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Meeting: informal Dialogue on the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights seen through the lens of compliance research (Strasbourg, 30 November 2020) organised under the aegis of the German Presidency of the Committee of Ministers

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Réunion : Dialogue informel sur l'exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme vue à travers le prisme de la recherche sur la conformité (Strasbourg, 30 novembre 2020), organisé sous l'égide de la présidence allemande du Comité des Ministres

(anglais uniquement)

Presentations by the speakers :

- David Kosar / Jan Petrov (Czech Republic)
- Davide Paris (Italy)
- Øyvind Stiansen (Norway)

JUDICIAL STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Strasbourg, 30 November 2020

Beyond Compliance:

Judicial Implementation of the Strasbourg Case Law

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The research leading to this article has received funding from the Czech Science Foundation under grant agreement No. 16-09415S, panel P408.

Domestic level matters

Significance of the domestic level in ECHR System

- ECtHR as one of many actors within the multi-level ECHR system

- Legal grounding of the ECtHR‘s impact on national legal systems:

A. Obligation to execute the Strasbourg Court‘s judgments

(1) just satisfaction

(2) individual measures

(3) general measures

B. Res interpretata effect

- implications for the states which were not parties to the proceedings

=> Two roles of domestic authorities – “diffusers” and “filters”

“Diffusing” phase



“Filtering” phase



Problematizing the “ideal” model

- Reality – more open-ended story & instances of partial compliance and non-compliance
  - Principled non-execution vs. dilatory non-execution (de Londras & Dzehtsiarou)
- Domestic level is not monolithic:
  - plurality of domestic actors
  - divergent interests and attitudes
  - different capacity (resources & expertise) and willingness to act
  - complex mutual relations
- Individual actors and their potential contribution to implementation processes

Judicial Compliance – Unpacking the Judiciary

Plurality of Domestic Actors

- State is not a monolithic bloc
  - “no single domestic actor, not even the strongest executive, can satisfy all of the tribunals' mandates, legally or logistically” (Hillebrecht)

- We have to “unpack” it
  - Executive, legislature, judiciary, civil society & NGOs, pressure groups, Government Agent etc.
  - We can go further
    - Judiciary => constitutional courts, supreme court, lower courts

Unpacking the Domestic Judiciary

- Even the judiciary is not a monolithic bloc (it is not “it”, but “they”)
- Key Judicial Actors
  - Constitutional court (if it exists)
  - Top ordinary court(s)
  - Lower courts (ECtHR acceptance can be lower or higher than at top courts)
  - Judicial associations
  - Sometimes even individual actors within the judiciary matter
    - court presidents
    - individual judges (e.g. influential Justices of ConCourts/SCs)
    - law clerks
- These actors interact (war of courts = ConCourt vs. general courts, Supreme Court vs. lower courts)

Judicial Compliance – Treatment of ECtHR Case Law

Impact of rulings of the ECtHR on domestic (apex) courts

I.

Macro level

- Automated quantitative analysis of references to ECtHR case law by domestic (apex) courts
- Studies to what extent ECtHR is “living” domestically
- RQ: Which ECtHR cases are referred to? How? How often?

II.

Meso level

- Qualitative codebook analysis of references to ECtHR case law by domestic courts
- RQ: How domestic courts use ECtHR rulings in their argumentation?
- Substantive vs. supporting influence
- Following/distinguishing/rejecting
- Invalidation/direct application/ conforming interpretation etc.

III.

Micro level

- In-depth qualitative analysis of the usage of ECtHR case law in leading domestic cases (e.g. ne bis in idem, free assembly)
- RQ: Do ECtHR rulings matter in leading domestic cases?
- Includes normative assessment of the citations (obsolete citation, “fig leave” citation etc.)
- zeroes in on strategic citations (gate-keeping, passive-aggressive approach etc.)

Meso-level analysis

How is the case followed	Following	Distinguishing	Refusing			
Influence of the HR case on the reasoning	Supportive	Substantive				
Technique of the HR case application	Invalidation of domestic legal norm	Primacy (in case of conflict) and application of ECHR50)	Conforming interpretation of national law with ECHR50	Filling the gap in the legislation/Giving it more precision	“Blessing” the domestic law	Other

Broader Implications

Where is the field heading?

