A SITE FOR DEBATE, NEGOTIATION AND CONTEST OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: LANGUAGE POLICY IN AUSTRALIA

Guide for the development of language education policies in Europe: from linguistic diversity to plurilingual education

Reference study

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Preface

This text, part of a series published by the Language Policy Division, is clearly significant in its own right because it deals with certain influential factors in the organisation and sociolinguistic foundations of language teaching and in the linguistic ideologies at work in problems related to the languages of Europe. It is, however, part of a larger project since it is one element of a collection of publications focused on the Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe: From Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education.

This Guide is both a descriptive and programmatic document whose purpose is to demonstrate the complexity of the questions involved in language teaching, often dealt with in a simplistic manner. It aims to describe the processes and conceptual tools needed for the analysis of educational contexts with respect to languages and for the organisation of language learning and teaching according to the principles of the Council of Europe.

There are several versions of this Guide for different audiences, but the Main version deals with a number of complex questions, albeit in a limited framework. It seemed necessary to illustrate these questions with case studies, syntheses and studies of specific sectors of language teaching, dealing in monographic form with questions only touched upon in the Guide. These Reference Studies provide a context for the Guide, showing its theoretical bases, sources of further information, areas of research and the themes which underlie it.

The Modern Languages Division, now the Language Policy Division, demonstrates through this collection of publications its new phase of activity, which is a continuation of previous activities. The Division disseminated through the Threshold Levels of the 1970s, a language teaching methodology more focused upon communication and mobility within Europe. It then developed on the basis of a shared educational culture, the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (published in its final version in 2001). This is a document which is not concerned with the nature of the contents of language teaching but rather with the form of curricula and syllabi for language teaching. The Framework proposes explicit referential levels for identifying degrees of language competence, and thus provides the basis for differentiated management of courses so that opportunities for the teaching of more languages in schools and in lifelong learning are created. This recognition of the intrinsic value of plurilingualism has simultaneously led to the development of an instrument which allows each learner to become aware of and to describe their language repertoire, namely the European Language Portfolio. Versions of this are increasingly being developed in member States and were at the heart of the European Year of Languages (2001).

Plurilingualism has been identified in numerous Recommendations of the Council of Europe as the principle and the aim of language education policies, and must be valued at the individual level as well as being accepted collectively.
by educational institutions. The Guide and the Reference Studies provide the link between teaching methods and educational issues on the one hand and policy on the other, and have the function of making explicit this political principle and of describing concrete measures for implementation.

The relationship of plurilingualism to a sense of identification with other Europeans, with a possible development of a European identity complementing other social identities, national, regional professional, familial and so on, which all individuals have, is an issue which remains speculative and which can only be confirmed in future generations of plurilingual people. There are however other regions of the world where language education policy is related to questions of identity in a multilingual space. In this study, Lo Bianco shows how a range of language and language education policies have evolved both informally and formally in the history of Australia, a country which now accepts and rejoices in its multilingual composition, despite earlier attempts to create a monolingual population. The ways in which language policy are closely related to identity formation, are clearly evident in the presentation which Lo Bianco provides. That a multilingual entity like Australia can develop both policies and means of implementation which facilitate the growth of plurilingualism is a significant case-study for Europe.

This specific aspect of the problems of language education policies in Europe gives a perspective on the general view taken in the Guide but nonetheless this text is a part of the fundamental project of the Language Policy Division: to create through reflection and exchange of experience and expertise, the consensus necessary for European societies, characterised by their differences and the transcultural currents which create 'globalised nations', not to become lost in the search for the 'perfect' language or languages valued at the expense of others. They should rather recognise the plurality of the languages of Europe and the plurilingualism, actual or potential, of all those who live in this space, as a condition for collective creativity and for development, a component of democratic citizenship through linguistic tolerance, and therefore as a fundamental value of their actions in languages and language teaching.

Jean-Claude Beacco and Michael Byram
1. Introduction: Pragmatic and Symbolic Goals of Language Education

This first section introduces the Australian experience in broad terms and discusses some areas in which this experience may be relevant to contemporary Europeans. The sections that follow first describe and critique the longer-term pattern of language planning in Australia, in general terms, and then discuss and analyse the period from 1987, when language policy became explicit and national. From 1987 attempts were made to issue comprehensive statements about language use, learning and status throughout society. This watershed time in Australian language planning history replaced the previous policy style of implicit policy effected by language practices, such as people’s language behaviour and attitudes. 1987 also attempted to replace the regionalised and single-issue focus of policy with comprehensive and far reaching principles that would apply across many areas. The paper briefly considers the outcomes of the language policy-making history outlined and then concludes with some speculation about connections between language education and modifications to national identity that may be both “emotionally plausible” as well as “politically viable” (Anderson 1991).

Three social phenomena shaped national language planning during the recent particularly active period. These phenomena: constituency-driven multiculturalism; commercial or security driven accommodation to Asia, and demands for indigenous reconciliation, operated both separately and in interaction. The cumulative effect has been that despite their different specific agendas they have produced a successful multilingual language planning whose historic effect has been to overturn an earlier history of steadfast mono-lingualism. Although these forces have disparate origins and only a wider and longer account could adequately deal with them, it is important to state at the beginning that they represent a fusion between top-down and bottom-up interests, an uneasy, and temporary, alliance of language-committed forces who developed political consciousness at a strategically useful time and effected some radical changes in language education, and more widely in national imagination.

Language planning is precisely the kind of policy activity that the Australian state had historically imagined it would never engage in, since it implies the management of multiple languages in society, which in turn reflects ethnic diversity, and worse still, ethnicity-based political mobilisation. Also implied in language planning is accommodation to non-English speaking regional powers, certainly another assumption that Australian political sentiment had not historically imagined desirable. Indeed, one of the Australian state’s most successful, and longest lasting, language policy actions, the creation and maintenance of the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP) in 1948, was designed precisely to preclude such possibilities, especially multilingual population enclaves with prominent Asian communities. However, few would doubt today that the immigration planners of the immediate post-war period were wise to provide comprehensive and free adult English training. If the nation had
been forced by the traumas of war, economic depression and under-population to recruit millions of new people it had no desire that they should constitute inter-generationally stable ‘enclaves’ of ethnic and linguistic difference. And yet this was precisely the outcome. Only one generation later English-articulate second generation citizens, the children of the first wave of recruited immigrants, agitated successfully for multilingual planning based on the secure role of English as the uncontested national, but not official, language of a multicultural nation. The AMEP contributed significantly to economic mobility and social integration of new arrivals, thereby ameliorating the lasting ethnicity-social class correlations resulting from immigration programs that do not provide initial and serious settlement assistance. Combined with high rates of citizenship take-up, and compulsory voting, there emerged a socially integrated political constituency interested in cultural maintenance.

This second generation population element came to be the main social category, a veritable language interest, agitating for the public recognition of minority languages, in hospitals, legal and police work, and in education, but eventually also contributing to new visions of national identity around ideals and rhetoric about, but also the reality of, cultural pluralism. Both the successes and failures of this optimistic experiment in policy-led social change are instructive, and make it interesting, and probably unusual, at least among English speaking nations.

The energetic language planning was taken further, and was eventually dominated, by the very reality that the Europe-favouring immigration program was designed to prevent: Asian regionalism. This is the second of the social phenomena identified above. Asian regionalism is now a recurring staple of Australian public policy, in all fields of endeavour. However, for most of the independent political history of the Commonwealth of Australia, since 1901, and even of the British colonies that preceded it throughout the 19th and late 18th centuries, geographic proximity to Asia was a feared potential that motivated exclusionary immigration practices and intensified defensive attachment to British Empire institutions, its language and culture.

