SURVEY ON THE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE

The provision of services in times of war and post-war recovery
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Council of Europe
Survey on the needs and priorities of local authorities of Ukraine. The provision of services in times of war and post-war recovery

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The survey Needs and priorities of local authorities of Ukraine. The provision of services in times of war and post-war recovery’ studies local authorities’ effectiveness and capacity to provide adequate services to the citizens in war conditions, analyses their efforts to collaborate with a wide range of stakeholders to mitigate the multiple crises, and enlightens the local authorities’ readiness to have a key role in Ukraine’s recovery.

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (Congress) commissioned this report in the framework of the Congress project “Strengthening local democratic governance in Ukraine” within the Priority Adjustments to the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine 2018-2022. The survey was conducted in close co-operation and with support of the Association of Ukrainian Cities (AUC).

The study was developed by experts Dr Oksana Huss and Dr Oleksandra Keudel, and the overall co-ordination was ensured by the Secretariat of the Congress. The authors are grateful to the survey respondents, interviewees and focus group participants for their time and dedication in sharing their practices, needs and challenges, thankful to Anastasiya Romany for supporting the desk research and to the Congress and the AUC for their support throughout the study.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Anticipatory governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>Association of Ukrainian Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMU</td>
<td>Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>District military administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Focus group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Local authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLG</td>
<td>Multi-level governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>Open government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIT</td>
<td>Personal income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Regional military administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

The Survey on the needs and priorities of local authorities in Ukraine. The provision of services in times of war and post-war recovery was conducted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (the Congress) and in close co-operation with the Association of Ukrainian Cities (AUC). The survey is designed along the two elements of anticipatory governance: foresight, and intergovernmental co-ordination; and the two elements of collaborative governance: public participation, and partnership networks with other municipalities within the country and abroad, which reinforce and enhance the resilience of local authorities in Ukraine.

The assessment of LAs’ (local authority) resilience in this survey confirms that local self-government authorities in Ukraine are a pillar of the national resilience in the multiple crises arising from the war. Despite high threats to security, the ongoing work of LAs ensured that public services respond to the current needs of citizens. LAs also provided adequate centres to manage crises and co-ordinate resources in line with the local situation. This finding indicates the importance of the decentralisation reform, which strengthened communities' political and fiscal powers and increased their efficiency.

The practices that significantly help most communities to withstand the challenges of the war times reflect those of anticipatory and collaborative governance, supported by digital technologies:

- Foresight: most respondents had emergency response plans and found them helpful. Noticeably, many communities use data for planning their policies. For example, they collected data on the number, demographics, and professional profile of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and on local availability of housing as a basis for their housing and integration policies towards IDPs.
- Vertical co-ordination: the exchange of information along the vertical governance takes place at a satisfactory rate. Especially RMAs (Regional Military Administration) provide helpful clarifications on the policy issues.
- Public participation: LAs in Ukraine increasingly realise that the complexity of war-related crises requires multi-stakeholder collaboration. They engage non-governmental stakeholders, such as residents, IDPs, and businesses, in a broader range of activities and more collaboratively.
- Horizontal intergovernmental collaboration via national associations of local and regional authorities and inter-municipal partnerships in Ukraine and with EU (European Union) municipalities is a helpful practice of resilience.
- Digital technologies facilitate stakeholder communication, data collection and provision of social and administrative services thanks to speed and agility, being prone to adapt to emerging needs.

LAs reported that the most urgent needs for external support are organising bomb shelters and accommodating IDPs. Considering the diverse crises co-occurring, communities expect speed and flexibility from international donor organisations and local ownership. To ensure resilient decision-making and service provision to citizens and vulnerable groups, the following challenges are in place:

- Foresight: the planning horizon for dealing with burning issues is extremely short and varies between six months to one year. As a result, solving one crisis may create another one as an unintended outcome. There is a need in supporting evidence-based policy-making that relies on relevant data.
- Vertical intergovernmental collaboration: the feedback loops between the central and local levels of government remain weak. The findings indicate a demand to improve
communication on the side of central authorities. In addition, bureaucratic hurdles did not decrease, hampering a quick and flexible reaction to crises.

- Public engagement: despite its benefits, public engagement may induce emotional pressures and overload LAs employees. The latter sentiment has increased compared to 2021. The emergence of businesses as partners in LAs problem-solving indicates a need for relevant dialogue platforms.

- Horizontal partnership: the international collaboration between LAs in Ukraine and other European countries needs support in establishing the first contact, which should be personal and in terms of intercultural communication.

- Digital support: in terms of digital technologies, the survey findings indicate an urgent need for the assistance of e-governance among small communities. About a third of communities need help setting up data protection policies to be protected from cyber-attacks.

**How to understand, aggregate and channel the needs of communities into the national political system and international assistance** emerges as a greater policy challenge for both central authorities and international partners. The advantage of LAs inclusion in national crisis management processes is their ability to quickly assess local needs on the ground and mobilise local resources. At the same time, many issues, such as the maintenance of electricity supply, education or healthcare facilities cannot be solved by LAs alone and require multi-level and stakeholder co-ordination. The latter needs to be as agile and quick as possible, considering the uncertainty of the war context. Therefore, intergovernmental co-ordination regarding war-related crisis management and post-war recovery should, on the one hand, account for local needs and capacities, but on the other hand, this must not overburden the multi-level system with unnecessary consultations. Therefore, the following solutions to this co-ordination dilemma are proposed as follows:

- Increase meaningful participation of associations of regional and local authorities in elaborating all legislative and policy proposals concerning self-government. To this end, it’s necessary to invest not only in the AUC but in developing capacities of other associations and establish dialogue platforms such as the one on open government.

- Provide (international) technical assistance to initiatives of co-operation between individual LAs (e.g., LAs coalitions) aimed at solving specific policy issues in networks' or intermunicipal partnerships. In the latter, consider the co-ordinating role of the district level, which potentially can help aggregate LAs interest and deliver it to regional/central authorities or international donors.

- Ensure communication between levels of authority via data. This would require a fundamental rethinking of the relations between LAs and some of the central authorities, such as the Tax Administration, where now exchange of information is virtually absent.

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1 The Platform for National–Local Dialogue on Open Government in Ukraine was established by the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Association of Ukrainian Cities (AUC), with the support of the Congress. Find more information in the Congress co-operation project website in Ukraine website: https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/co-operationactivitiesukraine

2 An example is the LA Integrity Network or National Platform for Resilience and Cohesion, supported by the EU: http://national-platform.org/

3 Note: in its current form, district level is under-resourced, making its self-governing and citizen representation functions impossible to execute. An alternative model for district self-government to be a representation of LAs rather than citizens directly, was discussed before the invasion.

1. Introduction

1.1 Aim and scope of the assessment

The Russian Federation full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 created many crises, such as massive displacement, destroyed critical infrastructure, and military occupation, to name only a few. The Ukrainian society proved surprising resilience in the asymmetric war. The local authorities are contributing to this resilience significantly. However, new challenges continuously emerge as the war goes on, such as providing sufficient bomb shelters, preparing for the winter season with limited access to energy and in the face of the ongoing destruction of the civilian infrastructure, economic recession, and unemployment, among many others. At the same time, all issues require urgent resolution at once.

This study aims to assess the needs and priorities of local authorities of Ukraine for the adequate provision of services, the effectiveness of local policies and policy-making processes in the conditions of war and related legislative change through the introduction of the martial law. This report builds on the theoretical foundations and empirical substantiation of resilience at the local level of governance in Ukraine while considering good and bad crisis management practices. The study also covers the analysis of LA’s capacities related to the interaction with peers in Ukraine and from other European countries, considering the efforts towards human rights protection and the development of collaboration mechanisms for citizen engagement.

The Congress commissioned this report in the framework of the Congress project “Strengthening local democratic governance in Ukraine” within the Priority Adjustments to the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine 2018-2022. The project aimed to improve the quality of local democracy in Ukraine by strengthening institutional frameworks and by supporting local authorities and their national associations in their efforts to promote ethical decision-making and more citizen-oriented, inclusive, responsive, and transparent local governance. This project has been restructured to match local and regional authorities’ humanitarian and social needs considering the consequences of the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine.

The survey was conducted in close co-operation and with support of the Association of Ukrainian Cities (AUC). The report’s findings are of a broader value, going beyond the wartime in Ukraine and beyond the geographical scope of Ukraine. These findings can serve as a basis for defining the role of LAs in the recovery of Ukraine, not only infrastructural but also institutional. It will help guide the Congress’ further actions and align the priorities of its political advocacy to the needs of the Ukrainian local authorities. In addition, the findings can inform the Congress’ actions in other countries to promote governance practices that increase resilience in crisis situations.

The report is structured in six parts: the introductory part provides a theoretical framework and methodology of the study; the second part presents the findings about the extent of the resilience of LAs in Ukraine; the third part lists supporting governance practices and demonstrates how they work; the fourth part elucidates the needs of LAs based on stated challenges and the analysis of limitations to supporting practices; the fifth part provides recommendations; and the final part discusses the outlook of these findings for a broader understanding of resilience and post-war recovery.

1.2 Local self-government in Ukraine: scope conditions for this study

The decentralisation reform, launched in 2014, resulted in profound changes in the territorial organisation of Ukraine and strengthened local self-government. Thanks to amalgamation, the number of territorial communities (hromadas) was reduced from 11 250 to 1 469 territorial communities, and the number of districts went from 490 to 136, while all 24 regions remain unchanged. The European Commission President praised the decentralisation reform as a “success” when delivering the positive Opinion on the EU Candidate Status for Ukraine.6 Decentralisation strengthened local self-government by granting extended competencies and fiscal autonomy to LAs. It also gave an impetus to more transparent and accountable,7 and increasingly collaborative local governance.8

The put into force of the Martial Law due to the full-scale Russian Federation’s invasion had implications for the multi-level governance (MLG) system in Ukraine. First, the powers of the community heads were expanded.9 Regional military administrations (RMA) were entrusted with the authority to organise the provision of social services,10 and communities were granted the possibility to use assets from special funds to meet emergency needs.11 Second, traditional democratic mechanisms have been suspended. All elections, referendums, protests, and strikes are forbidden during the imposition of the Martial Law.12 There are no legitimate possibilities to terminate the mandates of the community heads or deputies, whose powers were prohibited by law, by popular appeal. Finally, transparency has been curtailed: some drafts of local government acts do not need to be made public.13 Similarly, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) restricted the publication of open data14 and despite restrictions being later eased, some accountability-related data is still not open.

