TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PHYSICAL PLANNING CONCEPT
EUROPEAN REGIONAL PLANNING

STUDY SERIES

Study No. 33

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PHYSICAL PLANNING CONCEPT

Association Internationale Futuribles

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Strasbourg
1980

65.407
09.4
PRELIMINARY NOTE

This study has been drawn up at the request of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe in application of the work programme for 1979.

It was presented and discussed at the Round Table on a draft European Regional Planning Concept held at Strasbourg on 17 and 18 December 1979 (see report on the Round Table published in this series, No. 32).

The author is responsible for the opinions expressed in the text; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council of Europe.

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FOREWORD

The development of industrial society has, in terms of land use, caused a number of problems such as urban concentration, unequal regional development etc.

The concept of physical planning has arisen from the desire of public authorities to restore balance and achieve greater harmony in the spatial development of Western society.

The aim of this report is first to consider what forecasts have served as a basis for physical planning and secondly to discuss the main trends in the socio-economic evolution of Europe in order to highlight their spatial implications and to establish the need for control mechanisms.

In discussing first the example of French physical planning we feel it important to concentrate on two particular points:

- in the first place on the contribution the "French scenario of what must not be", can make, thanks to its exemplary methodology and political impact;

- in the second place on the results of French physical planning policy as seen from a general picture.

In the second stage, extending our thinking to the European scene, with a European physical planning concept in mind, we approach the subject in two ways:

- remembering that physical planning is the transposition of economic and social forces into terms of space, the first step is to take stock of the socio-economic trends at the beginning of the 1980s in Europe, as it presents itself with its potential, its aspirations and its national and regional deficiencies, in order to bring out the challenges that Europe is facing or is going to have to face.

- after discussing these main tendencies which bring out what might be styled the "European scenario of what must not be" the second step is to endeavour to present, in answer to this scenario, sketches of various possible alternative scenarios for a general and organised European physical planning concept.

None of these scenarios is worked out in detail (because of restricted time and finance); we have simply sketched what seems to emerge as a European scenario of existing trends and the considerations that might preside over the working out of alternatives.
INTRODUCTION
(from "Le Monde", 7 November 1979)

POINT OF VIEW
Physical planning and forecasting
In favour of prospective geography
by André CHADEAU (1)

Physical planning arises out of the standing concern to achieve the optimum distribution of the population over the national territory by siting activities, providing infrastructures and protecting and developing natural resources; the concern to give every individual everywhere maximum freedom of choice of residence, employment and recreation and to eliminate to that end the inequalities bound up with geography.

Physical planning depends on long-term development and therefore feeds on forecasts and models of the future. These serve, depending on physical planning aims, to stave off unacceptable prospects or to point the way to new goals. This concern with the future must be accurately interpreted, for historical action and evolution always modify planning forecasts and consequently produce changes in methods and means.

Thus, up to 1970, measures to slow down demographic growth in the Paris region and halt the rural exodus were based on a predicted 62 million population in France by the year 2000. The most recent forecasts have convinced us that 57 million is a more likely figure, with obvious implications for our policy, particularly in rural areas.

These constant re-adjustments do not mean that investigation of the future is pointless. In a field of this kind one can never be entirely wrong.

We have to forecast trends in order to calculate what resources must be brought into play. Looked upon in that way, forecasting is no magic lantern for plodding technocrats but an instrument for the selection of long-term priorities. It forces us to see each individual measure in the light of a reappraisal of major trends and to correct our aim by working out effects. It helps to reduce uncertainty at every stage.

(1) Governmental delegate for planning and regional action.
Medium-sized towns: the vital network

Forecasting studies (1) feed us with two kinds of information. They assess the long-term consequences of present trends or intended policies and they seek to bring to light unexpected conditions or fresh considerations which will change the economy and society and, consequently, physical planning.

Some examples will be useful here.

First an example of the assessment of the effects of present policy. To reduce the risk of the national territory being split in two - Paris and the French desert - the Vth Plan introduced measures to develop counterweight metropolises. But at the same time as this strategy was taking shape around major development centres, forecasting research alerted us to two further questions.

What was becoming of the role and function of Paris as an international city in the network of world cities? Was Paris continuing to occupy her rightful place in the cultural, economic and political spheres and, if not, what should be done for her to regain and consolidate her position? This matter was made the subject of extensive forecasting research which supplied invaluable information in the early 1970s.

A second question arose at practically the same time - were there not natural limits to polarisation around the major metropolitan centres or even real risks attaching to it? Trends towards spatial concentration were being quietly modified by the move towards smaller-sized production units, the results of decentralisation and siting policies and of the desire of the population to improve the quality of urban life. One achievement of prospective studies was that they showed the future importance of the vital network of medium-sized towns throughout the French territory.

Having proved its worth in analysing and influencing urban policy, prospective research likewise revealed modifications in industrial siting caused by the rise of multi-national companies. While it was in no sense the aim of such research to cause upheavals in existing planning methods, it did show, at a time when only a handful of experts were working on the question, exactly how and to what extent regional planning could be affected by big firms with world-wide markets and investments and, consequently, exactly how we would have to improve our methods and what new instruments we might need to use to explore new investment areas or in conjunction with other administrative departments, to control them.

(1) Most forecasting studies are done by the "Système d'études du schéma d'aménagement de la France" (SESAME), a team of seven attached to the DATAR. The SESAME research budget is about one sixth of the total DATAR research budget, estimated at about 5 million francs.
Forecasting also means finding out what would happen if nothing were done and that, precisely, was established by means of an exercise known as "the scenario of what must not be". Regional planning policy has in fact consisted of taking steps to ensure that the "image of France in the year 2000" does not really come about. The black picture painted showed various administrative departments the urgency of the need to dovetail physical planning requirements into their own schemes.

There are of course numerous other sectors in which prospective research has illuminated, guided and supported physical planning, for example the transformation of rural society, the "tertiarisation" of society, work on the future of seabords. Even if the process is incomplete, and although awareness of risk may not bring security, it is still worth finding out what risk there is and measuring it, so certain is it today, more than ever in the past, that "to govern is to foresee".

As I have said, one of the main purposes of forecasting is to identify new issues and map out the areas of uncertainty. At the present time uncertainty is great and the stakes considerable. Tomorrow's planning must, it seems to me, revolve around four essential considerations:

- Models of energy supply and consumption and their implications for the regions. This is an issue whose terms have been considerably modified in recent years. It is not sufficient to estimate ensuing trends - we need to identify alternatives and evaluate possible solutions.

- The future of French agriculture - in a process of complete mutation following twenty years of change. It must become "the oil of France" while remaining an activity which preserves and fertilises space. What structures will it produce, what sort of economic life, what kind of rural society can it fashion? The reply must be a complex one and prospection must point to the possible shape of things to come.

- The management of urban society has hitherto been founded mainly on the concept of the town. However, the major phenomenon over the last ten years has been the growth of suburbs and, more recently, of peri-urban areas. A third of the French population lives in suburbs. It is estimated, if the trend continues, that by the year 2000, half the French population will live in the "large suburbs", combining city and non-city life. This is a new problem affecting costs, producing new and different modes of life and creating constraints as yet not properly evaluated. In this field forecasting can make a big contribution to the planning of the future - and it has already done so.

- Advances in technology and the application of new techniques can also affect the organisation of space, the distribution of activities and lifestyles. This is true of the remote processing industry, which by 1985, will be equal in world importance to the motor vehicle industry. Its siting will, for France, be an instrument of physical planning. Being free of the technical constraints affecting heavy industry, it can be set up practically anywhere, provided communications are satisfactory and skilled manpower available. It is a means of greater de-centralisation and provides an opportunity for the development of local firms.
It is easy to see why we must carry out prospection in this field as well for, if properly designed, tele-processing can be a basic tool of modern physical planning.

French society and its expression in terms of space will take shape and evolve as a result of the convergence, confrontation and co-existence of these major trends and perhaps of others yet unknown. Like a sort of guiding thread stretching beyond short-term and medium-term thinking and research, prospective studies are the means, in some cases of revealing, in all cases of comprehending, the pattern of major forces, conflict, rupture and change, with which society has to contend — a very difficult exercise in lucidity that can be irritating to those who want nothing to change, but one which physical planning cannot escape.
PART I

PHYSICAL PLANNING IN FRANCE

I A  The French "Scenario of what must not be"

At the end of the 1960s physical planning was marked by:

- the largely negative impact on space of very fast industrial growth

- innumerable separate efforts to take control (1), stemming more often from the need to put right damage done rather than from the will to prevent it.

To remedy this situation two complementary steps were seen to be necessary:

- the first was to endeavour to forecast the main trends likely to appear in French society so as to be in a position to adopt the requisite measures in advance, before problems became too acute and so to avoid crises;

- the second was to bring greater coherence into the various hitherto unrelated State schemes.

Interest in these two points produced support for the application of forecasting to physical planning and helped to justify the very special attention given by the DATAR, from the end of the 1960s, to long-term research. Among its various activities in this direction the "scenario of what must not be" may serve as an example, in methodology as well as in political impact.

