable, defined, recorded and inspected, including travel, hotel stays and national team duty;
2. **Article 2§3**, because it does not guarantee four weeks of genuine annual leave, at least two of them uninterrupted and free from employer-directed training and monitoring;
3. **Article 2§5**, because it does not guarantee weekly rest or compensatory rest after congested periods and international duty;
4. **Articles 3,** because the regulatory and inspection framework does not ensure that the specific occupational risks created by cumulative workload, travel, camps, constrained periods and inadequate recovery are assessed, prevented and controlled effectively,
5. **Article 11**, because the State has not adopted, applied or reviewed an effective health-protection response to the documented systemic risks of the profession, in particular the accumulation of workload across competitions and employers and the insufficient recovery;
6. **Article 7**, because minors in professional squads are not protected against working hours and night work that the law itself prohibits.

For FIFPRO, Hoofddorp, 23 October 2026



Stéphane Burchkalter
Secretary General
FIFPRO


Annexes

No.	Exhibit	Referred to at
Annex 1	FIFPRO Player IQ: five-week working time record of a first-team player at a leading European club (weekly schedules by activity; Weeks 1 and 2 at 68 and 79 hours)	§§11–12
Annex 2	FIFPRO PWM: national team working time in 2025/26 and 2026 for A. Hakimi, A. Mac Allister and H. Kane; club versus national team load of two team-mates in 2023/24	§13
Annex 3	Extracts from a 2026 club off-season programme, redacted: day-by-day calendar, sample conditioning session, GPS tracking and data-sharing instructions	§§21–23
Annex 4	FIFPRO, *Minimum Player Workload Safeguards: Medical Position Statement on Consensus-Based Protection Standards for Competition Regulations in Men's Professional Football*, June 2025 FIFPRO_PositionStatement_June2025_low	§§20, 41
Annex 5	Player voices on the calendar and workload safeguards: FIFPRO player video submission. https://icnk.io/u/kEsIe1Y5s0zY/ FIFPRO coaches video submission: https://icnk.io/u/aYHRAtxID9de/	§§31, 37
Annex 6	Expert opinion: Dr Zafar Iqbal, Consultant in Sports and Exercise Medicine, former Head of Sports Medicine, Arsenal FC, "Match density, travel and injury risk in professional football: why medical advice alone cannot protect players", 23 October 2026, with sub-annex 6.1 (curriculum vitae)	§§11–23, 25 (n. 1), 30, 36–37

Annex 1 – FIFPRO Player IQ: weekly working time of a first-team player at a leading European club


FIFPRO Player IQ, in coordination with team representatives and union delegates, recorded every hour of the player's week by activity over five consecutive weeks of the competitive season. In each chart, every coloured block is time on duty for the club; rest and sleep are shown faded. Team travel and hotel stays ordered by the employer are recorded as time on duty (see §16). The player and club are anonymised.

Figure A1.1 – Week 1: UEFA Champions League away match (Wednesday) and league away match (Sunday) – 68 hours on duty



Source: FIFPRO Player IQ working time documentation, as presented in FIFPRO HPAN, The Invisible Impact of the Modern Football Calendar.

Figure A1.2 – Week 2: away matches on Thursday and Sunday, each followed by overnight team travel and a hotel stay – 79 hours on duty



Source: as Figure A1.1.

Assessment of the five-week record

Week	Fixtures	Working time	48-hour level	Rest findings (EU Working Time Directive)
Week 1	UEFA Champions League away match; league away match	68 hours	Exceeded	Daily rest missed 3 times: Tue–Wed (9 hours only), Wed–Thu (none), Sun–Mon into Week 2 (none)
Week 2	Two away matches with overnight returns	79 hours	Exceeded	Daily rest missed Thu–Fri (none). No weekly rest: the player worked every day
Week 3	[to be completed from Player IQ record]	[•] hours	Exceeded	Daily rest missed Sat–Sun (none)
Week 4	[to be completed from Player IQ record]	[•] hours	Exceeded	Daily rest missed on two consecutive nights: Mon–Tue and Tue–Wed. No weekly rest: the player worked every day, with no 48-hour compensatory rest in the fortnight
Week 5	[to be completed from Player IQ record]	[•] hours	Not exceeded	Daily rest missed Wed–Thu (below the 11-hour minimum)
Total			4 of 5 weeks	Daily rest missed on 8 occasions; weekly rest not provided in Weeks 2 and 4

The record was assessed against the EU Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) and, in parallel, against the law of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Under the Directive, the 11-hour daily rest (Article 3) was not provided on at least eight occasions, including two consecutive nights in Week 4; no weekly rest (Article 5) was provided in Weeks 2 and 4; and the 48-hour level (Article 6) was exceeded in every week except Week 5. Under French law (Code du travail, L.3121-20), 48 hours is an absolute weekly maximum, so each of those weeks is in breach. The national assessments identified breaches of daily or weekly rest under the law of France, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom, in several cases on the conservative assumption that time in the team hotel is not working time.