Together, these changes may provide for speed and some flexibility in decision-making and can be justified by security considerations. Still, these changes often increase agents’ discretion and weaken accountability in the MLG system. This report will show that collaborative governance practices of public engagement partially compensate for the lack of accountability and transparency tools.

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1.3. An analytical framework for the study of needs and challenges of local authorities

The assessment of challenges and needs, as well as capacities and practices, is informed by a literature review on resilience and a theoretical question: which forms of governance are supportive or limiting to resilience in a decentralised state? We define resilience as the capacity of local authorities to adjust and provide public services during the war despite external shocks and threats. The underlying assumption is that the two elements of anticipatory governance, foresight, and intergovernmental co-ordination; and the two elements of collaborative governance, public participation, and partnership networks with other municipalities within the country and abroad are helpful to reinforce and sustain the resilience of local authorities in Ukraine.

Anticipatory governance is an approach to policymaking that enables societies to respond to the double simultaneous challenge of acceleration and uncertainty, closely linked to national security. The focus is on foresight mechanisms to enable strategic planning, even in uncertainty, by considering multiple ways in which events can evolve and preparing for “multiple futures”. This approach also builds upon effective inter-governmental co-ordination, which is critical not only to ensure fast information flows between governmental agencies in a country but also to foster flexible policymaking, enabling rapid institutional reactions in a crisis situation, taking into account the needs and demands of both local and central levels of governance.

However, to properly respond to the crisis, collaborative efforts are required. Collaborative governance creates channels for other stakeholders, non-governmental and governmental, to contribute to the solutions with resources and local knowledge. This approach foresees strong communication and partnership-based relations between governments and non-state stakeholders. It also relies on the availability and use of national and international peer networks to find scarce resources, circulate information and learn from each other about how to adjust in a crisis.

Thus, the analysis in this study builds upon four fundamental mechanisms: foresight, intergovernmental vertical co-ordination, public engagement, and horizontal partnerships, all assisted by the fifth, digital technologies’ support, that may increase the resilience of a society in crises challenges that neither public authorities nor individual stakeholders can resolve on their own (see Figure 1).

---

**Figure 1: Analytical approach to the study of needs and challenges**

[Diagram showing the relationship between Anticipatory governance mechanisms (Foresight, Vertical intergovernmental co-ordination) and Collaborative governance mechanisms (Public engagement, Horizontal partnerships (local, national), with Resilience as the outcome. Supported by digital technologies.

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1. **Foresight** includes monitoring prospective events, providing timely warning, and preparing for several scenarios of how the events in a crisis may evolve. This is different from conventional governance, which is based on forecasting with the premise of stability and linear economic and social development. Instead, foresight aims to be prepared for future challenges while recognising the disruptive nature of upcoming crises. Worldwide, there are different forms of how authorities integrate foresight in their work, varying from foresight activities across governmental departments (integrated government foresight), to agile policy development or participation-based foresight, facilitated via ICT platforms. The use of relevant data plays a critical role in effective foresight.

2. **Vertical inter-governmental co-ordination** is a critical factor that is decisive in maintaining the resilience of the society in crisis, while the lack of it is damaging in a decentralised state. For example, conflicts among different levels of government over resource management, common in decentralised states, are a massive obstacle to managing crises. On the other hand, intergovernmental political culture, which is more collaborative, can ease political conflict and enable co-ordination in emergencies.

   Inter-governmental co-ordination relies on the availability of feedback loops. These are the mechanisms to collect and define the needs, conduct a comprehensive and fast assessment of ongoing policies, and respond to the identified demands by adjusting policies accordingly. Rapid co-ordination along power vertical (local-regional-national levels of governance) ensures a complete picture of a problem, i.e., having differentiated information of what is happening on the ground in different parts of the country simultaneously, integrating this information into decision-making, and co-ordinating the work towards solutions. For example, budgetary planning and spending regulations must provide flexible ways to allocate resources according to the needs on the local level, but at the same time, consider priorities for the expenditures on the national level.

3. **Public engagement** indicates a participatory approach to problem-solving. It is based on the recognition that the crises are too extensive to be resolved by the governments alone. This way of governance acknowledges that citizens can assist the state with resources and local knowledge. Broad public engagement, involving ordinary citizens, vulnerable groups, stakeholders from the private sector and civil society, mobilise the social capital and multiply available resources for problem-solving.

4. **Horizontal partnerships** between communities in Ukraine and abroad enable the circulation of ideas and knowledge and co-ordinate the demand and supply side to cover the needs of citizens and vulnerable groups.

5. Finally, **digital technologies assist** all four interconnected mechanisms and are critical for fast communication and efficient co-ordination. Data in its diverse forms can provide the basis for evidence-based foresight and strategic planning. Digital platforms and social media are critical to building networks. E-democracy tools improve communication about the needs and preferences of citizens, while e-governance improves the provision of public services. All these functions of digital technologies are critical to responding to crises, if appropriately managed, while acknowledging the risks of cyber warfare.

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1.4. Methodology

The findings in this report rely on the survey of Ukrainian communities fielded between 30 August and 20 September 2022. Two interviews and a focus group of three members of the Ukrainian delegation to the Congress informed the survey questionnaire. Focus group and interviews included participants from urban and rural communities, local and regional levels, and communities in different security situations (except occupied communities).

The survey dataset consisted of 241 responses, which is 16% of all communities in Ukraine. The survey results mostly reflect the practices and attitudes of communities with 50,000 residents or less, rural, and urban, as they comprise 86% of respondents. The remaining answers are almost equally distributed between medium-sized (50,000–100,000 residents) and large (100,000 residents and more) urban communities. Among the latter, there are 11 (of 24) regional centres, three of which were on the territory of hostilities (see Table 1).

Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the responding communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of community</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small (50,000 or less)</td>
<td>80 (33%)</td>
<td>128 (53%)</td>
<td>208 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (50,000 – 100,000)</td>
<td>14 (6%)</td>
<td>14 (6%)</td>
<td>14 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large (100,000 and more)</td>
<td>19 (8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>19 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>113 (47%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>128 (53%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>241 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: all % are from the total sample (No. = 241)*

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20 In total, we received 271 responses, out of which 29 were duplicates and 1 Insider for the analysis was provided by a municipal enterprise, not a community executive body. The cleaned version of the responses has been 20 containing 241 responses. This is twice more than the 2021 Baseline Assessment, with 126 responses. As a “rule of thumb”, a 20% response rate is considered acceptable for surveys.
2. Proven resilience of local authorities

Resilience has been defined as one of three principles of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, next to the principles of deterrence and collaboration with international partners. The Strategy defines resilience as the capacity of the society and the state to adjust to security challenges, quickly return to and maintain sustainable functioning. To assess the resilience of local authorities in Ukraine, we analysed the scope of their functioning and the speed of recovery regarding governance processes, legitimacy in crisis management, and the capacity to provide administrative services to the citizens.

2.1. Functioning of local authorities

Two-thirds of Ukrainian communities outside the combat areas or liberated at the time of the survey preserved their normal operations despite the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Out of this number, 28% never halted their functions, and 43% returned to normal operations within two weeks after the full-scale invasion or liberation (Table 3, Annex 1). The proportion of respondents who returned to normal operation in two weeks or less is even higher among the liberated communities (50%) (see Figure 2). Moreover, among the liberated communities, 17% reported never halting operations, meaning that the local authority was operational under occupation.

Figure 2: First response: resistance and return to routine

Note: No. outside combat areas = 192, No. liberated = 12, No. total = 204

Question: Over which timeframe after the full-scale invasion or after liberation (if your community was occupied) did local authority in your community return to routine operations (processes work, employees know what to do)?

---

2.2. Public and administrative services

All liberated communities and communities outside the combat zone provide administrative services, and most deliver all services (72%). Services are provided offline through the administrative service centres (94%) and their branches (51%) as well as via Diia app22 (77%). About a third of communities (28%) also have special registration centres for IDPs, and 20% also offer access to their administrative services via the community website.

There are disruptions to the provision of public services, such as water, heating, and sanitation, due to physical destruction or damage to the relevant infrastructure. It is the second largest damage category (USD 35 billion or 28% of total damage),23 severely affecting the liveability of municipalities. Among the destroyed or damaged objects of infrastructure, to date (September 2022), these damages are 335 boiler houses, 11 thermal power plants and three thermal power stations. Nevertheless, local authorities work to rehabilitate district heating networks and running water supply.24

Despite destructions, municipalities continue providing social services. In healthcare, direct documented damage to facilities is estimated at USD 1.6 billion; at least 978 facilities (primarily hospitals and outpatient clinics) were destroyed or damaged as of 1 September 2022.25 In education, at least 1,270 schools and 786 kindergartens were destroyed or damaged, while some schools are used as collective centres for IDPs.26 Nevertheless, 12,924 schools began their school year in September 2022, and 60% did so offline, while the rest went online.27 Power outages are a severe issue for the education process: frequent blackouts cut Internet and light, interrupting education even when there is no shelling.

2.3. Legitimacy in crisis

Ukrainian LAs enjoy the highest public trust after state and civil institutions responsible for security: 63% for mayors and 60% for councils.28 While managing an emergency, LAs sustain legitimacy in their decision-making and act based on decisions by their collegial bodies: the executive committee and the municipal council (82% each), followed by official recommendations of higher authorities (78%) (see Figure 3 below) below. Decisions of community heads and their managers or the RMA heads are less preferred (about 70% for each). At the same time, every second community had an algorithm for work in emergencies (54%).