1.  The scenario of what must not be - method

The scenario asked for was a future history of France based on the prolongation to the year 2000 of the economic, sociological and demographic trends already at work which affected the distribution of population and activities throughout the national territory. It was thus a tendential scenario designed to describe France in the year 2000, on the assumption that present trends and action would continue without any profound changes in the system under observation.

A scenario of this kind has four parts:

- the base
- the external context
- the on-going process
- the final image or images.

(1) Policy of counterweight metropolitan centres, setting up of water basin agencies and regional and national parks, establishment of inter-ministerial delegations for tourist facilities in Languedoc-Roussillon and Aquitaine, setting up of rural revival boards in Brittany, Auvergne and the Limousin as well as boards for mining conversion, then industrialisation, etc ...
a. The beginning of the scenario (1) is the present situation, analysed in such a way as to bring out its essentials so that subsequent history can be deduced - that is what we call "the base".

The base is a structured image of reality that can be used to achieve the purpose of the research.

The base is not an assembly of every known quantified or unquantified fact, nor is it a detailed and static description of the existing situation; it is the expression of a system of dynamic elements linked to one another and appropriately joined as a whole to an external environment by an adequate set of links.

For example, the base for "an image of France in the year 2000" was French society inside the national territory. It would have been neither realistic nor possible to seek to describe French society in every detail, and pointless also, since the main feature of the scenario was the organisation of the French socio-economic scene.

The authors felt that of all the sub-systems composing French society the four which had direct links with the organisation of the socio-economic scene could be said to be the industrial, urban, rural and agricultural societies.

There are other societies in France - military, political, administrative etc ... but these did not have the same importance for this research.

The base of the model was therefore the organic system constituted by the four societies - industrial, urban, rural and agricultural.

The components of this system were the production forces inherent in these societies, their modes of production, the social relationships between the social groups they comprised, the institutions which had given birth to them and the ethical or moral values on which they were founded. The overall dynamics of the French social system in the physical planning sphere are the product of the complementary or conflictual relationships between the components of the system.

Such dynamics, however, do not engender themselves nor do they emerge from the mere examination of the existing complementary and conflictual relationships. There must be a motive force. In the case of the scenario for France with which we are concerned we selected industrial society. It would in any case have been difficult to make any other choice for a scenario based on existing trends - today it is beyond doubt industrial society that gives the main impetus to French society as a whole.

The base is thus a system of component parts and their relationships to one another:

- corresponding to the purpose of the scenario
- representing the essence of that purpose
- rendered dynamic by the choice of one of its components as the motive force

(1) The details that follow are taken from the survey of forecasting experience drawn up for DATAR by "Prospective et Aménagement".
Thus it can be seen that preparation of the base plays a fundamental part in the construction of the scenario.

b. But the system thus constructed is not isolated and closed. It is immersed in a context - economic, social, political, diplomatic, etc and either national or international, according to the scenario to be worked out.

Quite obviously, it would be unrealistic to study the entire context of the system in every detail and irrelevant to study its own dynamics.

Either way one would be losing sight of the essential goal - that is to say the scenario to be worked at - by dwelling on subsidiary matters more than necessary and more than is possible when a scenario is to be constructed with the limited means available.

It is therefore best to define the external conditions affecting the base by making a varying number of assumptions. Systems analysis specialists are familiar with this problem.

The aim in constructing a scenario showing "an image of France in the year 2000" was precisely to produce an image of France and not one of the world or of Europe. Consequently, it was necessary to adopt certain working hypotheses concerning the international environment; these were kept down to four - no world conflict, no world economic crisis, no political integration of Europe, existence of general characteristics common to all the advanced industrial countries ...

We must not forget that we are studying a system in its environment and not the environment itself. In order not to clutter up the scenario it is accordingly best not to make too many external assumptions or change them too often ...

The external conditions selected at the same time as the base in accordance with the purpose of the scenario naturally also apply to the ongoing process either throughout, or for a given stage of it.

How is this process worked out?

c. The ongoing process is produced by a method quite different from the one used to construct the base and requires a different instrument - "historical simulation", this time. This simulation is not mechanical. It is a product, of course, of the dynamic base and of the external conditions chosen, but first and foremost of the evolution of the system and inter-reaction of its components. Backtracking and adjustments are absolutely indispensible as "history" moves forwards.

It is not a matter here of a model in the mathematical sense, which would allow the use of computers; a great many of the components and relationships in the system are qualitative and their evolution, modification or transformation depend on assessment by experts well acquainted with their field (eg industry) and the links that may exist between it and other neighbouring fields (eg transport, labour organisation, siting problems, relations with towns etc ...).
Certain components of the system may lend themselves to the preparation of partial models and to data processing (e.g., demography). However, even then, the figures obtained are generally adjusted to make them fit better.

Figures thus produced can only serve as a guide. They illustrate the evolution of the system and, especially, allow its cohesion to be checked at a number of points and any incompatibilities that might arise to be detected.

Tensions and antagonism in particular must be looked for. It is indeed the quantitative and qualitative incompatibilities that are most interesting to study, for they are likely to indicate the important problems, the conflicts and the contradictions which have to be eliminated so that the evolution can continue. It may be worth introducing "regulators" at this stage and that is just what was done in the case of the scenario of France, with "regionalisation" as soon as the system itself became doubtful and "history" could no longer move forward in the conditions fixed at the beginning of the study — namely the permanence of the existing socio-economic system.

d. This "progress into the future" will occasionally call for a sort of cross-section in time. That means analysing the entire system (in this case French society) to establish its main features, any components which have been transformed, any new components, any trends which have persisted or which have emerged, and establishing a sort of intermediate base, i.e., a systematic description of "reality" at the time of the cross-section by means of which we can enter a new diachronic phase.

Such intermediate cross-sections and the cross-section made at the selected stopping point (e.g., the year 2000) are of great importance.

These images are not an automatic product of the ongoing process and the adjustments it requires. The adjustments are, in any case, partial, as we have seen. While the image obtained by means of the "synchronic section" highlights the differences in relation to the "base" or the preceding image, it also makes it possible to review certain aspects of the ongoing process which may have been minimised or, on the contrary, overestimated, and to correct the relative importance of the various components of the system or their inter-relationships.

2. Four stages of future history

The history of French society in the three decades 1970–2000 was broken up into four periods (1):

a. In the years 1969–71 various disparate tensions build up which have one thing in common — they can only be dissolved by action on the part of the highest authorities of the State. "The steps taken, which each group considers compatible with the system, create an overall threat to destroy the institutions; each group denounces the system as a whole." (2)

(1) The following details are taken from Jacques Durand "Le scénario de l'inacceptable sept ans après". Travaux et Recherches de Prospective No. 68.

(2) This quotation and the ones that follow are taken from: "Une image de la France en l'an 2000. Scénario de l'inacceptable."
"The State is faced with a serious dilemma - on the one hand there are forces urging it to solve certain immediate, and often conflicting problems; on the other hand the policy of opening up to the outside world is increasing the benefits to industrialisation of international competition."

"With its traditional means of action the State is not managing to restore a peaceful social climate and local authorities are by no means fulfilling their function of 'safety valves' ... The situation may well degenerate into a conflict ... Regionalisation alone appears likely to be able to reduce the tensions."

According to the scenario, regional reform is thus introduced in 1972, as was confirmed in reality three years after the scenario had been prepared but also three years after the failure of the referendum on regionalisation.

b. The second stage bore the title in the document of "the vicissitudes of regionalisation". Two categories of regions gradually emerge - "rich" regions strengthened by the new powers granted to them and "poor" regions lacking the means for their own development.

"The rich regions in fact refuse to finance the development of the less-favoured ones. They feel that an increase in their own resources would give them greater decision-making powers and consequently make them better able to solve their own problems."

On the other hand, "the authorities of the less developed regions are exercising constant pressure on the central authority in order to obtain additional financial assistance".

How does the State, as guarantor of the permanence of the social system, react to the contradictory pressures to which it is subjected? The State is forced, one might say, to opt for growth or stability.

The Rhône-Alps region being next to the Paris region, the furthest in the lead, it is there that the State decides to carry out a pilot experiment. Talks lead to an agreement granting additional financial means to the Rhône-Alps region.

The example of the Rhône-Alps region naturally serves as a model and subsequently the North, Lorraine, Alsace and the Provence-Côte d'Azur regions follow its lead. Given the positive result of the Rhône-Alps experiment, the State undertakes to extend to these regions the same system of agreements as it concluded with the first.

We are now at the end of the 1970s.

"The authorities of the less developed regions are, for their part, anxious about the relative reduction in their grants." In order to offer a semblance of satisfaction to such regions the central authority gives the agreements concluded with the rich regions "force of law, standardising and generalising them ... thus abandoning more and more any effort to equalise development. In so doing, its intention is to give the authorities in the better developed regions the means of making their decision-making powers more effective and operative."
c. The third stage, in the years 1985-2000, is dominated by conflicts not between regions but between "industrial society" and "urban society".

Industrial society is chiefly concentrated in 80% urbanised polarisation zones in which two-thirds of the French population live.

