The misuse of history

Symposium on "Facing misuses of history"
Oslo (Norway)
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Keynote speech, by Georg Iggers
General report, by Laurent Wirth

Project "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century"

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– the promotion of an awareness of European identity;

– the search for common responses to the great challenges facing European society.

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1. Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

Vladimir: *…how is it that of the four Evangelists only one speaks of a thief being saved? The four of them were there – or thereabouts – and only one speaks of a thief being saved … Why believe him rather than the others?*

Estragon: *Who believes him?*

Vladimir: *Everybody. It's the only version they know.*

Samuel Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*
(Faber and Faber, 1956, pp. 12-13)

About the symposium

The misuse of history is based on the symposium "Facing misuses of history", organised jointly by the Council of Europe's Council for Cultural Co-operation (CDCC) and the Norwegian Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs, as part of the project "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century" (see appendix). Besides the keynote speech and the general report, this book contains a selection of the speeches and papers presented at the symposium.

After discussing what makes history, by its very nature, vulnerable to distortion, the participants attempted to clarify why and by whom history could be abused, looking at a wide variety of misuses of history (abuse by denial of historical facts, by falsification, by fixation on a particular event, by omission, out of laziness or ignorance, by exploitation for extraneous purposes, to name but a few). They concluded that while contemporary history is the most susceptible, all historical periods can be open to distortion. Similarly, all fields of history – not only political but also economic, social and cultural history – run the risk of abuse. Finally, the participants identified a number of approaches to face and counter misuses of history.

The keynote speaker, Georg Iggers, is Distinguished Professor of History emeritus at the State University of New York at Buffalo in the United States, where he teaches intellectual history and historiography. He is the author of *Historiography in the twentieth century: from scientific objectivity to the post-modern challenge* (Wesleyan University Press 1997).

Laurent Wirth, the general rapporteur, has a doctorate in history and is a senior inspector in the French Education Ministry. He is the author of a book and several articles on the peasants of Haute Auvergne in the 19th century and his latest book is *L'exception française 19e-20e siècle* (Armand Colin 2000).

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Historiography in the 20th century

Keynote speech by Georg Iggers

In this brief talk I would like to combine two themes: the topic on which I have been asked to speak, historiography in the 20th century, and the theme of the conference, facing misuses of history. Historical thought in the late 20th century has entered a period of self-examination which reflects the catastrophes that the world has experienced in this century. No century began with as great confidence in the prospects for humanity than did ours. And no other century has seen as much barbarism, as much deliberate destruction of human lives and as systematic tyranny and this with the instruments provided by the much-vaunted scientific and technological progress. On the one hand there has been remarkable progress in the creation of a global consciousness, a global economy and global political institutions, and on the other hand the global economy has created not only new wealth but also new poverty within the industrial countries and in the former colonial world. The second half of this century has seen both the overcoming of old national conflicts, particularly in the countries of the European Union, and bitter ethnic and national conflicts in others, the spread of tolerance in multicultural societies as well as the resurgence of religious fanaticism and dogmatism.

To understand why the main forms of historical writing and particularly of historical scholarship came under attack in the last part of the 20th century we have to examine contradictions in the conception of history and historical knowledge that have guided them. We must go back to the origins of a modern historical consciousness in the Enlightenment. Critics such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Michel Foucault, and Jean François Lyotard have pointed at the fundamental tension within the Enlightenment outlook which on the one had wanted to emancipate human beings and on the other hand in fact laid the basis for heightened control and exploitation of men and women.

The modern historical outlook that emerged in the 18th century and dominated historical thought well into the second half of the 20th rested on two

interrelated assumptions, which both suffered from internal contradictions. These assumptions were, firstly, that history possesses direction and coherence and secondly, that objective, scientific understanding of this process is possible.

First to the conception that history is a continuous, coherent process: this is a new idea, not found in western thought previously or in non-western, for example far eastern thought. It is true that the idea of history moving toward an eschatological end was central to Judaeo-Christian-Islamic thought, but this was a religious conception not applicable to the secular sphere which had no coherence. The secular notion that there was *one* history, identical with world history, was new in the 18th century and is characteristic of a peculiarly modern outlook. This notion dominated historical thought until very recently. An earlier pre-modern outlook was reflected in the English *Universal history* begun in 1736. Written from a Christian perspective, faithfully adhering to Biblical accounts of the origins and early history of mankind, it presented the histories of many peoples, not only those of the west, and even including Black Africa. Instead of one history, it told many histories. Each volume contained an accumulation of information about geography, climate, social and legal structures, family patterns and religious traditions. Only its sections about politics told continuous stories, and even here the tendency was to concentrate on rulers rather than on development. Yet from the modern perspective history consists not in the accumulation of historical data but in a continuous narrative of the history of mankind. But every narrative necessarily contains a plot which involves the selection of relevant and the exclusion of irrelevant data. Relevant was what fitted into the grand narrative which made up world history and this history was for the most part made by an élite in central positions of power. The common people and the activities of everyday life, to which the German historian Droysen contemptuously referred to as *Geschäfte* (transactions of everyday life), were not a part of history proper *(Geschichte).* A sharp distinction was drawn between civilised and primitive peoples and among civilised peoples there were gradations of civilisation. Ultimately the west alone had a place in world history. Leopold von Ranke, hailed in the 19th century as the "father of historical science", as if there had not been serious historical inquiry long before, proclaimed that China and India had no history, that they were stagnant, that they had not developed since their beginnings, and thus could not be the subject of historical study, but needed to be consigned to natural history. While historians from Herodotus until the 18th century had generally recognised the impact of the Near East, Egypt and Babylonia, on the formation of civilisation, the new classic scholars such as Winckelmann emphasised that European civilisation had its roots in classical Greek culture, which they saw as innovative and basically separate from those of the Near East. And while 17th-century thinkers such as Leibniz still saw China as a civilisation of equal or even higher status than that of Europe, 19th-century writers as diverse as Guizot, Hegel, Burck-

hardt, Renan, Buckle, and last but not least Marx and Max Weber stressed the superiority of the civilisation of the west. Involved in this ethnocentric view were also the beginnings of colonial attitudes and of racism. Here again the contradictions of the modern outlook became apparent. The University of Göttingen in the late 18th century under the impact of the Enlightenment saw the beginnings of an empirical anthropology which went in two diverse directions. While one argued for the basic equality of human beings, another, represented by Christoph Meiners, tried to establish a hierarchy of races on the basis of skull measurements with the Nordic Europeans at the top and the darker peoples at the bottom.

In the course of the 19th century historians focused increasingly on national history and within national history on politics and political élites. Certain individuals and classes were particularly privileged as we shall see while others were regarded as irrelevant, ahistorical. Only those who contributed to the grand narrative were historical.

But coming closer to the question of the misuses of history, we come to the second basic component of the modern historical outlook, the ideal of scientific history. It is important to stress the role which professionalisation has played in 19th- and 20th-century historiography. History until the 19th century had at least in the western world been written by men in public life or men of letters – I think of Thucydides, Caesar, Tacitus, Machiavelli, Voltaire, and Gibbon among others. This continued to be true of many writers in the 19th and 20th century such as Maculay, Bancroft, Henry and Brooks Adams, Gustav Freytag, Winston Churchill, Bruce Catton, Barbara Tuchman, to mention only a few. But the professional historians have gained increasing authority since the early 19th century and continue to hold it today despite recent criticisms of professionalism.

Historical studies first became professionalised in Prussia in the period of restoration after the Napoleonic wars. It occurred first in Prussia not necessarily because Prussia represented a highly modern society but because it offered a peculiar mixture of modernisation and resistance to modernisation. While on the economic, juridical, and to an extent the social level, Prussia and Germany generally moved in the direction of western Europe, on the political level it resisted the move to constitutionalism and parliamentary government. The reform of the university was closely linked to the transformation of the bureaucracy which played a key role in governing the emerging society. Professionalism was to guarantee impartiality and objectivity. The professionally trained historian claimed that in contrast to the amateur he could speak with authority, that, in Ranke's words, he could without prejudice show "how things actually happened". To do this he must base himself purely on primary evidence as contained above all in documentary sources. I am intentionally saying he, because the profession until very recently systematically excluded women.

However, in fact, the profession as it developed in the 19th century was by no means disinterested. Everywhere professional historians devoted themselves to inventing images of national history – in Germany, in France, in Great Britain, in Poland, in Bohemia, in the United States, and later in Japan. Scholarship as it was practised by Michelet, Treitschke and Seeley did not discover the past as it was, but projected the ideals and the ideologies of 19th-century nationalism and middle class society into a distant past. Thus Droysen and Sybel set out to discover a German national consciousness among the Hohenzollern dynasts in the early modern period where none existed. Far from concentrating on the diversity and particularity of the past, the historians discovered a grand narrative in their national histories which gave these histories unity, direction, and coherence. Macaulay presented what has since been called the "Whig interpretation of history", the story of the emergence of the political and social *status quo* of 19th-century England as the best of all possible worlds. Michelet did something similar for the revolutionary tradition in France; the Prussian School portrayed the Bismarckian empire as the happy outcome of German history. Thus although historians generally rejected the idea of progress as schematic and unhistorical their historical narratives told the story of progress.

In the sections which follow I shall focus on professional historiography, because of the very important role it has played in historical writing, although, as will become clear, I recognise its limitations. Briefly I shall identify three major models of historical scholarship in the 20th century. I intentionally avoid the Kuhnian term "paradigm", because the latter suggests a unanimity within a scientific or scholarly community which simply does not exist in historical studies or generally in the cultural sciences. I want to distinguish between what for better terms I shall call a historicist, a social scientific, and a culturalist model.

The first model which originated in the 19th century dominated historical scholarship well into the middle of the 20th century. It followed the model of professionalism which I described above. It originated in the 1830s in Ranke's seminars at the University of Berlin with their focus on the systematic application of critical philological methods to documentary sources. In the second half of the 19th century this model was introduced in all German speaking universities; in the 1870s and 1880s it was adapted with some modifications in France, the United States, and Japan, and then with some delay in Italy, Netherlands, Russia, Scandinavia, Spain, Great Britain and China, and finally the former colonial countries. Despite the claim of objectivity and neutralist values, professional historians were almost all closely tied to the political outlook and the social values of the institutions in which they worked. Not that they were paid agents of these institutions, but that they generally shared the outlooks and values of these institutions and those of the social classes from which they were recruited. Thus the methods of historical scholarship were used by the next several generations of German historians to justify the Bismarckian solution of the German ques-

tion with all its antidemocratic aspects and in the aftermath of the Versailles Treaty to clear Germany of any guilt or responsibility for the outbreak of the first world war. In the United States the so-called scientific school of historians at Columbia University in the first third of the century set out in its studies of the Reconstruction following the American Civil War to demonstrate the racial inferiority of the Black population and legitimise discriminatory practices. In 1914 the frail international community of historians broke apart as professional historians in all countries with virtually no exceptions rallied to the flag and placed their scholarship at the service of the war effort. The explicit commitment to professionalism and therefore scientific objectivity obscured the ideological assumptions which underlay this claim.

By the end of the 19th century this first model, which nonetheless continued to be dominant through much of the 20th century, began to be challenged by adherents of social science models. It is difficult to reduce these adherents to a single denominator since they went in many different directions. Nevertheless they generally agreed in rejecting the older model not because it sought to be scientific but because from their view it was not scientific enough. They criticised the older model because it was narrative, not analytical, and focused on privileged élites rather than on broader aspects of society. In their sight it represented an outdated outlook which did not reflect the social and political conditions of a modern, industrial society. The focus now moved away from political narratives to the analysis of social structures and processes. Only an occasional historian such as Karl Lamprecht in his German history attempted to establish regularities and laws in historical development. For the most part historians such as Charles Beard, Henri Pirenne, and Lucien Febvre merely wanted to extend the scope of history to include broader segments of the population and consider the interaction of economic, social, geographic and political factors such as Febvre did in his very comprehensive regional history of the French province of Franche-Comté at the time of the Protestant Reformation.

There were two very distinct tendencies in the new social history. On the one hand there was the occupation with anonymous structures such as in Marc Bloch's *Feudal society* (1939-40) in which individual human beings virtually do not occur. On the other hand Eileen Power in *Medieval people* (1924) gave social history a human face in her biographies of a select number of common people, including women. In the immediate post-second world war period, historians oriented towards social sciences sought to make history into a rigorous analytical science working with quantitative models. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie proclaimed that "history that is not quantifiable cannot claim to be scientific." In his massive *Peasants of Languedoc* (1966), the second volume of which consists entirely of charts and statistics, he studied the interaction of population and food supply over a period of five hundred years and in a companion volume the history of climate since the year 1 000 with its effect on historical developments. The computer appeared conveniently at this moment. Robert Fogel, who since

then won the Nobel Prize for economics, together with Stanley Engerman in *Time on the cross* (1974) wanted once and for all to lay to rest the question of the profitability of slavery in the United States by feeding all possibly relevant data on the productivity of slaves and their living conditions into the computer. History, Fogel argued with Geoffrey Elton, the defender of the traditional Rankean model of history, if it is to be scientific, is not intended for the general public but is restricted to specialists, similarly as the strict natural sciences or economics are. The French history of mentalities, popular in the 1970s, sought to study changing attitudes in the 17th and 18th centuries on such existential questions as death by feeding thousands of testaments into the computer.

Similar to the older school of narrative political history, the new social-scientific orientation stressed that its scientific approach excluded value judgements. It did in fact free itself from the narrow nationalism of the older school and generally thought in comparative, global terms. Nevertheless, as in Walt Rostow's *Stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto* (1960), the advocates of a rigorous, quantitative social science believed in the solidity and rationality of a dynamic capitalist economic order. They too preached a "Whig interpretation of history" which saw history as a modernising process that reached its pinnacle in the post-war order, of which the foremost example was the United States. West German models of social-science history were more reluctant to apply quantitative methods and rather looked to Weber, and to an extent to Marx, for an approach to history which too stressed structures and processes and saw modernisation in similar normative terms but looked critically at Germany's failure to develop democratic institutions similar to those of other western European and North American industrial societies.

It is this complacent world of science and modernity which was shaken as the 20th century approached its end. The primary attack came not from historians but from philosophers and literary and cultural critics, although the new attitude was reflected in historical writing. The critique came from a New Left in the 1960s and 1970s but built on a tradition of antimodern thought which went back to earlier thinkers of the far political right, foremost Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. There existed on the right a deep-seated discontent with the evolving modern society which evolved at the time with its middle class values, its belief in scientific and technological progress and its affirmation of liberal or even democratic institutions. But while many conservatives wished to go back to a pre-modern world founded on Christian belief and aristocratic and monarchical structures, more radical thinkers like Jacob Burckhardt and Friedrich Nietzsche focused on the mass culture created by commercialisation. They challenged the two basic assumptions of the modern outlook, that the world could be understood through rational inquiry and that history possessed coherence and meaning. Central to their thought was also a fervent rejection of the ideal of the equal worth of human beings proclaimed by the Enlightenment and

the search for a new aristocratic order, not an aristocracy of birth but one of spirit. Martin Heidegger's fervent anti-rationalism and rejection of democracy in the Weimar Republic paved the way for his subsequent endorsement of the nazi regime in 1933.

But it is the left, and in fact a New Left, which took over many of the arguments of the cultural critics of the right, including its critique of science, technology, and progress, and which paid its tribute to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Its political aims were very different from those of the intellectual right. It fervently espoused the emancipation of human beings from external constraints, and it endorsed the very idea of human equality which the right, including Nietzsche and Heidegger, rejected. But it was convinced that the modern world as it had been shaped under capitalism with its stress on scientific and technological progress had created a monster which found its expression in the brutality of war, political repression, various forms of exploitation, and a distorted mass culture. What gave the New Left, which emerged in the 1960s in the face of the civil rights movement in the United States, the apartheid struggle in South Africa, and the war in Vietnam, its impetus was a continued deep sense of justice which went far beyond the more narrowly economic conceptions of the traditional Marxists and traditional liberals. Although the New Left inherited from Marxism its commitment of struggle against exploitation, it saw Marxism with its commitment to scientific and technological progress and its blind faith in productivity as merely a by-product of capitalism with no alternative view of culture. It was totally disillusioned with the Marxist-Leninist regimes of the Soviet bloc and China.

Parallel with the student movement of the 1960s there also emerged an intellectual critique of the modernist belief in science and progress. This critique took several forms. Of relevance to our discussion of historiography is first of all the critique of the idea of objectivity. Hayden White in *Metahistory: the historical imagination in 19th century Europe* (1973) examined the works of four master historians of the 19th century, Ranke, Michelet, Tocqueville, and Burckhardt, and concluded that works of history had no more claim to objectivity than did speculative philosophies of history or for that matter literary works of fiction. He agreed with the French literary critic, Roland Barthes, that all historical accounts are forms of literature and that there is no clear distinction between history and fiction. The research a historian does is in the final analysis irrelevant to the truth value of the historical work. It serves merely to buttress the story the historian has decided to tell in the first place.

The notion of objectivity itself was put into question. The historian obviously cannot confront the past directly as it was. He knows it only through texts. To quote Jacques Derrida: "There is nothing outside the text." We can therefore not assume that the text has any direct reference to an outside reality. Moreover every text is a linguistic construct. From the per-

spective of the extreme advocates of the linguistic turn, it is not reality which determines linguistic formulations but language which shapes and defines reality. Recurring to Nietzsche's notion of the will to power, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida see science and language as instruments of control and domination. Every historical, literary, or scientific text contains ideological elements of which the author is often not conscious but which define structures and strategies of power. For them, the very tradition of logical thought which has been characteristic of western thought since Socrates involves such patterns. The task of philosophy today, as they see it, is to deconstruct all expressions of thought in order to unveil the ideological elements they contain. This stress on deconstruction contains an interesting paradox. On the one hand it denies the possibility of any standards of objective knowledge, on the other hand it seeks to ferret out the irrational and ideological elements in all texts, but this is only possible if there are standards of rationality.

Further postmodern thinkers challenge the notion basic to modern historical theory that there is direction and coherence in history and with it the notion that the west occupies any privileged place in human history. The very notion that there is direction in history, which Lyotard and Baudrillard describe as a "grand narrative", has for them totalitarian implications as we have seen not only in the readiness of Marxist-Leninist utopians to sacrifice millions on the slaughterbank of history for a noble purpose and to dominate millions of others but also in a more subtle but by no means less dangerous way in the determination of capitalist advocates of a dynamic market economy to move relentlessly to a better future.

Can historical inquiry and writing be rescued from the epistemological relativism which this repudiation of scholarly objectivity implies? Hayden White argues that historical writing is indeed possible and can be meaningful but it must take on different forms. The 20th-century novel, White suggests, has recognised better than the historians the fragmentary character of reality and time and has abandoned the simplistic classical notions of continuity and coherence. For White it is time for the historians to turn to the classical works of 20th-century literary writing in novels, poetry, and drama as best represented for him in the "great classics of modernist writing" (Joyce, Proust, Woolf, Stein, Lawrence, Pound, Stevens and so forth) as models of historical writing.

What does all of this mean for historiography? Very little and very much. It means very little in so far as historians continue to assume, contrary to the above postmodernist theorists, that research is central to their work and that this research follows a logic of inquiry shared by the academic community which aims at reconstructing the past while recognising that such a reconstruction is likely to be incomplete and perspectivistic. Yet if we take the postmodernists we have discussed at their face value, then serious historical work is impossible, as for that matter is any sort of rational or scien-

tific inquiry. Then science as we know it is merely a ritualistic function of the western world, no more able to give answers to existential questions than the mythological imagination of so-called savage peoples. As for historical consciousness, White tells us that we may view it "as a specifically western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of modern industrial society can be retroactively substantiated".

Nevertheless, there has been a fundamental reorientation since the 1960s and 1970s in the topics historians have dealt with and their approaches to these topics. It is interesting that at a time when computers became increasing powerful tools the fascination with numbers gave way to an increasing attention to qualitative aspects of life. In 1975, only nine years after *The peasants of Languedoc,* Ladurie published *Montaillou,* a minute reconstruction of life in a small village of heretics in the early 14th century. This time the sources were the recorded proceedings of the inquisitional interrogations. We are presented with a host of individuals and initiated into their lives and mind sets. In a sense this is historical anthropology with its focus on familiar relations, religious beliefs, superstitions, conceptions of nature and death, sexuality and so forth. Lawrence Stone in an important essay in 1978 observes what he calls the "rebirth of narrative" in historical writing and the turning away from scientific explanation. Yet the narrative we see in *Montaillou* is not a master narrative but a collection of many small narratives. But *Montaillou* is not a sole example. A host of studies now appeared which focused on the existential life experiences of the low and humble. At the same time the rigid distinction between history and literature, fact and fiction became fluid. Two famous and important examples are Carlo Ginzburg's *The cheese and the worms* (1975) and Natalie Davis' *The return of Martin Guerre* (1984), both concentrating on humble people. Both tell stories. *The cheese and the worms* portrays a miller in a small Friulian village who ultimately is put to death because of his heretical beliefs. *The return of Martin Guerre,* now famous as a film, reconstructs the actual story of a 16th-century peasant woman in southern France, abandoned by her husband, who accepts an impostor as her husband until the real husband returns to disrupt the idyll. The Dutch philosopher of history Frank Ankersmi has argued that the only way historians can free themselves of ideological bias and recapture the past is by focusing on the small world such as Le Roy Ladurie, Ginzburg, and Davis have done. Yet at least the latter two works are shot through and through with ideological components. It has been argued that Davis consciously goes beyond the documentary evidence to construct a heroine, the peasant woman Bertrande de Rols, who consciously fashions, or in Davis' words "invents" her marriage with the impostor, to react and survive in a world in which women are subordinated. The heroine Bertrande de Rols in Davis' history consciously follows strategies which permit her to survive and fulfil herself in a man's world. Critics have accused Davis of projecting a 20th-century feminist agenda into a 16th-century peasant society. Ginzburg reflects the nostalgia for a peasant world which

has been destroyed by the forces of modernisation. He invents an age-old Mediterranean peasant culture whose representative, the heroic and heretical miller, is caught within the pincers of a modernising capitalistic society which sends him to burn on the stake in its determination to eradicate this peasant culture.

There is an interesting relationship between Marxism and the new cultural history. Traditional Marxism has stressed economic and social forces. In its emphasis on structures and processes and on economic growth it has close affinities to much of the social science history of the post-1945 period. It has been objectivistic in its belief that these structures and processes are not inventions of the social scientists but are inherent in social reality. Yet Marxists have had problems with quantification. Already beginning in the 1920s in Georg Lukács' essays in *History and class consciousness* and in the writings of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin, Marxist theorists began to question the empiricism of the social sciences from a dialectical perspective. They charged that the social sciences tended to abstract quantitative data from the broader context of a society. In this vein E. P. Thompson in *The making of the English working class* (1963) conceded that the defenders of capitalism, the so-called optimists such as Clapham, Ashton, and Hayek, were right when they argued that the workers had actually profited materially from the industrial revolution, but he emphasised that they had overlooked the costs in the quality of life, the destruction of older patterns, which this transformation involved. Edward Thompson's work was also important because it redefined class in terms of culture. The English working class emerged in the process of industrialisation. But the workers were not passive objects of this process, but rather entered this process with a very definite culture and consciousness. Moreover they were not proletarians in an abstract sense but Englishmen and women. To understand this transformation literary and artistic expressions were even more important than economic data.

Moreover, many western Marxists, totally disillusioned with the Leninist experiment in the east and deeply affected by the catastrophes of the 20th century, abandoned their confidence in human progress. Perhaps one of the most poignant expressions of this disillusionment was Walter Benjamin's tragic comments on Paul Klee's angel who races into the future with his back turned to it and sees the shamble of the past in front of him. Benjamin's "Angel of History" was composed very early, before the worst occurred, but western Marxist thought increasingly distanced itself from optimistic theories of modernisation central to much of social science theory and rather saw the destructive side of progress.

In 1963 Thompson's work seemed innovative and exciting. Today its Marxism appears very much outdated. The discussions of the 1960s, particularly the writings of Michel Foucault, led to a very different understanding of

exploitation, from a central core of political and economic control, as envisaged by the Marxists, to "a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth". This opened the way to a history which gave greater attention to the role of women. While earlier histories of women had focused on politics, the struggle for the suffrage, or the role of women in the workplace, a new feminist historiography placed greater importance on the experiences of women, including their sexuality. Joan Scott, who assumed the role of a major spokeswoman for feminist historical theory, argued that history written from a woman's perspective would also require a logic of inquiry fundamentally different from that of traditional historiography. Fully identifying herself with Jacques Derrida's practice of deconstruction, she argued that the traditional logic as practised in the sciences and the social sciences was oppressive and in her words "phallocentric". A new feminist way of thinking critically needed to replace it; yet she remains vague on the form which this new way of thinking should take. Her own histories of French women between the French Revolution and the 1848 Revolution remain conventional in their focus on a primarily political narrative.

Perhaps more typical of the directions in which recent historiography has gone since the 1970s have been the controversies about the nature of the French Revolution. With the work of Georges Lefebvre in the 1920s and 1930s the older narrowly political narrative had been replaced by a Marxist analysis in terms of conflicting socio-economic classes. This essentially economic interpretation remained dominant until the 1970s. Already in the 1950s George Rudé sought to give the history of the French Revolution a human face by seeking to reconstruct from police records who the actual participants were and where possible what their intentions and aspirations were, in brief a history from below. In an exchange with such Marxist stalwart historians as Albert Soboul, François Furet directly challenged the economic interpretation of the revolution altogether and stressed the role of political and ideological factors which cut across class lines. In a pioneering work, Lynn Hunt not only argued for the primacy of culture, but also looked for new sources in language and symbolism which provided keys to an understanding of the revolution. Increasing emphasis was placed on the role of language and symbols by Maurice Agulhon and Mona Ozouf in work on the emergence of a republican tradition in 19th-century France, by Michelle Perrot and William Sewell in their examinations of the ritualistic and symbolic aspects of working class protests, by Gareth Stedman Jones on the language of Chartism, and by Thomas Childers in his analysis of the social language of German politics on the eve of the nazi assumption of power. Yet it is important to note that none of these works negated the role of social forces or adopted the hard linguistic lines of Derrida and others who asserted that language did not relate to reality. Rather they assumed an interaction between social reality and language.

There was a misleading confrontation in the 1980s between the advocates of a social science oriented and a culturally oriented history. Some advocates of the latter went so far as to question the utility of the analytical social sciences and to call for a historical anthropology based on immediate experience. They took Clifford Geertz' anthropology as a model, his call that ethnologists confronted with an alien culture should not approach the other culture with hypotheses and questions, which would only distort and prejudice the subject being studied, but should directly confront it through what Geertz called "thick description".

But what indeed has happened in the last twenty years or so has been an increasing merger of social and cultural history. Social history has in fact frequently paved the way to cultural history. The new discipline of historical demography developed in Great Britain and France in the 1960s is a case in point. Historical demography began as a strictly empirical study which sought to give a statistical basis for a time in early modern history before official statistics existed. But a by-product of the reconstitution of families from church parishes was to provide information on such things as marriage patterns, illegitimacy, and sexual behaviour. Microhistorical studies such as those of David Sabean, Hans Medick, and Giovanni Levi focused on a locality, generally a small village in a period of social and economic transformation, and through extensive use with the help of computers on property relations, legal records, and demographic information sought to reconstruct the life patterns and mentalities of concrete communities.

There had been a tendency on the part of both social science and cultural history to neglect the role of politics as superficial to the underlying realities of society and culture. We have already seen in the case of Furet, Hunt, Childers and others how political history is inseparable from culture and *vice versa.* The rapid transformation of political relations since the end of the cold war has shown that the analysis of politics cannot be neglected but that it must be approached in a broader social and cultural context and global framework than it was by the classical narrative historians in the Rankean manner who proceeded from the assumption that politics could be understood in isolation from other factors. Moreover whatever criticism can be levelled at theories of modernisation which do not recognise the uncertainties and the negative side of progress, students of society and history would be blind if they did not recognise that we are living amidst tremendous transformations in every aspect of life which cannot be simply brushed aside but need to be analysed in all their complexity with the tools of the social sciences.