Annex 2 – FIFPRO PWM: national team working time

FIFPRO's Player Workload Monitoring (PWM) platform records, for each player, the days spent with the club and with the national team, matches played, travel and rest. The figures below show the share of the season or calendar year that leading players employed in Europe spent on national team duty, and how international tournaments reduce rest and recovery (see §13).

Figure A2.1 – Achraf Hakimi (Paris Saint-Germain / Morocco): 107 days with the national team in 2025/26 (29.3%), 77 of them at AFCON and the FIFA World Cup



National team duty accounted for an exceptionally large share of Achraf Hakimi's 2025/26 season. His campaign began on 6 August 2025, when he returned to pre-season training with Paris Saint-Germain, and concluded following Morocco's elimination from the FIFA World Cup in July 2026. Across this period, Hakimi spent an estimated **107 days with the Moroccan national team**, which is equivalent to **31.2% of the working year**.

Much of this load was driven by his participation in two major international tournaments: the CAF African Cup of Nations held in December-January and the FIFA World Cup in June-July. Together, these two tournaments accounted for 77 days spent in a national team environment. His case shows how participation in multiple major international tournaments can significantly increase a player's total working time alongside an already intensive club schedule.

It should be noted that his national team working time could have been even higher: Hakimi had to miss the November 2025 international window as he was recovering from an ankle injury.

Source: FIFPRO Player Workload Monitoring (PWM 2025/2026). Accessible via FIFPRO website as of end of November 2026.

Commented [AB1]: Typo corrected (PWM 20225/2026 → PWM 2025/2026), here and in the source lines of Figures A2.2 and A2.3.

Figure A2.2 – Alexis Mac Allister (Liverpool FC / Argentina): 86 days with the national team in 2025/26 (23.6%) across five camps



For Alexis Mac Allister, workload was defined not only by time away but also by the travel required to fulfil international commitments. He spent an estimated **86 days with Argentina** during the 2025/26 season (starting on 13 July 2025 with return to Liverpool training and ending after the World Cup in July 2026), which is equivalent to **27% of the working year**.

This load encompassed five separate national team camps with most of them requiring the player to travel the long distance between the base of club side in the United Kingdom to South America for important World Cup qualifying games and friendlies. Combined with a 50-day FIFA World Cup period in the summer, these repeated intercontinental movements added further travel, recovery and transition demands beyond the time spent in camp itself.

Source: FIFPRO Player Workload Monitoring (PWM 2025/2026). Accessible via FIFPRO website as of end of November 2026.


Figure A2.3 – Harry Kane (FC Bayern München / England): 80 days with the national team in 2026 (21.9%), interrupting the club schedule four times



Assuming participation in the November UEFA Nations League window, Harry Kane would spend 80 days with England in 2026, equivalent to 21.9% of the calendar year. He was involved in every England camp during the year, meaning his Bayern München schedule was interrupted by international duty on four separate occasions. The largest commitment came around the FIFA World Cup, which accounted for 50 days, while subsequent international windows added further transitions between club and national team environments.

Source: FIFPRO Player Workload Monitoring (PWM 2025/2026). Accessible via FIFPRO website as of end of November 2026.

Figure A2.4 – Two team-mates at the same club in 2023/24: the player who played at UEFA EURO 2024 spent 88% of the year in a workplace setting and had 42 days of rest and recovery; the player who did not had 79



Source: FIFPRO Player Workload Monitoring (PWM). Annual Report 2024/2025.

Annex 3 – Extracts from a 2026 club off-season programme (redacted)

The screenshots below are taken from a 50-page off-season programme issued for 2026 by a club in one of Europe's top-five leagues to a first-team player. The club's name and crest, staff names and telephone numbers, the team code and the athlete ID have been redacted, and a vendor marketing photograph has been cropped from Figure A3.9. Over the 24 days from 15 June to 8 July 2026, the programme prescribes 14 pitch conditioning sessions and 12 gym sessions, and never leaves the player more than two consecutive days without a session.