- We need to go beyond (judicial) compliance
  - Embeddedness of ECHR50
  - Is ECHR50 a lived instrument and taken seriously? (not only as an "ornament" or "collateral argument")
  - From compliance to influence of ECtHR case law on domestic (apex) courts' case law

Good practice

- How to induce/nudge (judicial) compliance
  1. Overcoming limited capability
     - ECHR commentaries written by local authors (“translators”)
     - Tailored domestic training by local interlocutors
     - Specialized analytical departments at apex courts
     - “College of experts dealing with implementation of ECtHR’s judgments” convened by GA (ministries & apex courts represented) => coordination
     - ECtHR: thematic fact sheets (updated, translated) & superior courts network
  2. Overcoming principled resistance (beyond Article 46(4) ECHR)
     - reframe the issue domestically, improve the reasoning by ECtHR, clarify implementation steps, international pressure
     - exploit the “windows of opportunity” (x lapse of time) – elections, external shocks
- Government Agent = intermediary between courts & politicians, expertise&coordination
  - Under-researched topic (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of FA, Office of the President)
  - Length of his/her term, degree of autonomy, budget, prestige etc.

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Thank you very much
for your attention!

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Potential and limits of constitutional constraints in securing compliance with the judgments of the ECtHR

Evidence from a recent comparative research: Research Handbook on Compliance in International Human Rights Law, edited by R. Grote, M. Morales Antoniazzi, and D. Paris, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2021

Davide Paris, University of Foggia (IT), davide.paris@unifg.it

Open Dialogue on the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights seen through the lens of compliance research
Strasbourg, 30 November 2020

Context

"The ECHR is the most effective human rights regime in the world"
Keller & Stone Sweet 2008

⟺

"a number of persistent difficulties in the execution of certain judgments by respondent States"
13th Annual Report of the CM

- Payment of „just satisfaction" vs adoption of individual and general measures
- Minimalist compliance
- Selective compliance: the same State, in the same time span, promptly and fully complies with some judgments, whereas other judgments are stuck in partial/no compliance

problems of capacity of domestic actors, problems of resources, insufficient political will or even clear disagreement with a Strasbourg ruling
13th Annual Report of the CM

To what extent can constitutional arrangements at the national level help compliance with the ECtHR judgments, especially when compliance is politically difficult?

Parliaments

"Many parliaments still have not established special structures to examine the compatibility of draft legislation with the Convention and to systematically monitor the implementation of the Court's judgments concerning their countries, neither have they organised regular parliamentary debates on this subject"

(Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,
Report on The Implementation of Judgments of the ECtHR, 15 July 2020, § 72)

"The quality of parliamentary engagement as a factor influencing the determination of the margin of appreciation by the ECtHR" (Donald 2015)

Judicial Compliance

Pros	Cons
Quicker and more effective	Lack of power, expertise, or legitimacy
Strengthening the legitimacy of the ECHR (short term)	Weakening the legitimacy of the ECHR (long term)

- ECtHR, M. v. Germany, 17 December 2009

BVerfG, 2 BvR 2365/09, 4 May 2011

«the Court considers [...] that by its judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court implemented this Court's findings [...] in the domestic legal order. It thereby fully assumed that responsibility. [...] In the light of the foregoing, the Court does not consider it necessary to indicate any specific or general measures to the respondent State which are called for in the execution of this judgment» (ECtHR, Kronfeldner v. Germany, 19 January 2012, n. 21906/09, § 102-103)

- ECtHR, Torreggiani v. Italy, 8 January 2013

Corte costituzionale, sent. 279/2013

«overcrowding cannot be countered with the remedy indicated by the referring courts because [...] it would achieve this result in a random manner, giving rise to differences in treatment between prisoners.»
«a range of possible legislative arrangements»
(Corte costituzionale, judgment 279/2013)

Courts resisting courts

Judicial dialogue...

...or judicial justification for non-compliance?