A final turn to the postmodern critique of historical knowledge. Historical studies in the past twenty or thirty years have shed a great deal of their confidence in the possibility of historical objectivity. They have also become much less sanguine about the direction in which a society which has witnessed so many catastrophes is moving. They have recognised to what

extent historical knowledge is not a mere reflection of the past but always involves subjective and ideological elements. But this does not mean that the reconstruction of the past is pure ideology as postmodern theorists argue. A crucial test of postmodern theory is the reality of the Holocaust. None of the theorists of radical historical relativism, Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit, François Lyotard, or Jacques Derrida would deny that it occurred. Confronted by Saul Friedlander, one of the leading historians of the Holocaust, Hayden White conceded that to deny it would be "morally offensive and intellectually bewildering," yet continued to maintain that all accounts of the Holocaust would be equally valid if they did not violate the basic facts. This concession that there was a Holocaust violates the basic assumptions of postmodern theory that history consists of texts which are self-referential and have no relation to a reality which in fact does not exist. If it holds to this, postmodern theory is incapable of replying to the deniers of the Holocaust. But even if they agree as White does that the Holocaust actually took place, they rule out any attempt to examine its causes or view it in a larger social and historical setting.

Admittedly ideological components enter into all historical accounts. There is no non-ideological or value-free historical inquiry. One of the inherent dangers of all three models we have outlined, the historicist, the social science, and the culturalist, is that many of its practitioners refused to recognise the ideological bases of their work. History has over and over again been used and misused to help create collective memories whether in the service of aggressive nationalism, religious intolerance, communist dogma, economic and cultural imperialism, or more recently ethnic particularism or radical feminism. Historians cannot avoid value oriented perspectives which inform their questions, but they must make these explicit and avoid distortions. The fact that values enter into every historical account does not mean that all accounts possess the same truth value or are equally false. There are standards of rational inquiry which are generally accepted. The criteria of critical method which have been fundamental to historical studies continue to be valid for practising historians. It is a good deal more difficult than Ranke supposed to establish "what actually happened", but it is frequently possible to establish what did not happen. And that is a basic task of critical historical scholarship, namely to dismantle the historical myths which all three models have constructed. Historical scholarship is an ongoing dialogue which is generally unable to posit interpretations with any finality, but which by correcting errors may give us greater historical understanding and help limit the misuses of history.

Facing misuses of history

General report, by Laurent Wirth

Introduction

The theme of the Council of Europe symposium, "Facing misuses of history", recalls that this subject was an early concern of the Council of Europe's work in history. The first stage of that work consisted in eliminating stereotypes and prejudices, which are among the forms such misuses can assume, from school textbooks. More recently, the Council of Europe argued for an approach to history that is not deflected from its proper purposes by closed conceptions of culture impermeable to dialogue and one which draws on the various sources, with a sense of how they are to be selected and classified and the importance to be accorded to each. The time was right to look more closely, in the context of the project "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century", at this complex problem of the misuse or distortion of history.

Such distortions are not new in Europe. Before history there was myth. The very name of Europe has its origins in a Greek myth. Even when the so-called "dark age of Greece" came to an end and alphabetic writing appeared, this was still an age of myth – the days of the Homeric epics. Then came the age of history. Herodotus, whom Cicero called "the father of history" and who was moved to write by the conflict which had pitted the Persians against his own fellow citizens, marks the boundary line between the mythic time of the bards and the time of the historian. However, readers of his "investigation" (the meaning of the word *istoria*), which he embellished with endless anecdotes, were still regaled with extraordinary feats. It was Thucydides who first asserted the claims of history writing as a genre, with a genuine methodology: in his view, the historian's aim was not so much to tell a story as to understand and explain events by seeking out "their truest cause". History writing as a specific activity came much later to Rome: indeed, it did not emerge for a further two centuries. However, the birth of history was no guarantee against distortion; it did not even spell a complete end to myth. Livy padded out his account of the early days of Rome

with myth and Julius Caesar is well known for the artful distortions of historical fact in his *War commentaries.*

In the 20th century, misuse and distortion of history are still current and may even still involve resort to myth, as we shall see. The symposium enabled us to confirm how widespread abuses of the historical record have been in the century that is now drawing to a close and how they have affected not just countries with dictatorial regimes, but also pluralist democracies. Misuses of history for propaganda purposes have naturally been particularly blatant in the dictatorships which have plagued Europe, whether communist, fascist or merely authoritarian. Such abuses reached extraordinary heights in totalitarian regimes such as existed in nazi Germany or the Soviet Union under Stalinism. However, the participants in the seminar were particularly keen to study the dangers of the misuse of history in democratic countries, or countries which have recently achieved democracy as a result of the collapse of communism in Europe. Another important challenge emerged during the proceedings of the symposium: to highlight the persistent abuses of history in democratic Europe at this century's end, in order to reflect on ways of preventing them.

To examine that theme more deeply, the tasks of the different working groups in the symposium were organised around a number of basic questions:

– What is it in history's very nature which makes it potentially subject to misuse?

– Why is it misused and by whom?

– What are the various forms such misuse assumes?

– What are we to do about this misuse?

An introductory lecture by Georg Iggers on the development of historiography in the 20th century ably situated the problem in its general context from the outset. The various papers which followed put the spotlight on national examples. Three of those examples related to countries which had communist regimes until the late 1980s: Hungary (Attila Szakolczai), Estonia and the former East Germany (Sirkka Ahonen). Two papers dealt with countries which had until the mid-1970s been ruled by dictatorships of the extreme right: Spain from 1939 to 1976 (Gregorio González Roldán) and Greece from 1967 to 1974 (Christina Koulouri). Two were on countries which have remained democratic throughout the 20th century, with the exception of the period of nazi domination: Denmark (Bernard Eric Jensen) and Norway (Ola Svein Stugu). All these countries are currently under democratic rule, but the problem of misuses of history still arises there, as it does in all the states of Europe.

This division of labour enabled us to form a relatively broad view of the problem, which this report will attempt to convey. It is constructed around the major questions which underlay the work of the groups at the symposium and it ends with a summary of the answers given by the participants to the last of those questions: what are we to do about misuses of history?

Is history subject by its very nature to misuse?

The problem of misuse may seem to some extent to be intrinsically linked to the nature of history itself. We surely have to be sensitive, when we use the word, to the ambiguities of the term "history". Then there is the problem of whether academic history, which is admittedly a product of research, can truly be regarded as a science. And the teaching of history in schools requires a transposition of scholarly knowledge to another level, a transposition which may itself provide an opportunity for distortions to occur.

The polysemic nature of the word "history"

In French, the word *histoire* refers to all the following:

– the work of the historian and the object of that work (with the problem of the distance between subject, that is the historian, and object, and the interaction between the two);

– history as taught (with the problem of the discrepancy between the writings of academic historians and history as a subject on the curriculum, a problem which relates to the transposition of knowledge from research to teaching);

– an untrue fiction (telling a story).

These multiple meanings are found in many other languages (the words *Geschichte* in German, *storia* in Italian, *historie* in Norwegian or Danish, for example). We should note, however, that in English the word "story", not "history", is used for a fictional narrative and, similarly, in Spanish one says *cuento,* not *historia.* The fact that the same term can be used to designate academic historical research, history as taught and an untrue story could be significant for us here. We should, however, beware of according too much importance to this point and believing that speakers of English or Spanish are less prone than others to distort history.

The object of the symposium was not to analyse fictional narratives, but to determine how the work of the historian and history as taught can be distorted or abused. This prompted us to ask two questions: is academic history a science? and is the history taught necessarily liable to misuse?

Is history a science?

History has been known to claim scientific status. In the age of scientism at the end of the 19th century, for example, French thinkers like Renan and Taine took the view that it could be a "positive" science. In this they were misguided: history clearly cannot be accorded the same status as the exact sciences, if only because it is not susceptible of experimental verification. The "methodical" historians who followed did not feel able to entertain such notions. It was their aim simply to promote the most scientific method possible (Langlois and Seignobos, *Introduction aux études historiques,* 1898).

Against historical scientism, the German philosopher Dilthey (1833-1911) asserted that the methods of historians could not be explanatory, as in the exact sciences, but were necessarily related to understanding. Historicism, which stood opposed to scientism, made a decisive breakthrough in a number of European countries: for example in Germany (Windelband, Rickert, Simmel), Italy (Benedetto Croce), the United Kingdom (Collingwood) and Spain (Ortega y Gasset). In the view of these writers, historical knowledge could be achieved only through the historical experience of the persons making that history. Croce says that "a fact is historical in so far as it is thought". Collingwood counterposes understanding to scientific explanation, arguing that the historian is not God looking down on the world, but is a man of his time and his country.

The fluctuations in the terminology employed to characterise history in France reveal a certain difficulty in situating history among the various branches of knowledge. The expression *Geisteswissenschaften* (literally: "sciences of the mind"), used by Dilthey, has never gained acceptance in France. The term "social sciences" has been used for around a century; "human sciences" became prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, but "social sciences" recovered strongly as a designation at the end of the 1960s.

Can we say, then, as Paul Veyne does, that "history is not a science" (*Comment on écrit l'histoire* 1971, pp. 10, 97, 115) and that "it will never become one"? (*Faire de l'histoire,* 197 vol. 1, p. 62). Can we arrive only at provisional, refutable truths – truths which, as Karl Popper said, are falsifiable?

The working groups, while taking account of the need to temper statements about the scientific status of history, concluded that one should, nonetheless, not give in to relativism. Admittedly, history is a construction by historians, who are men or women of their times, but we should not, for all that, deny it the possibility of aspiring to truth.

A consensus emerged that radical scepticism should be avoided, for example that of the Pyrrhonian sceptics of antiquity, for whom any certainty was unattainable. Georg Iggers's lecture showed that, in spite of the impact of nationalism and ideologies on the work of 20th-century historians, they can produce work that is "scientific" in so far as they strive towards objec-

tivity. While being, as Henri-Irénée Marrou has it, "an indissoluble blend of subject and object", history can represent a path towards truth. On that path there is a place, between the true and the false, for verisimilitude or "truthlikeness", in the sense, as Popper has it, of an "approximation to truth" (*Unended quest, an intellectual biography* 1976). Though it does not achieve truth, history has truth as its norm, as Jacques Le Goff has put it (*History and memory,* 1996). The historian cannot subscribe to an absolute subjectivism. The historical fact is, admittedly, a construct, but there is a reality of past human experience. Historical reconstruction is a form of mediation through which we can at least attain to something of the past. The historian's object of study is not that of the natural sciences; it is not reproducible and hence not susceptible of experimental verification.

Though the historical fact is reconstructed, it does not emerge *ex nihilo* and cannot therefore be regarded as having no foundation in reality. "Intentionalist" and "functionalist" historians may debate the genesis of the Final Solution, but the Holocaust-deniers, who deny the materiality of the extermination camps, have no right to call themselves historians. What they claim is clearly false, since it is contrary to a reality attested by material evidence, official documents and the testimony of witnesses. They are not merely "assassins of memory", to use Pierre Vidal-Naquet's expression, but assassins of history. There is an objectivity to the human past which one cannot misrepresent without forfeiting the title of historian. The basis of the historian's work is the study of the traces of that past which we call sources.

All historical research derives, in fact, from sources. Without these it cannot be regarded as valid. However there are some problems to be taken into account in the handling of sources. There is the problem of the rules for opening up archives, which vary from place to place and can make research difficult. The recent opening of the archives of the former Soviet Union is the most striking example, but some delays in providing access to the archives in democratic countries, often for laudable reasons (the protection of individuals), may hamper the historian's work.

Then there is the problem of possible forgeries, which is not a new one (see the Donation of Constantine) and which concerns not just written texts, but also images (the famous photograph in which Trotsky has been edited out from his place beneath the podium on which Lenin is haranguing the crowd). With the new information and communication technologies the danger of falsification is growing (see *The challenges of the information and communication technologies facing history teaching,* Council of Europe, 1999).

In addition, there is the problem of the overabundance of – not to say massive increase in – documentation, with the difficulties this presents for selecting the relevant material. The fact that there are Holocaust-denial sites on the Internet seemed particularly worrying. Historians have to take these dangers into account when they do their research.

A nuanced answer to the question whether history is a science emerged over the course of the symposium: to quote the late Raymond Aron, academic history is not an exact but a human science. It is the implementation of rational procedures with the aim of establishing the truth. The historian's construct is made the more valid by being submitted to the critical gaze of his or her colleagues. This is one of the guarantees of the seriousness of history, which Popper terms "intersubjectivity". Historians are not immune to subjectivity, but fortunately they are not alone in this.

Is the history taught in schools by nature liable to distortion?

There is here the initial problem of the use of exaggeration for effect in order to imprint ideas on the young. In a more general sense, this raises the question of the discrepancy between history as produced by scholars and history as taught in schools, since it is not the role of the school system to train specialists.

All young teachers are confronted with the gap between the academic knowledge they have just acquired and the knowledge they can hope to impart to their students. They have necessarily to make an effort to transpose their knowledge to this new level. But does this make for an inevitable gap between research and teaching? The French-speaking working group drew attention to the need to maintain a relationship between the two: "the history taught in schools must reflect and follow scholarly history … We have to introduce children to historical criticism … We must not avoid subjects just because they are controversial." We were warned against imparting second-rate knowledge and it was stressed that we have to enable schoolchildren to grasp the complexity of history and gauge the reliability or otherwise of sources. In short, they have to develop critical faculties. The dangers of handing on a simplifying "received version", disconnected from research, were roundly denounced.

However, the opposite danger of adhering too closely to current academic research was also highlighted. Researchers can sometimes handle the distance between their subjective view and the objectivity of the human past in a dishonest manner. We have to be aware that university departments may be prone to fashion or to forms of ideological domination. Distortion in such cases would then pass directly from the university to the schools. Moreover, there is a danger of structuring the curriculum exclusively around fashionable themes and neglecting what might be termed the basics. For example, the 1977 syllabuses in France, which were linked to the Haby reform of secondary education and organised, under the influence of the "new history", around diachronic themes, confronted pupils with a positive torrent of chronological data. This development was widely, and in some cases virulently, criticised. The historian Pierre Goubert described the syllabuses as "criminal and drawn up so as to be able more easily to gov-

ern a population of half-wits and robots, who will buy what they are meant to and vote as they are meant to…".

The bilingual working group suggested that, in confronting the relationship between research and teaching, a dialectical connection should be established between the two. University historians, they argued, should not cut themselves off from what is going to be taught in the schools and should have a knowledge of school history syllabuses and their development. In this way, a genuine two-way relationship would enable a satisfactory balance which is fruitful for the teaching of history to be achieved.

Apart from the problem of the relationship between academic history and the subject as taught in schools, we have to consider the dangers of distortion which may arise as a result of the precise functions assigned to history teaching by political regimes and the institutions which underpin them, and also by society as a whole. This raises the question: who misuses history and for what purpose?

Misuses of history – by whom and for what purpose?

It is difficult to dissociate these two closely interrelated questions. Finding the guilty party comes down to asking who profits by the crime: identifying the motives for misuse enables us to show who is responsible.

This is a complex investigation and it has to be conducted very openly. As was pointed out by the Norwegian Minister for Education at the start of the symposium, anyone can misuse history.

When history is used for propaganda purposes, responsibilities are quite clearly delineated, but generally much more diffuse and mitigated responsibilities exist, running through the whole of a society.

The propaganda function assigned to history

This function, which political regimes may assign to history, represents a major danger of abuse. It is in undemocratic countries that the most obvious danger of misuse has existed. It was also in those countries that the schoolbooks represented an official point of view and were strictly controlled. As the mobilisation of the masses by propaganda and by the indoctrination of the young were fundamental aspects of totalitarianism, historical "research" and the teaching of history were kept under systematic surveillance by the totalitarian regimes, which channelled them for their own ends.

Marc Ferro has shown how, in the communist countries, the single party was the "crucible of history", keeping a permanent watch on the required conformity between historical development and its own analyses, any interpretation at variance with these being condemned as "un-Marxist and unscientific". Schoolbooks and teachers had to align themselves totally with the official view. In her paper, Sirkka Ahonen referred to the old pre-

1989 Marxist-Leninist vision. She gave the example of the German Democratic Republic's history syllabus, which was designed as follows:

– 1945-61: the struggle for socialist conditions of production;

– 1961-70: the further development of socialism;

– 1970-80: the accomplishment of developed socialism;

– from 1980 on: the advancement of the accomplished development of socialism.

In that same country, the Reformation in the 16th century was presented as the early bourgeois revolution in Germany, the American War of Independence as the first bourgeois revolution in America, the mutinies in the German navy in 1918 as the socialist November revolution, the communist seizure of central Europe after the second world war as the victory of the socialist revolution in Europe and the invasion of what was then Czechoslovakia in 1968 as the suppression of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia.

Sirkka Ahonen was keen to demonstrate how academies of science produced history that was used to impose a socialist identity on people. Under the communist regime, Estonia, which had been violently annexed, was described in the history syllabus as having been kindly received into the happy family of the Soviet nations, founded on the union of workers, peasants and intellectuals, led by the working class.

Attila Szakolczai said that before the fall of communism in Hungary, official historiography, fashioned to serve the regime, presented the events of 1956 as a mere attempt to restore capitalism and spread the idea that the masses who had gone over to the workers' councils consisted of misguided workers, capitalist petty-bourgeois elements who had infiltrated the working class, functionaries of the old state apparatus and common criminals.

At the other end of the totalitarian spectrum, participants in the symposium recalled that history was also crudely distorted by the nazis and fascists for propaganda purposes. In nazi Germany, the view of history which was imposed was a racial one, dominated by the idea that the master race had to battle against inferior breeds, its most urgent task being to combat the "Jewish peril". In Hitler's view, racial struggle was the motor of history. This basic theme of *Mein Kampf* became the official, obligatory version of history in Germany once the nazis took power. The symposium was reminded that the content of school history books in nazi Germany was essentially racist. The idea of conquering living space in eastern Europe also drew on a version of history which glorified German eastward expansion – the *Drang nach Osten* – particularly the battles of the Teutonic knights against the Slavs.

In fascist Italy, history was enrolled into the service of Italian greatness, with particular emphasis being put on the memory of the power of ancient

Rome – a favourite theme of Mussolini's propaganda. Just as Hitler had himself portrayed as a Teutonic knight, so Mussolini was depicted as Caesar. For the occasion, he would don a toga and pose against a classical backdrop, as he did, for example, in an official painting of 1926.

It should not, however, be thought that democratic countries are immune from this use of history for their own purposes. It has been, and may still be, used to reinforce national cohesion. Georg Iggers presented what he described as the correlation between the development of nationalism and the study of history – the role history played in "the invention of nations" (Ernest Gellner) and the way professional history became increasingly nationalistic in the late 19th century. It was pointed out that an abuse of history occurred when it was taught from a nationalistic point of view, and that there was a danger of selecting and exaggerating an element on the grounds that it contributed to the formation of the nation-state. Many examples of such uses of history can be cited.

For example, in France in the early years of the 20th century, Ernest Lavisse virtually had the role of "the nation's teacher", to use Pierre Nora's expression. His successive textbooks (the famous *Petit Lavisse*) were in use in primary schools until the early 1950s. In the schools of the Third Republic a veritable pantheon of national heroes was assembled: Vercingetorix, Joan of Arc, Bayard, the young revolutionaries Bara and Viala, to name but a few. (see Christian Amalvi, *De l'art et la manière d'accommoder les héros de l'histoire de France,* 1988). This may properly be described as a national mythology (see Citron, *Le mythe national,* 1987).

And the French Republic was not alone in this. Ola Svein Stugu showed how Norway, among others, had its own *Petit Lavisse* in the person of the historian Ernst Sars, along with heroes (Trygvasson, Skjalgson, and so forth) and myths of its own – beginning with the sagas, which are myths in the proper sense of the term.

Christina Koulouri stressed the role of myths in the Balkan countries, illustrating their potency and the use that is made of them. We have already mentioned the importance of the Greek myths, but their significance extends far beyond Greece itself and represents a European cultural heritage. To return to the Balkans, one significant myth – burningly topical in 1999 – was mentioned several times during the symposium. This was the myth the Serbs have forged around the Battle of Kosovo, which Milošević's government has turned to effect to justify its domination of the Kosovars. This is all the more interesting in that it is a myth of heroic defeat. Other examples of defeats worked up into national myths were mentioned in the symposium: in France, the defeat of Vercingetorix at Alesia, the capture and execution of Joan of Arc and the battle of Camerone, which bears mythic significance for the French Foreign Legion; in Franco's Spain, the desperate resistance of the military academy cadets in the Alcazar.

Examining this issue of history in the service of national cohesion, Christina Koulouri drew attention to the use of pairs of opposites. The reference here is to the need for an enemy against whom one can assert one's own identity. In the Greek case, a complex network of pairs of opposites is in play. First, there is the Greek-Slav opposition: the Greeks asserted their national identity against the Slavs on several occasions (in reaction to Fallmerayer's theory of the Slavisation of the Greeks in the mid-19th century, from fear of pan-Slavism and Bulgarian expansion at the turn of the century, and out of a fear of communism during the cold war). This pair of opposites leads us to consider another which overlaps with it: Greece and Orthodoxy. This issue is quite poorly perceived in western Europe, as was shown by some of the comments in the western European press during the recent war in Kosovo, where mention was made of an Orthodox axis in which Greece allegedly figured as an active participant. Fear of the Slavs modified relations with these Orthodox countries, particularly with the most important of them, the Russian Federation.

Another pair of opposites is that of Greeks and Turks, with the Greeks rejecting the period of Ottoman domination as having been one of subjugation and decline. All the ills of modern Greece are ascribed to what are seen as centuries of enslavement. As in the preceding case, we may see the Greek-Turk opposition as being embedded within another: the opposition between Greece and the east, the former differentiating itself resolutely from the latter.

Lastly, the problem of relations between Greece and the west was raised. In spite of misunderstandings, it is with the west that relations seem most firmly established. The Greeks feel European by virtue of a mirror effect, since ancient Greece was the forerunner of modern Europe.

The need for an enemy in order to assert one's identity – with the consequences this implies for readings of national histories – prompted the participants in the symposium to provide different examples. France (for which Britain played this role until Germany took its place), the Baltic states (the enemy being the Soviet Union and Poland (the enemy being both Germany and the Soviet Union were all mentioned.

Sirkka Ahonen showed how, in a former communist country like Estonia which is now a democracy, there is a tendency towards a nationalist re-reading of history as a reaction against Marxist-Leninist history, which denied the idea of an Estonian nation – that nation being reduced merely to one part of the great Soviet community. The rejection of pan-Soviet identity appeared there as early as the beginning of the 1980s, as part of a campaign for the truth to be told about Estonia's history. In 1988 the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party and that of the Soviet Union vainly attempted to maintain the official pan-Soviet version. The final fall of the Soviet Union enabled new perceptions of history to assert themselves, perceptions designed to accompany the re-emergence of a national community. These

new perceptions began with a reinterpretation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. To understand this trend towards a nationalist re-reading of history, one has to take into account how national communities were persecuted, sometimes by mass deportation, in the former Soviet Union. The representatives of Georgia and Lithuania reminded the bilingual group of this persecution.

In democracies, history can also be used to promote particular values. There is, of course, a very positive side to the resolve to defend democratic values. It is entirely laudable for history to be given a civic purpose, where the intention is to enable schoolchildren to become citizens capable of thinking freely and taking an active part in the community. The participants in the symposium were all agreed on this point and it was pointed out that history must develop pupils' critical faculties, the idea being that the minds of our pupils should be comparable to filters rather than blotting paper.

We may, however, ask whether, in certain cases, this promotion of values does not have some questionable effects. In France, historians like Lavisse developed a kind of Republican catechism, which led at times to democracy being confused with Republicanism, and to the idea that the only true republic was the French, the others being vulgar imitations. It also produced the belief that the "land of human rights" could not possibly itself infringe those rights – a conception which underlay a tendency to neglect certain facts, such as the rapaciousness and repression of the colonial era and the period of decolonisation. We shall come back to this point in the section on the specific forms of historical distortion.

We may also ask whether a certain liberal view of history – in the sense of free-market liberalism – resurgent in the 1980s, further reinforced by the collapse of communism and cultivated in political circles to the point of becoming a sort of consensus, has not led to a reinterpretation of economic history – and particularly of the Great Depression of 1929 – which accords excessive importance to monetarist explanations, leaving what is called the "real" economic sphere out of account and totally eclipsing the notion of over-production. But this relates more to a kind of diffuse consensus than to a conscious use of history by governments and their dependent institutions.

In the democracies, abuses of history may in fact be produced by more diffuse social pressures.

The pressure of memory

One should not confuse history with memory. In *Les lieux de mémoire* (Gallimard 1984) Pierre Nora says:

> far from being synonymous, they are different in every respect: memory is life, always borne along by living groups, open to the dialectic of recollection and amnesia, vulnerable to use and manipulation. History is the problematical,

> incomplete reconstruction of that which is no more… Memory accords reminiscence a sacred place, history hunts it out from that place … Memory is an absolute, history knows only the relative … To history, memory is always suspect…. (pp. 19-20)

Though both are mental constructs, they do not operate in the same way. But the relations between them have been complex and remain so. The participants in the symposium referred to these relations on several occasions. There is interaction between the two, in two main respects.

Firstly, the collection of memories is of interest to historians on two counts: on the one hand, the memories of eye-witnesses to events are a precious source. Jacques Le Goff calls these "the finest historical material" (*Histoire et mémoire* 1988); on the other hand, memory itself has in recent years become a new object of study for historians.

Secondly the construction of memory: historians and history teachers do not simply confine themselves to using the memory of societies as a source material. They contribute to constructing that memory. Thus, history and memory feed off each other in ways and with degrees of intensity which vary from one period to another and from country to country.

In the French case, studied by Pierre Nora, history was initially, as he puts it, a "rector of national memory". He takes the view that, in the Third Republic, until the 1920s, "there was something more than a natural circulation between the concepts of history, memory and nation: there was between them a complementary circularity, a symbiosis at all levels". One of the functions historians set themselves from the 1870s onwards was to provide the French nation with a memory. In this they were at one with the desire of the Republican regime, mentioned above, to give greater cohesion to the nation. A certain uncoupling of history from memory was to occur only gradually, with three elements playing a role in the process.

Firstly, as history and memory had fused around the idea of nation in the years preceding the Great War, the horrors of that war triggered a reaction of severe disapproval among some people.

Secondly, in advocating a form of history that was wide-ranging and structural, the work of the *Annales* school, to which Iggers referred in his paper, was not easy to incorporate into the national memory.

Lastly, there has been a realisation that memory could, in some cases, stifle history and hold up the work of the historian. In *The Vichy syndrome: history and memory in France since 1944,* Henry Rousso highlights the long consensus which existed to repress the dark years of Vichy, a consensus sustained by the myth of widespread resistance to the occupying forces cultivated by both Gaullists and communists. It was not until the 1970s, after Robert Paxton had shown the way, that French historians finally began to confront this material seriously.

Memory has, however, come back into vogue somewhat since the 1980s. Pierre Nora speaks of a "memory-moment". The book he edited *(Les lieux de mémoire)* is one sign of this; the fashions for anniversaries, heritage and oral history are others.

The symposium provided scope for tackling further examples of uneasy relationships between history and memory. Gregorio González Roldán showed how difficult it is for Spanish historians seriously to assess the figures on violence in the Spanish civil war. They are split between the interpretation of those who won that war (who argue that there was violence only on the Republican side), the "half-and-half" approach and the "Romantic" line, which sees violence as being less marked on the Republican than the nationalist side. The controversies this provokes are all the more intense for the fact that these painful events still loom large in the memories of the opposing parties, and can re-open wounds which have not yet fully healed.

Attila Szakolczai spoke of the polemics which had developed in post-communist Hungary around the interpretation of the events of 1956. There have even been public quarrels between veterans of the 1956 uprising. Historians have divided into several camps, often more on political than professional grounds, and it is difficult for public opinion and teachers to decide where they stand on the various interpretations.

