

**COMMITTEE ON SAFETY AND SECURITY
AT SPORTS EVENTS (T-S4)**

COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON AN
INTEGRATED SAFETY, SECURITY AND SERVICE
APPROACH AT FOOTBALL MATCHES AND OTHER
SPORTS EVENTS (CETS No.218)



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**Recommendation Rec (2021) 1 rev 1
of the
Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events**

**(Adopted at the 1st meeting of the Committee on 15 April 202
and amended in November 2025 by written procedure)**

ANNEX B - Security

Recommended Good Practices

Recommendation Rec (2021) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events (adopted at the 1st meeting of the Committee on April 15, 2021; and amended in November 2025 by written procedure)

ANNEX B - Security

Recommended Good Practices

A Introduction

This Annex provides a range of good practices on the security component of a wider and overlapping integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service. The good practices recommended herein are based on extensive European experience, and are intended to assist States in adopting practices that are consistent with the content of the 2016 Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and other Sports Events (CETS No.218). An indication of the relevant Convention Article is provided in the thematic contents section below.

2. It must be stressed at the outset that the good practices cannot be considered in isolation from the guidance contained elsewhere in the Recommendation.
3. The focus of this document is on the role of the police in connection with football events. It is recognised that private security and other agencies can and do undertake what are described as "security" functions, usually in the context of wider safety operations in stadia or at other organised events, and, for ease of reference and consistency, their activities are covered within Annex A (Safety - Recommended Good Practices).
4. As indicated throughout the Recommendation, whilst the good practices herein have been established in respect of the delivery of policing football operations, States can adapt and apply the content to other major sports where necessary or desirable.

B Integrated Multi-Agency Approach

5. As stressed above, the good practices on policing football herein cannot be considered in isolation from the safety and service good practices contained within the Recommendation. The aim throughout should be on developing and implementing an integrated, multi-agency approach in respect of safety, security and service.
6. Moreover, the good practices are not intended to be prescriptive. Policing strategies and operations are the preserve of each State and there is no intention to undermine this core principle. Moreover, it is neither possible nor desirable to provide definitive models of application in view of wide variations in the constitutional, judicial, policing, cultural, and historical circumstances, and the equally varied character and severity of football-related incidents, among and within States. Instead,

the intention is to provide a range of good practices which should be taken fully into account by States in developing, refining and delivering a customised policing football strategy.

C Thematic Contents

7. For ease of reference, the recommended good practices herein are presented under the following, inter-related, thematic headings:

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D Role of Police in National Coordination

8. Policing agencies have a key role to play in the national multi-agency coordination arrangements highlighted throughout this Recommendation. It is imperative, therefore, that policing interests are represented by expert practitioners who are able to influence key policy decisions.

9. A crucial objective centres on ensuring that national and local policing strategies are consistent with the wider integrated approach. The police also have an important role to play in providing updated information on trends in supporter behaviour and associated risks and in clarifying how European good practices on policing football can be adapted for inclusion in the national arrangements.

10. Policing information and expertise are also critical in respect of monitoring and analysing events at domestic football matches and/or incidents involving domestic club supporters in connection with football matches played abroad.

11. Similarly, police information and risk assessments should be central to national coordination of multi-agency preparations for high risk football matches and tournaments and international matches played in other States.

12. High level participation of a number of key partner agencies in the national coordination group (notably governmental interior, justice and sports departments; prosecuting agencies; and national football authorities) should assist the police in identifying and explaining the enabling legal measures necessary to facilitate delivery of the policing strategy.

13. The police also have a key role to play in identifying the training necessary to ensure that policing personnel are able to deliver their tasks effectively and proportionately. In view of the interaction between the police and stadium personnel, the national coordination arrangements should explore the scope for organising integrated joint training of key policing and stadia safety personnel, taking into account European experience and established good practices.

E Role of National Government and the Police

14. Irrespective of the national policing structure (that is irrespective of whether responsibility for strategic and operational decisions rests at national or local level), cooperation between the police and national government is critical not least in terms of resource provision and international police cooperation.

15. However, such cooperation is also crucial in respect of ensuring that the national legislative, regulatory and administrative framework includes provisions which empower the police to undertake all of their football-related activity effectively. Aside from reviewing the relevant provisions in core public order and criminal law, the police and Interior and/or Justice authorities should evaluate the efficacy of any football specific policing/security provisions, along with identifying the legal measures necessary to deliver an effective exclusion ("banning order") strategy (see Exclusion Strategies below).

16. In addition to matters in which the police have operational primacy, the national coordination arrangements should review the legal, regulatory and administrative framework to ensure that it includes provision obliging the lead agency concerned to consult the police in respect of matters of shared interest.

17. In practice, the lead governmental authority on matters like football stadia licensing/safety certification and responsibility for in-stadia safety and crowd management may be a sports department or other authority so it is crucial that the partnership between the police and government extends to governmental agencies with a direct interest in football safety and security.

F Role of Prosecuting Agencies

18. Across Europe there are wide variations in the role, structure and competencies of prosecuting agencies. However, irrespective of the arrangements in place, an effective partnership between prosecuting and policing agencies can be crucial both at a strategic level, in terms of identifying gaps in criminal law provision, and at a tactical level, in terms of the gathering and presentation of evidence in respect of judicial or administrative proceedings.

19. This is crucial as spectators identified as being involved in criminality in connection with football events should be prosecuted in accordance with the appropriate legal provisions.

20. To ensure that the legal provisions are used appropriately and effectively, prosecuting agencies and the police need to work in partnership in developing a prosecution strategy designed to fully exploit the legal options at their disposal.

21. The independence of the judiciary remains a constant and important safeguard though strategies can and have been applied by the police and prosecuting agencies in some countries to enhance awareness among the judiciary of the problems associated with football related violence and disorder and the need for a proportionate but effective response.

22. However, a common characteristic of most (though not all) football related violence and disorder is that the impact will often exceed the severity of the actual offences committed. Most offences committed in connection with a football event are low level criminality (especially when considered in isolation), a consequence of which is that penalties imposed on conviction can often be perceived as ineffectual.

23. This phenomenon generates challenges for law makers as well as prosecuting agencies. It would not be appropriate for persons convicted of low-level criminality to receive disproportionately severe sentences simply because an offence was committed in connection with a football event. However, European experience evidences that supplementing a criminal conviction with the imposition of

exclusion measures, following a judicial or administrative process set out in the relevant legal provisions, can be very effective. The role of prosecuting agencies can be crucial in encouraging the court, or other designated authority, to impose such exclusion measures when adjudicating on football-related criminality.

24. It is worth stressing that whilst preventative detention or arrest without conviction can provide a short term measure to assist in the maintaining of public order, it cannot substitute for the prosecution of offenders if sufficient evidence is available to convince the designated judicial or administrative adjudicator that a conviction is likely and if a prosecution is considered to be in the public interest. Nor, in many countries, does such a detention or arrest provide evidence of guilt for exclusion purposes.

25. In respect of international police and judicial cooperation, it is important for the prosecuting agency and police to liaise with the relevant Government Departments regarding the potential for sharing information in accordance with national and international data protection obligations and police and judicial cooperation arrangements. This can be important in circumstances where there is evidence that an individual has caused or contributed to violence or disorder whilst attending a match in a State in which the individual is not resident.

26. The aim here should be to identify and exploit the available options for the police, prosecuting agency or other designated authority to share details of a conviction, or alternatively evidence (ideally CCTV coverage or other images) of violence or criminality, with the relevant agency/authority in the individual's country of residence.

G Role of Police in Local Coordination

27. In view of the crucial role played by local policing and partner agencies in delivery of an integrated approach in cities and towns hosting football matches, the police have a vested interest in actively participating in the local multi-agency coordination arrangements highlighted throughout this Recommendation.

28. This participation is crucial in terms of ensuring that local policing strategies are consistent with the national and local multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service and in developing with partner agencies a shared ethos in delivery of joint or overlapping functions.

29. It is also crucial in respect of ensuring that police information and risk assessments are taken fully into account in multi-agency preparations for international and domestic football matches hosted in the locality.

30. Effective local coordination should also ensure that:

- the roles and responsibilities of policing (and other) personnel in football related operations are clear, concise and widely understood and that this clarity of function extends to operations in both public and private spaces, including football stadia;
- the police are consulted at an appropriate level on all aspects of the wider integrated approach which may impact on delivery of the policing football strategy, including stadium licensing, ticketing, stewarding and other in-stadia operating arrangements, local hospitality and related

activities (including community and supporter liaison), transport and other logistical arrangements, and crisis planning for emergency scenarios (inside and outside of stadia);

- local policing arrangements (and those of partner agencies) are regularly reviewed and refined as appropriate in the light of any changes to the national strategy and national and local post-match analysis of events connected to previous matches; and
- key police messages are communicated to host and, in particular, visiting supporters about designated/recommended areas for pre and post-match recreation and policing tolerance levels (offering clear advice on what constitutes unacceptable behaviour) highlighting any additional or exceptional measures planned for high risk matches.

31. The constitutional relationship between the police and municipal authorities, including Mayors, varies across Europe. In some States, municipal authorities play an important role in determining the character and scope of policing operations in their locality whereas in others the police are wholly independent or accountable to a national policing structure or national government. Clearly, therefore, the character of the football-related partnership between the police and local government will need to reflect the constitutional position.

32. However, irrespective of designated remit, there is a clear need for the police to develop a close partnership with municipal authorities, not least because all football matches occur in a specific locality, impact on local residential and business communities, and are subject to a range of local dynamics and organisational arrangements.

33. The police and municipal authorities also have a mutual interest in assessing risk and preparing appropriate and proportionate preventative measures designed to minimise disruption to local communities and businesses whilst providing visiting and host fans with a welcoming environment;

34. A high-profile example evidencing the need for this partnership centres on public viewing events. This issue is covered in depth within Annex A (Safety: Recommended Good Practices) which incorporates guidance highlighting (inter alia) that:

- a police risk assessment should be a pre-requisite of hosting such an event;
- the police should determine the appropriate safety and security arrangements at the event, along routes to and from the venue, and in the surrounding area; and
- the police should monitor crowd behaviour on the basis of an ongoing dynamic risk assessment and respond to minor incidents with early intervention in a proportionate and targeted manner to prevent escalation.

35. A further area where an effective partnership between the police, municipal authorities and other agencies, notably football clubs, can be of special assistance centres on the planning and exercising of the multi-agency response to emergency scenarios inside and outside of stadia.

H Cooperation between the Police and the National Football Authorities

36. Effective cooperation between the police and football authorities is pivotal to the delivery of a successful integrated football safety, security and service strategy in terms of:

- assessing risk and identifying associated multi-agency preventative arrangements in respect of domestic and international matches (played at home or abroad); and
- evaluating post-match multi-agency operations and reviewing and refining, where necessary, the arrangements for future matches.

37. Moreover, effective cooperation is critical in terms of sharing with the football authorities, police views on a range of potentially key in-stadia safety and security national policy considerations including:

- stadium licensing/safety certification;
- ticketing arrangements;
- sale and consumption of alcohol;
- deterring, preventing and countering the use of pyrotechnics;
- potential segregation of rival supporters (inside and on the approaches to and from stadia);
- entry checks and controls;
- counter-terrorist threats and operations; and
- threats posed by organised criminality (linked, for example, to counterfeit tickets and the unauthorised sale of tickets through the black market).

38. Information sharing is a further area where effective cooperation can assist in determining the appropriate mechanism for exchanging information on convicted and/or excluded (banned) persons. If this is permitted by national data protection law, then the police should ensure that operating arrangements are in place to facilitate such information exchange.

I Cooperation between the Police and Football Clubs

39. Close cooperation between the police and stadium authorities/match organiser (and other involved parties, including any private security or stewarding companies operating in stadia) is crucial in respect of the delivery of effective in-stadia safety and security arrangements.

40. The key partnership at a local level is between police match commanders and the individual appointed by the match organiser as being responsible for safety and crowd management within the stadium (commonly referred to as the stadium safety officer - though other terminology such as stadium safety manager or stadium security officer may be used in some countries).

41. Without prejudice to their respective roles, remits and competencies, as set out in national legislation, the police commander and stadium safety officer should work closely together in order to specify the role of the police (if any) in a range of crowd management related scenarios, including:

- pre entry cordons and searching;
- monitoring and managing crowd movements;

- opening and closure of access and egress points; supporting safety personnel (stewards) in preventing and dealing with any public disorder or other criminality;
- delaying the start of a match;
- abandonment of a match and liaison with the referee;
- supervising evacuation of the stadium; and
- activation of the organiser's emergency procedures.

42. This liaison process should include determining the procedures to be applied in circumstances, such as an emergency or major incident, when it is appropriate for the police to take control of all or part of the stadium and for the eventual return of control to the organiser. Once agreed, the arrangements should be set out in a written agreement between the organiser and the police (often described as a statement of intent).

43. Close cooperation should also ensure that police views on a number of key in-stadia safety and security considerations are taken into account by the organiser. A range of important issues can be covered in this way, including:

- arrangements for ensuring effective and efficient separation of rival fans (where necessary);
- measures designed to deter and detect the possession and use of pyrotechnics in football stadia;
- in-stadia alcohol policy;
- use of CCTV for crowd management and evidence gathering purposes;
- shared or designated in-stadia communication arrangements;
- monitoring of crowd densities and behaviour by trained police or stadium personnel;
- stewarding arrangements;
- possible use of visiting stewards in a liaison capacity both in-stadia and *en route* to and from a stadium; and
- arrangements for a multi-agency control room, incorporating where appropriate a police command post.

44. The above issues are considered in more depth in Annex A (Safety - Recommended Good Practice).

J Policing Football Operations - Key Functions

45. European experience evidences the importance of police strategists and operational commanders taking full account of the following established European good practices in developing and refining national and local policing football strategies, notably in respect of:

- (i) integrating policing arrangements into a wider, multi-agency approach to safety, security and service in connection with football matches;
- (ii) developing effective policing partnerships with key stakeholders in order to make public spaces safe, secure and welcoming for supporters and local communities alike before, during and after football matches;

- (iii) supporting the event organiser in making football stadia safe and secure for participants and supporters in terms of minimising the risk of (and responding proportionately and appropriately to) any significant in-stadia public disorder or other forms of criminality;
- (iv) planning and delivering proportionate policing operations based on pre-match risk analysis, ongoing dynamic risk assessments, and key operational principles like dialogue, graded deployment, and early targeted intervention where necessary; and
- (v) ensuring that the police command structure incorporates personnel designated with (i) responsibility for overall (strategic) command, (ii) tactical response to existing or emerging scenarios, and (iii) operational command of resources in a functional or geographical area related to the tactical plan¹.

K Understanding Supporter Dynamics and Risks

46. The starting point for developing and refining any effective football policing strategy centres on obtaining a clear understanding of supporter behaviour, crowd dynamics and the character and threat posed by individuals or groups who have previously engaged in football-related criminality. This can be a complex issue though updated policing profiles on the behaviour of football club and national team supporters can be of assistance in terms of preparing initial risk assessments (see National Role of NFIPs below).