The third force, weaker politically than these two, but one that carries considerable moral force, is indigenous reconciliation. The term indigenous reconciliation refers to a wider field of activity than language teaching and learning, incorporating indigenous participation and modes of political and legal governance, public administration, and the most contested field of all, interpretations of Australia’s history of white settlement. Specifically for our present interests however indigenous reconciliation refers to the slow progress towards language education policy accommodating indigenous languages, indigenous English varieties and creoles.

The combined effect of these three forces, immigration-induced multi-ethnicity, progressive accommodation to Asia, and indigenous rights activism, has produced vocal constituencies for pluralism in language policy. The distinctive, sometimes conflicting, voices of these three claims on school curricula, especially their periods of successful alliance for compromise and collaboration,
give Australian language education planning its distinctive character. The period from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s constitutes an especially productive phase, which, although it appears today to have exhausted itself, affords the benefit of retrospective analysis and evaluation of outcomes (Lo Bianco and Wickert 2001a).

Despite present rupture among the language policy interests their past collaboration produced phases of genuinely comprehensive language policy making, addressing a wide array of social contexts and interests, a wide diversity of languages, and a variety of implementation domains. This is possibly the unique feature of the Australian language policy experience. In retrospect it is clear that many times language policy became a site for contest and renegotiation of cultural imagery, for the display and promulgation of new national identities, or for the assertion of tradition and continuity, as much as it was a vehicle for solving real-world communication problems. In this respect therefore policy has functioned as a surrogate barometer of national sentiment and been expressive of national ideologies.

As intimated above, in many respects Australia is an improbable state to embark on explicit language planning. It lacks the problem-solving, secession-stemming, or commodity-acquiring motivation of most countries’ national language plans. Unlike Sri Lanka or Canada, there has been no national secessionism threatened on the basis of territorially defined language politics. Unlike societies whose national language is not an international medium of exchange Australia does not in this respect perceive a shortfall in its capability in languages of trade and commerce. The very opposite is true, in that in recent years the promotion of English medium higher education has become a major “export” industry for Australia, perceiving English and English medium education as a tradeable commodity. Unlike many European states Australia has no proximal languages, and no split-border language-defined communities, whose political management demands language-planning concessions from the state. In regional cooperative institutions to which Australia belongs, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Community forum, and those to which it does not belong but that are the most prominent regional bodies, especially the Association of South East Asian Nations, English is the sole official language. Australia does not belong to any supra-national entity whose policies on language education, such as some instruments of the Council of Europe and the European Union, for example the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, would impact domestically. Most United Nations conventions and instruments that contain language references are weak in execution or inapplicable. Unlike the United States civil rights and class action, legal mechanisms for advancing language rights are weak. Despite having a multicultural and multilingual population the institutions of Australian society are dominated by English, seamlessly connected to English-using international bilingualism.

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1 The teaching of Asian languages of commerce was motivated by trade and commerce, but these have since become mass languages of the education system and are promoted to all students.
These factors remove some of the key language problems for language planning in relation to second language acquisition, or for language policy granting minority-language rights concessions, that other states face. In common with most English speaking nations, (the exception being bilingual Canada), bilingualism in Australia is for the most part distributed only socially, and is typically transitional (Clyne 2001). Clyne and Kipp’s (1997) calculation of language attrition among immigrants indicates that, despite positive and supportive language policies, there has been an increase in language shift between the two most recently available decennial census dates, 1986 and 1996, for all studied groups. For example, first generation shift according to birthplace rose to 6.4% in 1996 from 4.4% for Greece born respondents, 5.8% in 1996 from 4.2% in 1986 for Turkey born, and from 10.5% in 1986 to 14.7% in 1996 for those born in Italy. Only 1996 figures are available for people born in the People’s Republic of China, 4.6%, Hong Kong 9% and Macedonia, 3% but it is unlikely that that different trends would be at work. Although there are increases, all these communities are at the low end of the spectrum compared to the very high shift rates for the Netherlands born of 48.4% in 1986 to 61.9% in 1996, and the Germany born, from 40.8% to 48.2%. Second-generation language shift is considerably higher for all groups.

With the added consequence of the possible extinction of entire languages that children no longer speak, a similar and accelerating pattern of language attrition is identified for indigenous languages (Lo Bianco and Rhydwen 2001b).

In aggregate, Australian bilingualism has for the most part been confined to language professionals, individual enthusiasts; a small and in sociological terms, elite (unrepresentative) category; and to immigrants and indigenous peoples; a larger but not socially elite category. The former categories learn languages from an English-speaking base, and historically a privileged one; the latter two acquire English from a non-English speaking base; and historically a disadvantaged one. Neither kind of bilingualism is inter-generationally stable. However Australian language education planning in recent decades has been rather successful, as evaluated in the last section of this paper, but the social effects of second language skills resulting from that are unlikely to be evident for many years, precluding a direct comparison with Europe. Nevertheless, for Europeans the age, sex and occupation status correlations with second language skill, as measured by Euro-barometer studies taken between, 1994 and 1996, reflect a promising social distribution of bilingual skills. Age and occupation are the best predictors of conversational proficiency in an additional language, rather than immigrant or ‘indigenous’ status, while the strongest predictor of low spread of bilingualism is having English as the official or national language of the country. This last is relevant to the claim made above that Australian language planning is unusual, contrasted to the general lack of enthusiasm for pluri-lingual planning among Anglophones the world over.
**Age, sex and occupational status and second language skill**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-demographic category</th>
<th>% claiming second language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated up to 20+</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 15-24</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 25-39</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average for EU 15</strong></td>
<td><strong>45%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated to age 16-19</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 40-54</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House persons</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 55+</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated to age 15 or younger</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The absence of territorially based communication problems, or high stakes political imperatives, however, makes Australian language education planning potentially more interesting and relevant to the European project of integration. This relevance resides in the more overtly ideological motivation that has been a feature of policymaking on languages, specifically attempts, however wise or misguided, successful or less so, to “will” the nation into “otherness”. It is precisely this quality that forms the main focus of the present paper. In the absence of large-scale problem-solving, secession-stemming, or commodity-acquiring language planning Australia’s language planning has contained a significant degree of both conscious and unconscious nation-(re)-making. This is not to imply that policy making in other settings is devoid of such ideology, nor to suggest, conversely, that practical problems have been absent in Australian language planning. In fact extensive and compelling communication problems arising from immigration and indigenous needs directly produced community interpreting and translating services in the early 1970s, and a shortfall of Asian language competent business-trained young people led to 1990s language education planning. However, in comparative terms, Australian language planning appears to contain a higher proportion of ideology-based rather than problem-solving motivations than is typical of states that self-consciously make languages an object of policy.

In addition to this higher proportion of ideology there is another possible relevance of Australian language planning for Europeans. Australia is one of the
very few nations in the world that has attempted to develop and promulgate comprehensive national policies on language. These attempts, it should be said at the outset, have only partially succeeded, and in some clear ways have failed. However, as Europe aggregates across its often language-demarcated borders, exemplifying the crucial role in history of the ideology of state-making according to linguistic boundaries (however imprecise in reality), perhaps there is more relevance to the Australian experience, both positive and negative, than may at first appear to be the case.

2. Community and Foreign; European and Asian

The two broad language categories around which policy has been generated in Australia are the community and the foreign. In the first grouping are more than 120 remaining indigenous languages and the approximately 100 immigrant languages. The foreign language category has two main sub-divisions, the European and the Asian.

