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INDICATOR FRAMEWORK ON CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY (IFCD)
PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEXT STEPS

For action

Report to the Council of Europe by Hertie School

Secretariat Memorandum
prepared by the
Directorate of Democratic Governance
Democratic Institutions and Governance Department

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Report to the Council of Europe on
The Indicator Framework for Culture and Democracy (IFCD)
designed and produced by the
Hertie School of Governance

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Executive Summary

This report describes our work to develop the indicator framework for culture and democracy (IFCD). Our review of existing evidence on culture's impact on democracy and the economy concludes that, while diverse efforts have been made to trace the phenomenon, no overarching and comprehensive framework exists at this stage that allows for international comparison of the concepts and relationships we seek to grasp. The IFCD aims to solve this problem by capturing the many dimensions and processes connected to culture and democracy. We provide an overview of the framework's various parts, lay out the theoretical and methodological considerations that went into their development. We provide compelling evidence that culture strongly impacts aspects of democracy and show the practicality of the indicator system for policy makers.

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1. Introduction

“Quantifying culture’s role in development processes is a conceptual minefield.”
(UNESCO Culture for Development Indicators (CDIS))

Empirical evidence on the relationship between culture and countries’ state of democracy is scarce, and the existing work paints a diverse yet incomplete picture. While empirical studies have attempted to map out the impact of culture on democracy, there is at this stage no overarching and comprehensive framework that allows for international comparison. The studies conducted thus far have been relatively limited in number and scope, focusing on a narrow dimension of the question and often at the local or national level only. Moreover, few of these studies use comparable frameworks, due in part to the complexity of defining both culture and democracy.

This report introduces a novel framework designed to study the complex and largely unexplored relationship between culture and democracy. We call it the Indicator Framework for Culture and Democracy (IFCD). The Council of Europe (CoE) contracted the Hertie School to develop the framework as part of a project to devise a set of indicators for assessing culture’s contribution to democracy according to the Work Programme of the Directorate of Democratic Governance of the CoE, and specifically, the Action Plan devised at the 10th Council of Europe Conference of Ministers of Culture in 2013.

The IFCD seeks to examine the relationship between culture and democracy and to monitor trends in European comparison. The framework addresses the issue of culture on two related, but different levels: a broad understanding of culture, comprising among others also values and beliefs, and a narrow understanding focusing on cultural artifacts and artistic production. The IFCD allows one to delve into the details of specific art forms (literature, cinema, etc.) and touches upon the broad issues of culture in relation to democracy. The framework is innovative in that it encompasses the two broad concepts of culture and democracy simultaneously. Values (broad cultural understanding) are added as a kind of linchpin for both.

The framework breaks down each of the two domains into dimensions: the policy dimension, the civic dimension, for culture the economic dimension and for democracy the rule of law dimension, and a normative dimension of freedom and equality. These dimensions are developed for both concepts, allowing detailed analyses of relationships and trends. Each of the dimensions is again separated into different components, each of which is measured by one or more indicators. Our aim was to collect indicators for different units of analysis: institutions, organizations and individuals. All indicators are aggregated at the national level. Where possible, indicators are combined into indices, as this improves measurement of the complex phenomena at hand. The overall matrix structure of domains, dimensions and components allows for re-arranging indicators in different ways. It would be, for example, possible to combine topical indicators that are spread over the whole framework for a more focused analysis of this topic. When creating the indicators we aimed to have a varied selection of measures from three distinct phases of culture and democracy: inputs, throughputs, and outputs. This allows us to capture dynamic processes within the fields of culture and democracy both theoretically and empirically.

The design of the IFCD is based on an extensive survey of the related literature on culture and democracy. A significant amount of work went into a review of existing indicators in the field, which were then assigned within the framework. We presented the framework early on to a group of international experts. This group of expert included Pier Luigi Sacco and Guido Ferilli from the Institute of Arts at the IULM University in Milan, Péter Inkei from the Budapest Observatory, Philippe Kern from KEA, and Andreas Wiesand from the European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (ERICarts).

Our final product is a framework filled with 177 variables covering a wide range of issue areas and concerns for 37 CoE member states.

2. The impact of culture on democracy

We understand culture to include both a 'narrow' definition, centered on cultural artifacts and artistic production, and a 'broad' definition, in which social norms, values, and institutional arrangements are equally included. We define democracy not only by electoral or legislative conditions, but also by broader notions of democratic and social ideals, including freedom, inclusiveness, and equity. These definitions are by no means standard, and the contested and variable notions of both culture and democracy lend themselves less easily to predictable operationalization outside of purely economic terms. The IFCD also allows one to operationalize the narrow concepts of culture and democracy and analyze their relationship.

The majority of studies on culture have focused their attention on cultural industries and their economic impact on countries' GDP or unemployment rate (see for example Statistics Canada, 2014; United Kingdom Department for Culture, Media & Sport, 2014; European Commission, 2011). Similarly, a number of studies have analyzed the cultural sector's potential impact on innovation and long-term economic prospects, noting that in many contexts, the cultural industries are among the most innovative (Müller, Rammer, and Trüby, 2009), are often growing faster than the rest of the economy (KEA European Affairs, 2006), and provide higher levels of employment and income (Higgs, Cunningham, and Bakhshi, 2008). These economic analyses generally do not address the broader social impacts of culture, including those on democracy.

In addition to these economic analyses, previous studies have identified indications of culture's impact on democratic notions of engagement, the health of civil society, and broader positive social outcomes. A number of studies in Canada, for example, have attempted to make a 'holistic case for the arts', seeking to quantify the arts' impacts on not only the economy but also on broader notions of quality of life, well-being, health, education, and society (e.g. Hill Strategies Research, 2014). Leroux and Bernadska (2014) applied a similarly narrow conception of culture to the American context seeking to find evidence of the ways in which both active participation in the cultural dimension (i.e. making art) and passive participation (i.e. attending museums, performances, etc.) are linked to higher levels of civic engagement. The authors argue that specific cultural activities (e.g. making visual art, attending a museum or being a part of a theatrical performance) are individually linked to participation in civil society, measures of social tolerance, and the incidence of selfless behavior. While somewhat limited in scope, these studies offer promising indications of causal links between culture, in its narrow sense, and democracy. This research is also closely linked to the emerging discussion on cultural education (see for example BpB 2014).