22 Diia (Ukr Дiя, transl. “action”) is a portal and related App to provide digital administrative services to the public in Ukraine. It has been developed under the project “Digital state” to implement the digital transformation strategy in Ukraine. Diia was launched in 2020 and digitally complemented the administrative services provided offline through Centres of Administrative Services (Ukrainian) across Ukraine.https://plan2.dia.gov.ua/
23 KSE Institute. (2022). Report on Direct Damage to Infrastructure Due to the Military Aggression of Russia against Ukraine as of 1 September 2022 (in Ukrainian) (Kyiv, 2022), 3. https://damaged-de-ve-wordpress.eiuevedesite.net/
25 KSE Institute. (2022). Report on Direct Damage to Infrastructure Due to the Military Aggression of Russia against Ukraine as of 1 September 2022 (in Ukrainian), 7
26 FG, Delegation members
A unilateral decision-making by the community head was mentioned only by 17% of respondents as guiding crisis response, even though it is legally permitted for many matters under martial law. Following informal explanations in professional networks was the least followed guideline, even though at focus groups and interviews seeking peer advice this was mentioned as an essential ground to learn about adjustments to the procedures.

Most communities, which at the time of the survey were either outside combat areas or liberated, held their council meetings offline, the number approaching 80% for one to three months after the full-scale invasion (see Figure 4 and Table 4. Annex 1). Despite security concerns – the missile strikes were a serious threat throughout the reported period – very few communities moved their sessions online.

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)

Question: What was the format of the local council sessions during various periods after 24 February 2022? Check all that applies. Percentage may not add to 100%, since few respondents ticked both online and offline.
3. Supporting practices

Governance practices that significantly help most communities withstand the war times reveal mechanisms of anticipatory and collaborative governance. More than 50% of respondents selected seven practices out of the 17 proposed as helpful to respond to war-related crises (see the complete distribution of responses in Table 6, Annex 1). Communities marked ICT-based practices of public information channels and open data, elements of anticipatory governance such as planning for an emergency, including in scenarios (marked green in Figure 5) and mechanisms of collaborative governance such as horizontal partnerships and networks, including international ones (marked blue in Figure 5). The top four practices were also marked as helpful for communities under occupation and on the frontline. This chapter will present how these practices were useful and why they worked.

Figure 5: Most helpful governance practices in response to war-related challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Established public information channels (chatbots, social media channel)*</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in associations of local and regional authorities*</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of emergency response plans*</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established links with other communities in Ukraine*</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of open data</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International partnerships</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenarios for different developments in an emergency</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N° = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)
Question: Which of the following helps your community respond to the challenges of the war times and how significantly? Respondents could choose all that apply from 17 practices.
Options: helps significantly, helps insignificantly, does not help, there is no such practice. This Figure presents all options that received 50% or more of answers "helps significantly". Options marked* were also identified as helpful by communities who were at the frontline or occupied at the time of the survey (they had a list of 11 practices). See the complete list of practices in Table 6, Annex 1.

3.1. Foresight: emergency planning and use of data

LAs in Ukraine reported the availability of emergency response plans and scenarios for different developments in an emergency to help respond to war-related challenges. Emergency response plans have been helpful for almost 70% of LAs in responding to war-related difficulties, while 50% of them also mentioned scenario-based planning (see Figure 6 below). Yet, when asked about guidelines for action in an emergency, elaborated algorithms for emergency response are used only by 54% of LAs. The majority (82%) rely on the decisions of the council, which are more ad hoc (see Figure 3 above).
Figure 6: Utility of emergency and scenario planning for response to war-related challenges

Availability of emergency response plans helps significantly helps insignificantly doesn’t help no such practice

Scenarios for different developments in an emergency

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)
Question: Which of the following helps your community respond to the challenges of the war times and how significantly?
Options: helps significantly, helps insignificantly, does not help, there is no such practice.

The assessment of individual practices indicates the attempts of municipalities to respond to adverse events earlier by planning for contingencies and considerations of risks, by collaborating with non-governmental and governmental stakeholders.

Box 1: Examples of planning for contingencies:

- ensuring stable electricity for hospitals in case of an emergency with alternative energy sources, with U-LEAD (Dobrovelychkiv hromada in Kirovohrad oblast)29;
- ensuring heating for the winter by re-equipping boilers for Ukrainian and imported coal and transferring them from Russian to Ukrainian municipal ownership (Sumy)30;
- transferring a municipal thermal power plant away from gas to biofuel (Lviv, Zhytomyr)31;
- during consultative citizen meetings (“viche”), the community leadership and the residents agreed on locations where residents could find help in case of an emergency (Novoiarychiv village hromada, Lviv oblast).32

LAs reported to have the capacity to collect and analyse basic policy-relevant data to manage crisis. Ukrainian LAs (liberated communities and those outside combat areas) reported having capacity to collect their own data, for example, regarding IDPs: 78% of communities reported collecting demographic data on IDPs in their communities via registration upon arrival or in places of temporary accommodation, such as schools. Only 32% of respondents reported using data from the Ministry for Social Policy (see Table 17, Annex 1).

**Box 2: Examples of the analytic effort (use of data)**

To cope with emerging issues and cover the IDPs' and humanitarian needs nowand in the future, LAAs used:

- audit of municipal property to be turned into IDP housing (Shyrokiw hromada, Odesa oblast)\(^{33}\) and creating an e-database based on such an audit (Nekhvoreshchya village council, Poltava region)\(^{34}\)
- volunteer and client surveys for assessment of needs in humanitarian aid (Ternopil youth council, survey for youths; Kharkiv assesses needs of mothers and vulnerable groups) and number of potential volunteers (Fastiv youth council conducts surveys twice a week for volunteers and local youths on ways of improvement and their motivation to volunteer).\(^{35}\)

### 3.2. Vertical inter-governmental co-ordination: positive assessments of information exchange

A significant share of LAs in Ukraine reports **sufficient exchange of information** between them and the district military administrations (DMAs) (75%), them and central authorities (74%), while the best exchange is reported with the regional military administrations (RMAs) (88%) (all percentages are a sum of answers four and five, see Figure 7). When **assessing the quality of information**, regarding the most useful clarifications provided in a crisis, RMAs recognised for their timely clarifications on issues within their scope of responsibility (90%), followed by DMAs (68%). The Ministry of Digital Transformation leads the list of central authorities that provided the most accurate clarifications within their competencies (62% of respondents reported so), followed by the Ministry of Education (49%) and the Ministry of Communities and Territories Development (MinRegion) (52%) (Error! Reference source not found., Annex 1).

**Figure 7: Information exchange between LAs, DMAs, RMAs and central authorities**

![Information exchange chart]

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement (note: see statements 1-3 in the Figure). Choose one: 1 – fully disagree, 5 – fully agree, don’t know.

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35 Representatives of these communities presented these cases at the Round Table "Youth Engagement in Local Self-Government" (in Ukrainian), accessed 25 November 2022, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97myv2MCnk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97myv2MCnk).
Among the **mechanisms that facilitate** the vertical intergovernmental exchange of information in an emergency, respondents selected the Ukrainian associations of local and regional authorities as the most useful (70% selected this option). This was followed by informal talks between community heads (45%). Co-ordination councils or operative headquarters at the regional level (often at RMAs) were indicated only by every third respondent as useful (37%) (see Table 14, Annex 1).

### Box 3: Example of vertical policy co-ordination: Co-ordination Council at the Rivnenska RMA

If available, an intergovernmental council at the regional level can be critical to co-ordinate crises management among communities. For example, the Co-ordination Council under Rivne RMA, which includes all communities’ heads, was instrumental in managing the IDPs issues. It aggregated IDP-related statistics from communities, identified empty housing for relocation and issued a call among region residents for available apartments. It supervised relocation of companies and institutions.\(^{26}\)

### 3.3. Public engagement: collaboration with diverse publics for problem-solving

Most liberated communities and those outside the combat zone (160 of 204, or 78%) had initiatives to inform and engage the public after 24 February 2022 (see Table 5, Annex 1). In comparison to the previous year, however, LAs become more **pragmatic in their public participation initiatives**\(^{37}\) and recognise that public engagement can help LAs handle the complexity and resource shortage (see Figure 8 below). In the question about the purpose of public engagement, there is a striking increase compared to the 2021 Baseline Survey in the choices of an option “**attracting external resources**”: from 49% in 2021 to 88% in 2022. Moreover, almost all respondents indicated co-ordination of help (92%) and meeting the needs of vulnerable social groups (91%) as the primary purposes of their public engagement initiatives. The options like the inclusion of diverse opinions and engaging direct stakeholders gained fewer mentions as the primary purpose of public engagement (still high at 65% and 74%, respectively).

**Increasing community trust** remains one of the primary purposes for LAs, where public informing and participation initiatives received most mentions (at 87%, no change since the 2021 Baseline Survey on Open Government). LAs seem to feel responsible for **community cohesion** (marked primary purpose at 88%) and aspects of their communities’ emotional and social well-being. Reducing emotional pressures (85%) and information uncertainty (71%) are ranked high as the primary purpose of public engagement. **Anti-corruption** seems to be lower in priority. However, the value increased significantly compared to the 2021 Baseline Survey: from 47% in 2021 to 68% in 2022. This indicates LAs' sensitivity to the public demand for the integrity of government operations among these respondents.

\(^{26}\) FG, Rivne RMA

\(^{37}\) Although the answer options for the question on public engagement are not identical between 2021 and 2022 Congress surveys, we compare the variation in five categories that are matching
Figure 8: Purpose for public informing and engagement initiatives at times of war

![Bar chart showing purposes for informing and engagement initiatives]

Note: No. of opinions = 134, No. of needs of vulnerable groups = 150, No. of community cohesion = 153, No. of reduce fear = 147, No. of engage direct stakeholders = 143, No. of trust = 147, No. of anti-corruption = 139, No. of co-ordinate volunteers = 146, No. of attract resources = 145, No. of co-ordinate demand and supply = 149, No. of reduce chaos = 147.

Question: What was the purpose with which LA in your community introduced initiatives on informing and/or engaging citizens or businesses after 24 February 2022? Mark what was primary or secondary purpose or was irrelevant. Figures in white squares indicate change compared to the 2021 Baseline Survey (Figure 4 p. 22). Figure shows only “primary” responses.