But these zones are subject to two concomitant movements:

- increasing opposition between regional economic leaders and political leaders: the latter accuse the former of wishing to revise their siting policy in order to move to areas where installation and running costs are less, at the risk of seeing the polarisation zones stagnate or even experience a recession and social conflicts grow;

- opposition between the supporters of the economic rationale and those of what might be called the "urban rationale"; the latter, who have grown considerably in numbers in the 1980s, take as their objective the fulfiment of the individual in his daily life and not in his work and consequently demand the transfer of part of the value added to pay for social and community facilities.

Watchwords appear concerning community ownership of land and of "the machinery of urban life".

After 1985, industrial society, which continues to expand and maintain its role as the motive force in the evolution of French society, enters into conflict with urban society which until then had served as its foundation - its values clash with those engendered by urban society which tries to impose its modus operandi on French society as a whole.

In the face of these developments agricultural and rural society have also been transformed, particularly as, with but few exceptions, they have adopted the lifestyle and values of urban society.

d. Tensions build up with this evolution. A new threat to the economic and social order appears. The question of the rules governing the functioning of regions and the role of the State is again forcefully posed.

While agricultural society has been profoundly transformed - it has lost the essential part of its traditional structures, become urbanised and taken on an increasingly urban mentality - the less developed regions are being exasperated with their impotence. The more developed regions are caught between the demands of the other French regions and the need to face international competition, particularly in Europe.

For different reasons both sides turn to the State to ask it to step in.

In order to preserve national unity the State has no alternative but to develop a highly nationalistic ideology in the first instance, and then to regain control of the financial and legal means of exercising its power which it had to a large extent relinquished to the regions.
Finally, two alternatives emerge - growing authoritarianism by a nationalist-type State on the one hand, and, on the other, the ever-present possibility of a social explosion.

The authors of the scenario do not choose between them and conclude in the following terms:

"On the threshold of the XXIst century the free play of present trends - and that is the only certainty if one keeps to the rules established at the outset for the tendential scenario - will have produced a dramatic situation. True, from then on, all kinds of future are possible, but at the price of serious conflict whatever the path chosen, whatever the outcome desired."

This more than pessimistic conclusion alone was a sufficient reason for the physical planning policy-makers to give the published document the sub-title "scenario of what must not be".

The value of a scenario of this kind is to serve as a "warn off" and show clearly the consequences of doing nothing. It has the virtue of mobilising effort insofar as it invites rejection and so calls on the policy-makers to change the course of history.

I B French Physical Planning Policy

1. The main outlines of French physical planning policy

Physical planning policy in France must be placed in a historical perspective. It is expressed in the policy of decentralisation by the establishment of new structures.

a. History of the concept of physical planning (1)

- A homogeneous France

The France of 1789 was a homogeneous economic area. It was predominantly rural and the towns were small. Economic life thus had a local character. With the revolution, France was divided into départements, a mode of subdivision which corresponded to the state of transport at the time (2).

- Inequalities

The second, industrial, revolution of 1850, brought about a significant change in the geography of the French economy. True, for more than a century, the West of France remained predominantly rural, but in the East of France industrialisation began to get underway on the basis of iron, coal, textiles and steel. Industrial cities of a new kind began to emerge and develop in the North, in Lorraine, the Rhône-Alps region and the Massif Central. Development poles became established in those regions. The image of an industrial East of France took permanent shape.

The French economy developed geographical contrasts. The West of France remained predominantly agricultural. Between 1850 and 1945 the East of France and Paris continued to grow steadily while the West became comparatively impoverished. The free economic system had the effect of increasing inequality.

(1) Extracts from "La pratique de la ville dans l'aménagement du territoire", Jean-Louis CEPPE, Le Cercle d'Or 1980.

(2) The dimensions of the départements were determined by the distance a horse could cover at a gallop in one day.
The fight against inequality

After the second world war regional planning policy was introduced with the aim of reducing inequalities between regions.

In 1945 the Ministry for Reconstruction rebuilt the war-damaged towns. In 1950 Claudius Petit launched the idea of a regional plan for agriculture, industrial and cultural decentralisation and tourism.

The earliest instruments of a policy to reduce inequality were introduced in the years 1950-53:

- refusal of building permits for certain factories in the Paris area;
- creation of a regional planning fund;
- establishment of a fund for the adaptation, development and conversion of industrial firms (origin of productivity centres).

In 1955, J F Gravier published his book "Paris et le désert français" clearly posing the problem of decentralisation. On 2% of the national territory Paris concentrates 17% of France's total population, 26% of all industrial jobs and 34% of all tertiary jobs (1). A new policy began to get under way in France.

Population of Paris as a percentage of the total population of France

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>17%</td>
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Source: INSEE

For the last 20 years decentralisation policy has enabled jobs to be created in a number of provincial towns and has considerably assisted or revived their expansion. But the effect has varied considerably from one town to another. For example, it was essential for Angers but far less important for the Lower Loire.

b. The establishment of new structures

- The outposts of DATAR

In 1970 DATAR put out antennae - in the United States, England, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Spain. Their function was to look for foreign capital.

At the same time, industrialisation and industrial modernisation boards were set up in the North, Lorraine, the West and the South-East. These boards, in close co-operation with DATAR, had the task of establishing new firms and rescuing any in difficulty. In addition, rural revival delegates were appointed in Brittany, Auvergne, the Limousin and the mountain areas.

(1) 1975
Maj or facilities

At the instigation of DATAR a public works policy was introduced. Numerous natural parks were set up, such as La Vanoise, La Brière, L'Armorique. The State launched operations for providing tourist facilities in Languedoc-Roussillon and on the Aquitanian coast. Several thousand kilometres of motorway were built, mainly by motorway subsidiaries of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations.

Tertiary decentralisation policy came a little later. It was not until 1971 that the Picard report raised the question of the decentralisation of banks, administrative departments, ministries, insurance companies, research services and semi-public companies. In reality, the decentralisation of tertiary activities began hesitantly in the years 1972-73. Resistance from headquarters and staff was very powerful in the private as well as in the public and semi-public sectors.

Results

From 1945 to 1973 France and the developed countries experienced a period of rapid and continuous growth. New firms were founded, existing firms expanded and foreign firms moved in. French growth was geared to the development of the country's industrial potential. The combination of these two favourable factors brought about a real decentralisation of industry.

Between 1945 and 1962, 320 industrial firms were decentralised resulting in the creation of more than 200,000 industrial jobs. From 1963 to 1973 the movement gathered pace - 300,000 industrial jobs were created and 2.2 thousand million francs awarded in subsidies. In 1975, as a result of decentralisation a slight decrease in industrial manpower in the Paris area was to be noted.

Tertiary decentralisation remained limited. From 1967 to 1973 there were 90 instances involving 25,000 jobs.

From 1973 on the economic crisis began to check industrial decentralisation. The main effort was concentrated on the tertiary sector.

c. Industrial and tertiary decentralisation policy

- Content

Industrial decentralisation policy originated in 1955. The aim was essentially to encourage Paris industrialists to move to the provinces.

For that purpose "critical zones" were defined. These were regions marked by a high degree of unemployment, factory closures, conversion of certain branches of activity and excess manpower of rural origin (Fougères region). They were given special assistance.

The first economic expansion committees were set up in and around 1955 - for "départements" (Loire Atlantique expansion board) and for regions (CELIB for Brittany).

At the same time, regional development companies emerged - banking bodies granting loans to firms (SODERO for the Loire and the Val de Loire).
From 1955 ministerial authorisation was required in order to set up any firm in the Paris area. The creation of the Economic and Social Development Fund made it possible to grant subsidies and loans to firms intending to decentralise.

In the same year, the National Public Works Company and its branches, the public works companies of the départements, were founded. Their purpose was to provide infrastructures for industrial decentralisation - industrial zones, housing areas and public facilities.

DATAR (Delegation for Regional Planning and Regional Action) was founded in 1962. It allocates subsidies to assist decentralisation, regulates urban policy and supervises the siting of national public works. In the same year the FIAIT (Regional Planning Investment Fund) and the Standing Committee for Regional Planning were set up.

Major ports accessible to ships of 250,000 tons dw and comprising several thousand hectares of docks were built at Fos, Le Havre, and Dunkirk. France built modern international airports – Roissy (Paris), Satolas (Lyons), Marignane (Marseilles) and the airports of Toulouse and Nice.

More recently a policy was formulated for three structural axes:

- Rhine-Rhone-Mediterranean
- Mediterranean coasts
- Atlantic coasts

Lastly a Coastal Conservancy Board was set up in 1977 with its headquarters in Rochefort. Its task is to acquire land on the seaboard in order to protect the environment.

- The concept of the region

It was in 1955 that the 22 programme regions were set up. In 1964 the CODER - regional assemblies comprising elected representatives and representatives of economic interests first appeared. In the same year the State appointed regional prefects.

In 1972 the CODER were turned into regional public institutions. The new regional assembly comprises a regional council of elected representatives - members of the Conseil Général, mayors, senators and members of parliament, who alone have the right to vote. The economic and social council comprises representatives of the various sectors - economic, social, professional, family, scientific, cultural, sports, trade union, education etc. This second assembly has only an advisory role and simply gives opinions. The regional prefect is the executive of both assemblies.