Analysis of culture in its broader sense, as a compendium of both artistic activity and broad social characteristics, has for its part yielded a number of studies related to culture's impact on issues that may be deemed facets of democratic culture: tolerance, inclusiveness, and freedom. Maussen and Bader (2012), for example, address the institutional setting of the school in various European contexts and its impact on processes of racial and religious discrimination. Others have looked to the notion of the 'creative class' as both an individual and spatial phenomenon (the 'creative city') and found evidence that such emerging cultural and urban forms may indeed be resulting in more tolerance and acceptance (Sharp and Joslyn 2008).

Another branch of studies focused on identifying links between the diffuse and contested notions of national identity on the one hand, and broader social and democratic ideals on the other. A number of British studies, for example, looked at how divergent conceptions of national identity (i.e. civic vs. ethnic) impact support for anti-discrimination policies, immigration, and concepts of multiculturalism (Heath and Tilley, 2005). Similar analyses at the international level have found conceptions of both civic and ethnic national identity to vary among social groups, conditioning perceptions of immigration and overall tolerance (Lewin-Epstein and Levanon, 2005). Analyses of broad cultural characteristics have established further important links between culture and other aspects of democracy (see for example Ingelhart, 1997; Harrison and Huntington, 2000).

What emerges from this literature is a commitment to mapping out the impact of culture on democracy, but an absence of consistent and comparable measures with which to do so. This diversity of inquiry has identified crucial links between culture and democracy, and yet they remain underexplored. The IFCD seeks to remedy this situation by offering a comprehensive framework that will encompass a wider array of facets for each concept, ranging from the economic and the political to notions of civic participation and freedom.

3. The main concepts

3.1 Culture

Most policy-inspired frameworks use a rather narrow definition of culture (e.g. Eurostat, 2007: 5). The definition focuses on the arts, artifacts and cultural expression, as found in the sectors of theatre, literature, music, and dance. For a long time, this concept has also been at the heart of cultural policy. An extension to the so-called creative and cultural industries can be seen during the last decades. However, we think that a broader understanding of culture (e.g. Williams, 1967; Griswold, 2012) is needed to grasp and understand its relationship with democracy.

Since the IFCD analyzes the process and formation of culture, its definition does not focus on existing culture but on the process of cultural production or cultural activity. Culture in a narrow understanding is defined as activity that is based on cultural values emphasizing cultural freedom, equality, and pluralism. Cultural activity includes cultural action, products, services, and creative capacity. They comprise market and non-market activities, which are carried out by any type of individual or collective actor. Cultural activity occurs in the political, civic, and economic dimension, and as an aspect of freedom and equality.

According to Ross (2009: 134), culture's impact on our worldviews and values is important for democracy. Culture in this broader sense includes not just values, but also beliefs. This value dimension is at the heart of most social science definitions of culture (already Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952). Values, in this sense, are a kind of linchpin between cultural activities in a narrow sense and democratic behavior. Culture in this broader understanding can be defined as relatively stable values, norms and beliefs that are shared by a group (see Gerhards and Hölscher, 2005). Values and beliefs are not defined as a separate domain in the IFCD because they overlap with notions of culture as well as with notions of democracy (see for example Almond and Verba, 1989 and the vast literature on political culture).

3.2 Democracy

How to conceptualize and measure democracy is the subject of ongoing, lively debate among social scientists. Broadly speaking, there are two general approaches to developing quantitative measures of democracy. The first approach uses a minimalist definition that primarily concentrates on the electoral processes in a country. Scholars using this approach look at electoral competition and participation and investigate questions such as whether there is universal suffrage for all citizens, whether elections are conducted in a fair and meaningful manner, and how fairly and competitively the executives are selected (see for example Alvarez et. al., 1996; Vanhanen, 2000). However, this narrow definition might not necessarily capture what democracy really means to people. Other scholars, by contrast, adhere to a maximalist notion of democracy. In this second approach, measurements of a wide range of features regarded as characteristic of democracy are used to construct a quantitative measure. Aspects of social justice, basic freedoms and mutual constraints on constitutional powers are considered to be as central to democracy as features of the electoral process (see for example the Freedom House Index or the Democracy Barometer). The problem with this approach is the difficulty to assess which aspects are essential to include and which of them are beyond the actual meaning of democracy (Munck, 2009: 16-17).


In light of these considerations, we apply an abstract, structural or formal concept that leaves room for heterogeneous realizations and avoids more normative definitions. We define democracy as a form of government where citizens have opportunities to choose the representatives that reflect their values and opinions and influence decisions via direct democratic participation (civic dimension); where party competition is institutionalized and the executive power is controlled (policy dimension), and where basic civil rights and liberties (freedom) are protected by an independent judiciary (rule of law dimension).

4. The overall framework

We argue that culture has an independent and dependent (via democracy) effect on how society works; just as democracy has an independent and dependent (via culture) effect.

Figure 1 shows our conceptual understanding of the relationship between culture and democracy. As culture and democracy are both part of society and interwoven with other institutional complexes such as the state, the market or civil society, the separation is primarily an analytical one. Both domains are connected via specific values and have an underlying causal process, which has phases that we call inputs, throughputs and outputs. For culture, inputs represent the prerequisites of and for cultural activities in terms of laws, rules and regulations, and resources. Throughputs are the patterns, processes and practices applying inputs to effect cultural activities. Outputs are the results of inputs and throughputs in terms of creative capacity, innovation, stewardship of heritage, cultural participation and inclusion. Similarly, democratic inputs are the prerequisites of and for democracy in terms of values, laws, rules and regulations, and resources, including input legitimacy. Throughputs encompass the patterns, processes and practices for applying inputs to the operations and functioning of democracy. Outputs are the results of inputs and throughputs in terms of democracy such as regular, fair and open elections, functioning governments, inclusion, and participation.

Figure 1: The overall framework.



This framework serves as an organizing heuristic primarily. For in reality, culture and democracy are ongoing processes and have neither clear starting points nor easily identifiable intermediary markers and end products. Instead, we observe interwoven time sequences whose impact on society is hard to identify; they are riddled with attribution problems. What is more, there are conceptual and methodological difficulties in deciding whether particular factors should be treated as inputs rather than throughputs or outputs.