These groupings are clumsy (the categories are neither technical nor water tight) but convenient (they feature in all language policy discussions and formulations). The Asian/European dichotomy in fact names not formal linguistic divisions but geo-political arrangements, their historical traditions and present interests. This naming already suggests that the language education policies given life are not technical matters of what to teach and how, but kinds of cultural and social planning. Effectively this category divides by geography and history, which, in much Australian political discourse, has been about whether to lean towards a European past, or an Asian future, whether history binds present policy, or whether imperatives dictated by proximity, security and present commercial interests will dominate. America, the other identity-influencing destination, does not involve any impact on language education choices. The community languages category is clearer in what it describes, though the immigrant languages are usually Asian or European, and some indigenous advocates insist on separate specification. The dilemmas about children who speak dialect, and hybrid, versions of named languages is a complexity of great relevance to schools, and indeed for interpreters in hospitals, wherever real world language use is a social priority, but need only to be noted here. These categories, then, and the approximate number of languages they include, are set out in the figure below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITY</th>
<th>FOREIGN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular teaching: possibly ~10</td>
<td>Principally Chinese, Indonesian, Korean and Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revival: potentially ~50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revitalisation: potentially ~100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal: all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potentially well over 100 languages are involved.</td>
<td>Principally French, German and Italian, but also Russian and Spanish.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For most of Australia’s tens of thousands of years of human occupation some 250 languages, representing some 600 dialects, co-existed (Dixon 1980; Jupp 2001). By contrast, in the 200 years since British settlement many Australian languages have become extinct, and all have been rendered vulnerable to extinction. Language extinction is the result of the obliteration of indigenous patterns of intergenerational socialisation, the disruption of native processes of intimacy, and the erosion and eventual removal of the sustaining cultural contexts. Under such pressure languages die as their speakers transfer their communication practices to replacing codes.

Schmidt’s (1993) calculation is that only about 20 Australian languages are still passed on to children, locating the languages at Stages 1 or 2 of Fishman’s (2001) Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS), a device for ascertaining the degree of disruption to the transmission of languages, with stage 1 being the lowest, where language transmission is least disrupted, and 8 the highest, where disruption is greatest. Some 50-60 languages are known only by old people and are not used in communication across the generations, – communication relies instead on code switching – and are therefore located at Stage 3 on the GIDS. Between 170 and 180 languages are no longer used at all, and virtually nothing is known about some of these languages. About 2/3rds of all pre-contact languages are either extinct or almost. Only about 50,000 indigenous people speak a traditional language, approximately 10% of the total (Lo Bianco and Rhydwen 2001b).

Education policy on indigenous languages has been a tormented affair. For most of its history officials have framed it around assimilation and specifically around how to impart effective English literacy. Both communities and professional educators or linguists have contested this view. Since the ‘progressivism’ revolution in education of the late 1960s and 1970s, however, many of the educational objectives for the ‘culturally different’, indigenous Australians as well as immigrants, have tended to stress ideals and goals of biculturalism and bilingualism. One result has been continual tension, and policy oscillations, between approaches that stress cultural and linguistic preservation, and those that stress English literacy to enhance social and economic participation in mainstream society (Nakata 2000). This tension was on prominent display in recent political moves to take away funding from indigenous bilingual schooling on the basis of its claimed inability to enhance English literacy standards (Nicholls 2001). The most recent version of this ‘hardy perennial’ dispute essentially re-runs old educational politics about the purposes of teaching indigenous languages and false dichotomies about “identity” versus “social and economic participation”. An analysis of the parliamentary debate on this issue reveals how in powerful circles English literacy standards and aspirations-expectations of assimilation prevail over notions of self-determination and how in bilingual programs for the disadvantaged and oppressed, criteria for evaluating success are biased against the first language and culture (Lo Bianco 1999). A different politics emerges in relation to the long-term survival of the languages themselves, however, producing a different array of discourses, including even among the powerful a discourse of the conservation of heritage, of the value of
uniqueness and difference, and of how pluralism and difference are important (House of Representatives 1992).

Asymmetrical power between the cultural and economic capital afforded by English, compared with indigenous languages, makes advocacy for indigenous language maintenance vulnerable in policy, whether it espouses poverty remediation, attenuating educational disadvantage, or the virtues of cultural diversity and the survival of unique endangered languages. Claims for indigenous language support risk being repudiated by a discourse that conflates economic equality with cultural sameness; deriving from refusal or inability to imagine equality within and across persisting difference. Assimilationist and neo-colonial discourses, overtly or silently, deploy the instrumental power of English literacy, economic opportunity, and poverty alleviation, alongside a youthful gratification consumerism. Dominant and liberal political notions of participatory modernity often construe the desires of minority groups for ethnolinguistic vitality as demands for separation. Problematically for minority advocacy, preserving distinctive languages requires some measure of dedicated institutional space, or the ability to create and transmit to new generations distinctive cultural meanings, generated linguistically.

Equality and participation are key principles that education in participatory social systems, or modern neo-liberal politics, elevates as the overarching goals for all citizens. The false, but difficult, dichotomy for minorities, both political and educational, is between notions of equality that assume universality of lifestyle, against more complex notions that conceive of equality within and across persisting differences. Fishman (2001) calls the ideology of universal social participation “incorporative modernity”; and argues that it can relegate indigenous languages to social margins. Even the discourse of ‘heritage preservation’ in relation to endangered or minority languages can relegate to them strictly limited and therefore mortal communication domains. This way to imagine a future role for minority languages, not as living, actual cultural practices, but ones with restricted purposes; to be studied and admired perhaps, icons of identity and heritage, but effectively marginalised from prestigious and mainstream life, may parade as liberatory and progressive, but its ultimate effect is language attrition. Minorities’ desires for continuing and distinctive cultural traditions, with their equally insistent demands for social and economic opportunity, seem as intrinsically hard for societies to achieve in practice as they are clearly persuasive in theory. It is wise to keep in mind that even in secular post-modern societies, those imagined to have transcended overt displays and demands for demonstrations of belonging, “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995) operate as a continuous, almost subliminal, invocation of national identity allegiance, sustaining powerful ideologies that sameness constitutes a guarantee, or the promise, of equality.

In practice, research shows that immigrant languages, like Arabic, Chinese, Italian and Khmer, just like indigenous languages, such as Noongar and Yindjibarndi (Lo Bianco 2000) most often negotiate space in existing institutions and in contemporary social conversations, such as schools and the ways to talk about education, hospitals and health care policy, and policing alongside law and
order debates. Multicultural policies based on integration in fact lead to communities of discourse that interact with mainstream society, and are comprised in the mainstream. Community language maintenance advocated as complementary with English literacy and mainstream social practices is the compromise position of several decades of identity politics in Australia. This is clear in what evidence mainstream society requires and how their involvement is recruited. The more than 100 languages spoken by Australians that derive from recent immigration (Jupp 2001), motivated by national slogans of ‘populate or perish’, and initially continuing earlier anti-Asian exclusionary practices, have transformed cities and towns, and public discourse, but less so mainstream institutions.

The next section describes the broad national ideologies and phases that have shaped language policy especially since national Federation in 1901 that produced the Commonwealth of Australia.

3. Britishism: English mono-lingualism, southern British norms and language repression

With the exception of indigenous languages, whose societies were impacted in devastating ways by ‘land grabs’, frontier conflict and introduced diseases, for most of the 19th century what passed for language policies were to be sought in public attitudes. Although these attitudes fluctuated widely, from embracing to repudiating, broad toleration of language pluralism was common. The absence or weakness of central socialising institutions permitted diffuse and variegated language practices. Gold rush sites, land-clearing gangs, sea-port cities with their human cargo speaking the languages of the south Pacific, Europe, and Asia, and in a few large cities the gradual emergence of a bourgeois civility with its refining arts, produced a vast array of different local language arrangements. The variation was constrained only by the domination of mainstream British values on language: such as the undesirability of passing laws or regulations to influence the course of language development, the improving virtues of the classical European literary canon, and, of course, the overarching commitment to English as the language of authority.

As compulsory schooling was instituted from the early 1870s across the British colonies of Australia, however, its aims of mass literacy and cultural socialisation supplied the institutional platform for more effective and widespread language education, and institutionalised the religious sectarian divisions inherited from the British Isles. Progressively, both formal policies (laws, regulations and official texts) and social practices (attitudes and behaviour) came to sustain an underlying national desire for cultural homogenisation. In effect this meant immigration policy determined on national origins, and regulations intending to exclude Asians, completely assimilate indigenous people, and homogenise non-British others.

