



iPROCEEDS

Project on targeting crime proceeds on the Internet
in South-eastern Europe and Turkey

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General guide on Protocols on interagency and international cooperation for investigations involving proceeds from crime online

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Contents

General guide on Protocols on interagency and international cooperation for investigations involving proceeds from crime online	4
Introduction.....	4
Relevant institutions.....	4
Principles.....	5
Interagency Cooperation	5
Cooperation during Criminal Investigations.....	5
General Forms of Cooperation.....	6
International Cooperation.....	6
Appendix: Explanatory Report	9
1. Introduction	10
1.1 Purpose and Background.....	10
1.2 Explanatory note.....	10
1.3 Information/request exchange.....	10
1.4 Criminal investigation	11
1.5 Scope/Applicability	11
2. Measures	14
2.1 Domestic Measures	14
2.2 International Measures	14
3. Cooperation during Criminal Investigations	16
3.1 Pre-investigation.....	16
3.2 Commencement of investigation	16
3.3 Cooperation with respect to exchange of information.....	16
4. Exchange of Intelligence, Information and Evidence.....	17
5. Multi-Agency Groups	18
5.1 Establishment of a Multi-Agency Group.....	18
5.2 Multi-Agency Group Personnel	18
5.3 Strategic Decision-making.....	19
5.4 Collaboration of Technologies	19
5.5 Review and Reporting.....	19
5.6 Research.....	20
5.7 Joint Training	20
5.8 Informal Cooperation.....	20
5.9 Contact Points for Multi-Agency Groups	20
5.10 Publicity.....	21
5.11 Termination of Multi-Agency Groups.....	21
5.12 Expenses	21
6. Public-Private Sector Cooperation	22
7. International Cooperation	23

7.1	Joint Investigation Teams	23
7.2	Standards for international cooperation	24
7.3	Evaluation of Application of International Instruments	28
8.	Statistics	32
8.1	Gathering of statistics.....	32
8.2	Review of statistics.....	32
9.	Recommendations for Drafting Protocols	33
9.1	General guidelines.....	33
9.2	Amendments and supplements to the Protocols	33

General guide on Protocols on interagency and international cooperation for investigations involving proceeds from crime online

Introduction

1. Domestic and international investigations involving cybercrime, electronic evidence, proceeds from crime online and money laundering cut across different institutions, and require the involvement, in particular, of cybercrime units, financial investigation units, and Financial Intelligence Units and prosecution services. Effective interagency and international cooperation to identify and prosecute perpetrators, identify and trace proceeds of crime online with a view of confiscation and to prevent and prosecute money laundering are essential.
2. The purpose of the present document is to help institutions improve interagency and international cooperation, and – if appropriate – formalise such cooperation through protocols between them.
3. The basis for cooperation shall be the existing relevant legal framework, taking into account also existing Memoranda of Understanding between relevant institutions.
4. While recognising the importance of cooperation with each other, within their respective legal responsibilities, and the importance of timely information and data sharing in concrete criminal investigations, particularly in cases involving cybercrime, tracing online crime proceeds and online money laundering, the institutions shall identify and explore possible cooperation protocols to achieve coordinated, timely and effective cooperation.
5. The aims of a domestic protocol are to:
 - Bring together all relevant institutions to cooperate more effectively.
 - Eliminate practical obstacles encountered during investigations into online crime proceeds.
 - More effectively identify perpetrators of criminal acts, prosecute and bring criminals to justice and to lead to the seizure and confiscation of online crime proceeds.
 - Specify the possible avenues for international cooperation, related to the search, seizure and confiscation of online crime proceeds and to identify opportunities and obstacles.
6. The existence of domestic protocols tends also to engender trust and greater cooperation with international partners.

Relevant institutions

7. The institutions (units) to which a protocol applies may include, for example:
 - The Public Prosecutor’s Office – Special Prosecutor Office for High-Tech Crime
 - The Ministry of Interior - Department for Combatting Cybercrime
 - The Ministry of Interior - Service for Special Investigation Techniques, Electronic Surveillance Unit (Digital Forensic Unit)
 - The Ministry of Interior – Financial Investigations Unit, Service for Combatting Organised Crime

- The Ministry of Interior – Section for Suppression of Money Laundering, Service for Combating Organised Crime
 - The Ministry of Finance – Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML – Serbian Financial Intelligence Unit)
 - The Ministry of Justice - Directorate for Seized and Confiscated Assets
 - The Ministry of Justice – E-justice Department
 - The Ministry of Justice - Central Authority for Mutual Legal Assistance.
8. These institutions cooperate with each other on the basis of legally defined roles, responsibilities and powers. These institutions may invite observers from other public institutions to join their regular or operational meetings if the expertise or know-how is deemed relevant to cooperation.

Principles

9. Institutions agree to the following principles:
- There is a need for **effective** interagency cooperation and **efficient** sharing of information is a key pillar of this cooperation.
 - Each institution obtains and/or controls information that may be useful to an investigation involving online crime proceeds.
 - The institutions will access data and share information in accordance with existing **legal provisions**, including **data protection requirements**.
 - Investigations involving online crime proceeds may require **timely** responses to requests from other organisations and all relevant institutions are prepared to make undertakings in this respect.
 - Investigations involving the joint action of multiple agencies will require **coordination**.
 - The processes for cooperation should be as efficient as possible in order that they are used in the greatest number of appropriate cases and, in particular, that the existence of these processes does not hinder existing interagency cooperation.
 - There is a need for a **joint training programme** on cybercrime, electronic evidence, financial investigations and online crime proceeds.
 - There is a need for **regular yearly meetings** between the institutions to discuss, identify and advocate for ways to improve cooperation.

Interagency Cooperation

Cooperation during Criminal Investigations

10. The institutions recognise the importance of cooperation and information sharing in concrete criminal investigations involving online crime proceeds (with elements of cybercrime, tracing online crime proceeds and money laundering).
11. The institutions will access data and share information in accordance with existing legal provisions and in line with data protection requirements.
12. Institutions will respond to urgent requests for information upon receipt of a request from another institution relating to a cybercrime investigation or online crime proceeds investigation. Urgent requests should be marked as such by the requesting institution and include the motivation for the indication of the urgency.

13. The Prosecution service (responsible prosecutor) will consider the need to involve relevant units/institutions when targeting online proceeds of crime.
14. During an investigation, the Prosecution service (responsible prosecutor) will consider the appropriate form of cooperation on a case-by-case basis, and this can include, for example, creation of a task force, regular meetings or other forms of cooperation.
15. Investigations involving joint action of multiple institutions might require operational coordination under the lead of the prosecutor, including coordination of the activities of multiple agencies. A lead investigation unit will be responsible for the coordination of operational activity, with all actions conducted under the instruction of the prosecutor and with regular reports being provided to the prosecutor.
16. The institutions aspire to the use of a secure electronic platform for exchange of information between themselves.