Analytically, the purpose of the IFCD system is to offer an empirical portrait of how well countries deal with culture and democracy challenges by positing a causal sequence for each:

Inputs → Throughputs → Outputs

It would be more accurate – but nonetheless extremely challenging from a methodological point of view – to establish time orderings with exact attributions:

Inputs_{time 1} → Throughputs_{time 2} → Outputs_{time 3}

The specification of the actual time lags, however, would require a lot of additional information, as they are likely to vary across policy fields, countries and time. Even if we could control for the many confounding factors and processes that intervene in each of the relations we would have to ignore any feedback relations among the different phases. For this reason, we do not group the individual parts of our framework into inputs, throughputs and output but merely take these different stages into account to ensure that we cover the entire process to the extent possible.

4.1 Design principles

In order to bridge the two concepts of culture and democracy we developed a common, nearly parallel structure. More specifically, we identified specific aspects of culture and democracy, namely, four dimensions that are quite similar for both domains: policy, civic, economic, and freedom & equality for culture and policy, civic, rule of law, and freedom & equality for democracy, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Structure of the framework.

Culture			
Policy	Civic	Economic	Freedom & Equality
Democracy			
Policy	Civic	Rule of Law	Freedom & Equality

Within each dimension, we identified key components. For the culture concept, for example, the policy dimension features cultural funding, cultural openness, and cultural policy in relation to education; the civic dimension focuses on cultural participation; and the economic dimension encompasses cultural industries and infrastructure. The fourth dimension, freedom and equality has been included in the framework to emphasize the ideas of pluralism and equal access to culture and features the components of open access to culture and equality.

One can easily imagine the complexity of any indicator system, and indeed anticipate the danger that it might become unwieldy. Against this background, it is useful to keep a number of methodological 'best practices' in mind (see Anheier, Stanig, and Kayser, 2013; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008):

- *Conceptual focus*, i.e., developing a system that improves understanding and generates knowledge in terms of some 'value added';
- *Policy relevance*, i.e., developing indicators useful for policy analysts and policymakers
- *Parsimony*, i.e., 'achieving most with least' by aiming for design simplicity;
- *Significance*, i.e., focusing on the truly critical aspects of culture and democracy, and the relationships among the four dimensions and three phases above;
- *Definitions*, i.e., using concepts that lend themselves to valid operational definitions;
- *Transparency*, i.e., being explicit about the limitations of data used and the uncertainty attached to any estimate.

Underlying the four dimensions is a set of components and indicators. Each of these measurements relate to one of the three distinct units of analysis: Institutions (e.g., rules and regulations, social and cultural patterns), organizations (formal structures and tools to enact institutions), and individuals (including collectives such as groups or professions). We aggregate all measures to the country level.

4.2 Operationalization and measurement


The IFCD is conceived not as a single indicator, let alone designed to yield a single number; rather it is designed as system based on four separate dimensions for both culture and democracy.

The main argument for a dual instead of singleton system is the additional value added that derives from looking at the differences among the measures in each dimension. Particularly from a policy point of view, and for conceptual reasons, knowing the interconnections between the separate dimensions offers more insights and generates more concrete recommendations than any single number could achieve by itself. In this context, we should recall the Stiglitz et al (2010) example: if you want to know how well your car operates, both the fuel gauge and the speedometer provide important information; but it would make little sense to combine them into a single index or score. Generally, a carefully selected group of measures carry more conceptual and policy-relevant weight than a single overall score or rank. Finally, as suggested above, projecting all four measurements into a single, aggregate index has serious methodological implications. The same concern would apply to a regression approach with one dimension as the dependent and the other three as the independent variables.

We put a lot of thought into defining our measures, so that we can select the appropriate measures and data sources. Some of the definitions are easier or more straightforward than others. Generally, capacity-related indicators and participation measures are less contested and not as ambiguous as definitions of value-related measures. Some cultural factors are difficult to capture as they connote aspects of power, religion and dispositions. We had to explore alternative ways of defining and measuring those to find out how differences in definitions and measurement affect indicator estimations.


Figure 2 shows an example indicator tree for our culture concept. As explained above, we divide our main domain into four dimensions. Each dimension consists of components which are described by one or more indicators. In our example tree, the component *Cultural Funding* is measured by multiple distinct indicators such as *Cultural Funding Legislation*.

Figure 2: Structure of the framework: Culture.



As Figure 3 shows, the hierarchy for the measurement of democracy roughly parallels that of culture. The four dimensions (policy, civic, rule of law, and freedom and equality) group together multiple components and indicators.

Figure 3: Structure of the framework: Democracy.



Each indicator consists of one or more individual variables. Where possible, the indicators are measured by variables from at least two different sources, allowing for sufficient reliability of the measures. The full list of variables is listed in the codebook and sorted by concept, component, and indicator.

We rely on a wide array of data sources (see the codebook for a full list of sources) to create the measures described by the numerous indicators listed in the IFCD. Each phenomenon requires its own type of measures; one cannot estimate interpersonal trust from expert surveys, nor the existence of a given type of regulation from citizen surveys. In addition, we took into account the feasibility and availability of the information.

Cross-national survey data, based on citizen evaluations or judgments by organizations, are one of our primary data sources. Using individual level data we can estimate beliefs and attitudes (e.g., confidence in government) as well as behavior (e.g., election turnout or membership in organizations). For instance, we assess country-level confidence in government by looking at the average self-reported confidence in government services, the police, or other institutions and organizations. Likewise, we estimate political participation from the proportion of respondents who declare to have voted in the most recent election.

We also use survey data to estimate gradients of given phenomena with respect to individual characteristics such as income or levels of education attainment. For instance, to measure the degree of unequal political participation in a given country, we look at the extent to which electoral turnout and membership in political parties are associated with income differences and education.

A second type of source that we rely on is so-called raw data, from which we construct indicators. The steps involved to create such measurements can range from simple hand coding of constitutions, written laws or legislative proposal to more complicated 'scraping' of electronic archives. For example, to measure 'institutionalized participation', we analyze if a country's political system allows citizens to vote in referenda. Furthermore, to assess the amount of cultural education children receive, we compiled country-level estimates as no readily available aggregate measures existed.