In both these cases, as in the case of Vichy France, we may speak of "a heavily-laden memory". The history of these events has emerged only with difficulty, if it has emerged at all, since the emotions surrounding the conflicts have continued to run high over a long period. When debate begins on such issues, the crucial step has in a way been taken: at least the silence is broken; the period of repression is over. The problem for historians is to be able to work on the question with the requisite serenity: it is the problem of an ever-present past, as Henry Rousso and Éric Conan said in connection with the passionate debates about Vichy.

On this problem of the history-memory relation, let us note in conclusion that the point was made at the symposium (by the participants from the former Soviet republics) that, in the states which have just emerged from Soviet domination, the need for memory was felt all the more intensely because the Communist Government had attempted to eradicate it. *Homo sovieticus* was not supposed to have a national memory. But it must be said that this attempt to assassinate memory failed, as is shown by the events which precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union.

However, these resurrections of memory may be very virulent and may give rise to exaggeratedly nationalistic history. This is particularly a problem in the Balkans, a part of the world much discussed in the work of the various groups. The revival of old memories has stirred up ancient quarrels in that region, with the tragic consequences we have seen in the former Yugoslavia.

The participants in the symposium acknowledged that the need for memory was a legitimate one, but argued that it had to be guided by an aim of understanding and harmony. Schoolchildren should be presented with the elements of a memory that is their heritage, but they should also be equipped to adopt a critical stance on the perceptions reflected in the collective memory, so as to offset the dangers of nationalist abuses of history.

The idea also emerged from the symposium that memories lying outside the national mainstream should not be eclipsed and that tolerance should be promoted. Memory is plural: ethno-linguistic groups, socio-professional groups, religious groups and the like all have memories. This is easier to deal with in countries like the United States, where there is acceptance of the model of communities living side by side (and where the myth of the "melting pot" has given way to that of the "salad bowl"), than in a country like France, which vests its hopes for harmony in integration and secularism and where the French Republic genuinely regards itself as a melting pot.

Referring to the problem of communities and their memories, Bernard Eric Jensen drew attention to the changing nature and importance of those communities over time and spoke of a post-national phase of memory, while noting that this was truer of western than of eastern Europe. He also referred to other pressures which society applies to history.

Other pressures of many kinds which society applies to history

Bernard Eric Jensen described a process of decentralisation occurring in European societies today, with the result that school is no longer the only place where children learn about history. With the media and the new technologies, they are confronted with a flood of information which history teaching cannot ignore if the aim is to maintain pupils' interest in history and contribute to the formation of their historical awareness. It is all the more important not to ignore it as the information in question may involve distortions of history of all kinds, which are beyond the scholarly control of university academics and the pedagogical control of schoolteachers.

The symposium specifically analysed the possible dangers of distortion in the welter of historical information pupils receive outside the classroom. One of these was manipulated images. This is not a new phenomenon: we have already referred to the removal of Trotsky from official photographs in the Soviet Union. The editing of photographs was a regular practice in the totalitarian regimes, both Stalinist and nazi. The new technologies now offer far more sophisticated possibilities for fakery. Examples of the manipulation of digital images were presented at the Andorra symposium, including, among other things, the doctoring of a photograph of the world leaders at Yalta to include Mao Tse-tung.

Publications aimed at young people may convey stereotypes of which pupils need to be forewarned. In *The adventures of Tintin in the Congo,* for exam-

ple, which dates from the colonial period, blacks are presented at best as children whom the white colonialist must look after for their own good (as, for example, in the derailment scene) and at worst as dangerous, bloodthirsty savages (the "panther-men"). In the *Asterix* comic books, deliberate use is made of a host of stereotypes, ranging from caricatures of the ancient Britons (that is the English) to satirical depictions of the Greeks and the Romans, not to mention the Belgians. It must be said, however, that the Gauls are themselves caricatured as brawling, heavy drinkers, gluttons and nationalistic male-chauvinists.

So-called historical epics in the cinema often take liberties with historical fact and their presentation of events may be more of the order of romance than reality. For example, Patrice Chéreau's film *Queen Margot* (though the title here, reflecting that of Alexandre Dumas's novel, in no way conceals the romanced nature of the narrative) draws on an outdated interpretation of the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre in which Catherine de Medici is presented as the villain of the piece, the interpretation which Dumas espoused in his novel. These films are often based on historical myths, as is illustrated by the very many screen versions of the life of Joan of Arc, the most recent of which was Luc Besson's hit.

There is, however, a much more serious danger than the one posed by these films, which do not seek in any sense to manipulate history, but simply have artistic and/or commercial goals: the danger posed by films which are actually instruments of covert propaganda, such as those made under the nazis – particularly anti-Semitic productions like *Jew Süss*. These films, if broadcast without commentary or warning on television, could have catastrophic effects on impressionable young people.

Some radio and television programmes with historical pretensions continue to peddle received versions of events, such as the perennial reference to the division of the world at Yalta. This is so commonly heard in the broadcast media that many teachers repeat it in their classes. Given the requirements of the medium, it is, admittedly, not possible for broadcasters to give a full account of academic research, except on some specialised channels, and popularisation must not be rejected *per se.* It is even desirable, so long as it does not distort, since it can promote an interest in history. The problem is that, in their desire for effect, journalists may confuse a simple version of events with a simplistic one.

One also finds an opposite form of excess, associated with journalism as a genre. The pursuit of sensation and scandal can lead to the acceptance, without any serious checking of the facts, of mere hypotheses presented as revelations. This applies not only to radio and television, but also to the press. Journalists love historical scoops and sometimes run a story without taking the precaution of verifying the scientific validity of their information. How many articles have we seen along the lines that Pearl Harbor was not a sur-

prise attack because Roosevelt knew about it in advance or on the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy?

The new technologies also come under fire in this regard – particularly the Internet. This is, admittedly, a very valuable research tool, but it can prove dangerous. For example, a school pupil surfing the Web alone may come across a Holocaust-denial site without being forewarned of its content, falling victim as a result to the most scandalous form of the distortion of history. How are schoolchildren to be protected from such abuses? This question shows how important it is to rise to the challenges posed by these new technologies so that teachers can help their pupils to be filters rather than blotting paper.

There is another form of misuse of history with which schoolchildren are confronted outside the classroom: the use of historical material in advertising. This is as old as advertising itself. Ola Svein Stugu cited the example of the use of Vikings on matchboxes, but the historical image most widely exploited for commercial purposes is that of Napoleon, which is used in a great many countries. A danger may exist here in the sense that historical characters who were in fact tyrannical rulers and set little store by human life may be turned into familiar and, in a sense, likeable figures. The example of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung featuring in a French advertising campaign in 1999 was cited at the symposium. The number of deaths these tyrants had on their hands and also the prison-camp systems (the Gulag and Lao Gai) on which they based their terror are well known. To use such figures as advertising images is offensive; it may also turn out to be dangerous.

Lastly, artists too may distort history. The totalitarian regimes, in which artists were able to express themselves only under state supervision, were masters of this. Many examples were cited at the symposium, but examples from democratic countries were also mentioned, particularly in connection with poster art: Ralph Soupault's "Gaul with a shield" of 1936, the "Scudo crociato", the emblem of Italian Christian Democracy, and the 1968 poster by Paris Beaux Arts students equating the French CRS riot police with the SS.

How is history misused?

We may attempt to construct a typology of the methods of abusing or distorting history (comprising denial, falsification, fixation on a particular event, omission and exploitation for extraneous purposes), while at the same time remaining aware that such a typology is relative and that it may be difficult to classify some forms of misuse in one precise category, since it belongs to several at once.

This also raises the question of what areas of history can be distorted and abused, in terms of both period and subject matter.

Abuse of the historical record by denial of a clear historical fact

This is one of the most serious forms and one which springs to mind immediately. The participants in the symposium saw such distortions by denial as extremely important and attempted to compile a list of them.

This kind of abuse is in some cases the work of states, and is backed up by official versions of history. Among the most famous are the denial by the Soviets of their part in the massacre of the Polish army officers at Katyn and the denial by the Turks of the massacres of Armenians. Denial occurs when a state is forced into that course of action in the face of a challenge from international opinion. Generally, states prefer not to make any reference to the events concerned (see below). This is most often how they react to the pressure of opinion within their own countries, an attitude usually reflected in a "blackout" of the events in history books and school textbooks. This is how the Katyn massacre was dealt with in the Soviet Union and it is the case even now where the massacres of Armenians in Turkey are concerned. We shall return to the problem of distortion by omission below, supplying many more examples.

Organised groups may also engage in abuse of the historical record by denial. The most shocking example of this, referred to throughout the symposium, is the denial of the Holocaust by the negationists, who refuse to accept that the nazis set about exterminating the Jews during the second world war, and have even gone so far as to claim that the gas chambers were merely facilities for disinfecting camp inmates' clothing. They contest the clear facts of the case, which are supported by all the evidence which the nazis, in spite of their efforts, did not manage to destroy (reports of horrific findings when the death camps were liberated, the material existence of gas chambers, documents found on the "management" of the camps, survivors' accounts, etc). In their version of events, the Jews were responsible for the second world war. The "alleged genocide" was merely a hoax perpetrated by politicians and financiers, mainly for the benefit of the state of Israel, with the Germans and Palestinians as its victims. These Holocaust deniers, who have a presence in many countries, use various means to spread their views: leaflets, books, supposedly scholarly studies, specialised journals, cartoons, cassettes and videos, Internet sites). They employ perverse methods: fantasising disguised as hyper-criticism; quibbling over figures, details and words; persistent innuendo; deliberate ignoring of context; attempts to pass off as conclusions what are in fact initial assumptions. These methods are diametrically opposed to the proper approach of the historian. That is why what these people do has to be described as "Holocaust denial", not "revisionism", the latter term being quite inappropriate since it would grant them the entirely unwarranted status of historian.

During the discussions at the symposium, the problem arose whether "Holocaust denial" should be regarded as an offence, as it is in France. According such criminal status to the practice does not mean that the judges are

made guardians of an official history, nor that history is laid down by the legal system: what the law punishes is the denial of a clear historical fact and a public expression of anti-Semitism, which is all the more dangerous – as was pointed out by the author of the French legislation, J.-C. Gayssot – "because we are moving away from the period when these crimes were committed and revealed, and the victims and witnesses will soon all be dead".

The denial of a clear historical fact involves concealing the traces of the past or, when those traces cannot be erased, distorting their true meaning or, where possible, falsifying them. Falsification may also take other forms.

Abuse by falsification

Falsification may consist in the creation of false evidence. This is not a new practice. We know, for example, of the Donation of Constantine, the alleged last will and testament of the Emperor Constantine in favour of the Pope, the effect of which was to legitimate papal aspirations to dominate the empire. In the 15th century, Lorenzo Valla demonstrated that the document was a forgery, probably made in the 8th century. There is also the False Decretals forgery, a collection of letters attributed to the popes of the first six centuries. Though long regarded as authentic, these were in fact the work of a 9th-century forger.

In the last century, the doctoring of the Ems Telegram by Bismarck achieved its goal, the German chancellor cutting down a 200-word telegram from the King of Prussia to twenty words so as to make it appear insulting. As Bismarck hoped, "the telegram had the effect of a red rag to the Gallic bull". France fell into the trap set by a telegram falsified through deliberate and skilfully calculated abridgement.

One of the most scandalous cases in the 20th century is that of the use by anti-Semites, and particularly by the nazis, of the *Protocols of the elders of Zion.* This document, which appeared to provide evidence of a Jewish conspiracy for world domination, was in fact a forgery made by an agent of the Tsarist secret police in Paris at the beginning of the 20th century. The Hitler regime made systematic propaganda use of it to denounce "the Jewish peril". Since the creation of the state of Israel, it has been used in the Arab Muslim world as ammunition for the anti-Zionist cause. That demonological anti-Zionism, based on the idea of Jewish world conspiracy, a notion still fuelled today by the protocols, has combined insidiously with a virulent anti-Semitism to form a movement which has not balked at taking the ultimate step of Holocaust denial. In France these two currents initially came together around Pierre Rassinier and the journal *La Vieille Taupe.*

Forgery is not confined to texts; all kinds of pseudo-proofs may be involved. For example, the nazis fabricated false evidence in order to accuse a for-

mer Dutch communist, Van der Lubbe, of the Reichstag fire, which had been started by the SA.

The Stalinist regime did likewise in preparing its case against the defendants in the Moscow Show Trials. In 1937, we may even speak of collusion between Stalin and Hitler in the fabrication of false evidence to dispose of Tukhachevsky. The Soviet marshal represented a danger to Hitler in so far as he advocated preventive war against nazi Germany, with the Soviet Union fighting alongside western armies if necessary. He also seemed dangerous to Stalin, for, though apparently respectful of his authority, this prestigious senior officer might at some stage prove a formidable rival. Berlin supplied the Kremlin with the evidence it lacked. The SD forged documents incriminating Tukhachevsky and those who seemed to Stalin to be his supporters. The Soviet regime was consequently able to present them as "paid agents and accomplices of the Hitlerians". Tukhachevsky was arrested on 26 May 1937, confessed under torture and was executed on 11 June 1937. In the following months, two other marshals (Blucher and Yegorov), 8 admirals, 430 generals and more than 30 000 officers were executed in their turn. The manoeuvre, based entirely on forgeries, had been a complete success.

Moreover, the Soviet Union systematically doctored its statistics to persuade the world of its success and power. It was not until the Soviet Union first faltered, then collapsed, that we learned how greatly western historians, geographers and economists had been deceived right up to the 1970s by this meticulous concealment of the parlous state of the Soviet economy.

The Japanese also faked evidence. In 1931, for example, in order to justify their intervention in Manchuria, the Japanese army mounted a fake attack, thus lending credence to the idea of a "Manchurian Incident". They repeated the move in July 1937, with the so-called Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in order to shift responsibility for their assault on China on to the Chinese themselves. Similarly, the Germans set up attacks by fake Polish soldiers on Silesian border posts. And in 1964 the Americans falsely reported an attack on the *USS Madden* in the Gulf of Tonkin so as to be able to launch reprisal bombings on North Vietnam and openly enter the war.

We have already seen that images too can be faked and this danger has increased with the new information and communication technologies. We shall not labour this particular danger here, but we must keep it in mind. The task of forgers of all kinds is made easier by these developments, particularly in an age like ours, which accords such importance to images.

The desire to falsify evidence may go as far as the material destruction of the physical vestiges of the past. The nazis attempted to suppress the evidence of their extermination project. In many camps they attempted, as at Matthausen, to destroy the gas chambers. They forced the Auschwitz prisoners to undertake a terrible "death march", so that the Soviets would not

discover them when the camp was liberated. For all their last minute efforts, they could not destroy all trace of their crimes, which had been so numerous. When the Allies reached the camps, horrific discoveries were made.

Other examples of the destruction of material evidence were mentioned. For instance, little is left of the buildings of the Soviet Gulag. Sites where the material remains are still visible, such as the Solovetsky Islands, are rare, but this seems to be more a result of the huts being destroyed by the snow and cold of the Siberian wastes than of systematic destruction. The sudden collapse of communism has also made archives available which fortunately have not been destroyed and which detail the sinister facts and figures of the Gulag and the realities of the terror in the Soviet Union. Researchers like the French historian Nicolas Werth are able to work on these today.

Gregorio González Roldán stressed how important it was that historical material should not be destroyed, so that historians could use it one day. Historians could not have worked on the problem of violence during the Spanish civil war, as they are currently doing in Spain, if the relevant documents had been destroyed. In this same spirit, regrets were expressed during the symposium that the destruction of the files on the resistance in Greece had been ordered by act of parliament.

Apart from the forging or destruction of documents, many examples of the falsification of historical events were given.

One such is the so-called the *Dolchstoss* legend in Germany, which was spread by senior officers of the Reichswehr after 1918. They contended that the Kiel mutiny and the proclamation of the republic in November represented a "stab in the back" for an undefeated army. In fact the General Staff, faced with an irretrievable military situation, had themselves advised the imperial government to sue for an armistice.

In 1940, Pétain denied responsibility for French defeat and blamed this on the Popular Front, when in fact the blame lay with a General Staff whose military doctrine he had inspired.

We have seen how in 1933 the nazis accused the communists of burning the Reichstag when they had done it themselves. They were not averse to the crudest of falsifications, accusing the Jews, for example, of being behind a war for which they were themselves entirely responsible.

The murder of Kirov in 1934 was ascribed to individuals whom Stalin wished to eliminate, but it is possible that Stalin organised the murder himself, though it is difficult to come to any certain conclusions on the question.

The massacre of Polish officers at Katyn in Byelorussia was attributed by the Soviets to German troops, whereas it had been committed by the Soviet army and the populations deported by Stalin at the end of the second world

war were systematically accused of having collaborated with the Germans, a charge which was most often baseless.

Those involved in the uprisings in East Berlin in 1963 or Budapest in 1956 were described as "fascists" whereas they were, in fact, fighting to free themselves from communist oppression and there was a left-wing element in the uprisings, the extent of which was fully brought out by Attila Szakolczai.

Ideologies have falsified the totality of historical events in order to make them fit in with the worldview they wished to present. For the communists, events could be interpreted only in terms of the class struggle, while the nazis saw history entirely in terms of racial struggle. Ultra-nationalists have regarded historical events solely as products of clashes between nations, and ultra-liberals have seen them wholly in terms of the triumph of the market.

Myths, which we have already discussed, are themselves more or less elaborate falsifications of historical truth. These are either integrated into a sort of national collective unconscious or turned to their own ends by regimes or groups whose interests are served by the consequent enhancement of their image.

Abuse by fixation on a particular event

In this case, the distortion arises through a systematic focusing on one precise element in order to consign another to oblivion or to justify it.

For example, Soviet historiography stressed the Munich Agreement in order to justify the Nazi-Soviet Pact (the secret clauses of which on the division of Poland and the Baltic states were not mentioned). The aim was to show that, since the western democracies had done a deal with Hitler, the Soviet Union (which would otherwise have been left to face Hitler alone) had been forced to play for time by signing the pact, so that it could better prepare for the forthcoming struggle.

That same Soviet historiography refers exclusively to the role of the Lublin Committee in the Polish Resistance, in order to deflect attention from the role of the non-communist Resistance and the way the Red Army deliberately allowed it to be crushed by the Germans in Warsaw.

French Third Republic historiography played up the death of Joseph Bara in order to justify the campaign of repression carried out in the Vendée by the *colonnes infernales* – a repression which it also substantially underplayed. In the era of decolonisation, it underscored the violence of the various anti-colonial uprisings, so as to omit any mention of – or justify – the violence of the ensuing repression; this was the case with the events at Sétif and Guelma on 8 May 1945, at Haiphong in 1946, in Madagascar in 1947 and during the Battle of Algiers.

For many years the fashion in post-war Austria was to present the Austrian people as having been subjected to nazi occupation without themselves being involved in nazism. Austrian victims of the nazi regime were given prominence so as to avoid confronting the reality of that involvement.

In Luxembourg, there was great emphasis on the enforced conscription of Luxembourg citizens into the German army, but no mention of their involvement in the massacres of Jews, as revealed by Christopher R. Browning.

In Germany itself, the atrocities committed by the SS were brought to the fore, but the role of ordinary units in those atrocities, to which Browning and Goldhagen have recently drawn attention, was downplayed.

In the Balkans, atrocities committed by other peoples are denounced, but those carried out by one's own people are not mentioned. The latest illustration of this is the systematic evocation by the Serbs of Ustashi outrages in the second world war, while they themselves are engaged in ethnic cleansing.

Ireland provides another example. Historians there have latched on to the failure of the British to provide aid during the Great Famine, which is presented as a consciously calculated act, without explaining that the real cause of that failure was the then prevalent free-market dogma which prevented the British state from intervening.

One particularly fearful and scandalous type of fixation is the use of the "scapegoat": when a country is confronted with serious situations or events affecting the population, scapegoats are declared responsible and all attention is diverted on to them. For example, Nero, suspected of having himself set fire to Rome, found convenient scapegoats in the Christians. As a result, there was a ruthless crackdown on that community. It is, in fact, highly likely that the fire of 64 ad was caused by some clumsy accident.

This technique of latching on to a scapegoat proved popular. In France in the reign of Philip the Fair, the Templars, Lombards and Jews all fell victim to it. In the Middle Ages, from the Crusades onwards, the Jews figured as the principal scapegoats, with lepers sometimes joining them in that role. In the Rhine valley, crusading sometimes amounted to little more than massacring Jews. In Spain, the Jews were expelled by the "Catholic kings". To this Christian anti-Semitism the 19th century added a social, racist dimension which reactivated the fixation on this ideal scapegoat. The Jews, the "rulers of the age", were clearly identified by anti-Semites as the source of all ills. In the Great Depression of the 1930s, the nazis singled them out for condemnation by the German people, holding them responsible for all the country's difficulties.

More generally, it may be said that the writing and teaching of history in Europe have been characterised by a fixation on the European continent. European history has long been Euro-centric history: it has largely been a

history with Europe as its heartland and the rest of the world forming a kind of periphery, which has been studied only with a certain degree of condescension. In the colonial age, this fitted in with a vision of the world under European domination. The symposium raised the problem of the greater or lesser persistence of historical Eurocentrism, long after the age of colonial domination had ended.

In much the same way, as Georg Iggers pointed out, for a long time history in the United States remained "white history", its high points being the voyage of the Mayflower, the war of independence and the conquest of the frontier. The Indians, who were the first inhabitants of America and victims of white expansion, and the Blacks, who were forcibly shipped over to form a slave workforce for the southern planters, merely had a subordinate, undervalued and depreciated place in a history told exclusively from the white viewpoint.

This is a problem one finds with all ethnic minorities, since the spotlight is invariably on the dominant white people who write history: the example of the Lapps in Norway was also mentioned in this connection.

A further, related issue raised was the place accorded to women. They are not a minority in the strict sense of the term, but they were for many centuries treated as minors. France did not grant them the vote until 1944 and in the United States the Equal Rights Amendment has never been ratified. Many participants pointed out that history, which was first and foremost men's history, has also treated women as minors.

On this problem of the space accorded to the various minorities and to women within history, we must bear in mind that a country like France has subscribed to an integrative, universalist ideal which, in the name of equality and secularism, values resemblance more than difference. We have seen that the French Republic sees itself more as an integrative melting-pot, unlike the Anglo-Saxon democracies which accept the idea of being a set of juxtaposed communities, as in the famous "salad bowl" of the United States. This has made a history which gives each community its place more difficult in France than in the United States, where it has developed enormously.

Lastly, in the communist countries, a general process of fixation took place on what might be seen as the regime's successes. Thus history books laboured heavily, over-estimating and, in some cases, inventing them. This was a way of avoiding mention of the blatant failures, which were difficult to disguise, in spite of all the efforts made to do so. In Stalin's Russia it was better to speak of the development of heavy industry and military power than of agriculture and consumer goods.

We can see that in all these cases the dividing line between distortion by fixation and distortion by omission is not an easy one to draw.

Abuse by omission

A distinction was made by one of the English-speaking working groups between intentional omission (the example given being the Nanking massacre by Japanese troops, which Japanese history textbooks do not mention) and unintentional omission (such as the absence, until recently, of the history of women or minorities). However, that group itself pointed out how difficult it is, here again, to draw a dividing line between what is deliberate and what is not.

Clearly, in totalitarian countries, where historical research and the teaching of history are wholly under government control, the deliberate intention of the government to conceal a particular, inconvenient event is patent and there can be no doubt about the intentional character of the omission. Nazism, fascism and Stalinism all practised deliberate omission as a matter of course wherever possible. Where it was not possible, they resorted to denial, falsification or fixation.

But the example given by the English-speaking group in fact relates to a country, Japan, which became democratic in 1945 and which continued, nonetheless, to produce schoolbooks which made no reference to the terrible slaughter at Nanking.

So it seems that we can still find cases of intentional omission in democracies. A number of examples mentioned during the symposium, some of which have already been cited, seem to confirm this. For many years, no reference was made in France to the violence of colonial repression or to the murder by police of Algerians in Paris in October 1961. In Austria and Luxembourg, involvement in nazism was concealed for many years. In Switzerland the problem of nazi gold was covered up, while silence was maintained in Finland on the fate of the Karelians imprisoned in concentration camps, and in Iceland a national hero's syphilis remained hidden. This is not an exhaustive list.

But what proportion of these omissions is deliberate and how much is unintentional? It is often difficult to say, particularly as university researchers and teachers in democracies are not under absolute government domination and can express themselves freely. This seems to imply that a social consensus exists, somewhere on the borderline between consciousness and the unconscious, not to unearth sensitive episodes from the past. One particularly interesting case is the silence on the Vichy period in France, which was maintained until the early 1970s. Henry Rousso refers to this as an instance of repression. After the phase of post-war purges which followed the Liberation, a myth of generalised resistance grew up in France, maintained both by the Gaullists and by the communists. According to that myth, the French people had supported the Resistance in enormous numbers; only a handful of traitors had collaborated and these had been dealt with in the post-war purges. It was not until Robert Paxton's book on the Vichy period in

France appeared in the 1970s that their repressed memories were revived – they were also reactivated by the film *The sorrow and the pity*. Significantly, however, though originally made for television, the film was banned at a time when the state still enjoyed a broadcasting monopoly. Thus, at a point when French society was beginning to ask itself questions – the pardon granted by President Pompidou to Paul Touvier, a *Milice* officer responsible for the murder of Jews, caused a great stir in public opinion – a violation of the myth of resistance was punished by conscious censorship. Historians have since set to work with a will on these questions. Many books and articles have been published and the French have learned to face up to their past. Against a background of successive "affairs" (the Touvier affair was followed by the Bousquet and Papon affairs), which have even seen the role of President Mitterrand brought into question on account of his relations with Bousquet, Vichy has become that ever-present past that forms the subject of a book by Henry Rousso and Éric Conan.

The case of the massacre of Algerians in Paris in October 1961, to which we have already referred, also involves a combination of conscious and unconscious forces. The authorities concealed the scale of the killings committed by the police, which was at the time headed by Maurice Papon, and public opinion showed little concern, whereas French deaths at the Charonne metro station a few months later elicited strong public feeling. Only after the publication of Jean-Luc Einaudi's book *La bataille de Paris* (1991), the Papon trial and a report submitted to Lionel Jospin in May 1999 was this dramatic episode widely discussed in the public arena.

The propensity for forgetting finds expression at the institutional level in the granting of amnesties. All the great crises which have torn French society apart have been followed by amnesties. There were amnesties after the Commune, the Dreyfus Affair, the Vichy period and the Algerian war. This institutional form of forgetting is the counterpart to the conscious and unconscious omission we have alluded to above. In order to heal the rifts in society, the state acts as though the events had never happened.

The difficulty of healing wounds, with all the obstacles this may put in the way of history writing, is not confined to France. Democratic Spain has for many years found it difficult to arrive at a calm assessment of the violence during the Spanish civil war, as was demonstrated by Gregorio González Roldán. In Austria, too, it was a long time before the involvement of Austrians in nazism was confronted, even though it is a proven fact.

Abuse out of laziness or ignorance

Such abuse of the historical record may result from teachers lacking the commitment to update their knowledge and being content merely to repeat a received version or a presentation of the facts which goes back to the time when they themselves were students, without taking account of recent research findings. In France, for example, it is not unknown for teachers to

tell their pupils that French veterans in the inter-war years were all fascists, that during the second world war De Gaulle was the sword and Pétain the shield, that the world was divided up at Yalta in 1945, that during the civil war in Russia the peasants supported the Bolsheviks in large numbers, that the Soviet Union put an end to the "prison of nationalities" which the Tsarist Empire had previously represented, that the New Deal was inspired by Keynes or that the economic and political policy of the Popular Front in 1936 was Marxist in inspiration. This catalogue of howlers, which is far from exhaustive, shows a real danger that history may be distorted as a result of the ignorance and idleness of a few routine-bound teachers.

Abuse through the exploitation of history for the sake of commercial interests

We return here to aspects we have already discussed above: the use of history by advertising and in publications or audiovisual products aimed at young people, which may peddle stereotypes, if not indeed crude errors or dangerous ideologies.