At political Federation in 1901, just as today, demography and geography, multiculturalism and Asia, were the constant points of reference in what passed
for policymaking on languages. Other dominant language attitudes included suspicion, and occasional hostility, towards the public use of minority languages, a conviction that indigenous languages (always pejoratively labelled ‘dialects’) were both primitive and destined to disappear, and a strong attachment to southern British norms of correctness for English. Correct language style was policed by public attitudes and inculcated by schoolteachers, clergy and the print media.

From the more tolerating tenor of the mid 19th century, attitudes hardened in the early part of the 20th. Perceiving itself as a British outpost far from its cultural home, Australia was reluctant to accept foreigners but in need of a more robust domestic economy, occupying a vast continent but unable to populate it, located at the edge of Asia, but fearing it as too populous, too close and its labour too cheap. These anxieties and attitudes acted as default or implicit language planning, but were bolstered by overt policy in the anti-bilingual schooling provisions incorporated into existing education acts in most states in 1917-1918, specifically targeting the prominent German communities. Forcible conversion of place names from German and other languages to English made the linguistic landscape consonant with the mentality. As radio communication spread, the restrictive measures in education and place names were extended to rules forbidding broadcasting in languages other than English, initially totally, but later liberalised to permit broadcasting in other languages, but only when accompanied by English translations.

The objective of this ensemble of practices was for universal mono-lingualism in an English modelled on southern British norms. This goal was discernable through the close synchrony of the mostly implicit operations of attitudes and values, with the occasionally overt language policy or legislation on education and media. The combination of public sentiment with laws and regulations makes for powerful language planning. As the early decades of the twentieth century progressed, the sense of national vulnerability that sustained these attitudes intensified, through deep economic depression, and war, and made any notions of linguistic diversity political anathema. Australians carried British passports; most evaluated southern British linguistic norms as superior to their own speech, and, like many people in the world, imagined the state as a homogenous and indivisible reflection of the nation.

In formal education Britain’s languages of proximity, French and German, combined with a ‘mind-training’ view of Latin, meant that grammar-translation studies dominated language-teaching methods. A strong attachment to the European and especially English literary canon sustained the language arts. However, there was also minor study of non-European languages from as early as 1907, with Japanese introduced at the University of Sydney, sustained both by Orientalist ideology and its interest in the exotic but also by the early stirrings of an interest in the emerging powers of Asia, Japan having defeated Russia in the war of 1905-1907. English political values and beliefs in the intrusiveness of overt language planning, an inheritance of British liberal politics and literary theorising of the 17th and 18th centuries, delegated to public attitudes the role of pursuing adherence to mono-lingualism and correct eloquence: foreign languages
were taught without an expectation that they would be used, public exchange in minority languages was mistrusted and repressed; tolerated only in domestic spheres.

Of course such generalising conceals nuance and patterns, and even during this most British of times in Australian cultural history and sensibilities post-Federation Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, who occupied the nation’s most senior position during 1903-1904, 1905-1908 and 1909-1910, prophetically warned Australians that “they made their homes neither in Europe nor America” and advised that ‘in trade and in strife’ Australia would need to forge close links with Asia (Milner 2002).

4. Australianism: dignifying local English

From an early period Britishism was challenged through the assertion of the value of Australian writing, writing whose themes, idioms, style and character extolled the landscape, experience and character of Australia, contesting its judgment and representation solely through British prisms, but also through the activities of amateurs and later professionals to document and describe the evolving new varieties of English that was Australian. From the earliest period of Europeanisation, collecting and documenting what was happening to English, to what new purposes it was put, and what distinctive meanings it was generating, attracted interest. Although there has been more popular interest in colloquialisms, and particularly informal registers of language, Australianism has been a sustained effort of language documentation with a long history.

The Australian lexicon itself has evolved under very different conditions, such as during the phase of convict transportation from 1788 to 1850 with the commencement of the gold rushes. This phase is characterised by the dynamic way in which Australian English emerged as an initial response to an environment, both natural and social, that European English could not adequately name and talk about. The active language planning of this period involved the extension of English to represent the continent of Australia. The needed new names were either borrowed from indigenous languages, invented, or existing words and phrases were stretched and adapted to describe changed or new entities. The gold rushes brought in immigration from much wider sources than Britain and Ireland, and saw the first notable American influences on English in Australia.

A ‘nationalist’ phase followed, from the 1890s as the British colonies agitated for and imagined national independence, to after the Second World War. During this time the print media, led by the magazine *The Bulletin*, fostered local identity by assertive attitudes towards Australian vernacular expression, and many writers used idiomatic Australian English. The first of the talkies, sound movies, saw the vernacular prominent, and distinctive national life featured. Vastly expanded immigration after 1948 exposed Australian speech to wider cultural influences, and the growth of international communications linked it to other English varieties. These processes were accompanied by expansion in
Commentary on the emergence of this variety of English dates from the early 19th century, as Australian idiomatic expression and pronunciation came to the attention of government officials and foreign visitors. From the early 1800s simple word lists, glossaries and commentaries were published. The limited scope of this early work, and its interest in the curious, the deviant, the informal registers, especially slang, gave way over time to more serious collection and description of pronunciation, cultural meanings, lexicon, place names, and much later to Aboriginal varieties of English, and eventually to indigenous and immigrant community languages. The culmination of the historical focus was W.S. Rampton’s The Australian National Dictionary (1988), the first comprehensive historical record and analysis of the more than 10 000 words that Australia has contributed to English and the huge effort of the Macquarie Dictionary, of 1982, with A. Delbridge as editor in chief, notable because it gives precedence to Australian pronunciations and definitions, as the unmarked forms.

Beyond its formal features however the language evolved to express cultural and political differences that writers, poets and new nativists identified as a resource. A considerable distance emerged between linguistic norms evolved in the homeland and those that were required on its application in a diaspora immersed in new and radically different landscape ("lakes" without water, "rivers" that do not run, still deep billabongs, shimmering heat, unique flora and fauna and uninhabited space). This difference is all the more profound in relation to the new human interactions, convict and free, immigrant and settler, Aboriginal and European, European and Asian, Pacific Islander and Australian, not to mention the original binaries of the European background. All this was original to place and created new memory, and old memory re-interpreted in new context (Malouf 1998; Turner 1991), moulding new expression, original metaphor, a new communicative profile, and, of course, even from the early 19th century, found its champions, both literary and political. By the middle of the 19th century the native born exceeded greatly the immigrant British, and the huge Irish infusion made class, ethnicity and religious complexities resemble those operating in the British Isles, but also distinguished them (O’Farrell 1986), in language and opportunity, as much as in remembered history.

The replacing of British spoken norms and literary sensibilities, asserting Australian alternatives as standard, was co-present with Britishism and mostly, ultimately, prevailed. Australianism was both a documentation of change that was happening ‘on the ground’ and a movement pushing the adoption of this change, for an Australian indigenous English as authentic expression of national sensibility, for this new world to be named in its own terms. Often Australianism
assumed continuing attachment to a wider English speaking British Empire. This
Australianist cultural assertion, because it was internal to English, developed an
initial problematic relationship with the later emergence of multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism advocated the legitimacy of non-English ways to know and
describe Australia, and the legitimacy of their experiences in Australia.
Asianism, to the extent that it stressed that Australians could and should relate to
the Asian environment in and through Asian languages, also has had an initial
problematic relationship with Australianism. In time however Australian
linguistic nationalism shifted towards including multicultural concerns, and, later
still, towards a sense of geo-politics as well, including an Asianist dimension. It
is common to read these days descriptions of Australian national identity as
including its “neighbourhood” of Asia, the powerfully symbolic characterisation
of “our region”.