Box 4: Examples of LAs’ mobilisation of community resources

Local authorities mobilise and co-ordinate resources of the residents through partnership. For example, local entrepreneurs, in collaboration with the authorities in Novoarychiv village council, Lviv oblast, provide a “social taxi” to residents and IDPs.38 Several communities outside the areas of hostilities organised food and equipment delivery for the affected communities (e.g., Kiptiv and Ponornysia in Chernihiv region baked bread for bordering occupied hromadas39). Mykhailivska hromada provided Zaporizhzhia maternity hospital with milk;40 Shyrokih vromada in Zaporizhzhia region provided bordering hromadas with food, medicine and hygiene items41).

Most respondents involved the public in solving the following critical problem: providing IDPs with food and personal items (51%) and housing (23%), followed by providing residents with food and personal items (13%) (respondents could select only one option, see Table 7 in Annex 1). Notably, accommodation for IDPs is among the top challenges, where LA need external support, and it seems that they seek it from the public and businesses. Indeed, when asked about stakeholder engagement in solving those mentioned critical problems, more communities than in the 2021 report to be involving stakeholders (up to +34 percentage points (p.p.) (see Figure 9 below).

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38 Decentralisation.gov.ua. ‘In the Novoarychiv Community, Showers and Laundry Rooms Were Built for the Displaced People – Video Comments of the Head of the Community (in Ukrainian)’


Figure 9: Stakeholder engagement in solving critical problems by the level of citizen participation

Note: No. = 160 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas, which confirmed having public informing and participation initiatives). Forms of engagement are grouped by levels of citizen participation according to the CoE Congress. The numbers above the columns show a change in percentage points (p.p.) compared to the 2021 Baseline Survey (the 2021 survey did not feature IDP category). Blue rectangles denote the most significant changes.

Question: Indicate which stakeholders and how they were involved in solving the problem you identified in the previous question. Multiple stakeholders could be selected.

LAs seem to appreciate the practical value of **partnership with stakeholders** in implementing solutions for war-related problems. There is a significant increase in stakeholder participation in **initiative implementation** (up to +30 percentage points (p.p.), depending on stakeholder), with **entrepreneurs** (+30 p.p.) and **residents** (+27 p.p.) seeing the highest increases as executors or coordinators of initiatives. LAs also reported increased importance of **feedback** from entrepreneurs, followed by citizens and NGOs for their decision-making (up to +25 p.p., depending on stakeholder).

**Residents** have the highest engagement rates by LAs, albeit they declined compared to the 2021 Baseline Survey. **IDPs** are also a fairly involved group in all types of participatory activities, except initiative implementation. **Entrepreneurs**, on the contrary, emerged as a stakeholder whose engagement in all levels of participation has gained traction. **Expert** involvement, conversely, declined noticeably (up to -21 p.p. depending on the level of participation). This finding aligns with the research on anticipatory governance, which uses the term “democratising knowledge,” which prioritises the engagement of ordinary citizens with very different values to face complex challenges.42

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**Box 5: Example of engagement of IDPs**

For **informing and consulting** with IDPs, some communities:

- developed roadmaps for integration of IDPs in their locality (e.g., Biliaiev hromada, Odesa oblast;\(^{43}\) Ternopil\(^{44}\));
- established consultation hotlines and physical spaces for communication with IDPs and getting their response and needs (e.g., Biliaiev hromada, Odesa oblast; “I am Mariupol” centres;\(^{45}\) Fastiv youth council, Kyiv oblast, members working in information centres;\(^{46}\) Humanitarian Centre in Shyrokiy hromada, Zaporizhia region; \(^{47}\) Unity for Victory consultation centre in Rivne for IDPs from Kreminskaya hromada, Luhansk region\(^{48}\)).

**Partnership** with IDPs was fruitful for integration of the relocated citizens and businesses in Zhytomyr. There, some IDPs with background in IT and international technical co-operation worked jointly with LAs. For example, a survey on the capacities and skills of IDPs was developed and conducted (via a chatbot, which they developed); a database of available housing was made too. Later, many survey participants were hired by the LA or other local organisations, including companies. Through this engagement, the relocated and local businesses also established contact.\(^{49}\)

**Pre-existing participatory practices** likely made it easier to collaborate with various stakeholders on war-related crises. Almost every second respondent marked public hearings and consultations as helping “significantly”. For a third of respondents, participatory budget is a helpful practice – even though no municipality started a new cycle this year. These findings indicate the advantage of open communication with stakeholders in that it gives the skill and establishes collaborative culture that can support emergency response.

**Figure 10: Supportive pre-existing practices of public engagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice of public hearings &amp; offline consultations</th>
<th>Helps significantly</th>
<th>Helps insignificantly</th>
<th>Doesn’t help</th>
<th>No such practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practice of participatory budget</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)

Question: Which of the following helps your community respond to the challenges of the war times and how significantly?

Options: helps significantly, helps insignificantly, does not help, there is no such practice.

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\(^{44}\) Interview, urban


\(^{46}\) Round Table “Youth Engagement in Local Self-Government” (in Ukrainian)

\(^{47}\) Decentralisation.gov.ua. ‘Where They Are Friendlier, There They Are Stronger. How the Shyrokiy Community Helps Neighbouring Communities during the War (in Ukrainian)’


\(^{49}\) FG, Zhytomyr, urban

27
Box 6: Example of adaptation of pre-existing participatory structures

Pre-existing official and informal consultation structures were adapted to co-ordinate in the emergency, for example:

- to co-ordinate humanitarian aid (e.g., Ternopil youth council for humanitarian aid co-ordination\(^{50}\) Centre for social services “Rodynne Kolo” [family circle] in Biliaiev village hromada in Odesa oblast\(^{51}\)),
- to ensure cohesion and co-ordinate actions in case of emergency and loss of mobile connection (e.g., use of an ancient consulting platform “viche” in Novoairyivchiv village hromada, Lviv oblast\(^{52}\)).

3.4. Horizontal partnerships: use of domestic and international links to cover material needs and knowledge exchange

Horizontal partnerships between communities in Ukraine and abroad have been helpful for circulating ideas and knowledge, as well as co-ordinating the demand and supply to cover the needs of citizens and vulnerable groups (see Figure 11).

More than half of the respondents marked the practices of networking, such as through associations and partnerships with local and international peers, as significantly helpful for dealing with war-related challenges. Every second community found the international partnerships as significantly helpful to respond to the challenges of the wartime.

Figure 11: Helpful practices of horizontal co-operation

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)
Question: Which of the following helps your community respond to the challenges of the war times and how significantly? Options: helps significantly, helps insignificantly, does not help, there is no such practice.

Ukrainian communities show high capability for mutual support, both directly and through their associations. Slightly more than half of the respondents (56%) reported having partnerships with other Ukrainian communities, with this ratio slightly higher among the liberated communities (67%). More than half of the respondents (54%) also strengthened their horizontal co-operation since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Personal connections (78%) and twinning agreements (43%) are the two most important mechanisms for establishing these partnerships (also, 25% of communities reported using them together). At the same time, most communities (108 of 115 communities) reported using these partnerships in response to war-related crises. As such, these

\(^{50}\) Round Table ‘Youth Engagement in Local Self-Government’ (in Ukrainian)
\(^{51}\) Decentralisation.gov.ua, ‘Art Therapy Classes Are Held in Odesa Region for IDPs in the Community (in Ukrainian)’
\(^{52}\) Decentralisation.gov.ua, ‘In the Novoairyivchiv Community, Showers and Laundry Rooms Were Built for the Displaced People – Video Comments of the Head of the Community (in Ukrainian)’
partnerships were beneficial to meeting humanitarian challenges such as providing food (82%) and medical assistance (54%) (see Table 11, Annex 1).

**Box 7: Example of practices of mutual support between communities in Ukraine**

LAs across Ukraine supported each other with advice and in-kind. For example, the heads of transport departments checked each other’s policies on how municipal transport should work during the air raids. Similarly, cyber security specialists routinely consult with each other in dedicated social media groups. In terms of in-kind support, municipalities provided technical support to each other (e.g., Slavuta offered liberated Borodyanka in Kyiv oblast mobile administrative service centres; reviving the water supply to Irpin, Kyiv oblast, was a collaborative effort of municipal water companies of the cities of Kyiv (Kyivvodokanal), Zhytomyr (Zhytomyrvodokanal), and the International Committee of the Red Cross in Ukraine). Other local authorities helped evacuating their peers from occupied territories (Kreminske hromada, Luhansk oblast, and Rivne).56

For the successful establishment of partnerships, personal contacts of LAs employees (62% of the sub-group with partnerships) and twinning agreements (56% of the sub-group with partnerships) were the most useful mechanisms. The third most common way was the international partners proactively reaching out to the Ukrainian communities (14% of the sub-group), with at least two partnerships established via cities4cities and one partnership via unitedfonia platforms. These results underscore the importance of where technical solutions like communication platforms can assist but cannot substitute personal contact. Twinning agreements, most likely, also reflect some level of interpersonal trust.

**Box 8: Examples of international horizontal partnerships of Ukrainian LAs**

Existing twinning and partnership initiatives:

- **Polish twin-cities of Lviv provided buses to increase mobility around the Lviv region and help with the transportation of Ukrainian refugees to Europe.**
- **European twin cities of the Ukrainian municipalities provide social aid, host refugees, and give equipment to Kyiv, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Boryslav, Chortkiv, Berdychiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kalush, Nadzirna, Odesa, Mykolaiv.**

Newest established commitments to date of publication, agreements and support were announced from the German City of Borna to help rebuild Irpin, from German City of Hamburg to rebuild Kyiv, Polish City of Gdansk to rebuild Mariupol, from Estonia to rebuild Zhytomyr region, from Denmark to rebuild Mykolaiv, or from the UK to rebuild Kyiv region, among many others.59

53 Interview, Ternopil, urban
55 Interview, Congress
56 Decentralisation.gov.ua, ‘The Kreminska Hromada from Luhansk Region Continues to Provide Services to Its Residents in the Occupation (in Ukrainian)”
3.5. Digital technologies: elements of e-governance to enable policy responses in an emergency

If available, communities assessed the elements of e-governance as helpful to respond to the challenges of the wartime: 81% reported that established public information channels (chatbots, social media channels) helped significantly to respond to the challenges of war (see Figure 12 below). Moreover, since the full-scale invasion, every fifth community (21% of respondents) either created or was working at the time of the survey on an ICT tool for overcoming war-related challenges. All of them are information tools: community websites, social media groups (Facebook and Telegram) and two chatbots (see Table 18, Annex 1). This finding that communities invest their time and resources into the creation of new communication channels under conditions of emergency, seconds the crucial role of direct communication channels between public authorities and citizens and the facilitating role of technology. It is important to note that the digital tools, similarly to the public engagement practices, had been adjusted to the new situation, and modified where necessary. Thus, the fact of availability and established practice was necessary but insufficient for a tool to be useful. It also requires additional resources, human, technical and financial capacities, to adjust the tools and practices flexibly (see Box 9).