In a more general way, the popular demand for history, which is in itself a good thing, may produce some unintended negative effects. That demand may be shaped and guided by fashions, which are transient and highly changeable in a manner incompatible with serious research, for which sustained and calm endeavour is required. Anniversaries stimulate publishing activity on a particular subject, but when anniversaries come thick and fast, we sink into a kind of historical "channel-hopping", in which the main concern is to achieve sales on the strength of some particular year or other. It is, admittedly, gratifying that history books sell, but history must not be written primarily to satisfy publishers' interests, at the risk of seeing its fields of investigation restricted by the expectations of the market and the moment.

Which areas of history are susceptible of abuse?

Two questions suggest themselves here. Which are the *periods* of history that are in danger of being misappropriated or distorted? Which particular *fields* of history run this risk? The answer to the first question is simple: all periods are in danger of being distorted, even if the danger varies from one period to another.

What is known as contemporary history – the history of the most recent years – is naturally the most susceptible. The temptation to censor or distort is particularly strong in that the events are recent and still have some currency. This applies to undemocratic countries, but also to democratic ones: how is one to write the history of the Bosnian war or the war in Kosovo? The problem is even more difficult for those who have suffered as a result of the events. The delegate from Bosnia and Herzegovina pointed out during the sessions that the Bosnians would have to be given a little time before they could sit down calmly to write their recent history. We have already

referred to this problem above and we have seen that the French needed time before they could study the Vichy period, and the Spaniards before they could investigate violence in the Spanish civil war.

The history of the present, where eye-witnesses to the events are still alive, is for that very reason a sensitive matter. There may be contradictory memories and it may be difficult to face up to history calmly and collectedly. There is a danger that the work of historians may be hijacked by controversies: it is in this sense that Vichy represents what Rousso and Conan have described as an ever-present past. The problem of the Algerian War, that "nameless war", to use the phrase which director Bertrand Tavernier borrowed for his 1991 film, is another example. In a broader sense, modern history, which is generally dated from 1789 (so large does the French Revolution loom in our thinking!), is equally sensitive, even if it goes back much further. That sensitivity is particularly intense in France, as can be seen from the frequent political controversies with historical references going back to the revolution, if not indeed to the *ancien régime*. Those controversies were very lively in 1989, the bi-centenary of the revolution. On that occasion, François Furet expressed the hope that historians might at last work with a degree of calm on a subject too long dominated by political and ideological polemics. More recently, while preparations were under way for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Zola's *J'accuse* article and the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery, the French Prime Minister, in a speech to the National Assembly, implied that pro-Dreyfus sentiment and abolitionism were exclusively left-wing values.

More distant periods are also potentially open to misappropriation. This has to do, in part, with the role of founding myths, which can go back far into history, as is shown by the many examples already mentioned. The problem can, however, also arise from ideological re-readings of history: for example, the Marxist interpretation of antiquity and the Middle Ages or the glorification by the nazis and the fascists of medieval Germany and ancient Rome respectively.

The answer to our second question is an identical one: all fields of history run the risk of abuse. Political history is, naturally, the main area affected, but economic, social and cultural history are exposed to this same danger. The Marxist interpretation, by distinguishing between an infrastructure and superstructures, implies a re-reading which forces the economic and social spheres into its ideological mould from the outset. The nazi *Weltanschauung* is the product of a racist vision of history in all fields: the racial struggle serves as the driving force for history, as the class struggle does for Marxists. No field of history is excluded from these totalitarian explanations, in which everything is lumped together.

However, the danger of distortion across all fields of history exists in democratic countries too: as we have seen, the revival of economic liberalism has had an impact on the re-reading of economic history. And the general

view of history has at times been unduly influenced by one dominant culture, as in the cases we have already mentioned of Eurocentrism and of "white history" in the United States. The tendency towards an excessively Christian view of history is another example. Against such tendencies, there is clearly a case to be made for taking account not only of the cultures of other continents, but also of the specific histories of minorities within a country – histories which have been ignored for too long. However, over-concentration on these kinds of history, against a background of self-assertion on the part of the communities concerned, might run the opposite risk of having exaggerated effects on the social, cultural or religious history of a country, in so far as its history would be seen merely as a juxtaposition of histories of communities. We should not jump from one extreme to the other.

History can be misused in many ways and all periods and fields are open to the danger. This makes the question how we are to confront these misuses even more important and renders the answer to that question even more complex.

What is to be done about misuses of history?

In keeping with the theme chosen for the symposium, the participants identified a number of approaches to countering misuses of history. One course of action is simply to promote democracy in general, given that, as we have seen, undemocratic regimes are by their very essence manipulators of history. But the symposium highlighted the fact that, though democracy is a necessary condition for avoiding abuses of the historical record, it is not a sufficient one.

Old habits may die hard in countries which have just achieved democracy. In the countries which have emerged from the former Soviet Union, there is a strong temptation to produce a highly nationalistic history as a reaction against the negation of their national identity and the imposition of a Soviet socialist identity.

Those countries with long-standing democratic traditions are not themselves immune from misuses of history, as the many examples we have cited have shown. How can abuses be prevented in countries where democracy is not itself sufficient to prevent them? It seemed useful in this connection to offer a number of recommendations.

Allowing historians and teachers to work freely

This seems an obvious point, given that freedom is a necessary component of democracy. In a democratic, pluralist system, academic research must be free from interference by the political regime: the history teacher has no "official truth" to impart on behalf of that regime. However, having re-stated this basic principle, we should also take into account some difficulties which

may arise when the historian or the teacher exercises that legitimate freedom.

The freedom of the historian poses a problem, given his/her subjectivity, which may be a distorting factor. How far can that subjectivity go? The true historian strives to manage the inevitable distance between subject and object as honestly as possible. Without claiming to possess the truth, the historian must always aspire to it. The person who does not obey this imperative of intellectual honesty is merely a sham historian and some pseudo-researchers who claim to be historians clearly have to be unmasked as impostors: this is the case with the Holocaust-deniers. There is a bulwark against such abuses, which Karl Popper terms "intersubjectivity". A historian's research must be accorded validity only in so far as they have been subjected to the critical examination of his/her colleagues. Review by the community of historians must rule out of court what are, in view of all the evidence from the past and all serious research, clearly erroneous versions of the historical record. Manipulators of history, such as the "Holocaust deniers", who have no right to call themselves historians, must be clearly designated as such. No place in academic circles must be given to these assassins of history: it is not for universities to offer a platform to anything which cannot be properly regarded as research. Above all, denials of this kind must not be granted any kind of academic respectability.

Should we go further and legislate against the most scandalous abuses? Should Holocaust denial be made a crime as it already is in France? The question was raised during the symposium, but some participants pointed out that such legislation did not seem compatible with other democratic traditions, such as that of the United States, where a strict interpretation of the first amendment to the American Constitution guarantees freedom of expression.

For history teachers to have freedom, they must have textbooks available to them which allow them to exercise that freedom fully. There is no need to go into this problem of textbooks at length here, as the Council of Europe has already devoted a great deal of work to it.

Consideration of pedagogical freedom led the participants in the symposium to raise the question of how teachers are to be monitored. Opinions were divided on the subject. To the participants from some countries – Switzerland and Norway, for example – which have no inspections of this kind, monitoring by bodies of inspectors seemed an infringement of teachers' liberty. It also seemed to pose a risk that the content of teaching might be improperly influenced. Against this view, it was argued that an incompetent teacher or one who manipulated history represents a danger for which no other remedy can be found. Can a lazy or ignorant teacher be allowed to caricature history to generations of students? Can a teacher nostalgic for the nazi era be allowed to sing the praises of Hitler and deny the existence of the Holocaust in front of impressionable young people?

The role of inspectorates must not by any means be limited to mere monitoring. Theirs is also a role of advice, assistance and vigilance where the initial and in-service training of teachers is concerned. This latter aspect is crucial to maintaining a connection between academic research and the history that is taught in schools, which is a fundamental linkage if we do not want teachers to mistake the simple for the simplistic.

Ensuring that historians and teachers are well trained

It is, firstly, important that the history student should have training in historiography so as to understand that history has not been written once and for all and that historians attempting to reconstruct the past are people of their own times and their own countries with all that that implies. They are part of an age and a society from which they can detach themselves only with difficulty. This does not imply a thoroughgoing relativism, but it is a precondition for any form of honest historical research which is conscious of its limits.

If students are to be equipped for that honest research, they must be properly trained in the critical analysis of source materials of all kinds. They have to be taught to sort, identify and situate sources precisely, to distinguish reliable information from that which is not, and to grasp its implications. Students must understand that historical thinking is a construct supported by incontestable evidence from the past.

A grounding in how history has been misused – with historical examples of such abuses – would also be desirable, in order to afford students full protection from the various dangers of manipulation, which have been further heightened by the new technologies. This initial training must enable future researchers and teachers to confront these dangers with a thorough awareness of what is involved. Furthermore, those intending to teach in secondary education should be trained to transpose knowledge from one level to another, so as to be prepared for adapting what they have learned at university to the classroom situation. This transposition is a difficult task. Future teachers have to learn to manage the relation between academic history and history as it can be taught in schools.

In-service training must also help teachers to deal with misuses of history. Refresher courses at universities will enable them to stay in touch with research and to distinguish serious research from manipulation. This training must also help them throughout their careers to manage the problem of transposing knowledge from one level to another, taking into account changes in the curriculum. When new syllabuses come into force, they have to be given the means to identify those facts which are important and choose significant examples, so that they can obey the imperative, to which we have already referred, of remaining simple without being simplistic.

In this way, teachers who are well trained at the outset and assisted throughout their careers are in a position not only to deal with abuses of the historical record, but to enable their students to deal with them too.

Helping pupils to deal with potential abuses of history

The teaching of history must contribute to the formation of pupils' critical faculties. If properly trained in the study of the various source materials, teachers can in their turn initiate pupils in this work of selection, identification and criticism.

Pupils have to be taught that, though history must tend towards truth, it is an attempt to reconstruct the past. It is not an account that is settled once and for all; historians are not immune from subjectivity and the influence of their time.

Pupils have to learn that the aim of history teaching is not to have them accumulate facts and dates, but to teach them to accord proper importance to facts from the past and probe their meaning. In this way, their critical intelligence is shaped.

With this aim in mind, it would be desirable to sensitise them, using examples, to the problem of distortions of history in order to protect them from potential manipulation.

The value of this is all the greater for the fact that, in the contemporary world, they are overwhelmed by a flood of information which has its source outside the schoolroom – mainly in the media and the new information and communication technologies. Teachers must help their pupils to be selective within this diverse range of information sources. However, before all this work on the part of historians and teachers can begin, one thing is indispensable if we are to be forearmed against misuse: material evidence from the past must be preserved. Without this it would not be possible to write history.

Preserving the traces of the past

The debates following Gregorio González Roldán's paper provided an opportunity to underscore this recommendation that the material evidence of the past be preserved. It has proved difficult to arrive at a proper evaluation of the respective levels of violence in the Spanish civil war in a country which did not emerge from dictatorship until the mid-1970s and where the wounds have not yet healed. If such an evaluation can be attempted today, it is thanks to the fact that the traces of that violence have been preserved, providing historians with the indispensable documentary evidence.

Every effort should be made to conserve the traces of the past – and not simply that evidence which, in cases of past conflict, serves the interests of the victors. The defeated must also have their place in the record.

A statement by the Bosnian delegate on the difficulty of writing the immediate history of a country which is just beginning to emerge from a terrible civil war and on the need to allow a little time before that history can be written calmly and collectedly provided an opportunity to reiterate the point that, if history is one day to be written dispassionately, all the evidence must without fail be preserved. It was largely in this spirit – given that reconstruction has to be undertaken – that a photographic inventory of the destruction in Bosnia was made at the end of the war. In view of the diversity of its population, Bosnia was also one of the cases which prompted the symposium to raise the problem of the need for a "plural" history.

Promoting a pluralist history with an aim of achieving harmony

Since the use of history for nationalistic ends is the source of much distortion, the participants at the symposium argued that national histories should be open and tolerant. And as the closed character of national histories can reach the point of mythicisation, one of the working groups recommended that the Council of Europe devote a future symposium to this problem of the use of national myths.

Considerable progress has certainly been achieved in Europe, where history is now used less frequently for purposes of nationalistic glorification. But this progress has predominantly occurred in western Europe, where, at the beginning of the 20th century, history still fostered enmities between the peoples of the major countries. The clearest examples of this are to be found in France and Germany. The maps of France in which the provinces lost in 1871 appear in colours of mourning, the school reader *Le tour de France par deux enfants,* the *Petit Lavisse* history textbook and the history lessons by junior school teachers whom Péguy called "the black hussars of the Republic" may all have played their part in reinforcing hostility to Germany, even though the chauvinistic character of that teaching should not be exaggerated. In Germany, where in the 19th century national sentiment was largely constructed in opposition to France, history teaching in the schools also fuelled the antagonism towards the neighbours across the Rhine. As this century draws to a close, these two countries, which for many years regarded each other as hereditary enemies, have not only been reconciled but are often viewed within the framework of the European Union as forming a Franco-German partnership. History teaching, while facing up to the antagonisms of the past, has taken on a European dimension and no longer by any stretch of the imagination promotes conflict between the two peoples.

On the other hand, in eastern Europe and the Balkans much often remains to be done on this score. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the other communist regimes and the end of an era in which national history was denied and supplanted by "socialist history", the pendulum in history writing has swung back towards a very nationalistic form which can promote conflict between peoples. This danger was discussed with regard to Armenia and

Azerbaijan, among others. In Armenia, animosity against Azerbaijan is kept alive largely by historians who make play with the evidence of the massacres committed by the Turks in the early years of the 20th century.

In a multi-ethnic country like Yugoslavia, which, since the fall of communism, has been torn apart by civil wars, this may be an obstacle to reconciliation. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina came in for special mention and the hope was expressed that that country might become reconciled to its plural history and identity, which was symbolised for many years by the tolerant city of Sarajevo, before the atrocities of the civil war tarnished that fine symbol.

A plural history is also a history which respects minorities and can acknowledge their contribution. Historical research and teaching have to take this dimension into account. However, a possible unintended consequence has to be avoided here: it is crucial that such an approach should not lead to a history which merely juxtaposes and extols the histories of individual communities. The danger here is that we may end up in a situation that is the opposite of tolerant, where everyone retreats into an exclusive concern with the history of their own community. Plural history must set itself the objective of achieving concord: enabling different peoples and different communities to get to know one another so as to live together more harmoniously.

In France, the proponents of secularism see that doctrine as a means to achieve such harmony. Those things which belong to the private realm and the field of individual freedom must be kept out of the public sphere. Secular education sees itself as respecting religious differences by containing them in the private sphere, in order to allow everyone to live together in harmony, both at school and in the French Republic generally. This secularism has not prevented French history syllabuses from including a substantial amount of religious history, concerning not just Christianity, but all the great religions. However, the ideal of secularism is a peculiarly French one, which is often poorly understood and confused with anti-clericalism. This lack of understanding means that it may be perceived in other countries, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, as a form of intolerance.

This controversy aside, there was a point on which the participants in the symposium were firmly agreed: plural history must have the achievement of harmony as its goal. It has to be an open history, a history that is tolerant in spirit.

While enabling communities to discover an identity, it must not confine them in that identity. In the discussion that followed Ola Svein Stugu's paper, the author, a Norwegian, expressed the desire for a post-national identity as well. For his part, Georg Iggers stressed that producing a history exclusively designed to confine people within their national identity could be said to be one of the essential sources of the abuse of history.

Conclusion

History and its teaching convey a common heritage which some have attempted – or are still attempting – to distort to their own exclusive advantage. Where political regimes or clearly defined groups are involved, those guilty of such abuses are easy to identify. However, responsibilities may be much more widespread throughout society, particularly in democratic countries, where abuses of the historical record sometimes occur without any clear awareness that they are happening.

This common heritage must not be misappropriated for ideological ends, whether narrowly nationalistic or securing the interests of a particular community. It is legitimate for each community to feel the need to constitute its own history and identity. But this must not detract from the pursuit of historical truth and an honest teaching of history. The aim should be that the identity so constituted is able to connect and combine with other identities. Recent events show how difficult it is to build a post-national identity, which would not mean the disappearance of national identities, but would allow us at last to learn to live together. At the other end of the scale, withdrawal into community-based identities may threaten societies with fragmentation at the base.

The end of the 20th century has seen the decline of ideologies which have been responsible for a great deal of historical manipulation, but the danger of abuse still exists – particularly of distortion in order to glorify a community-based or national identity. A plural and tolerant history, running the gamut of multiple identities, from the local to the universal, has to equip pupils to become responsible citizens in their towns, villages, regions and countries – and also in Europe and the world as a whole. Geography uses a range of different scales: history has to learn to use a range of different identities. The constitution of a history and an identity would then no longer be achieved in opposition to other identities, but through a complementary relationship with them. The temptation to distort or misuse history would be correspondingly reduced.

Among the greatest treasures of the legacy of universal history are a number of texts emblematic of democracy. We may cite in particular Pericles' funeral speech, the Writ of Habeas Corpus (1679), the Bill of Rights (1689), the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1789), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech. These are a common historical heritage of humanity, though unfortunately only part of humanity currently has the benefit of them.

Let us hope that enjoyment of this heritage will be genuinely shared one day and that identities can assert themselves without being mutually opposed. Given that such clashes of identity often involve distortions of history, it has been important to reflect on what should be done to confront such abuses.

Post-communist history curricula: the cases of Estonia and East Germany

By Sirkka Ahonen[1]

History is an identity subject. It reinforces collective identities among nations and social groups. Those in power are inclined to mediate appropriate representations of history in order to bolster the unity of a community and make it easier to govern. Equally, suppressed groups tend to construct a historical narrative in order to legitimise their pursuits and actions.

Representations of history in the formation of historical identity

People make sense of what happens in society in terms of narratives (Rüsen 1994). A narrative includes (an) agent(s) of historical happening and their aspirations. A narrative can also be "a grand narrative", where an external goal determines "happening". People have been seen to identify themselves with both kinds of narratives, becoming devoted followers of a hero figure or of an ideology. Narratives are thus a phenomenon of social psychology, besides being based on the reconstructive nature of historical knowledge.

The individual representations of history are constructed in the context of narratives. They can, however, be manipulated by those in power, in order to make a collective historical identity, needed for desired political action. Or, if one resorts to Michel Foucault's concept of anonymous "power", representations of history are part of the hegemonial discourse. Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith have studied the invention and diffusion of national identities by political and cultural leaders in a variety of countries during the 19th and 20th centuries (Anderson 1983, Smith 1991). Representations of history are not very hard to set in people's minds. As they become established they serve as a legitimisation of social action.

In regard to the reception of the official representations of history on the personal level, human rationality implies a certain amount of individual

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judgement and choice. The representations are processed and adopted in the course of a person's secondary socialisation, which implies that there is not as much compelling personal dependency determining the person's identification with ideas and objects as there is in primary socialisation. "One has to love one's mother, but not one's teacher". As a rule in secondary socialisation there is no unquestionable "significant other" to convey the meanings of reality. Secondary socialisation is a cognitive process in comparison with primary socialisation (Berger and Luckmann 1970).

The purpose of this paper is to study how official representations of history were manufactured in two former socialist countries, the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Estonia, how they were received and made into a historical identity and how they were eventually transformed to comply with the new power discourses.

The evidence used in this study consists of articles from historical journals and methodology books, and to a major extent from official history syllabuses launched by ministries of education in Estonia and the GDR between 1986 and 1992, as well as interviews with educators.

Representations of history in "actually existing socialism" in Estonia and East Germany

History was a hegemonial discipline in "actually existing socialism". Ample time was allocated to history in schools, and academies of sciences produced history used in imposing a socialist identity on people.

The official representations of history were constructed within the grand narrative of Marxism-Leninism. The most prominent tenets of the narrative were the concepts of progress and revolution.

History was supposed to be represented as progress. The road of progress wound as the social formations of primeval, slave-based, feudal, bourgeois and socialist societies replaced each other in dialectical turns. The final socialist society, when started, could only move upwards. This pattern was represented in the GDR syllabus as late as 1989, only a few weeks before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The content was the great forty years of the GDR:

– the struggle for the socialist conditions of production 1945-61;

– the further development of socialism 1960-70;

– the accomplishment of developed socialism 1970-80;

– the advancement of the accomplished development of socialism 1980.

The myth of revolution as the engine of history was used to organise history. The "October legend" is illustrated in the "newspeak" used in syllabuses and textbooks to refer to the events that were seen as turning points in

European history (the conventional or western liberal term on the left, the Marxist-Leninist term on the right):

The conventional "western" term	**The Marxist-Leninist term**
reformation of the church in the 16th century	the early bourgeois revolution in Germany
the American war of independence	the first bourgeois revolution in America
the uprising in the German navy in 1918	the socialist November revolution
the political changes in Poland, Hungary etc., in the late 1940s	the victory of the socialist revolution in eastern central Europe
the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1968	the repulsion of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia

The denial of national identity eventually became a problem in socialist societies. A socialist community was too faceless and abstract to be identified with. Therefore a combination of national and socialist identities was resorted to by the authorities. The concept of the "fatherland" was manipulated to suit the Marxist narrative.

In the GDR in the 1980s, the Communist Party encouraged historians to reassess German "heritage and tradition". The historians gave up the previous idea of only the champions of class struggle being acceptable objects of historical identification. Instead, all promoters of the German cause in history were now counted as progressive heroes, especially those from the eastern parts of the country. "Progress" was now applied to medieval emperors as makers of German unity, and to both Martin Luther and King Frederick II as promoters of the necessary bourgeois revolution (Ahonen 1992).

In Estonia the question of national identity was far more problematic than in East Germany. As Estonia had been part of the Soviet Union since 1944, the new regime converted the term "fatherland" to mean the greater Soviet Union. "Homeland", "native history" and "our country" likewise referred to the Soviet Union, while "the Estonian area" was used for Estonia. Even the history of Estonian independence, 1918-40, was dealt with under the heading "history of the Soviet Union" (Ahonen 1992).

According to Soviet rhetoric, explicit in the history curricula, Estonia had been "kindly received into the happy family of the Soviet nations" in 1940. The all-Union identity was systematically supported in history books and school syllabuses. The history syllabus of 1986 still claimed:

> Our country is a supranational state that represents the interest and will of all of the people... a new historical community has been born, the Soviet people, founded on the union of workers, peasants and intellectuals, led by the work-

> ing class and guided by the universal friendship of all nations and nationalities. (quoted in Ahonen, 1992)

As late as 1987 Estonian authorities were accused of having included too many Estonian place names in the syllabus (Ahonen 1992). They would distract pupils' minds from the idea of the Soviet Union as the fatherland.

The reception of the official representations: collective identities rejected

The enforcement of collective identities clearly failed both in the GDR and in Estonia. As late as the 1980s the East German authorities started to suspect that the institutional socialisation of youth had not worked properly. In 1986 the Youth Research Institute in Leipzig was authorised to conduct a survey on attitudes towards society and its institutions. The results were not, however, published before 1989. They showed that youth only weakly identified themselves with the GDR. The survey was repeated in 1987, with even more alarming results. When young people were asked whether they felt as if they belonged to the GDR, only 43% answered "yes". Two years later in another survey only 19% identified themselves with the GDR (Anon. 1990, Ahonen 1992).

Collective identity depended on one's social class. In 1986, 48% of young workers felt that they belonged to the GDR, while among university students the figure was 68%. Two years later the two figures were as low as 19% and 34% (Anon. 1990).

History culture, as a whole, disappointed the school authorities. The reconsideration of "heritage and tradition" by historians in the 1980s had not succeeded in promoting positive historical identity (Wernstedt 1991).

Another form of failure in forcing a collective historical identity on people was *double consciousness.* "Perhaps the most obvious and psychologically most burdensome inheritance from SED [East German Communist Party] pedagogy was the education which produced a double face... In public, that is in the media, at work, at the trade union meetings, at school and so forth, the compulsory political rituals were strictly obeyed," wrote R. Wernstedt, a historian, in 1991. The political rituals corresponded to the expected historical identification. Anna Seghers, a writer, describes in her novel *Das Vertrauen* (The trust, 1970, p. 110) how embarrassing it was when a comrade due to a sudden burst of distress forgot the right symbols:

> Alwyn stammered, as she had forgotten what she had prepared and written on a paper beforehand. She did not find her notes. Instead she told, crying, that she had known Ella since childhood, she had attended her wedding and supported her when Hans fell in the war. She did not say anything... of the War against Imperialists...Nothing about the victory of the Soviet Union or the eventual founding of the German Democratic Republic. (author's translation)

In Estonia the rejection of the forced all-Union identity was brought into the open as early as the beginning of the 1980s. In Tallinn in 1980, a total of 2 000 Estonian school students rallied against Soviet rule in defence of Estonian culture. Glasnost in 1985 ignited an explicit history discussion. Truth about history was loudly demanded. The first new interpretation of history concerned the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. In 1987 it became the symbol of new history, required by an emerging new Estonia (Ahonen 1992).

Gradually new representations of history, such as for the years 1940, 1944 and 1949 emerged. They were established by historians and readily received by people. In 1988 both the Central Committees of the Estonian Communist Party and Soviet Communist Party still attempted to intervene in defence of Stalinist "truths", but in vain. In conclusion, the authorities eventually capitulated (Ahonen 1992).

The socialist community in Estonia was breaking up and giving way to a community with a national ethos. New representations of history were to accompany this development.

Reformed representations of history in post-Marxist history education in East Germany/Germany and Estonia

With the end of the socialist regime, the Marxist-Leninist representations of history lost their significance. The new transformed representations, however, are not only ideologically deconstructed texts but also new social constructs, due to a new social situation.

East Germany/Germany

The observations below are based on texts and interviews in the *new Länder* 1989-92. They show attempts for reorientation by the East German educators. Their work eventually became obsolete, as the school authorities decided to adopt the history syllabuses from the neighbouring western *Länder.*

On 9 November 1989 the Marxist-Leninist representations of history became redundant overnight. As historical identification often finds objects in ancient landmarks of change, re-interpretation concerned old events as well as recent ones. However, the examples shown here are predominantly from 20th-century history.

Old representation	New representation
Martin Luther – a lackey of princes	a liberator of German minds
the rise of Nazism in the 1930s: the final stages of monopolistic capitalism	the rise of Nazism in the 1930s: an enormous crime
Stalin's terror: "a blank spot"	Stalin's terror: dictatorship
the end of the war in 1945: liberation	the end of the war in 1945: capitulation
the birth of the GDR: the first German workers' and peasants' state	the birth of the GDR: Stalinism
the invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968: struggle against counter-revolution	the invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968: Soviet aggression
Die Wende 1989 [the change in 1989]: reaction	*Die Wende* 1989: peaceful revolution

Source: Ahonen, 1992

The reformed representations did not adhere to any grand narrative, other than a liberalist view of history, portraying the past as a road to freedom and humanity. As a general rule the receivers are left to modify their individual representations on their own.

Estonia

In Estonia both the quest for and the legitimisation of a restoration of national identity was the key issue in the changes which took place around 1990. There was no need to push national feeling underground, as in Germany, as there was no national guilt complex or a verdict by the international community against such feelings. On the contrary, it was in the international community that a feeling of guilt prevailed: why did we allow Estonia to be treated as it was in the years following 1944. In Estonia the transformation of historical representations happened with a clear nationalist ethos.

The new interpretations observed here include old and modern sensitive topics. With some topics, an anachronistic interpretation was adopted. The grand narrative of deterministic nationalism was restored from the 1930s, a time when Estonia had been a young nation-state using history for nation-building. "The invention of tradition" (Hobsbawm 1983) had resulted in presenting medieval peasant uprisings as attempts at a nation-state and the conquest of Estonia by the Swedes as "the good old Swedish time". Such representations were now re-introduced.

The "October legend" was fiercely rejected. Revolution, whether the French Revolution of 1789 or the Russian Revolution of 1917 was seen more as coups by power greedy monsters than the rising up of the people. So unpop-

ular was the idea of revolution that had been forced on Estonian history during the previous years.