47. European experience evidences that the behaviour of supporters generally and risk groups in particular can be variable and influenced by a wide range of external factors, including policing tactics. It cannot be assumed that risk supporters are programmed to automatically act in a certain manner or are immune from policing measures designed to proactively and positively engage with supporters. Similarly, supporters not associated with known risk groups can and do sometimes act in a violent or other unacceptable manner.

48. Policing strategies, therefore, should not be unduly influenced by assumptions and expectations about the threats posed by supporters based on historical trends and preliminary risk assessments.

49. Moreover, experience demonstrates that stereotyping supporter behaviour and policing supporters (including known risk groups) in a disproportionate manner can sometimes be self-fulfilling in terms of generating potential conflict with the police, empowering any violent or confrontational supporters, and exacerbating the actual degree of risk through generating support and sympathy among other supporters.

50. European good practice demonstrates that treating supporters on their behaviour rather than reputation provides an effective basis for reducing risk while determining policing deployment and tactics on the basis of an ongoing process of dynamic risk assessment and early and targeted police intervention can prove to be highly effective in terms of marginalising the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation.

L Risk Categorisation of Supporters

¹ The terminology commonly adopted in the United Kingdom and in some other countries refers to Gold for strategic command, Silver for tactical command and Bronze for operational command.

51. In view of difficulties in predicting the behaviour of supporters, and following a detailed review of extensive European experience, the following supporter risk categorisations should be applied in respect of all football matches with an international dimension:

- **Risk Supporter:** "a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or anti-social behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event";
- **Non-Risk' Supporter:** "a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing little or no risk to public disorder and other criminality whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event".

52. The purpose of limiting the categorisation to risk and non-risk is to assist host policing operations by obliging visiting police delegations (either from abroad or another city) to identify the potential risk factors and circumstances which may impact on visiting supporter behaviour. It also reinforces the important need for the host police to adopt a process of ongoing dynamic risk assessment in order to monitor the actual degree of risk throughout the period of an operation.

53. Although this categorisation arrangement and process was designed for international matches, it can also be adopted for domestic matches.

M Risk Based Policing Operations

54. There are a number of references to "dynamic risk assessment" throughout the Recommendation. A summary of this important concept is provided at Appendix 1. It sets out a model of application covering dynamic risk and graded tactical police deployment throughout the period of a football event. It is based on European experience and extensive research into crowd dynamics in connection with football matches.

N Communication and Engagement with Supporters

55. European experience evidences the importance of communication between the police, professional football clubs (through designated Supporter Liaison Officers where appointed), partner agencies and supporter representatives as a means of providing a welcoming environment and minimising safety and security risks. This process is often labelled as "dialogue".

56. A police commitment to communicating with supporters as part of a wider policing football strategy is now established good practice. However, there are various interpretations of what dialogue means in practice and a number of different models have been adopted within various States. The exact character of the dialogue approach to be employed can be customised by the police to reflect a wide range of national and local circumstances, including the character of the football dynamic and associated risks. Similarly, a decision to embrace dialogue can be either a national or local police decision depending upon designated roles and responsibilities and policing structures.

57. One version featured in Annex C (Service - Recommended Good Practices) highlights a model of dialogue that centres on establishing permanent communication structures between the football club, supporter group representatives and the police. In this respect, specially trained "dialogue officers" can play a fruitful role.

58. The aim of this model is to provide an ongoing mechanism for an exchange of perspectives with supporters, in part to develop trust, and in part to help reduce the risk of conflict on match days. It also aims to create opportunities for supporter representatives to be advised, and, where appropriate, consulted about match day security and planning, post-match evaluation and legal measures.

59. In other States, the dialogue concept centres on training and obliging designated personnel or all frontline police officers to communicate with supporters during a policing football operation. This version reflects that enshrined in the dynamic risk approach set out in Appendix 1.

60. At an operational level, dialogue can be a core policing tactic, particularly at low risk matches or, more usually, it can be employed to complement other strategic and tactical aims. To that end, effective dialogue with supporters can assist:

- challenge supporter perceptions of policing operations;
- demonstrate that policing tactics are designed to provide a safe and secure environment for all supporters;
- encourage supporters to understand and comply with operational decisions;
- encouraging self-policing;
- isolate the influence of violent or confrontational supporters and reduce the level of associated threats (though risk groups not inherently immune from dialogue); and
- facilitate early targeted intervention without escalation of risk.

61. European experience demonstrates that whilst a customised model of dialogue can and should be incorporated into the ethos of any policing football operation, there may be a need to provide training in communication and conflict resolution skills either for dialogue policing specialists or all frontline policing football personnel, including crowd control units.

62. In recommending that all policing strategies embrace the concept of dialogue, it is recognised that some police officers may be apprehensive and reluctant to openly communicate with supporters (especially if they are more used to conflict scenarios). That is why the importance of personnel receiving specialist football policing training is stressed throughout this Recommendation.

63. In terms of dialogue techniques, training is especially important as uniformed police officers are highly visible and will often be approached by supporters seeking assistance and information. It is therefore desirable for all police officers to be aware of the importance of, and be comfortable with, presenting a friendly, calm and respectful demeanour when engaged by supporters.

64. To assist football policing policy makers, strategists and practitioners in this important area, Appendix 2 of this Annex provides key extracts from a European Handbook comprising models for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters.

O Exclusion Strategies

65. European experience demonstrates that whilst dynamic risk-based policing coupled with effective dialogue and hospitality measures can significantly help reduce the risk and scale of any violence or disorder. However, the reality is that some supporters may continue to act in an

unacceptable manner and, in so doing, pose risks to the safety of other football supporters and local communities alike.

66. European experience evidences that it is crucial to supplement the football policing strategy with effective means for undermining and isolating the influence of supporters seeking confrontation by excluding supporters who have caused or contributed to violence and disorder from football matches and, importantly, the wider football experience.

67. There are various exclusion options in place across Europe which provide a menu for States wishing to develop or refine their own exclusion strategy. In determining an appropriate exclusion strategy, a number of considerations need to be taken into account. These include the character and location of the violence and misbehaviour and the degree of threat posed.

68. In some States, football clubs and/or the National Football Association impose stadium bans designed to help reduce in-stadia risks.

69. However, in isolation, stadium bans will not deter or prevent violence and disorder outside of stadia, where many incidents actually occur. Moreover, the potential scope of such stadium bans is limited and not consistent with the need to attach wider preventative conditions to the exclusion process. Nor will stadium bans prevent the individuals from travelling to matches elsewhere (including abroad) and causing or contributing to violence.

70. In this regard, European experience and good practice demonstrates that each State should take all possible measures (including travel restrictions) to prevent its own citizens from participating in and/or organising public disturbances in another country.

71. If the character and degree of football related disorder extends beyond stadia (as it does in most States), a judicial or administrative exclusion process, set out in national law, will provide greater scope for attaching geographical constraints, time-limited restrictions on movement (known as travel bans) and other preventative measures.

72. In circumstances where there is strong evidence that the individual has acted in contravention of criminal or administrative law, it is also desirable for exclusion arrangements to make provision to fast track the process, to the extent of imposing temporary constraints pending the final outcome of a judicial or administrative decision. These interim arrangements should incorporate opportunity for the individual to appeal against the decision. This is usually possible and is already applied in some States.

73. A number of factors and objectives will need to be taken into account when expanding or refining existing exclusion measures, particularly if adopting a judicial process. These include ensuring that:

- prosecuting and judicial agencies are consulted and fully understand what is required and why it is necessary;
- enabling legislation includes various safeguards (such as an exemption options) and incorporates measures that will be widely perceived as reasonable, targeted and proportionate;
- enabling legislation provides a degree of clarity regarding the character of the evidence that will be necessary for a judicial (or administrative or policing) exclusion measure to be imposed;
- exclusion periods are time limited in order to be proportionate and provide the (banned) individual with opportunity to demonstrate that their behaviour has been transformed; and

- supporter concerns are answered, and the potential scope and impact of the exclusion process explained to provide reassurance that the measures are targeted, designed to maintain their safety, and likely to influence the way they are treated by the police and other agencies.

74. There is good European experience demonstrating that effective and comprehensive exclusion measures can be highly effective in:

- deterring misbehaviour;
- preventing repeat offending;
- undermining the influence and status of potential troublemakers;
- reducing the scale of any violence;
- transforming the post-exclusion behaviour of offenders;
- assisting the police in targeting those individuals who remain committed to behaving in an unacceptable manner; and
- reducing the scale of police deployment and associated football policing costs through reducing the potential for significant incidents of violence or disorder, including the risk posed by pyrotechnics (see Annex A).

75. These outcomes are more likely to be achieved if exclusion is pursued in tandem with more positive measures like dynamic risk-based police deployments amid an ethos of dialogue and hospitality.

P International Police Cooperation

76. Most European States have established a NFIP, which is mandatory for States that have ratified the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (CETS No. 218) and for Member States of the European Union, in order to maximise international police cooperation and comply (wherever possible) with the procedures and practices set out in the Handbook.

77. Article 11 of the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (CETS No 218) defines the tasks of a National Football Information Point (NFIP):

- act as the direct and single contact point for exchanging general (strategic, operational and tactical) information in connection with a football match with an international dimension;
- exchange personal data in accordance with the applicable domestic and international rules;
- facilitate, co-ordinate or organise the implementation of international police co-operation in connection with football matches with an international dimension;
- be capable of fulfilling efficiently and promptly the tasks assigned to it.

78. Detailed, established and highly effective good practices in respect of international police cooperation in connection with football matches with an international dimension is provided in Appendix 3. These good practices (otherwise and widely known as the Handbook on International Police cooperation) cover a range of crucial considerations and procedures on matters such as information exchange, deployment and functions of visiting police delegations and facilitating international police cooperation.

79. The Handbook also stresses that a National Football Information Point (NFIP) should be set up and equipped and resourced to undertake a range of key policing football functions associated with minimising risk.

80. In view of the millions of football supporters who annually traverse Europe to support their national or club teams in UEFA and FIFA competitions, a crucial component of effective international cooperation centres on the hosting and deployment of visiting police delegations in connection with football matches with an international dimension. This can and does generate major logistical challenges and a potential increase in risk levels. Visiting police delegations can play an important role in supporting the host police to manage such risks. Whilst the cost arising from the deployment of visiting police delegations can vary, a recent study confirmed that it was low in comparison with the benefits for host police commanders and partner agencies (See Appendix 4).

Q National Role of NFIPs

81. Whilst the primary role of the European network of NFIPs is to exchange information and facilitate international police cooperation, Article 11 of the Council of Europe Convention (CETS No. 218) and the good practice (Handbook) also recommend that each NFIP undertakes a range of duties that are national in character. These include recommending that NFIP personnel should:

- be trained and equipped to provide a national source of expertise regarding football policing and associated safety and security matters;
- coordinate information exchange in connection with football matches and where appropriate, coordinate and organise the training and work of intelligence officers and / or spotters.
- have access to relevant national police databases;
- develop a profile on national and club supporters, including risk-groups and how they relate to other supporters at home and abroad including local population groups and the circumstances which can increase potential risk (including interaction with police and stewards); and
- act as a source of knowledge and expertise on supporter dynamics and associated risks with the police, civil servants and academics contributing to this process.

82. European experience demonstrates that to deliver its national (and international) functions effectively, it is crucial for the NFIP to be adequately resourced and to be supported by national policing arrangements designed to provide the NFIP with timely and accurate information and intelligence.

R Communication and Media Strategy

83. European experience also demonstrates the importance of the police actively participating in the development of effective multi-agency communication and media handling structures as a means of explaining the importance and content of an integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service.

84. An effective communication strategy is crucial in terms of using the media to provide information and reassurance to local communities in cities and towns hosting football matches and in providing supporters with a wide range of information on policing football operations, including behavioural tolerance levels, and relevant legislative and regulatory provisions. It can also be important in terms of highlighting the priority accorded by the police (and partner agencies) to creating a safe and welcoming environment for all football supporters.

85. It is therefore recommended that national and local police spokespersons work closely with their counterparts in government, local authorities, football authorities, and other partner agencies in the preparation and delivery of a comprehensive communications strategy.

S Terrorism and Serious and Organised Criminality

86. The good practices recommended herein are focused on effective crowd management, reducing safety risks, and preventing and countering public disorder, low level criminality and anti-social behaviour. It takes no account of policing measures designed to deter and counter terrorist threats and serious and organised criminality.

87. These are specialist policing areas where advice must be sought from expert sources. The aim, thereafter, should be to accommodate the advice received within the wider policing football operation taking into account the possible impact of any counter-terrorist measures on the ethos and delivery of an integrated approach to safety, security and service. The same approach is recommended in respect of policing measures designed to deter and counter any other threats posed to spectators, stadium personnel, police, emergency services and others by serious and organised criminality.

88. Additional information on Counter Terrorism is provided in Annex A (Safety- Recommended Good Practice).

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1

Key Extracts from the European Union Council Resolution providing a Handbook on Police Liaison with Supporters

Document agreed at the 3490th meeting of the Council of the European Union (Justice and Home Affairs) held in Luxembourg on 13 October 2016

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to enhance safety and security at international football matches.

The document provides recommendations as regards good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters during international football events, notably in public places.

The content, where appropriate, can also be applied to other international sporting events and national football events.

The content is without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the competencies and responsibilities of the various agencies within each Member State.

The content is designed to ensure that police commanders and partner agencies can take full account of good practice in developing and refining national and local policing football strategies, notably in respect of:

- (i) integrating policing operations within a wider, multi-agency approach to safety, security and service in connection with football matches and tournaments;
- (ii) developing effective policing arrangements to reduce the risk of violence or disorder through consultation, communication and liaison with football supporters, and to make public spaces safe, secure and welcoming for supporters before, during and after football matches;
- (iii) planning and delivering proportionate policing operations based on pre-match risk analysis, ongoing dynamic risk assessments and key operational principles such as dialogue, graded deployment and early targeted intervention where appropriate.

This document should be widely disseminated, and its recommendations applied in each Member State as well as in other European countries and beyond in order to minimise risks to safety and security and ensure effective international police cooperation.

It should be stressed that effective liaison with supporters is but one, albeit important, element of a wider integrated approach to safety, security and service. This should not be considered in isolation from other measures designed to maintain public safety and security, notably effective but proportionate exclusion arrangements designed to prevent individuals who act in a criminal manner from participating in the football experience, inside and outside stadia.

2. Service Ethos: Evolution of Concept

Over the past decade, extensive European experience has demonstrated the positive impact that a service-based approach can have on football-related events, not least on reducing safety and security risks.

Since UEFA EURO 2004 in Portugal, the importance of services has played a major role in minimising the impact of safety and security incidents at a series of international tournaments and high-profile Champions League and Europa League Finals.

However, the extent to which the concept has been embraced for individual international and domestic football matches remains variable for a number of reasons, not least because of a lingering perception that the ethos of service is supplementary, rather than integral, to multi-agency planning and delivery of football safety and security operations.