Figure 12: Useful digital tools and related policy

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas). Question: Which of the following helps your community respond to the challenges of the war times and how significantly? Options: helps significantly, helps insignificantly, doesn’t help, no such practice.

Box 9: Example of legacy and new digital tools supporting emergency response

- “Smart village”, a solution for rapid data collection and open data publishing, helped evacuation. Coupled with Viber and Telegram chats, it smoothed and speeded up coordination even under occupation, and helped prevent panic thanks to timely citizen informing.60
- An online map of bomb shelters, which a community developed in line of its practice of publishing geodata, helped reduce panic among the residents on 24 February 2022, when the first shelling started.61
- Digital Customer Relationship Management systems (CRM) to track needs in and distribution of humanitarian aid among several warehouses (Kharkiv).62
- Some communities reported specifically using the software “Social hromada” for IDP data, although almost all communities use this software to process resident social service requests.63

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60 FG 2, rural, liberated community
61 Interview, Temopil, urban
62 Round Table “Youth Engagement in Local Self-Government” (in Ukrainian)
63 https://socgromada.io.gov.ua/#spreading
3.6. Summary of supporting practices

The following mechanisms of **anticipatory governance** help municipalities respond to war-related crises:

- Foresight: most respondents had emergency response plans and found them helpful. Noticeably many communities use data for planning their policies. For example, they collected data on the number, demographics, and professional profile of IDPs and on local availability of housing as a basis for their housing and integration policies towards IDPs.
- Vertical co-ordination: the exchange of information along the vertical governance takes place at a satisfactory rate. Especially RMAs provide helpful clarifications on the policy issues.

The following mechanisms of **collaborative governance** help municipalities respond to war-related crises:

- Public participation: LA in Ukraine increasingly realise that the complexity of war-related crises requires multi-stakeholder collaboration. They engage non-governmental stakeholders, such as residents, IDPs, and businesses, in a broader range of activities and more collaboratively.
- Horizontal intergovernmental collaboration via municipal associations and inter-municipal partnerships in Ukraine and with EU municipalities is a helpful practice of resilience.

**Digital technologies** facilitate stakeholder communication, data collection, and provision of social and administrative services thanks to speed and agility, being prone to adaptation to emerging needs.

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64 Although the answer options for the question on public engagement are not identical between 2021 and 2022 Congress surveys, we compare the variation in five categories that are matching. Thus, the variation in these categories in the baseline survey is between 47% and 87%, while in the present the survey for the same categories it is 65% and 87%. Moreover, the highest value in this survey is at 91%. These results should be taken with caution, however, as our sample is not statistically representative of the whole country’s LA as well as the sample is not identical to the one in the 2021 survey.
4. Needs and challenges

Following the presentation of policy priorities by LAs, this chapter outlines the needs and challenges of LAs related to mechanisms of anticipatory (foresight and vertical co-ordination) and collaborative (public engagement and horizontal collaboration) governance. The challenges to the use of digital technologies for governance complete this section.

4.1. External support of local authorities’ public service provision

Due to Russian Federation’s attacks on critical civilian infrastructure and housing, Ukrainian local authorities deal with co-occurring crises in service provision and civil defence virtually in every area of their competence. Most municipalities (between 64% and 74%) need external support for the organisation of bomb shelters, accommodation for IDPs and residents (who lost their houses) and overcoming unemployment (see Figure 13). More details on the most pertinent issues, relevant for more than 60% of communities, are provided below.

Figure 13: Priority areas for external support identified by LAs

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)
Question: Regarding which of the following challenges does local authority in your community need external support? 1 - needs the least support, 5 - needs the most support; irrelevant. The graph shows a sum of answers 4 and 5.

Bomb shelters are the priority issue for most respondents (74%). Alongside public bunkers and bunkers in residential buildings, the most common concern for the Ukrainian local authorities are bunkers at bomb shelters for schools. About 70% of schools reportedly feature bomb shelters, but there are reports of insufficient quality for continuing the education process. For example, some schools do not have bomb shelters for all students, some bomb shelters do not have toilets, and some schools use spaces that do not qualify for safety standards. Communities need financial support as many cannot afford to build capital structures out of reduced revenues. Additionally, bomb shelters need heating equipment and electricity generators for the winter.

Accommodation for IDPs and residents (68%). Specific challenges include physical damage, precarity and winterisation of accommodation. Physical damage to and destruction of housing is the largest share of estimated losses of Ukraine, summing up to USD 50.5 billion (or 40% of total material

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65 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2022). The Prime Minister gave the task of creating a working group to implement the project of equipping educational institutions with bomb shelters (in Ukrainian). 16 September 2022, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/premier-ministri-day-zaydanna-stvorty-robochu-hrupuz-realizatsii-proektuoblashhtuvanniazakhladiv-osvityzakhysnymy-ukryttiamy

losses).⁶⁷ Among an estimated 6.2 million persons internally displaced within Ukraine as of September 2022,⁶⁸ 7% still lived in collective centres (often schools or medical centres) or with kind strangers. Significant shares of IDPs, especially in the East and West microregions (22% and 18%, respectively), do not have appropriate housing for the winter.⁶⁹ For some of the underpopulated municipalities, providing such accommodation is a humanitarian and pragmatic need to ensure that working IDPs would stay in the municipality.⁷⁰

**Overcoming unemployment (64%).** This issue is critical for local economic development and the ability of the local authorities to cater for the growing social needs, as their revenues depend on the personal income tax (PIT). Without official statistics, about 50% of respondents in a representative survey reported a job loss. SMEs report having released more than one million employees.⁷¹ The issue of IDPs integration, relevant for 56% of respondents, is primarily about their employment. The State Relocation Programme for Enterprises is one of the means to tackle the lack of local revenue and unemployment.⁷²

**Meeting humanitarian needs is relevant regarding IDPs and residents (61%).** Medicine and hygiene items remain priority needs of civilians no matter their migration status, only surpassed by a need for cash (which would also be spent chiefly for food). With winter coming, solid fuel and heating appliances are also urgent. Among IDPs, these needs are, however, more pressing.⁷³ It is not least because of a high proportion of households with vulnerable members among IDPs: e.g., 57% have children under 17 years old, 30% have chronically ill family members and 39% have elderly members (above 60 years old).⁷⁴ Often, LAs must solve humanitarian support and accommodation issues simultaneously for the new arrivals from the area of hostilities.

When asked about the preferred **forms of external (international) support**, LAs prioritised support in response to specific needs (e.g. for equipment) (77%) and provision of social support and humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups (74%), followed by support for alternative energy sources (53%). A significant portion of LAs also marked help in rehabilitating veterans (45%) and integrating stimuli for economic development as part of the preferred donor support (44%).

**Ukrainian communities expect local ownership and speeding up decisions and operations of international partners.** Communities report slow reactions to requests for help (31%) and lack of flexibility when needs change (26%) as negative practices in international aid. At the same time, 39% pointed to no negative practices (see Table 15, Annex 1).

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⁶⁷ KSE Institute, “Report on Direct Damage to Infrastructure Due to the Military Aggression of Russia against Ukraine as of 1 September 2022 (in Ukrainian),” 3
⁶⁹ IOM, 8
⁷⁰ Interview, Novovolynsk, September 2022.
⁷³ IOM. ‘Ukraine Internal Displacement Report. Round 9, 26 September 2022’, 7
⁷⁴ IOM, 5
4.2. **Foresight: short-sighted planning and technical limitations on the use of data for policy planning**

The main challenge to effective foresight is missing or **short-sighted planning**. A sustainable recovery process requires thinking beyond the current crises while handling ongoing emergencies, even though it is extremely challenging at the moment. The most common planning horizon (37%-41% of respondents) varies between six months and a year (see Figure 15). Reacting instead of anticipating leads, as a rule, from one crisis to another. For example, in the focus group some community representatives reported placing IDPs at schools to resolve the emergency. In a couple of months, they faced the urgency of relocating the IDPs to prepare the schools for the education year.

**Figure 15: Planning horizon of Ukrainian LAs**

*Note: No. of IDP integration = 191, No. of IDP accommodation = 192, No. of infrastructure rebuilding = 183, No. of energy supply = 187, No. of education process adapting = 190 (all liberated communities and those outside combat areas). The data labels show the most common planning horizon for a policy field.*

**Question:** For what time period does the local authority do planning regarding the following issues?
In contrast, the communities that did more strategic planning (11% among respondents planned for three and more years), considering internal migration as an opportunity, were searching for more sustainable solutions for housing, business relocation, etc. They put a significant effort into establishing communication channels with IDPs immediately upon their arrival (e.g., invited to join the relevant groups on social media), collecting systematic feedback from IDPs or engaging them in problem-solving. Especially for heating, energy supply and recovery of municipal infrastructure, the short planning horizons of most municipalities (20% and 14%, respectively) lead to long-term vulnerability to blackout and shortage of essential services (water, electricity).

Another limitation to foresight is access to reliable data for planning emergency responses. For example, access to data by employees of service centres is a main challenge when responding to IDP needs barred access to state registers (67%), including access to data on IDPs registered via the Dilia app, and to community registers (28%). Because of missing data, LAs had difficulty estimating the number and needs of IDPs and adjusting their response. This challenge directly connects to the next mechanism of anticipatory governance, vertical intergovernmental co-ordination.