Old representation	New representation
peasant leaders Lembiru and Kaupo: "blank spot"	peasant leaders Lembiru and Kaupo: freedom fighters
Swedes in the 17th century: robber conquerors	Swedes in the 17th century: founders of Tartu University
Russians in the 18th century: Estonian-Russian friendship	Russians in the 18th century: oppressors of Estonian peasants
national awakening in the 19th century: characteristics of the capitalist formation	national awakening in the 19th century: a cultural defence of the nation
Estonian Independence 1918-1940: counter-revolution	Estonian Independence 1918-1940: nation-state
arrival of Soviet troops in Estonia in 1940: an extension of the happy family of the Soviet peoples; re-establishment of the rule of the Soviets	arrival of Soviet troops in Estonia in 1940: the end of Estonian independence
deportations of Estonians 1941, 1944, 1949: "blank spot"	deportations of Estonians 1941,1944,1949: rule of terror by Stalin
Russian settlers after 1944: "blank spot"	Russian settlers after 1944: uncontrolled industrialisation and migration

Source: anonymous 1991b, Ahonen 1992

The new discourse implied a representation of Estonians as immanently nation-building people. To help construct a clear representation with this meaning, the past of Estonia was written in the new curriculum as a continuous grand story isolated from other nations. Friends and fiends were redefined.

Estonia declared itself independent in 1991, with historical representations supporting the new national consciousness.

The reception of the new representations: identity in transition?

Since 1990, the representations of history both in school and in the street have changed. The cases of Estonia and East Germany differ, though. In Estonia a new grand narrative is being provided, namely that of nationalism. In Germany no such umbrella is provided. Multi-perspectives characterise history lessons, now common to east and west. Which of the reformed

representations would be more powerful and engaging in people's minds, in terms of enabling an identification with history?

The Estonian response to present history lessons was empirically studied in the context of a European research-project "Youth and History" (v. Borries 1993). The study was conducted in 1995 among 15-year-olds of twenty-seven European countries, including Estonia. The Estonian responses are of special interest.

For the young Estonians the "October legend" of revolutions as the engine of history has faded. Young Estonians saw revolutions as making changes in history to a lesser degree that Europeans as a whole. More than European youth as a whole, the Estonian students acknowledged history as a *magister vitae.* The old hegemonial status of history in school might be reflected in this response, or, on the other hand, it can be due to the recent experience of historical change.

Estonian students do not trust school books to the same extent as the rest of Europeans. This could be due to the communist period when "official history" contradicted family tradition and private narratives.

"Nation" as a historical entity had already gained new significance in Estonia in the 1980s. Not unexpectedly, this was reflected in research data. Still, only a minority of the persons queried accepted the right of ethnic groups to form nation-states by means of war.

In East Germany, the remnants of the old history lessons were empirically researched by Bodo Borries in 1990. The old official representations were still present in the street and in people's minds, but their credibility was questioned everywhere. Borries asked youth in East and West Germany in 1990 about their relation to the past. He was particularly interested in the allegations that East German youth is more prone to neo-nazism than those of West Germany because they had had little opportunity for open and non-manipulated discussions on history. However, his results showed that young East Germans shared the same historical judgement of national socialism as West Germans. If they eventually joined the new street nationalism, it was due to social frustration and not a lack of historical knowledge (v. Borries 1993).

The "Youth and History" project data as such does not provide comparative information on the old and new *Länder* Germany. One has to wait for a closer look, hopefully to be taken up eventually by German investigators. To conclude from sporadic observations, many easterners seem to be frustrated by the failure of a "third way", that is of an opportunity to construct representations of the recent past on specifically East German experience and information. Unpredictable representations of history can easily take shape in such a situation.

For instance, one can question how far the irrational identification with the nazis, acknowledged by Borries, will be contained by the mainstream of historical culture. Easily received street "signs" can be more powerful than critically reconstructed "meanings" in shaping identities.

In present societies "signs" are overwhelmingly numerous. An access to a vast variety of media is widely open and encounters with different cultures and subcultures frequent. As a result a uniform collective identity tends to be aspired to by political leaders only. Identities are fragmented. Authorities try to counteract this development. For instance, history curricula have come under the focus of strong political interests (Bennet 1985, Englund 1986, Füredi 1992). Mediation of history in school and in the culture as a whole is based on social representations that are only partially products of historical research. Often they have very little to do with the past, but a lot to do with the present. The power of the representations depends rather on their street credibility than their epistemological solidity. Making them transparent and critically manageable is a challenge for education.

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The Spanish civil war

By Gregorio González Roldán[1]

Introduction

This paper argues for the need to record the history of violence, briefly analyses statistics on the violence and repression associated with the Spanish civil war and presents an outline and chronology of its key events.

Recording the history of violence in order to build peace

Over the past year we have seen how difficult it is to build peace day after day. The fact that certain forms of violence dominate the others – the violence associated with outright war, the imperative nature of the arsenal of violence – requires that history be capable of exposing the myths about the past which sustain violence between states, social groups and individuals. In our modern era, characterised by growing violence, historical research must get to the very roots of the processes of violence.

A society with no memory is defenceless; worse still, a society that perpetuates historical myths is guided by the wrong motives and will constantly make the wrong decisions.

The work of historians must be geared to the above objective; this is the best reaction to the at times implacable criticisms of the job done by historians and of its contribution to the building of peace.

Recording the history of violence in 20th century Europe

Following these introductory comments, our first challenge is to define the meaning of violence. To cite a recent definition, Ignacio Sotelo describes violence as "use of, or the threat of using, physical force to varying degrees,

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even going so far as to cause death, with the aim of imposing one's will on others who are resisting it."[1]

But aggressiveness, violence, is not a general, abstract concept; it is necessary to specify which particular forms of behaviour will be interpreted as violent or aggressive to single out the kinds of conduct which typify violence.

Giddens considers that a country's internal pacification goes hand in hand with concentrating control over the means of violence in the hands of the state.[2] According to this line of reasoning, historians should regard political violence not as something which is instinctive, a response, a characteristic or a pathological anomaly, but as a new "history subject" linked to specific forms of social organisation.

Violence must be perceived as a "collective activity", and it is not so much violent acts themselves as the context in which they take place that must be studied. Treating violence as a history subject, moreover, does not seem unreasonable, particularly in the 20th century.

Following the cultural crisis of the modern age, from the outbreak of the first world war – or to be more precise from the beginning of the 20th century – there emerged five types of political organisation of society in which political violence was present:

– democratic capitalism;
– communism, which took a specific, concrete form in the Soviet Union;
– fascism, as exemplified by Italian society;
– nazism, exemplified by Germany under Hitler;
– traditionalist authoritarianism, as put into practice in Spain and Portugal, and perhaps Greece.

Spain offers a perfect example of the authoritarian, traditionalist use of violence as a product of a given social system. The Spanish civil war can be regarded as an ideal research laboratory for observing how political violence was implemented by two completely different regimes.

The military uprising of 18 July 1936 was the authoritarian, traditionalist camp's alternative to the sublimated form of social revolution which was, in practice, what the Popular Front Government was suggesting. When civil war broke out, the machinery of repression was unleashed in the two zones into which Spain had been divided, ranging from the arbitrary, uncontrolled violence of the early months to the more ordered, rational forms of violence instituted under their respective laws.

1. I. Sotelo, *"Violencia y modernidad. Prolegómenos a una reflexión sobre la violencia política",* published in *Claves* No. 1 (Madrid, 1990) page 47.
2. A. Giddens, *The nation-state and violence* (1985).

Both the republic and Franco's authoritarian traditionalists exercised a monopoly of violence, although their attitudes clearly differed: for the former, violence was a defensive measure; for the latter, given the very nature of the uprising, it was offensive in character.

The Spanish civil war

The rebellion's failure to win a sweeping victory, the revolution's lack of direction and precise objectives – both of which can be ascribed to the rifts which occurred within what immediately became two rival sides in a conflict – make it impossible to define the Spanish civil war once and for all with one of the labels commonly in use in the 1930s.

What began in 1936 was an armed class conflict, but it was also nonetheless:

– a war of religion;
– a nationalist conflict;
– a war between a military dictatorship and a republican democracy;
– a struggle between a revolution and a counter-revolution;
– and the first war in which fascism was pitted against communism.

Its anachronism might be brought to the fore, its unmistakable air of a war from another age, with so many lying dead in the ditches and the trenches, with peasants in rope-soled shoes, carrying rifles on their shoulders, ranged against soldiers led by mercenary troops.

But at the same time it might be regarded as a prelude to the war of the future, a war of tanks and aircraft, a war in which towns and cities were bombed, in which a democratic-communist coalition confronted the fascist powers, a foretaste of the camps into which Europe would be divided three years later.

The civil war showed that the Spaniards had been incapable of establishing a framework for political, social and cultural co-existence during the republic. The accumulated social tensions led to acts of hatred and revenge behind the lines on both sides, if not to an absolute determination physically to destroy those who were perceived as enemies.

The conflict had enormous repercussions throughout Europe, where fascism and socialism were already at loggerheads. Only the totalitarian states – nazi Germany, fascist Italy and the Soviet Union – intervened directly. The democracies adhered to a policy of non-intervention.

Until 1937 the Spanish Republic underwent a genuine social revolution combined with a disintegration of authority. This conferred a huge advantage on the rebels, who maintained strict unity of command, both military and political.

Interpreting the statistics on violence and repression during the Spanish civil war and the post-war period

One of the continuing myths about the Spanish civil war concerns the number of deaths caused by the war itself and by repression on both sides during the war and under Franco's regime in the post-war years. Numerous studies have been devoted to the human losses which resulted from the war. There is little concordance between these studies, which shows that allegiance to one or the other camp has frequently prevailed over objectivity and dispassionate reasoning.

Some writers have, however, shown more detachment and a greater desire to discover the truth, to place on record a sound, sober analysis of some value for the future. Ramón Salas Larrazábal (*Perdidas de la guerra,* published by Planeta, Barcelona, 1977) conducted a meticulous, thorough study of the subject on the basis of civil registers and National Statistics Institute records, in which he concluded that the civil war caused 271 444 deaths at most, of which 142 239 were attributable to acts of war per se and the remainder, that is to say 129 205 or 47.6% of the total, "*were the result of reprisals* against enemies or of repression by an implacable system of justice, a hair-raising figure which clearly shows the extent of the so-called cleaning-up operations which took place behind the lines in both zones".

To these figures must be added the deaths resulting from the post-war repression, which was carried out with inexplicable harshness, even against many people who were known to be supporters of the winning side. Although some writers attribute 200 000 to 250 000 deaths to the post-war repression, Salas says "the truth – the hard and terrible truth – is that exactly 22 716 people were executed by order of the courts from 1 January 1939 to 31 December 1959, the year in which the repression came to a complete end, a chilling figure which has no need of exaggeration to show the scope and scale of the repression."

Publication of these figures gave rise to a debate, which we might sum up under three headings corresponding to the three specific views of civil war violence expressed in all that was written from 1939 to 1992, before the figures were revised following the 20th anniversary of the war.

The victors' version of the facts, according to which violence was solely confined to the Republican camp, with its killing and looting, its secret police, its "red" tribunals, its mobs, its firing squads, its religious persecution, and so forth. Moreover, the same pattern of violence perpetrated by the left-wing parties and trade unions before July 1936 served as an argument to justify the *coup d'état.* "Life was unliveable in Spain in 1936" is the phrase most frequently heard in this respect.

The workers' parties and the unions were allegedly bent on a revolution, which would have followed either the Soviet model or the alternative path of libertarian communism.

Such views were first expressed in *Causa General* and the writings of Joaquín Arrarás, and have come down to us today, albeit without obtaining much success, in the writings of Ricardo de la Cierva and other polemicists.[1]

A second "line of investigation", as Pierre Vilar called it in his book on the Spanish civil war,[2] was followed by the "fifty-fifty" movement, that is to say those who tended to believe that both camps shared responsibility for the violence, that the repression was evenly distributed in quantitative terms also. Ramón Salas Larrazábal[3] would become the most ardent defender of this theory, and this is certainly the argument which won, and continues to command, the greatest public support. Furthermore, this line of thinking is consistent with the view that Spain is traditionally a very violent country, and that the excesses which are inevitable in a civil war will be all the greater if committed by Spaniards.

A third theory, which we might venture to call the "romantic" view, had its origin in studies of the civil war by such eminent hispanicists as Gerald Brenan, Franz Borkenau, Hugh Thomas, P. Broué and E. Témime, Gabriel Jackson, Bernatt Bolloten and others,[4] and culminated in the modern-day contributions of Alberto Reig Tapia and Francisco Moreno Gómez, to cite only two of the leading specialists on the subject of repression.[5] Proponents of this theory maintain that there was less repression in the parts of Spain under Republican control than in those held by the rebels. However, it does not now seem that there is sufficient evidence to support this. In any case, in view of the quantity of victims on both sides, is the question whether more or less slaughter was committed of any importance?

There were allegedly qualitative differences in the acts of repression perpetrated by the two sides. The fundamental argument relied on by proponents of this theory is that in the Republican-ruled territories repression was the work of "uncontrolled elements" having nothing to do with the Republican Government.

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1. J. Arrarás, *Historia de la Cruzada española* (Madrid 1984); *La dominación roja en España, Causa Genera,* (Spanish publications, Madrid, 1953); R. De la Cierva, *Historia de la guerra civil española* (Madrid, 1969).
2. P. Vilar, "The Spanish civil war", Spanish version published in Barcelona in 1986, page 152.
3. R. Salas Larrazábal, *Pérdidas de la guerra* (Barcelona, 1977).
4. G. Brenan, *The Spanish labyrinth: an account of the social and political background of the civil war* (1943); F. Borkenau , *The Spanish cockpit"* (1937); P. Broué and E. Témime, "The Spanish revolution and war", published in Spanish in Mexico in 1977; G. Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the civil war* (1965); H. Thomas, *The Spanish civil war* (1961).
5. A. Reig Tapia, *Ideología e Historia. Sobre la represión franquista y la guerra civil* (Madrid, 1985) F. Moreno Gómez, *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba* (1936-1939) (Madrid, 1985).

This leads to the obvious conclusion that on the Republican side the repression was not instigated either by the government or by members of the left-wing parties and trade unions but was, in short, the work of former convicts, outsiders or, at most, anarchists – a line of reasoning which in passing ignores the fact that it was the pro-CNT press which was most forthright and fearless in reporting the scandal of these violent deaths.

This would leave us with a repression which sprang up as if by magic, no one knows why – a spontaneous movement – and no one knows at whose instigation – "uncontrolled elements". Conversely, the repression carried out by the rebels is alleged to have been perfectly organised, masterminded by those in power and initiated from the very start of the war.

The current revision process, which began in 1986 (Santos Juliá, *Victimas de la guerra civil, Temas de hoy,* Madrid, 1999), the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war, has brought the following results.

Progress is slowly being made towards solving the problem of the statistics, with the publication of new studies (at the provincial, local and regional levels) based on painstaking fieldwork and consultation of records not usually taken into consideration (municipal and private documents, provincial prison records, civil registers, graveyard registers, and so on) and also making use of oral sources.

The authors of these studies have not succeeded in overcoming the military authorities' unwillingness to co-operate in the investigations, an attitude which does serious harm to the cause of history.

In half of the Spanish provinces, all the previously published statistics concerning the repression carried out on both sides have been revised.

Repression under Franco during the war and in the post-war years

These studies have shown the need for an upward adjustment of the figures advanced by Ramón Salas Larrazábal for repression under Franco.

As regards the sources, the National Statistics Institute's data for the 1940s have proved uncertain and deficient, and completely inadequate as a means of discovering the truth about the repression. Nor are the civil registers reliable, at least not on the subject of killings during the war, since it has been shown that only half (and in many cases one third) of the executions carried out were actually recorded. On the other hand, the records concerning executions in the post-war period can be accepted as reliable, although they also reveal gaps of varying significance.

There is a lack of studies concerning certain provinces where there is evidence that repression under the Franco regime took a particularly heavy toll (the Galician and Castilian provinces, among others).

The research carried out, therefore, does not lead to any very clear conclusion. Studies concerning twenty-four provinces – less than half of Spanish territory – show that 72 527 people were executed by firing squad by the pro-Franco camp. Salas did not even arrive at half this figure (34 250) for the same provinces.

Republican repression

The authors of the studies on Republican repression carried out in twenty-two provinces reach the opposite conclusion. The "traditional" figures for this repression must be adjusted down.

Salas attributes 60 628 victims to Republican repression in these twenty-two provinces, but most of the recent investigations in the same provinces, based on other sources, give a result of slightly over half this figure (37 843). One reason for this difference may be the large number of duplicate entries in the registers; victims are often mentioned in the records of both the village where they lived and the place where they were executed.

In short, historical research is taking a very clear direction: the previously accepted figures for pro-Franco repression are almost always adjusted up, and those concerning Republican repression adjusted down.

According to current estimates, the victims of Republican repression, which some historians place in the region of 70 000, should number no more than 50 000.

The victims of repression by the pro-Franco camp, which covers both the war and the post-war period, were previously underestimated at about 57 000, but are now turning out to be far more numerous. Since 72 527 executions are already known to have taken place in half of the provinces (during and after the war), the figure for the whole of Spain should be about twice as high (that is 150 000 dead).

Conclusions

The above figures recently published in Spain have allowed us to put paid to a longstanding historical myth: the statistics on violence and repression during the Spanish civil war, which are still not final sixty years after the end of the conflict.

They also lay to rest another myth, prevalent outside Spain: that Spaniards are reluctant to talk about the civil war, a reluctance which allegedly has its basis in the general amnesty granted at the time of our exemplary transition from dictatorship to democracy under the leadership of His Majesty Juan Carlos.

Concerning this last historical myth, it should be said that in Spain reconciliation was the result of a very generous decision on both sides to forget

the past. However, amnesty is not the same thing as amnesia, or failure to remember, and new studies are being published every year. We therefore do not find it difficult to talk about our past, and our democracy is not built on a lapse of memory.

Outline: the Spanish civil war (1936-39)

I. The military uprising

A. The military forces present on each side

B. The rebels (pro-Franco; an experienced army)

i. the African army

ii. the legion

iii. the Civil Guard (except in Valencia and Barcelona)

C. The Republicans (scant military preparation)

i. reserve troops

ii. the navy (except the officers)

iii. the airforce

iv. riot troops

II. Political and social support

A. The Nationalists

i. the monarchists

ii. the military

iii. the centre right

iv. the traditionalists

iv. the clergy

B. The Republicans

i. left-wing parties, socialists and communists

ii. the Republicans

III. The Spanish civil war's international dimension

A. International backing for the rebels

i. Hitler's Germany

ii. Italy

iii. Portugal

B. International backing for the Republicans
   i. the USSR
   ii. the International Brigades (volunteers)
   iii. Mexico (diverse forms of assistance)

IV. Stages in the civil war

A. First stage: July 1936 to March 1937
   i. the rebels cross the Straight of Gibraltar
   ii. objective to take Madrid
   iii. failed to take Madrid

B. Second stage: April 1937 to November 1938: rebels capture part of northern Spain

C. Third stage: December 1938 to 1 April 1939
   i. the taking of Catalonia
   ii. surrender of Colonel Casado
   iii. end of the war

V. Political developments in Republican Spain

A. The economic and social system
   i. the power of organisations
      – trade unions
      – revolutionary committees
   ii. the backing of the autonomous regions
      – the Basque Country
      – Catalonia
   iii. internal divisions leading to the almost complete collapse of the Republican Government

VI. Political developments in the Nationalist zone: the birth of Franco's Spain

A. Single command and discipline

B. All authority vested in Franco

C. Traditionalist, authoritarian, despotic state

VII. The price of war

A. Irreparable human losses

B. Huge economic costs

C. Many Spaniards went into exile

i. 515 000 to France

ii. 22 000 to Mexico

iii. 2 300 to Chile

iv. 3 000 to the Dominican Republic

Chronology of the Spanish civil war

1936: general

Considerable increase in membership of the CNT;
Dissolution of the Cortes and calling of a general election in January;
The Popular Front wins the February general election;
Formation of a government of left-wing republicans under Azaña (February);
Outlawing of the Falange in March;
The President of the Republic, Alcalá Zamora, is removed from office in April;
General Mola leads an attempted military rising in April;
Azaña elected President in May;
Casares Quiroga becomes Prime Minister;
Confrontation between Calvo Sotelo and Casares Quiroga in the Cortes in June;
Calvo Sotelo assassinated in July

July 1936: the Nationalists

The military rising begins in Morocco;
Revolt of General Queipo de Llano in Seville and General Franco in the Canary Islands; start of the civil war;
Formation of the National Defence Junta by the rebels;
Toledo is taken by the nationalist troops;
The nationalists arrive before Madrid in November;
García Lorca assassinated in August

July-March 1936: the Republicans

Casares Quiroga's government resigns and that of Martínez Barrio comes to power;
Martínez Barrio's government resigns and is replaced by Giral's;
Largo Caballero forms a new government in September;

Tarradellas elected to head the government of Catalonia in September;
In November the Republican Government moves to Valencia;
The International Brigades rally to the defence of Madrid in November;
José Antonio Primo de Rivera executed in Alicante in November;
Intensification and radicalisation of agrarian reform in March

1937: the Nationalists

The battle of Jarama takes place in February;
Approval of the decree establishing the Spanish Falange movement, unifying the Falangists and the traditionalists;
Bombing of Guernica by the Condor Legion in April;
The Nationalists take Asturias in August

1937: the Republicans

Negrín replaces Largo Caballero in May;
Battle of Guadalajara in March;
Battle of Brunete in July;
The Republican Government moves to Barcelona in November

1938: general

The Nationalists form a government in Burgos in January;
Republican offensive – the battle of the Ebro in July

1939: the Nationalists

In April General Franco announces the end of the war and the defeat of the Republican army – his last announcement of the war;
Franco forms his second government in August;
In September Spain declares its neutrality in the second world war

1939: the Republicans

In January Miaja is appointed to represent the Republican Government and head the army;
In February the Republican Government moves to France;
In March Azaña and Rojo resign

History in schools and in society at large: reflections on the historicity of history teaching

By Bernard Eric Jensen[1]

Introduction

It should be noted at the outset that our understanding of what actually goes on in the course of teaching history at European schools has never been as informed as it is at the present time. This is due in large part to the many results and insights that have been generated by the "Youth and History" project. Some 32 000 students of 14 or 15 years of age in almost thirty countries have been asked in detail about their views on history and history teaching, and their answers have been subjected to a thorough, comparative analysis. The original report, *Youth and history: a comparative European survey,* was published in 1997, but it is so technical and detailed that it is probably only specialists in the field who will find the time to read it. However, with the publication of *The state of history education in Europe* in 1998, the results have now become available in a much more readily accessible form, such that politicians, educationalists and history teachers will be able to avail themselves of the many insights generated by this project.

When I accepted the invitation to present some reflections on the state of history teaching in Europe at the close of the 20th century, I was fully aware that it would imply that I had to make use of some of the results of the "Youth and History" project in my presentation. Yet, it is also important to make clear from the outset that there is no way in which I will be able to do justice to the enormous richness of detail and the nuanced lines of analysis found in this piece of collaborative European research. I will be singling out only a few of the most significant findings of the "Youth and History" project, and I will be subjecting these findings to some further scrutiny and comment. The title of my paper is "History in schools and in society at large:

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reflections on the historicity of history teaching", and it is meant to indicate the direction that my thinking will be taking. It should make two of my premises clear from the very outset. First, that one can only meaningfully discuss the role of history in schools within the context of a broader discussion of how history is experienced and used in society at large. Second, that it is important to attend to the specific features that constitute the teaching of history at the end of the 20th century. In other words, one has to bear in mind the historicity of that teaching – because the challenges that it is required to handle will tend to differ somewhat from one epoch to another.

Some significant findings of the "Youth and History" project

Those history teachers who decide to take the time off to read *The state of history education in Europe* will not find it a very uplifting or pleasing experience. Readers of the reports will probably differ in their judgements when it comes to the question of specifying just how gloomy the present state of affairs can be said to be. They may differ in their assessments because the situation is somewhat different in different parts of Europe. But few history teachers if any – I believe – will be able to put these reports down, having read them, without feeling somewhat uneasy and disappointed. Moreover, there will also be those teachers – I would guess – that might feel quite overwhelmed by some of the challenges that they may be requested to take on in the years to come.

In the original research report one of the significant disparities revealed by the "Youth and History" project was indicated. This is the disparity that appears to exist between the ambitious aims of the history curricula on the one hand and what is actually being achieved in the history class on the other. On this point, it states:

> Modern curricula assume that history education develops democratic skills and attitudes in young people. According to the answers to the questionnaire, it is far from certain that history educators have been able to arouse the interest of young people for topics like politics and the development of democracy. Although most of the teenagers believe that in forty years Europe will be democratic, they show little interest in learning about democracy... The results of this part of the investigation urge history educators to find ways to engage their pupils' interest in those topics, which are vital for the reinforcement of democratic societies.[1]

One of the chapters in *The state of history education in Europe* has been devoted to answering the question: "Is history teaching up to date?" The author's analysis of the available comparative data reveals another major

1. J. van der Leeuw-Roord in M. Angvik and B. von Borries (eds.) *Youth and history: a comparative European survey on historical consciousness and political attitudes among adolescents,* 1997, vol. A, p. 3.

disparity in the field of history teaching. Her main conclusion reads as follows:

> Today's history teaching does not really meet student's preferences... Teaching methods, the use of media and the goals of teaching history, as observed by the students, are rather traditional. Dominating this are the storage of facts, textbook use and the narrations of the teacher. Empathy, the reconstruction of past situations, project work and modern media is really seldom encountered. This is not in harmony with the students' wishes. They prefer by far audio-visual media, sources and documents, and museums to their textbooks. This gives the impression that history teaching is not up to date and has not taken account of the innovatory debates of the last decade.[1]

The "Youth and History" project has pinpointed two very notable disparities in the field of history teaching in present-day Europe. The first concerns a disparity between the ambitions displayed in existing history curricula and the actual achievements of history education. The second concerns a disparity between the interests that students display in the kind of history that they meet inside the school and that which they meet outside the educational system.

In the present context it is worth noting that it is not only in Europe that history education is confronted with major difficulties at the present time. Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen have recently published the results of a nation-wide in-depth survey of this issue in the United States. It has the title *The presence of the past: popular uses of history in American life* and demonstrates that most adult Americans say that they felt less connected with the past during their school classes than in any other social setting they were asked about. Moreover, this survey report makes the point that the words "history" and "the past" have very different connotations in the minds of adult Americans. When asked if they are interested in history, most adults will tend to say "no". Whereas when asked if they are interested in the past, most of them will say "yes, very much so". Rosenzweig and Thelen explain this very interesting finding of theirs in the following way:

> After listening to 1 500 Americans, we understand how a generation has grown up to say that something is "history" when it is dead and gone, irrelevant, beyond any use in the present. That is how many of the people we interviewed described their classroom encounters with the past. While some of them praised individual teachers, their stories only underscored how deeply respondents felt alienated from the structure and content of history classes.[2]

1. S. Barschdorff in J. van der Leeuw-Roord (ed.), The state of history education in Europe: challenges and implications of the "Youth and History" survey, 1998, p. 85 and 90.
2. R. Rosenzweig and D. Thelen, *The presence of the past: popular uses of history in American life,* 1998, p.113.

What are the implications of these findings?

The disparities which the "Youth and History" project has revealed make it pertinent to ask: what are the implications of these findings for the teaching of history? In my attempt to answer this question, I would also like to reflect a little on the above-mentioned responses to these disparities. They are, it seems to me, rather typical of the way in which many people nowadays think about the problems facing history education. In both cases the operative assumption seems to have been that it will not be very difficult to change and amend the present state of affairs. Thus, the present state of history education is due mainly to the shortcomings of history teachers. Had they been better at appropriating the innovatory debates about history education then things would have been much better than they are. The situation appears to be one that can be remedied easily. The other response is to urge history teachers to set about finding ways to engage their pupils' interest. But without giving any consideration to the dimensions or magnitude of the challenge at hand.