3. Service and Security

Service is neither a soft option nor an alternative to tackling misbehaviour or excluding individuals who engage in football-related crime. It is complementary to effective crowd management arrangements (inside and outside stadia) and to the implementation of an effective exclusion strategy.

European experience and academic research show that individual supporters and groups of supporters react positively when treated in a welcoming, inclusive and respectful manner.

If supporters are made to feel appreciated and valued, they are far less likely to act in a violent or anti-social manner. This, in turn, can help prevent the escalation of minor incidents into significant public disorder and help to marginalise, identify and deal with any individuals or groups seeking to cause problems. There is also evidence that supporters categorised as risk fans are not immune to the impact of hospitality-focused strategies.

A service approach involving effective communication and liaison can assist in generating high levels of compliance and in encouraging self-regulation among supporters. Supporters who feel respected and appreciated will often be less tolerant of violent, discriminatory and other anti-social behaviour. This, in turn, can help to marginalise, identify and exclude individuals who act in a criminal manner in connection with the event.

On a daily basis, policing agencies deliver to their communities a wide range of service-focused functions, on a routine and emergency basis. However, the profile and activities of the police in connection with football is often perceived to be overtly focused on public order and on preventing and responding to crime. These are and will remain core police responsibilities, but the adoption and application of a service ethos to the policing of football events will not only be welcomed by supporters but can also significantly help reduce the need for major public order operations and help reduce levels of football-related criminality and disorder.

Adopting a service ethos can pose challenges for policing personnel and supporters alike. This is not surprising as decades of having to deal with relatively high levels of misbehaviour by a minority of supporters has distorted the perception of the policing role in connection with football matches, both among policing personnel and supporters.

As a consequence, the desirability of adopting intelligence-led, risk-based and service-focused crowd management operations, rather than more reactive and repressive public order operations, can present challenges.

The recommended good practice outlined in this handbook stresses the importance of overcoming such challenges, where they exist, and sets out a range of different options.

4. Cooperation with Supporters

It is crucial for the police to participate in stakeholder consultations and for that consultation to incorporate liaison with representatives of visiting police delegations, supporter groups, professional or voluntary bodies expert in supporter dynamics - in particular fan embassy or fan coaching personnel (see Annex C - Service) and the designated football club (or National Federation) Supporter Liaison Officer (SLO).

This consultation is important as it can help significantly in determining how best to meet the needs and, where possible or acceptable, the wishes of supporters in designing and implementing event preparations. Historical considerations and previous experience can be taken into account. However, supporter dynamics are continually evolving and the specific circumstances at each event will vary to some degree.

Host police commanders will have ready access to expert information and advice on the behaviour of, and any risks associated with, home supporters, provided by designated police football intelligence officers (or coordinators) and police spotters, local SLOs, local supporter groups, fan coaches (where applicable) and others.

However, comparable information and advice as regards visiting supporters should be obtained from the police in the country of the visiting team, via the European network of National Football Information Points (NFIPs). This will include anticipated numbers of visiting supporters, the type of transport used, itineraries, duration of stay, behavioural characteristics and any associated risks. Information obtained by football clubs and football supporter networks can add value to this information.

If the visiting police delegation undertakes a pre-visit, this will provide an opportunity to explore preparatory arrangements in more depth. Similarly, security meetings on the day before the match can be crucial in enabling all the parties involved to exchange last minute information and adapt their preparations and security concepts dynamically according to potentially changing risk assessments. The participation of fan embassy or SLOs representatives in pre-event visits and pre-match security meetings can also be useful for information gathering and event planning.

Access to up-to-date information and sources of expert advice are pre-requisites to developing customised preparations designed to minimise safety and security risks.

5. Cooperation with Event Organiser

In addition to the need to share match-specific information and risk assessments with stadium safety (or security) officers, it is important for the police to liaise closely with the organiser in developing joint approach designed to make all supporters (home and visiting alike) feel safe, secure and welcome throughout the event.

This is because European experience demonstrates that the way supporters (especially visiting supporters) are treated in public spaces can impact on behaviour inside and outside stadia and *vice versa*. It is desirable, therefore, for the police and stadium safety (or security) officer to develop and implement a harmonised hospitality approach inside and outside of stadia. This will significantly impact on supporter perceptions, enhance their enjoyment of the event, marginalise the influence of any individuals or groups seeking confrontation and encourage supporters to self-regulate their behaviour and act in compliance with safety and security instructions.

6. Operational Planning

Clearly the planning for policing operations in connection with football events embraces a range of important considerations, including traffic controls *en route* to and from city centres, community reassurance, emergency incidents and the arrangements for dealing with any public disorder or misbehaviour in a timely and proportionate manner.

However, European experience and academic research in the field of crowd dynamics demonstrates that embedding a series of inter-related core considerations in crowd management planning lies at the heart of reducing and managing supporter related risks. These considerations include pre-event information and intelligence gathering and analysis; ongoing dynamic risk assessment; risk-related graded deployment; early but targeted intervention; and, crucially, effective and ongoing communication with supporters. The effectiveness of this liaison can be especially vital in preventing minor tensions and incidents from escalating into significant public disorder.

7. Understanding Supporter Dynamics and Risks

The starting point for developing and refining any effective football policing strategy centres on obtaining a clear understanding of supporter behaviour, crowd dynamics and the character and threat posed by potential football-related offenders (otherwise known as "risk groups").

European experience shows that the behaviour of supporters generally, and risk groups in particular, can be variable and influenced by a wide range of external factors, including policing tactics. The definition of "risk supporters" (set out in the European handbook on international police cooperation) stresses the importance of clarifying the factors and circumstances which generate negative behaviour. It should not be assumed that all risk supporters automatically act in a certain manner or that they will not react positively to policing measures which proactively welcome supporters. Similarly, supporters not associated with known risk groups can and do sometimes act in a violent or other unacceptable manner if they feel they are being mistreated by the police.

It is important, therefore, to ensure that policing strategies are always flexible and not based on false assumptions and expectations about the risks posed by supporters based solely on historical trends or ill-informed preliminary risk assessments.

Moreover, experience demonstrates that stereotyping supporter behaviour and policing supporters (including known risk groups) in a disproportionate manner can sometimes generate conflict between supporters and the police, empowering any violent or confrontational supporters and exacerbating the actual degree of risk by provoking other supporters.

Experience shows that treating supporters on the basis of their actual behaviour rather than reputation reduces risk. It is better to determine policing deployment and tactics on the basis of ongoing dynamic risk assessment. Early and targeted police intervention can be highly effective in marginalising the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation.

8. Risk Based Policing Preparations

Transforming the principles and good practice, outlined within into event-specific preparations requires that police commanders identify a range of public safety and other possible risks. As already indicated, this process encompasses traffic and transport management, community considerations as

well as specific factors relating to supporter dynamics. This crucial to ensuring that an event is managed in a safe, secure and welcoming manner.

As regards supporter dynamics and risks, the starting point for operational planning should be an informed risk assessment prepared in consultation with the police in the country or city from which visiting supporters will be travelling. Football clubs, Supporter Liaison Officers (SLO's), supporter group representatives and other supporter focused experts can assist in this process.

The aim of this pre-event or preliminary risk assessment should be to identify factors and circumstances which could impact on supporter behaviour. These include:

- the anticipated reaction of home risk groups to their visiting counterparts and visiting supporters generally;
- the pre-event habits and preferences of visiting supporters (*e.g.* will they travel independently or in organised groups, will they go direct to the stadium or gather in the city/town centre before and/or after the match);
- patterns of alcohol consumption or drug use in connection with football events;
- use of pyrotechnics in public places (and stadia);
- reaction to various policing strategies and tactics (*e.g.* do supporters respond positively or negatively to high- or low-profile police deployment); and
- possible relations and interaction (negative or positive) and tensions between supporters and local community groups.

A home and visiting supporter perspective on these and other generic and event-specific considerations can be extremely useful. The self-evident willingness to consult and liaise with supporters at this early stage will also generate a positive reaction from influential supporter representatives.

Once the risks have been identified, the aim should be to incorporate risk mitigation and counter options. The aim should also be to ensure that the preliminary planning arrangements for the wider policing operation will enable a positive and safe supporter experience.

The key element in all planning considerations is recognition that preliminary risk analysis is just the starting point. Risk analysis will need to be reviewed as additional information emerges and once supporters (home and visiting alike) begin to arrive in the city or town (see Chapter 5).

Throughout this preparatory phase, full account should be taken of the need to cater for the needs of female supporters, children, other vulnerable supporters and those with disabilities. Appropriate facilities should be identified and set up before the event.

9. Pre-Event Communication and Media Strategy

Once the preliminary preparations are in place, it is important for the police to participate actively in the development and delivery of an effective multi-agency communication and media handling strategy. This strategy should explain the content of the preparations and the adoption of a positive and friendly service ethos within a wider multi-agency approach designed to reducing safety and security risks in connection with the event.

The strategy should aim to use media channels (including websites, etc.) to relay key messages to the maximum number of supporters (home and visiting alike) and to provide information and reassurance to local communities in cities and towns hosting football matches. Messages can incorporate a wide range of important information on policing football arrangements, behavioural tolerance levels and relevant legislative and regulatory provisions. They can and should also highlight the priority accorded by the police (and partner agencies) to creating a safe, secure and welcoming environment for all football supporters.

However, to be truly effective, key messages need to have credibility with football supporters, the primary target audience. The preparation of policing strategies should include proactive engagement with Supporter Liaison officers (SLOs), representatives of supporter groups and other specialists, such as fan embassy and fan coaching coordinators. Such persons can play an important role in communicating relevant information in a language that is tailored to their peers. These persons can help ensure that important information is relayed to all supporters (including any risk supporters). This can have a positive impact on behaviour, given that supporters may often be skeptical and mistrust official sources of information

10. Dialogue with Supporters: Models of Application

Effective liaison and communication ("dialogue") between the police and supporters lies at the heart of the planning and delivery of proportionate, intelligence-led and risk-based policing of football events.

There are various interpretations of what dialogue means in practice. A number of different models have been adopted by the police across Europe.

One version provides a dialogue model that focuses on establishing permanent communication structures between police and supporter group representatives. This is often achieved through designated SLOs. In this respect, specially trained "dialogue officers" can play a positive role, in particular if their role is fully incorporated within police operations as part of a wider service ethos.

The aim of this model is to facilitate the exchange of perspectives within a wider strategy that aims to promote mediation and negotiation with supporters. This can help develop mutually acceptable operational arrangements and reduce the risk of conflict on match days. This structured approach also provides an opportunity for supporter representatives to be consulted on a wide range of event-related safety and security considerations.

In other countries, the dialogue concept focuses on training designated personnel, or all frontline police officers, to communicate with supporters during a policing operation.

At an operational level, dialogue can be the core policing tactic, particularly at low risk matches. As a rule, it can be employed to complement other strategic and tactical aims. To that end, effective dialogue with supporters may help:

- promote a friendly and welcoming atmosphere at the sporting event;
- challenge supporter perceptions of policing operations;
- demonstrate that policing tactics are designed to provide a safe and secure environment for all supporters;

- encourage supporters to understand and comply with operational decisions;
- encourage supporters to regulate their own behaviour;
- isolate the influence of any violent or confrontational individuals or groups, not willing to engage in dialogue, and thus reduce the level of associated threats; and
- enable early, targeted interventions without escalating risk.

European experience shows that whilst customised dialogue can and should be incorporated into the ethos of any policing operation, there may be a need to provide training in communication and conflict resolution skills. This training should be given to all frontline police personnel, including crowd control units.

Although policing strategies should embrace the concepts of dialogue and hospitality, some police officers may be apprehensive and reluctant to communicate openly with supporters (especially if they are used to conflict scenarios). For this reason, this handbook stresses the importance of personnel receiving specialist training.

As regards the dialogue approach, training is especially important as uniformed police officers are highly visible and will often be approached by supporters seeking assistance and information. It is therefore desirable for all police officers to be aware of the importance of presenting a friendly, calm and respectful demeanour.

Police liaison with supporter groups at national and local level can have a significant impact in minimising safety and security risks relating to football matches. Nevertheless, cooperation can be undermined if supporter representatives are perceived to be working on behalf of the police or a football club.

That perception can impact on the potential role and influence of some SLOs (given that they are employees of a football club or National Association). This may be unfair, but effective communication can be compromised if the focus for supporter liaison is placed solely on one source. For that reason, dialogue should also embrace ongoing liaison with supporter-led/supporter-related initiatives such as Fan Embassies, Fan Projects and representatives of supporter groups.

Dialogue with visiting supporters during operational scenarios should also embrace the potential benefits to be derived from maximising the liaison opportunities presented by visiting police delegations and, where possible, visiting stewards, visiting SLOs and accompanying persons who will be aware of the character and culture of the visiting supporters.

11. Intermediaries

Police contact with supporters either in an ongoing structured manner or as part of specific policing operations, or both, is a primary imperative in terms of effective liaison with supporters and in minimising safety and security risks.

However, it is recognised that, it may sometimes be productive for the police and supporters alike if the liaison is undertaken with the assistance of an intermediary person or body. This is especially the case in circumstances where tensions are emerging and when the immediate need is to diffuse tension and/or resolve conflict.

The key requirements in such circumstances centre on the intermediary being: trained and tested in handling conflict scenarios; familiar with the behaviour, culture and perceptions of the supporters involved; and known and trusted, at least to some degree, by the police and the supporters concerned. A number of (visiting or specialist) policing or other designated personnel, such as SLOs or accompanying persons, can undertake this intermediary role depending on local circumstances.

As stressed throughout, intermediaries should only be deployed by the police on the basis of a risk assessment.

a) Designated Police Supporter Dialogue Personnel

In some countries, communication with supporter groups, including risk groups, is undertaken by specialist police dialogue officers who are experienced in interacting with supporter groups and are perceived by supporter groups as being distinct from operational personnel. The dialogue officers can often develop a high degree of trust among supporters and this reputation can be used to good effect in terms of defusing conflict situations before they escalate into significant public disorder. To provide added value to policing football operations, the primary function of dialogue personnel should be to develop effective channels of communication and a trusting relationship with supporters.

b) Visiting Police Delegations

In accordance with the European handbook on international police cooperation, some visiting police delegations include personnel designated to undertake supporter liaison duties. Their primary role is to liaise between host police agencies and visiting supporters in an ongoing capacity. This role enables the individual officers concerned to develop a good understanding of visiting supporter dynamics and associated risks and to be recognised and trusted, especially among supporters who travel to away fixtures on a regular basis. It must be recognised, however, that not all members of a visiting police delegation are trained, equipped or experienced in this role and the deployment of such liaison spotters should always be based on a risk assessment by the head of the visiting police delegation.

c) Visiting Stewards

In some countries, it is common practice for visiting clubs to deploy teams of stewards to support host club stewards in liaising with visiting supporters. They are familiar with and experienced in dealing with the behaviour and culture of their supporters. The stewards are also known to travelling supporters and, as such, are often treated with a higher degree of tolerance and respect than either host stewards and/or police personnel. However, the role of any visiting stewards must be agreed prior to the event and their use as intermediaries should only be considered if there is prior agreement that their role will extend beyond the stadium to include public spaces and conflict resolution scenarios. Again, deployment should be governed by a risk assessment undertaken by the head of the visiting steward delegation.

d) Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs)

A separate Chapter on Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs) is included within this handbook. This sets out guidance on the potential role of designated SLOs communicating with supporters in pubs and supporter meeting places and playing an intermediary role in tension and conflict resolution in public places. It is important to remember that SLOs are club/Federation employees and that their skills and

competencies will vary across Europe. SLOs should be an important and competent point of contact for all stakeholders (on match days and beyond) in various scenarios. However, they should not be deployed as intermediaries unless they are trained and willing to undertake the task. Deployment should always be subject to a police risk assessment.

e) Accompanying Persons

The practice in some European countries is for designated “accompanying persons” to travel with visiting supporters. These persons come from the supporters’ country or city/town of origin or residence and are familiar with the culture of the visiting supporters.