Another type of data that we collected is based on information from expert surveys collected by third parties. Relying on existing third-party data avoids duplication of efforts and exploits synergies with other projects. Specific items (for instance, from the World Justice Project) that refer to details of a given institutional setup can be combined with data from other sources.

Finally, we also used existing cultural, economic, political, and social indicators. Some of these directly relate to the measures required by the IFCD. For others, such as estimates of macro-level phenomena, we had to rely on second-best, or proxy measures. For example, for measuring indicators in the economic dimension of culture we had to use official statistics on strengths and innovativeness of the creative economy. Similarly, for measuring the different aspects of cultural activities, we used data from Unesco's UIS.Stat data base about the funding of innovative research in a given country. To measure the strength of the cultural industry, we collected data on the 'birth' of new cultural enterprises and the exports of cultural goods in each country.

To develop comparable metrics across the different member states, we assessed each indicator in terms of data source and country coverage. We invested considerable time and effort to ensure that the data cover a wide selection of CoE member states and are as recent as possible. In case we had to select from multiple time series we always used the most recent data point available.

Our data construction involved multiple stages of standardization and aggregation. As Stanig and Kayser (2013: 194-5) argue, aggregation serves three broad purposes:

- Signal extraction by identifying a common core from various imperfect measures;
- Noise reduction by reducing the combined random variation of each measure;
- Scaling by providing a common metric for indicators measured along different scales to allow for comparisons across sites, over time and with other indicators.

We first transformed all variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (z-score transformation). This makes it easy to identify countries that perform above (positive scores) and below the average (negative scores). We then aggregated all individual variables into single indicators. The indicators are in turn aggregated to components. Finally, we aggregate the component scores to the level of the four dimensions for both culture and democracy. We aggregated the different scores by taking the simple, even-weighted average of each data point. We considered and reviewed various alternative approaches, such as latent variable models and principal component analysis, but decided to go with the aggregation method that requires the fewest assumptions about the data generating process and can be understood and replicated even by users with little statistical training.¹

As a result of our aggregation method, we cannot present our point estimates along with estimates of uncertainty or statistical confidence, a central requirement of transparent indicator construction, as Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) rightly demand. The main function of uncertainty estimates is to identify real differences in performances of individual countries. As our main goal is not to rank countries but to study the impact of culture on democracy, we are less dependent on measures of statistical confidence.

Our country-indicators matrix (see the accompanying spreadsheet) makes it possible to compare countries from many different angles. The framework not only allows analysis of individual country scores across the different dimensions, components and indicators but also makes it possible to compare performances across different country groups. A summary of countries' performance is provided in the Appendix. In general, one could test how indicator performance varies within and across countries by conducting performance comparisons and systematic associations.

Performance comparison uses the scores obtained by a given country to assess performance for each of the components and indicators. Generally speaking, this involves ranking countries from highest to lowest, or best to worst, pointing to countries that show good, average or poor performances. This is often the main (if not only) way in which culture and democracy indexes and related measures are typically 'used and consumed' by various audiences. Moreover, we can compare performance across fields and policy areas for a given country. This allows us to find out if countries perform strongly in one area but poorly in others and to identify its strengths and weaknesses in terms of overall performance.

Alternatively, one could try to identify systematic patterns between phenomena, including measures that are not currently within the system. For instance, one might want to answer questions such as: do countries with more competitive political systems tend to provide better poverty reduction policies? Does cultural creativity lead to higher economic growth?

While the IFCD in its current state does not allow one to identify causal relationships there is still a lot of interesting information that can be gleaned from systematic associations between macro-phenomena. As suggested above, we can provide narratives highlighting specific policy measures, regulations, or innovation against the background of the wider indicator system.

¹ For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods see Salzman, 2003 and Stanig and Kayser, 2013


5. Testing the relationship between culture and democracy

To assess the impact of culture on democracy and to gauge the overall potential of the IFCD for policy-makers we formulated and tested a series of hypotheses. It should be clear that the empirical correlations shown on the next few pages are not causal relationships in a straightforward way. The correlations should be interpreted rather as plausible explanations, as evidence of some underlying mechanism or mechanisms. Still, they can be used to assess the overall usefulness of the framework and the extent to which it allows the examination of interesting relationships between culture and democracy.

The idea is not to show the most important results with regard to the available data, nor the most interesting hypotheses. The aim of the testing is to show in which ways the IFCD can be used to address interesting relationships on different levels. The first hypothesis looks at the overall relationship between culture and democracy:

H1: *A country's overall level of democratic performance is related to its cultural performance.*

Figure 4: The relationship between culture and democracy.



To test this hypothesis, we aggregated the scores of each country in each of the four dimensions of culture and democracy. We then estimated the strength of the linear relationship between the two domains. Figure 4 shows the results of this estimation for our set of 37 countries. The dots represent individual countries, the solid line in the middle is the regression line and the dotted lines are confidence bands. The correlation coefficient of 0.80 suggests that culture is strongly associated with democracy and the slope of the linear regression line portrays a positive linear relationship. To find out if this relationship also extends to lower levels of the framework we tested a series of hypotheses using scores from the component and indicator level.

With our second hypothesis we want to test if participation in culture is related to participation in democratic activities.


H2: Participation in cultural activities leads to more participation in democratic activities.

Since Tocqueville underlined the importance of culture for democratic development, few studies examined the interrelationship between these two categories. One notable exception is the study from Silva and colleagues, who point out that democratic politics is promoted by membership in culture-related associations. They conclude that, "cultural organizations nurture a wider range of civic virtues than most other types of associations" (Silva, Clark, & Cabaço, 2014: 343).

Political participation as a concept has to account for country differences in political institutions and legal opportunities to become politically involved. Therefore, different indicators such as voter turnout and the effective use of public petitions and referendums are important measures for explaining differences in political activities across countries, but each might be biased or only grasp a certain aspect of participation. For our example, we use aggregate component scores for political participation.

Figure 5 shows the aggregate relationship between participation in cultural activities and participation in political activities. Both are positively linked, and the correlation is moderate ($r = 0.42$). This lends support for our argument that active cultural participation may enhance the awareness of community and civic virtues, and in return political engagement.

Figure 5: Cultural participation and political engagement in society.