In contrast, I want to focus our attention on the fact that the teaching of history at the end of the 20th century seems to be a very difficult and challenging task indeed. Why this is so, I shall attempt to indicate in a moment. Before doing so, I want to make the point that if we begin to openly acknowledge that the teaching of history in many parts of Europe is a very challenging task indeed, then we will not be so prone to explain the shortcomings of this teaching by pointing to the failings of history teachers. Rather, we would be more inclined to acknowledge that many history teachers are – to use the rather apt phrase of the American psychologist and educationalist Robert Kegan – "in over their heads" when they go about the task of teaching history in their classrooms.[1] What I am saying is, that before we set out to change the existing modes of history teaching, we need to be in the position of being able to give some plausible explanation of why the state of history education in Europe is as gloomy and fraught with difficulties as it appears to be from the pages of the "Youth and History" report.

It must be noted that we cannot plausibly explain the problems of the history classroom by claiming that there is a prevailing a-historical mood in society today, or by claiming that the up-coming generation is on the whole a non-history generation. It is not only surveys such as Rosenzweig and Thelen's about *The presence of the past* that demonstrates that this is simply not the case. If we look at the growth of the number of museums, monuments and memorials, or at the growing number of jubilees,

1. 0. R. Kegan, *In over our heads. the mental demands of modern life,* 1994.

commemorations and anniversaries being held, there is little to indicate that most people nowadays are significantly less interested in the affairs of the past than earlier. On the contrary, in several fields there seems to be a growing public and private support for many different kinds of memory work. There are even those scholars who say that we are actually in the midst of a "memory craze" in the 1990s.[1] As I see it, these tendencies indicate that we must look elsewhere if we are to come up with some plausible explanation of why history classes are not enjoying a notable success at the present time.

If we try to bring a bird's eye perspective to bear on our attempt to look back at the history of history teaching in Europe, it becomes rather clear – I think – that in the 19th century and well into the second half of the 20th century this teaching mainly took place within the context of a series of ongoing nation-building projects. Most teaching of history during this period had a national tradition or community of memory as its axis and centre. At certain times and places the teaching of history sought to further aggressive or militant forms of nationalism. At other times and places it sought to further mutual understanding and respect between the members of the family of European peoples. Although this aspect of European history has not yet been fully researched, it seems fair to assume that the many nation-building projects in Europe could not have succeeded to the extent they did without a major contribution from their educational systems. It was of course not only the teaching of history that contributed to these nation-building processes. The study of national literary and artistic heritage also made their significant contributions to these projects. But the point that I want to make is that history education, as far as we know, seems to have functioned in the main as a successful and meaningful venture, in conjunction with other cultural endeavours, during the period in which it served as a cornerstone of a nation-building project.

During the past two or three decades, however, things have begun to change. In some parts of Europe these changes have been much more manifest than in others. The challenges that now confront history teaching are – as I see it – due to a significant extent to some more general changes taking place both within the educational systems and in society at large. There is much research that indicates that we are living through a period of change at the present time that is both dramatic and far-reaching. I shall not make any attempt to survey these ongoing changes. I shall limit myself instead to reflecting a little on three of the changes I find most relevant to our present concern. These three changes can all be characterised as processes

1. See, for example, A. Megill, "History, memory, identity" in *History of the Human Sciences* 11:1998.

of de-centring. It is in these processes of de-centring that I believe we may find at least part of the explanation of why it is proving so difficult to teach history today.

The first process of de-centring concerns our understanding of how history is learned and used. During recent decades our understanding of the aims of history teaching has changed significantly. It is becoming more and more common to see the overarching aim of history teaching as that of developing and refining the historical consciousness of students. The second process concerns a change in the position of the school as a place of learning – this change is partly due to the socio-cultural impact that the media and the market economy are having on the everyday lives of children and teenagers. The third process of de-centring concerns a change in the way in which history is being used in contemporary society. In many parts of Europe, the national community of memory is no longer able to uphold the dominant position that it had 100, 50 or even 25 years ago. This fact has of course also affected the ways in which history teaching is experienced in the school setting. I intend to say a little more about each of these processes of de-centring, and on that basis I will then present my concluding remarks.

The first process of de-centring: teaching history in school

Formerly one could find history educators who conceived the learning of history as being similar to learning to read, write and do arithmetic. They tended to think of the school, therefore, as being a privileged place of learning and as a pivotal social institution in regard to the objective of learning history. During the past two decades, however, there has been a growing appreciation among history educators that children are not only well able to interpret and use the past before they begin at school, but that they also learn a significant amount of history outside the walls of the school. In close conjunction with the recognition of these facts, a significant shift in the way of understanding the purpose of history teaching has occurred. The overarching aim is no longer seen as that of giving pupils detailed and solid knowledge of the past. The aim tends rather to be seen as that of developing and refining the historical consciousness of children and teenagers.

At first sight, this shift in the aims of history teaching may not appear to be very significant or far-reaching. To my way of thinking, however, it amounts to a fairly radical shift of thought. So radical, in fact, that I think one may justifiably call it a paradigm shift in our thinking about history teaching. Not only does it modify and change our understanding of what is to be understood by the term "history", it also gives us a somewhat different starting point for understanding where history is learned and used, how it is learned and used and why it is learned and used.

Historical consciousness is nowadays defined as an interlinking of interpretations of the past, not only with an understanding of the present, but also with the working out of expectations with regard to the future. It is important to note that this process of interlinking works both ways. Interpretations of the past may influence one's understanding of the present and the future. But it is also such that changes in one's understanding of the present and the future may also have feedback effects upon the manner in which one interprets the past.

I have not time to go into any details as regards the theoretical assumptions on which this way of thinking is based. However, I would like to make two small, yet basic points. First, that it is a conception based on the idea that to live in the present means that one recurrently has to go about remembering the past as well as working out expectations with regard to the future, and that this is the case in all fields of human life. It therefore applies to the lives of individuals as well as to that of groups. Second, it is a conception based on the idea that human life can be viewed – and here I borrow an apt phrase from the American philosopher David Carr – as "... a process of telling ourselves stories, listening to those stories, and acting them out or living through them".[1] Moreover, it is important to note that when one talks about historical consciousness, the term "history" is no longer identified with the past. Rather, history is conceived as a process that encompasses the past, present and future. Or to put it a different way: history is a term used to describe the kind of socio-cultural processes in which humans live their lives – that is history means to live in and through socio-cultural processes that are temporal in character.

It is relatively easy to demonstrate that historical consciousness is something that is not only shaped and developed, but is also used and transformed in many different fields of human life. If one were to illustrate this point, it could be done as it is outlined in Diagram 1 below. There is no need here to go into detail about the different parts of this diagram. It should of course be mentioned that the relative importance of the different areas might not only differ from person to person and from group to group, but may also play a very different role at different stages of the human life cycle. However, the diagram shows that as soon as one starts to place historical consciousness at the centre of one's thinking about history education, it means that one has also to begin to face the fact that history classes are no more than one factor among many that shape and transform the historical consciousness of our students. In other words, one is also forced to acknowledge there has occurred a very notable de-centring of the history teaching that takes place in schools.

1. D. Carr, *Time, narrative, and history,* 1986, p. 61.

Diagram I



When one looks at the findings of the "Youth and History" project it is beyond dispute that many history teachers have started to think of history education in terms developing the historical consciousness of their students. Thus, the teachers who were interviewed ranked the following aim highest: "to use history to explain the situation in the world today and to find out the tendencies of change." It was not the only aim that teachers were pursuing in their history classes, but it was the one that they thought the most important. However, the findings of the project also show very clearly that so far as the students are concerned, this aim does not come over to them. In their minds, the overarching aim of their history classes is that of acquiring "knowledge about the main facts in history." On some of the other points that are also concerned with the shaping of historical consciousness among the students, the gap between the perception of teachers and that of students is not quite so manifest. As far as the students are concerned, the task of coming "to acknowledge the traditions, characteristics, values and tasks of our nation and society" is rated as the

second most important aim pursued in their history education, whereas the imbibing of national traditions only comes in as number four among the teachers of history.

The findings of the "Youth and History" project appear to demonstrate that European history education has not yet succeeded to any notable degree in re-orientating the practice of teaching towards the aim of developing the historical consciousness of the students. This does not seem to be due, however, to any unwillingness on the part of the teachers. They seem to be more than willing to pursue this aim. Many different factors could account for the apparent lack of success in this endeavour of theirs. I shall at this point only indicate two such factors.

First, there has not been a sufficient appreciation of the magnitude of the task at hand. There is much more involved in this than the mere substitution of a new aim for an older one. To think of history teaching in terms of developing the historical consciousness of students has far-reaching implications that demand a major reshuffling of one's thinking about history education. It requires, for instance, that one gains some insight into the manner in which the learning and use of history in schools is and can be related to that learning and use of history that takes place outside the walls of the school.

Second, we are not only talking about a difficult task when we talk of developing the historical consciousness of students. We need to openly acknowledge that we do not have the insights we need at the present time. Nor is this knowledge at hand. Whereas a fair amount of research has been undertaken about the relationship between academic history and history in schools, almost no research has been undertaken regarding the relationship between the teaching of history in schools on the one hand and popular history-making and everyday uses of history on the other. There is a fairly straightforward explanation for this. It is only in the last decade or so that scholars have begun to take a serious interest in finding out what characterises popular uses of history and the ways in which popular memory works. Things have started to change in recent years, but I still think that it is fair to say that we are talking about a field of research that only exists on the periphery of the academic world.

The second process of de-centring: the place of the school

When thinking about the historicity of history teaching, we should also focus attention on the changes that regard the place of the school in the everyday lives of young people. This is both a complex theme and a rather tricky one, and although there is only time to dwell on it for a short moment, I have mentioned it because of its importance and relevance to the issues that we are taking up for consideration at this symposium.

Were we to describe the place of the school in the everyday lives of young people, we might try to do so along the lines indicated in Diagram 2 below. As with the previous diagram, the point should once more be made that the relative importance of these different arenas may not only differ from person to person and from group to group, but also from one society to another. What is important is not so much the specific way of dividing up the everyday lives of young people into different fields. What is important, is to point to some of the changes that have been affecting the school as a place of learning during recent decades. I shall limit myself to one small point concerning a change that has affected the authority of the school as a place of learning.

Diagram II



In the history of mankind, oral culture is the culture upon which all other cultures of communication are grounded. People will always first learn to communicate with others by employing their own inherent physical resources. It should be noted that oral culture encompasses the use of both non-verbal and verbal means of communication. People learn to communicate with others first through the use of non-verbal means such as gesture, and subsequently by the verbal means of talking. That oral culture is the foundation upon which all other modes of communication is based is true both in phylogenetic and in ontogenetic terms – that is to say in the history of the human species as well as the history of any individual person.

It is at a third or later stage that people may begin to learn to communicate with others by such means as reading and writing. Literacy is not only a mode of communication that requires that one start to transform and use non-human materials for the purpose of establishing communication between people – by using for instance paper and ink. To become literate also presupposes that one is able to perform the tasks at issue – that one has learned a set of skills that go beyond those developed in the most basic forms of social interaction, that is those belonging to oral culture. The school is the place where most people acquire these additional skills of reading and writing, and it has thus traditionally functioned as the entry point to the world of reading and writing. To become literate not only meant that one gained access to the world mediated by writing, it has also meant for the last century and a half that one could begin to gain access to the adult world. It is this social function among others that has traditionally conferred authority upon the school as a place of learning.

However, during the last four or five decades the position of the school has been affected by the impact of ongoing changes in the world of communications. Scholars such as Walter J. Ong and Raymond Williams have made the point that the use of new electronic media of communication should not only be seen as an extension of the world of reading and writing. The use of these media also introduces a change in the modes of communication that partly runs counter to traditional forms of literacy. Although the new electronic modes of communication make their entrance in human history very much later than the techniques of writing and printing, these new technologies function in a manner that is in some ways much closer to oral culture. For this reason Walter J. Ong says that we are at the present living in "a new age of second orality".[1]

The point I want to make is that this "new age of second orality" is also affecting the school as a place of learning. It can in fact be said to contribute to yet another aspect of the de-centring process. The school of course remains a place where young people acquire those skills that are necessary for entering the world of reading and writing. However, the school no longer holds a privileged position when it comes to initiating the exploration of the adult world. The new electronic media offer young people today the possibility of a much easier and freer access to the world around them than was the case a century or a half-century ago. In other words, it provides an access to the adult world that adults themselves have much more difficulty in structuring and controlling than earlier. The new media offer those young people who want, and are able to exploit the opportunities at hand, some further degree of autonomy or self-determination than was the

1. W. J. Ong, *Orality and literacy: the technologizing of the work,* 1982, p. 135. See also Raymond Williams, "Means of communication as means of production" in *Problems in materialism and culture,* 1980.

case earlier. In my view, these changes have begun to affect the authority of the school as a place of learning.

There is some evidence of this process of de-centring in the pages of the "Youth and History" reports. One of the aspects that this research project clearly demonstrates is that young people find that history teaching which is based on textbooks is rather dull and boring. They clearly prefer history teaching that is able to exploit some of the many possibilities that the new media have made available. This is precisely what one might expect to hear from a generation that have been brought up and are living in the "new age of second orality". Moreover, this process of de-centring not only concerns the place and role of textbooks in the teaching of history. It also affects the position of teachers. It implies among other things that teachers nowadays have to prove themselves *vis-à-vis* their students to a much greater extent than previously. They work under an increasing demand that they should be able to demonstrate in a manner that is convincing to their students that what they have to offer is meaningful and worthwhile. And this makes teaching – and not least the teaching of history – a very great challenge indeed.

The third process of de-centring: communities of memory

I will now say a little about the third and last of the processes of de-centring that I think we should bear in mind when reflecting on the state of history teaching at the end of the 20th century. It is concerned with those communities of memory that form the framework around any history education.

Whenever people begin to form groups and establish forms of collective identity, they will normally also search for answers to questions such as: *(i)* who are we? *(ii)* where do we come from? *(iii)* what is our present situation? and *(iv)* where are we or where do we want to go? People employ their historical consciousness in order to establish among other things a community of memory. This seems to be a fairly universal process and the fact that it regularly takes place is one which few people, if any, would be inclined to dispute. The constructed character of such communities and identities is nowadays broadly acknowledged.

Such a community may also be described – to use Benedict Anderson's term – as an "imagined community".[1] People experience and feel that they have something in common with many other people whom they will never meet or talk to. This may be for the reason that these other people lived in the past, that they live in far away places at the present time or even that they will constitute future generations of people. Although such a community

1. B. Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism,* rev. ed., 1991.

is in a very real sense an imagined community, there is nothing imaginary or fictional about it. A community cannot exist and function, as a matter of fact, independently of the consciousness of its members, and an imagined community is a construction that has very great consequences indeed. It quite literally shapes the social world.

Although the establishment of communities of memory seems to be a universal process, actually established communities of memory are very much historical phenomena, and they will also therefore usually change character in the course of time. Moreover, it is such that different communities of memory may prevail or dominate in different periods. The history of communities of memory in the European context is far from fully researched at the present time. But several scholars working in this field tend to distinguish between at least three major and partly overlapping phases.[1]

There was a "pre-national" phase in which communities of memory tended to be either strictly local or relatively cosmopolitan. In that phase there were very significant differences between popular and élite memory. As from the 18th century we begin to move towards a national phase in Europe, and from that time onwards it is the national communities of memory that tend to become the more dominant ones. At first, the commemorations that upheld and kept these national communities alive had the character of being for the people, rather than of the people. But later on, national memory seems to have obtained a much more democratic form.

I would like to dwell on what is meant by a dominant community of memory. If we for a moment return to Diagram 1 – regarding the different settings in which the historical consciousness of a people is produced and reproduced – then one can define a dominant community of memory as one that manifests itself and makes its presence felt in a series of different settings at the same time. In European history there have been times and places when school children, whether they were reading literature, history or geography, whether they were reading historical fiction, watching films, going to the theatre or singing songs, were engaged in activities that all, more or less, referred to and re-affirmed the same community of memory.

The national phase was such a period in which a specific community of memory was dominant, and it was during this phase that history teaching seems to have been experienced as a fairly successful and meaningful venture. Unlike today, the need to legitimate the teaching of history does not seem to have been called for. However, when we look at the existing research into how contemporary communities of memory have been developing and changing, there are a series of factors indicating that parts of Europe

1. See, for example, J. Gillis, "Memory and identity: the history of a relationship" in *Commemoration: the politics of national identity,* 1994.

during the past two to three decades have been moving into what is called – for lack of a better term – a post-national phase.

I am well aware of the fact that it is necessary to differentiate between different trends in different parts of Europe in regard to this point. The transition to a post-national phase of memory is much more pronounced in western Europe, for instance, than in eastern Europe. I would also like to emphasise that speaking of a transition to a post-national phase does not imply an assertion to the effect that national communities of memory have ceased to exist in western Europe. Not at all. These communities most certainly continue to exist and play a role in the lives of people. But they do not – and this is the claim – play the same dominant role that they did earlier.

The reason why I have decided to dwell on the history of communities of memory in Europe is that this transition towards a post-national phase is beginning to have – I believe – a major impact on European history education. It lies behind what I have termed the third process of de-centring in the field of history teaching. In parts of Europe, history teaching can no longer meaningfully define and legitimate its main task in relation to a specific and dominant community of memory. The American historian John Gillis has described this situation in the western world in the following way:

> Today everyone is her or his own historian, and this democratisation of the past causes some anxiety among professionals, most of whom still write in the nationalist tradition, and who still retain a near monopoly over professorships and curatorships, even as they lose touch with the general public... the reality is that the nation is no longer the site or frame of memory for most people and therefore national history is no longer a proper measure of what people really know about the past.[1]

Many people nowadays seem to spend more time on memory work than was common earlier. However, this work is sometimes experienced as being more burdensome than it was when the task was, in the main, one of defining oneself in relationship to an existing national community of memory. In a post-national frame people seem to be more concerned with issues relating to family, to local history and to global issues (such as the Holocaust, Hiroshima, the Vietnam wars) than they are with issues relating to national history. One of the more significant findings of the "Youth and History" project confirms this pattern. This project has pointed to the fact that European students nowadays think that family history should be given a much more prominent place in the teaching of history than is normally the case. Such a finding is precisely what one might expect at a point in time when the overarching importance of national communities of memory clearly seems to be receding in many parts of Europe.

1. Ibid. p. 17.

The challenges at hand

In this contribution to our symposium I have attempted to reflect a little on the challenges that are at hand. At the centre of the picture that I have been attempting to draw is an open acknowledgement that teaching history today is a very difficult and challenging task indeed. In some parts of Europe it appears in fact to be quite a bit more difficult than in others. I want to emphasise that I have only been saying that it is a very difficult task. I have not tried to convey the message that it is an impossible task. What I have done is to attempt to make some sense of the difficulties by pointing to three process of de-centring that are affecting the contemporary teaching of history. If we wish to change the present state of affairs, our ability to act intelligently and responsibly depends upon our understanding of the specific conditions of teaching history at the close of the 20th century. What I have tried to do is precisely to further our insight into the historicity of that teaching. I would like to conclude by pointing to three of the challenges at hand.

First, I believe that we misunderstand the challenge at hand if we assume that we are living in a period in which peoples' interest in history is at particularly low ebb. What some scholars interpret as a prevailing a-historical mood in present day society, I think should rather be understood as ongoing changes in the kinds of past that people find interesting and worthwhile today. If one looks at what goes on outside the walls of the school, there is ample evidence to show that popular memory and public history are flourishing as never before. Thus, one of the tasks at hand consists in reaching an understanding of the relationship between history as taught in the schools and the many kinds of memory work that are taking place in society at large. One might even start by considering the idea of making history classes a place where students were given ample opportunity to reflect on and to discuss how they employ the past in their everyday lives and for which purposes they use it.

Second, I think that we are standing in the midst of a major educational experiment at the present time. I am thinking of the different attempts that are being made to understand history teaching in terms of developing and refining the historical consciousness of students. As mentioned earlier, the "Youth and History" project shows that many history teachers certainly have begun to work along these lines when thinking about their teaching. But it is also very clear from the available evidence that the new message has not reached the students as yet. They still perceive the overarching aim of their history teaching as being that of acquiring "knowledge about the main facts of history". In this situation, some history educators and politicians may want to argue that when these experiments with the use of the concept of historical consciousness have not been more successful, then the time has come to abandon this new line of thinking about history education. In my view, however, it would be premature to draw this conclusion.

If one looks at the results generated by the in-depth survey done by Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen in the United States and published in *The presence of the past* (1998), they demonstrate clearly that the patterns of popular history-making in fact run along the same line of thought as that which has sought to make the concept of historical consciousness an axis and turning point of history education.

This brings me to my third and last point. When we are thinking about the challenges at hand, it is important to acknowledge that patterns of teaching only change slowly in the normal course of events. It not only takes quite a bit of time to acquire the required skills of history teaching, it also takes a fair amount of time to modify and change one's teaching habits. Insight into this socio-cultural fact is what the theory of historical consciousness is all about. That humans are historical beings means precisely that part of their nature is culture. In other words, that it is something they acquire and change by means of ongoing and life-long processes of socialisation and learning. It also implies that people with different kinds of historical experiences become different kinds of people, and that to come to an understanding of people different from oneself requires that one has to understand something about their history and culture. At the present time, I feel fairly convinced that the theory of historical consciousness can potentially make a significant contribution to re-shaping and re-vitalising history education in Europe. But I also think that we need to openly acknowledge that old habits most often die hard, and that it sometimes can be rather difficult to nurture new ones.

The two facets of discrimination in history teaching: perpetrators and victims

By Christina Koulouri[1]

I am here today because of my background and experience: firstly, my work on Greek history and geography textbooks and their ideological messages since the 19th century; secondly, the fact that I teach history in a university located near the Turkish border, and therefore in a region inhabited by the largest ethnic minority in Greece. So in some ways my academic concerns tie in with everyday life – all the more so as, before I came to Thrace, my idea of this minority was rather vague and confused, as it seems to be for most of the inhabitants of Athens, if not of the rest of Greece as a whole.

On the other hand, we are all, or almost all, aware of the steadily increasing number of immigrants in Greek society. This is partly due to the media, of course, which continually cover acts of crime, particularly by Albanians and Romanians, in the daily news. As a result, the prevailing image of immigrants is undoubtedly negative.

The integration of indigenous and immigrant minorities into Greek society raises issues that go far beyond the education sector, encompassing the full range of ideological and social structures. I shall, however, concentrate on education issues, which are the subject of this seminar, and more specifically on history teaching. In order to understand the content of the Greek history syllabus, we must analyse the specific historical circumstances that have produced minorities within the Greek nation-state, and the relationship between Greek and European identity. Moreover, the minority status of Greeks in western countries since the war is a historical experience that

1. Ms Koulouri is associate professor of modern and contemporary history at the University of Democritus in Thrace (Greece). Her paper was originally presented at a CDCC seminar for the project "Democracy, human rights, minorities: educational and cultural aspects" (Athens, Greece, 22-24 October 1998).

is not dealt with in the teaching of history, but might be used for the purposes of intercultural education. I shall begin by addressing this last point.

Greeks as a minority

Like other Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Greece has been a country of mass emigration throughout the 20th century. At the turn of the century, the United States received the most Greek immigrants. After the second world war, migrants also went to Australia, South Africa and the industrialised countries of western Europe. From the 1960s on, Germany took the largest number of Greek immigrants. In the 1960s and 1970s, Greeks were consequently among the migrant minorities that changed the demographic and social structures of western countries. The situation they faced in the host societies was not easy. Placed on the lowest rung of the social ladder – together with Turks, Italians and Moroccans – they suffered hardship, prejudice and discrimination. As a minority, Greeks were thus subject to a form of racism, something they had not previously encountered owing to their majority position in their own country.

There was also a Greek minority in Turkey following the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, under which there was an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, with the exception of the Muslims in Thrace and the Greeks in Istanbul. The experience of the Greek minority (an indigenous minority in this case) within a nation-state desperate for homogeneity was traumatic. There are still a few Greeks in Istanbul, which continues to be the seat of the Orthodox patriarch. A similar case is that of the Greek minority in southern Albania, which accounted for the large flow of migrants moving to Greece after the fall of the communist regime.

The experience of Greek migrants and Turkish and Albanian Greeks as a minority, and thus as the victims of discrimination, is part of the nation's history; we shall take it as a reference point for an intercultural approach to history teaching in Greece.

Indigenous and immigrant minorities

The Greek diaspora and Greek minorities abroad – indigenous or otherwise – comprise one facet of the nation's existence. The other facet is that of the Greek majority within its nation-state, which is also home to indigenous and immigrant minorities. In fact, the issue of minorities seems to have become a matter of concern to the Greek state and Greek society recently. A decade ago, Greece appeared to be a homogenous nation in which cultural differences were dispersed or contained in distant frontier regions. Racism was understood to mean discrimination against Blacks, and was thus seen as a problem that did not affect Greece. In many ways this cultural homogeneity was genuine, owing to the assimilation policy pursued by the

state since its inception and the fact that Greece did not experience large-scale immigration until the 1990s.

Political developments in eastern Europe and the Balkans after 1989 resulted in large migratory flows towards Greece. These flows were not homogenous. They included migrants from eastern countries (Poles, Romanians, Bulgarians, Russians, etc.) and from Asia (Kurds and Iraqis). Among them were immigrants from the Balkan countries and the former Soviet Union who felt themselves to be Greek and who were welcomed as "repatriates". So the southern Albanians (or northern Epirotes from the Greek point of view) and Pontians from the former Soviet republics arrived in Greece as compatriots rather than "foreigners". They were consequently expected to belong to the national majority rather than forming specific minorities. Since these ethnic groups still suffer exclusion and discrimination, a definition of minorities based on national identity appears to be inadequate. Discrimination is not confined to a national "other", but also affects the social "other", such as communists in Greece at the end of the civil war (1949) and women today. It is impossible to establish rigid dichotomies between "us" and "them": it must be borne in mind that identity is a multiple, complex and dynamic phenomenon which is socially constructed and which evolves. A prime example is that of the Albanians who describe themselves as northern Epirotes (and thus Greeks) in order to improve their situation; conversely, they are all defined indiscriminately as Albanians when they commit crimes.

In contemporary Greece, therefore, we can identify two groups of minorities formed by different historical processes and occupying different places in the Greek education system.

Firstly, there are the indigenous minorities having survived the break-up of the multicultural Ottoman Empire and the formation of nation-states in the Balkans. They stand out from the majority owing to their religion, language and general culture, and seek to preserve their cultural identity.

Secondly, there are the non-native migrant minorities with different languages and cultures, in turn divided into two subgroups: those who wish to be legally integrated into the majority as members of the same nation, and are more or less willing to abandon their dialects in favour of the country's official language; and those who wish to be accepted as equal members of the host society and whose cultural identity is modified by the integration process.

Discriminatory attitudes towards these different minority groups are neither uniform nor stable. Immigrant minorities are treated in a fairly similar way to those in western countries. Relations with the Muslim minority in Thrace, however, are shaped by the long-standing rivalry with Turkey and the situation with regard to Balkan and Greek-Turkish disputes.

Ethnocentric history teaching

Two different but comparable attitudes may also be identified in the teaching of history: firstly, the attitude towards all minorities in general, which is based on the idea of the superiority of Greek civilisation; secondly, the specific relationship with the Muslim minority, which is partly determined by two opposing views of the collective past. Respective Greek and Turkish accounts of their national past are mutually exclusive and do not foster tolerance or coexistence between the two peoples.

To quote F. Audigier, the following problem then arises:

> If a minority in one state corresponds to a majority in another, either adjacent or nearby, should that reference state's history become the minority's history? But if they shared a past, sometimes very recently, why should they not share the present and the future too?[1]

This obvious danger may be illustrated by a long series of cases including the Albanians in Kosovo, the Hungarians in Romania, the situation in Northern Ireland, for example. The problem might be solved by teaching history that is not based on states and political and military events, but which disregards borders and focuses on cultural and geographical entities; examples include local history, regional history, European history and world history.