The vulnerabilities of isolation and small size were brought home dramatically
with Japanese bombing of the northern city of Darwin and the British surrender
of Singapore during World War II, along with military calculations about the
inability to defend the vast continent. The political slogan “populate or perish”
was invigorated and bolstered public acceptance of the post-war recruited
immigration program, whose rationale of boosting the white, preferably British
or northern European, elements of the population was progressively liberalised,
ultimately producing the population diversity its original intention had been to
prevent. It was accompanied, from the beginning, by an adult English language
teaching scheme, the Adult Migrant English Program, described at its 50th
anniversary celebration conference in 1999 as “50 years of Nation Building”.
This connection between language education and national identity is more self-
conscious and explicit than most. By many criteria the AMEP is Australia’s most
successful language policy initiative. More than 40 000 new arrivals from nearly
90 language backgrounds were learning English under the program in 2001,
more than 1.5 million people since it commenced; it is vast when the fact that
the total population is only 19 million is taken into account.

Although there had been vibrant Chinese, French, German, Irish and Italian
speaking segments in the population throughout the nineteenth century the
immigration program that commenced after World War II permanently and
radically transformed the overall population mix, and ultimately many of its
public policies. The migration program had commenced with the admission of
displaced persons from eastern Europe but, because demand outstripped supply,
moved geographically to the north of Europe and then to its south, then to its
south-east (with the strategically significant admission of Turks by the middle
1960s), then to Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, and most recently to
Africa. The moving geography represented a progressive abandonment in
practice, and from the late 1960s in law, of the 1901 Immigration Exclusion Act,
the infamous ‘White Australia’ policy.

The original ethos that accompanied the post-war migration program aimed to
modify these ‘new’ Australians linguistically and culturally to fit into the
national identity forms of the ‘existing’ Australians. New arrivals would alone
make the effort to accommodate, by discarding their distinctive cultural practices
and languages. But the Australian norm to which the immigrants adapted proved not to be static, based initially on an evolving national identity forged from British to Australian models, it came progressively to include influence from the ‘new’ Australians, and ultimately, even those who had been totally excluded, the indigenous people, the ‘original’ Australians.

In language planning the interaction of the three nation-shaping factors: Asia, original inhabitants and new arrivals, in their relations to the ‘existing’ Australians, not the indigenous people but the settled Anglo-Australian mainstream, attained new vigour as decades of post-war emphasis on assimilation receded and the phase of multiculturalism took its place, from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. At least nominally, from the 1970s, national identity came to be identified with pluralism, though always understood to operate within a cohesive unitary political stability.

5. Multiculturalism: linking population pluralism to public policy

The multicultural moment in Australian public policy is most closely associated with the Whitlam Labour government of 1972-75 but its conservative replacement, the Fraser government of 1975-1983, also embraced it as a national vision, as did the Hawke Labour government of 1983. The success of multicultural notions of public identity is in fact encapsulated in these political transitions, since both conservative and reformist political parties embraced pluralism, devising versions expressing their distinctive political ideologies, and by this process enshrining the overall notion. The project of multiculturalism for Labour in the 1970s, still clinging then to class analysis of society, saw immigrants essentially as recruited labour, a diversification of the working class, and their interests as an extension of class politics. For conservatives this caused initial alarm, but ultimately stimulated them to devise an endogenous ideology to incorporate immigrants’ political and social interests, initially constructing a culturalist analysis of their social disadvantages, but later utilising the conventional conservative discourse of appeal to aspirations of social mobility, individual prosperity and personal reward.

The governing theoretical ideal of thoughtful multicultural discourse has been for a separation of the domains of the political from the cultural nation. By this logic the political nation remains a vertical structure, a unitary, English speaking, representative parliamentary democracy, governed by law, based on notions of formal legal and economic equality, and buttressed by a single common citizenship. The cultural nation is characterised by horizontal affinities of culture, language, plural identity attachments and notions of community.

Relatively liberal citizenship laws, combined with compulsory voting, produced a large urban constituency that the political classes appealed to with cultural politics in which languages featured prominently. This period of multicultural policy ferment conceived Australia differently from its representation under Australianism. Multiculturalism imagined and advocated the nation as a
multilingual and independent entity with attenuated connections to Britain. But within this ambitious claim to re-make national identity along multicultural lines there were also strains and tensions, apart from the immensity of the claims it made, and the vast shift in attitudes such changes would require. The first tension was an uneasy accommodation between indigenous and immigrant interests, though because the former are mostly urban, the latter mostly rural, this tension in priority for the deployment of resources has never really been significant. The second tension involved mainstream language choices in education, originally European ones and later Asian ones. The mainstream was much more committed to elite foreign languages than to minority community languages. Basing its public advocacy originally on claims of language rights, later on claiming that maintaining minority languages was maintaining useful national resources, multiculturalism advocated language education selections based on criteria of ‘community presence’ of particular groups of speakers of these languages, rejecting traditions of esteem, prestige or ‘foreignness’. A key justification in culturally advocated language policy was related to intergenerational maintenance and ethnic continuity.

In addition multiculturalism advocated English not in a British-Australianist literary dichotomy, but as applied linguistics, second language methodologies suited to immigrant and indigenous adults and children. In relation to adult literacy, which had constituted itself as a program mainly for disadvantaged ‘mainstream’ Australians, multiculturalism sought a seamless provision of adult English, spoken and written, according to specific needs of learners. Perhaps the strongest tension of the multicultural phase was its claim to represent and reconstruct the entire nation, and its opponents’ refusal to collapse mainstream culture into the idea of a nation of many cultures, preferring instead to imagine that the mainstream would remain unchanged and new arrivals (and indigenous peoples) would have to adapt to its norms and character.

Despite these complexities cultural diversity entered the national political consciousness. Many government enquiries were conducted into aspects of language education and extensive funding for multilingual services was allocated. Extensive innovation in curricula, in school language programs, in plural cultural perspectives to pervade all of curriculum, in the inclusion of cross-cultural skills and knowledge in professional training from medical, to legal, to policing; and related areas, was commenced and in some areas sustained till now, and despite regional differences, the trend became established nationally.

Virtually the entire national infrastructure for responding to linguistic diversity which Australia still uses was created in the 1970s. Multiculturalism was a productive period of innovation in other areas of language policy, for example, the world’s first multilingual Telephone Interpreting Service, at first for emergencies, later for more general assistance, was established in 1973; the professional provision for language interpreting in health and medical situations, in courts of law and in policing, the setting up of the National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters, all attest to this energetic sense that
specific language services are a settlement responsibility of immigration recruiting authorities.

From 1973, for the first time since its abolition in 1917, Australian primary schools also started to teach languages on a significant scale. Until then what had survived First World War language restrictions, save small exceptions, were small numbers of private school programs in elite European languages understood as foreign languages of literature, taught not for speaking and using, but for writing and reading. In high schools foreign language programs often served the purposes of selection instruments for admission to university. But in 1968 institutional changes removed the requirement for language study as a criterion for university entry. The result was a collapse in language enrolments. From the 44% of students who in their final year of study were enrolled in languages, the numbers declined dramatically to a national average below 10%. From such arid beginnings we can appreciate the extent and depth of change required to declare, as we truly can, the 1970s the decade of community languages, and the 1980s, the decade of national language policy.

General educational orthodoxy in this period held that schools should reflect their communities, and in urban Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide especially, but much more widely, many of the communities that schools were trying to reflect were multicultural and multilingual. The term community languages devised to express precisely this claim was itself a micro-policy, seeking not only to distinguish immigrant and indigenous languages from foreign and classical languages, but to suggest that locally-used languages (since schools were reflecting their communities) should have priority, or at least equality of esteem, with foreign languages. This emerging, and ultimately successful, discursive politics was encountered in many institutional settings, and linked community pluralism to the state institutions, eventually becoming the shared political project of the major mainstream political parties. Bilingual education, which had enjoyed a flourishing nineteenth century history (Clyne 1991) but had fallen victim to the 1917 cultural policy that withdrew Australian identity within Empire and English, was during the early 1970s also rejuvenated in programs of indigenous education.