The main function of the regional assembly is to promote the region's economic development and to express an opinion on the regional development plan.
In fact these assemblies are fairly broadly in the hands of the regional prefect, who exercises strict control on behalf of the central authority. The State has set up regional assemblies but has not given them sufficient financial means. Owing to their very modest budgets their possibilities of action are limited. They are nonetheless the embryos of a regional authority which needs to be strengthened and developed.

Physical planning policy in any country is fairly generally dictated by urban policy. What are the main features of urban policy in France?

2. **Urban policy in France**

The aim here is to give the background to urban policy in France and to point to the main ideas at present governing it.

a. **The origins of urban policy**

- **The hierarchy of the urban network**

The problem of the hierarchy of the urban network arose as early as 1966. Not all French towns have the same role to play in relation to economic space. Some, such as Paris, have an international function. Others play a regional role, such as the counterweight metropolitan centres - Lille, Lyons, Marseilles, Nantes, Toulouse and Bordeaux. And there are others which have only a local role - prefectures and sub-prefectures. Thus the hierarchy of the urban network is an organic whole within which each town has a part to play.

In our country urban policy has been implemented under successive plans.

- **Policy for the creation of counterweight metropolitan centres (1966-70)**

Under the Fifth Plan, from 1966 to 1970, the government pursued its policy for the creation of counterweight metropolitan centres. The purpose was to counteract the influence of Paris by favouring the development of a certain number of provincial cities - Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, Nancy-Metz, Strasbourg, Lyons-Saint-Etienne-Grenoble, Marseilles-Aix, Toulouse, Bordeaux and Nantes-Saint-Nazaire. The purpose of the development of these cities is to provide jobs and services for the population and firms in the surrounding area.

In each of these centres the government has set up an OREAM - Organisation Régionale de l'Aire Métropolitaine (Regional Organisation for the Metropolitan Zone). It comprises a multidisciplinary study group, a technical committee and a co-ordinating body. The study group consists of a director (generally a civil servant), economists, sociologists, architects, town planners and engineers and its function is to draw up proposals for the future of the centre. These are submitted to the technical committee of departmental directors of the ministries concerned - public works, state lands, agriculture, labour, tourism ... It is chaired by the prefect. The proposals are presented to the co-ordinating body comprising elected representatives (mayors and general councillors) and representatives of the chambers of commerce, agriculture and trades. This is also chaired by the prefect.
This machinery for studying and working out policy turns over for several years before the "white paper" and the outline plan for the structure of the regional centre is produced. These two documents set out the prospects, looking ahead to the year 2000, for the metropolis and its region.

The setting up of this OREAM machinery made it possible in France to develop regional forecasting units. However, once the plans had been prepared, their implementation was left to the traditional administrative departments which have only very rarely acted on them.

At the same time, the government launched the first urban corporations (communautés urbaines). These were bodies which in various forms (community, urban area authority, multi-purpose consortium) amalgamated the municipalities comprised in such large urban areas as Lille, Bordeaux and Lyons.

These new urban authorities did not always produce good results. The smaller municipalities were afraid that their power would disappear together with their individuality. In the event of political change, as in Bordeaux, serious tension built up threatening the very existence of the urban area authority.

May 1968 saw a profound revolt, particularly among young people, against the city and the way of life it engendered. The result was the demand for a different mode of production of urban space and the hope that citizens would be able to reconquer it for themselves.

A deep-seated movement was stirring in French society. The clash of structures was the source of future social reform.

City-dwellers must recover their power of action and speech.

The policy of promoting counterweight metropolises centres was favourable to the large cities and quickly produced reactions from the medium-sized towns.

- Medium-sized towns and new towns (1970-75)

Other towns reacted against the counterweight metropolis policy. Thus arose the medium-sized town policy. These were towns of between 20 and 200,000 inhabitants. From 1970-77 over 90 contracts were concluded between medium-sized towns and the State.

It might be thought regrettable that policy on such a purely regional scale should be so closely supervised by the central authority. Medium-sized town contracts should have been a matter for regional authorities alone. They are local in scope and regional assemblies have all the necessary powers to debate such questions and vote funds.

In the 1970s the new town policy evolved. It originated in the urbanisation pattern developed in the Paris region. The aim was, in order to counteract creeping urbanisation in the Paris region, to create new towns in a ring around Paris at a distance of 30 – 40 kms from the capital. These towns were each to have several hundred thousand inhabitants. The selected sites were: Cergy-Pontoise, Evry, Marne-la Vallée, Melun-Senart, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines.

From Paris the new town "contagion" spread to the provinces. Schemes were worked out for Lyons (Isle d'Abeau), Rouen (Le Vaudreuil), Lille (Lille-Est), Marseilles (Etag de Berre).
It is noteworthy that all the new town schemes are sited in the East of France. The plan to create a new town in the West of France, eg Savenay on the edge of the Nantes-St Nazaire metropolis, was rejected by the central authority. Thus experiments with new forms of urbanisation and the large sums allocated to them were claimed by the East of France and Paris alone.

The economic crisis hit the new towns policy hard, but it is too early to say whether it will be a failure. It is certain that it will cost the French taxpayer a tidy sum (1).

- Small towns and rural contracts (1975-80)

Since 1973 the French economy has been undergoing a severe crisis. Industrial expansion has slowed down while unemployment has become established and spread fast. Urban growth has come to a halt.

From 1975 on the government has appeared to be making particular effort on behalf of small towns.

At the same time the government launched a contract policy intended particularly for rural zones. These contracts were made between the State, small towns and their rural hinterland, with the State making grants for the development of the rural area.

Dozens of such contracts were concluded. Once again they reflected the grip of the central authority on certain parts of rural territory. Such rural contracts should be decentralised and shifted to regional and "département" level.

French urban policy bears the stamp of the central authority. The centralising State introduces procedures which will enable it to control everything - metropolises, new towns, medium-sized towns, rural contracts.

A different policy might have been followed - it would have consisted in strengthening the powers and resources of the regions. Is it not archaic to have to refer every urban scheme of any importance to Paris?

The town has a meaning only in relation to a region. In its architecture, life-style and character, it reflects a local identity. Urban policy should not be uniform or imposed from above. It must come closer to the citizen. It must be specific, "grass-roots", human in scale.

b. The major currents of urban policy in France

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the motives behind urban policy have evolved considerably, moving on, for example, from "conservationist" town-planning to "operational" town-planning and then to "concerted" town-planning, until recently people began to speak of the "setting" of urban life, and lastly, the idea of a "global concept of the city" emerged.

(1) More than 1.5 thousand million francs.
From conservationist to operational town-planning

Between 1919 and 1953 "conservationist" town-planning developed in France. The aim was, essentially, to control the harmful effects of industry. Towns were not allowed to extend outside certain limits, beyond which no building was possible. The built-up area was contained by the imposition of certain obligations.

The zoning theory developed, according to which the city was divided up into specialised areas - housing zone, industrial zone, recreation zone.

The essential aim was to make towns beautiful. But this ideology was conservative. Protection of the urban heritage within a tight perimeter does not allow for urban expansion.

Having been long turned towards the past, town-planning then began to take on new forms. It became operational (1954-66). The housing crisis in France called for greater production capacity. Thus in the years 1954-57 low-cost housing companies appeared. A powerful semi-public sector emerged. Through it large-scale housing construction projects could be put into effect in towns. At the same time, urban redevelopment schemes appeared in France.

The first sketchy plans for towns appeared during this period. The essential aim of urban policy was to construct a large amount of housing. Vast projects were launched without much thought for the surroundings.

The State consequently felt the need to bring some order into the mushrooming of private schemes. Town-planning became "concerted".

From concerted town-planning to the urban "setting"

The 1967 Land Act introduced two important innovations into town-planning practice - co-ordination and forecasting.

It brought in the future dimension. Towns are required to draw up master plans allowing for changing trends in population and activities and their implications for land use. Town-planning took on a forecasting function. Subsequently in several towns forecasts were contradicted by the facts. Long-term forecasting is a gamble in the field of urbanism; it is a valuable exercise if mistakes are regularly corrected according to the facts.

Under the 1967 Act, town-planning had to be concerted by means of negotiation between State, towns and firms according to a special procedure known as ZAC - Concerted Planning Zone ("Zone d'Aménagement Concerté")

The jargon of the "specialists" is full of abbreviations which make it "hermetic" to the man in the street. Thus the gap between the language of technicians and the language of the people is widened.

The big housing ZACs, comprising 5,000, 10,000 or 15,000 housing units, produced a revolt by the population. Associations for the protection of the urban setting sprang up everywhere.

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From the 1970s onwards, at the instigation of trade unions, associations and ecologists, town-planners discovered the notion of the urban life setting.

The public called for green spaces. The State gave grants for building land reserves and laying out green spaces.

In 1971 the official ideology changed. Both tower blocks and long low blocks of flats, common under the ZAC régime, were ruled out. In 1972 the ideology of the individual home began to develop. In 1973 big complexes were banned. The ruling power changed course.

But at the same time, huge redevelopment schemes were launched in the town centres of Bordeaux, Rouen, Lyons and Lille, reflecting the directional centre theory. Large sums of money were poured into them, producing land speculation and enormous profits for private promoters.