With the worldwide financial and economic crisis, governments and researchers began to argue that economic growth is not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, goal for a society. Instead, concerns of well-being such as health and happiness have moved into the center of attention. Many studies contend that democracy is an important ingredient for citizens' well-being (Owen, Videras, & Willemsen, 2008). Orviska and colleagues, for example, argue that democracy has a positive impact on subjective well-being. Using data from the World Values Survey, they observe that democratic satisfaction impacts both individual happiness and life satisfaction (Orviska, Caplanova, & Hudson, 2014). Along the same vein, Dorn and colleagues find a significant effect of democracy on well-being and life satisfaction after controlling for socioeconomic, demographic and cultural variables (Dorn, Fischer, Kirchgässner, & Sousa-Poza, 2007).

We can also assume that culture has an important influence on this outcome. Reuband, for example, shows that life satisfaction (and well-being) in three German cities is correlated with cultural participation, also when taking into account gender, age and education (Reuband, 2013). The argument is that participation in cultural activities goes hand in hand with the accumulation of social capital. This echoes the argument made by Gundelach and Krainer, who emphasize that social capital is the most important predictor of happiness (Gundelach & Kreiner, 2004).

In our third and fourth hypotheses we argue that participation in cultural activities and political activities – respectively - positively influences individuals' well-being.

H3a: *States with higher cultural participation rates tend to exhibit higher levels of well-being.*

H3b: *States with higher political participation rates tend to exhibit higher levels of well-being.*

To measure well-being we use data from the OECD Better Life Index (OECD, 2015) that allows people to compare countries' performances according to their own preferences in terms of what makes for a better life. Figure 6 displays the average score on this index in comparison to our index of cultural participation. The results indicate a strong correlation between the two indices (0.72) and a positive relationship, supporting the hypothesis that cultural participation may contribute to increased life satisfaction.

As shown in Figure 7, we find a similar positive relationship regarding the impact of political participation and life satisfaction, although the level of association is much weaker ($r = 0.46$).

Figure 6: Cultural participation and life satisfaction.





Figure 7: Political participation and life satisfaction.




In our next hypothesis we examine the level of association between cultural participation and social capital. Robert Putnam defines social capital as the “features of social organisation such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1994). We take a narrow view of social capital and focus on the relationship between cultural participation and trust in our fifth hypothesis:

H4: *Participation in cultural activities lead to more trusting societies.*

In his work, Putnam identifies a basic level of interpersonal trust as essential to a functioning society as it reduces personal fears and increases security and cohesion within communities. We measure cultural participation as above and use the share of people who trust others from the World Values Survey to measure interpersonal trust.

Figure 8 provides supportive evidence that participation in cultural activities is strongly linked to increased trust in others ($r = 0.73$). Countries with high cultural participation rates also show high levels of interpersonal trust among its people.

Figure 8: Cultural participation and trusting society.




While the previous set of hypotheses analyzed relationships between culture and democracy and social capital, the next two focus on interactions solely within the cultural domain.

A number of studies on cultural participation have provided evidence that cultural activity varies with individuals' level of education, occupation status and affluence (Coulangeon, 2013; Danielsen, 2008; DiMaggio & Useem, 1978). With our fifth hypothesis, we are particularly interested in finding out if the existence of a constitutional framework that protects minority groups from unequal treatment and discrimination leads to a lower degree of inequality in cultural access and representation (Moghadam & Senftova, 2015):

H5: *Countries with integrative policies exhibit more equality in terms of cultural access and representation than countries without such policies.*

Figure 9: The effect of integrative policies on equality of cultural access.




As can be seen in Figure 9, there is no clear relationship ($r = 0.06$) between the existence of governmental programs promoting equality and equality in cultural access. We do not find evidence that would suggest that government policies that address issues of inequality may induce higher levels of equality in cultural access. Our results somewhat contradict previous findings showing that institutions providing basic freedoms and legal rights are an important element in tackling unequal participation rates (Danielsen, 2008; Jancovich, 2011; Looseley, 2004).

We delve deeper into the relationship between different cultural components with our sixth hypothesis:

H6: The higher the degree of digitalization in a society the higher its level of cultural participation.

The internet has become one of the most important platforms for artists to present their work. At the same time, cultural institutions are faced with the challenge of becoming relevant to a wider group of people with diverse backgrounds. To achieve this goal, they have to meet new demands in terms of how they communicate. Artists' and institutions' ability to attract new audiences largely depends on the availability of a strong digital infrastructure. Digitalization also allows people who are immobile or have limited resources to participate in cultural activities, both active and passive. We therefore expect that higher levels of digitalization lead to higher levels of cultural participation.

Figure 10: Digitalization and cultural participation.




We find support for our hypothesis in Figure 10. Digitalization (measured among others by the share of households with internet access, the percentage of individuals using the internet, and activity on social media platforms) correlates strongly ($r = 0.83$) with cultural participation and, as indicated by the regression line, has a large linear impact on it.

Finally, with our last hypothesis we test the efficiency and effectiveness of cultural investments by looking at the relationship between public cultural expenditure and the competitiveness of a country's cultural industry. In times of turbulent and volatile economic conditions many countries face increased pressure on public budgets and need to make sure that their resources are spent in the most efficient and effective way possible. We therefore test the following hypothesis to find out if increased public cultural spending is associated with a stronger cultural industry:

H7: Higher levels of public cultural funding lead to higher outputs of the cultural industry.

We use data from the Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe to create a measure of public cultural funding. Our measure cultural industry outputs includes Eurostat data on extra-EU trade in cultural goods and the turnover of the publishing sector as a share of total manufacturing.

Figure 11: Public cultural funding and industry outputs.



The variation between the different countries in Figure 11 suggests that cultural industry outputs and public cultural funding are only weakly positively associated ($r = 0.32$). A few countries achieve large outputs with low actual investments suggesting that increased funding does not automatically result in a more cultural industry outputs. This is indicative of a great potential for increased efficiency in public cultural funding.

In summary, we find strong evidence that culture and democracy are closely connected and that an active culture positively impacts democratic quality and individual well-being and trust. It is important to mention that our analyses are measures of association and not causality. We cannot be certain if high levels of cultural participation lead to high levels of democratic quality, or vice versa and what other factors moderate this relationship. Making these judgements requires further investigation and more comprehensive analytics.