There were many concrete achievements of the multiculturalism phase, a period characterised by intense debate and frequent government enquiries, in which language education became the locus of claims for social reconstruction, some of which are lasting: the beginnings of indigenous rights understood as cultural self-determination, some world-first policy provisions (the already-mentioned public interpreting and translating) and moves towards comprehensive and explicit national language planning that sought to combine demography, geography, pluralism and cultural continuity (Clyne 1991, Ozolins 1993, Lo Bianco and Wickert 2001a).

However, by the mid 1980s advocacy of rights to the maintenance of minority languages was starting to lose momentum. One reason was the realisation that the successful intergenerational language retention rests in considerable part with individual communities, and a growing view that public institutions cannot
practically directly intervene to support all differences of language and culture. A new manner of thinking emerged. This regarded language and cultural retention as a ‘resource’ rather than a ‘right’. A right implies that a sanction against some authority for non-compliance is possible. A resource involves thinking about the benefits (intellectual, cultural, economic and social) of assisting young people to retain and develop a mastery of the language of their families, and the cultural knowledge that they are developing in their communities (Ruiz 1984). And, as importantly, in the mid 1970s Britain applied to join and was formally accepted into the European Economic Community. Britain’s move was important for both Australian language education and national identity. One consequence was to cost Australia guaranteed markets for several export items, but its cultural importance lay in the pragmatic stimulus it provided for commercial communication with regional neighbours. Language education would undergo a further and dramatic revolution.

From elite European foreign tongues, for elites and for elite purposes, to community languages for community purposes, including indigenous languages for indigenous purposes, the exigencies of trade and geo-politics shifted language education towards Asian languages, again elite ones, and often for foreign purposes too.

6. **Asianism: education for regional integration**

"Once you become Asian, we will think about that"². Dr Mahathir Mahamad has become famous for his frequent repudiation of Australian claims to ‘be part of’ Asia. Although by many practical indicators, of people and institutional links, and overwhelmingly in commercial and strategic considerations, Australia is deeply linked to Asian and Pacific countries, formal membership of Asian, and especially South East Asian, regional institutions is a separate matter. Malaysia’s Prime Minister rejects Australia’s claim for membership based on geography, by asserting that belonging is determined by criteria of ethnicity or ‘race’. However, by an interesting logic, his words hold open the intriguing possibility that it is possible to ‘become’ Asian. Australian public discourse has in fact tried to ‘become’ Asian, not by Dr Mahathir’s notions of what being Asian means, nor simply by geography, but by means of will, re-definition, practical engagement, and even language education. The debate about whether Australia is an Asian nation however, also raises the question of what is Asia.

Dr Mahathir’s words encapsulate some of the territory traversed by debates about national identity and its connection with language education that have been energetically waged in Australia from the late 1980s. “Joining” Asia, or “becoming” an Asian nation, are discursive manoeuvres that embody will and desire, are larger than language education policy, but themselves sites of definition and re-definition, negotiating, symbolizing and marking culture and identity as well as geography.

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² Lyall, K., **Hello again, I am quitting: Mahathir.** The Australian, July 4 2002, p. 7.
Claims on formal language education and its role in ‘signifying the nation’ reflect powerful mixtures of economic interest and national security, both in turn premised on geographic proximity. These claims became more frequent after Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community. The imperative of securing new markets for Australian primary produce and raw materials, underscored by continuing political turmoil in SE Asia, especially the victory of the north Vietnamese forces in the Vietnam war, decisively directed the national policy gaze to what political discourse later dubbed ‘the region’ and ‘the neighbours’. Although always present, and steadily evolving in prominence, ‘the region’ is now a shared political program, a staple of political discourse, recalling how multiculturalism featured in political discourse in an earlier phase. The most committed to this program of re-conceptualising national identity was the Keating Labour government in the early 1990s which embraced regional integration in a very energetic way and made language education a clear and important part of this project, and, despite wide suspicion that it harbours a preference for American associations, the replacing conservative Howard government since 1996 has continued the policy of Asian integration though with less commitment to any assumption that Australian national identity should be affected by such integration.

From the late 1980s, but very strongly during the 1990s, policy reports advocated the teaching of key Asian languages, sometimes linked with calls for pervasive transformation of the cultural orientation of public education to de-emphasise Europe-knowledge and stress what came to be called Asia-literacy. Academic writing, and astute political wisdom, had advocated similar policies for a much longer period. Even language education had been pressed into service, such as the teaching of Indonesian introduced experimentally in the 1960s, but the very prominent surge of Asia-consciousness, the extent of public funding, and the depth of institutional attachment to it in recent times makes this present phase distinctive. Bilateral priorities have in fact shifted, from Indonesia during the late 1960s, Japan in the 1970s and 1990s, SE Asia and China in the 1990s, and again SE Asia and especially Indonesia in the 2000s but since the late 1980s these modifications have all occurred within a secure overall multilateral Asian priority.

The language priorities3 of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade under the conservative Howard Liberal government, deriving from its defence and strategic interests White Paper of 1997, succinctly express this pragmatic hierarchy.

3 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Administrative Circular PO370 16 November 2001.
### TIER ONE
Japanese, Mandarin, Indonesian

### TIER TWO
Arabic, French, Korean, Spanish, Thai

### TIER THREE
Bislama, Burmese, Cantonese, Farsi, German, Greek, Italian, Khmer, Lao, Melanesian Pidgin, Malay, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Tok Pisin and Vietnamese

“Australia’s major priorities”

“international application” and “important interests”

“significant interests”...

In education, Asian languages have been the boom subjects of the 1990s, not always comfortably aligned with multiculturalism, sometimes distancing that legacy (Singh 2001) drawing on a stream of thinking of Asia-literacy as a national capability deficiency, a missing part of needed human capital, and as such required by mainstream English-speaking Australia, not its minority populations.

A significant feature of such economically motivated Asian regionalism is its championing by a special class of language interests, trade, diplomatic and political personnel, rather than the second generation immigrant communities and language teachers and linguists who advocated multiculturalism, or the lexicographers and writers who featured in the Australianist advocacy. Asianism has been a successful phase of language education policy, resulting in vast public investments in the teaching of Asian languages and in infusing Asian cultural and historical perspectives across the curriculum of mainstream schools. A boom in school and university enrolments in Asian languages, and enthusiasm at most levels of education for both studies of Asia and for Asian languages teaching, has resulted, as is shown below.

### 7. Economism; human capital and English literacy
The late 1990s has seen the dominant language policy discourse change again, returning perhaps to an older pattern, the assertion of the primacy of English; but this time English as ‘literacy’. New elements are the focus on international economic competitiveness in a global economy, rather than the assertion of national unity or British culture. Under prevailing ideas about language and opportunity there is also a reconfigured notion of the role of the state and public education as contributors to enhancing economic competitiveness. Conservatives and social democrats share the new rationality of governance that is reflected in this new policy priority. It elevates the interests of economy above those of nation and community and constitutes a new kind of challenge for advocates of bilingualism and multi-lingual language planning.
Throughout the 1990s a sequence of international research reports pointing to declining standards of English literacy coincided with a rationality favouring
education’s connections with the labour market. These developments essentially reflect a political economic ideology of human capital theory as advanced by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1992; 1996). Almost identical pressure has been felt in many English speaking countries, with literacy, and especially revised notions of ‘basics’ in English literacy, forming a major component of curriculum reforms in Britain and the United States during the 1990s and reinforced recently in the United States with the 2002 No Child Left Behind Act. Dislodging multi-culturally based multilingual policy, and making Asia-literacy less prominent, has not simply come about because of decline in assessed standards of English literacy. Rather political voices have insisted that the findings constitute a crisis in national performance. And although some allege it is a crisis of political manufacture (Boreham and Mitchell 1997; Raethel 1997) its policy effects may be no less strong for its having dubious origins or credibility.