4.3. Vertical co-ordination: lack of feedback loops and explanation of limitations on local authorities’ powers

The collaborative culture of intergovernmental co-ordination is critical to building resilience in a decentralised state. It is, therefore, an alarming finding that over half of LAs do not perceive co-ordination with central authorities as effective. Even more, 50% disagree that LAs can influence the decisions of central authorities. Finally, only about a third (29%) of communities agree that central authorities respond to their feedback (see Figure 16). These results probably mean that central authorities co-ordinate with some local authorities at best, and the rest of the LAs remain uninformed of the outcomes of this co-ordination.

Finally, almost half of the respondents (48%) perceive no decrease in bureaucratic hurdles in decision-making along the vertical power. At the same time, several respondents used open questions in the survey to bring up the need to reduce bureaucratic hurdles.

Figure 16: LAs interaction with central authorities: co-ordination, influence, and feedback

| LA & central authorities coordinate on strategic decisions | 12% | 16% | 24% | 19% | 26% | 15% | 4% |
| LAs can influence decisions of central authorities | 26% | 24% | 24% | 10% | 16% | 8% |
| Central authorities respond to LAs’ feedback about governmental decisions | 8% | 14% | 30% | 18% | 11% | 20% |
| Bureaucratic hurdles in making government decisions along the power vertical decreased | 19% | 29% | 13% | 14% | 9% | 15% |

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)
Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement (note: see statements 1-4 in the Figure). Choose one: 1 – fully disagree, 5 – fully agree, don’t know

75 For example, new businesses contribute to the local budget through the personal income tax (PIT), or new pupils at schools allow requesting higher subventions from the central level
Most LAs considered that limitations imposed to their powers by higher levels of government were justified as a response to the war. However, there is still a need for better and more effective consultation, as well as political and institutional dialogue between the central government and LAs, especially in view of more controversial issues, such as budgetary restrictions that limit the autonomy of LAs. While 40% reported no unjustified limitations imposed on the LAs’ powers, every fourth of LAs perceived the opposite, suggesting that there may be a need to provide a credible explanation of the rationale for limitations on LAs’ powers. This refers to the restriction of LAs access to national data registers (61% reported that this measure limited their powers) and budgetary constraints (47% said that these restrictions are NOT justified at times of war). Closure of access to open data, on the contrary, is considered justified by most respondents (77%) (see Figure 17).

Figure 17: Intergovernmental relations and powers of LAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the conditions of war, there is an unjustified attack on the powers of LAs</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>15%</th>
<th>26%</th>
<th>17%</th>
<th>9%</th>
<th>8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closure of access to registers limits the LA abilities to exercise their powers</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary restrictions on LA are justified under war conditions</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing open data is justified at the time of war</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 204 liberated communities and those outside combat areas
Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement (note: see statements 1-4 on the Figure). Choose one: 1 – fully disagree, 5 – fully agree, don’t know

Box 10: Vertical co-ordination: LA perceive financial restrictions as limiting their powers

Among the decisions of central authorities that limit LAs autonomy, those related to financial resources and their disposal within the framework of their powers are the most pressing issue. Prioritisation of expenditure transactions to be released by the State Treasury Service de facto limits the fiscal autonomy of LAs. Every second LA stated that budgetary restrictions are not justified, while every third expressed the absolute disagreement with the restrictions. In addition, the interviews and focus group contained complaints that some LAs could not invest in capital construction of bomb shelters because the Resolution of the CMU of 09.06.2021 No. 590 prioritised maintenance works and the State Treasury wouldn’t release these payments, respectively. After complaints and advocacy by the associations of local and regional authorities (notably, the AUC), the Resolution was updated.

The communication process between the LAs and the State Treasury Service also needs improvement: only 37% of respondents reported that State Treasury Service provided sufficient clarification for issues within its scope of responsibility. This is rather low considering the magnitude of the impact of the budgetary restrictions on the daily operations of LAs (also to be noted that for RMAs, whose decisions are also relevant for day-to-day LAs’ operations, this figure is 90%) (see Error! Reference source not found., Annex 1).

76 Access to the national registers was one of the issues, raised already in the Roadmap for Development of Open Government and E-Governance at the Local Level in Ukraine, March 2020.
77 Regulation on execution of powers by the State Treasury Service in a special regime under martial law, approved by Resolution of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 09.06.2021 № 590: [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/590-2021-%D0%BFText](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/590-2021-%D0%BFText)
4.4. Public engagement: limits to institutional and human capacities of local authorities

Public engagement is one of the most vital elements of LAs resilience. At the same time, the changes in stakeholder composition with the increased role of businesses, requires adjustment of institutional set-up to collect their inputs. Pre-existing dialogue platforms with businesses have helped many municipalities to cope with the emergencies, but almost 50% of respondents do not have them (see Figure 18). This gap can be addressed with external support. A dialogue platform with businesses at the local level is even more relevant for the issue of recovery, to make sure that it utilises local entrepreneurial potential and is transparent and accountable.

**Figure 18: Limitations to engagement of local businesses in emergency response**

The main challenges to the process of public engagement touch upon the **human limitations of working under extreme stress**. As adverse outcomes of public engagement, LAs mostly noted emotional pressure due to the spread of rumours (59%). Overload of responsible employees (51%) is the second most cited negative outcome, which is a substantial increase compared to the 2021 Baseline Survey (+18 p.p.). At the same time, about a quarter of communities (23%) with participatory initiatives reported no adverse outcomes, a slight increase from 2021 (+10 p.p.). Interestingly, compared to the 2021 Baseline Survey, significantly fewer communities (9%, which is -22 p.p.) reported misuse of the process of participation for private rather than public gain by interest groups (see Table 8, Annex 1).
4.5. Horizontal partnerships: local authorities need facilitation and better communication skills for international partnerships

Ukrainian municipalities need support in establishing horizontal municipal partnerships abroad, as about 35% of respondents did not have them. At the same time, communities with international partnerships found that they helped significantly to tackle war-related crises (see Figure 11).

Facilitation of inter-municipal networking and support for communication skills can boost international partnerships. Assistance is especially needed for establishing the first personal contact between municipal officials. Failure to establish the first contact accounts for the failure to develop new partnerships among 49% of those who tried to find new municipal partners after 24 February 2022 (see Figure 19).

Figure 19: Challenges to establishing partnerships with European municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did not try</th>
<th>Tried but failed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It wasn’t the right time</td>
<td>We didn’t manage to establish a first contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We don’t know how to search for international partners</td>
<td>Communication with potential partners didn’t work out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was no need</td>
<td>Language barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We don’t speak foreign languages</td>
<td>Different visions of partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. “tried but failed” = 39, No. “did not try” = 94
Question: In your opinion, what prevented the establishment of new partnerships after 24 February 2022? Why did LAs of your community not try to develop new partnerships after 24 February 2022?

Lack of communication skills is a significant obstacle to horizontal international partnerships. Not knowing how to search for an international partner was relevant for approximately 50% of respondents who did not try to find new partners. When communities tried but failed, 23% reported that communication did not work between potential partners. 10% said the language barrier was an obstacle to either searching for partnerships or failing to establish them (see Figure 19 above). Support by providing translators as part of partnership facilitation could solve this issue in the short term.

Box 11: Example of facilitation for a horizontal international partnership

- There are cases of advocacy work of the state authorities for the municipalities. For example, the Kyiv RMA established the first contact with Cesvi (Italian humanitarian NGO) for rebuilding Bucha, from which the Cesvi-Bucha partnership was established.78
- Matching platforms by international organisations for the Ukrainian and other European municipalities: the Congress launched the cities4cities platform together with the city of Sindelfingen, German Association of Municipalities and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR),79 or SALAR International launched a partnership-support platform with its own team in Ukraine “United for Ukraine”80

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79 https://www.cities4cities.eu/
80 https://unitedforua.org/
4.6. Digital technologies: policy and technical challenges

Survey findings indicate an urgent need for assistance on e-governance among small communities. A significant share of the responding communities did not fully implement available e-governance policies and tools. Given the recent nature of the digital transformation in Ukraine\textsuperscript{81} and the low response rate of large cities (100,000+), this result is not surprising. It is highly alarming, especially under war conditions, that every third community has no data protection policies, while half of the respondents found these policies significantly helpful.\textsuperscript{82} Moreover, about a quarter of respondents expressly indicated a need for external support in storing and protecting their data (Figure 13). Similarly, considering the usefulness of internal e-document systems for nearly a third of respondents, it is a challenge to crisis management when about 50% of communities do not have such a system. About 20% of respondents expressly indicated that a non-functioning e-documentation system is a challenge to administrative service provision (Table 10 in Annex 1).

Most LAs face various technical challenges for routine governance processes, while 39% reported no technical challenges. The most-mentioned technical challenge is a lack of equipment such as notebooks and printers (37%). Automation of data exchange within an LA (23%), lack of data (18%) and low data quality (9%) follow the lack of equipment. Thus, most communities do not note issues with data availability and quality (Table 16 in Annex 1). This may also indicate that they do not rely on data in their decisions (Figure 20 below).

Figure 20: E-governance practices and LAs response to war-related challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-government platform</th>
<th>LA experience</th>
<th>Elaborated data protection policies</th>
<th>Internal e-document system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)

Question: Which of the following helps your community respond to the challenges of the war times and how significantly? Options: helps significantly, helps insignificantly, does not help, there is no such practice.

\textsuperscript{81} e.g., the e-portal for the administrative services Dixa was launched in 2020 and the Trembita system for interoperability of databases, launched in 2019, is still in the process of implementation, while only 165 public authorities on the national and local levels of governance were connected to the system: \url{https://euddigitalua.eu/news/trembita-gov-ua-zvit-za-2-kyvartal-2022-roku/}

\textsuperscript{82} In the base-line survey in 2021, 56% of respondents marked data protection as a challenge they are facing in digital participatory initiatives
4.7. Summary of needs and challenges

LA reported the most urgent needs for external support are organising bomb shelters and accommodating IDPs. In light of the multiple crises co-occurring, communities expect swiftness and flexibility from international donor organisations and local ownership.