- Safety net rather than standard way of compliance
- Judicial independence matters

NGOs

- Rule 9(2) of the Rules of the CM but also pressure and dialogue at the national level
- Some positive examples of NGOs' participation include NGO human rights forum, involvement in defining the State's response, consultation in the legislative process
- No need for a specific legal framework for NGOs participation
- Transparency and receptiveness of domestic authorities to external actors

Conclusions

- Focus on the constitutional arrangements to secure compliance
- Improving parliamentary structures and processes
- Courts as a safety net
- Receptiveness to the contribution of civil society

Thank you for your attention!

Political Science Research on Compliance with ECtHR Judgments

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Open Dialogue on The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights seen through the lens of compliance research (Strasbourg, 30 November 2020)

Outline

Compliance Research in Political Science

- Implementation problem: The ECtHR relies on the respondent states to give effect to its judgments.
- Under what conditions are judgments promptly executed and under what conditions are they not?
- Explanations centre on what factors make political actors in respondent states more or less willing/able to comply.
- Tracking time between (lead case) judgment and a final resolution using statistical methods.

Main Findings from Compliance Research

- Compliance depends on domestic politics
- Country-level differences help identify general dynamics:
  1. Capacity to identify and implement appropriate remedies
  2. Government accountability
  3. Perceived benefits/legitimacy of international human rights institutions



The European Journal of International Law Vol. 25 no. 1

Domestic Implementation of European Court of Human Rights Judgments: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter: A Reply to Dia Anagnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

Erik Voeten*

Abstract

This article responds to the valuable contribution by Dia Anagnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi in which they analyse how nine countries implemented European Court of Human Rights judgments that found violations of Articles 8–11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Their conclusion that capacity plays an important role in the implementation of ECtHR judgments is certainly correct. In this short response, I highlight various aspects of the authors' analysis where they make problematic choices with regard to data and statistical methods. First, I describe and use a more comprehensive dataset that allows us to reach more generalizable conclusions. Secondly, I show how survival analysis is a more appropriate framework than logit or linear regression for analysing these data. Thirdly, I argue that the difficulty of the implementation task needs to be accounted for in any analysis of cross-country variation in implementation. My re-analysis shows that low capacity countries attract judgments that are more difficult to implement. The analysis also uncovers a subtle relationship between time, institutional capacity, and checks and balances. High capacity helps willing politicians to implement judgments quickly. Yet, among judgments that have been pending longer, countries with higher capacity are no quicker to implement than lower capacity countries. By contrast, checks and balances initially slow down implementation but help to eventually ensure begrudging implementation.

* Erik Voeten is the Peter F. Krogh Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Justice in World Affairs at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government. Email: ev42@georgetown.edu.

EJIL (2014), Vol. 25 No. 1, 229–238 doi:10.1093/ejil/chu004

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

Predictions based on a Cox model controlling for needed remedies, type and number of human rights violations, strength of accountability institutions, and democratic history.

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The power of human rights tribunals: Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights and domestic policy change

Courtney Hillebrecht
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Abstract
When international human rights tribunals like the European Court of Human Rights find states responsible for human rights abuses, they ask governments to pay reparation to the victims, engage in symbolic measures, and enact the policy changes necessary to ensure that the violations do not recur. This article considers the conditions under which states comply with these rulings, especially when the tribunals are unable and often unwilling to provide strict enforcement. This article extends current theories about the domestic politics of compliance with international human rights law to the case of the European Court of Human Rights. This article analyzes a new, hand-coded data set on states' compliance with over 1000 discrete obligations handed down by the European Court of Human Rights that ask states to change their human rights policies. The results of these analyses suggest that robust domestic institutions, particularly executive constraints, are the key to compliance with the European Court of Human Rights. When domestic institutions enforce the Court's rulings, the results can be significant changes in states' human rights policies and practices.

Keywords
Compliance, domestic politics, European Court of Human Rights, human rights, international law, supranational courts

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

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

Are New Democracies Better Human Rights Compliers?