Measuring English literacy performance utilising standardised testing procedures permits international comparison. This practice was especially powerful in the early 1990s when economic competitiveness had moved decisively to the north Asian region. The resultant discourse about public education was a powerful incentive towards stressing literacy as the overwhelming schooling priority. Related to negative international economic comparisons, there has been a perceived decline in young people’s employment prospects in the post-industrial labour markets, in a context of rapidly intensifying globalisation. Compounding these literacy-related problems has been the steady recognition and naming of English as the global medium of exchange. In this context 1970s and 1980s multicultural and multilingual education achievements, and 1980s and 1990s regionalism stimulating achievements in Asian languages teaching, are vulnerable to contraction. The new funded priority is for devoting greater quantities of curriculum time to explicit teaching of English literacy. Many principals of schools have felt pressure, and many parents express concern, about the English literacy consequences of devoting considerable educational time to languages other than English. Making things worse is the tenor of debate facing language advocacy that struggles to defend past achievement, rather than to consolidate and solidify it, and extend and improve educational practice for languages (Lo Bianco and Wickert 2001a; Australian Language Matters 2/2002).

Economicist formulations of education tend to support curriculum choices that give prominence to future employment prospects for individuals, and the aggregate effects for national economies. Some language interests fear the consequences of relegating humanistic and intellectual justifications for languages to economic ones, although in truth it has been this principle applied to Asian languages that is responsible for their phenomenal growth in recent times. Others express concern that domination by the logic of economism will lead to restricting the state’s role in education. If the state contracts its role, so this argument goes, and the marketplace becomes more prominent, what institutional location will advance the interests of pluralism, opportunity for the marginalised and cultural visions such as those required to support multiculturalism? Others oppose the narrowed notions of literacy that dominate present public understandings. The priority, at least in public discourse, is on
‘basics’ in English literacy and numeracy, constituted as a transferable quantum of acquired measurable fixed skills that public education produces, and that individuals deploy in competitive personal promotion in an unfettered marketplace of competence. Many lament this as a wholly inadequate depiction of what constitutes ‘literate capability’ when more persuasive accounts of the phenomenon show it to be variable, multiple, contingent and complex (Cope and Kalantzis 2000).

It remains to be seen precisely what the longer term effects will be of this return to stressing English literacy as the primary and overarching objective of public schooling, especially on languages. Three effects appear to be emerging at this early stage. First, language policy advocates have had to sharpen their justifications for mass language learning, advancing the interdependent effects of literacy in second languages with literacy in English. Second, policy interests that stressed ‘multiple values’ for languages, (that is cultural, regional, intellectual, community and other warrants for language learning, in the context of national identity and social cohesion) are evaluating their rhetorical positions. Third, it is already evident that many schools are re-evaluating the extent of their present commitment to languages in the context of the higher priority now devoted to increasing performance in English literacy assessments.

Literacy interdependence between two languages is well established, both empirically and rhetorically (Cummins 2000). It will be more difficult to reinscribe within public discourses about economy and education an interest in the social and the cultural. But some developments promise to do just this. First, contemporary scholarship points to inadequacies of ‘economics-only’ explanations of economic phenomena, as disparities in national economic development are increasingly explained through recourse to ‘culture’ (Harrison and Huntington 2000) while ‘social capital’ (Putnam 1993) comes to appeal more and more to economic analysis as the organic operations of networks of civil society whose result is essential trust and social relations without which economies cannot operate. Second, macro-economic development tends towards declines in fertility rates, so as development proceeds labour demand cannot be met without immigration; globalisation and economic development tend both therefore to accelerate population movement across the globe. The effects of these developments is make more societies more multicultural, producing ever-greater needs for language education planning and continual processes of national identity (re)-definition.

8. What has been achieved?

The 1990s has seen continuing interest in language policy and rapid development of different language policy statements. In general, while multi-cultural policy has been and in some areas continues to attract public criticism, and is the source of political controversy, very few people challenge the study of languages. Perhaps related to this, there is very little concern about the status of English. The demand for English among immigrants and indigenous people is vibrant and although the AMEP (Martin 1999) has been squeezed in recent years it remains a
coherent and critically important national program. Public provision of English
instruction has meant the almost complete absence of politics on this issue.
However, there has been considerable public controversy around standards of
assessed literacy performance, for both children and adults, but, unlike the
United States and to a lesser extent Britain, this is not generally perceived to be
an immigration connected issue. These are significant achievements and indicate
national identity impacts of language education, which is now, as will be shown
below, the expected experience for all young people at all school levels. This is a
dramatic reversal of the historic pattern of language policy. The range of
languages shows the effects of the multiculturalism and the Asianism phases,
and also the persisting strength of earlier phases of language priority.

There has been a wide public acceptance that planning for language competence
is both appropriate and necessary. Evidence is supplied below of one state
(Victoria) that has supplemented Federal policy with complementary but state-
specific programming and achieved impressive outcomes. This is true of several
States; Victoria is mentioned only to provide an example.

• There has been a vast increase in the study of languages other than
English across Australia with regional differences affected by local
demography, or neighbouring country languages (for example the
Northern Territory has a higher proportion of spoken Aboriginal
languages and is closer to Indonesia and so indigenous languages and
Indonesian predominate among its language offerings).

• There has been a significant diversification across Australia of languages
studied and of the modes through which language teaching is delivered.

• In many cases there have been well-developed and coherent connections
between English, mother tongue teaching and foreign-community
language policies.

• 1999 figures for the government-schooling sector (almost 25% of pupils
attend non-government, mainly Catholic parochial schools) in Victoria,
show a continual expansion in all areas of language education, guided by
the state’s commitment and its full acceptance of Federal policy
initiatives.

• Specifically in 1999 97% of primary (primary, or K-6) schools offered at
least one language, with over 90% of all primary pupils studying a
language, all secondary schools offered at least one language, the vast
majority more than one, with a network of specialist language schools
offering many. 18 languages were taught in government primary schools,
17 in secondary schools and a further 39 were offered by the Victorian
School of Languages, itself a government specialist school that makes
available teachers to schools that cannot staff an in-demand language in a
particular area. The VSL also offers Saturday language programs.

• After-hours (ethnic, or heritage, community-run schools) teach 52
languages which have varying but often very high levels of collaborative
relations with relevant government or public schools. There are more
than 190 such community organizations. Most have become solid and
professionally organized in recent years, and all receive state funding supplementation to Federal ‘per capita’ funding. Many also offer “insertion programs” in which the community school employs teachers and “supplies” these to the day school (though administratively effective these programs are not always of high quality). Insertion programs are more common in the non-government sector.

- The most widely taught languages, in alphabetical order, are Chinese, French, German, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Greek and Vietnamese.
- The state also offers satellite and visiting teacher schemes in remote areas for both primary and secondary levels, and although 91% of primary schools offer face to face, or direct contact, language teaching. 96 remote schools offer their only language, or an additional one, or extended and enrichment language teaching, via the satellite scheme. 167 secondary colleges do likewise but overwhelmingly this is enrichment or additional teaching.

The expansion of language education, to more than 90% of all primary schools, has been one of the great success stories of Australian language policy since the multicultural movement of the 1970s turned its attention towards school language policy, but most particularly from the commencement of provision of Federal government funding for languages in 1987.

The national total enrolment primary school enrolments for the four Asian priority languages in 1996/7 were: 202, 376 and of these Japanese 108 848, Indonesian 73 142, Chinese 19 970 and Korean 416. The total enrolment numbers in 1996/7 for all languages (including Asian languages other than the four identified above) were: 234, 493, and of these 150, 520 were for Italian, 44, 094 for German and 28, 107 for French.

