

Disinformation Defense

Provenance

Bing Multimedia
Microsoft


Ashish Jaiman

@ashishjaiman


medium/@ashishjaiman

linkedin/in/ashishjaiman

Disinformation: Mapping the Problem



Disinformation Harms & Threat Modeling




Individual

- Exploitation
- Sabotage
- Reputation
- Integrity



Society

- Social Division
- Public Safety
- National Security
- Undermining Journalism



Business

- Impersonation
- Financial Fraud
- Harassment and litigation
- Market Manipulation



Democracy

- Distortion of Democratic Discourse
- Manipulation of Election
- Eroding Trust in Institutions
- Undermine Diplomacy



Journalism

- Trust Deficit
- Liars' dividend
- Safety
- Reputation

Cognitive Hacking

Effective Responses



Reduce Exposure

- Removal of content
- Differential Promotion
- Dissemination Control
- Demonetizing

Reduce Belief

- Labeling
- Providing Context
- Civic Education

Countermeasures



Media Literacy

Consumers
Journalists
Voters



Platform Policies

Terms of Use
Code of Conduct
Norms



Regulations

Individual
Election
Business



Technology

Detection
Authentication
Provenance

Technical Solutions



Detection




Authentication




Provenance

Problem statement

- Publishers and consumers have low trust in digital content
- Ecosystem-wide impact, multiple symptoms
 - Publishers looking for ways to increase trust, maintain value
 - Consumers skeptical and unsure who to trust
 - Lack of trust in content shared on social media
 - Everyone concerned about “deepfakes”



Provenance




Enhanced media come with **Manifest**


- Contains creator-chosen metadata tags
- Is “bound” to the associated asset
- Is signed by the creator

If you get media with an Manifest, you can be sure that:



- It came from the person/publisher that signed it
- It has not been altered

Anatomy of an Manifest





Signed claims:
Date, location
Publisher certificate



deceptively simple

Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA)

An open technical standard providing publishers, creators, and consumers the ability to trace the origin of different types of media.



C2PA Charter

Develop technical specifications that can establish content provenance and authenticity at scale to give publishers, creators, and consumers the ability to trace the origin of media.

Joint Development Foundation Project

<https://www.jointdevelopment.org/>



C2PA Members

Steering Committee Members



General Members



Contributor Members



C2PA Key Activities

- ✓ Applying requirements from industry to the development of content provenance specifications
- ✓ Ensuring that the specifications can be used in ways that respect privacy and personal control of data, and promote tool availability for a wide range of organizations
- ✓ Ensuring that specifications meet appropriate security requirements
- ✓ Promoting selected specifications to become global standards
- ✓ The global adoption of digital provenance techniques by target industry devices, systems, and services, including social media and messaging platforms
- ✓ Ensuring that content accessibility is not negatively impacted by digital provenance techniques



thank you

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