They travel with their club or national supporters wherever they go and are present in the host city on the day before, the day of and the day after the game. They also travel to other places if large numbers of supporters are present.

They may either be based in the fan embassy and provide a form of outreach to spectators or they may act as stewards, escorting organised groups from their home countries or cities/towns to the stadium and home again.

Such “accompanying persons” have no legal status outside their own country so their role must, by definition, be limited to liaison activities.

Their main duty is to look after the visiting supporters and provide appropriate services to improve the reception that they receive and to optimise the hospitality shown to them. They can provide the supporters with information and help them to solve problems, in close consultation with the fan embassy.

They play a roving fan ambassador role, helping to develop and strengthen a positive fan culture based on respect and tolerance. In some circumstances and in some countries, they may also be able to facilitate dialogue between police and supporters, so as to defuse tension and settle disputes without the need for police intervention.

The size of the team and the means of liaison with the organisers, police and municipal authorities will vary according to local needs and circumstances. It is important to ensure that clear lines of communication are established, and roles and responsibilities clearly understood.

The desired profile for an accompanying person does not necessarily have to be that of someone who does the work professionally, or of someone who works in the education sphere with risk supporters, as their tasks focus mainly on primary prevention aimed at all supporters, dialogue and conflict resolution skills and competencies.

12. Inclusiveness and Combating Discrimination

In accordance with Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union¹, and taking into account Article 11 of the same Charter, on the freedom of expression and information², football events should be wholly inclusive and attractive to all communities within society. This is a key component of an effective service-orientated approach. As such, there should be no tolerance of any form of discriminatory behaviour. The aim should be to ensure that the football experience (inside

¹ As well as Article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

² As well as Article 10 (Freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

and outside stadia) is welcoming and enjoyable for everyone irrespective of their colour, language, religion or belief, nationality, national, ethnic or social origin, disability, age, gender or sexual orientation.

It is important, therefore, for the police to participate in local multi-agency arrangements that set out comprehensive and sophisticated measures designed to prevent and counter racist and other forms of discriminatory behaviour in connection with football events. Football-related activity should form part of a broader and systematic programme of anti-discriminatory activity by the police

This coordinating body should ensure that the definition of what constitutes discriminatory and intolerant behaviour is clear, widely understood and applied. The definition should include:

- public incitement to violence, hatred or discrimination;
- public insults and defamation;
- threats against a person or a group of persons;
- public expression of an ideology which claims the superiority of, or which deprecates or denigrates, another group of persons on the basis of race, colour, language, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, disability, gender or sexual orientation;
- public denial, trivialisation, justification or condoning of discrimination or intolerance; and
- public dissemination or public distribution, or the production or storage with the intention of public dissemination or public distribution, of written, pictorial or other material containing manifestations of discrimination or intolerance covered under legislation.

Certain types of behaviour, including any behaviour that represents a criminal offence in the host country, should be prohibited, including racist insults and chanting, the flaunting of racist banners and symbols and the wearing, distribution and selling of racist and other discriminatory banners, symbols, flags, leaflets or images.

Local agencies should work together to develop a clear response strategy and use available legal provisions to penalise racist and other discriminatory behaviour. The measures imposed should be proportionate but sufficiently robust to prevent and deter potential offenders and, where appropriate, include an educational dimension.

In addition to ensuring enforcement of the relevant legal provisions, the coordinating body should ensure that specialist training is provided for the police and in-stadia personnel on implementation of the law, on offence identification and on combating more hidden forms of discrimination and intolerance. The police should liaise closely with all local agencies involved in the criminal justice system, including prosecutors and judges/adjudicators, in order to increase awareness of the need to penalise and impose appropriate sanctions on any supporter, or other participant, convicted of a racist or discriminatory offence.

It is also important for the police and other authorities to liaise with supporters in determining the football club's anti-discrimination and intolerance strategy and on how to encourage supporters to self-regulate and encourage victims to come forward with complaints. The designated SLO can play a pivotal role in such liaison. Support should be given to existing supporter initiatives actively focused on preventing and tackling racism or other forms of discrimination. The designated SLO can play a

pivotal role in such liaison and in the development of a sustainable multi-agency strategy against discrimination.

13. Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs)

Since the beginning of the 2012/13 season, clubs applying for a license to play in one of the European competitions (Champions League/Europa League) are required under Article 35 of UEFA's Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations to appoint a dedicated Supporter Liaison Officer (SLO) as a main contact point for fans.

With many national associations or leagues having adopted a similar clause in their own domestic licensing regulations, more than 1,000 clubs across Europe are required to have at least one SLO.

Role of the SLO

The primary role of an SLO is to act as a bridge between the supporters and the club/federation and to facilitate dialogue between the two sides. SLOs will normally also perform this intermediary role with external stakeholders, such as the police and stewarding services, communicating the needs and wants of each side and acting as a "translator" in the event of misunderstandings or erroneous interpretations of behaviour.

Supporters Direct Europe have been engaged in overseeing the roll-out of the SLO project and implementation of Article 35 at national association level. Together they have produced a detailed handbook on the SLO concept. This handbook, which is currently available in 18 languages, outlines a standard definition of the role, functions and anticipated benefits etc. of SLOs.

The overarching theme in the work performed by SLOs is dialogue and communication. It is at the heart of everything they do.

In the area of prevention, SLOs can perform the following tasks:

- acting as an interface and communicating between fans, security officers, stewards and the police, etc. before, during and after matches;
- providing detailed information for fans attending matches to facilitate match day travel and logistics and removing the potential for misunderstandings;
- providing input at security meetings before home games and high-risk away games;
- explaining the actions of fans to police and stewards and vice-versa to break down barriers and misconceptions;
- attending "concourse meetings" inside the stadium with club security officers, stewards and the police an hour or so before kick-off to evaluate the situation;
- working to prevent disorder by exerting a calming and de-escalating influence on fans and other stakeholders, mediating in conflict situations, and encouraging a positive supporter culture;
- attending debriefing meetings after matches;
- contributing to police training;
- participating in local sport and security committees, etc.; and
- building an effective communication structure with fans, clubs, security staff, police, local and national government, other SLOs, transport companies, etc.

Interaction with the police and security staff

SLOs should not be seen as the extended arm of the club security officer or the police. SLOs should not have a security role within a club, league or association, nor should they work for an organisation appointed by the club to carry out security tasks. Instead, with their insight into the prevailing mood within the fan base, SLOs can act as a kind of seismograph, identifying potential conflict situations at an early stage and working to prevent their escalation. SLOs can provide valuable feedback on developments among fans and the effects, positive and negative, of police tactics that can feed into risk assessments and dynamic match day policing strategies. They can also perform an intermediary role in conflict situations as part of a de-escalation strategy.

The implementation status of the SLO project varies greatly from country to country and, within countries, from club to club. In addition, SLOs do not have to be employed full-time and often work on a part-time or volunteer basis. These points should be borne in mind when assessing how to make best use of their services.

Trust and credibility

In view of the varied nature of the job, it is important that everyone has a good understanding of the work SLOs do. It should be clear that SLOs are not supporter representatives. They work for the club, preferably on the same hierarchical level as the security officer. Ideally, SLOs should come from the fan base and know its protagonists and groups very well. As credibility and trust are key factors in the work of SLOs, they should have the acceptance and respect of all stakeholders. In the interface between club board members, supporters, police and stewards, they act as "balanced players", acting as dialogue and communication partners to ensure a positive match day experience.

Perception

The perception of the SLO role varies from stakeholder to stakeholder. For the fans, they are points of contact, mediators and advocates of their interests. For the police and crowd control or stewarding organisations, SLOs act as cooperation partners who can help them to ensure that match days pass off smoothly and without incident. And for the clubs, SLOs or employees or appointees provide a direct communications link to the fan base. These differing perceptions make their role particularly valuable, but also especially challenging. It is therefore vital that SLOs are supported by all stakeholders and given the necessary scope and trust to carry out their work.

14. Communication and Media Handling Strategy

As stressed throughout this handbook, European experience demonstrates the importance of the police actively participating in the development of an effective multi-agency communication and media handling strategy designed to explain the importance and content of an integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service.

A multi-agency media strategy can be of particularly important in providing all parties, notably visiting supporters, with a range of important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels.

The central aim should be to promote a positive image of the event among home and visiting supporters, local communities, the general public and individuals participating in safety and security

operations. This can help generate a welcoming environment for all involved and make a significant contribution to minimising safety and security risks. The provision of information, advice and explanation can also be crucial in encouraging supporters to self-regulate.

The police, in particular, should use the multi-agency media strategy to:

- provide information in a proactive, open and transparent manner;
- provide information on safety and security preparations in a friendly, reassuring and positive manner;
- communicate the police intention to facilitate the legitimate activities of supporters; and
- identify what kinds of behaviour will not be tolerated by the police.

Police spokespersons should work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities /organisers and supporter groups in establishing and delivering a multi-agency media strategy based on shared and updated briefing material. Such material should be regularly refined to take account of recurring themes or questions and emerging risks or events.

Where possible, supporter representatives should be encouraged to participate in media briefings and to relay positive messages about the event.

However, to be effective the communication strategy should not be limited to the sharing of event-specific information. It should also encompass a commitment to engage with supporter groups in order to provide clear messages and glean a fans' perspective on a range of matters. As crucial stakeholders in the football experience, supporters share a vested interest in working with the police and other authorities in developing a meaningful dialogue with supporter groups and supporters generally.

Dialogue is a two-way process and there are a number of communication options available for the police to share information and perspectives, and otherwise engage with supporters.

These include:

- supporter meetings;
- supporter panels or consultation groups for gathering feedback from fans;
- supporter satisfaction surveys/fan feedback forms;
- supporter clinics or surgeries (informal meetings between club personnel, police and supporters);
- complaints procedures;
- interaction with supporters on websites;
- newsletters and similar publications;
- social media channels (Facebook, Twitter, etc.);
- match day volunteers to assist supporters with a wide range of issues;
- fan zones;
- fan embassies (e.g. at European matches);
- open player training days; and

- supporter events (e.g. at Christmas or pre-season) with autograph signing sessions.

Before matches, police commanders can convey pre-match information and a welcoming note directly to supporters through police and club websites. Experience demonstrates that such pre-match initiatives can be highly effective in outlining general behavioural limitations and in clarifying that the aim of policing operations is to facilitate a good and positive match experience for supporters. Such an approach can promote a feeling of safety among supporters and encourage the perception of transparent and positive interaction. This, in turn, helps to reduce tensions from the outset. It is important, however, that any commitments contained in such initiatives are delivered as an integral part of policing operations. This maintains credibility and reduces the risk that public statements are mistrusted.

After match days, experience demonstrates the value of the police proactively seeking independent feedback from match-going supporters and incorporating such feedback into the police debrief/match evaluation process. In cases where internal evaluation reveals obvious mistakes in police operations, public acknowledgement can help to reduce tensions and encourage the establishment of a respectful culture of constructive criticism both by the police and by supporters. Likewise, publicising positive behaviour by supporters through the media can significantly enhance mutual respect and cooperation and encourage increased levels of such positive behaviour.

In cases of incidents, police spokespersons should consult, where possible, with all relevant agencies, experts in supporter behaviour and other intermediaries before making any substantive statements to the media and the wider public. The publication of inaccurate information or superficial assessment of incidents can exacerbate tensions between supporters and the police, and unintentionally increase future risk levels.

APPENDIX 2

Key Extracts from the European Union Council Resolution providing a revised Handbook on International Police Cooperation

Document agreed at the 3490th meeting of the Council of the European Union (JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS - HOME AFFAIRS ISSUES) held in Luxembourg on 13 October 2016. A copy can be obtained from the Council Register of publicly available documents (available in all the official languages of the EU) on <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register/> by inserting the following document reference number OJ C 444, 29.11.2016.

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Purpose, scope and use of the handbook

The purpose of this document is to consolidate and enhance policing in connection with football matches with an international dimension, and in particular to maximise the effectiveness of international police cooperation.

The content, which is consistent with the established good practice of adopting an integrated multiagency approach to football safety, security and service, can, where appropriate, be applied to other sporting events with an international dimension if a Member State so decides.

The content is without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the competencies and responsibilities of the different agencies within each Member State.

Although this document is mainly focused on international police cooperation, the multi-agency character of managing football (and other sporting events) is reflected in references to police interaction with other key partners, such as the event organiser, and stakeholders, notably supporters.

International police cooperation and football policing operations must be guided by the principles of legality, proportionality and adequacy. Examples of good practice in relation to dynamic risk assessment and crowd management are detailed in Appendix 4.

Whilst the competent authority in the organising Member State is responsible for providing a safe and secure event, authorities in participating, neighbouring and transit states have a responsibility to assist where appropriate.

This document should be widely disseminated and applied in each Member State and other European countries and beyond in order to minimise safety and security risks and ensure effective international police cooperation.

PART I - INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

CHAPTER 1

Information Management and Exchange by the Police

1.1. Introduction

The timely exchange of accurate information is of the utmost importance in consolidating and enhancing policing in connection with football matches with an international dimension and reducing the likelihood and impact of football-related crime, most commonly violence and disorder.

In accordance with Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, as amended by Council Decision 2007/412/JHA of 12 June 2007, each Member State has to establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP) to act as the central national contact point for the exchange of relevant information for football matches with an international dimension, and for facilitating international police cooperation concerning football matches.

Where there is direct contact between organising and visiting police, any information exchanged should be shared simultaneously with the relevant NFIPs. Such contact should not jeopardise the key role of the NFIP in ensuring the quality of the information and wider dissemination to other relevant partners and authorities.

The relationship between the NFIP and the competent national authorities should be subject to the applicable national laws.

In accordance with Article 1(4) of Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, each Member State has to ensure that its NFIP is capable of fulfilling efficiently and promptly the tasks assigned it.

In order to be effective, NFIP personnel should be trained and equipped to provide a national source of expertise regarding football policing and associated security matters.

1.2. Tasks with an International Dimension

The NFIP supports the competent national authorities. On the basis of information that has been analysed and assessed, the necessary proposals or recommendations are sent to the competent national authorities to assist in developing a multi-agency approach in delivering safe, secure and welcoming football events.