Figure A3.1 – Information page: "Use this off season to rest and recover, whilst also preparing for the upcoming season"


[redacted]

OFF SEASON 2026

INFORMATION

Use this off season to rest and recover, whilst also preparing for the upcoming season

Ensure you fuel, hydrate and warm up appropriately for all sessions

Any questions/issues please contact [redacted]

CONTENTS

3. Calendar
4. Run Session Library
9. Week Commencing 01.06.26 Sessions
11. Week Commencing 08.06.26 Sessions
13. Week Commencing 15.06.26 Sessions
15. Week Commencing 22.06.26 Sessions
17. Week Commencing 29.06.26 Sessions
19. Week Commencing 06.07.26 Sessions
21. Off-Feet Conditioning Library
27. Pre Activation Sessions
30. Exercise Library
38. GPS User Guide

2

Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.2 – Day-by-day calendar: one week of "regeneration", then pitch and gym sessions until the instruction to "Ensure Return to Country" the day before pre-season


[redacted]

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
08/06/2026 Regeneration	09/06/2026 Regeneration	10/06/2026 Regeneration	11/06/2026 Regeneration	12/06/2026 Regeneration	13/06/2026 Regeneration	14/06/2026 Regeneration
15/06/2026 Pitch Session Strength Session	16/06/2026 Regeneration	17/06/2026 Pitch Session UB Session 1	18/06/2026 Regeneration	19/06/2026 Pitch Session Strength Session	20/06/2026 Regeneration	21/06/2026 Regeneration
22/06/2026 Pitch Session UB Session 1	23/06/2026 Pitch Session Strength Session	24/06/2026 Regeneration	25/06/2026 Pitch Session UB Session 2	26/06/2026 Pitch Session Strength Session	27/06/2026 Regeneration	28/06/2026 Regeneration
29/06/2025 Pitch Session UB Session 1	30/06/2026 Pitch Session	01/07/2026 Pitch Session Strength Session	02/07/2026 Regeneration	03/07/2026 Pitch Session UB Session 2	04/07/2026 Pitch Session Strength Session	05/07/2026 Regeneration
06/07/2025 Regeneration	07/07/2026 Pitch Session Strength Session	08/07/2026 Pitch Session	09/07/2026 Regeneration Ensure Return to Country	10/07/2026 Report to Training Centre Start of Pre-Season	11/07/2026	12/07/2026

3

Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.3 – Run session library: drills specified to the metre and the second (e.g. 25 m shuttle in 10 s, rest 10 s)



Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.4 – Session sheet, week commencing 22 June 2026: four conditioning sessions and four gym sessions


[redacted]

Week Commencing 22.06.26

22.06.26			23.06.26			25.06.26			26.06.26		
Conditioning Session			**Conditioning Session**			**Conditioning Session**			**Conditioning Session**		
Order	**Exercise**	**Sets x Reps**	**Order**	**Exercise**	**Sets x Reps**	**Order**	**Exercise**	**Sets x Reps**	**Order**	**Exercise**	**Sets x Reps**
1	Pre-activation session A, B, C or D		1	Pre-activation session A, B, C or D		1	Pre-activation session A, B, C or D		1	Pre-activation session A, B, C or D	
2	Warm Up		2	Warm Up		2	Warm Up		2	Warm Up	
3	Box to Box to Halfway	2 x 4	3	Figure of 8	1 x 4	3	Box to Box to Halfway	2 x 4	3	Box to Box	1 x 10
4	Acceleration:Deceleration	1 x 6	4	Pitch Shuttle	1 x 3	4	Acceleration:Deceleration	1 x 6	4	"4"	1 x 6
5	1:1 Variations	1 x 1	5	Gacon	1 x 6	5	Football Intermittent	1 x 5	5	7/15/7	1 x 6
Gym Session			**Gym Session**			**Gym Session**			**Gym Session**		
UB Session 1 **1a: Chin Up or Pull Up:** 3 x 6 **1b: DB or BB Bench Press:** 3 x 6 **1c: Banded or Cable Pallof Press:** 3 x 6es **2a: DB or BB Bent Over Row:** 3 x 8 **2b: Seated Shoulder Press or Arnold Press:** 3 x 8 **2c: Plank Slides or Banded Plank Row:** 3 x 8es			**LB Strength** **1a: Trapbar Deadlift / Back Squat / Leg Press:** 4 x 5 **1b: Barbell Hip Thrust:** 4 x 5 **2a: RDL:** 3 x 5 **2b: Calf Raise Seated:** 3 x 10 **3a: Bridge and Slide** 1-2 x 3 **3b: Short Lever Copenhagen:** 2 x 20-30s			**UB Session 2** **1a: BB or TRX Inverted Row:** 3 x 12 **1b: Incline DB or BB Bench Press:** 3 x 10 **1c: Plate or DB Alenka:** 3 x 12 **2a: Banded or Cable Lat Pulldown:** 3 x 12 **2b: Landmine Shoulder Press:** 3 x 6es **2c: ½ Kneeling MB Throw or Cable Wood Chop:** 3 x 6es			**LB Strength Speed** **1a: Trapbar Deadlift Jump / Back Squat Jump :** 4 x 4 **1b: Box Jump** 4 x 4 **2a: Lateral Squat:** 3 x 4 es **2b: Banded Lateral Shuffle:** 3 x 8es **3a: Short Lever Copenhagen:** 2 x 20-30s **3b: Calf Raise Standing:** 3 x 10 **3c: Nordic:** 1-2 x 3		

Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.5 – Off-feet conditioning library: bike intervals specified by gear, cadence and wattage



WattBike / Bike CV Sessions

This page details Bike Sessions that can be used to maintain cardiovascular fitness.

Light sessions	Moderate sessions	Hard sessions
Session 1 – 4 x 4 min blocks with 2 min active recovery between blocks 4 min work (Gear 4, 100 RPM/275 Watts) 2 min recovery (Gear 1, < 50 RPM)	Session 1 – 4 x 4 min blocks with 2 min active recovery between blocks Block 1 – 4 x 30 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/350 Watts) to 30 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM/100 Watts) Block 2 – 8 x 15 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/375 Watts) to 15 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM/125 Watts) Block 3 – 8 x 10 sec work (Gear 6, 100–110 RPM/450 Watts) to 20 sec recovery (Gear 6, 60 RPM/125 Watts) Block 4 – 8 x 20 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/400 Watts) to 10 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM/100 Watts)	Session 1 – 2 x 12 min blocks (12 x 40 sec on:20 sec off) with 2 min active recovery between blocks 40 sec work (Gear 6, 100 RPM/350 Watts) 20 sec rest (Gear 6, 60 RPM/125 Watts)
Session 2 – 2 x 10 min blocks (10 x 40 sec on:20 sec off) with 2 min active recovery between blocks 40 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/325 Watts) 20 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM/100 Watts)	Session 2 – 10 km time trial Gear 5, 90–100 RPM/250 Watts Target time – < 15 min	Session 2 – 7 x 4 min blocks (see below) with 2 min active recovery between blocks Block 1 and 5 – 4 x 40 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/300 Watts) to 20 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM/100 Watts) Block 2 and 6 – 4 x 30 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/325 Watts) to 30 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM/125 Watts) Block 3 and 7 – 8 x 20 sec work (Gear 6, 100 RPM/400 Watts) to 10 sec recovery (Gear 6, 60 RPM/125 Watts) Block 4 – 8 x 6 sec work (Gear 7, 110 RPM/450 Watts) to 24 sec recovery (Gear 1, 60 RPM/100 Watts)
Session 3 – 4 x 4 min blocks with 2 min active recovery between blocks Blocks 1 and 3 – 4 x 30 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/350 Watts) to 30 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM 100 Watts) Blocks 2 and 4 – 8 x 15 sec work (Gear 5, 100–110 RPM/375 Watts) to 15 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60 RPM/125 Watts)	Session 3 – 8 x 2 min blocks with 1 min active recovery between blocks 2 min work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/250–300 Watts) 1 min recovery (Gear 1, <50 RPM)	Session 3 – 10 x 120 sec blocks (90 sec on:30 sec off) 90 sec work (Gear 5, 100 RPM/300 Watts) 30 sec recovery (Gear 5, 60–70 RPM/125 Watts)


Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.6 – GPS user guide: joining the club's first-team squad in the tracking app (team name and code redacted)




Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.7 – GPS user guide: entering an Athlete API ID so that "your data will be automatically shared […] after each session you sync" (ID redacted)



Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.8 – GPS user guide: tagging each session "to your coach created session"



Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.

Figure A3.9 – GPS user guide: metrics recorded, including "step balance" as "an indicator of a potential or historical injury"



Source: club off-season physical programme 2026, redacted by FIFPRO.