General Forms of Cooperation

17. A training programme/workshop will be held at least once per year, where representatives from each of the institutions shall exchange best practices and experiences related to investigations of online crime proceeds and discuss open questions and opportunities to improve cooperation. Where appropriate, the involvement of public sector observers or relevant private sector entities could be considered.

Presentations may include topics such as:

- a. The role and the powers of their institution when it comes to investigations involving online crime proceeds.
 - b. The nature of information available to that institution.
 - c. The process for engaging with that institution in matters requiring cooperation.
18. The training will be hosted each year by one of the institutions, in rotation.
 19. Each institution will consider the incorporation of interagency cooperation on targeting online crime proceeds training into their annual training programmes.
 20. Regular yearly meetings of heads of relevant institutions or units will be held with the purpose to improve cooperation. The heads of relevant institutions may, by unanimous decision, determine further guidelines that govern aspects of their institutions cooperation.

International Cooperation

21. The increased cooperation of relevant institutions at national level also reflects the need for coordinated international cooperation by information exchange and mutual legal assistance. The relevant institutions shall identify and explore possible cooperation protocols to achieve coordinated, timely and effective international cooperation.
22. Institutions are aware of different options for international cooperation on the basis of national legislation (Law on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters), including on the basis of reciprocity, international legal instruments in the area of laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime, cybercrime and money laundering (Council of Europe

Strasbourg, Warsaw and Budapest conventions, European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters and additional protocols) and bilateral agreements.

23. National contact points for exchange of information:

- CARIN: Ministry of Interior, Financial Investigations Unit (Vlatko Božovič)
- European Judicial Network: Ministry of Justice (Katarina Nikolič) and Special Prosecutor for High-Tech Crime (Branko Stamenkovič)
- EUROJUST: Ministry of Justice (Katarina Nikolič) and Republic Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade (Gordana Janičijević)
- EGMONT Group: Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering (APML), Ministry of Finance
- INTERPOL, EUROPOL and SELEC: Ministry of Interior (Milan Dimitrijevič)
- 24/7 contact point of the Budapest Convention: Department for Combatting Cybercrime, Ministry of Interior (Vladimir Vujič) and Special Prosecutor for High-Tech Crime (Branko Stamenkovič)
- SEEPAG: Belgrade Prosecution Office (Tomislav Kilibrarda).

24. The Central authority for mutual legal assistance is the Ministry of Justice:

- Council of Europe Strasbourg, Warsaw and Budapest conventions
- UN Palermo Convention, and
- Other regional conventions and bilateral agreements.

25. The institutions recognise the opportunities of different options for international cooperation within their legal responsibilities in concrete criminal investigation involving online crime proceeds: with elements of cybercrime, tracing of proceeds of crime and money laundering.

26. The institutions will continue to provide information to the others on the nature and type of information that can be requested internationally, within their responsibility, as well as the process and timeframes involved.

27. The institutions will continue to consider and explore different possibilities for the use of the channels for international cooperation in a concrete case in accordance with the existing legal provisions.

28. Prosecutors shall consider the possible approach in concrete case for:

- a. exchange of information through the existing networks (such as EGMONT Group, Europol EC3, EUROJUST), 24/7 Network, access to information through voluntary cooperation of multinational service providers,
- b. transfer of mutual legal assistance request, according to the conditions in national legislation and international legal instruments,
 - through central authorities for MLA;
 - by the use of the options provided by Strasbourg, Warsaw or Budapest conventions (Articles 34, 25 and 27 respectively) or any other multilateral or bilateral possibilities.

29. The institutions, led by the Prosecutor, shall consider the benefits of using joint investigations and joint investigation teams in cross-border cases. When task force or joint team is created, the leading prosecutor or the leading unit should define tasks in order to avoid duplication of information requests through different networks.

30. The institutions shall use and share good practices and guidance provided by relevant international institutions, such as the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on the Operation of European Conventions on Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PC-OC), the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), the Conference of the Parties to the Warsaw Convention, and others. National representatives shall provide the update on developments to relevant institutions.
31. The institutions shall inform each other, at least on a yearly basis, on statistics on international cooperation related to online proceeds of crime as well as on best practice and other experience.

Appendix: Explanatory Report

Explanatory Report On the General guide on Protocols on interagency and international cooperation for investigations involving proceeds from crime online

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose and Background

The purpose of this document is to provide a source of reference to agencies involved in the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime and the search, seizure and confiscation of online crime proceeds and to supplement the information in the General Guide on Protocols on interagency and international cooperation for investigations involving proceeds from crime online.

The document contains various aspects and options for interagency and international cooperation, as well as some considerations related to domestic protocols.

It is designed to assist prosecutors, investigators and other relevant entities to form a strategic framework on which to base an effective and collaborative exchange of information and investigation team when working in partnership with other public agencies and/or parts of the private sector to search, seize and confiscate online crime proceeds.

The common interest is to bring the criminals to justice and to deprive them of the criminal profit.

1.2 Explanatory note

Interagency cooperation depends on the legal framework defining the roles and responsibilities of the relevant institutions, including for the cases that bring together aspects of cyber investigation, financial investigation and prevention and investigation of online money laundering.

The intensity of cooperation among the relevant institutions might vary from simple (spontaneous) exchange of information or sending the requests for answers to another institution to the level of creation of more structured investigation teams on operational level (led by leading (police) unit) or on formalised level (led by prosecutor).

The interagency and international protocol documents should be reviewed and updated at regular times such as at annual meetings held between all of the relevant institutions mentioned within this document.

1.3 Information/request exchange

It is the understanding of the value of engagement between different institutions that drives the decision to cooperate. Thus consideration should be given as to whether communication between the institutions (Criminal Police, Financial Intelligence Unit (APML), Tax Administration, Customs Administration and Prosecutor Service) is centralised (by defined contact points and communication channels – for example in a memorandum of understanding) or if the mode of communication should be left for decision by heads of units in the relevant institutions on a case-by-case basis. There might be benefits of centralised exchange of information/requests, but with operational flexibility.

Such exchange of information/requests might occur even prior to formal start of criminal investigation, so the prosecutor might not be engaged in leading (yet). Should the prosecutor be informed on such communication depends on legal and practical arrangements.

1.4 Criminal investigation

Criminal proceedings that precede the trial encompass pre-investigative proceedings and the formal investigation. Pre-investigative proceedings are led by the prosecutor, however, the police is authorised to implement all necessary measures to locate and apprehend the perpetrator, to detect and secure traces of the criminal offence and objects that may serve as evidence, as well as to collect all relevant information provided that they immediately notify the competent public prosecutor thereof. The prosecutor orders the formal investigation. The latter conducts the proceedings and the police can only provide assistance if so requested. Financial investigations provided for under the Law on Recovery of the Proceeds of Crime are likewise ordered and led by the prosecutor.