Sharanbir Grewal and Erik Voeten

Abstract Recent scholarship finds that new democracies are more likely than established democracies to make binding commitments to international human rights institutions. Are new democracies also better at following through on these commitments? Stated differently, does their greater willingness to join international institutions reflect a genuine commitment to human rights reform or is it just "cheap talk?" We analyze this question using a new data set of more than 1,000 leading European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cases. Since new democracies face judgments that are more difficult to implement than established democracies, we employ a genetic matching algorithm to balance the data set. After controlling for bureaucratic and judicial capacity, we find that new democracies do implement similar ECtHR judgments initially more quickly than established democracies, but this effect reverses the longer a judgment remains pending. Although new democracies have incentives to implement judgments quickly, they sometimes lack checks and balances that help ensure implementation should an executive resist.

A growing literature asserts that new democracies are more likely than stable democracies to make binding commitments to international human rights institutions. Governments in new democracies may wish to "lock-in" reforms for future governments that could be less respectful of individual rights.[1] New democracies also have stronger incentives to credibly communicate to domestic and international audiences that they are sincere about human rights reform.[2] These governments are therefore more willing to pay the sovereignty costs associated with delegating authority to an international court with compulsory jurisdiction than are governments in established democracies.

Are new democracies also more likely to implement the judgments of international human rights courts? The theoretical arguments imply as much. If a government truly intends to lock in rights improvements, then it ought to implement international court

The authors would like to thank Karen Alter, Liesbeth Hooghe, Yonatan Lupu, Gary Marks, Michael Zurn, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. An earlier version was presented at the 2013 Conference on European Studies (Amsterdam) and the 2013 annual Political Science Association meeting. This research was supported in part by the Lisa J. Raines Research Fellowship and the Carroll Fellows Initiative.

1. For example, Moravcsik 2000.
2. See, for example, Pevehouse 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Simmons and Danner 2010; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 8–9; Guzman 2008; and Elsig, Milewicz, and Stürchler 2011.

International Organization 69, Spring 2015, pp. 497–518

doi:10.1017/S0020818314000435

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

Predictions based on a Cox model controlling for needed remedies, type and number of human rights violations, bureaucratic capacity, and strength of accountability institutions.

Main Findings from Compliance Research

- Case-level factors can influence how domestic politics unfold
  1. Clarity concerning needed measures
  2. Societal awareness of compliance performance (no systematic research in the ECtHR context)

British Journal of Political Science (2019), page 1 of 9
doi:10.1017/S0007123419000292

British Journal of Political Science

LETTER

Directing Compliance? Remedial Approach and Compliance with European Court of Human Rights Judgments

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Keywords: European Court of Human Rights; judicial politics; compliance; human rights; courts; judicialization; implementation; law and politics

Judicial power is often limited by courts' reliance on other actors to implement their rulings (Carrubba and Gabel 2015; Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 2008; Hall 2014; Johns 2015; Kapiszewski and Taylor 2013; Rosenberg 2008; Vanberg 2001; Vanberg 2005). To promote compliance, courts therefore employ strategies designed to legitimize their judgments (Hume 2006; Larsson et al. 2017; Lupu and Voeten 2012), raise public awareness (Krehbiel 2016; Staton 2006) and enable pro-compliance constituencies to monitor implementation (Gauri, Staton and Cullell 2015; Staton and Romero forthcoming). However, few scholars have evaluated whether such strategies are effective (Keck and Strother 2016, 3; but see Gauri, Staton and Cullell 2015; Staton and Romero 2019). Thus we know that courts act strategically to promote compliance, but we do not yet know the conditions under which such strategies may succeed.

I investigate judges' ability to promote compliance in the context of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Despite being considered 'the most effective human rights regime in the world' (Stone Sweet and Keller 2008), the ECtHR faces significant compliance problems (Hillebrecht 2014a; Hillebrecht 2014b). While the ECtHR traditionally leaves the identification of remedies to respondent states, its compliance problems have motivated the Court to start spelling out necessary remedies in selected judgments (Keller and Marti 2015, 836).[1] Such remedial indications may enable pro-compliance actors to argue more forcefully that specific remedies are necessary and to credibly call out non-compliance (Spriggs 1996, 1127; Staton and Vanberg 2008).

