

Election Observation of New Voting Technologies

CoE 5th Review Meeting E-voting
28 October 2014, Lochau



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe




OSCE/ODIHR Definition of NVT

Tools for conducting elections making use of information and communication technologies in **casting, counting, and tabulating votes**

Ballot Scanners



DRE



Internet Voting



ODIHR Election Observation and NVT

OSCE/ODIHR Election Department

- Election observation and technical assistance
- 300+ observation activities since 1996
- Approx. 16 missions a year

Growing emphasis on NVT

- Use of NVT across the OSCE region
- Observation, reporting, and recommendations
- Methodology and expertise

ODIHR Experience with NVT

25 missions in 13 States with NVT assessments

Albania (2013)

Belgium (2006, 2007)

Bulgaria (2009, 2014)

Estonia (2007, 2011)

France (2007, 2012)

Kazakhstan (2004, 2005, 2007)

Latvia (2011)

Mongolia (2013)

Netherlands (2006, 2010)

Norway (2011)

Russian Federation (2011, 2012) Switzerland (2011)


United States (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012).



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ODIHR Observation Missions with NVT Assessments



- Ballot Scanner & DRE
- Ballot Scanner & Internet Voting
- DRE & Internet Voting
- Ballot Scanner
- DRE
- Internet Voting
- Everything

Reporting and the Electoral Observation Cycle




ODIHR Methodology and Expertise

Since 2010: Senior Adviser on New Voting Technologies:

2013: Handbook for the Observation of NVT:

www.osce.org/odihr/elections/104939



Assumptions about Observing NVT

NVT can help offer **additional functionalities** to elections:
counting complicated and large volume elections, supporting
disabled or remote voter participation.

NVT creates **new challenges** - it is **not a means to build trust**,
but requires trust for proper implementation.

Option of NVT is a **matter of national determination**, ODIHR
assess its use against existing commitments and obligations.



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Seven Principles for Observing NVT

1. Secrecy of the Vote
2. Integrity of Results
3. Equality of the Vote
4. Universality of the Vote
5. Transparency
6. Accountability
7. Public Confidence



What to assess: NVT specifics


- ✓ Feasibility Studies
- ✓ Procurement
- ✓ Legal Framework
- ✓ Election Administration
- ✓ Training + Voter Education
- ✓ Risk Management
- ✓ Usability
- ✓ Secrecy and Integrity
- ✓ Public Testing and Certification
- ✓ Observer Access



Summary

New voting technologies retains existing commitments and obligations:

- Requires assessment of context and NVT specifics
- Challenges observation timelines
- Requires a team effort



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