The NFIP works closely with local police with regard to national or international football matches. To be fully effective in the provision of this support, information on the important role of the NFIP should be widely disseminated and understood by all policing agencies in each Member State.

Each Member State should also make arrangements to establish a national network of designated local police personnel tasked to gather and supply the NFIP with all information and intelligence regarding football events in their locality.

For the benefit of other countries' NFIPs, each NFIP is required to maintain an updated risk analysis¹ in relation to its clubs and its national teams. The risk analysis is generally shared with other NFIPs on the EPE-NFIP². It is stressed, however, that risk is variable and dependent upon a range of factors. Accordingly, a dynamic risk assessment needs to be undertaken throughout an event.

Each NFIP should have access to the relevant national police databases. The exchange of personal data is subject to the applicable national and international law, especially the Prüm Decision³ or bi-national or multilateral agreements.

The NFIPs should be able to exchange personal data related to football security matters in terms of prevention and investigation of football related incidents.

The NFIP is required to ensure that all information is subject to quality control in respect of content.

Information (except personal data) should be exchanged using the EPE-NFIP.

1.3. Exchange of Police Information

1.3.a. General considerations

The transmission of information, including the exchange of personal data, is to take place in accordance with the national, European and international law and data protection provisions applicable to the countries participating in the exchange of such information.

¹ Risk analysis means developing a profile on national and club supporters, including risk groups and how they relate to other supporters at home and abroad including local population groups and the circumstances which can increase potential risk (including interaction with police and stewards).

² The EPE-platform (EUROPOL PLATFORM for EXPERTS) contains a section available for the exclusive use of NFIPs with information relating to football matches with an international dimension (e.g. club overview, pre-match assessments and post-match reports), see definition on EUROPOL-website.

³ Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

Personal information will solely be used for the purpose of ensuring the security at the event for which this information is shared and remains the ownership of the entity that provided this information **1.3.b**

1.3.b. Definitions

The term ‘event’ in this handbook is used to mean a specific football match or tournament in all its aspects. The term ‘host police’ is used to mean the police in the country in which the match or tournament is being held. The term ‘visiting police’ is used to describe the police in, or from, a country in which the participating team or teams is located.

1.3.c. Types of Information

A distinction can be made between general information and personal information.

(a) General information

General information includes strategic and tactical information designed to inform event preparations and operations in respect of identifying and preventing or reducing security risks, undertaking pre-event and ongoing dynamic risk assessments, and responding appropriately and proportionately to security risks as they emerge during the event.

(b) Personal information

In this context, personal information refers to information on individuals who are assessed by the police as posing a potential risk to public safety in connection with the event. This may include details of individuals who have evidently caused or contributed to violence or disorder in connection with previous football matches.

1.3.d. Chronological Sequence of Information Exchange

Three phases may be distinguished: before, during and after the event. These three phases need not always be strictly separated.

Before the event

Information requirements (including a pre-match assessment - PMA) are supplied by the NFIP of the visiting country/countries to the NFIP of the hosting country no later than five working days prior to the event. These requirements include:

- a risk analysis of supporters of the visiting team;
- other relevant information regarding the security of the event, e.g. supporter travel details and other public order threats.

The NFIP of the host country provides information on the applicable legislation and policy of the authorities (e.g. alcohol policy), the organisation of the event and on other key security arrangements.

All relevant information is put at the disposal of the other NFIPs concerned and entered on the EPENFIP via the appropriate forms.

The NFIP of the visiting country/countries is requested to provide timely and accurate information regarding the movements of risk and non-risk supporters, the participating team (where there is a threat) and ticket sales, together with any other relevant information.

The NFIP of the host country provides information to the NFIP of the visiting country/countries, particularly on the integration of the visiting police delegation into the host policing operation, as well as information for visiting supporters, etc.

The NFIP of the visiting country/countries should provide updates to the host NFIP up until the event. The host NFIP may also request further information following receiving the pre-match assessment.

During the event

The host country NFIP should keep the visiting country NFIP informed when relevant incidents occur during the event.

The visiting police delegation (see below), if present, monitors and, where appropriate, provides the designated police contact in the host country with updated information and intelligence regarding the visiting supporters. Useful information concerning event-related incidents in their home country during the matches or tournaments is also provided to the host country and any other relevant NFIP.

During the operational phase the visiting police delegation should be informed by the host authority about all relevant information regarding visiting supporters. This should include refusals of entry, expulsions, arrests and fines or penalties, preventative detentions or other relevant details. The NFIP country/countries should also be informed by their own delegation accordingly.

After the event

Within five working days of the event, the NFIP of the host country provides the NFIP of the visiting country (via the appropriate forms on the EPE NFIP or bilaterally) with information:

- regarding the behaviour of supporters so that the risk analysis can be updated by the NFIPs of the country/club they support and/or their place of residence;
- on the operational usefulness of the information they have provided and of the support provided by the visiting police delegation(s);
- the description of any incident: information regarding arrests or sanctions is exchanged in accordance with national and international law. Where possible this information should include:
 - personal details of the arrested/convicted offenders;
 - the name of the responsible law enforcement authority;
 - a record of events (if available);
 - the court decision (if available);

- the available evidence (in particular photo/video material of visiting offenders who have not yet been identified).

Based on the information provided by the host country NFIP and the visiting police delegation, the visiting NFIP then updates its generic risk analysis.

The host and visiting NFIPs will cooperate to assess the effectiveness of the information exchange arrangements and the work of the visiting police delegation.

1.3.e. Information Exchange with Non-EU Countries

NFIPs are the proper channel for the exchange of information with NFIPs in non-EU countries. If a country does not have an NFIP, the governmental departmental responsible for policing matters should be asked to designate a central police contact point. Contact details should be forwarded to other NFIPs and entered on the EPE NFIP.

1.4. Counter-Terrorism and Serious and Organised Criminality

For the exchange of information on matters such as counterterrorism and serious and organised crime, the competent police agency in the host country may communicate through any existing network or specialist liaison officers appointed for that purpose.

1.5. EPE NFIP

The EPE NFIP is hosted by Europol Platform for Experts (EPE) and it is only used for sharing information related to football events with an international dimension.

Personal data or classified information cannot be exchanged between the concerned NFIP's via the EPE NFIP website, but only using other secured channels of communication.

1.5.a. Access to the EPE NFIP website

Only the NFIP's members of the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts have access to the EPE NFIP website.

Other interested third parties can have access to the EPE NFIP website, but only following a formal agreement from the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts.

The European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts will designate a EPE NFIP platform manager who, in conjunction with the Europol platform manager, will be responsible for overseeing management and use of the platform.

In the case of creating new accounts, the head of the concerned NFIP will submit a request to the EPE NFIP platform manager consisting of name and surname of the NFIP member and its business e-mail address.

The process of deleting EPE NFIP accounts is similar to the one referring to the creation and it implies a formal request from the concerned NFIP head.

1.5.b. Pre-match assessments (PMA)

In the PMA section, the visiting team/teams NFIP are responsible for providing the PMA for the matches with an international dimension.

The visiting team/teams NFIP should upload the PMA with at least 5 working days before the date of the match.

In the case of knock out stages of the European competitions the aforementioned deadline is reduced to 3 working days.

The PMA is locked for editing only by the NFIP that created it.

The PMA should be regularly refined by the issuing NFIP in case of new information available.

1.5.c. Post-match reports (PMR)

In the PMR section, the host NFIP is responsible for providing the PMR for the matches with an international dimension.

The host team NFIP should upload the PMR no later than 5 working days after the date of the match.

After the upload of the PMR, notifications should be sent to all NFIP's concerned (for example future opponents in the same group).

1.5.d. Team overview

Each NFIP is responsible for uploading the overview for their national football teams and clubs.

The information should regularly (at least at the beginning of each season) be reviewed and updated as necessary by the respective NFIPs.

1.5.e. Stadiums

Each NFIP is responsible for uploading stadium information.

The information should regularly be updated by the respective NFIPs.

1.5.f. Matches

The host NFIP should register each match on the EPE NFIP as early as possible, preferably as soon as the match is scheduled, to enable the sharing of information in advance of the matches.

After the match is registered, the PMA and PMR can be uploaded.

1.5.g. Data analysis

Data uploaded in the EPE NFIP should be used as basis for the annual threat assessment to be issued by the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts in cooperation with Europol.

CHAPTER 2

General Guidance on the National Role and Tasks of NFIPs

At a national level, the NFIP should act as a national source of expertise on football policing matters. In fulfilling this role, the NFIP should undertake a range of key football-related tasks, including:

- coordinating the exchange of information regarding football matches played in domestic competitions;
- gathering and analysing data on football-related incidents (inside and outside stadia) along with associated arrests and detentions and the outcome of any judicial or administrative proceedings that ensue;
- gathering and analysing information on the imposition of exclusion measures and, where appropriate, manage compliance with such exclusion measures;
- where appropriate, should be responsible for delivering, or at least overseeing, the training and work of intelligence officers and/or spotters.

An NFIP can enter into a formal bilateral agreement with a third party regarding the exchange of certain information in accordance with their own national legislation. This information cannot be further shared without the agreement of the originator.

NFIPs can have a key role to play in assisting police match commanders in the delivery of their strategic and operational priorities at all matches with an international dimension. The key priorities for host policing operations should include:

- providing a safe, secure and welcoming environment for supporters and local communities;
- managing all policing-related aspects of the event;
- determining policing preparations and operational strategies informed by police risk assessments;
- monitoring emerging risk scenarios and responding proportionately, through early targeted intervention, to prevent or reduce escalation of the risk;
- maximising the use of information and advice on visiting supporter dynamics provided by visiting police delegations; and
- facilitating an understanding of how best to accommodate potentially different visiting policing cultures, styles and tactics in the host policing operation.

CHAPTER 3

Cooperation between Host Police and Visiting Police Delegations

3.1. Key Principles

The vital role played by visiting police delegations in supporting the policing operations of host countries is shown by widespread European experience over the past decades.

It is essential, therefore, for the NFIP responsible for the visiting team to provide assistance to the host NFIP via the deployment of a visiting police delegation composed of specialized officers that can support effectively the host policing operation. The deployment should always be based on a risk assessment and be agreed via the existing protocols.

Countries which have the legal possibility to prevent risk supporters from travelling abroad should take all the necessary measures to achieve this objective effectively and should inform the organising country accordingly. Each country should take all possible measures to prevent its own citizens from participating in and/or organising public order disturbances in another country.

3.2. Supporting Host Policing Operations

In addition to the comprehensive exchange of information, and in accordance with the principles in chapter 1 of this handbook, the organising NFIP, following close consultation with the competent operational policing agency, should invite a visiting police delegation from the visiting country or countries whenever there is a requirement in respect of a football match with an international dimension. This can also be the case for national matches in which risk supporters from other countries may have interest and attend the match.

To provide added value to the policing operations of the organising country, it is crucial that visiting police delegations comprise personnel with knowledge and experience of the dynamics and behaviour of the visiting supporters.

Before the event, the visiting police delegation should:

- be briefed by their NFIP as regards their tasks and responsibilities during the deployment;
- be in possession of the relevant information (number of fans travelling, associated risks, fan marches, meeting/ticket exchange points, host country national legal framework, travel means and accommodation details – if available);
- be provided by their NFIP with the contact details of their counterparts;
- be able to contact the security officer of the club/national association, SLO, supporters' federation/groups etc.

Furthermore, where spotters are to be deployed to fixtures with an international dimension, consideration should be given to them being trained and briefed prior to deployment (or hosting) where appropriate in:

- the role and functions of the NFIP;
- the functions of the Europol Platform Experts (EPE);
- the role of UEFA and UEFA competitions format;
- the EU Handbook provisions and responsibilities in sending and hosting delegations;
- requirement to have knowledge of the laws and cultures of countries to be visited;
- police powers and personal safety;
 - crowd safety considerations - Appendix 4 of the EU Handbook - Dynamic Risk Assessment and Crowd Management;
 - overseas delegation roles;
- the role of the cicerone.

During the deployment, the visiting police delegation should be viewed as a primary source of information about visiting supporters, their behaviour and any potential risks. This will provide added value for the host police commander in respect of:

- appropriate crowd management of regular fans;
- obtaining and sharing pre-match and match-day intelligence;
- close monitoring of events in order to provide the organising police with timely and accurate information;
- monitoring and interpreting visiting supporter behaviour and identifying and monitoring risk fans and potential risk scenarios to inform an ongoing dynamic risk assessment (see Attachment 4);
- where agreed with the head of the visiting delegation, and following a police risk assessment, proactively intervening to prevent escalation of any misbehaviour by visiting supporters;
- communicating with visiting supporters and acting as a bridge between the supporters and the host police to help address any potential or emerging concerns;
- gathering evidence of any criminality and misbehaviour and criminal offences and identifying visiting offenders.

After the event, the visiting police delegation should provide a feedback report to their NFIP. If some elements can be of interest, this will be referred back to the host NFIP.

3.3. Cooperation Arrangements

In accordance with Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, for football matches with an international dimension, the formal invitation for a visiting police delegation should be transmitted via the NFIP in the host country. This should take account of the specific aims of cooperation. The invitation should also indicate the composition of the delegation and clarify their roles and responsibilities. It should also specify the intended duration of the visiting police delegation's stay in the host country.

For international tournaments and one-off matches (if requested by either NFIP) the formal invitation for a visiting police delegation should be sent by the competent authority in the host country, on the advice of the host country NFIP, and can be subject to an inter-governmental agreement.

If a visiting police delegation is not invited by the host NFIP, the NFIP of the visiting country can, if deemed appropriate, submit a proactive proposal to the host NFIP to send a delegation. If the host NFIP does not accept the proposal, any police delegation that travels will be acting in an unofficial capacity outside the scope of this handbook.

The detailed invitation to provide support should be agreed between the NFIPs concerned well in advance of a tournament and/or one-off match to allow the visiting police delegation sufficient preparation time.

For one-off matches with an international dimension the visiting police delegation will require at least three weeks' preparation time. If there is less than three weeks' prior notice of a match (for example in the later stages of a European club competition or due to an increased level of risk) the invitation should be sent immediately. For international tournaments, the visiting police delegation will require at least 16 weeks' preparation time.

The detail of the arrangements (e.g. police powers, equipment, uniforms etc.) for the visiting police delegation are negotiated between the NFIPs, following consultation with the local police for the one-off match.

3.4. Model Protocols for One-Off Matches

Section 3.14 provides a model for negotiating bilateral agreements on the international police cooperation arrangements that will apply in respect of major football tournaments.

However, it is strongly recommended that the arrangements for deploying a visiting police delegation for one-off football matches with an international dimension should be agreed in advance by the host and visiting countries and set out in a protocol. Model protocols are provided in Appendix 1, for use when both countries are party to the Prüm Treaty, and Appendix 2, for use in circumstances when one or both countries are not subject to the Prüm Treaty.

If a bi-national governmental agreement is not in place, these arrangements should comply with Article 17 of Council Decision 2008/616/JHA¹ and the applicable national laws.

¹ Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12).