In the years following 1971, the first pedestrian streets appeared (rue du Gros Horloge, Rouen). They were a success and the idea spread to many towns. In these pedestrian precincts free from traffic pressures, the citizen came into his own again. Pedestrian streets are one of the most interesting ventures of contemporary town-planning.

French town-planning, born at the beginning of the century as a series of prohibitions then blown off course by the cult of the gigantic and by speculative business, recovered its balance to some extent thanks to the popular demand for a better environment. These various factors combined to produce a global concept of the town.

Towards a global concept of the town

By 1976, a global concept of the town was coming to the fore. Quality of living requirements began to take priority over production requirements. A more human scale of growth was sought.

The 1973 crisis hit the western economies hard. It brought uncertainty into urban policy. The first doubt concerned the indefinite growth of the western economies alone. Then there was a revolt against urban "macrosystems". The immense majority of people felt a profound desire for change.

Is the renaissance of a European civilisation founded on the quality of life possible? The hope of such a change is a palliative to all the ills brought on the individual by our society: insecurity, unemployment, uprooting, etc. Men want to rediscover their roots and live on a human scale ... Change has taken on a positive value. Towns must be changed so that life will change.

Urban policy in France has had no real direction. For 30 years it has drifted, a prey to pressure groups and political events. Since France lost her colonies she has been vainly endeavouring to manage her home territory properly. But in the process the ideal of production supplanted the quest for the satisfaction of men's needs.... Rather than develop a "French-style" town-planning philosophy which would be a pale expression of a space bounded by frontiers, we must think in terms of civilisation. The town is a long-term social project fertilised by world-wide exchange and experiment. As well as its local dimensions and identity, the town has a "cosmic" world-wide dimension - that is the fundamental contradiction which the urban civilisations of the future must overcome.
PART II

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN REGIONAL PHYSICAL PLANNING CONCEPT

II A. The socio-economic facts

1. An ageing Europe

The specific features of population trends in Europe are an astonishingly low fertility rate, a long-standing tendency to decline and the consequent ageing of the population. Apart from Ireland and Turkey the other European countries, particularly Germany and France, do not replace their generations (2.1 children per woman). In 1975 the average number of children per woman was 1.45 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1.53 in Luxembourg, 1.66 in the Netherlands, 1.76 in Belgium, 1.79 in England, 1.91 in France, 3.57 in Ireland and 2.17 in Italy. One might have expected the situation to become stabilised. However, the rates recorded in 1976, 1977 and 1978 show that the average number of children per woman is continuing to drop (Italy for instance no longer replaces her generations).

The ageing of the population of Europe is, in any case, inevitable in any hypothesis, (upward trend in the birthrate, stabilisation of the present rate or drop in the birthrate). It is important to emphasise this new phenomenon of non-replacement of the generations in Europe; if it worsens, the greatest challenge Europe will have to face in the future may prove to be a demographic collapse.

Economically the effect of the decline will be to make the total non-working population more numerous, a few years from now, than the working population with a consequent increase in the burden of public expenditure. Nevertheless we must avoid the temptation to see demographic ageing as a generalised phenomenon. In fact it conceals great structural differences between rural and urban areas which are not shown in the national averages. As this is a question of interest to us in the context of regional planning it would be worthwhile conducting research to take greater account of the space factor, remembering that structural differences are frequently pernicious.

Furthermore, the drop in the birthrate which is widespread in European countries and has no historical precedent in times of peace, may well increase Europe's vulnerability.

Indeed, in contrast to this reduction in fertility in Europe we note a strong increase in the birthrate in developing countries. Even if the other industrialised nations (North America, the Soviet bloc etc) are also, demographically speaking, falling behind the developing countries, the contrast between Europe's age structure and that of Mediterranean countries - the Arab world in particular - will further accentuate the existing discrepancies, despite numerous compensatory economic and cultural features. By 1990-2000 Europe should total between 260 and 270 million inhabitants, 20% of whom will be under 20 and 14% 65 or over ... At the same time the Mediterranean countries of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) should total about 185 million (106 million in 1979) 25% of whom will be under 15 and only 3.5/4% 65 or over.
2. Threats to economic balance

Whereas in the 1950s we could speak of economic convergence (the less developed countries of the world were growing more rapidly than the most highly industrialised ones), after 1974 the trend was reversed with economically weaker countries having to bear the brunt of the crisis. If European countries are to achieve a degree of homogeneity in their economic policies and, in particular, in their long-term economic policies, such economic convergence should again be actively encouraged on a basis of concerted strategies.

The rate of economic growth in European countries is affected by the functioning of the monetary system, particularly by the exchange-rate machinery. The adoption of floating exchange rates has facilitated irrational behaviour by governments (so-called devaluation "policies"), producing short-term uncertainty while discouraging investment. Furthermore, autonomous national monetary policies have conspired to cause a rift in Europe between "hard-currency" and "weak-currency" countries.

The only hope lies in the resumption of solidarity that may result from the introduction of the EMS (European Monetary System).

Whereas Europe has very important capital needs (capacity and modernisation investments, Investments in the advanced technology industries...), the climate of uncertainty resulting from monetary instability and the rise in interest rates caused a marked slowing down of investments in Europe from 1973 onwards.

Private savings were not channelled towards the long-term financing of firms but towards fixed-income securities ... Furthermore, the drop in the profits of firms resulted in less self-financing and less return on capital, necessitating costly external financing.

Since the 1970s a shift in the structure of demand has been noted.

The 1950s saw a marked drop in the relative prices of durable goods resulting in an increase in consumption.

At present this decrease is tailing off and in certain sectors (durable goods etc) saturation phenomena are to be observed, whereas there is increased demand for services (which have far less of a chain effect) and the result is a slowing-down of growth.

It is interesting to note, however, that the situation varies from one European country to another, since countries such as Italy or Spain have not yet reached saturation. On the contrary, they will, in the 1980s have to meet an increasing demand for manufactured goods.

- The impossible goal - full employment

As labour plays an increasing part in overall balance, employment is not simply a resultant, but a component of Europe's future.
There are various angles from which the present European situation in regard to labour and employment may be analysed – the uncertainty of future growth rates and, therefore, of employment rates, the disappearance of practically guaranteed full employment, the increasing importance of the quality aspect of work. While present under-employment in Europe may be looked upon as a wastage (non-use of resources entering into the GDP), it is not possible to foresee a return to full employment before 1985.

If we take the case of France alone, on the basis of the present trend in the working population a million new jobs per year would be needed by 1985 to maintain the present level of employment, but the average for the years 1955 to 1973 was 300,000 new jobs a year. Thus it will be necessary to triple the figure simply to maintain the present level of employment.

In order to achieve or attempt to achieve a balance between labour supply and demand one may contemplate a variety of solutions:

The exclusion of certain categories of workers (young people, women, old people ...) appears to be the most probable mode of adjustment. This solution is already being applied today (exclusion of women and young people), but it is tending increasingly to take institutional forms (extension of compulsory schooling, lowering of the retirement age) or the form of incentives (measures concerning the income of women in the home, for example).

The reduction of productivity is another possible form of adjustment with the grave risk of Europe being unable to withstand competition. In the view of André Danzin (1) every possible effort must be made to avoid "letting productivity stagnate, despite the technological possibility of improvement simply on the pretext that improvements would bring unemployment, particularly in the services sector. A less competitive Europe will import less, consume less and unemployment will increase".

Lastly, there is a third type of adjustment, involving the reduction of working hours, a solution towards which we are at present moving. It remains to be seen what precise form this will take - daily hours/weekly hours, with or without pay etc. Despite under-employment the reduction of working hours remains one of the main pre-occupations of Europeans. It raises the entire question of the time allocated to work and to other forms of activity and calls for a rethinking of social relations, the educational system and the organisation of urban life.

Depending on the form it takes, the reduction in working hours will bring about changes in the siting of activities. For instance, supposing weekly working hours are reduced, a four-day working week would affect the place of residence during working time and during free time.

In addition to the problem of the relationship between technology and employment (cf above research and innovation), special attention should be drawn to two further points.

(1) In "Science et Renaissance de l'Europe", André DANZIN, Paris 1979, Chotard et Associés, Editors.
Firstly, in the present unemployment situation and given the tendency to reduce individual working hours there is considerable likelihood of an extension of clandestine work in free time, as in Italy and the Netherlands.

Secondly, the precariousness of employment owing to the crisis, the rigidity of the market and individual preferences, may well become a permanent feature, so increasing the segmentation of the labour market. In France in 1970, 3% of the working population were in some kind of unsettled employment (temporary jobs, fixed-term contracts etc) which, however, accounted for nearly 30% of the unemployment figures. In Denmark, between 15 and 20% of the working population is employed part-time. It is worth thinking about how to avoid a situation in which the same people are always in unsettled employment or how they could be given career prospects equivalent to those of people in permanent jobs.

3. The future of European agriculture

Since the end of the second world war, European agriculture has evolved very rapidly, particularly as regards the productivity of labour, which has increased four-fold in the space of twenty years. A glance at the external - geo-political and technological - causes of friction in agriculture, at the balance between regions and at the common agricultural policy pursued by the EEC will enable us to grasp the major questions which Europe is facing and is going to face in the future in that field.