The prosecutor has the power to establish investigation teams constructed by representatives of relevant institutions for the purpose of a concrete case investigation.

The conditions to create such team depend on legislation and the decision of the prosecutor (and consent of heads of relevant institutions). It would be advisable to determine the working methods, intensity of the meetings or even (temporarily) joint office. A work plan is particularly important to avoid duplication of tasks, and especially to avoid multiple international requests through different channels of cooperation/information sharing.

In complex cases also the operational lead should be considered (especially when several police units are involved).

It might be useful to define general guidelines (by the Prosecutor General) for creation of an investigation team, taking into account the existing experience with the new Criminal Procedure Code. This could include concrete conditions when such teams would be considered and the possibility for police to propose its creation to the prosecutor. Available personnel and financial resources might affect such forms.

1.5 Scope/Applicability

Relevant institutions include:

- The Public Prosecutor's Office – Special Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime
- The Ministry of Interior - Department for Combatting Cybercrime
- The Ministry of Interior - Service for Special Investigation Techniques, Electronic Surveillance Unit (Digital Forensic Unit)
- The Ministry of Interior – Financial Investigations Unit, Service for Combating Organised Crime
- The Ministry of Interior – Section for Suppression of Money Laundering, Service for Combating Organised Crime
- The Ministry of Finance – Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML – Serbian Financial Intelligence Unit)
- The Ministry of Justice - Directorate for Seized and Confiscated Assets
- The Ministry of Justice – E-justice Department
- The Ministry of Justice - Central Authority for Mutual Legal Assistance.

The mandate of each institution:

- **Special Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime** was created on the basis of the Law on Organisation and Competence of Government Authorities in Combating High-Tech Crime. The Prosecution takes the lead in cybercrime investigations above a particular financial threshold and directs the relevant law enforcement agencies on what

tasks they need to complete. In relation to the investigation of cybercrime, Serbia has two nominated points of contact for the 24/7 network; one is a prosecutor based at the Public Prosecutor's Office and the other is a police officer based at the Ministry of Interior. The prosecutors rely upon close cooperation with officers from all of the relevant institutions subject to the scope of this document to expedite their tasks so that investigations are completed as efficiently as possible. This is providing a heightened level of cooperation with Law Enforcement Officers.

- **Ministry of Interior – Department for Combatting Cybercrime** leads the investigations into cybercrime and provides both expertise in supporting other agencies in the Police and Prosecution in matters where technology is a significant factor to a crime or related evidence. The Department for Combatting Cybercrime works closely with the Financial Investigations Unit and benefits from the cooperation of the Public Prosecutor's Office who conducts regular meetings to discuss current issues – providing advice on best evidence.
- **Ministry of Interior – Financial Investigations Unit** conducts financial investigation. Specialised investigators might provide assistance and support also to other units, such as cybercrime unit, and vice versa.
- **Ministry of Finance – Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML)** derives its powers from the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorist. The main role of the APML is to receive and analyse suspicious transaction reports and other information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and to disseminate the results of its analysis to the competent state law enforcement authorities. The APML may issue a written order to the banks and other obliged entities for a temporary suspension of a transaction if it assesses that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing with respect to a transaction or person carrying out the transaction, A temporary suspension may be issued for 72 hours with possible extension for additional 48 hours to cover the weekend. Moreover, under the same conditions (e.g. existence of reasonable ground for suspicion of ML /TF) the APML may also issue a written order to the obliged entities to monitor all transactions and business operations of suspects carried out in the obliged entity.
- In cases involving money laundering or terrorist financing the APML will share intelligence with the Section for Suppression of Money Laundering within the Service for Combating Organised Crime, and the Financial Investigations Unit.

The APML is a member of the EGMONT Group, an international network of 152 FIUs, which enables sharing of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing among its members.

- **Ministry of Justice – Directorate for Seized and Confiscated Assets** is an Asset Management Office (as opposed to an Asset Recovery Office). The Directorate is responsible for managing and safeguarding seized and confiscated assets with due diligence, i.e. with due and reasonable professional care, depending on the nature of assets, until the revocation of the decision on temporary seizure of assets, i.e. final judgement on permanent seizure of assets¹.
- **Ministry of Justice – E-Justice Department** is responsible for IT related infrastructure supporting the work of the prosecutors and courts. From the perspective of interagency cooperation in particular, the e-Justice Department has an important role to play by facilitating the development of the infrastructure that will enable

¹ Article 37 of the Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia No. 97/08).

communication between various agencies (most particularly the prosecution service(s) and the courts).

- **Ministry of Justice – Central Authority for Mutual Legal Assistance** is the designated central authority for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. It communicates directly with counterparts and performs its role in respect of the Council of Europe conventions, including Budapest, Strasbourg and Warsaw Conventions, the UN conventions and engages in international cooperation based on the principle of reciprocity. Its primary responsibilities include the receipt, translation and transmission of MLA requests.

2. Measures

2.1 Domestic Measures

Every country has legislation under which it prosecutes offenders and through which authorities are authorised to investigate crime (and criminals).

Practice might show the need for more detailed arrangements for cooperation between the institutions in applying some particular measures (for example special investigative means, freezing order, expedited preservation etc.). A special provision of protocol/Memorandum of Understanding could be considered.

The following domestic matters will require legislation and due process. Consequently they should be considered in investigations involving cybercrime and related investigation into the proceeds of such crimes. As such, the following matters should be conducted in a manner provided for under domestic legislation:

- Issuance of warrants
- Arrests
- Expedited preservation of stored computer data
- Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data
- Production orders
- Search and seizure
- Real-time collection of traffic data
- Interception of content data
- Require reporting of suspicious transactions
- Require identification/disclosure of transaction trails
- Require maintaining or disclosure of transaction information
- Prohibition of disclosure of any on-going money laundering enquiry or investigation
- Temporarily suspend or withhold transactions that have been reported as suspicious transactions
- Attachment/confiscation of bank accounts and other assets (virtual currency etc.)
- Measures for temporary freezing the property, measures to confiscate proceeds of crime
- Investigative tools (access to bank account data, use of SIMS).

2.2 International Measures

When cooperating with international partners, there is a general expectation that nations will have sufficient measures in place to support the agreements made under the Budapest and Warsaw conventions.