Japanese and Italian represent an interesting cultural and national identity contrast. Japanese is perhaps the exemplar of the Asianism phase while Italian is perhaps the exemplar of the multiculturalism phase. Japanese primary enrolments have almost doubled every two years over the past 10 years while the growth of Italian is from an earlier period, it has maintained its presence in the primary sector of schooling. At the post-compulsory school years Japanese has considerable holding power on its enrolled students due to its association with vocational and professional careers. For Italian the strong primary school showing, as a language of initial bilingualism for the majority of learners, is depleted somewhat into secondary education. Japanese enrolments have increased from 2 541 at this level nationally in 1990 to 5 381 in 1996, from the total 9 859 Year 12 enrolments in the four nominated Asian languages. The others are Chinese 2 361, Indonesian 1 869 and Korean 248. Italian commanded 2 429 enrolments in 1990 and 2 100 in 1996.

For government schools in 2001, though only for selected States, figures for the final year of schooling show an intensification of this trend, with Italian registering 1 558 and Japanese 3 642. While for Italian in primary schools the figures are 51 109 compared to Japanese registering 78 840.
In different ways Japanese and Italian represent experiences in which wide strata of previously steadfastly monolingual Australians have discovered Australian-specific motivations to study languages. Japanese is the dominant language of choice while Italian commands possibly greater numbers if the informal settings of community based schools are included. As indicated above these two languages epitomise two distinct phases of the history of language policy making: multicultural reconstruction of Australian identity on the one hand, and regionalism on the other.

The changing fortunes that individual and whole groups of languages have encountered in public policy are captured by the eras and policy texts that brought Japanese and Italian into mainstream education as mass educational offerings and not for elites or for specifiable target populations. The continuing presence of Japanese and Italian in public education, one the nation-making experience of immigration, and the other the momentous re-orientation of the nation towards Asia, encapsulate the identity shifts that have characterised national cultural policy since the middle part of the twentieth century.

9. Constituting new entities of solidarity

Thinking about national identity has been dominated by modernism’s view that attributes its emergence and vitality to conditions of industrial and post-industrial modernity, and rejects any sense that national feeling is a primordial and unchanging entity of solidarity (Hobsawm 1993; Gellner 1983). The modern nation is from this perspective only possible in a historically recent period, when the conditions for its construction were mature, including, for Hobsawm, standard national languages that are spread by printing, mass literacy and schooling. Tradition itself, those practices that invoke heritage and the past, are sometimes if not often, invented or re-defined (Hobsawm and Ranger 1995).

Anderson’s (1991) formulation takes relations of solidarity for both small and large collectivities further and locates solidarity among co-nationals in the active imaginings of its members. Unlike traditional notions of community based around daily or frequent and repeated acts of interdependence, the members of even small nations will never experience interpersonal or collective intimacy with national co-habitants. Anderson’s explanation of the paradox that follows, namely that we have a palpably greater sense of national feeling in many parts of the world but the states in which this occurs are vast and impersonal, involves injecting imagination into the operations of national identity. In explaining how collectivities that are large, dispersed and ethnically or linguistically diverse, might live precisely as a community, language plays a decisive role, as print languages, diffused writing, and narration help form the conditions of both instilling and modifying national consciousness.

Modernists agree that nations are constructed, though they stress that this happens essentially ‘from above’, with necessary sense relations with those ‘below’; found in the assumptions, hopes, needs and interests of ‘ordinary people’ (Hobsawm, passim 1992). In such interactions national feeling can
emerge or be invigorated where the designs of state makers are sensitive to the aspirations of populations. Languages have been centrally involved in the creation, ideation and maintenance of nations, whether as legitimations for separate statehood or as unifying ‘traditions’ after statehood.

But these processes have been based on distinct national languages. Pluri-lingualism is a radically different endeavour, although it is logically and practically consistent with some kinds of cohesive statehood. Perhaps more easily facilitated under civic identities but not impossible under ethnic statehood, it is still an unfolding story. However even a cursory view towards the pre-national state, where dynastic or religious rule, in both cases trans-national, was the norm over all the present European space, shows that pluri-lingualism was the unremarked and normal state. Perhaps trans-nationalism of the third millennium recovers some of the separation of political nation from cultural nation that seemed to characterise pre-nation-state formations.

As Bhaba (1991) points out nations are also ‘narrated’ into existence, telling and hearing narratives of endless repetition. Beyond territory, administration and economy nation-states involve and produce “cultural signification”. Cultural signification for pluralism is its own distinctive narration that seeks to enshrine pluri-lingualism, whereas states fashioned on single ethnicities bolstered only single languages. Since pluralism has not been the narrative of states and nations it won’t be possible to be confident, or pessimistic, of its prospects until the stories are devised and told. Anderson is sceptical about whether trans-national structures and entities, say, the Association of South East Asian Nations, or, indeed, the European Union and Council of Europe can produce attachment. He writes “…in themselves, market-zones, natural-geographic or politico-administrative, do not create attachments. Who will die for Comecon or the EEC?” (1991: 53). But there are many kinds and degrees of attachment and emotional commitment that fall short of the willingness for the ultimate sacrifice, but that are worthwhile advances of present human modes of solidarity, and which are more appropriate in a globalising world. In moves towards realizing these kinds of solidarity language education can make a distinctive and positive contribution, perhaps the unique contribution, if language education is not conceptualised merely as technical mastery of a linguistic code but as induction in intercultural practice. Some of the solidarity modes that this kind of language education fosters might be: trans-national mobility; cross-culturally effective communication skill, and trans-cultural psychological dispositions such as the ability to analyse history, values and general information from different perspectives, tolerating the ambiguity that may be inherent in such practices; enhanced literacy; artistic or aesthetic expansion; and so on.

In the Australian case public policy on languages other than English has been an instrument for nation making, seeking at different times to sustain multiculturalism, to integrate immigrants or placate mainstream populations about the persistence of linguistic and ethnic differences, or to advance the nation’s accommodation to its Asian geography. Similarly, English has been pressed into national service, but with different ideological aspirations attached to it. Originally invoking identification with Britain, English norms and
standards later became absorbed into a politics of assertive cultural autonomy (Australianism) but still within a broad matrix of British identity, and later still, became enmeshed in a politics of ambivalence (embrace and rejection) towards both British and American influence. At times under the influence of critical theory English teaching aimed to ameliorate class inequalities or to bolster transnational identifications. From Asian regionalism, to disengaging from colonial cultural dependence, to validating cultural pluralism or institutionalising minority interests, while all the while, of course, giving life to politics of energetic resistance and rejection of all of these, language education gives rise to multiple possibilities of ambition and desire. The evidence from the history of language policy shows this will to construct ideologies of nation; it proves only that the desire to construct new entities of solidarity is an ambition that has a hold on language planners. Some desires for making new entities of solidarity have been, to use Anderson’s terms, politically viable, some have been emotionally plausible; few have been modest in the changes they were seeking to bring about.

In the intensified complexity produced by globalising economies, language education and national identity, in their separate ways, are under considerable challenge. Relations between language education and national identity are also made more complex by contemporary notions of culture that repudiate essentialised and primordial views and understandings. Cultures are not “separate, bounded and internally uniform” but “overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated” (Tully 1997: 10). It follows that identities are multiple and shifting, always communicated and often about communication. Language education is inextricably involved in the construction of new, or the enshrining of existing, identities. Understanding language education as a practice of intercultural exploration, competence-acquiring processes for dealing with otherness and as local experimentation in global difference, we can confidently place both, language education and identity, as prominent vehicles in forging new worlds.

Perhaps unconscious, or possibly all too consciously, there has been continuing awareness of the identity forming capability of language policy in Australia. One effect has been to convert language policy texts, and language education policy, into sites where identities have been displayed, contested, negotiated and defined. This may be always the case, but recent experience has supplied some interesting lessons and experimentation, both hopeful and less so.
References


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