It will be necessary to adapt and increase European production if, in a situation where there is an international division of labour, European exports are to meet the demand of certain buyer countries for agricultural foodstuffs or to give food aid to the poorest countries. For example, by increasing the yield per hectare, expanding the area under cereal crops and intensifying fodder production on the remaining land in order to maintain livestock production, France could produce more cereals without any reduction in the agricultural working population. This possibility, however, does not exist everywhere in Europe, but only in France and Ireland, where the land is under-exploited so that there is a potential for extra production. On the other hand, we must avoid a situation where, by exporting, Europe checks the development of the agriculture in the developing countries, a sector frequently neglected in favour of the industry, thanks to which countries hope to "get off the ground".

On the technological side, there is still a very big margin of possible progress thanks to techniques that have been perfected but not generalised.

The use of data processing in agriculture could be envisaged in order to improve the production co-ordination. Farmers, co-operatives and governments linked up to a central computer, could initially co-ordinate production more effectively, and later decision-making. But we cannot assess the changes that would result from such agricultural organisation as no such system has yet been tried out.

Biological farming cannot in any case be a substitute for modern agriculture. It is still farming for the rich which if generalised, would mean that only a fraction of the world's population could be fed.
European agriculture must share in research to find new energy sources (methane etc.). But we should not expect quick results. At present, for instance, we are up against the fact that the industrial input in agriculture for energy production exceeds the output.

As well as its food supply function, European agriculture has others that it is interesting to think about, namely, its functions of maintaining and occupying space and receiving visitors. It might well be a good thing, alongside productive farming, to preserve a form of agriculture that, though less productive, could help to solve the problem of employment and meet the need of individuals for accessible, unspoiled rural space.

It would seem that European policy has failed as regards regional balance since the inequalities have grown worse. In the countries of northern Europe agricultural activity has attained a degree of autonomy, while engaging in practically all kinds of production, whereas the southern countries have had to specialise in crops in which they were competitive, thereby placing themselves in a dependent position.

In order to begin to reduce regional inequalities it is essential above all to agree on the objective in view. Do we want to keep agriculture going everywhere, or do we prefer to resite it and devote some areas to extensive farming, which means accepting a very low density of agricultural working population?

Lastly, we must pause for a moment to consider the problem of the common agricultural policy even though it involves only the nine countries of the Community. Four main questions should be put. Will the EEC continue to be protectionist about imports? Will the Community's agricultural prices remain as high as they are at present? Will the Community continue to market the produce of its farmers? Lastly, what will be the effect of the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal who have at once the need, the capacity and the will to develop their agriculture?

4. Divergencies in European industry

In the period from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s which was marked by a tremendous movement to adapt economic structures and by general progress in the standard of living on the basis of dynamic and regular growth, it appeared that every country was bound, without meeting any major obstacles, to achieve the goals of full employment and rising incomes.

With the exception of the United Kingdom, whose industry has become slowly less competitive, the industries of the other European countries have developed fast, frequently in identical sectors (chemicals and by-products, electrical and electronic equipment, motor vehicles, energy other than coal), replacing the same declining sectors (coal, textiles, leather, clothing).

Following the oil shock, European countries pursued differing goals in endeavouring to adapt their industry and followed divergent paths, whence the concern at seeing the inequalities between countries becoming more firmly established.
Certain countries adapted to the situation by compressing costs and rapidly reducing the number of industrial jobs (Germany, the Netherlands, for example). Other countries adapted by accepting a drop in productivity and a reduction in the growth of imports (United Kingdom, Italy). Countries such as France and Belgium adopted an intermediate position. As a result of these highly differing forms of adaptation, European countries are today in very unequal situations. The differing reactions to the crisis must not obscure one disturbing aspect in all the countries of Europe - a low rate of investment. The gap is steadily widening between the new plants being set up in the Third World and the ageing European production units.

Another criterion for the assessment of the European countries varying reactions to the crisis is their resistance to competition. The examples of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom will help to illustrate this point.

In the specialised fields for which it has opted, the Federal Republic of Germany encourages the export of high technology products and permits the entry of products with low added value. At the same time, it has compressed costs and continued to improve productivity at the expense of a net loss of 1.7 million jobs between 1973 and 1977. As a result its industry has emerged stronger than before. The marked assumption of investment in 1978 and 1979 and the drop in the unemployment figures are clear signs of the success of this adaptation process. Thus the German industry alone appears to remain competitive whereas the gap is widening between Germany and the other European countries.

Despite the devaluation of the pound, the stagnation of internal demand, new oil resources and initially favourable specialisation in exports, the United Kingdom's share in world trade is continuing to decline steadily. Apart from certain sectors such as the chemical and electronics industries, the British economy is becoming steadily de-industrialised, while a very big tertiary sector is building up. Thus we observe a sharp drop in the number of jobs in each branch of industry unaccompanied by the restoration of productivity levels compatible with the importance of foreign trade for the overall economy.

It will therefore be increasingly difficult to define commercial policy at European level as, on the one hand, the EEC countries occupy partially different economic areas and, on the other, there is frequent divergency in the way production machinery is being restructured in regard to low-technology manufacture and cheap labour, advanced technology products and the central activities on which numerous types of production further down the chain depend. The European countries are therefore faced with a choice between liberalism and protectionism, a choice made particularly difficult as there are many arguments in favour of both.

5. Energy - perilous dependence

Although it was once the chief industrial power in the world, mining its own metal and coal, and then importing and processing the raw materials it needed, Europe today, having failed to foresee the crisis in time, is in a dangerous situation of dependency. True, the situation varies from country to country. Certain countries such as Great Britain (oil and coal) and Holland (gas) have a potential or real export capacity. Others with a high degree of dependence - France, Ireland, Italy and Belgium (98.8%) - are short of energy.
There is no doubt that while minerals are still variously subject to a classical, though relatively disorganised market system, energy is increasingly governed by agreements between producers.

Europe's energy dependence, already a source of anxiety from the strategic and political points of view, may turn into an economic and social disaster if the price of oil continues to climb excessively in real terms.

The most likely development is that oil will become expensive, around 40/50 dollars a barrel (discounting inflation) by 1990 if relations between the great powers and OPEC continue to deteriorate. In France, in the event of a doubling of the price of oil, the oil bill would be 140,000 million francs (1979 francs) by 1990, taking account of energy savings, and that would be with more than 3 million unemployed!

However, by 1995-2000 Europe could face the energy situation with confidence if measures were taken here and now on the following lines:

- Development of nuclear power in countries still hesitant about that form of energy. For example, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have no provision for nuclear power stations in their public works programme for 1990 and in other countries (except France) programmes have been slowed down. Permanent supplies of nuclear energy beyond the year 2010 would depend on the use of fast breeder reactors. Lastly, if fusion is the ultimate hope, no date for it can be suggested and it still calls for a greater research effort. None of this of course overlooks the problem of the acceptance of nuclear power by the public in the countries concerned; a real information campaign on the essential problems of nuclear safety and a determination to achieve it are still needed.

- Revival of coal mining by new techniques. Europe is rich in coal and it is important that the research now being resumed in all European countries should be stepped up (underground distillation etc) and a proper coal policy pursued (revision of programmes to step down production in certain coalfields, assessment of the potential of new coalfields, joint decision-making as a guarantee that this policy will be a continuing one).

- Development of new forms of energy.

Europe has a considerable potential where minerals are concerned with certain exceptions - manganese, chromium, phosphate etc. Its mineral deposits compare favourably with those of the rest of the world, but it remains largely dependent on imports for the ores and metals it needs.

We could increase our European resources considerably and achieve economic self-sufficiency with a determined policy of improving deep-level prospecting methods, changing attitudes to small mines with rich deposits, stock-taking and economy. This would have the two-fold advantage of improving returns on investments and helping to diversify supplies.
A propos of raw material supply problems it should be said that since 1970 investments of European capital in the mining industries of developing countries have lagged behind investments in developed mining countries. That being so it would be wise to conclude bilateral or regional agreements, to introduce a system of safeguards against political risks and offer various incentives.

Europe must expect such raw materials to be up-valued more and more at the place where they are mined, whenever this is justified, having regard to production possibilities and costs. However, there being no guarantee of geopolitical stability in these countries it will still be necessary to build up stocks in Europe.

6. **Innovation - A pressing need**

"Europe may slip towards underdevelopment ... the risks of this are real and it seems that little is being done to reverse the situation ... The prospect is a cause of serious anxiety ... Europe's chances depend essentially on the place she can make for herself as regards quality. That is why the capacity to innovate is so important." These quotations from André Danzin's work "Science et Renaissance de l'Europe" (1) pose the problem of research and innovation fairly and squarely.

It is true to say that while Europe remains exposed to many threats, while space, energy, raw materials and capital are all in short supply today, there is one factor which appears unlimited - the capacity to innovate.

However, we may legitimately wonder, firstly about Europe's innovating capacity and secondly about Europe's ability to translate it into marketable goods.

Europe's basic research resources have dwindled since the end of the 1960s, whereas the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union have re-launched their programmes.