These conventions require parties to enact national legislation providing for particular investigative and provisional measures. Mutual legal assistance requests may then be made pursuant to the conventions in respect of measures listed below:

- Expedited preservation of stored computer data (Article 29 Budapest Convention)
- Expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data (Article 30 Budapest Convention)
- Mutual assistance regarding accessing of stored computer data (Article 31 Budapest Convention)
- Mutual assistance regarding real-time collection of traffic data (Article 33 Budapest Convention)
- Mutual assistance regarding interception of content data (Article 34 Budapest Convention)
- Request for information on bank accounts (Article 17 Warsaw Convention)

- Requests for information on banking transactions (Article 18 Warsaw Convention)
- Requests for monitoring of banking transactions (Article 19 Warsaw Convention)
- Confiscation of instrumentalities/proceeds/property of corresponding value (Article 23 - 26 Warsaw Convention):
 - Execution of requests for confiscation
 - Dealing with confiscated assets
 - Conditions on confiscation orders

The requests referred to above are transmitted in the manner provided for in the conventions, Article 25 Budapest Convention, where there is an existing legal basis for cooperation or Article 27 (if accepted by the state party), where there is not such a basis, and Articles 33 and 34 of the Warsaw Convention, subject to confidentiality and limitation provisions where applicable and in the absence of existing relevant agreement (Article 28 Budapest Convention and Article 43 Warsaw Convention).

Additional provisions relevant to international cooperation include:

- Provision of spontaneous information (Article 26 Budapest Convention, Article 20 Warsaw Convention),
- Trans-border access to stored computer data subject to consent/where data is publicly available (Article 32 Budapest Convention). This is an extra-territorial measure available to investigators engaged in investigating the offence in their territorial jurisdiction of competence applicable in certain defined, limited circumstances,
- The establishment of a 24/7 Network POC (Article 35 Budapest Convention),
- Exchange of information between FIUs spontaneously or on request (Article 26 Warsaw Convention),
- Cooperation between FIUs related to postponement of suspicious transactions (Article 47 Warsaw Convention).

3. Cooperation during Criminal Investigations

The establishment of a Multi-Agency Group, a Joint Investigation Team in cross-border cases or sharing of resources requires planning, sharing of information, agreement and collaboration. Below are some of the considerations that Prosecutors, Senior Police Officers and Agency managers will need to consider in support of agency cooperation during criminal investigations.

3.1 Pre-investigation

- Notice at pre-investigation stage.
 - Where cooperation is required by two or more agencies, early indications of the type of support, length of time and the resources required should be discussed as soon as possible.
 - Anticipation and early notice of the likelihood of investigations requiring agencies to cooperate will allow managers and alike to plan their response in a planned and methodical way.
 - Means by which pre-investigation notices and requests are to be confidential should be clearly identified.
 - Prosecutors and senior investigators can review the requirements of the establishment of a Multi-Agency Group or Joint Investigation Team and put necessary plans in place. Further details are outlined in this document below.

3.2 Commencement of investigation

- How is notice to be given?
- At what stage is notice to be given?
- What should notice include?
 - Name of parties
 - Court, if any, where proceedings have been or are to be initiated
 - Nature of the action/proceedings
 - Alleged facts that serve as basis for the action/proceedings
 - Anticipated date of initiation of actions/proceedings
- Is there a requirement for parties to keep notices regarding commencement of investigations confidential if required?
- Cooperation with respect to certain measures (see Measures below).

3.3 Cooperation with respect to exchange of information

See Exchange of Intelligence, Information and Evidence below.

4. Exchange of Intelligence, Information and Evidence

Law enforcement, intelligence organisations and governments recognise the need to collaborate, share and exchange information. The effective exchange of intelligence, information and evidence requires process, trust and security.

By considering the following requirements, Prosecutors and Law Enforcement agencies will provide a system that balances legal requirements and considerations of privacy as well as identify exactly how information, intelligence and evidence may be used in respective processes.

- Preconditions for exchange of intelligence, information and evidence
- Procedure for requesting intelligence, information and evidence:
 - How will requests for information be made, received and processed by each party?
 - Which persons within each agency will requests be sent to?
- Confidentiality of requests
- Limitations to confidentiality of requests
- Penalties for breach of confidentiality of requests
- Spontaneous information
- Upper time limit to process requests:
 - Exceptions
 - Urgent requests
 - No exception for holidays/weekends/office hours
- Data protection
- Confidentiality of information – level of classification
 - Requirement that no notice be given to parties (e.g. no notice to be given to bank account holder regarding freezing of bank accounts)
 - Security measures to be implemented
 - Physically securing premises
 - Securing IT systems
 - Penalties for disclosure of information exchanged
 - Exceptions to confidentiality:
 - Where disclosure is required by law
 - Where there is consent to disclose
 - Adequate instructions given to contact points/other staff involved about confidentiality requirement
- Conditional exchanges of evidence
- Integrity of information, intelligence and evidence exchanged:
 - Ownership
 - Processes to maintain integrity/chain of custody
 - Making officials available to testify to authenticity of data in courts
- Means through which electronic data will be shared (cloud/physical discs etc.).

5. Multi-Agency Groups

The creation of a Multi-Agency Group for a criminal investigation may be required for a number of reasons, which include sharing of resources, the size of the operation, the legal requirement for different agency involvements, expediency and many other needs.

There are a number of issues to consider during the establishment of a Multi-Agency Group, which includes leadership, resources, responsibility and legal framework. This set of guidelines lays down some considerations that should be undertaken in the creation of such a Multi-Agency Group and should be reviewed throughout the investigation. National legislation and directives will take priority over the recommendations detailed below.

5.1 Establishment of a Multi-Agency Group

During the establishment of a Multi-Agency Group, the following should be considered and recorded for later review:

- Permanent or temporary Multi-Agency Group:
 - If temporary, term of Multi-Agency Group
- Any process undertaken for identifying and mapping agencies involved
- Development of structure:
 - Leadership and governance for the Multi-Agency Group
 - Planning resources and ensuring hub management
 - Provisions for changes in leadership or structure
- Levels of Multi-Agency Groups:
 - Existing forms of practice and coordination
 - Virtual links between agencies:
 - Co-located hub of agencies/ride-along.

5.2 Multi-Agency Group Personnel

Once a decision has been made to create a Multi-Agency Group, the resourcing should be considered and agreed by relevant managers from the agencies involved in the creation of such a group. The resourcing should continually be monitored by the hub management. The following provides a guideline to those considerations:

- Assignment of personnel by agencies:
 - Number of personnel
 - Duties of personnel
 - Duration of assignment
 - Schedule of personnel
- Specific personnel to be assigned:
 - Interagency collaborator positions (designation of individual in an agency to collaborate with/between agencies and departments)
 - Liaison positions (person employed by one agency designated to work with another agency)

- Personnel details (specialist or professional employed by to perform tasks for another agency).