The visiting delegation should not exceed the number agreed by the host NFIP and should respect the host police command and control arrangements. If they act in a manner that is not within the terms of the agreement then they are acting outside of the scope of this handbook and the applicable EU Council Decisions and Treaties.

3.5. Costs and Financial Arrangements

The costs involved in hosting and deploying a visiting police delegation are modest and represent a sound investment in reducing security risks.

It is strongly recommended that each Member State makes budgetary provision to host and send visiting police delegations for all matches with an international dimension. On each occasion:

- **the host country** should pay for accommodation, meals (or subsistence) and domestic travel required in the host country (airport transfers and operational travel),
- **the visiting country** should pay for international travel, salaries and insurance (medical, travel and life) of the delegation members involved.

The respective NFIPs can exceptionally agree alternative arrangements, following bilateral negotiations, well in advance of the deployment and based on a rationale of why the recommended cost arrangements are not to be met.

These arrangements need to be clarified in the aforementioned visiting police delegation protocol for deployment of visiting police delegations.

3.6. Pre-Visits

It is recommended that in order to facilitate and adopt an effective working relationship with the local police, the visiting police force (along with the NFIP if needed) should undertake pre-visits prior to the respective match. Specific budgetary allocations in this regard should be provided for the NFIPs for this purpose.

Where possible, the pre-visits should be undertaken jointly with the club/National Association representatives to foster an integrated approach to safety, security and service. Consideration should be given to there being representation at meeting from the operational match commanders, supporter's representatives, embassy staff of the visiting country, host NFIP, stadium security staff etc.

The police in the host country should give key members of the visiting police delegation an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the organisation of local police operations and with the stadium location and operating arrangements:

- for international tournaments, this should take place no later than six weeks before the tournament (e.g. by hosting workshops or seminars for key members of visiting police delegations).
- for one-off matches with an international dimension this should be on one of the days prior to the match.

Such pre-visits provide an ideal opportunity for host and visiting police representatives to maximise international cooperation by:

- sharing logistical information on supporter arrangements in the host city/town;
- visiting locations where visiting supporters are expected to gather before and after the match;
- discussing and agreeing on the role of the visiting delegation;
- increasing awareness about host policing preparations and operations;
- planning for the integration of the visiting delegation into the operation;
- identifying relevant legislative provisions and police tolerance levels;
- building trust and effective liaison channels between the two policing agencies and
- where appropriate, identifying measures to separate supporter groups in the host city/town.

3.7. Accompanying Visiting Police Delegations

Ensuring the safety of all members of a visiting police delegation is paramount and must be reflected in all host and visiting police risk assessments concerning police deployment.

Visiting members of a police delegation, in particular the intelligence officer (if needed), operations coordinator and operational police officers (see below) should work alongside local police officers (commonly known as cicerones) who themselves should be serving police officers with experience of policing football in their own city or country, including familiarity with the venue area and potential risk areas.

Cicerones:

- should be integrated into the national/local policing operation and be able to relay information enabling operational police commanders to make key decisions;
- should have knowledge of their police organisation, processes and command structure;
- should not be tasked with monitoring their own risk supporters whilst they are deployed accompanying members of a visiting police delegation;
- should be thoroughly briefed on the host policing operation, their responsibilities, and on the tasks expected to be performed by the members of the visiting police delegation;
- should be responsible for the safety of visiting police delegation and provide a channel of communication with the host police;

- should be deployed with the visiting police delegation for the duration of the operation; this will assist in developing an effective working relationship;
- should work with the visiting police delegation in a common language agreed beforehand.

3.8. Composition of Visiting Police Delegations

The visiting police delegation should be composed in such a way that it is able to support the host country policing operation.

Depending on the exact nature of the support to be provided, the composition of the delegation could be as follows:

1. **a head of delegation** who is functionally and hierarchically in charge of the visiting police delegation;
2. **an intelligence officer** (or more if agreed by the respective NFIPs) who is responsible in particular for the exchange of information between his/her home country and the organising country;
3. **an operations coordinator** who is responsible for coordinating the work of the visiting operational police officers;
4. **police spotters**¹ with spotting, supporter liaison, accompanying and other duties;
5. **a spokesperson/press officer** for media liaison.

During international tournaments the intelligence officer is likely to be based in a single or binational International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC), whilst the operations coordinator may be based in a local information centre in the locality of the venue city. For one-off matches they may be based in the organising country NFIP or another appropriate environment.

For a one-off match the intelligence officer/operations coordinator should work closely with the host police in the venue city.

The host police should provide the intelligence officers/operations coordinators with access to the relevant technical equipment so that they can perform their functions effectively.

The visiting police delegation can be deployed in plain clothes or in uniform.

Specific training programmes should be developed by Member States for these positions.

3.9. Deployment considerations

The recommended deployment duration is arrival on MD-1 and departure in MD+1. If there is requirement to work during the day before the match, arrival on MD-2 has to be considered. This

¹ Also known in other countries as Operational Football Police officer.

may vary depending on the host police operation's needs. The visiting police delegation members should be available throughout the entire operation, as agreed with the host police.

The host police should plan to deploy the visiting police delegation members in accordance with their existing national working time legal provisions, unless unforeseen operational circumstances dictate otherwise.

The accommodation for the visiting police delegations should be suitable for the operational needs of local policing operation and if possible in close proximity to the deployment area.

3.10. Key Tasks of the Visiting Police Delegation

To provide added value to the policing operations of the organising country, it is crucial that visiting police delegations comprise personnel with knowledge and experience of the dynamics and behaviour of the visiting supporters.

The visiting police delegation should have the following competencies:

- a good working knowledge of this handbook;
- an understanding of the processes required to facilitate the international exchange of information;
- the ability to represent their country and their role effectively when liaising with the organising police services (i.e. be diplomatic, self-confident, independent and able to communicate in a common language agreed beforehand);
- a background knowledge of the situation concerning football-related violence/disorder in their country.

The main tasks of the delegation can be summarised as:

- gathering and transferring information/intelligence within their delegation and to the host police;
- ensuring effective deployment of their operational police officers (in uniform and/or plain clothes) in order to play an integral role in the host police operation for the event;
- providing timely and accurate advice to the host police commander.

The primary role of the head of delegation is to act as a strategic and tactical advisor to the host authorities.

The primary role of an intelligence officer and/or an operations coordinator (which may or may not be the same person depending upon the bilateral police deployment agreement) is to facilitate effective exchange of information between the visiting and host country authorities in connection with a one-off football match or a tournament. If neither an intelligence officer nor an operations coordinator is appointed, their functions should be undertaken by the head of delegation.

Operational police officers deployed within a delegation are known as police spotters.

Police spotters, whether in uniform or plain clothes, can:

- be used by the host police as a means of interacting with visiting supporters in order to assist crowd management;
- assist in reducing the anonymity of risk supporters in a crowd, and their ability to instigate and/or participate in acts of violence or disorder without further consequences.

The spotters should have experience in the policing of football matches in their own country.

They should:

- have the skills and experience to communicate effectively (where appropriate) in order to influence the behaviour of supporters; and/or
- be specialists in the behaviour of, and the potential risks posed by their supporters; and
- be able to communicate effectively during the event with host police regarding the type of risk that visiting supporters may or may not pose at any given time and place.

If the visiting police delegation is not able to perform any/some of these tasks, this should be explicitly communicated to the host NFIP.

Spotters should be able to communicate positive, as well as negative, information concerning their visiting supporters. This will allow the host country police commanders to make balanced decisions around the need to intervene or facilitate legitimate supporter behaviour.

Subject to the agreement of the host country, visiting spotters can also be deployed to gather intelligence/evidence, using agreed equipment, for use by the organising police or for prosecution purposes in their own country.

3.11. Language

Language arrangements should be made in advance by the countries concerned.

Where possible, visiting police delegations should include personnel skilled in the language of the host country to facilitate communication between the host and visiting police personnel.

3.12. Cooperation between Host and Visiting Police during the Event

The visiting police delegation should be kept informed about the host police operational plan (including their crowd management philosophy and behavioural tolerance levels). They should be fully integrated into the host police operation (and given the possibility to attend and participate in pre-match briefing and post-match debriefing meetings).

The host police and the visiting police delegation should keep their respective NFIPs informed of developments throughout the operation and submit a post-match report to their NFIP within five working days.

The visiting police delegation should always ensure that their actions do not unnecessarily jeopardise the safety of other persons¹.

3.13. Use of Identification Vests

When it is jointly agreed for tactical reasons, visiting police officer(s) who are not deployed in uniform can use the standard luminous and distinctive visiting police identification vests described in Appendix 3. Each visiting police officer should bring this vest when he/she travels abroad.

3.14. Accreditation

The police force of the organising country, in consultation with the football organisers, should ensure that the visiting police delegation has, when appropriate, stadium access and accreditation (seating is not required) to enable the delegation to carry out their tasks effectively. Stewards and other safety and security personnel should be made aware of this at their briefing(s) prior to the game.

3.15. Football Events in Countries without an NFIP

As stressed throughout this handbook and particularly in Chapter 1 above, where a football match or a tournament is played in a State with no NFIP, all information should be exchanged between the designated police contact point in the host country and the NFIP of the visiting country.

During the event, the designated police contact point of the host country should communicate with the NFIP of the visiting country/countries via the designated visiting police delegation intelligence officer, if one has been appointed.

3.15.a. Bilateral Agreements

It is strongly recommended that, at an early stage of the preparations, countries participating in the event should adopt a bilateral agreement with the host authorities setting out the arrangements for information exchange, deployment of visiting police delegations and other police cooperation matters in connection with the event. Such bilateral agreements can also include areas of governmental and judicial cooperation. A template for a bilateral agreement is set out in 12261/16. It includes the list of issues which should be considered and agreed between the two parties. The template is not a model agreement but rather an aid to bilateral negotiations.

3.15.b. NFIP Cooperation

When preparing to assist with major tournaments, it is recommended that NFIPs should:

- share information about bilateral discussions/negotiations with the host authorities;
- commence at an early stage and maintain dialogue with the host authorities, using international agencies, notably Interpol, to stress the key role of the European NFIP network; and
- undertake coordinated visits to the relevant venue cities and stadia in the host country in order to clarify local arrangements and foster effective dialogue at national and local level.

¹ See Articles 21 and 22 of the Prüm Decision on civil and criminal liability.

3.16. Role of Interpol and Europol

The NFIP network provides an appropriate and timely channel for the exchange of information regarding crowd management, public safety and public order, and associated risks. It is mandatory under European law for such information to be exchanged between host and visiting policing agencies through the respective NFIPs or the designated host police contact point and the visiting police intelligence officers deployed in the host country during an event.

The EPE NFIP is key factor in the successful exchange of information and resulting operational police deployment. Constant update of the system should be implemented based on the user's feedback and taken into account the best practices identified.

However, NFIPs can liaise with Europol or Interpol regarding any links between the activities of any supporter risk groups and links with serious and organised criminality or other non-football related criminality

Moreover, Europol, Interpol and/or other agencies in the Justice and Home Affairs area, such as Frontex may, in accordance with their legal mandates, play an important role in supporting the competent authorities of countries hosting major international football tournaments. This may include providing various support services, relevant information and analysis, and threat assessments in respect of serious and organised crime and/or terrorism.

For example, during major tournaments:

- an Interpol major events support team may be deployed to support host law enforcement activity during a major tournament;
- Europol may deploy its staff at the host police coordination centre to facilitate information exchange, to provide intelligence and analytical support in respect of serious organised crime and terrorism;
- host and Frontex personnel may have bilateral arrangements in place for cross-border operations.

In such circumstances, the NFIPs of visiting countries, or heads of the visiting police delegations, should seek to ascertain at an early stage the exact functions of these agencies and liaise as appropriate on matters of mutual interest.

PART II – INTERACTION WITH OTHER KEY PARTNERS AND STAKEHOLDERS

The general principles in the next chapters reflect the multi-agency character of managing football (and other sporting events).¹

CHAPTER 4

Cooperation between the Police and the Organiser

Close cooperation between the police and stadium authorities/the match organiser (and other parties involved, including any private security companies and stewards operating in stadia) is crucial for the delivery of effective in-stadia safety and security arrangements.

The key partnership at a local level is between the police match commander and the individual appointed by the match organiser as being responsible for safety and crowd management within the stadium (commonly referred to as the stadium safety officer, though the term security officer is used in some countries).

The police commander and stadium safety officer should work together on a complementary basis, without prejudice to their respective responsibilities, competencies, and tasks. These may be set out in national legislation or stadium regulations or specified in a written agreement between the organiser and the police (often described as a statement of intent) specifying the role of the police (if any) in crucial crowd management functions. Such functions include: supporting safety personnel (stewards) in preventing and dealing with any public disorder or other criminality; activating the organiser's emergency procedures; and determining the circumstances in which the police should take control of all or part of the stadium in emergency and major incident scenarios, along with the procedure for doing so and for the eventual return of control to the organiser.

Close cooperation should also ensure that police views on a number of key in-stadia safety considerations are taken into account by the organiser. A number of important issues can be covered in this way, including: the use of CCTV for crowd management and evidence gathering purposes; shared or designated in-stadia communication arrangements; possible use of visiting stewards in a liaison capacity both in stadia and *en route* to and from a stadium; arrangements for a multi-agency control room, incorporating a police command post where appropriate.

Detailed guidance on this matter is set out in Council of Europe Safety and Security Committee Consolidated Recommendation (2021) 1.

¹ These principles retain all their importance at football matches with an international dimension

CHAPTER 5

Cooperation between Police and Justice and Prosecuting Agencies

The contents of this chapter should be seen in the context of wide variations in the structure and competencies of justice and prosecuting agencies in Member States.

There can be significant benefits from close cooperation between police and justice and prosecuting agencies in respect of both one-off matches and tournaments.

Whilst the host country has sovereignty and jurisdiction to deal with all alleged event-related offences committed in that country, the police and other authorities in Member States and EU competent bodies (e.g. Eurojust) should support the judicial and law enforcement authorities of the host country where possible and permissible.

All Member States should ensure that it is possible to deal quickly and appropriately with event-related offences.

The host police and other authorities should inform visiting police and supporters of relevant domestic legislation and/ or criminal, civil or administrative procedures together with the maximum penalties for the most common football- related offences.

Existing multi-lateral agreements on mutual legal assistance (MLA) should be fully utilised, where appropriate, for all football matches with an international dimension. Additionally, a host country may agree bilateral arrangements with any other country for enhanced MLA before, during and after the event.

The NFIP of the supporting country/countries should inform the organising NFIP:

- of any legal possibilities (e.g. football banning orders/exit bans) they have to prevent risk supporters attending the event;
- what measures can be taken by the visiting police delegation and/or any other competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) to gather evidence of any football-related offences committed by visiting supporters;
- what offences committed in the host country could be prosecuted in the supporting country (upon the return of the offender).

The host country may invite any other countries to send a liaison prosecutor/judge to be present during the event.

It is recommended that the host authority, in accordance with the national legislation on data protection, provides the visiting police delegation and/or competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) with information from judicial or court records and police or investigative reports, including arrest records, of their nationals.