In the field of applied research, particularly armaments, space, aeronautics and nuclear power, Europe's position is excellent as regards quality, but is not so good when it comes to marketing the results.

Europe's lead in the field of aeronautics is well known and yet European aircraft comprise only a small part of the total world airfleet.

In the field of information technology Europe has now been overtaken by the United States and is on the point of being overtaken by Japan.

"For the first time in recent centuries, with semi-conductors, integrated circuits and informatics software, Europe is faced with techniques invented, in the main, elsewhere." (2)


(2) op. cit.
An information-based society is emerging which is helping to make obsolete the distinction between the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In Europe 30-35% of all workers - and the figure is increasing all the time - are concentrated in this sector. Combined with technological developments this helps to increase productivity not only in industry but also in the services where it had so far remained fairly stationary.

The question we have to ask, therefore, is whether there is a direct link between productivity and employment, ie whether the combination of the two phenomena just referred to will bring a sharp increase in unemployment or not.

From the years 1973-74 onwards there was a very sharp decrease in employment in the primary and secondary sectors; the question remains whether this trend will affect the tertiary sector, so far unscathed. It is quite conceivable - even if the imperfect statistics available make any accurate assessment difficult - that the introduction of micro-electronics, if it steps up capital investment in the tertiary sector, will help to create new services and hence new jobs. What groups will be directly or indirectly affected? What are the possibilities of re-employment or re-training? What effect will international competition have on the situation? These are all questions it is vital to ask.

The micro-processor revolution may well have other effects on unemployment by making wide geographical deployment possible. Productivity in the services sector can only increase if the existing industrial structures are modified. Cellular structures should be envisaged, made up of small units which would be better suited to the geographical deployment made possible by telecommunications and telematics.

This might affect physical planning in every country if, in addition, through the development of telecommunications infrastructures it is possible to decentralise activities bound up with information processing and production and industrial production activities likewise.

However, we must not be hypnotised by the problem of unemployment, the essential point being the new division of labour between man and machine with machines acquiring intelligence capacities enabling them to become more effective than a human being. This calls for a thorough re-organisation of functions and for training programmes, as the new functions in an information-based society will require more extensive knowledge than in the past.

7. The emergence of new European values

The present challenge to our moral values and to the consumer society forces us to enquire into the reason for this rejection and into the new values that are emerging, so that European society can respond to the new aspirations and restore social and human equilibrium.

European society in the 1950s, a mass production society, was intent on securing collectively what it had achieved. This was reflected in a growing demand for a protective state. "The welfare state" thus became an additional factor in economic growth and served as a driving
force in the type of development experienced by the more advanced countries - in their education systems, public health, social security and even transport. The slowing down of growth has already had noticeable effects on budget policy. Public health policy, to take just one example, is building up large budget deficits in most European countries in the effort to meet an increasing demand which the ageing of the European population can only accentuate.

Here, the case of Sweden is interesting for two reasons - first because it is a good example and secondly because certain features of the "welfare state" originated there - the health system, the educational system and social transfers between the various sectors. Even if the Swedish situation can be severely criticised (inertia, inability to promote preventive medicine or services, expansion of costs resulting in a marked increase in municipal expenditure ...), the popular consensus behind its development is still there.

New structures have to be envisaged to give the public services and programmes. It may be necessary to make certain community services private again. Japan's example, where a number of such services are provided by firms with, in exchange, tax relief, could be applied in Europe (to part of the medical services for instance).

Some group needs could, furthermore, be met by associations or community bodies. This would relieve the state of part of its burden and meet the aspirations of associations and individuals. There is indeed a real possibility of creating a sector independent of the official sector. The example of Italy is interesting here. An unofficial sector estimated at about 30% of the whole relieves the state of part of the cost of social services and allows the population to replace the state in satisfying its own requirements.

This new type of relationship between the individual and society is also reflected in the individual's growing desire to develop his full potential, thus refusing to be any longer an "assisted person".

This shows itself in the individual's desire to participate, as a producer (in firms this calls for a rethinking of the pyramid-shaped structure of authority - importance of a social assessment of the firm), as a citizen (having a greater say in decisions affecting him, whence the need for real decentralisation), as a consumer of time (re-arrangement and reduction of working time).

Looking at European regional planning in the light of these new values, Mr Fontela (1) considered that it was outmoded:

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(1) Rome, 3-4 December 1979, "Long-range forecasting and regional planning" (Council of Europe).
- industrial production structures do not allow the individual to fulfil himself in his work;
- urban centres are not conducive to participation;
- communication techniques (teleinformatics ...) alone offer hope of greater decentralisation.

8. **Europe and the rise of the third world**

Prospects for the development of the various regions in the third world would appear to be even more sombre than in the past. There are a number of reasons for this conclusion - the population explosion in the third world, continuing poverty, the widening of the gap between the third world and industrialised countries, the third world's problem of food and energy supplies and the very nature of its model of growth.

Europe has an important part to play in promoting the development of the third world countries if we remember the world inter-dependence emphasised in the "Inter-futures" report, the increase in world trade and the fact that a certain model of "productivist" development geared to a certain type of consumption has become widespread.

Such action, which can arise from a concern for social justice (steps to combat poverty) may also proceed from a desire to obtain maximum benefit from inter-dependence. It is indeed essential for Europe to create particularly favourable relationships with the countries of the third world, whether these stem from the colonial past or from new contacts. While developing countries need our technology and facilities, in the same way we depend on them for our energy and raw material supplies. The developing countries constitute a market which is three times more important for Europe than the United States. A report by the World Bank has shown that there would be three million more unemployed in the "Europe of the Nine" if the third world countries with no oil had economised on other imports to compensate for the rise in the price of oil in 1973 and 1974 (1).

Thus there is an urgent need for increased co-operation by European countries in the form of research into new technology for the industrialisation of the third world countries.

Lastly, Europe must make a contribution to world security on the same scale as other nations.

There is another problem associated with the kind of development model we tend to put forward. It now seems out of the question that the South will ever catch up with the North. One may therefore wonder to what extent Europe might accept the challenge to the "productivist" model from the third world countries and recognise alternative development strategies.

For Europe, will such action be regional or world-wide in outlook? Europe has, in the first instance, maintained special links with the countries of the Mediterranean basin for geographical, historical, cultural and strategic reasons. She is at present trying to harmonise the policies pursued in the various Mediterranean countries and helping to establish a new balance among them.

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(1) In "30 jours d'Europe", Special issue, January 1979, p 10.
The advantage of action of the kind that fosters inter-regional relationships (e.g., Europe/Africa/Near East) is that it facilitates more concrete schemes and finds a ready-made basis in links which already exist.

With the signing of the Lomé Convention the EEC, for its part, has moved from regionalist action to define the main lines of a policy much greater in scope and world-wide in its outlook. This Convention, which provides for co-operation in numerous forms (technical, industrial, commercial and even social), is a definite innovation, particularly since no counterpart was required from the "ACP" countries, paving the way for a real North-South dialogue.

If this co-operation with developing countries is to be effective, it must be co-ordinated with the economic re-deployment of the rich countries. Europe is at once too small and too highly developed to remain content with national dimensions and to put up protectionist barriers. On the contrary, it must play an active part in the international division of labour.

II B Possible scenarios for Europe (1)

1. An emerging unacceptable scenario for Europe - prolongation of the present trends

a. The scenario of what must not be - two Europes with two different pulse rates

This scenario is produced by prolonging the trends of the past. The growth model is liberal and spontaneous in character. The "opening on to the sea" is provided mainly by the North Sea ports, which remain "the gate to Europe". The traditional poles of growth - South of England; Ruhr-Hamburg-Switzerland triangle; Northern Italy - are strengthened. A megalopolis is forming from London to Berne. An "inland Europe" is becoming established with a predominantly continental growth axis.

This "lifeline" specialises in advanced technology and sophisticated functions. It continues to develop by attracting man power from the peripheral areas; whence large-scale migration.

The "peripheral areas" become depopulated. Their relative poverty increases. Disparities between the EEC regions grow. These imbalances combined with rising energy costs, aggravate inflation and the balance of payments deficit; unemployment spreads.

Two "European with two different pulse-rates" emerge. The one is a productive, competitive triangle in the north, a "growth pole of the trans-national system" trading with the whole world; the other consists of the "peripheral regions", the outcasts from the market economy, under-populated and under-urbanised. Their standard of living is low. They specialise in agriculture and tourism.

(1) To work out these scenarios in detail would require more thorough research.
- The trans-national system irrigates northern Europe -
Industrialised Europe comprises three main growth poles - the South of England, the Paris-Hamburg-Switzerland triangle and Northern Italy.

This, Europe's spinal column, contains the major part of the total population. The urban system comprises predominantly industrial and tertiary activities. It is a "high performance" transport system linked up via the North Sea ports and the international airports with the "world trade system".

The European megalopolis forms the world's chief commercial pole, a strategic financial and banking centre, a powerful industrial centre, a vast market, a reserve of skilled manpower, a crucible of innovation ... It is a stronghold of the "transnational system".

- The peripheral regions are (comparatively) badly off - they comprise: Ireland, Scotland, Western France, Southern Italy, Sweden and Norway.