5.3 Strategic Decision-making

The effective delivery of an efficient Multi-Agency Group will rely upon clear leadership, transparent decision-making and good strategic planning. By setting out a strategic decision-making process at the inception of such a group, the collaborative processes should be much more effective. The following provides some considerations:

- Leading agencies
- Particular roles
- Choosing jurisdictions
- Choosing forums
- Coordinated interventions:
 - With respect to already-existing information/intelligence/information
 - With respect to conducting arrests, searches and seizures
 - With respect to freezing of assets.

5.4 Collaboration of Technologies

- Agree on establishment of real-time information database
- Requirement for agencies to maintain and update interconnected databases in real-time to allow:
 - Real-time information sharing between agencies
 - Real-time decision making between agencies
 - Real-time communication between agencies
 - Data protection measures
 - Security/encryption standards
- Access to information database to use at pre-investigation and investigation stages.

5.5 Review and Reporting

Measurement of achievement and development of procedures is a continual requirement in the development of any investigative process. This enables best practice to be identified, blockages to be removed and risks to be mitigated. Some considerations that can best achieve this objective are recorded below:

Retention of records:

- Period of retention required
- Mode of retention
- Kind of data to be retained by agencies

Accountability:

- Measure of achievement of short-term/long-term outcomes
- Means by which progress is to be tracked
- Meetings/Reports:
 - Development of timetable schedule for meetings
 - Annual meetings & extraordinary meetings
 - Notice for meetings
 - Agendas for meetings

- Results of meetings.

Required reviews:

- Review of on-going law enforcement activities
- Review of effectiveness of coordination
- Future law enforcement activities
- Review of statistics to identify problems in cooperation etc.
- Risk analysis
- Review of work action plans/work programs of each agency.

5.6 Research

- Exchange information on upcoming research activities of mutual concern
- Invite each other to relevant expert meetings and collaborate in research activities
- Exchange information on issues with respect to law enforcement.

5.7 Joint Training

Training is a method of sharing best practice and breaking down some of the misunderstandings across different organisations. It is a vital part of pre-planning for Multi-Agency Groups. The following list is a baseline standard of what training activities should consider in their delivery:

- Sharing of existing training materials
- Design and evaluation of training activities/workshops/tools/methodologies for different agencies
- Development of joint training materials
- Procedures for holding joint training
- Inviting each other to training activities/workshops
- Frequency of training
- Funding for joint trainings
- Responsibility for joint trainings.

Where appropriate, the involvement of relevant private sector entities should be considered.

5.8 Informal Cooperation

- Authorisation of informal/innovative means of cooperation
- Explore all legal avenues/possibilities for cooperation
- Continuing to respect personal data rules, privacy and other rules
- Consideration of what value a court may view informal cooperation and therefore exclude evidence.

5.9 Contact Points for Multi-Agency Groups

- Designation of contact point in each agency
- Means by which contact point can be contacted
 - Urgent matters
 - Non-urgent matters
- Contact points permanently staffed by individuals with appropriate security clearance to an agreed upon standard
- Staff of designated point of contacts to have full authority to respond to cases (no further authorisations required).

5.10 Publicity

- Restrictions on making statements to press regarding activities of Multi-Agency Groups without consent of all parties.

5.11 Termination of Multi-Agency Groups

- Can an agency unilaterally terminate the Multi-Agency Groups?
- Under what circumstances can a Multi-Agency Groups be terminated?
- What is the effect of termination on obligation of parties?
- What is the effect of termination on cooperation/information exchanged previously?
- How is notice of termination to be given?

5.12 Expenses

- Who will bear expenses that arise in course of implementation of Multi-Agency Groups?

6. Public-Private Sector Cooperation

The investigation of cybercrime and/or targeting online proceeds of crime and money laundering requires robust and efficient public-private sector cooperation. Such cooperation will be based upon domestic and international measures (specified elsewhere in this document), which need to be enacted within each nation.

The effective delivery of these laws and treaties relies upon relevant protocols and standard operating procedures being agreed and implemented between public and private sectors.

Requirements to support public-private sector cooperation should consider the following points:

- Developing a system whereby the appropriate agency will obtain data from private sector persons that it has legal mandate to regulate/seek cooperation/information from:
 - Allocation of roles based on efficiency and legal mandates
 - Make it dependent on an issue-wise basis or case-to-case basis
- Mechanisms by which cooperation with private sector will take place
- Establishment of permanent Multi-Agency Groups with different private sector bodies (e.g. CERTs, ccTLDs, ISPs etc.).

The success of public-private sector cooperation is often based upon succinct and relevant Memoranda of Understanding. It is important that these documents are reviewed regularly and updated as necessary. Although public-private cooperation protocols are a separate issue², there is recognition that the current levels of public-private cooperation could be improved in relation to cybercrime investigations; sharing Internet based information and financial intelligence.

Workshops, meetings and conferences are a good method to achieve improvements in these areas. Such joint meetings could identify blockages, solutions and methods to mitigate mutual concerns about legality, proportionality and necessity.

Any interagency cooperation initiative should take public-private cooperation into account, take stock and coordinate efforts, also with a view to preventing contradictory requirements, messages and policies and identifying successful strategies and cooperation methods.

² See Council of Europe Guidelines for cooperation between law enforcement and internet service providers against cybercrime, 2008:
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802fa3ba>
Available in in Serbian: <https://rm.coe.int/16802fe14f>

7. International Cooperation

The obligation to cooperate (whether by way of information exchange or mutual legal assistance) derives from international treaties, including the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Protocols, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No.185), the Strasbourg Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No.141), and the Warsaw Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism Convention (CETS No.198). However, some of the practical challenges arising from such cooperation are addressed by committees or other monitoring mechanisms established for that purpose (see Council of Europe committees below). Where appropriate, relevant bilateral or regional cooperation frameworks should also be taken into account as a potential basis for cooperation.

Although responsibilities for mutual legal assistance usually lie with judiciary and central authority (Ministry of Justice), it is also important to be aware of other cooperation channels (and their limitations) at police and prosecutors' levels. In all cases, but especially in complex cases, the most efficient information gathering method should be identified by those involved at the outset with a view to avoiding simultaneous use of more than one channel for the same purposes as this can lead to the duplication of requests.

7.1 Joint Investigation Teams

The applicable international legal basis for joint investigation teams (JITs) is to be found in Article 20 of the 2nd Protocol of 2001 to the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Article 27 of the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe of 2006 provides an additional legal basis and the United Nations conventions on organised crime (Palermo Convention) and corruption (UNCAC) also each provide a basis for the establishment of joint teams and joint investigative bodies. In all cases the appropriate legal basis should be identified as early as possible.

If approached to form part of a JIT by an European Union (EU) Member State useful information on EU practice on JITs is available at the Europol³ and EUROJUST⁴ websites.