6. Conclusion

In this report on the IFCD, we have provided an overview of the frameworks' various parts and lay out the theoretical and methodological considerations that went into their development. We have also shown the usefulness of the indicator system for studying relationships between and within the domains of culture and democracy. These initial explorations provide compelling evidence that culture strongly impacts aspects of democracy. The results hint at the IFCD's practicality as a tool for policy makers to analyze evidence and make decisions about where to invest and what institutions to build.

However, a number caveats have to be mentioned beyond those already discussed in the report. One of them concerns claims about causality. In its current form the framework cannot be used to test if changes in cultural behaviors also lead to changes in how well democracies work. To explore these types of relationships we would need to add time series data. Furthermore, although our data collection is already very comprehensive and encompasses many different aspects and themes, we still lack information on a number of key areas of culture. In particular, our data on the activities and preferences of civil society organizations are relatively scarce. There is a general lack of comparative data on civil society organizations, so any information would have to come from national statistical offices or novel survey instruments. Furthermore, we have to be aware that a concentration on measurable aspects of culture might be oversimplified or even misleading. As with the critique on the current assessments in education (e.g. PISA), we also need to recognize the qualitative nature of culture.

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Appendix: Summaries of countries' performances

Albania

Though its overall scores in the culture and democracy domains are among the lowest in the sample, Albania shows an above average score in the civic dimension of democracy. Albania's scores are slightly bolstered in the culture domain by above average scores on cultural funding legislation and in the democracy domain by engagement in non-institutionalised activities such as protests and petitions. The well below average score in the policy dimension in the culture domain reflects lower performance in cultural education policy and direct funding of culture, perhaps not surprising for a lower income country. In the economic dimension, the low cultural industry outputs determine Albania's below average score.

Austria

Austria's performance in the democracy domain is well above average, while its scores in the cultural domain lie close to average. Its scores in the freedom and equality dimension in the culture domain stand out as well above average, especially with regard to public measures to promote equality. On the other hand, the below average score in the economic dimension reflects the relatively small size of its cultural industry and outputs. The somewhat above average score in the policy dimension is driven in part by above average expenditures on culture and legislation facilitating the sector's funding. Finally, the average performance in the civic dimension balances a below average score on interest in foreign cultures and a somewhat above average score on cultural participation (though passive participation on the part of citizens is higher).

Belgium

In the culture domain, Belgium exhibits a near average overall score. Behind the overall score is a somewhat above average performance in the civic and freedom and equality dimensions and about average scores for the economic and policy dimensions. In the civic dimension, above average scores for artistic expression and creation are brought down by about average scores for passive participation. In the policy dimension, Belgium's above average score for cultural education policy are counterbalanced by much lower scores on measures related to cultural policy-making, including a favourable funding environment. The democracy domain includes above average scores on almost all democracy indicators, particularly in the freedom and equality and or policy dimension.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina exhibit below average scores in both domains in relation to other Council of Europe member states covered. In the civic dimension of the culture domain, for example, while the country's citizens are more active in voluntary work than some of the other Council of Europe countries, they are less actively engaged in online cultural creativity. Furthermore, in the economic dimension, the size of the cultural infrastructure and cultural industry outputs are somewhat below average.

Bulgaria

In both the culture and democracy domains, Bulgaria's scores fall below the average. The same holds true in all four dimensions within the culture domain, with scores in the freedom and equality dimension and in the civic dimension well below the average. A closer look at the civic dimension shows relatively low scores on all indicators, although the country's score on online cultural participation is near average. In terms of the policy dimension, however, performance on cultural education policy is better than average.

Croatia

Croatia's strength in the culture domain tends to be in the policy-making dimension, with stronger scores on cultural education policy and funding regulations. In the civic dimension (culture domain), Croatia's high degree of online cultural participation is not matched by online creativity, and citizens' non-partisan involvement through volunteering and donations is among the lowest of all countries. The country's below average cultural performance is also reflected in the economic and freedom and equality dimensions within the culture domain, with below average scores for size and output of the cultural industry and large inequalities in terms of access to cultural sites and events.

Cyprus

Though Cyprus's overall score in the democracy domain lies above the average, its score in the culture domain falls below average. In the civic dimension (culture domain), citizen non-partisan involvement, online participation and creativity, and interest in foreign cultures are above average, but all other indicators for which data are available are only about average or well below average as in the case of passive cultural participation. In terms of the policy dimension, public expenditure on culture is a strength, while other policy-related indicators tend to score below average. The well above average score in the freedom and equality dimension reflects the large degree of equality in terms of access to culture. Finally, in the economic dimension, an average score on the intangible assets indicator is counterbalanced by the relatively small size and output of the country's cultural industry.

Czech Republic

Behind the Czech Republic's average overall score in the culture domain lies quite a range of scores in the four culture-related dimensions. An above average score in the freedom and equality dimension reflects primarily the existence of public measures promoting equality. In the economic dimension, the size and output of the country's cultural infrastructure are average, as is the score on intangible assets. Within the policy dimension, near or below average public expenditures on culture and cultural education policy are matched by below average scores relating to cultural openness. Finally, within the civic dimension of the culture domain, average scores on artistic expression and creation and passive cultural participation are counterbalanced by below average scores on interest in foreign cultures and students in the arts.

Denmark

Denmark is among the top two performers in the culture and democracy domains. Yet the country's relative strength in the various culture-related dimensions varies. The civic dimension, for example, is a clear strength, with very high scores for cultural participation measures such as passive online and offline participation in culture, artistic expression and creation, and citizen involvement. Denmark's scores in the economic dimension are also generally well above average, though the overall size of the cultural infrastructure and scores on intangible assets tend more to the average. Finally, in the policy dimension, well above average public cultural expenditure and cultural education policies are moderated in the cultural policy component by below average scores on funding legislation.

Estonia

Estonia's overall scores in the culture and democracy domains lie well above the average for the CoE member countries in the sample. A look at the four culture-related dimensions and their various components reveals differences behind the average overall. For example, scores for the size and outputs of Estonia's cultural industries lead to an above average score in the economic dimension. By contrast, in the freedom and equality dimension, the score is below average, with below average scores in public measures for equality counterbalancing near average scores for equality in terms of access to culture. Estonia has its greatest challenge in the policy dimension in the culture domain mainly due to its lower degree of cultural openness and lack of sufficient funding for culture.