To investigate the efficacy of the ECtHR's new remedial approach, I employ an original dataset of ECtHR judgments and their implementation by respondent states. The dataset includes information concerning both (1) required remedies and other judgment characteristics and (2) the length and outcome of the compliance process.[2] Using these data, I consider how remedial indications affect compliance by respondent states.

After conditioning on the factors that influence the ECtHR's decision to indicate remedies, I find that judgments containing remedial indications are implemented faster than comparable judgments without such indications. Remedial indications are particularly helpful when the institutional context enables pro-compliance actors to hold governments accountable. These findings suggest that courts can succeed in promoting quicker compliance with their judgments.

[1]The Appendix provides further details concerning the ECtHR, its compliance problem and the shift in remedial approach.
[2]More information about the dataset is available in the Appendix.

Main Findings from Compliance Research

- Case-level factors can influence how domestic politics unfold
  1. Clarity concerning needed measures
  2. Societal awareness of compliance performance (no systematic research in the ECtHR context)

Predictions based on Cox models estimated after matching on needed remedies, type and number of human rights violations, bureaucratic capacity, strength of accountability institutions, and democratic history

Main Findings from Compliance Research

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  1. Clarity concerning needed measures
  2. Societal awareness of compliance performance (no systematic research in the ECtHR context)

International Studies Quarterly (2019) **63**, 477–491

Rational Remedies: The Role of Opinion Clarity in the Inter-American Human Rights System

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AND

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International courts have far-from-perfect records of compliance. States routinely delay the implementation of policy changes necessary to come into line with international obligations. Some judicial orders are simply ignored in their entirety. Yet judicial orders aimed at potentially recalcitrant states often vaguely express what is required and thus create conditions for delay and defiance. This article leverages a detailed public monitoring system for decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to evaluate a model of judicial opinion writing that connects the informational challenges associated with effectuating significant policy change to the language that judges adopt in their orders and, ultimately, to the reactions of states. Our results suggest that uncertainty about how precisely to bring about a policy change influences compliance by reducing the clarity of judicial orders. Flexibility in language permits judges to tradeoff maximal pressure for compliance for the ability to leverage local knowledge about how to bring a state in line with its international obligations. From this perspective, noncompliant outcomes are not necessarily a clear signal of weak judicial institutions, but, instead, they are a natural piece of the process by which judges manage difficult policy-making tasks.

The study of Latin American politics is the study of judicialized politics. Judges across the region routinely shape the production of public policy where once executives, legislatures, and bureaucracies dominated (e.g., Wilson 2009; Ríos-Figueroa 2016; Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell 2016). The study of Latin American politics is also the study of transnational and international politics. Most obviously, the protection of human rights in Latin American political systems is regulated by overlapping, often-complementary, domestic and international legal obligations, interpreted by judges at both the domestic and international levels, and promoted by international advocacy networks (e.g., Sikkink 2005; Brewer-Carías 2009; Huneeus 2011; Binder 2011; Dulitzky 2015). For these reasons, studies of human rights in Latin America often illuminate the complex ways in which policy is produced in a system that is neither fully international nor fully domestic. Yet studies of human rights in Latin America also highlight core features of politics, which transcend the international and domestic levels, as well as the complications that naturally follow from the interconnectedness of a transnational legal system.

One of these features is that courts empowered to review a state's policies for consistency with their legal obligations are tasked with two interrelated challenges. They craft rules that detail how to evaluate policies in light of a substantive interpretation of the obligation, and, having found a violation of this obligation, courts often construct remedies in the form of direct orders to states explaining how to bring their policies in line with the obligation. Both of these tasks, especially the remedial task, require the resolution of a "means–ends" problem. A judge may know what outcome she desires, but she may be uncertain about how to ensure that this outcome is realized. Importantly, although common concepts of the rule of law value legal clarity,[1] judges do not always clearly express how they expect states to remedy their violations (Schlag 1985; Lax 2012). Deadlines for policy change are set indefinitely; general activities are ordered, as in "investigate this crime" or "build this program," but the details of how precisely to do this are left largely to the state's imagination. The flexibility with which orders can be expressed in natural language offers judges a measure of control over the process linking legal obligations and legal orders to policy outcomes. Vagueness can be used to provide state officials with a measure of discretion, allowing them freedom to use local knowledge about particular processes and actors to reach outcomes that judges desire but would struggle to produce absent better information. Yet, because vagueness invites delays, resistance, and, sometimes, outright defiance (Spriggs 1997), this ability to manage the means–ends problem through vagueness invites a tradeoff. Informational gains must be traded off against increasing chances of noncompliance.