In the EU, a JIT is set up for a fixed period and for a specific purpose, based on an agreement between two or more competent authorities in the member states. Competent authorities from countries outside the EU may participate in a JIT dependent upon the agreement of all other participating parties and the existence of appropriate underlying international legal base.

Generally, each JIT is set up to investigate a specific case. Once the investigation has concluded, the JIT comes to an end: thus, there are no permanent or on-going JITs. The terms in accordance with which a JIT operates varies somewhat with each case, however, the terms are usually based on a model agreement appended to the Council Resolution of 26 February 2010 on a Model Agreement for setting up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) (2010/C 70/01), which encourages the competent authorities in Member States "to agree upon the modalities for the joint investigation team."

³ <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/joint-investigation-teams>

⁴ <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/JITs/joint-investigation-teams/Pages/jits-framework.aspx>

As most EU Member States have signed and ratified both the Budapest and Warsaw Conventions, the expectation is that members of the JIT will be able to comply with the provisions of these treaties.

Law on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters refers to JIT in Article 96.

Establishment of a JIT

The following considerations should be undertaken during the creation of a JIT:

- Notice of establishment
- Structure/leadership
- Standard Operating Protocols
 - Standard Operating Procedures with financial institutions to ensure that where necessary, the flow of illegal money transfers can be delayed until necessary intelligence and/or further legal instruments can be utilised
 - Agreement that each of the relevant institutions will contact a nominated representative in the partner relevant institutions to expedite requests
- Conducting investigations
 - Maintaining chain of custody of exhibits.
 - Proper initiation of investigations
 - Current contact list of Police departments that are on call
 - Retention of up-to-date contact lists of financial institutions by relevant institutions
- Necessary funding (albeit some funding may be provided by Europol)
- Resources and staffing
 - Appropriate leadership
 - Appropriate resources including skill levels.
 - Appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities
- Common agreement at which stage to terminate a JIT
- Cooperation following termination of JIT.

7.2 Standards for international cooperation

Relevant provisions of the Warsaw Convention (applicable to financial investigations, mutual legal assistance and FIU cooperation), the Budapest Convention (applicable to cybercrime investigations and acquisition of electronic evidence), and the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (applicable to prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing) should be considered when embarking on a course of international cooperation. The most significant provisions of these instruments are listed below.

EU legal instruments

EU legal instruments are applicable within the European Union. It may be useful to understand the standards, methods and practice of the most relevant instruments targeting proceeds of crime and cybercrime in areas of mutual legal assistance, when cooperating with an EU Member State.

- Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union;

- Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime;
- Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property;
- The principle of mutual recognition, as opposed to mutual assistance, has been introduced within the EU:
 - Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA for the execution of freezing orders
 - Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA for the confiscation orders
 - Council Decision 2007/845/JHA introduced the obligation to set up Asset Recovery Office(s) (ARO)
 - Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information system (24/7)
 - Directive 2014/41/EU on the European Investigation Order in criminal matters.

General Principles and Measures for International Cooperation

- Warsaw Convention, Article 15
 - The Parties shall mutually co-operate for the purposes of investigations and proceedings aiming at the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds.
 - The parties shall comply with requests for confiscation of specific items or requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds and for investigative assistance and provisional measures with a view to either form of confiscation.
- Budapest Convention, Article 23 and 25
 - The Parties shall afford mutual assistance for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.
- FATF, Recommendation 37
 - Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest possible range of mutual legal assistance in relation to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions, and related proceedings.

Communication and transmission of requests

Parties to both Warsaw and Budapest Conventions are required to designate central authorities, which communicate directly with one another (Warsaw Convention - Articles 33 and 34; Budapest Convention - Article 25 applies where there is an existing basis for cooperation, and Article 27 may apply if accepted by the party where there is no such existing arrangement or central authority designated). However,

- Warsaw Convention, Article 34 provides that urgent requests may be transmitted directly between the judicial authorities, including prosecutors, with a copy to be sent through central authorities or through INTERPOL.
- Warsaw Convention, Article 34 (5) provides that non-coercive requests (i.e. where execution of a request does not require the use of a coercive measure) may be directly transmitted between competent authorities.
- Warsaw Convention, Article 34 (6) provides for the possibility of direct exchange of draft requests in order to facilitate cooperation prior to a formal request being made.
- Budapest Convention, Articles 29-31 provide for requests to be dealt with in an expedited manner.

- Transmission via INTERPOL is available to all parties to the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
- Budapest Convention, Article 27(9) provides a similar provision (applicable if accepted by a party and if not covered by an existing arrangement).

Provisional Measures

- Warsaw Convention, Articles 21-22
 - Parties shall take provisional measures, such as freezing or seizing, to prevent any dealing in, transfer or disposal of property subject to confiscation and provide spontaneously all information relevant for the execution of such provisional measure.
- Budapest Convention, Articles 29-30 provide for the following measures:
 - Expedited preservation of stored computer data
 - Expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data.
- FATF, Recommendation 38⁵
 - Countries should have the authority to take expeditious action in response to requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering, predicate offences and terrorist financing, instrumentalities, or property of corresponding value.

Investigative Assistance

- Warsaw Convention, Articles 16-19
 - Parties shall assist each other in the identification and tracing of instrumentalities, proceeds and other property liable to confiscation, which includes securing evidence as to the existence, location or movement, nature, legal status or value of the aforementioned property.
 - Such assistance comprises also of requests for information on bank accounts, on banking transactions and monitoring of banking transactions).
- Budapest Convention, Articles 31-34 - Mutual assistance regarding investigative powers:
 - Accessing/seizing or similarly securing/disclosing of stored computer data,
 - Trans-border access to stored computer data with consent or where publicly available,
 - Mutual assistance regarding the real-time collection of traffic data,
 - Mutual assistance regarding the interception of content data subject to Domestic law.
- FATF, Recommendation 37
 - Countries should ensure that all powers and investigative techniques available to their competent authorities, including those relating to the production, search and seizure of information, documents or evidence (including financial records) from financial institutions or other persons, and the taking of the witness statements, are also available for use in response to requests for MLA.

⁵ See also the Interpretative Note to FATF Recommendation 38.

Confiscation

- Warsaw Convention, Articles 23-25
 - Parties are requested either to enforce a confiscation order or to submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and enforce it.
 - This includes a request to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds, or confiscation of specific item of property.
 - Article 23/5 provides for the execution of a judicial request for measures equivalent to confiscation leading to the deprivation of property, which are not criminal sanctions (non- conviction based confiscation).
 - Article 25 determines the rules of asset sharing: property is primarily disposed of by executing Party, unless requested to give priority consideration to returning it to the requesting Party so that it can compensate the victims or return property to their legitimate owners.
- FATF Recommendation 38 (see above).