Alternatively, a supporting country may agree to have a liaison prosecutor/judge available on call to travel to the host country at its request, or appoint a designated liaison prosecutor/judge for liaison with the designated host authority.

Within the scope of national legislation, the supporting NFIP(s) will attempt to answer promptly any requests for further information on arrested individuals, such as details of previous convictions, including football-related offences.

All costs related to liaison prosecutors/judges being sent to the host country should be subject to bilateral agreement.

The organising country should provide the necessary means of communication and other facilities for the visiting liaison prosecutors/judges.

CHAPTER 6

Cooperation between Police and Supporters

Police liaison with supporter groups at national and local level can have a major impact in minimising safety and security risks at football matches with an international dimension. This cooperation can however be undermined if there is any perception that supporter representatives are working on behalf of the police and, for example, sharing personal data.

Visiting police delegations and supporter representatives can help ensure that host police are aware of the character and culture of the visiting supporters. The host police should take this into account in their dynamic risk assessment.

Home supporters, local communities and visiting supporters should be provided with potentially important information and reassurance in respect of an event. Some of the main means of achieving this are: an effective media handling strategy; use of social media/internet sites; leaflets; and working closely with designated Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs), supporter representatives and supporter focused initiatives (such as fan embassies).

Ongoing cooperation and communication between police and supporter groups can help provide a basis for a safe, secure and welcoming atmosphere for all supporters, and can provide a channel for relaying important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels.

The host and visiting police should, therefore, have a strategy in place for communicating with supporters (termed ‘dialogue’). Dialogue can either be a task for specialist (and trained) communication officers and/or front line (crowd control/public order) operational units trained in communication and conflict resolution techniques.

This approach has been shown to help promote self-policing amongst supporters and facilitate early and appropriate intervention when security problems or risks emerge.

Detailed guidance on this matter is contained in Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters¹ and the Council Resolution concerning good practice guidance in respect of police liaison with Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs) appointed by football clubs and national federations to help prevent and reduce the scale of violence, disturbances and other prohibited behaviour in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved.²

CHAPTER 7

Communication and Media Strategy

7.1. Communication Strategy

An effective and transparent communication strategy is integral to a successful safety and security concept for football matches, tournaments and other sporting events with an international dimension.

Host country policing agencies should, therefore, work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities/organisers, the media and supporter groups in the preparation and delivery of a comprehensive multi-agency communication strategy.

An effective multi-agency media strategy is a crucial aspect of any communication strategy in terms of providing all parties, notably visiting supporters, with important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels.

The central aim should be to project a positive image of the event among home and visiting supporters, local communities, the general public and individuals participating in the safety and security operations. This can help generate a welcoming environment for all involved and make a major contribution towards minimising safety and security risks.

7.2. Media Strategy

The police (and wider multi-agency) media strategy should at least aim to:

- provide information in a proactive, open and transparent manner;
- provide information on safety and security preparations in a reassuring and positive manner;
- communicate the police's intention to facilitate the legitimate activities of supporters;

¹ 11907/16

² 13371/22

- make clear what kinds of behaviour will not be tolerated by the police;
- provide authoritative information on any incidents as quickly as possible.

The police should work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities/organisers and, where appropriate, supporter groups in establishing and delivering a multi-agency media strategy which:

- proactively promotes a positive image of the event;
- ensures responsibilities are clearly assigned among police and partner agencies in terms of who has the lead in communicating with the media on the various aspects of safety and security (and beyond);
- provides common background and briefing information for all police and partner agency spokespersons (briefing material should be regularly updated to take account of recurring themes or questions and emerging risks or events);
- ensures that factual information is released to the media and/or on the internet on a regular basis in the build up, during and after the event;
- provides regular opportunities for press/media briefings;
- takes account of the needs/interests of different categories of journalists/media.

PART III – MEETINGS AND DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER 8

Meetings of the EU Football Safety and Security Experts

It is highly recommended that during each EU Council Presidency, the Presidency holds a meeting of the experts group for major sports events (MSE) and that the Presidency reports to the Law Enforcement Working Party on the result of that meeting and the ongoing work by the expert group.

It is further recommended that each Presidency hosts a meeting of the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP Experts (Think Tank) to:

- prepare relevant documentation for consideration by the experts group for major sports events;
- prepare, and monitor the implementation of, the work programmes of the experts group for major sports;
- monitor new trends/developments in supporter behaviour and associated risks;

- monitor and facilitate the work of the European network of NFIPs;
- share good practice in respect of international police cooperation and policing strategies and tactics for football events;
- work in partnership with partner institutions in promoting the development of an integrated, multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service; and
- any other issues of interest and relevance.

CHAPTER 9

List of Relevant Documents on Safety and Security at Football Events

9.1. Documents previously adopted by the Council of the European Union

1. Council Recommendation of 30 November 1993 concerning the responsibility of organisers of sporting events (10550/93).
2. Council Recommendation of 22 April 1996 on guidelines for preventing and restraining disorder connected with football matches, with an annexed standard format for the exchange of police intelligence on football hooligans (OJ C 131, 3.5.1996, p. 1).
3. Joint action of 26 May 1997 with regard to cooperation on law and order and security (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1).
4. Council Resolution of 9 June 1997 on preventing and restraining football hooliganism through the exchange of experience, exclusion from stadiums and media policy (OJ C 193, 24.6.1997, p. 1).
5. Council Resolution of 21 June 1999 concerning a handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches (OJ C 196, 13.7.1999, p. 1).
6. Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 22, 24.1.2002, p. 1).
7. Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 121, 8.5.2002, p. 1).
8. Council Resolution of 17 November 2003 on the use by Member States of bans on access to venues of football matches with an international dimension (OJ C 281, 22.11.2003, p. 1).

9. Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 322, 29.12.2006, p. 1).
10. Council Decision 2007/412/JHA of 12 June 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 155, 15.6.2007, p. 76).
11. Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 amending a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 165, 24.6.2010, p. 1).
12. Council Resolution of 29 November 2016 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook'), 444/2016
13. Council Resolution concerning the costs of hosting and deploying visiting police delegations in connection with football matches (and other sports events) with an international dimension 12791/16
14. Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters 12792/16
15. Council Conclusions on sports-related violence approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 3799th meeting held on 7 June 2021
16. Council Conclusions concerning the need to prevent and counter the use of pyrotechnics in spectator areas of football stadia and other sports venues approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 3899th meeting held on 13 October 2022 – 13370/22
17. Council Resolution concerning good practice guidance in respect of police liaison with Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs), approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 3899th meeting held on 19 October 2022 – 13371/22

9.2. Documents adopted by the Council of Europe

1. Council of Europe Convention on an integrated approach to safety, security and service at football matches and other sports events 2016
2. Recommendation (2021) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events (Consolidated Recommendation).

ATTACHMENT 1

PROTOCOL FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF VISITING POLICE DELEGATIONS FOR FOOTBALL MATCHES WITH AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

(FOR USE WHEN BOTH THE HOST AND VISITING STATES ARE PARTY TO THE PRÜM TREATY)

In compliance with the Prüm Decisions, in particular Article 17 of Council Decision

2008/615/JHA, this protocol sets out the practical detailed arrangements to be agreed between NFIPs for the deployment of visiting police delegations for football matches with an international dimension.

1. Requesting Member State/Country:

2. Requesting Organisation/Contact Person:

Name of the organisation:
Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP) Role:
Address:
Phone:
Mobile Phone:
Email:

3. Event (match or tournament)

3a: Place where the operation is to take place

Region, town, area or locality:
Other information:

3b: Period covered by the operation

Requested start date	Proposed end date

The end date may be deferred by mutual consent.

Name	Rank	Function	Service to which officer belongs	Telephone / email

3c: Officer(s) responsible¹

From the host Member State/Country

3d: Purpose

Joint operation at a football match/tournament with an international dimension		
Specific assistance requested from the seconding Member State(s)/Countries (if YES please indicate the number of officers requested) ²		
Head of Delegation:	YES	NO
Intelligence Officer:	YES	NO
Operational Coordinator:	YES	NO
Operational Police Officers in Uniform:	YES	NO
Operational Police Officers in Plain Clothes:	YES	NO
Press Officer:	YES	NO

3e: Place of deployment of the visiting police delegation (to include details of likely locations of deployment, i.e. airports, railway stations, city centre, stadium, etc.)

¹ This is normally the person responsible for the locality/venue where the event will take place.

² All members of the visiting police delegation, with the exception of officers who are deployed in uniform, should bring with them the EU standard Police Identification Vest.

Advising and supporting the host policing operation:	YES	NO
Liaison and dialogue with visiting supporters:	YES	NO
Other (please specify):	YES	NO

3f: Requested tasks for the visiting police delegation:

3g: Is it planned that any members of the visiting police delegation will have official (executive) powers in the host country? YES NO

If YES please provide details:

Executive powers of officers seconded to joint cooperation teams

(Article 17(2) of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA)

Executive power shall be exercised only under the guidance of and, as a rule, in the presence of officers from the host Member State. The seconding Member State`s officers shall be subject to the host Member State`s national law. The host Member State shall assume responsibility for their actions.

If applicable: executive powers of the seconded officers

1. Executive powers conferred by the host Member State, in accordance with its national law, on officers seconded by other Member States
2. Executive powers which the host Member State allows the seconding Member State(s) officers to exercise in accordance with the seconding Member State(s) national law

3h: Are the visiting police delegation allowed to use technical intelligence/evidence gathering equipment in the host country? YES NO

If YES please define the purpose:

to support the local police

for evidential purposes in the police delegation`s own country

And the equipment authorised to be used:

hand-held video camera

hand-held stills camera

Other (please detail)

3i: Does this request include authority for the visiting police delegation to bring them police protective weapons¹

Firearms	YES	NO
CS Gas	YES	NO
Batons	YES	NO
Tasers	YES	NO
Other (please specify)	YES	NO

If the answer to any of the above is YES please give details of any special conditions which apply:

3j: Can the visiting police delegation deploy confidential human sources? (commonly known as Informants or Covert Human Intelligence Sources)

YES NO

If YES please specify what conditions apply:

¹ Item 3i is based on Article 19 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA

3k: Details of accommodation proposed for the visiting police delegation

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3l: Details of transportation that will be provided for the visiting police delegation during the visit

--

3m: Information about the arrival and departure of the visiting police delegation

4. Costs (who will pay for what?)

In accordance with Chapter 3 of the EU Football Handbook

or

Exceptional alternative proposals apply

If exceptional alternative proposals apply please provide details:
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--

5. Any additional requirements/arrangements (please provide details):

CIVIL LIABILITY (ARTICLE 21 OF COUNCIL DECISION 2008/615/JHA)

1. Where official of a Member State are operating in another Member State pursuant to Article 17 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, their Member State shall be liable for any damage caused by them during their operations, in accordance with the law of the Member State in whose territory they are operating.
2. The Member State in whose territory the damage referred to in paragraph 1 was caused shall make good such damage under the conditions applicable to damage caused by its own officials.
3. In the case provided for paragraph 1, the Member State whose officials have caused damage to any person in the territory of another Member State shall reimburse the latter in full any sums it has paid to the victims or persons entitled on their behalf.

4. Where officials of a Member State are operating in another Member State pursuant to Article 18 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, the latter Member State shall be liable in accordance with its national law for any damage caused by them during their operations.
5. Where the damage referred to in paragraph 4 results from gross negligence or willful misconduct, the host Member State may approach the seconding Member State in order to have any sums it has paid to the victims or persons entitled on their behalf reimbursed by the latter.
6. Without prejudice to the exercise of its rights vis-à-vis third parties and with the exception of paragraph 3, each Member State shall refrain, in the case provided for paragraph 1, from requesting reimbursement of damages it has sustained from another Member State.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY (ARTICLES 22 OF COUNCIL DECISION 2008/615/JHA)

Officers operating within another Member State`s territory under Council Decision 2008/615/JHA shall be treated in the same way as officers of the host Member State with regard any criminal offences that might be committed by, or against them, save as otherwise provided in another agreement witch is binding on the Member State concerned.

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (ARTICLES 23 OF COUNCIL DECISION 2008/615/JHA)

Officers operating within another Member State`s territory under this Council Decision 2008/615/JHA shall remain subject to the employment law provisions applicable in their own Member State, particularly as regards disciplinary rules.

Done at (place and date)

Signature of the competent authority/person (as Paragraph 2)

RESPONSE REGARDING VISITING POLICE DELEGATION

1. Responding Country:
2. Responding Organisation & Contact Person:

Name of the organisation:

Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP):

Role:

Address:

Phone:

Mobile Phone:

Email:

3. Police Service(s) or other agency (i.e. Government Ministry) that has responsibility for the visiting police delegation:

Surname	First Name	Rank	Function	Service to which officer belongs
			Head of Delegation	
			Intelligence Officer	
			Operational Coordinator	
			Operational Police Officer - Uniform	
			Operational Police Officer – Plain Clothes	
			Press Officer	

3a. Details of members of the visiting police delegation (surname/first name of all members to facilitate booking accommodation + mobile telephone & email of one main contact person)

Contact Person:

Name of contact person (police commander or other):

Role:

Address:

Phone:

Mobile phone:

Email:

4a: Agreement to the request

YES

NO

--

4b: Please give details of any additional requirements/arrangements:

--

4c: Information about the arrival and departure of the delegation:

--

Done at (place and date)

Signature of the competent authority/person (as in Paragraph 3)

ATTACHMENT 2

PROTOCOL FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF VISITING POLICE DELEGATIONS FOR FOOTBALL MATCHES WITH AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

(VERSION TO BE USED WHEN EITHER THE ORGANISING OR VISITING STATE IS NOT PARTY TO THE PRÜM TREATY)

This protocol sets out the practical detailed arrangements to be agreed between NFIPs, or the designated police contact in States which do not have an NFIP, for the deployment of visiting police delegations for football matches with an international dimension.

1. Requesting Member State/Country:
2. Requesting Organisation/Contact Person:

Name of the organisation:
Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP) Role:
Address:
Phone:
Mobile Phone:
Email:

3. Event (match or tournament)

3a: Place where the operation is to take place

Region, town, area or locality:
Other information:

3b: Period covered by the operation

Requested start date	Proposed end date
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The end date may be deferred by mutual consent.

3c: Officer(s) responsible¹

From the host Member State/Country

Name	Rank	Function	Service to which officer belongs	Telephone / email

3d: Purpose

Joint operation at a football match/tournament with an international dimension		
Specific assistance requested from the seconding Member State(s)/Countries (if YES please indicate the number of officers requested) ²		
Head of Delegation:	YES	NO
Intelligence Officer:	YES	NO
Operational Coordinator:	YES	NO
Operational Police Officers in Uniform:	YES	NO
Operational Police Officers in Plain Clothes:	YES	NO
Press Officer:	YES	NO

3e: Place of deployment of the visiting police delegation (to include details of likely locations of deployment, i.e. airports, railway stations, city centre, stadium, etc.)

--

¹ This is normally the person responsible for the locality/venue where the event will take place.