Finland

In both the culture and democracy domains, Finland's overall score is well above average and higher than most others. Focusing on the culture domain, a well above average score for the civic dimension is bolstered by exceptionally high scores for artistic expression and passive cultural participation, though the score for interest in foreign cultures and non-partisan citizen involvement are closer to the average. Performance in the economic dimension is closer to the sample average with a mix of stronger (e.g. size of the creative industry) and weaker (e.g. cultural industry output) scores. In the democracy domain, the scores are above or well above average within all four dimensions, especially policy and rule of law, though a few exceptions do exist.

France

France's scores in the culture domain tend to be well above average. A strong showing in the freedom and equality dimension reflects both the existence of measures to promote equality and effective equality. France's well above average score in the policy dimension is influenced by a strong cultural education policy score, but moderated by slightly below average public cultural expenditures and a below average score for cultural openness. In the economic dimension of culture, France performs well above average on the size of its cultural infrastructure, but closer to average in terms of intangible assets. Finally, within the civic dimension, a below average score for interest in foreign cultures is counterbalanced by above average scores on artistic expression and creation and online cultural participation.

Germany

In the culture domain, Germany scores above average overall and in the freedom and equality and policy dimensions but lies at about the mean in the civic and economic dimensions. Its score in the civic dimension is boosted by strong scores on artistic expression and interest in foreign cultures but is offset by a below average score for cultural participation online. In the economic dimension, the size of Germany's cultural infrastructure is larger than average, but its cultural industry output below the sample average. The strong score for the policy dimension is characterized by above average scores on the cultural funding legislation indicator and cultural openness component, but counterbalanced by below average scores on the indicators for direct funding of culture and cultural education policy. Germany's overall score in the democracy domain is above the mean.

Greece

Greece's overall score in the culture domain, as well as the democracy domain, lies below the average for the sample. In the civic dimension of culture, the scores for almost all indicators are well below average, especially for those measuring passive cultural participation. Though within the economic dimension the size of the Greek cultural industry is well below average, its outputs are much closer to the sample average. In the policy dimension, where Greece's scores are also below the average, above average performance on cultural funding legislation is offset by a well below average performance in the area of cultural openness.

Hungary

Behind Hungary's below average overall performance in the culture domain lie quite diverse scores in the four culture-related dimensions. The well below average score in the civic dimension, for example, is driven largely by measures of online cultural participation and low scores on artistic expression and creation. In the freedom and equality dimension, though the measure of equality in access to culture is above average, the lack of public measures to promote equality brings the combined score well below average. The below average score in the policy dimension reflects, on one hand, a well below average score in cultural funding, and on the other, a below average score in cultural education policy. The economic dimension shows the strongest performance: though the size of Hungary's cultural industry and cultural infrastructure is relatively small, its score on industry outputs brings the score for the entire dimension near the sample average.

Ireland

Ireland's aggregate score in the culture domain is slightly above average, as is its score in the democracy domain. Despite the relatively small size of the country's cultural industry, its output and intangible assets bring the score in the economic dimension well above average. In contrast, the policy dimension within the culture domain displays scores near or below average on most components, though cultural funding legislation is above average. In the civic dimension, strong citizen involvement and above average scores on artistic expression and passive cultural participation help offset below average online participation and interest in foreign cultures. And a relative lack of measures to promote equality leaves the score for the freedom and equality dimension (culture) only about average.

Italy

Italy's overall score in the culture domain lies below the average, with performance variation among the four culture-related dimensions. On one hand, in the freedom and equality dimension, the scores for access to culture and public measures for equality are above average. On the other hand, Italy's scores on artistic expression and online participation are below average, bringing the score for cultural participation and thus the civic dimension well below average. Italy's cultural industry is of below average size, but its outputs are right at the average; the below average score on intangible assets results then in a below average score for the economic dimension.

Latvia

Latvia performs above average in terms of culture but below average in the democracy domain. Within the culture domain, the economic dimension appears to be Latvia's relative strength, with a cultural industry that exceeds the average in terms of both size and output. In contrast, in the policy dimension, above average scores for cultural funding combine with well below average scores for cultural education policy to pull the dimension's aggregate score slightly below average. And in the civic dimension, well above average interest in foreign cultures and passive cultural participation are offset by below average scores in nearly all other indicators so that the civic dimension remains only slightly above average.

Lithuania

Lithuania's performance in the culture and democracy domains is below average. The relatively stronger culture-related dimensions appear to be freedom and equality and economic, both with scores above the sample average. In the economic dimension, the cultural industry's size drives the performance measurement. By contrast, within the civic dimension, scores are below average except for on- and offline cultural participation and interest in foreign cultures. The aggregate score for the policy dimension lies well below average, the result of low scores on cultural openness and cultural education policy.

Luxembourg

In both the culture and democracy domains Luxembourg is well above the mean. Beneath the overall scores, however, is a mixed picture. In the culture domain, well above average scores in the civic dimension reflect in particular higher scores on participation. In the economic domain, Luxembourg's cultural industry is average in terms of size, but the industry's cultural outputs and intangible assets are well above the average. In terms of the policy dimension, cultural policy scores tend to be below average, while cultural openness pushes the composite score to above average.

Malta

Of the four dimensions within the culture domain, the civic dimension seems to be Malta's strength, receiving an above average score. Indeed, above average scores in the cultural participation indicators tend to be the rule, though a below average score on students in the arts brought the civic dimension's composite score closer to the sample average. In the policy dimension, however, the general trend was well below average scores, with exceptions in terms of cultural education policy. The same tendency was evident in the economic dimension, but with above average scores for the size of the cultural infrastructure and intangible assets.

Moldova

Moldova exhibits a mixed picture, with scores in the culture domain higher than in the democracy domain, though still below average. The country's strongest dimension-level performance in the culture domain lies in the policy dimension, with above average scores on direct cultural funding and cultural openness. And within the economic dimension of culture, well above average scores on intangible assets are offset by the small size of the country's cultural industry and infrastructure.

Netherlands

In the culture domain, Netherlands ranks among the top-performing countries overall. In the civic dimension of culture, it performs well above average, particularly in terms of artistic expression and passive cultural participation. Moreover, while the country's score on citizen involvement is among the highest among framework countries, the score on students in the arts is below the average. Netherlands' scores are also above average in the other three dimensions in the culture domain, i.e. freedom and equality, policy, and economic. Its above average performance in the culture domain is matched by its above average score in the democracy domain, with a particularly strong score in the freedom and equality dimension.