These regions are fairly sparsely populated and little urbanised. They are not greatly industrialised and specialise in agriculture and tourism; their income is accordingly low. Their transport system is inadequate and they form a market which is not sufficiently concentrated to make an autonomous "take-off" possible.

- Two Europes with two different pulse-rates - the European growth system aggravates inequalities between regions. When the Common Market was introduced (in 1958) the discrepancies between regions ranged from 1 to 3. In 1979 they range from 1 to 6. On this point, the EEC has not fulfilled the "hopes" of the Treaty of Rome which set out to reduce disparities between regions. Surely it is unacceptable to witness the emergence, on the one hand, of an urban, industrial, tertiary region in "Northern Europe" equipped with ports and engaged in a dynamic process of autonomous development (checked somewhat by conversion crises) and, on the other, "the Europe of the Periphery", consisting of underdeveloped, under-urbanised and under-industrialised regions, specialising only in agricultural activities and leisure pursuits.

In the future, the widening of the gaps between regions combined with the effects of crises will produce large-scale economic and social tension. This may well retard the progress of the whole. There is consequently an urgent need to initiate a policy to reduce inequalities (standard of living, life-styles, unemployment, working conditions ...)

b. A physical planning policy - Why?

- Its purpose:

The purpose of physical planning policy in Europe is to reduce inequalities, equalise opportunities and increase the inter-dependence of regions.
Its content:

The EEC has endeavoured to define a physical planning policy for the Community. From the point of view of space, the EEC is confronted with problems in regard to frontier regions, trunk communications, economic development axes, regions with priority functions (in Europe), co-ordination of its member states' physical planning and its own.

From the point of view of activities, the EEC defines common agricultural policy (guaranteed prices, EAGGF). In industry it seeks to encourage the creation of new industrial complexes, to protect the environment (Rhine), to harmonise industrial aid and industrial re-deployment aid, to facilitate the conversion of traditional industries and support vocational training and re-training (European Social Fund). In the tertiary sector, the EEC helps to define transnational lines of communication and takes measures to promote leisure pursuits (natural parks).

But there remains a vast amount of harmonisation to be done with regard to environmental and economic structures – statistical standardisation, legal and administrative structures, regional policies, protection of the quality of the environment, manpower policy and migration (in the Community and outside it), etc ...

Its short-term limits

The 1973 crisis hit the EEC hard. There are six million unemployed in the EEC (5.5% of the working population). Total employment is falling, industrial employment is declining and employment prospects in the tertiary sector are uncertain. The "right to employment" demand makes itself felt. The EEC growth rate is 2.63 per year in 1978 (against 4.4% from 1965 to 1975). The situation is unfavourable.

Does this low growth rate allow for a physical planning policy? In a difficult economic situation, growth produces less "surplus" and the possibility of net investment in poor regions is correspondingly less. Thus the crisis may well retard the implementation of a physical planning policy in Europe and the redeployment in the "peripheral zones" of the northern industrial pole.

2. Possible alternative scenarios

The planned scenario: the spontaneous scenario presents serious risks of social disorder which could restrict growth. Thus the EEC is implementing a deliberate regional planning policy. The growth rate and mode of growth are adapted to the crisis. The policy aims to put "voltage" into the whole of Europe's area and to take up the challenge of the 1973 crisis.

The resources of the European Funds (Social Fund, EAGGF, Regional Development Fund) have been increased. The peripheral regions, in particular the seaboard regions, have been given the means to "get off the ground". The EEC is helping to create new seaport "growth poles" of smaller dimensions (mouth of the Loire, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Southern Italy).
Scotland, Ireland, Sweden and Norway). The development of these poles spreads growth throughout the European area and helps to reduce the inequalities between regions. At the same time, a policy of decentralising tertiary industry from the richer to the poorer regions has commenced in the form of a "loosening of the fertile triangle".

The central growth poles - South of England, Paris-Hamburg, Switzerland, Northern Italy - specialise in the quaternary sector and advanced technology industries. This leaves "less sophisticated" industries free to irrigate the peripheral regions.

The EEC is trying to provide equal opportunities to harmonise development and spread it throughout its area. The aim is to regain control of space and distribute people and activities more suitably throughout Europe. This kind of growth makes it possible to achieve a better quality of life and to improve the environment. The living environment is better, human settlements smaller, social life more intense. Society's individual and collective chance of happiness is greater. Growth occurs in new space that has not yet been spoiled. The economic and social cost is less. Everything is kept to a more human scale.

The extreme scenario: the unwarranted costs and constraints due to urban concentration and the growth of the "megalopolis" seem intolerable to a growing number of people. They leave the towns and urban areas to go off to "found new human settlements" in new and peripheral areas.

They are particularly attracted to the coasts. A "seaboard" civilisation develops. Men gather together along the coasts attracted by open space, water and air. There they found towns, designed on a human scale, of many different types to meet the diversity of human needs. This could be a civilisation founded on the quality of life, spiritual progress, play, the inner life, culture etc.

The surpluses required for the achievement of this "golden age" (which might signify the dawn of civilisation and the end of "barbarism") are made available by the automation of industrial and tertiary production, especially the "fertile triangle" of northern Europe.

a. **EEC alternative strategies** (1)

- **Inland Europe**

This is a Europe which establishes a major development axis - South of England, Paris-Hamburg-Switzerland, Northern Italy - with the function of creating sufficient wealth to satisfy Europe's needs. Intra-community trade is given preference over trade outside the Community.

The peripheral regions are "assisted". Some poles of industrial and tertiary development have grown up spontaneously there (in limited numbers). The decentralisation of the heart of Europe is insufficient to irrigate its peripheral regions.

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(1) To discuss these would require much more thorough research.
This is the chosen course of an inland Europe in which the growth forces are concentrated along two major continental axes: Rhine-Rhone and Rhine-Danube. Its development results from the priority given to satisfying the needs of the EEC population, a population which is tending to become stationary.

- Seaboard Europe

Europe is wide open to the rest of the world from the point of view of its economy, culture, technology and civilisation. Europe "irrigates the world" and aims to play a part in satisfying the needs of "everyman and all men".

In the first place, it is wide open to the ocean, on all its seabords, North Sea, Atlantic, Mediterranean. Ports are built, regular shipping lines started up. Trade develops with all the countries of the world. A seagoing civilisation is "reborn".

Europe acts as a regulating force in the world, and helps to satisfy the basic needs of two thousand million poor and assist the 105 under-developed countries throughout the world to "get off the ground".

Europe fulfils a civilising mission and campaigns on behalf of a new "millennium of justice and equality for all people". She combats inequality throughout the world.

Europe is fertilised thanks to her opening up to the rest of the world and a European and transnational seagoing civilisation is reborn on the European continent. This in turn engenders a European civilisation founded on the quality of life, a harmonious synthesis of world currents and the aspirations of the peoples of Europe.

b. The structures required.

- Internal structures

Europe comprises at present 85,000 local authorities, more than 107 regions of different sizes and 9 member countries. The physical planning of Europe pre-supposes the establishment of a bank of standardised data on towns, regions and states.

A policy for the development of the ports of Europe is needed for the development of the peripheral regions.

Legislation, regions, social legislation, transport policy, industrialisation assistance, all need to be harmonised to provide equality of opportunity and enable the poor regions to catch up.

Europe must not promote the exclusive development of the "forces of uniformity" which tend to be reproduced in all the countries of the world by the same urban and industrial environment, the same airports, the same motorways, the same cars, the same buildings, resulting in a civilisation which may be effective, but which is monotonous and boring.

Europe is indeed full of differences - through its history, regions, peoples, inequalities and divergencies ... What is needed is to encourage the flowering in European regions and cities of the specific and diverse
energies that exist there. Europe then emerges as a variable geometric pattern creating towns and cultural centres of different sizes, corresponding in their content to the diversity of human needs.

Might it be necessary to go so far as to create a DATAR for Europe and a Development Bank for peripheral regions?

- **External structures**

Europe is associated with more than 40 countries in the world. It is Europe's duty to be "generous" towards poor countries. The 90 underdeveloped countries must be in a position to satisfy the basic needs of their population to become industrialised and launch out for themselves.

Europe must look at things in a new way and turn its energies to the future. Europe is necessarily at the centre of world trade, world currency reserves and advanced technology and skills. These vast resources ought to make it possible to work out a policy of world-wide import. Europe's message to the world could be one of liberty, equality, fraternity and justice for the poor. First, Europe must open up to the rest of the world.

The Europe of the future plays the part of a "regulator" in the world. It conveys a message of peace and wisdom founded on fair and balanced co-operation especially with the poor countries.

The world, having "shrunk", becomes inhabitable for everybody. The humble request of the poor is at last heard. The dignity of each man and of all men is recognised once the fundamental needs of two thousand million have been met.

We must replace the Europe of the "machine" and of "merchants" by the Europe of civilisation. The tendency of all human history may be said to be the increasing satisfaction of human needs.

At the dawn of the 21st Century, which could signify a new departure, (following a period of growth and continuity) satisfaction of the needs of the poor must have priority. It may mean limiting excessive consumption by the rich countries to allow an increase in consumption by the poor countries.
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