The history taught in Greece is quintessentially national history. Although derogatory statements about the country's Balkan neighbours have been removed from Greek textbooks, accounts remain largely ethnocentric. History teaching presents the Greek nation as "an almost natural entity" displaying two main characteristics: "uninterrupted cultural continuity since early antiquity and perfect homogeneity."[2] This ethnocentrism is accentuated by the belief that Greek civilisation is one of the pillars of European civilisation, the superiority of which is unquestionable. The image of autonomous, self-sufficient European cultures excludes all non-Europeans and even Muslims as "cultural invaders."[3]

However, relations between Greece and Europe are more ambiguous than is thought. They include both victims and perpetrators of discrimination, as we have seen in the dual majority/minority position of Greeks. Greeks – the "spoilt children of history", in the felicitous words of a mid-19th-century Greek scholar – believe that Europe is indebted to them for their eternal contribution to its civilisation. Whenever Europe is not clearly pro-Hellenic, the Greeks feel rejected and betrayed. At the crossroads of east and west,

1. F. Audigier, *Practising cultural diversity in education* (final conference for the project "Democracy, human rights, minorities: educational and cultural aspects", 21-23 May 1997 (Council of Europe, DECS/SE/DHRM (97) 1) p. 26.
2. T. Dragonas, A. Frangoudaki, C. Inglessi (ed.), *Beyond one's own backyard: intercultural teacher education in Europe* (Athens 1996) p. 40.
3. See A. Perotti, *The case of intercultural education* (Council of Europe Press 1997) pp. 38-40.

Greece oscillates between a valued European civilisation and a devalued Asian civilisation.[1] Europe is perceived as both a model and a threat. That is why currents of ideological thought openly hostile to Greece's Europeanness are often heard.

The idea of cultural superiority disseminated through the teaching of history is the first step towards intolerance and contempt of others. Discrimination is not caused by cultural diversity alone, but by the uneven balance of economic power and unequal cultural influence in the world. Human groups whose culture is considered "inferior" are subject to discrimination. If the European identity to which we aspire is just as exclusive as national identities, the inclusion of a European dimension in history teaching will not be enough to rise above ethnocentrism.

The new Greek secondary-level history syllabus contains certain principles of intercultural education. The aims of history teaching include "the development, through the study of specific cultures and their contribution to world civilisation, of an attitude of moderation, tolerance and respect for difference."[2] Individual subjects for each year group also include references to Muslim civilisation[3] and the civilisations of the Middle East.[4] The authors of the syllabus emphasise its flexibility: "Since the curriculum affects all pupils, regardless of their individual socio-cultural and linguistic characteristics, consideration must be given to whether the current curriculum is equally accessible to pupils with distinctive linguistic and socio-cultural characteristics.[5]"

Textbooks and teachers

Syllabus instructions reflect what ought to be done rather than the actual situation. Classroom practice is based on textbooks and teachers, and more on teachers than textbooks. Although many studies have been undertaken on textbook content, we must admit that textbooks play a fairly limited formative role as compared to teachers or "parallel" education (family, media, etc.). The role of textbooks in socialising younger generations has been overestimated to the detriment of other, far more significant factors. It is true that it is easier to study a set of textbooks than to try and ascertain what goes on in classrooms. However, the impact of textbooks cannot be assessed in isolation from classroom practice.

1. See C. Koulouri, "Entre l'Orient et l'Occident: les avatars de l'identité nationale grecque", *Historiens et Géographes* (February 1999).
2. Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, *Notice on the drafting of history textbooks,* (Athens, 1998) p. 16.
3. Ibid., pp. 44, 75, 103, 106.
4. Ibid., p. 39.
5. Ibid., p. 26.

The example of Northern Ireland may serve to demonstrate the importance of "parallel" education in conveying a selective, biased interpretation of history. Children do not come to school with an entirely empty book; they are brought up in a social and community environment riven by deep divisions.[1] They consequently bring to school stereotypes acquired elsewhere, and must learn to develop a critical attitude towards their own prejudices. Similarly, it is not at all easy for teachers to rid themselves of the ideas that prevailed in the society in which they themselves grew up. In Northern Ireland, what is known as "street history" seems to play a much greater role in conveying a vision of the common past than schooling. I believe that this observation also applies to Greece and other countries with far fewer problems than Northern Ireland. For this reason, intercultural education must not be confined to schools. Mutual understanding and respect for cultural diversity are stimulated above all by extra-curricular activities.

This is the approach adopted by the CDCC project on "Education for democratic citizenship", which rightly seeks to establish "sites of citizenship" in Europe and to address issues such as participation, informal education and adult education.

With regard to Greek schools in particular (both primary and secondary), the following may be said.

History textbooks do not seem to reflect the theoretical principles set out in the syllabus. Although they do not contain negative statements about neighbouring peoples, the idea of the superiority of Greek civilisation, more or less explicit ethnocentrism and the predominance of political history to the detriment of social, economic and cultural history clearly hinder tolerance and recognition of the value of minority cultures. History teaching should seek not to communicate moderate viewpoints but to equip young people with a process by which they can think critically for themselves.[2]

The current Greek system of a single textbook for each year group and subject, published and distributed by the Ministry of Education, does not provide the flexibility needed by mixed classes that include children from minorities.

Flexibility is also impeded by the exam-centred nature of the Greek curriculum, which culminates in the competitive university entrance examination. Academic success consequently depends on a pupil's ability to cope with a highly centralised system that does not reward diversity.

Initial training for Greek teachers does not prepare them for the requirements of intercultural education. General teacher training is flawed. As for history teachers, they are teachers of Greek who teach ancient and

1. "The teaching of history in a divided community", report by Alan McCully (Council of Europe, DECS/SE/BS/Sem (97) 8) pp. 5-7.
2. Ibid., p. 14.

modern Greek in addition to history. Teachers who have not received sound educational and historical training are clearly more vulnerable to stereotypes and prejudices.

Although history is a key subject for intercultural education, it alone cannot dismantle the ideological constructs developed by children inside and outside the school. The symbolic force of language and the importance of Greek language subjects must be taken into account in assessing the true impact of stereotypes in Greece, particularly in view of the fact that far less teaching time is devoted to history than to Greek. However, in the area of civic education, we cannot neglect the importance of general school life in addition to specific subjects.[1]

Historical experiences and intercultural education

Research has already been done in Greece to identify stereotypes among pupils and teachers and to try to introduce intercultural education in minority schools in the Thrace region and in mixed schools attended by children of immigrants in the Athens area. I shall not dwell on the detailed findings of these projects. By and large, they confirm the important role played by teachers and "parallel" education in passing on stereotypes and biased interpretations of the collective past to children. There is consequently a clear need to provide in-service training for teachers – including history teachers – and to devise more flexible syllabuses. Textbooks should also be revised so as to temper the prevailing ethnocentrism and to demonstrate the contribution made by several different cultures to contemporary Greek civilisation. An interpretation of the past which is not based on the idea of conflict and rivalry with others, but on that of a common heritage and similarities, would offer a foundation for intercultural history teaching.

Such an interpretation might draw on various experiences. Firstly, Greece's multiple identities: European, Mediterranean and Balkan. Owing to its geographical position, Greece has always been a cultural frontier between west and east, Europe and Asia, Christianity and Islam and, during the cold war, communism and liberalism. It shares certain characteristics with western countries and is a member of the European Union. It also belongs to a smaller group of Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain, with which it also shares common features. Lastly, it is located in the Balkans and is also a Balkan country, although in my view it is less Balkan than Mediterranean. If history teaching attempted to show the organic links between these different layers of identity, that would doubtless constitute an initial level of national self-interpretation that would neither be exclusive nor exclude.

1. See F. Audigier, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

Secondly, pupils could study comparable cases that are less sensitive because they are at a distance. The comparative approach would help pupils to put themselves in the place of Irish or Basque children, for example, and then to try and transpose the experience to their own country. Role-playing methods, such as simulated peace treaties, have been shown to be of interest to children and fairly effective.

Thirdly, teachers can draw on the historical experiences of Greek minorities. We have already described the two cases in which Greeks have been in a minority: firstly as a legally recognised historical minority (in Istanbul and southern Albania), and secondly as an ethno-cultural minority abroad (Greek migrants). This aspect of national history is totally absent from history teaching, even though it could be used for the purpose of intercultural education. Reversing the roles so that the majority puts itself in the place of a minority, or even making the perpetrators of discrimination feel like victims, may be a very effective tool in promoting mutual understanding and tolerance.[1]

All these proposals, like others that have previously been formulated or are currently being formulated, obviously require official approval before they can be incorporated into a series of measures to promote intercultural education. This is particularly true in the case of highly centralised education systems such as the Greek one. Levels of action range from syllabuses and history textbook content to initial and in-service teacher training. This paper has concentrated on the teaching sphere, but experiences of general school life and extra-curricular activities may have far more influence than either the curriculum or textbooks.

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The role of history in school – a Norwegian perspective

By Jon Lilletun[1]

It is a great pleasure for me that Norway is the host country for the symposium *Facing misuses of history*. The symposium is a contribution to the celebration of the Council of Europe's 50th anniversary this year. I myself was born shortly after the second world war, and regard 50 as a very good age. For most of this time the Council of Europe has been concerned with the teaching of history, so the symposium is also a way of marking its long-term involvement.

It is a pleasure to host the symposium. It is also, for me, and for all Europeans, a matter of profound regret that a new chapter on war and suffering in Europe must now be written, again with the Balkans in focus. The war in Kosovo has deep historical roots. Events that took place centuries ago are still alive in the memories of the Balkan peoples. They give rise to conflicts and are actively used to justify despotic policies of violence, persecution and ethnic cleansing.

Political leaders in western European countries also draw historical parallels in their analyses – they point to the Treaty of Versailles after the first world war, to Chamberlain and the Munich agreement before the second world war, to Hitler in his bunker and to the Vietnam war. By means of these historical parallels we try to explain and understand current events. However, not even professional historians can prove that the comparisons are right or wrong. We stand in the middle of history. But we all have a responsibility to think critically about this use of history. "History repeats itself" is a cliché – but we could just as well say, as I believe a historian has indeed said, "history never repeats itself". Historical situations are never exactly the same, and it can be fatal to disregard the differences.

1. Mr Lilletun is Minister for Education, Research and Church Affairs of Norway.

The conflict in the Balkans demonstrates the importance of strengthening and improving history teaching in schools, to which this symposium should contribute. Developments in central and eastern Europe in recent years have shown us that the picture of Europe in our history teaching – and in our minds – must be expanded.

Point of departure

I stand before you as Minister for Education, Research and Church Affairs. I am a male, middle-aged Christian Democratic politician from the south of Norway. I am neither a historian nor a teacher. This, and more, dictates my point of departure.

Why do I say this? First, to introduce myself in a few words. But more importantly, to underline the fact that my personal point of departure determines my view of history and my understanding of the place it should have in school. People with other starting points will have other views. As a politician I am aware that there is often considerable discussion and disagreement about current political decisions. It is clear that disagreement will also arise later about how these decisions, and their consequences, should be interpreted. We should therefore attempt to agree on a set of basic values for history teaching in Europe, while at the same time ensuring that the differences that exist are made clear. Only in this way can we tackle the misuse of history. Most important of all – respect for different points of view must be a constant aspect of history teaching.

The Council of Europe and history teaching

Many of you have a rough idea about the work the Council of Europe has done in history teaching, but it bears repeating. I have become more familiar with it in the preparation of this symposium, and have been very impressed. History and history teaching have always had a special place in the educational work of the Council of Europe. Our common historical heritage binds us together in Europe and contributes to the present climate of understanding and co-operation.

The Council of Europe's work with history teaching began with the European Cultural Convention of 1954. It has increasingly been recognised that recent history should be given its natural place in the teaching of history. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe now recommends that recent history should be given an important role, with a view to encouraging democratic developments and preparing responsible citizens.

After 1989, this Organisation's work in history teaching was intensified. At the Vienna Summit held in 1993 it was resolved that it is absolutely necessary to strengthen programmes for history teaching with a view to eliminating prejudice by emphasising the mutually positive influences between countries, religions and ideas in Europe's history. This recommendation was

followed up by the project "The teaching of history in the new Europe" in 1993.

In June 1997 the Council of Europe's Standing Conference of Ministers of Education met in my home town, Kristiansand. Here a new project was proposed: "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century". Two years later, this symposium in Oslo is part of this project.

Misuse of history

How can we tackle the misuse of history? This is the theme of the symposium. I do not know the professional historians' debate on the theme, but I see a number of challenges that need to be dealt with.

The first challenge is the obvious misuse of history in the former communist countries of eastern Europe. The second challenge is the flood of information in our modern media society. The third challenge lies in the saying that "history is written by the winners".

Misuse of history in eastern Europe

The whole project which we now participate in can be said to have started against the background of the massive misuse of history in communist eastern Europe. When these authoritarian regimes collapsed, fifty years of historical misrepresentation fell with them – in the case of the Soviet Union, almost a century. What two or three generations of pupils had learnt was seen to be false. Thus there arose an acute need to rewrite history, to design a new syllabus and write new textbooks. The Council of Europe project has played an active part in this work.

The misuse of history is almost synonymous with authoritarian regimes. History legitimates and glorifies dictatorship. And history is misused to promote authoritarian and violent systems of government. We have historians who try to write off the Holocaust, and we have Marxist-Leninists who try to minimise Pol Pot's massacres. In particular, those who would turn Hitler's extermination of the Jews into a historical footnote have, regrettably, many supporters among European youth, who think that the democratic establishment has betrayed them. The work of the Norwegian foundation White Buses to Auschwitz, which my ministry supports, arranges for young people to be confronted with the truth about atrocities.

The flood of information in the modern media society

This brings us to the second challenge linked to tackling the misuse of history: the flood of information into the modern media society. The Holocaust is represented as a lie on countless Internet sites, in neo-nazi brochures and publications, and in the texts of neo-nazi rock groups.

The flood of information is part of modern, pluralistic democracy. Here there are half-truths, distortions and oversimplifications. In short, in our society, history is being misused all the time, consciously and unconsciously. The enormous challenge we face, young and old alike, is to expose this misuse. We must learn to distinguish the true from the false, facts from impressions, the important from the trivial, and then use the material to form solidly thought-out opinions

What is important, regardless of the medium, is to develop critical attitudes and skills. This is something that young people cannot do alone, no matter how clever they are in surfing the Internet. However incredible it may seem, they need help from adults with historical and pedagogical insight.

The winners' misuse of history

It is said that history is written by the winners; this comment also hides a warning: losers get no say. Even in our democracies there is a danger that losers are barely visible in history.

The ruler's thoughts are the ruling thoughts, said Marx, and he may well be right. There will at all times be a dominant view in, and of, society. This will also put limits on the writing of history. But there is, perhaps, reason to expect that professional historians, with their specialised knowledge of long lines of development, should be the first to challenge accepted views. Historians should be the last to be regarded as children of their age.

To make losers invisible, or to market current prejudices, is not necessarily conscious misuse of history. But it results in a slanted, one-sided interpretation, just the same.

Pupils' views of history and history teaching

We learn something about the attitudes of young people in Europe in *Youth and history: a comparative European survey* (1997), and in the recent Nordic report *Youth and history in the Nordic countries,* based on the same European survey. Here it is, in particular, the attitude of the Nordic and European young people to democracy which gives me, as a politician, and you who work with 20th-century history food for thought. What is disturbing is that young people have such a pessimistic and resigned attitude to democracy. As one of the researchers says, "For Nordic youngsters, democracy has lost some of its appeal as the way to progress in Europe". Young people in the Nordic countries expect increased ethnic conflict in Europe. They have little belief in the growth of Europe's material welfare, and they fear increasing environmental problems.

The researchers conclude by pointing to one of the most dramatic results of the survey – European youths' negative attitude to politics and political activity. Across the board, European young people have little interest in

politics and do not expect to play an active part in it. This is indeed disturbing, but the situation is at the same time a considerable challenge, both for us politicians, and especially for you who are present here.

Use of history

Having looked at how history can be misused, and having heard that European youngsters are pessimists as far as the future of democracy is concerned, it is time to examine what prospects there are for making positive use of history. To use history in a positive way is, of course, not wholly problematic, because positive means different things to different people and groups. There is a very thin line separating what some would call use and others misuse. But the best must not be the enemy of the good.

I wholly agree with the conclusion reached at another symposium on the theme of history, democratic values and tolerance in Europe. The Council of Europe will not relent in its efforts to ensure that history teaching reflects the positive values that liberal democracy stands for. We must ensure that history teaching becomes a tool for civilised behaviour and values. We must make recommendations that are so balanced that we cannot be accused of favouritism towards one political course.

From where I stand, the positive use of history does not involve promoting particular political views, but mediating our common political basis, liberal democracy. First and foremost, history must be used to convey positive values and attitudes. In the Council of Europe's projects, a number of values have been defined: curiosity, openness, tolerance, empathy and social responsibility. Among attitudes which should be developed, the following are emphasised: the ability to understand others' views, awareness of prejudice and the critical interpretation of information. This is very important.

School researcher competition

This symposium is regarded as a preparatory event linked to the World Congress of Historians in 2000, to be held in Oslo. To establish a clear link between the two events and also focus on history in schools, I am announcing a school researcher competition in Norway. This competition will give young people a chance to dig deeper and discern historical trends as we enter a new millennium. The competition will start this autumn, and the winner will be declared at the world congress next year.

Since the time of the Vikings a thousand years ago, Norwegians have had contact with other peoples – with more or less good intentions. In a global world we must relate to more and more people whose background is different from our own. One of our greatest challenges at the turn of the century is to solve conflicts between people from different ethnic groups through dialogue, based on mutual respect and understanding.

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe emphasised earlier this year the importance of historical knowledge and history teaching. He urged us to show courage, intellectual honesty and immense tolerance, and be most strict as regards fundamental principles and values. The Council of Europe has a huge task in the new, united Europe. It is in this spirit that we welcome the history project as a very important part of the Council of Europe's work, and Norway is proud to host this symposium.

History and national identity in Norway

By Ola Svein Stugu[1]

My main theme today is the role of historical narratives in making a Norwegian national identity. As an introduction, however, I would like to make some more general remarks about the connection between history and identity.

Just before the war in Kosovo, the BBC produced a documentary, trying to explain the conflict to their viewers. One sequence was made at a school, which had once been integrated, but for some years had been divided into a Serbian and an Albanian department. The school subject chosen by the journalists to demonstrate the profound cultural cleavage between the two ethnic groups was – not surprisingly – history. A Serbian history teacher was filmed conveying the message that Kosovo Polje, the battlefield from 1389, was holy ground to the nation, while his Albanian counterpart dwelled extensively on the events and decisions that eventually separated Kosovo from Albania in 1913. In both cases the main message to the students was that historical injustices to their own ethnic group had to be rectified, and that their nation had been given a historical right to rule the territory.

There is nothing new in the fact that different nationalities maintain differing versions of the past. When nationalities belong to different states, we even tend to see this as normal and natural. Scandinavian historiography contains varying and conflicting national descriptions of the wars between the kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark in early modern times, centring around decisive moments like the Siege of Copenhagen in 1660, the Battle of Lund in 1676 or the death of Sweden's King Karl XII in 1718. In this part of Europe, however, substantial efforts have been made during the later decades to shift history away from its former nationalist versions.

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In contrast, Kosovo not only demonstrates the problems of an ethnically based nationalism when different ethnic groups share or claim the same territory, but it also shows the potentially dangerous role that history inspired by nationalism may play in areas and situations of tension. "The Serbs have too much history", the former Norwegian foreign minister and former United Nations negotiator in Bosnia Thorvald Stoltenberg once said, meaning that they have been too preoccupied with past offences against people of their own blood and kind. And the Balkans is not the only place in the world where the past is being used as a pretext for revenge. In India, with its long and complex history, virtually everybody can regard herself or himself as a victim of some historical injustice, as the social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen maintains in his book *Kampen om fortiden* (1996), a title which might be translated as "Disputed pasts".

If history is so dangerous, why then continue practising it? Could we not simply follow Henry Ford's advice to scrap it altogether? Or could we not agree to put away all propaganda and stick to factual truth?

As we know, it is impossible to isolate something called "factual truth" in history. Historical facts do not make sense until they are presented in some context, some edited version, and the choices made in the process of making sense to the past will inevitably and under all circumstances be influenced by the cultural context within which the editing is being made. The idea of doing away with history would not make sense either. Even if we could manage to get rid of history as a school subject, even if we could destroy all written texts about the past, history as individual and collective memories, tales and other oral narratives of the past would still exist.

So we have to accept that history in this broad sense is not to be treated as some external piece of knowledge, but as a precondition to make sense of our existence. Memories and narratives of the past play a vital part in all identity formation, individually as well as collectively, and the processes of identity formation are thus closely connected to historical narratives. These narratives define which events and trends of the past are significant in constituting one collective as "us", as well as showing what makes our collective into something different and particular compared to the outside "them". Professional historical research and writing is only one of the sources of historical identity, nevertheless professional history enjoys a status of its own by its function of legitimising or dismissing certain versions of the past, as well as of delivering basic materials for other narratives.

Among historical narratives, the narrative of national development has until recently been considered the most important one. It is no coincidence that the breakthrough of professional history runs parallel to a process of strengthening and deepening national identities all over Europe. According to Georg Iggers (1997: 23), "… the new historical profession served definite public

needs and political aims that made it important to communicate the results of its research to a public whose historical consciousness it sought to shape and who turned to the historians in search of their own historical identity."

Why was history considered to be of such importance to the nation?

In a recent comparative article on European national history, Miroslav Hroch (1998) has pointed out four circumstances that give an answer to this question:

– history strengthened the individual's identification with the nation, and strengthened the conception of the nation as a coherent unit, distinct from other comparable units;

– history legitimised the existence of the nation. To have a history made it possible to assert one's own national existence, and to see the nation as a result of an inevitable development;

– history made people feel like something more than mortal individuals. The continuity from the past not only made it possible for an individual to feel unity with the ancestors, but it also contained a promise of a continuing future;

– history served as a basis to create a consciousness about common national values – a collective value system. By help of history, models of positive and negative behaviour were constructed, and dreams and expectations for the future were projected backwards.

I think all four arguments are valid for Norway. Actually, I find Norway a very good case to demonstrate the close relationship between history and nation building. The development of Norwegian national history also demonstrates the close links between academic history writing and grand identity-making narratives and projects that later generations of historians have tended to turn their back on. Thus, academic history and popular history have not been opposed to one another, but have formed an interdependent relationship.

The construction of a national narrative

The breakthrough for academic history in Norway was the so-called Norwegian Historical School, centred around the historians Rudolf Keyser and Peter Andreas Munch, who practised mainly in the period from the late 1830s till early in the 1860s. In 1814, after centuries as a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway had become a state of its own in a loose union with Sweden, and Keyser and Munch had a more or less explicit programme to show that modern Norway was the resurrection and true heir of the Norse Kingdom of the past. Most of their research thus concentrated on medieval times. As Munch wrote, he wanted to show "… the importance

of the Norwegian nation in ancient times and its present Nordic genuineness" (quoted from Dahl 1970: 37). The most speculative aspect of their research was a theory of immigration stating that Norwegians were a distinct tribe that entered Scandinavia from the east far further to the north than their relatives, the Swedes and the Danes.

Their theories very soon found their way to the public, not at least by way of Munch's own elementary textbook in Norwegian history, published in 1839. Poets and other popular authors carried the message further, with useful assistance from composers, painters and other artists. The national master narrative of Norway that was developed in this way may be shortly summarised as follows. The most heroic period of Norwegian history was the Viking age, when the country was united and christened. The medieval kingdom then grew gradually and reached a peak in the 13th century, when the Norwegian king ruled most of the northern Atlantic. Then followed a period of decay and loss of independence, until a long period of internal growth resulted in a new dawn in 1814. That year the Norwegians took their fortune in their own hands, and when in the end they had to accept the union with Sweden, it was as an equal partner, contrary to what Sweden and Denmark had agreed, and the big powers had endorsed.

This narrative was fairly well rooted in the population until about 1905, when the union was dissolved. In this process a rapidly developing school system played a crucial part. A new Law of Common Schools in Towns was passed in 1846, followed by a Law of Common Schools in Rural Districts in 1860. History was not yet a compulsory subject, but in 1885, 46% of the primary school pupils were taught history – a formidable increase from 3% in 1853. When a new Law of Peoples' Schools was passed in 1889, history became a subject of its own, and the 1890s saw the definite breakthrough of history in Norwegian schools (Dokka 1967, Myhre 1992).

In this period, history teaching and history textbooks, conveying the authorised narrative of the nation, became important vehicles of identity construction. The ideological connections are clear and open between on one hand the efforts to lift the population into modernity and democratic participation by help of compulsory education, and on the other hand a stronger outward assertiveness, which not at least was expressed through a clearer nationalistic message in the textbooks. National pride is a dominant feature of primary school textbooks in the years before and after the break of the union. This gives them a clearly distinct flavour compared to the relative modesty on behalf of the nation that can be observed in earlier textbooks (Lorentzen 1988).

This national assertion was not only evident in history, but in other subjects as well, particularly in Norwegian – *morsmål* or Mother's Language *(Muttersprache),* as it was often called – but also in geography. The most widely used Norwegian reader from the time its first volume was published in 1892

until about 1960 was *Nordahl Rolfsens Lesebok.* During all editions and revisions, vividly retold stories from Norwegian history are important parts of the content. On the front cover of its first edition was an artist's impression of a troll, a reference to the old fairy tales, which had become another important identity making symbol.

In the preface of the first edition, the author states his goals to be that "Without patriotic bragging, without neglecting the truth in any way, a reader for the Norwegian peoples' school should educate Norwegian citizens." For that purpose, he wrote some pieces for the book that expressly was aimed at "leading the small ones to the great, that we call our native country" (literally: *Fedreland,* Father's country – *Vaterland*). One of the pieces contains a condensed version of national history, stressing the value of national liberty. "When a people can do whatever it wants with its money and its soldiers without asking another people to do so, they are free," Rolfsen maintained. "But if it is not allowed to build roads or warships or harbours or lighthouses or colleges or whatsoever without asking another people to do so, then it is not free." We should notice the examples: the ability to modernise – even military – thus is seen here as the heart and core of national liberty.

Another event which should not be underestimated in the public formation of a historical identity was the publication in 1900 of a new edition of the Icelander Snorri Sturluson's early *13th century sagas of the Norwegian kings,* illustrated by some of the country's most important artists. These drawings are still an important part of Norwegians' common cultural heritage.

Snorre's works were well known long before that time. Parts of the text were translated into more modern Danish, which at that time had become the language of writing in Norway too, in about 1550, and in 1633 a complete translation was published. During the following centuries there were several translations and editions, for example by the politician and industrialist Jacob Aall in 1838-39 and by P.A. Munch in 1859. The initiative to have a new translation made was taken by academics in connection with the publishing of a new, critical edition of the medieval manuscript. From this starting point, the project soon developed into a grand scale national identity building effort. Artists were delighted to take part in the project, and in 1900 the Norwegian Parliament, Stortinget, granted 20 000 kroner to the project – a substantial amount at that time – "so that the book be widely read when it becomes so cheap", as it was expressed. Even before that, parts of the text had entered into school readers, and the sagas had long been the primary source for history textbooks.

The Snorre text has considerable literary merit and makes exciting and engaging reading by itself. However, in constructing Norwegians' mental picture of the past, the drawings, which have been part of every edition since 1900, are of equal importance. Their style is very distinct, inspired by

contemporary European fashions *(Jugend/* art nouveau), but with a Nordic expression, as shown in the examples below.

The first drawing illustrates the dream of the legendary Queen Ragnhild that her son Harald was to become a king of all Norway.

The second shows the death of King Olav Haraldsson, the later Saint Olaf, at Stiklestad in 1030. The definite breakthrough of Christianity in Norwegian society was attributed to his reign.

