



Dutch Electoral Council

5th Review Meeting of Recommendation CM Rec(2004)11 on legal, operation and technical standards for e-voting to be held in Lochau/Bregenz, Austria, on the 28th of October 2014

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secretary-director**



History of e-voting in the Netherlands (1)

- Around 2006 almost 99% of the Dutch local communities used electronic voting machines
- Internet voting for Dutch voters living abroad
- Plans for introducing internet voting for Dutch voters living within the Netherlands



History of e-voting in the Netherlands (2)

- **2006: Action group “We don’t trust voting computers”**
- **2007: Commission proposed to introduce voteprinter and votescanner**
- **2008: Cabinets decision: NO**
- **2009: first (EP)elections with pen and paper;**
- **2013: New proposals to introduce voteprinter and votescanner (report “Every vote counts”)**



Principles of the electoral process

- **Equal suffrage**
- **Accessibility**
- **Transparency**
- **Verifiability**
- **Free suffrage**
- **Secret suffrage**
- **Fairness**

- **Independancy**



Four voting methods

Model 1: Voting and counting using a voting computer with a verified paper record;

Model 2: Voting using a voting printer with electronic counting;

Model 3: Voting using a ballot paper with electronic counting;

Model 4: Voting using current ballot papers with manual counting;

Paper process the guiding principle

Stemprinter met scanner

2



Kiezer print
stembiljet



21:00 uur ▶

22:00 uur



Scanner telt
stembiljetten
en print
het resultaat



Electronic **voting** and counting

- More voters can vote in person
- More reliable (feedback 2x)



Electronic voting & counting

- Better and faster results



Requirements (1)

- **Common criteria certification by independent body of printer and scanner on the protection levels EAL 6 (printer) and EAL 5 (scanner)**
- **No standard components and standard products**
- **Protection Profiles**
- **Use of open software and publishing of source code**



Requirements (2)

- **Measures against the tempest problem: restrict the possibility of “reading” radiation within 8 meters (NATO-standard SDIP-27/1 level A.3)**
- **One central administrative body responsible for procurement, testing, maintenance and distribution of the equipment**
- **Constant new risk analysis and testing**
- **Standard recounts of paper ballots**



Present situation (1)

Different lines of approach by the Ministry of the Interior:

- **Technical University of Delft (industrial design) -> improving accessibility**
- **University of Leiden -> developing a method of checking the electronic counting outcome**
- **Fox-IT: demands non-recording of votes by printer**
- **TÜViT -> Protection Profiles**
- **Berenschot -> organizational consequences**
- **?? -> Activating of printers**



Present situation (2)

- New questions for Commission (protection level, costs and number of printers)
- The Ministry is going to experiment with a new type of ballot (smaller, with logo's of parties; split choice)
- The Ministry also has (unclear) thoughts about internet voting



Problems

- **Introducing of central government responsibilities in Dutch highly decentralized electoral system**
- **Costs**
- **Solving tempest problem is complex**
 - **NATO norm is classified**
 - **Testing of printers and scanners**

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