² All members of the visiting police delegation, with the exception of officers who are deployed in uniform, should bring with them the EU standard Police Identification Vest.

3f: Requested tasks for the visiting police delegation:

Advising and supporting the host policing operation:	YES	NO
Liaison and dialogue with visiting supporters:	YES	NO
Other (please specify):		

3g: Is it planned that any members of the visiting police delegation will have official (executive) powers in the host country?

If YES please provide details:

3h: Are the visiting police delegation allowed to use technical intelligence/evidence gathering equipment in the host country? YES NO

If YES please define the purpose:

- to support the local police
- for evidential purposes in the police delegation`s own country

And the equipment authorised to be used:

- hand-held video camera
- hand-held stills camera
- Other (please detail)

3i: Does this request include authority for the visiting police delegation to bring them police protective weapons?

Firearms	YES	NO
CS Gas	YES	NO
Batons	YES	NO
Tasers	YES	NO

--

Other (please specify)	YES	NO
If the answer to any of the above is YES please give details of any special conditions which apply:		

3j: Can the visiting police delegation deploy confidential human sources? (commonly known as Informants or Covert Human Intelligence Sources)

3k: Details of accommodation proposed for the visiting police delegation

3l: Details of transportation that will be provided for the visiting police delegation during the visit

--

3m: Information about the arrival and departure of the visiting police delegation

--

4. Costs (who will pay for what?)

In accordance with Chapter 3 of the EU Football Handbook

or

Exceptional alternative proposals apply

If exceptional alternative proposals apply please provide details:
--

5. Any additional requirements/arrangements (please provide details):

--

CIVIL LIABILITY

Statement of policy

Done at (place and date)

Signature of the competent host authority

RESPONSE REGARDING VISITING POLICE DELEGATION

1. Responding Country:
2. Responding Organisation & Contact Person:

Name of the organisation:
Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP):
Role:

Surname	First Name	Rank	Function	Service to Which officer belongs
			Head of Delegation	
			Intelligence Officer	
			Operational Coordinator	
			Operational Police Officer - Uniform	

			Operational Police Officer – Plain Clothes	
			Press Officer	

Address:

Phone:

Mobile Phone:

Email:

Police Service(s) or other agency (i.e. Government Ministry) that has responsibility for the visiting police delegation:

3a. Details of members of the visiting police delegation (surname/first name of all members to facilitate booking accommodation + mobile telephone & email of one main contact person)

Contact Person:

Name of contact person (police commander or other):

Role:

Address:

Phone:

Mobile phone:

Email:

4a: Agreement to the request YES NO

4b: Please give details of any additional requirements/arrangements:

4c: Information about the arrival and departure of the delegation:

Done at (place and date)

Signature of the competent authority/person (as in Paragraph 3)

ATTACHMENT 3

SPECIFICATIONS FOR AND SAMPLE OF POLICE IDENTIFICATION VESTS

This is a slip-on (over the head) sleeveless vest.

Colour: NATO BLUE.

Colour code: Pantone 279C.

Identification Markers:

Single word: POLICE (in English only) with a box border — to be positioned in the centre of the vest both front & back.

POLICE letters and border: Nato Blue background.

Both letters and the surrounding box to be luminous silver.

Box measurements = 25 cm × 9 cm.

POLICE letters: Width = 1,3 cm per letter.

Height = 7,5 cm.

Vest Front:

Left Breast (above POLICE box): National Flag 10 cm × 7 cm — embroidered/sewn on or in a plastic sleeve.

Right Breast (above POLICE box): EU Symbol 8 cm × 8 cm.

Below the POLICE box should be a luminous silver band across the front of the vest × 5 cm wide.

Vest Rear:

National Flag above POLICE box: 10 cm × 7 cm.

Vests should be able to be secured by means of either Velcro or popper type fasteners on both sides.

Note: where possible, the specification should describe the material used for the vest, including whether or not it is water resistant, fire resistant, protective capability and other features.



Boxes measure 25 cm x 9 cm
Individual letters measure
7.5 cm vertically

Velcro or stud
fastening each side

Colour: NATO BLUE.

Colour code: Pantone 279C.

ATTACHMENT 4

DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND CROWD MANAGEMENT

Key principles (in accordance with national law)

Current understanding of effective crowd management highlights the importance of:


- Maintaining perceptions of appropriate policing among crowd participants.
- Avoiding the use of force against crowds as a whole when only a minority are posing a risk to public order.
- Adoption of a ‘high visibility but low friction’ or a ‘graded’ tactical approach to policing that enhances police capability for communication, dialogue and dynamic risk assessment.

A number of factors can influence police crowd management operations and make predicting supporter behaviour and planning a proportionate policing response a difficult task. These might include the diverse nature/size of a crowd, the importance of the fixture, incidents on the field of play the history and culture of fan groups or rapidly evolving crowd dynamics.

Police crowd management operations have an important role to play in reducing football-related disorder by:

- Excluding (where possible) individuals who are evidenced as previously causing or contributing to football-related violence or disorder.
- Engaging with and communicating with non-risk supporters.
- Influencing the actions of those supporters who are not currently understood to pose a risk but who may, under specific circumstances, become involved in behaviour that presents risk(s) to public safety, public order or potential criminal activity.

The following diagram seeks to illustrate this strategy in visual format:



In summary, the vast majority of supporters that attend events are there to enjoy the football experience.

A focus on an integrated approach to event safety and security, as opposed to a purely risk-based approach to those engaging in violence or disorder at football, can encourage non-risk supporters to contribute to public order through self-regulation and increase public trust/confidence in football policing.

To support this objective, police are encouraged to proactively invite supporter organisations to pre match planning meetings ahead of matches and facilitate post-match meetings where required. Acquiring the support of recognised fan organisations and use of fan-based social media, may assist in encouraging supporters to recognise the legitimacy of the policing crowd management operations.


On occasions some people attend with the intent of engaging in disorder and criminality. Whether this is expected or unexpected, police have a responsibility to deal with these people effectively.

In order to make effective and proportionate tactical decisions, it is important for police interventions to be based on a valid understanding of the risks that supporters present to the situation.

To assess these risks, officers in key football policing roles should engage with supporters on an ongoing basis by:

- Attending supporter group meetings and/or fans forums
- Use of social media (undertaken in strict accordance with policing policies and procedures)
- Where relevant, adopting or participating in youth intervention and diversion initiatives.

This process of engagement is ongoing across fixtures home and away and football seasons and takes place both on match days and non-match days. Therefore supporter engagement can be viewed as a continual cycle rather than linear.



Facilitation

- The strategic approach should be preventative rather than repressive.
- It is important that at every stage of an operation police strategy and tactics should take account of the legitimate intentions of supporters, as far as these are peaceful (e.g. to celebrate their identity and culture, travel to and from the fixture in safety).
- Any police interventions should be targeted, proportionate, and based upon information and intelligence derived from an ongoing process of dynamic risk assessment which should be appropriately and adequately resourced and, where appropriate, underpinned by effective international police cooperation.
- If it is necessary to impose limits on supporter behaviour, it is important to communicate with those supporters why police action has been taken and what alternative means the police are putting in place through which legitimate aims can still be achieved.

Balance

- During any crowd event the levels of risk to public order can change rapidly.

- It is important that there is a proportionate balance between the style of police deployment and the level, sources and nature of risk at the point of police crowd interaction;
- It is important, therefore, for police deployment and tactics to be capable of changing directly in response to the nature and levels of emerging and decreasing risk.
- Where balance or proportionality is achieved and is underpinned by good communication, the majority of the crowd are more likely to perceive the actions of the police as appropriate, are more likely to self-regulate others around them and less likely to support and associate with those seeking confrontation;
- Therefore, to help decrease the likelihood and scale of incidents, it is critical that risk assessments are accurate and inform police tactics at all times.

Differentiation

- Given the nature of crowd dynamics, the indiscriminate use of force can inadvertently contribute to a widespread escalation in the levels of public disorder.
- Differentiation between individual supporters who actually pose a danger and those who do not should therefore be built into every strategic and tactical decision relating to the management of crowds (i.e. training, planning, briefing and operational practice).
- It is inappropriate to act against a whole crowd who happen to be present at a given location, unless there is evidence that they are uniformly seeking to provoke disorder.

Dialogue

- Effective dynamic risk assessment is underpinned by police capacity to engage in constructive dialogue with crowd participants. It is important for police to communicate proactively with supporters. This is best achieved by specialist police officers with good communication skills;
- The focus of these officers is less on enforcement and more on creating trust and confidence through promoting a welcoming atmosphere and early de-escalation of any emerging potential sources of conflict.
- This approach can assist in the gathering of high quality information regarding supporter intentions, perspectives, concerns and sensitivities and any other information regarding potential threats and risk.
- Dialogue based interventions also allow the police to communicate their concerns regarding supporter behaviour, define tolerance limits and negotiate solutions to any emerging difficulties (i.e. limit setting, see below).

Models of good practice

Before the event

Risk assessment should take into account:

- The underlying culture of the supporter group to be policed (e.g. characteristic behaviour, legitimate motivations and intentions).
- Any factors likely to have an impact on risk, e.g. the activities of other groups (such as opposition supporters and/or local communities), expectations and sensitivities, history, and anything else of particular significance (dates, places, forms of action, symbols).
- Any circumstances likely to have an impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, those supporters or groups perceived to pose a risk to public order.

Behavioural tolerance levels should be defined and priority given to communicating these to supporter organisations. Consideration should be given to encouraging and actively facilitating supporters to gather in a safe/controlled environment (e.g. a fan zone).

Based upon this information and intelligence relating to the specific fixture it should be possible to predict and make a distinction between fixtures with normal risk and those posing an increased risk to public order.

It is important to clearly distinguish between risks for specific types of incidents, such as public order, public safety, criminality in relation to mass events, and terrorism.

Initial contact

Since the level of risk to public order is not fixed but highly dynamic it can increase and decrease rapidly in response to circumstances. The levels of risk should therefore be monitored and accurately assessed on an ongoing basis.

To achieve this:

- Police should engage in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with supporters (nonaggressive posture, smiling, deployed in pairs or in small groups in standard uniform, dispersed widely across and within crowds, accommodating requests for photographs, providing information, etc.).
- Where language is not a barrier, officers should try to communicate with supporters to gather information about their demeanour, intentions, concerns, sensibilities and any other issues relevant to their behaviour.
- Intervention units (i.e. ‘riot squads’ with protective equipment, vehicles, etc.) should be kept in discreet locations unless the situation determines that a more forceful intervention is required.

- If resource constraints require intervention unit personnel to adopt a high visibility crowd management presence (as opposed to public order interventions), they should be briefed and trained in verbal and non-verbal communication techniques and be deployed without riot control equipment.

These principals will help the host police gather information and inform command decisions regarding tactical deployment on the basis of continuous and ongoing risk assessment.

Increasing risk

Where circumstances posing a risk are identified it is important to:

- Where an incident involves visiting supporters, host police assessments should be validated by the visiting police delegation.
- Drawing upon earlier dialogue based interventions, both the host and visiting police delegations should communicate to those posing the risk that their actions are likely to provoke police intervention (i.e. limit setting, see above).

Should the above measures not resolve the situation, then further use of force by the police may be required. The objective of police deployment at this stage is to minimise further risk and avoid escalation. It is therefore essential that any action does not increase tensions (e.g. through the use of indiscriminate use of force).

Where any potential for an increase in risk is identified:

- it is vital that information about the persons creating the risk and its nature is communicated clearly to the intervention squads being deployed so that any use of force can be appropriately and proportionately targeted;
- those not posing any risk should not be targeted merely because they happen to be present in the same physical location and be allowed to leave the vicinity and/or given some time to impose ‘self-policing’.

De-escalation

- Once the incident(s) has been resolved policing levels should return to an appropriate level.

After the event

- A thorough debrief should be conducted and any relevant information (e.g. the quality of information received before and during the event, the behaviour and management of supporters, police tactics and the enforcement of tolerance levels) should be recorded with the NFIP.

ATTACHMENT 5

SPOTTERS TRAINING

Following the findings of the annual threat assessment produced by the European Group of Football Policing and NFIP experts (European Think Tank) edition 2021/2022, which recorded that only 17 of the 35 responding countries (48,57%) reported that they have set up national police spotters training schemes, it has been decided necessary to prepare draft European guidance in this regard in order to enhance and harmonise European wide understanding of the roles and tasks of visiting police delegations and assist those States who have yet to adopt such training schemes.

This objective is imperative given that over the past three decades, the use of police spotters in connection with international and domestic football events (and other sports with comparable risks) has proven to be an effective means for preventing and minimising the impact of security (and safety) incidents associated with such events.

Although the concept of police spotters has a long history, the absence of a uniform approach towards police spotter training needs to be remedied notably in connection with international football events given the extent to which the deployment of visiting (foreign) police spotter teams need to be deployed and integrated within host policing operations.

This is crucial as whereas football policing policies and operational strategies are and must remain the preserve of the host police, the integration (and role and tasks of visiting police spotter personnel) must be agreed between the NFIPs in the respective host and participating States concerned. This is necessary as there are variations in interpretations of the roles and tasks of “police spotters” across Europe. Harmonising training curricula should significantly reduce the scope for extensive discussion and potential misunderstandings between the respective NFIPs and the policing agencies engaged in the event.

In States where police spotter training is already established, a range of approaches have been adopted. The attached appendix, therefore, aims to summarise the good practices identified and provide a model for future implementation of harmonised and comprehensive police spotter training.

However, a key principle remains that the NFIP in each State should be responsible for delivering, or at least overseeing, the police spotters training process. This is consistent with the European guidance which highlights that a primary task of the European network of NFIPs is to coordinate football-related international and national police spotter arrangements.

Where possible, the spotter training should include as well subject matter experts who have relevant experience for each aspect of the course (including experienced spotters).

To that end, the appendix proposes that the training process should incorporate:

- A basic induction training for new police spotters (to enable the personnel to commence duties before being scheduled onto the next available course)
- A comprehensive training (this should be on a fixed date, matching staff turnover and seasons)
- Refresher training to be undertake at least once every 2 years.

The training curricula should include topics related to:

- Relevant (football/sports-related) national and European legal frameworks (including the Saint Denis Convention).
- Football-related operational policing strategies and tactics.
- Football subculture overview.
- Risk assessment process/intelligence.
- Evidence gathering and investigations.
- Use of police databases.
- OSINT.
- Communication and dialogue with supporters/spectators.
- Current crowd management and communications.
- Ongoing and emerging trends.
- Cooperation with other stakeholders.

These elements are subject to national legal and other police training frameworks and arrangements and can be adopted wholly or partially as deemed appropriate by the respective NFIP.

Consideration should also be given to supplement the training by establishing:

- Regional mentoring networks (where new police spotting personnel are paired with more experienced personnel in their region).
- National expert network (where teams from across regions share experience and insights).

It is also recommended that consideration should be given to establishing a police spotter training quality assurance panel (in which the NFIP should play a key role) responsible for trainer selection and for annually reviewing the impact and effectiveness of the training, utilising latest data on incident avoidance and management, together with emerging national and international trends.