Anticipatory governance faces the following challenges:

- Foresight: planning horizon for dealing with burning issues is extremely short and varies between 6 months to 1 year. As a result, solving one crisis may create another one as an unintended outcome.

- Vertical intergovernmental collaboration: the feedback loops between the central and local levels of government remain weak. The findings indicate a demand to improve communication on the side of central authorities. In addition, bureaucratic hurdles did not decrease, and they hamper a quick and flexible reaction to crises massively.

Collaborative governance faces the following challenges:

- Public engagement: despite its benefits, public engagement may induce emotional pressures and overload of LA employees. The latter sentiment has increased compared to 2021. The emergence of businesses as partners in LA problem-solving indicates a need for relevant dialogue platforms.

- Horizontal partnership: the international collaboration between LA in Ukraine and other European countries needs support in establishing the first contact, which should be personal and in terms of intercultural communication.

In terms of digital technologies, survey findings indicate an urgent need for assistance on e-governance among small communities. About a third of communities need help in setting up data protection policies to protect communities from cyber-attacks.
5. Recommendations for stakeholders

The assessment of LAs’ practices of crisis management in this survey confirms the widespread assumption that local self-government authorities in Ukraine are the backbone of national resilience in crises arising from the war. The ongoing work of LAs under high-security threats ensured the adequacy of public services to the current needs of citizens and provided legitimate centres to manage crises and co-ordinate resources in line with the local context. This highlights the importance of the decentralisation reform, which strengthened communities’ political authority and fiscal autonomy, which has increased their efficiency.

This report surveyed local authorities about their governance practices that can sustain resilience and their needs and challenges in implementing those practices. The findings indicate that elements of collaborative governance, both with citizens, businesses, and other communities in Ukraine and abroad, are crucial to withstand the war. At the same time, the survey indicated some weak spots in anticipatory governance practices that should be strengthened. The latter is especially important considering a new law that foresees municipalities to develop planning strategies for reconstruction and development and align them with national and regional strategies.\(^3\) In this area, external assistance from international partners and Ukrainian central authorities will be helpful. The following recommendations are based on the needs and challenges identified through the survey data and stakeholder interviews and focus groups. While most of these recommendations require cross-sectoral collaboration for their implementation, they are arranged by the primary stakeholders, meaning those who have an interest and authority to drive the implementation of these recommendations.

5.1. Ukrainian local authorities

- **To ensure ongoing, effective, and legitimate policymaking** even in case of a protracted war, include foresight as a standard planning approach. LAs can develop staff’s **foresight skills** for:
  - development of **emergency plans** and scenarios for those who lack them; and
  - extending the **strategic planning horizon** beyond six months.

- **Sustain the role of national associations of local and regional authorities** because they proved to be the most potent mechanism for information exchange between communities (marked by 70% of respondents) and provider of sufficient clarifications on crises-related issues.

- Through associations or other forms of collective representation of LAs interests, work towards **network-based collaboration with the Government of Ukraine**. Consider advocating for an institutionalised channel, through which central and local authorities can exchange on the situation in the field and co-create response policies. An example is the Platform on National-Local Dialogue on Open Government in Ukraine.\(^4\)

- **Extend e-governance**, especially in small communities.\(^5\) This includes technical and professional capacity development regarding:
  - **data protection**, especially under conditions of cyber warfare;
  - **evidence-based decision-making**, given that LA prefer their primary data collection (e.g. IDP crisis management). This includes understanding which data to collect, how to collect

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\(^4\) https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/platform-for-national-local-dialogue-on-open-government-in-ukraine

\(^5\) This finding corroborates recommendations in the baseline report 2021, that came to the same conclusion with a different data. In terms of capacity building, there is a massive online course Smart Hromada, co-created by many experts, with highly relevant content, that can be used as a basis for the offline trainings and technical support. https://courses.prometheus.org.ua/courses/course-v1:CID+SC101+2020_T1/about?fbclid=IwAR253fNSCOdacsNHPfJbzb4IKBIA12L2izRy57VZ2W1V0EF7bXVTiEVprT
and store the data, and how to analyse the data so that it is supportive of local and central policymaking process;
  o where missing, introduce **electronic documentation**, a part of Ukraine’s digital transformation strategy.

- Maintain **anti-corruption mechanisms** as a cross-cutting intervention in all governance processes to avoid unintended consequences of misuse of public participation by interest groups for their private rather than public interest.\(^{86}\)

- Following assistance can prevent some unintended outcomes of participation:
  - emotional pressure due to spread of rumours indicates an urgent **need of facilitators and moderators for public communication**. These skills can be trained, including with the support of international partners;
  - overload of responsible employees can be mitigated through the integration of **e-participation tools** that help co-ordinate the interactions.

- For the upcoming National Action Plan for the implementation of Open Government Initiative, consider a commitment to **transparent and accountable business engagement**. While business emerges as a visible stakeholder for engagement, and it is safe to expect its importance to grow, considering that private resources will be crucial for recovery, safeguards should be brought in place to pre-empt political-business entanglements. This feature was conducive to corruption in Ukraine at the local level before the full-scale invasion.\(^{87}^{88}\)

### 5.2. International partners and donors

- Provide local authorities with technical support for **sectoral issues**, starting from those where LA indicate the need for more external help: bomb shelters and physical security, including that of critical infrastructure more broadly, integration and support for IDPs, and tackling unemployment. Building skills for anticipation and collaborative governance should accompany technical support.

- Strengthen ongoing support for **e-governance** in Ukraine. Especially for smaller communities, capacity-building interventions should focus on data protection policies, evidence-based policymaking, and introduction of e-documentation. When present, the respondents marked these practices as useful.

- There are aspirations among communities to develop **IT communication platforms and tools** to improve the exchange of information in a crisis. Capacity building in this regard can include a repository supporting LA methodologically and technically in building an accessible and user-friendly communication platform.\(^{89}\)

- Facilitate **network-based collaboration between LA and the Government of Ukraine**, and other central authorities where relevant, for flexible exchange of feedbacks in emergencies and ensuring the voice of LA in designing central policies that affect LA powers. The Congress’

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\(^{86}\)Given that public participation in solving war-related crises is relatively fresh experience, only 9% of respondents reported misuse of participatory process for private interest. At the same time, in 2021 Baseline Survey every third community reported this, therefore there is a risk that abuse might be increasing, and anti-corruption mechanisms should be installed preemptly


\(^{87}88\) Forms of such an engagement have been tried elsewhere in Ukraine: The Council for Competitiveness in Lviv focused specifically on consultations with the local business, crucial for economic development; a model of a City of Content from Vinnytsia, although used for CSO engagement and recognized in OGP Local, can be adjusted to business platform.

\(^{89}\) E.g., In Ukraine, there are platforms on a software-as-a-service basis, which spare LAs’ effort of developing own e-democracy solutions: [https://e-dem.ua](https://e-dem.ua); on Dia.Digital Hromada there is a marketplace of solutions from private providers, from which communities can select: [https://market.hromada.gov.ua](https://market.hromada.gov.ua); Base on international cases, Renow repository in Luxemburg might be considered as an example for further inspiration [https://renow.public.lu/fr.html](https://renow.public.lu/fr.html)
facilitation of the Platform on National-Local Dialogue on Open Government in Ukraine is an example of an international support of this type.

- Continue supporting **public engagement** initiatives, as they are critical to crises management, according to the survey.
  - Support **collaborative trends in local public participation** based on partnership thinking instead of client-service oriented, when designing recovery programs. For example, recovery grants may be conditioned on cross-sectoral partnerships.
  - The practices of multi-stakeholder engagement by LA for crisis management in Ukraine can be developed as a reference point for other countries on how to increase their resilience in the face of crises connected to environmental, economic, and technological disruptions.
  - The qualitative survey data can be supported by individual case studies exploring how exactly public engagement with different stakeholders occurs, which communication tools and co-ordination mechanisms are in place, etc.

- **Highlight the added value of international partnerships** between communities, as many do not perceive it as a feasible support in a crisis. This can be done by sharing good practices in terms of practicalities, how an international partnership was established, and the outcomes of a partnership.

- **Provide space for face-to-face meetings and professional exchange** among peers, especially for international partnerships, given the importance of personal connections and interpersonal trust.

- **Support facilitation and trust-building** between Ukrainian and international communities, as the partnership attempts fail because of communication in most cases.

### 5.3. Central authorities

- **Improve responsiveness and feedback to local authorities and strengthen the dialogue.** LAs perceive their ability to influence strategic decisions as low. There is a need to clarify restrictions that can potentially hamper the exercise of LAs' powers, such as the closure of access to **registers** and the resolution on prioritisation of budgetary expenses. Absent clarifications, such as certain regulations, are perceived as unjustified. It should be considered establishing a dialogue platform, through which LAs' feedback can be systematically included into government decisions.

- **Decrease bureaucratic hurdles** in enlarging government decisions along the vertical power, where possible, promoting multi-level governance, as LAs perceived these hurdles as high and hampering flexibility.

- **Avoid duplications in the work of DMAs and RMAs**, especially when it comes to requests for reporting (e.g., on humanitarian aid), as this may increase the efficiency of LAs.

- **Foster co-ordination and feedback loops** of LAs with regards to **opening the registers** because access to some of them is crucial to sustaining administrative service provision.
6. Outlook

The survey findings have broader implications for understanding resilience in a crisis, going beyond Ukraine’s borders. First, they challenge conventional security thinking in mere military terms. Instead, the findings highlight the importance of new modes of governance, such as anticipatory and collaborative governance, for facing critical disruptions and managing complex crises. New ways of thinking about policymaking include flexibility-oriented instead of stability-oriented, network-based instead of hierarchy-based, and partnership-oriented instead of client-service-oriented approaches in citizen-state relations.

Second, for recovery, the findings demonstrate that local authorities in Ukraine are capable partners for national authorities and international donors for recovery processes. The international community emphasizes the need of transparent and accountable use of recovery funds for infrastructure.  