Norway

Norway's score on the measures included in the democracy domain, especially those in the rule of law and policy dimensions, are among the very highest. In terms of the cultural domain, the overall score is lower, but still above average. Strong performance in the freedom and equality and civic dimensions of culture, particularly the passive cultural participation component, co-exists with a below average performance in the policy-related dimension where cultural funding legislation, in particular, appears to be less than supportive.

Poland

In the culture domain, Poland's score lies well below the average overall, with the civic dimension exhibiting lower scores than other dimensions. In the civic dimension of culture, the scores for all indicators are well below those for other countries in the sample. The economic dimension sees below average cultural industry outputs and intangible assets as well as a relatively small industry size. In the policy dimension, at or above average scores for the funding legislation and public cultural spending indicators are offset by below average scores on cultural openness and cultural education policy.

Portugal

Portugal's composite score in the culture domain is below average; its score in the democracy domain right at the average. A closer look at the culture domain indicates that, in the policy dimension, Portugal's above average cultural openness and cultural education policy exist alongside below average scores on legislative support for and actual cultural funding. In the economic dimension, the relatively small size and output of the cultural industry combine with a below average size of the country's cultural infrastructure. The near average score in the freedom and equality dimension indicates both the existence of public measures to promote equality and their lower actual effectiveness. Finally, in the civic dimension, above average scores on students in the arts are not enough to balance the below average scores on the other cultural participation indicators.

Romania

In terms of overall performance, Romania ranks in the lower third in both the culture and democracy domains. The country scores well below average in all dimensions of culture except freedom and equality, where its scores are nearer the average. Romania's low scores in the economic dimension are largely driven by the size and the output of its cultural industry. Interestingly, Romania achieves relatively high scores on the cultural funding legislation indicator although its actual level of public investment in culture is quite low.

Serbia

While behind Serbia's below average overall score in the democracy domain lie some interesting variations, its low score in the culture domain is apparent across all four dimensions. For instance, the below average score in the economic dimension reflects the small size and outputs of the cultural industry as well as lack of intangible assets. Furthermore, the below average score in the freedom and equality dimension of culture is related to the absence of public measures for equality. Looking in more detail at the below average score for the civic dimension, a closer to average score on the students in the arts indicator is offset by low levels of passive cultural participation and artistic expression and creation.

Slovakia

Slovakia ranks in the lower half on both domains of culture and democracy largely due to its below average performance in the economic (culture) and the rule of law (democracy) dimensions. The size of the country's cultural industries and infrastructure is below average. This is surprising as Slovakia offers a decent market environment for cultural businesses, because the country has a larger support for cultural diversity than many of its peers and offers relatively good funding opportunities for new business ventures.

Slovenia

Slovenia ranks right at the average in the culture domain and performs slightly above average in the democracy domain. The strong overall cultural performance is due to the country's high scores in the policy and economic dimensions of culture and would have been even higher if it were not for Slovenia's average performance in the civic and freedom and equality dimensions. Artistic expression, citizen involvement and the size of the cultural industry are the country's strong suits, while online creativity and students in the arts are areas where cultural participation is not as strong.

Spain

Though Spain's overall score in the culture domain lies in the upper third, its score in the democracy domain is slightly below average. Spain is the best performing country in the policy dimension due to the excellence of its cultural education policy and its large public investment in culture. University students in Spain are much more frequently enrolled in arts classes than students in most other countries included in the IFCD. These results stand in relatively stark contrast to the country's below average scores on the passive cultural participation indicator.

Sweden

Sweden received the highest overall score in the culture domain and also ranks among the top three countries in the democracy domain. The country shows strong performances across the different cultural dimensions and components except for the freedom and equality dimension. For example, while Sweden's scores in the passive cultural participation and artistic expression indicators are very high, it performs well below average in terms of providing equal access to cultural sites and events. Moreover, Sweden has a very competitive cultural industry as can be seen by the country's performance in the cultural industry outputs and size of the cultural sector indicators.

Switzerland

Switzerland's overall performance in the culture and democracy domains ranks among the top ten countries included in the IFCD. In the culture domain, the country scores well above average in the civic, economic and freedom and equality dimensions, and particularly in the cultural participation, cultural industries and cultural infrastructure components. Switzerland ranks first in the public measures for equality and passive cultural participation indicators. This strong performance is slightly offset by Switzerland's lower scores in the policy dimension, particularly regarding the country's cultural openness.

"The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"

Though "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"'s overall scores in both domains are below average, the picture is quite mixed at the level of dimensions and components. Within the culture domain, for example, near average scores in the policy dimension are offset by well below average scores in the other three dimensions. In the civic dimension, stronger performances relating to citizen involvement and interest in foreign cultures are tempered by below average scores on all the other participation indicators. Furthermore, in the economic dimension, the relatively small size of the cultural industry and the below average cultural industry output contribute to performance that is well below average.

Turkey

Though its overall scores in the culture and democracy domains are among the lowest in the sample, Turkey shows an above average score in a number of indicators such as cultural industry outputs, support and promotion of cultural diversity, and students in the fields of art. The well below average overall scores in the civic dimension in the culture domain reflect low performance in citizen involvement and online creativity. In the economic dimension, despite above average cultural industry outputs, the small size of Turkey's

cultural industry largely determines the country's below average score on the dimension.

Ukraine

The Ukraine shows below average overall scores in both the culture and democracy domains. The country achieves above average scores in the policy dimension of culture mainly due to its strong performances in the cultural openness component and in the cultural funding legislation indicator. The lower scores in the economic and freedom and equality dimensions are due to a relatively small cultural infrastructure, low cultural industry outputs and a lack of public measures for equality in the cultural sector.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is a top performer in both the culture and democracy domain with particularly high scores in the policy dimensions. The country's strong cultural industry is reflected in the high indicator scores for cultural industry outputs and size of the cultural infrastructure. The UK's high scores in the policy dimension of culture, particularly the country's cultural funding legislation and cultural education policy, are a further indication of the country's strong overall cultural performance. Near average scores for cultural openness and equality in terms of access to cultural sites and events are not as strong as other indicator scores.