Our article considers this tradeoff in the context of both decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR or simply the Court) and state reactions to its orders. We leverage a rich source of data made available by the Court's compliance-monitoring process to consider implications of a theoretical model designed precisely to evaluate the choice of remedies in political contexts where compliance with judicial orders cannot be assumed. The model that guides us envisions two roles for vagueness. Vague orders permit judges to take advantage of policy expertise in state bureaucracies that can aid in the translation of a legal obligation to a policy outcome. In this way, vagueness

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[1] See discussions in Rodriguez, McCubbins, and Weingast (2010) and Waldron (2002).

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Main Findings from Compliance Research

- Case-level factors can influence how domestic politics unfold
  1. Clarity concerning needed measures
  2. Societal awareness of compliance performance (no systematic research in the ECtHR context)

The Costa Rican Supreme Court's Compliance Monitoring System

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In the summer of 2009, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica began monitoring compliance with its direct orders in amparo and habeas corpus cases. The court announced the early results from its analysis at a well-attended March 2010 press conference. The president of the court promised to continue monitoring and publicizing the results for the foreseeable future. We use a unique data set on compliance derived from this monitoring system to evaluate theoretical claims about the relationship between the transparency of judicial orders and compliance. We observe that vague orders, and orders issued without definite time frames for compliance, were associated with delayed implementation. We also find that orders issued after the press conference were implemented roughly two months earlier than orders issued just prior to the press conference.

A core element of the rule of law is that courts should be capable of remedying violations of legal obligations (Raz 1997, 218). To do so, relevant parties must comply with direct judicial orders. Judges themselves value compliance (e.g., Huneeus 2010; Widner 2001) in part because compliance is a key component of judicial power (Cameron 2002). Important factors that promote powerful courts rest largely beyond judicial control. Most obviously, judges are unlikely to have an immediate and strong influence on the degree to which political power is fragmented (Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 2011; Ríos-Figueroa 2007) or on the drafting of formal rules that insulate themselves from external pressure (Pozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa 2010). But some factors may be subject to judicial influence. Compliance, and judicial power more generally, depends on public support, which in turn is related to the transparency of the conflicts courts resolve because without at least the possibility of informing people about noncompliance, public support does not matter (Vanberg 2005; Yadav and Mukherjee 2014); and transparency *is* something that judges can influence.

In June 2009, we began a discussion with the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica (colloquially, the "Sala Cuarta" or "Sala IV") concerning potential experimental research designs aimed at understanding better their compliance process. Instead of conducting experimental research, however, the Sala IV built its own system for monitoring compliance with all direct orders to public officials in its amparo and habeas corpus jurisdictions. In October, it began to quietly track reactions to its orders. Six months later, the Sala IV held a press conference to announce its preliminary results, which called into question the compliance record of major arms of the Costa Rican state. The press conference, advertised one week in advance, was well-attended and received careful coverage in the media.[1]

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Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the *JOP* Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix containing supplemental analyses is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/681260 and will also be made available at www.cambridge.org/cjo/.

1. "Sala IV presentará plan para confirmar cumplimiento de sentencia," *Radio Reloj*, February 24, 2010; "Seguimiento de Sentencias," *La Nación*, March 3, 2010; "Gobierno con baja nota en ejecución de fallos de Sala IV," *Diario Extra*, March 3, 2010.

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Using Compliance Research to Improve the Execution of Judgments

- Compliance depends on capacity, political will, and accountability politics
- Assisting respondent states in identifying and implementing remedies is likely to be important, but not sufficient
- Enabling third parties to monitor the implementation process facilitates prompt compliance
  - Further developing HUDOC-Exec and similar tools may help increase clarity concerning required measures and awareness about compliance performance