Local authorities already have mechanisms for transparent and responsible governance, while their collaborative practices have been strengthened after the full-scale invasion. Therefore, they have the tools to source their residents’ needs and report back; due to proximity to residents, they are also well-placed to be driven to the account by the active Ukrainian civil society. The Parliament approved the law that requires municipalities to develop planning strategies for reconstruction and development and to align them with those at regional and national level. This requirement is an opportunity to foster anticipatory governance in Ukraine regarding post-war recovery.

Finally, concerning the institutional design, these findings highlight that even the most impressive peoples’ activism and engagement requires institutions that make the engagement possible, facilitate it and channelise to multiply the effort. The decentralisation reform created incentives for local authorities to engage citizens and create conducive for citizens to influence the local redistribution of public resources. This indicates the urgency to support and strengthen decentralisation, especially under war conditions.

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7. Annex

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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the responding communities by type and security status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community security status</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban small</th>
<th>Urban medium</th>
<th>Urban large</th>
<th>Total row</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberated</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>12 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is on temporarily occupied territory</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is on the territory of hostilities</td>
<td>16 (7%)</td>
<td>13 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>34 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside combat areas</td>
<td>103 (43%)</td>
<td>64 (27%)</td>
<td>10 (4%)</td>
<td>15 (6%)</td>
<td>192 (80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total column</strong></td>
<td><strong>128 (53%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>80 (33%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>14 (6%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>19 (8%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>241 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: all % are from the total number of responses (No. = 241)

Table 3: Resistance and bouncing back by the type of a community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities outside combat areas</th>
<th>Liberated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations never halted</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 2 weeks or less</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 3-4 weeks</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 1-3 months</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 5-4 months</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noroutine yet</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. total outside combat areas = 192; No. urban outside combat areas = 89; No. rural outside combat areas = 103; No. total liberated = 12; No. urban liberated = 4; No. rural liberated = 8

Question: Over which timeframe after the full-scale invasion or after liberation (if your community was occupied) did local authority return to routine operations (processes work, employees know what to do)?
Table 4: Detailed breakdown of holding council sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Up to 2 weeks</th>
<th>3-4 weeks</th>
<th>1-3 months</th>
<th>5+ months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Online%</td>
<td>Offline%</td>
<td>No sessions were held</td>
<td>Online%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberated</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities outside combat areas</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. n liberated = 12, No. outside combat areas = 192. Important: since we do not track the exact timeline of occupation for each community, high numbers of offline sessions probably reflect the periods when liberated communities were either not occupied yet or already liberated.

Question: What was the format of the local council sessions during various periods after 24 February 2022? Check all that applies. % may not add to 100%, because few answers ticked ‘online’ & ‘offline’.

Table 5: Public informing and citizen participation initiatives after 24 February 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communities total</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberated</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside combat areas</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. total = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas); No. urban = 93, No. rural = 111; No. liberated = 12, No. outside combat areas = 192

Question: Were there initiatives in your community on informing and/or engaging citizens or businesses after 24 February 2022? yes/no.
Table 6: Helpful practices to respond to war-related crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Liberated and outside combat areas</th>
<th>Frontline and occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Established public information channels (chatbots, social media channels)</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in associations of local and regional authorities</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of emergency response plans</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established links with other communities in Ukraine</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of open data</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenarios for different developments in an emergency</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International partnerships</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elaborated data protection policies (back-up, physical safety of servers)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice of public hearings &amp; offline consultations</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal e-document system (e.g., ASKOD, Doc Prof)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform for dialogue with business</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice of participatory budget</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital platforms for public engagement (e-petition, geoportal)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-governance platform</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA experience in remote work</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automated exchange between registers and systems (Trembita)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart-city concept introduced in LA</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 204 (liberated and outside combat areas), No. = 37 (frontline and occupied)  
Question: Which of the following helps your community respond to the challenges of the war times and how significantly? Options: helps significantly, helps insignificantly, does not help, there is no such practice. The table includes only “helps significantly” answers.

Table 7: Critical problems to solve in which LA have involved public authorities or businesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providing IDPs with food and personal items</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing for IDPs</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing residents with food and personal items</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organising bomb shelters</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological support for residents and IDPs</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation of residents</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring the functioning of critical infrastructure (water, energy)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP Integration (employment, school)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 160 (liberated communities, and communities outside combat areas, which confirmed having public informing and participation initiatives)  
Question: Recall one of the most critical problems to solving which you have involved the public or business in the conditions of war. What issue was it? Choose one.
Table 8: Negative outcomes of public participation in 2022 vs 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional pressure due to the spread of rumours</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overload of responsible employees</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing down the decision-making process *blocking in 2021</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deepening the division of the community due to too diverse positions of the public</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>-26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups used the process of involvement to defend private rather than public interest</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public proposals did not correspond to the powers or capabilities of the authorities</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder partners during their interaction with LSG were unreliable</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. 2021 = 97 (all respondents who confirmed having had citizen participation initiatives); No. 2022 = 160 (liberated communities and communities outside combat areas, which confirmed having public informing and participation initiatives)

Question: In 2022: Which adverse outcomes or tendencies have you observed in connection to citizen engagement in the conditions of war? Check all that apply. In 2021: What unintended outcomes have you observed as a result of the implementation of citizen participation initiatives? Respondents could choose multiple options.

Table 9: Administrative service provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberated</th>
<th>Outside combat areas</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Is the service provided?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Yes, in full</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Yes, partially</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. How is the service provided?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Offline (e.g., administrative service centre)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Online via Diija</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Remote workspaces of service centres operate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- IDPs can register via a special centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Online via the community website</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Territorial units of service centres operate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A dedicated centre for families of veterans and soldiers was created</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. liberated = 12, No. outside combat areas = 192, No. total = 204

Question: 1. Does the LA in your community provide administrative services to citizens and businesses? 2. What capacities are available in your community for administrative services provision? Check all that apply.

Table 10: Challenges in administrative service provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed access to state registers</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed access to the register of the territorial community</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-documentation does not work</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of employees</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged building of the administrative service centre</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difficulties</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 175

Question: What challenges does the LA in your community face when providing administrative services? Check all that apply or add other
### Table 11: Partnerships with Ukrainian communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberated</th>
<th>Outside combat areas</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Yes partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Is there a partnership?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Yes</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Among “yes” mechanisms for partnerships:**
- Personal connections
- Twinning agreements
- Other (asking association of local and regional authorities for help, patronage of MinRegion, DOBRE and neighbouring)

**2. The practical value of partnerships:**
- Providing food
- Providing medical assistance
- IDP housing
- Recovery/maintenance of infrastructure (e.g., water supply systems)
- Administrative service provision

Note: No. liberated = 12, No. outside combat areas = 192, No. total = 204, No. yes = 115
Question: 1. Does the LA of your community have partnerships with other communities in Ukraine? 2. Which ways of establishing partnerships were the most effective? 3. For solving which problems were partnerships with Ukrainian communities useful?

### Table 12: Strengthening partnerships among Ukrainian communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAs strengthened co-operation with other communities in Ukraine</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 fully NOT agree</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 fully agree</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas)
Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “LA of our community has strengthened co-operation with other communities since 24 February 2022”. Choose one: 1 – fully not agree, 5 – fully agree, Don’t know
**Table 13: Establishing partnerships with other European municipalities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of subcategory</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No, we didn’t try</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Reasons for not trying (n = 94):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It wasn’t the right time</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- We don’t know how to search for international partners</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There was no need</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- We don’t speak foreign languages</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes, and we succeeded</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mechanisms for establishing partnerships (n = 71):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Personal contacts of LA employees</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Twinning</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Partners reached out to us</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- We wrote a request to our partners directly</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Thanks to recommendations of foreign partners</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Via cities4cities.eu</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Via unitedforua.org</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes, but we didn’t succeed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Obstacles for establishing partnerships (n = 39):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- We didn’t manage to establish a first contact</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communication with potential partners didn’t work out</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Language barrier</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Different visions of partnership</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. total = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas).
Question: Main: Did the LA in your community try to establish new partnerships with other European municipalities after 24 February 2022? 1. Why did the LA of your community not try to develop new partnerships? Check all that apply. 2. How did the LA of your community manage to develop new partnerships? Check all that apply. 3. In your opinion, what prevented the establishment of new partnerships?

**Table 14: Platforms and mechanisms for exchange of information between local, regional and central authorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform and Mechanism</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian associations of local and regional authorities</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal talks between LAs heads</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination council of different LAs at the regional level</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups on social media</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas).
Question: Which of the following platforms/initiatives/bodies turned out to be the most effective for the exchange of information in an emergency? Check all that apply.

**Table 15: Negative practices of international support in the conditions of war**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Practice</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The slow reaction of international organisations to requests for help</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of flexible reaction of donors to the changing needs of communities</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complicated application requirements</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of donor consultations with LAs on needs</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakening the economy due to the import of goods that could be produced in Ukraine (e.g., textile products)</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas).
Question: Which negative practices of donor support have you observed in war conditions? Check all that apply.
Table 16: Technical challenges to the decision-making process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of equipment (e.g., notebooks, printers)</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of automation of data exchange within a LA</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of data</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited possibilities to work remotely</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low data quality</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA employees do not know how to analyse data</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of co-ordination between executive departments of LAs</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas).
Question: What technical challenges interfere with the management process in your community? Check all that apply.

Table 17: Sources of data on IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of data</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collect own data (e.g., via registration cards or at schools)</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use data from the Ministry for Social Policy</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via starostats (village leaders)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas).
Question: How does LA collect data on IDPs in your community? Check all that apply.

Table 18: Elaboration of IT tools by LAs to respond to war-related challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elaboration of IT tools</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We are developing an IT tool now by ourselves</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We are developing an IT tool now in a partnership</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, we developed [an IT tool] by ourselves</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, we developed [an IT tool] in a partnership</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas).
Question: Was an IT tool created in your community to overcome the challenges in war conditions (e.g., website, crowdsourcing platform)? Select one.
Figure 21: Evaluation of communication from state and non-state entities

Note: n = 204 (liberated communities and those outside combat areas).

Question: Which of the following state authorities or organisations provided the most useful clarifications within the scope of their competencies regarding challenges after 24 February 2022? Check all that apply. State bodies are marked blue; yellow bars mark self-government entities.