Cooperation between FIUs

- Warsaw Convention, Chapter V, Articles 46 and 47
 - FIUs shall exchange, spontaneously or on request and either in accordance with this Convention or in accordance with existing or future memoranda of understanding compatible with this Convention, any accessible information that may be relevant to the processing or analysis of information, or, if appropriate, to investigation by the FIU information regarding financial transactions related to money laundering and the natural or legal persons involved.
 - Countries should adopt measures to permit urgent action to be initiated by a FIU, at the request of a foreign FIU, to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction going ahead (postponement of suspicious transactions).
- FATF Recommendation 40
 - FIUs should exchange information with foreign FIUs regardless of their status. To this end, FIUs should have an adequate legal basis for providing cooperation on money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.
 - FIUs should have the power to exchange: a) all information that they can obtain from reporting entities as well as financial, administrative and law enforcement information that they have access to; and b) any other information which they have the power to obtain or access at the domestic level, subject to the principle of reciprocity.

24/7 Network

- Budapest Convention, Article 35
 - Each Party shall designate a point of contact available on 24/7 basis, in order to ensure the provision of immediate assistance for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.

- Such assistance shall include facilitating, or, if permitted by its domestic law and practice, directly carrying out the following measures:
 - the provision of technical advice,
 - the preservation of data pursuant to Articles 29 and 30,
 - the collection of evidence, the provision of legal information,
 - the locating of suspects.

Other methods of cooperation

The establishment of JITs pursuant to Council of Europe and EU instruments is discussed above.

Multi-disciplinary groups specialised in financial and asset investigations:

- FATF Recommendation 30
 - Countries should make use, when necessary, of permanent or temporary multi-disciplinary groups specialised in financial and asset investigations and ensure that, when necessary, cooperative investigations with appropriate competent authorities in other countries take place.

Spontaneous Information

- Warsaw Convention, Article 20 and Budapest Convention, Article 26
 - Parties may, within the limits of its domestic law and without prior request, forward to another party information obtained within the framework of its own investigations when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention or might lead to a request for co-operation by that Party under this chapter.

Exchange of Information between Non-counterparts

- FATF Recommendation 40 and related Interpretative Note
 - Countries should permit their competent authorities to exchange information indirectly with non-counterparts. Indirect exchange of information refers to the requested information passing from the requested authority through one or more domestic or foreign authorities before being received by the requesting authority. Such an exchange of information and its use may be subject to the authorisation of one or more competent authorities of the requested country.
 - Countries are also encouraged to permit a prompt and constructive exchange of information directly with non-counterparts.

7.3 Evaluation of Application of International Instruments

a. Targeting crime proceeds

PC-OC

The Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on the Operation of European Conventions on Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PC-OC) focused its attention on the area of targeting crime

proceeds in 2014. The replies to the PC-OC questionnaire⁶ showed inter-alia that there are differences in application of the provisions of Strasbourg and Warsaw conventions, relevant to international cooperation.

MONEYVAL⁷

The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism – MONEYVAL is a monitoring body of the Council of Europe, assessing compliance with the principal international standards to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism and the effectiveness of their implementation, as well as making recommendations to national authorities in respect of necessary improvements to their systems.

MONEYVAL mutual evaluations are assessing the countries' compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations⁸ and follow the practices and procedures used by the FATF. FATF Recommendations are international standards on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism as well as the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In relation to the interagency cooperation the following FATF standards are of particular relevance: on national cooperation and coordination (Rec 2), on FIU (Rec 29), on responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities (Rec 30) on their powers (Rec 31) and on statistics (Rec 33).

Recommendations on international cooperation *inter alia* emphasize the need to ratify and implement international instruments, including Budapest and Warsaw conventions (Rec 36), lay down requirements for mutual legal assistance (Rec 37), freezing and confiscation (Rec 38), extradition (Rec 39) and to other forms of international cooperation (Rec 40).

COP⁹

COP is a Council of Europe monitoring mechanism responsible for ensuring that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention are being applied. COP published its first Activity Report, covering the period 2009 – 2014, in April 2016.¹⁰ Serbia is a Party to the Warsaw Convention since 1 August 2009 and regularly attends the COP meetings, but it has not been yet assessed by this body.¹¹

b. Cybercrime

The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) is monitoring implementation of Budapest Convention and developing further standards and guidance notes. It is useful to consult some recent work of the T-CY, related also to the (efficiency of) mutual legal assistance:

⁶Questionnaire on the use and efficiency of Council of Europe instruments as regards international cooperation in the field of seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime, including the management of confiscated goods and asset sharing. PC-OC Mod (2015) 06Rev4, 19.5.2016.

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680666607>

⁷The fifth Mutual Evaluation Report of Serbia was adopted by MONEYVAL in April 2016. See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Countries/Serbia_en.asp

⁸ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf

⁹ http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/cop198/default_en.asp?expandable=0

¹⁰ http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/cop198/Reports/FirstActivityReport_CETS198.pdf

¹¹ Adopted reports can be found at:

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/cop198/Reports/CountryReports_en.asp

- T-CY Emergency requests: Preliminary observations on replies¹².
- T-CY Assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime¹³.
- Final report of the T-CY Cloud Evidence Group (CEG) on criminal justice access to electronic evidence in the cloud: Recommendations for consideration by the T-CY¹⁴.
- T-CY Guidance Note nr. 10 on production orders: in this note the T-CY addressed, amongst others, the situation where a subscriber was based in the same country as the requesting party, and subscriber data is requested from a party offering services in the country. The note provides guidance on Article 18, which allows for these requests – and T-CY provided more clarity on the meaning of “offering services” or the territory of a party.

In its assessment report of December 2014 T-CY¹⁵ adopted a set of recommendations designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the mutual legal assistance (MLA) process relating to the investigation of cybercrime and the obtaining of electronic evidence. The recommendations support a more effective use of existing provisions of the Budapest Convention and other agreements, they are divided into three parts consisting firstly of recommendations 1-15 directed towards the Parties (including *inter alia* (1) full implementation of preservation powers, (3 and 4) allocation of more, better trained staff to the MLA process, (5) the strengthening of the role and capacity of the 24/7 point of contact, (8) the establishment of emergency procedures), secondly recommendations 16-18 concerning capacity building directed towards Cybercrime Programme Office of the Council of Europe (C-PROC) and also proposing additional solutions ¹⁶, in recommendations 19-24 for the potential inclusion in a possible protocol to the Convention of provisions allowing for (19) the expedited disclosure of subscriber information, (20) the possibility of international production orders, (21) direct cooperation between judicial authorities, (22) addressing the practice of directly obtaining information from foreign service providers (23) joint investigations and/or joint investigative teams between Parties, (24) allowing for acceptance of requests in the English language.

