Third Annual PILON Cybercrime Workshop International Cooperation to Share Electronic Evidence and Combat Cybercrime 27 - 31 May 2019, Vanuatu

















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Challenge: e-evidence on ANY crime

Cybercrime

- Offences against computer systems and data
- Offences by means of computer systems and data

F Electronic evidence

- ► Any crime may involve evidence in electronic form on a computer system
- Needed in criminal proceedings
- ► No data, no evidence, no justice

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Assessment of international cooperation under the Budapest Convention (2014)

International requests for data

Types of data requested:

- 1. Subscriber information (80+%?)
- 2. Traffic data
- 3. Content data

Underlying offences

- 1. Fraud and other financial crimes
- 2. Violent and serious crime (murder, assaualt, trafficking, child abuse etc.)
- 3. Offences against computer systems

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Cybercrime and e-evidence: the problem of territory and jurisdiction

Where is the data, where is the evidence?
Who has the evidence?
Where is the boundary for LEA powers?

North
Pacific Ocean

South
Pacific Ocean

South
Ocean

- ► Transnational nature of cobercrime and e-evidence
- ► Crime and jurisdiction in cyberspace
- ► Need for public/private and international cooperation

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Crime and jurisdiction in cyberspace ► **Solutions**

Direct cooperation with service providers in other jurisdictions to obtain:

- Subscriber information
- Any data in emergency situations

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


Current system of direct requests to providers

	Requests for data directly sent to Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter and Oath in 2017		
Parties and Observers (70 States)	Received	Disclosure	%
Albania	27	14	53%
Australia	6 555	4 543	69%
Belgium	2 521	2 301	91%
Croatia	196	166	85%
France	29 400	18 466	63%
Germany	35 596	20 172	57%
Mauritius	2	0	0%
Morocco	30	18	59%
Portugal	3 569	2 394	67%
Senegal	2	0	0%
Turkey	8 618	4 739	55%
United Kingdom	31 954	23 073	72%
Total (excluding USA)	170 680	109 093	64%



Direct asymmetrical cooperation



Legal basis for processing? For transborder transfers?

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Direct cooperation with providers: some issues

- ECtHR: Case of Benedik vs. Slovenia (T-CY Discussion paper)
- Issues to addressed in domestic law:
 - Is subscriber information related to dynamic IP addresses "traffic data"?
 - Are dynamic IP addresses always linked to a specific communication and thus protected by telecommunication secrecy?
 - Data protection rules:
 - Is voluntary cooperation permitted?
 - · Risks for providers?
- Admissible as evidence?
- Sovereignty/territoriality and reciprocity

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Direct cooperation with providers: some issues

Direct cooperation with providers ► Practical measures (e.g. single points of contact, arrangements with providers) helpful but:

- ► Clearer domestic and international legal basis needed
 - ► Guidance Note Article 18 Budapest Convention
 - ► Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime

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Solutions: Guidance Note on Production Orders

Guidance Note on Article 18 Budapest Convention on production of subscriber information:

- <u>Domestic</u> production orders for subscriber information if a provider is in the territory of a Party even if data is stored in another jurisdiction (Article 18.1.a)
- <u>Domestic</u> production orders for subscriber information if a provider is NOT necessarily in the territory of a Party but is offering a service in the territory of the Party (Article 18.1.b)
- ► Foresee this in your domestic law



Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime

- A. Provisions for more efficient MLA
- Emergency MLA
- Joint investigations
- Video conferencing
- Language of requests
- Etc.
- B. Provisions for direct cooperation with providers in other jurisdictions
- C. Framework and safeguards for existing practices of extending searches transborder
- D. Safeguards/data protection

Negotiations:

Start - Sep 2017

End - 2020?

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