The third example is one of the most expressive drawings of the whole work, depicting the story of the sorcerers at Skratteskjær, a reef that was overflown by high tide. They had been put there by Olav Trygvason, a predecessor of Saint Olaf, and like him a former Viking chieftain who not only aspired to become the sole king of Norway, but also to christianise the country.

The last example shows Olav Trygvason in a fateful quarrel with the Swedish Queen Sigrid. The artist Erik Werenskiold on a couple of occasions used his friend and neighbour Fridtjof Nansen as a model for the king. The drawings must be seen as a deliberate effort to establish continuity in Norwegian history by giving the adventurous king sportsman the features of the modern scientist, explorer and adventurer, who as a result of daring expeditions in the Arctic became probably the greatest hero in modern Norwegian history. After the first world war Nansen also won international reputation for his humanitarian works.

The Nansen cult in Norway was so strong that he undoubtedly might have grabbed the political leadership of the country in the 1920s if he had wanted to – he was actually encouraged a couple of times to go for it, but declined. However, another man of much lesser stature, who was Nansen's closest assistant during a humanitarian campaign in the Soviet Union in 1922, later tried to pose as Nansen's heir. This man, Vidkun Quisling, is the only Norwegian whose name has become a part of international language – as a synonym for collaborator and traitor.

The saga texts as well as the Snorre drawings became an integrated part of the national master narrative that not at least dominated Norwegian schools well into the post-war era, and reproductions of Snorre drawings can be found in most history textbooks even today. However, newer illustrations too may become national icons. A famous example from this century is a photograph of King Haakon VII during a German air attack in the early spring of 1940. The King was a symbol of resistance and independence during as well as after the war, and the picture contributed to this. But he was not only symbolically important as a rallying sign. On a couple of occasions he also showed himself to be a better defender of the rules of parliamentary democracy than were some of his advisers, and he was immensely popular among the population after the war.

Draumen til dronning Ragnhild.



Da sa Sigrid: «Det kunne vel hende at dette vart banen din!»

Varieties of nation building

Until now I have spoken mainly about the grand narrative that became hegemonic during the heydays of Norwegian nationalism. The picture, however, has to be nuanced.

In a recent article the historian Øystein Sørensen has identified fourteen different Norwegian nation-building projects between 1770 and 1945. Some of them have been competing, others are clearly interrelated, and the intricate process of redefining and developing the projects has continued until this day.

For my purpose, it will be fruitful to sort these projects into broader categories. I will focus upon three main groups of projects: one that mainly sees nation building as *modernising,* a second one that views *democratisation* as the central aspect of nation building, and a third, *authoritarian and assertive* trend.

The first direction, the modernising, was internationally oriented and represented a mainly technocratic view of national development. Its golden age was the period between 1840 and 1870, when a small group of academics in the civil service lead the first wave of Norwegian modernisation. Their regime collapsed in the 1880s, but recent analyses have maintained that there are strong parallels between this regime and the social democratic regime of the post-war period, which above all was characterised by economic growth, technological modernisation and a dramatic increase in welfare (Slagstad 1998).

This interpretation of national growth as modernisation differs from the hegemonic national narrative of Norwegian history in at least two ways: on one hand it has been more heavily future oriented, in addition it has to a much higher degree been internationally oriented. As a consequence, the modernising technocrats – first wave as well as second wave, have on several occasions been accused of neglecting national values and traditions. This was the case in connection with the two referendums on Norwegian membership in the European Union in 1972 and 1994, when national sentiments were mobilised against membership, which by many was considered as a threat to national independence in the name of modernisation and internationalisation.

The second nation building project, which I want to focus upon, is what broadly may be called the National Democratic Movement. The main focus of this movement's nation building efforts was to integrate all parts of the population into the public life of the nation. In 1884 the broad Liberal Left Coalition of farmers, progressive intellectuals and servicemen, lay Christians and some liberal capitalists came to power. This was not only a shift in political regimes and the starting point of a wave of profound political reforms, but it also heralded a more pronounced nationalistic policy, which in the end was to lead to the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905.

The leading ideologist of this movement was the prominent historian Ernst Sars, and in many ways the hegemonic version of Norwegian national history – not at least as it has been taught in schools – may be seen as a simplified version of Sars' grand historical outlooks.

One important challenge to the national democratic conception of Norwegian history came from the labour movement, which grew rapidly during the first two decades of this century, parallel to a wave of heavy industrialisation in the country. The Norwegian labour movement was also strongly radicalised during this period, actually the Labour Party was the only majority Socialist Party in western Europe to join the Comintern for four years from 1919.

The socialists were internationalist – at least in theory. However, they too acted within a national frame of reference, and subsequently they developed their own versions of Norwegian history, with class struggle seen as the driving force behind historical development. In 1925 the journalist Olav Schieflo, who at that time was a member of the Communist Party, issued a book called *The red line in Norwegian history*. He was clearly inspired in his synthesis by professional Marxist historians, particularly by professor Edvard Bull, who served as foreign minister in the first, short-lived Labour Government in 1828, but the book is definitely stronger as agitation than as scholarly analysis.

The most surprising feature of the book is actually its back cover, which contains an advertisement for cigarettes, with a helmet-clad Viking as their main emblem, and the headline "Buy Norwegian goods" written in quasi-runic letters. "These brands are made by Norwegian workers at our factory"; the text beneath the drawings reads. Here is no mention of international solidarity; the advertisement simply confirms the national frame of reference as the most important one to socialists too.

How could these two versions of history, one of class struggle, the other one of national growth, be reconciled?

The man for this task was Halvdan Koht, history professor, a prominent member of the cultural nationalistic "new Norwegian lingual movement", and an active member of the Labour Party as well. According to Koht's grand narrative, the development of Norwegian national democracy did not end at the advent of parliamentarism and the integration of the farmers into the political system in the 1880s and 1890s. Democratisation had to continue, and the next important step would be to integrate the workers into the system (Koht 1953).

Eventually Koht's conception of the labour movement as a vehicle for integrating the workers in the national community gained the upper hand in the Labour Party too. During the post-war period it might be maintained that this further development of the national democratic conception took

root also in school history. In short, the social democratic era in Norwegian politics had its parallel in a gradual widening of the social focus of school history – and in historical research at large.

The third main branch of nationalism, which I have labelled an authoritarian and assertive one, never became hegemonic in Norway. In the decades up to 1940, however, ideas of what has been later branded a Norwegian "arctic imperialism", of national purity and that only certain classes and cultural elements were representative of the "true interests" of the nation had a fairly strong following. Arctic imperialism was clearly inspired by medieval as well as recent history of expeditions and explorations, and it comprised an effort to take control over Spitzbergen – which succeeded, and over eastern Greenland – which failed. In both cases, historical arguments that "we were there first" – even though we did not stay there permanently – were mobilised to legitimise the expansion.

The main tendency of Norwegian nationalism has been its close connections to liberal democracy, but in the 1920s the system was not only challenged from the left, but also from the right. Of particular interest is the development in the agrarian movement in that decade. Not only did it endorse the notion that the agrarian population harboured a more genuine Norwegian culture than the urban population, but also that their blood was purer, and that this gave them a right by birth to the country. To see farmers as symbols of the true national virtues was not uncommon in the national discourse of the time, but in this case it was also mixed with élitist ideas of forms of government centred around a strong leader or chief (Ohman Nielsen 1997).

A leading ideologist of the movement was the historian Oscar Albert Johnsen, whose "Norges Bønder" (Farmers of Norway) from 1919 was well researched, but ideologically loaded in its conclusions. It is symptomatic that the Union of Norwegian Farmers made a reprint of the concluding chapter of the book for distribution to their members (Rovde 1995:175).

The 1930s became a decade of integration in Norwegian history. By means of a historical compromise between the Labour Party and the Farmers' Party in 1935, Labour came to power. Professor Halvdan Koht became foreign minister, and one of the leading personalities within the government. Finally the historian got a golden opportunity to realise his programmatic vision of national development. And even though the post-war social democratic regime has been mainly a technocratic and modernist one, it is not difficult to recognise important parts of Koht's visions in ideological programs as well as in the educational and cultural policy of the period.

Dilemmas of school history

I would like to add some concluding remarks on today's situation, particularly concerning school history. When reading the present core curriculum for Norwegian primary, secondary and adult education, we find that

national identity and unity are still vital educational goals. A passage in a chapter on "Internationalisation and the appreciation of tradition" reads as follows: "When transitions are massive and changes rapid, it becomes even more pressing to emphasise historical orientation, national distinctiveness and local variation to safeguard our identity". Further on in the text we notice that the central strategy to safeguard identity is to make school take part in reproducing the national communality of memory by helping the pupils to "… share experiences and insights, stories, songs and legends."

Of course preserving a national identity is not the only primary goals of Norwegian education; it has to be balanced against other goals, like democratic participation, solidarity and the values of critical inquiry and scientific methods, which are heavily stressed in the core curriculum. This means that the basic value system of Norwegian education contains several contradictions which have to be negotiated in some way, and an important message in the core curriculum is that school should equip the pupils to make ethically based choices themselves.

When it comes to history, methods of critical inquiry are emphasised in the new curriculum. Critical inquiry is so to say a way to deconstruct history, and this approach may be seen as a counterpart to constructing grand historical narratives, even as an alternative to narrative methods of teaching. The old national narrative, however, is still clearly visible in parts, for example in textbooks, although it is clearly on the wane and is about to be replaced by a much more fragmented picture, consisting of a number of smaller narratives of the past.

The ambition, in brief, has been to put aside the grand narrative and to pursue ways of teaching which enhance the students' abilities to sort evidence and arguments and to choose critically. This raises another challenge: how to make history engaging to the students? How to compete with popular narratives and memories containing colours, sentiments, fascination, suspense and engagement?

One solution might be to re-establish some sort of grand narrative; perhaps to follow Koht's lead to say that there is now another group to be included in the national political culture, namely ethnic minorities and immigrants. This, however, does not solve the basic problems of internationalisation and multi-culturalism, which today face all projects of nation building and national integration. International integration, not at least in the cultural field, is making it increasingly difficult to maintain any national master narrative. At the same time even a culturally homogeneous nation like Norway has to face the question on how to give justice to claims of various ethnic and cultural groups to their own identities, without breaking the limits of a functioning political entity.

The challenge in short is to find a working balance between the goal of integration and tolerance of "the other" in an increasingly multi-cultural and internationally open society.

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Interpretations of the 1956 Hungarian revolution in secondary education

By Attila Szakolczai[1]

Before turning to the substance of my lecture, I would like to outline briefly the factors that decide how the 1956 revolution and war of independence are assessed in Hungary today. That, of course, affects how they are addressed in secondary schools as well.

The prime factor is the political significance that is still attached to the revolution to this day. The Kádár regime's condemnation of 1956 as a counter-revolution was one of the main pillars on which it rested the legitimacy of its power. It was something on which it stubbornly insisted right up until the system collapsed in 1989-90. So 1956 had an important part to play in the change of system. One of the most consequential events was the solemn funeral held in 1989 for the revolutionary leaders who had been executed, a commemoration that hundreds of thousands attended. All the opposition parties in 1989-90 claimed the revolution to be part of their heritage and based their programmes on the revolution's demands. The first act of the new parliament passed after the first free elections erected a memorial to 1956. The politician that the parliament chose as President of the Republic was condemned to life imprisonment after the revolution was crushed. Thus 1956 became an important basis of legitimacy for the new, democratic political system as well, which meant that it remained a factor in political life.

However, just at the moment of victory, troubles arose about how 1956 was to be evaluated. The first democratically elected Hungarian Government, the conservative cabinet of József Antall, found it hard to digest the left-wing inheritance from the revolution, at a time when communism was collapsing world-wide and Hungarian public opinion was strongly anti-communist. Meanwhile the national liberation struggle against the Soviets

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was largely becoming history as the occupation forces withdrew and the Soviet Union itself fell apart. The references to this glorious chapter in Hungary's history remained, but as they grew in solemnity, they became more insubstantial and empty. Society's overall picture of 1956 was darkened by the proliferating range of 1956 veterans' associations. Their public disputes, often engendered by personal antagonisms, have been peppered with recriminations and denunciations, which have blemished the public image of the revolution itself. The situation became still more discordant in 1994, when the Hungarian Socialist Party, the successor to the state party under the old regime, won a landslide election victory. The new prime minister was a politician who had admitted in his published autobiography to joining the special forces that took part in suppressing the revolution. (One veteran association has tried unsuccessfully for several years to bring charges against him for deeds committed at the time.)

Hungary's present right-wing government is trying to eliminate the left-wing character of the revolution and the left-wing participants in it. Funding is used as a weapon for the purpose, as the government tries to secure a monopoly for a group of historians close to it personally and intent on imposing the government's scale of values in their work. So the institute founded at the time of the change of system to research into 1956, and which has published more than fifty volumes on the subject, had its budgetary grant cut by 90%. Meanwhile a left-wing intellectual workshop had its grant completely withdrawn. These allocations were then transferred to a new research institute, headed by appointees who do not enjoy the professional recognition of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Official historiography under the previous system, designed to further the power interests of the Kádár regime, portrayed 1956 simply as an attempt at restoration. This left an inconsistency between the aims of the revolution as they retrospectively stated them (reinstatement of capitalism) and as they had been proclaimed by the revolution's leaders (including the executed communist Prime Minister, Imre Nagy) and institutions (such as the workers' councils). One way the authorities in the Kádár period tried to get round this contradiction was to brand and condemn Nagy as a traitor. The masses who had rallied behind the workers' councils in 1956 were described as misguided workers, as *petty bourgeois,* capitalist elements who had insinuated themselves into the working class, as officials of the old apparatus of state, or simply as common criminals. It was general practice under communist systems to accuse political opponents of common crimes (trafficking in foreign currency, embezzlement and so on) as a way of convincing the public. This was the technique used against the revolution as well. When the events were presented, the dark side was always to the fore, especially the lynchings and kangaroo courts, invariably illustrated with brutal pictures taken from the western papers.

Although teachers today are aware that what they learned (and taught) earlier is untrue, most of them are still unclear about what they should be teaching instead. Their problems were compounded, especially in the early 1990s, by the baffling quantity of writing on 1956 that appeared. For under the special circumstances of the change of system, the ones with a scholarly purpose were interspersed with many others that were sensationalist and bereft of value. Since extension training for teachers is in a rudimentary state in Hungary, most of them are left to their own devices on this, as on many other aspects of a newly pluralist society. So the problem is not just one of quantity. Historians as a profession, like society at large, have split into several camps that vehemently oppose each other, often, unfortunately, on political rather than professional grounds.

There are several strongly distinct interpretations of 1956 found in Hungary today among scholars, in the public mind and in education. The *national, conservative* side describes the events after 1945 as decisively dictated from outside. The defeated country tried to resist these as far as its strength and potentials permitted, but it was bound to fail against the Soviet world empire. As a function of this, 1956 was not and could not have been anything other than a nation seizing its first opportunity to turn against its conqueror and regain its freedom. Thus 1956 was a national war of liberation, fought for national independence. It would have reinstated automatically the individual and civil rights and freedoms snatched away when the communists took power, and it would have restored the political forms of western democracy. (In this respect this view coincides with the one held by Kádárite historians.) So the protagonists of 1956 are the heroes of the armed uprising, who managed for a while to halt the Soviet army and gave their country a few days of freedom. Their descriptions also assign an important role to civilian parties that were resurrected during the revolution, with pride of place for the Independent Smallholders Party, which had won the 1945 elections. According to this account, all that remained on 4 November was to hold free elections, so that the public could give approval to the gains in the revolution.

There is a *smaller group* of nationally, conservatively minded historians who see 1956 as the most encouraging attempt to implement a special Hungarian political idea, the so-called "Third Road". This means essentially that Hungary, throughout its history, has been jostled by east and west. It has been influenced more strongly by each alternately, but the characteristics of the other have always remained visible. In the bipolar world of the 20th century, the proper course was to turn to advantage what had hitherto been a drawback, by bringing the two models into accordance and preserving the benefits of both. Socialist society, freed of exploitation and intent on justice, should be crossed with the democratic political structure that guarantees rights and freedoms. According to its advocates, the timeliness of this was enhanced by power politics of 1956: the Third Road would have offered the Soviet Union a solution that entailed relatively

little loss of prestige. There was certainly support for this concept in society and among politicians at the time, but it had no chance of being implemented. The United States saw little to gain by it and the Soviet Union too much to lose.

Just as conservative Hungarian historians vary in the picture they present of 1956, so the other side differs as well. Left-wing, liberal thinkers agree that the changes in Hungary after 1945, even the communist take-over, had strong social support, and that disillusionment over the reality of the results, compared with the hoped-for ideals, was a major cause behind the uprising. Historians committed to socialism tend to portray 1956 as a corrective revolution, an attempt to rectify the mistakes made in building communism in Hungary and restore national independence. Their accounts give prominence to the indeed important role played by communist politicians, first of all Imre Nagy, but also János Kádár, who arrived at the top of the Communist Party during the revolution. Kádár was a member of the revolutionary government and a supporter of its main demands, including the trend towards Hungarian neutrality. However, his assessment of the situation in the early days of November was that the rising no longer aimed to rectify mistakes, but to overturn the socialist system. He undertook to lead the quisling government installed by the Soviets, but thereby prevented Mátyás Rákosi and his associates from regaining power. According to socialist history, Kádár sought for compromises directly after 4 November and tried to rescue the main demands of the revolution. But none of the participating sides could accept his policy. The fraternal Communist Parties in other eastern European countries and the pro-communist political forces at home sought the fullest possible reinstatement of the system (and reprisals). The other side swore by full attainment of the revolutionary demands, by force of arms and a general strike. This tight situation set Kádár off on his subsequent course. First came several years of protracted reprisals, in which he settled accounts, physically as well, with the adherents of the revolution. Then, at the beginning of the 1960s, he removed from the front ranks of power a group of those who had carried out the reprisals and expelled Rákosi and his most exposed associates from the party. After that restoration of order, he was able to set about the reforms that turned Hungary into the happiest hut in the camp.

The fourth school of thought that is of interest to the present subject tends to be closely tied intellectually to the liberal strand in Hungarian politics. Their descriptions assign a decisive part in creating a revolutionary situation to the opposition within the party, which eroded the hitherto monolithic structure of power. The uprising that broke out on 23 October 1956 was at once united and varied. It was united in what it rejected. It did not want Soviet supremacy, it did not want the disregard for human and civil rights, and it did not want any more poverty and privation. However, according to this school, the few days of freedom afforded were insufficient for ideas to mature on how the majority of society envisaged the future. There was

certainly strong support for bourgeois democracy and for the Third Road. However, there was undeniably a likewise broad sector (among the armed rebels as well) who saw the future in terms of a socialist state, cleansed of authoritarian, Stalinist methods and forms. The strongest difference between the socialists and the liberals is over the assessment of János Kádár. The latter see Kádár plainly as the betrayer of the revolution and the hangman of those who took part in it. In their view it was not Kádár's policy, but the desire for freedom shown by the broad masses of the Hungarian population and evinced in the armed struggle they undertook that led to cautious reforms beginning in the mid-1960s. By making those concessions, the authorities hoped to escape from the spectre of a new uprising.

So the assessments made of 1956 vary considerably. This is also shown by the uncertainty about what to call it. It is referred to equally as an uprising, as a revolution and war of independence, as a national freedom struggle, and so on. But while Hungarian society, now learning democracy, is prepared to accept political pluralism, the parties, in assessing a situation and an event in different ways, are not so understanding towards historians. They find it hard to accept that the road to understanding the past lies through considering a multitude of views, and often the more debates (and professional debates) there are, the faster this understanding appears. It does not matter if such differences appear in school textbooks as well. However, it does matter if they are not clearly distinguished from the factual syllabus material. That means students who have used different textbooks may enter the exam room or embark on their further education with substantial differences in their background knowledge, and whether these are to a student's advantage and disadvantage comes basically to depend on chance. On the other hand, although textbooks corresponding to each trend can be found on the market, the choice of supplementary books or Internet materials is not so full.

The result of all these circumstances is a sad one for Hungarian education. In one test for students of journalism, a line of introduction had to be written for a set selection of people. Some 80% of the students were unable to place even relatively in 20th-century Hungarian history the defence minister during the revolution, who was executed, and only two students recognised the name of the man who headed the biggest armed group in Budapest.

Appendix: Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century[1]

Often considered by historians as the most difficult to study and to teach, the 20th century is the subject of a specific project on "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century". In 1993 and 1997, the two summits of heads of state and government of the Council of Europe member states called upon the Council to develop in particular activities and educational methods relating to this period. The Parliamentary Assembly expressed a similar wish in a recommendation on history and the learning of history in Europe, adopted in 1996.

This project represents a complete teaching kit and may be described as an "atom" in which "satellites" gravitate around a "nucleus". This nucleus is a handbook for history teachers, devoted to the methods and different ways of presenting the 20th century to pupils. A British historian, Robert Stradling, has prepared this work which comprises educational chapters and practical worksheets and exercises based on concrete cases and themes. While drawing on and amplifying the Council of Europe's recommendations already adopted in the field of history, he has adapted them to the problems and difficulties of the 20th century, taking into account the intellectual, political and social upheavals which have marked it. He has also attempted to identify the omissions and falsifications in the presentation of the century and deal with contentious issues, the source of conflict, confrontations and misunderstandings.

The satellites are teaching packs looking at women's history, population movements, cinema, the Holocaust and nationalism in 20th century Europe. They are supplemented by reports and contributions on, amongst others, the use of new technologies in teaching, the problem of sources in contemporary history and the study of misuses of history. All these components form a teaching pack which can be used by all teachers and adapted to their needs and resources.

1. This text is based upon a chapter previously published in *Lessons in history* (Council of Europe Publishing, 1999).

Specifically dealt with by several reports and workshops, the question of the collection and exploitation of source material for 20th-century history is also included in the project within a transversal approach. It seeks to initiate pupils in the consultation and use of archives as a documentary basis or discussion theme. But unlike previous centuries, the 20th century can be studied and interpreted through new media such as the cinema, radio, television and more generally images which accompany or indeed replace written information.

These new sources must be inventoried and known, decoded and assessed. The power of images, whether still or moving, also increases the risk of the spectator's being manipulated: propaganda films shot by totalitarian regimes are perhaps the most tragic illustration of this, but omissions and misrepresentations – including those made by editing techniques or clever camerawork – are also a feature of films or documentaries which lay claim to objectivity or information. By discovering these techniques, deliberate or not, today's pupils who live in a permanent audiovisual environment will also learn how to be more critical towards it when watching television news programmes or a "contemporary" film.

Clearly, however, above and beyond propaganda and manipulation, the gradual transition from the written word towards an image society is also a historical phenomenon worthy of study. In this context the teaching pack on cinema offers teachers a filmography of the most significant 100 films of the century. These are to be used to shed light upon their period, both historically and culturally, and prompt discussion.

The project also seeks to encourage the use of sources which are little used in teaching, such as oral history. Sometimes, this is the only source available on a particular event or living environment and can provide an insight capable of counterbalancing the official history; increasingly it makes for more personalised history by giving the speaker the role of witness. Some schools already invite former members of the resistance or former deportees to recount their memories, thereby enabling the listeners to put the period in context. Similarly, life in a factory can be illustrated by a talk by a former factory worker. However, oral history must also be multiple, since, like any other written or visual source, it too can lack objectivity.

The most recent technology, computers in particular, can also provide new sources of information, such as CD-Roms or Internet sites, but they can also be used as a means of teaching. Here too, it is important to help both teachers and pupils select and evaluate the plethora of documents available on the Internet, and to encourage them to look at their source, their reliability and all the risks of manipulation or omission which they may contain. For teachers, using the Internet means first of all knowing how to use it: depending on their training and their own attitude to such tools, teachers can be very much in favour or very much against. The project therefore also seeks to help them use these tools which will provide them with text and

images. In this way, Internet sites and CD-Roms can be valuable supplements to textbooks and lessons.

Nevertheless, while these new tools have significant educational potential, teachers attending the training seminars stress the fact that they cannot replace books and papers and that while they do open new avenues, they will not completely revolutionise teaching. Furthermore, many teachers point out that their development in school is at present still limited because of the cost.

The pack on women in history fits in with the Council of Europe's desire for fair representation of both sexes in society, but its aim goes far beyond simply redressing the balance. While emphasising the role of women in society, too long overlooked, it also seeks to view history from their perspective. Several seminars were held on this project which is based on specific collective or individual examples. Amongst these, the role of women in Stalin's Russia illustrates the life, activities and image of women of the time, and the period through them. Biographies of famous women could provide the framework for lessons or themes, but it is also essential to present ordinary or unknown women and their views on events and the world. For that, the use of oral history must be encouraged: the teaching pack suggests examples and interviewing methods which could be used with women who have lived through historic events or who are representative of a period or a theme.

The pack also contains general subjects to be addressed in lessons, such as the struggle for the right to vote, working women or the image of women. It also deals with bias and omissions in the presentation of women in history and consequently has resulted in a genuine work of historiography conducive to comment and critical judgement.

Conceived in a similar way the pack on nationalism goes beyond mere definitions of the phenomenon to look at the more day-to-day aspects, even including topics such as sport or currency. It covers the major historic consequences of nationalism, such as shifting borders or the break-up of empires (Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Union) and looks at relations between majority and minority groups within states. It then discusses the cohabitation of groups and the means of living together, for example via federalism. The pack, like the two others, is supplemented by a bibliography including written documents, films, and also CD-Roms and Internet sites.

The pack on migration examines population movements in Europe in the 20th century, the reasons why individuals and groups change countries and the cultural and social exchanges which result from these movements. Not restricted simply to the major migration waves of recent decades, it also covers transfrontier movements caused as a result of border changes or economic necessities, as in the case of border workers. It seeks to illustrate

the situation and views of migrants as inhabitants of a host country, while facilitating dialogue and mutual understanding concerning increasingly similar concerns and lifestyles.

The pack on the teaching of the Holocaust, above and beyond the facts themselves, should personalise events through the life of victims, for example before and during the Holocaust. A 15-year-old adolescent will be more moved by the story of a young person of the same age before and during the war than by an overview of the period, and will develop a more concrete understanding of the extent of the tyranny and crimes. At a time when anti-Semitism is growing alarmingly in certain countries, it is important, over and above the facts, to point out that anyone could one day become the victim of such crimes, but thought must be given to the mechanisms which can, at the same time, turn normal individuals into torturers and executioners.

The project also examines the way in which the history of the 20th century is taught across Europe, in textbooks, syllabuses and lessons. It calls on teachers not merely to pass on facts but to deal with the practical expression and memory implicit in those facts. The concept of "place of remembrance", conducive to discussion and recollection, also introduces the idea of cultural heritage, which should not be restricted to a palace or a church, but should also include sites recalling the darkest hours of the 20th century, such as the trenches of 1914 or the concentration camps.

The theme of "living memory" can be illustrated by using little known documents such as letters sent by soldiers in the Great War to their families; these also provide an individual dimension to a collective event. Maps and photos, like film extracts, often speak more effectively to pupils than a mere chronological listing of events, and the presentation of a memorial also shows how a conflict affects a country or a region.

Lastly, comparative studies have been made on the training of history teachers and these serve as a basis for recommendations. Depending on the country, future teachers move directly from university to the school environment and their academic qualifications are supplemented by teacher training varying from short courses to one or more years of preparation for entry to the profession. The project sets out to assess and inventory the various models of teacher training although it seeks only to improve them and not to make them uniform. It insists on the need to develop in-service training for teachers, in both teaching techniques and in the choice of themes which should be presented to pupils.

The project aims to enable history teachers in Europe, whatever country they are from, to develop methods and themes adapted to the specific nature of 20th-century history. It also aims to help them to incorporate all documentary sources and subjects into their teaching, and also to adapt their approach to modern technological developments. The project underscores

the specific nature of teaching 20th-century history in relation to history training in general, and insists that the 20th century should be presented in a way which is more open to the outside world and enables pupils to understand this world more readily. Dynamic and appealing, such teaching must remind pupils, confronted outside the classroom by numerous external sources of history information, that school is the most appropriate place to learn about and analyse the history of Europe in the 20th century.

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