Importantly, CEG in its report and recommendations related to criminal justice access to electronic evidence in the cloud concluded that mutual legal assistance remains the main means to obtain electronic evidence from foreign jurisdictions for use in domestic criminal proceedings. This is particularly true of transmission and content data. It also highlighted that subscriber data, which by its very nature is less privacy intensive, should be obtained by use of less intrusive and lighter measures such as the production order. Here, the report advises on the use of Article 18 (domestic production orders) of the Budapest Convention for the purposes of obtaining subscriber information from multinational service providers operating in the territory of a state having jurisdiction over the offence under investigation, thus dispensing with the need for an MLA request to the country where the headquarters of the service provider is situated – Guidance Note nr. 10 on the use of production orders for the obtaining of subscriber information in these circumstances was approved by T-CY¹⁷.

¹² T-CY(2016)13, 25.7.2016: Emergency requests for the immediate disclosure of data stored in another jurisdiction through mutual legal assistance channels or through direct requests to service providers:

Compilation of replies: <https://rm.coe.int/16806ab6ab>

¹³ T-CY(2013)17rev, 3 December 2014: <http://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/t-cy-reports>
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802e726c>

¹⁴ T-CY (2016)5, 16 September 2016.

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806a495e>

¹⁵ See pages 123 to 127, <https://rm.coe.int/16802e726c>

¹⁶ See page 125 to 127, <https://rm.coe.int/16802e726c>

¹⁷ T-CY Guidance Note #10: Production orders for subscriber information (Article 18 Budapest Convention), <https://rm.coe.int/16806f943e>

CEG also proposed that consideration be given to the drafting of an additional protocol in order to address some existing challenges referred to above, including provisions for more effective mutual legal assistance (a simplified regime for mutual legal assistance requests for subscriber information; international production orders; direct cooperation between judicial authorities in mutual legal assistance requests; the establishment of joint investigations and joint investigation teams; acceptance of requests in English language; audio/video hearing of witnesses, victims and experts; emergency MLA procedures); provisions allowing for direct cooperation with service providers in other jurisdictions with regard to requests for subscriber information, preservation requests, and emergency requests; a clearer framework for existing practices of trans border access to data subject to stronger safeguards, including data protection requirements.

MLA requests vary, even if they are based on international legal instruments, as they depend on national legislation of sending State, as well as the legislation and practical expectations of the receiving State. Forms for MLA requests might help States to certain extent; therefore some efforts have been made to develop model templates.

The Council of Europe Committee PC-OC developed a Model request form for mutual assistance in criminal matters. See the documents from the 69th meeting (May 2016): Draft model request form on MLA and practical guidelines for practitioners.¹⁸

As mentioned above, the T-CY assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (T-CY(2013)17rev) puts forward Recommendation 17, which calls for the development standardised, multi-language templates for Article 31 requests.¹⁹

¹⁸ See <http://www.coe.int/en/web/transnational-criminal-justice-pcoc/pc-oc-69th-meeting> and <http://www.coe.int/en/web/transnational-criminal-justice-pcoc/model-request-form-for-mutual-assistance-in-criminal-matters>

¹⁹ See: <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802e726c>

8. Statistics

Official statistics should provide quantitative or qualitative information on all major areas of Government Agencies or other public bodies. This includes prosecution and law enforcement.

Statistics should supply decision-makers and other users with information that they can develop their knowledge about the subject, assess performance of the agencies and identify improvements to strategy and systems. This improves accountability of official agencies or other public bodies.

8.1 Gathering of statistics

- Minimum level of statistics required with respect to domestic and international cooperation - for example: data on number of financial investigations and related criminal offences, number and value of freezing orders, number and value of confiscation orders, number and value of executed confiscations; number of money laundering investigations/prosecutions/judgements; FIU statistics; international cooperation: number of incoming and outgoing requests segregated by articles of Warsaw and Budapest conventions and national provisions.
- Ensure that statistics are prepared in a method so that they can be compared between different units and that annual totals can be accurately reported.
- Designate body (unit) to gather statistics from different institutions (police (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance), prosecution, courts/judiciary, Ministry of Justice) and their commitment to send such data. Take into account different reporting obligations (Council of Europe: e.g. MONEYVAL, GRECO, OECD) or
- Designate or constitute body to collect statistics:
 - Mandate of the body
 - Powers to call for information from relevant institutions
 - Funding
- Developments of common classifications to harmonize work being done by different agencies.

8.2 Review of statistics

- Incidence monitoring based on statistics gathered
- Review of statistics by Multi-Agency Groups to evaluate and enhance effectiveness.
- Annual review of statistics by yearly meetings by heads of relevant agencies.

9. Recommendations for Drafting Protocols

9.1 General guidelines

Below are some general guidelines, which should be referred to when seeking to create, review and implement domestic protocols. These guidelines are not exhaustive and other national procedures and legislation should take priority over these generic recommendations:

- Ensure that the powers/mandates of different agencies are enunciated in the protocol
- Ensure that the objectives of the protocol are clearly defined within the protocol
- Ensure that the request form for cooperation/information exchange is simple and not confusing and time-consuming
- Ensure that agencies have specified a single point of contact with authority to cooperate with other agencies
- Ensure that agencies that have powers to conduct certain kinds of investigations/information-gathering can easily share such information with other agencies
- Ensure that the measures with respect to which there shall be interagency cooperation under the protocol are clearly defined, both with respect to domestic and international cooperation
- Ensure that there are specific provisions regarding the development, establishment and maintenance of integrated database of information
- Ensure that there are strong confidentiality, security and data protection safeguards built into the protocol
- Ensure that there are clearly defined standard operating procedures for Multi-Agency Groups.
- Ensure that Multi-Agency Groups under the protocol have a defined leadership structure
- Ensure that the protocol provides for joint training
- Ensure that there is a comprehensive accountability and monitoring mechanism, including regular meetings, statistics gathering etc.
- Ensure that private sector operators are encouraged to cooperate on an informal basis
- Resolution of disputes:
 - Ensure that there is a procedure to resolve disputes that are within and outside the scope of the protocol
 - Ensure relevant time periods are in place to assure the expedient resolution of such dispute
 - Ensure that there is a mechanism to prevent hindrance to on-going and new investigations as a result of disputes between agencies
- Termination of protocol
 - Ensure that there is a method to revoke or terminate any protocol, if required
 - Place a notice period for the termination of such protocol
 - Ensure that the effect of termination of the protocol is clearly stated, including impact on JITs, MAGs, on-going investigations and cooperation
- Term or period of the protocol
- Identify the date on which protocol becomes effective
- Specify the term of protocol
- Provide an option for renewal, where necessary.

9.2 Amendments and supplements to the Protocols

- Specify a procedure for making amendments

- Identify how amendments can be made to the agreed protocol including the level of consensus required.