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Ministers'
Deputies Major
Hazards Agreement Directorate
of Sustainable development Following the mandate given by the Committee of Ministers in its composition of the States members of the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement during the 652nd meeting, item 9.2 – 15 December 1998 – to the Secretariat of the Agreement, a report on “Risk assessment of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and counter measure efficiency” and a report on “Comparative study of legislation on radioprotection of the populations of: Ukraine, Belgium, France, United Kingdom” gave rise to a Declaration on action taken on the evaluation of the risks occasioned by the Chernobyl disaster adopted during the 8th Ministerial Session of the Agreement. Summaries of the two reports are appended (see Appendices 1 and 2 to these Notes, respectively). Full versions are available from the Secretariat (AP/CAT(99)66 revised and AP/CAT(2000)2). DRAFT DECISIONS 730th
meeting – 22 November 2000 Item
9.2 Assistance to victims of the Chernobyl
Disaster (CM(2000)138) Decisions The Deputies, in their composition restricted to the Representatives of the member states of the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Partial Agreement[2]: 1. took note of the Declaration on action taken on the evaluation of the risks occasioned by the Chernobyl disaster, as it appears in Appendix 8 to CM(2000)138; 2. noted that the Secretariat of the Agreement had completed their instruction given at their 652nd meeting (item 9.2) “to arrange for a study of Ukrainian legislation concerning the radio-protection of the population with a view to proposing possible amendments”; 3. instructed the Executive Secretary of the Agreement to present to the Committee of Permanent Correspondents the proposals for action concerning “Risk assessment of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and counter measure efficiency”, with a view to their possible implementation in the framework of the Agreement's budget and in co-operation with the European Commission, the International Agency for Atomic Energy and the other International Institutions concerned and to present a report on the follow-up. Appendix 1 SUMMARY OF DOCUMENT AP/CAT (99) 66 rev. RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AND THE COUNTERMEASURES EFFICIENCY By analysing the disaster management experience gained at Chernobyl we may make the following conclusions: 1. In the former Soviet Union the emergency response plans devised for a nuclear accident were satisfactory from the point of view of modern requirements. However, in the event, the plans were not implemented largely because those responsible were inadequately informed of what they had to do should an accident occur. The lack of necessary training and regular drills was also partly responsible for shortcomings in responding to the Chernobyl accident especially at the early stage (death of firemen, insufficient supplies of iodine prophylactics, belated evacuation of the town of Pripyat). 2. Of all the many countermeasures to reduce the exposure dose carried out during the 13 years after the accident, the following are estimated as the most effective in terms of dose reduction: a. in terms of total dose reduction: - evacuation, - sending of children during the first year after the accident to recreational camps outside the contamination areas for 2-3 months during summer time; b. in terms of external exposure dose reduction: - clean-up of schools and children's institutions and areas only during the early post-accident period when there were many short-lived gamma-emitters in the surrounding environment; c. in terms of internal exposure dose reduction: - substitution of the local food products with products considered "clean" from the radiation point of view. 3. At present, the resettlement of the population from contaminated to "clean" areas is not very effective in terms of the avertable dose. Intensive national and international studies on the possibility of the restoration of agricultural and industrial activity in contaminated areas are requested. 4. The creation of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone on the most contaminated areas was justified in terms of both minimising the accidental dose received by the population and establishing a buffer territory which limited radionuclide migration to neighboring regions. The continuation of activity on the stabilising of the radiological situation of the Sarcophagus, radioactive waste storage, washing out radionuclides from the soil surface, are important components for strengthening the Exclusion Zone barrier properties. The comprehensive study of radionuclide migration and the rehabilitation processes are compulsory activities for the control of the Exclusion Zone as a safety barrier against penetration of radionuclides outside this area. The role of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone as the most important protective barrier from radionuclide migration will be exceptionally important in the long term. Assessing its reliability and its auto-rehabilitative processes and substantiating possible additional protective measures must remain the most important task of future national and international research. 5. At present, the psychological impact of the accident on the population is one of the most pressing and hazardous consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Nowadays it is very important to demonstrate to the population living in contaminated areas what are the real consequences of the accident. The most important task for the coming period is to help people living in contaminated areas to regain the capability of building their own lives. 6. Unfortunately, the comprehensive epidemiological study of low dose radiation effects on the affected population has not been performed. It is threfore very difficult to extract the direct effects of radiation from the other negative (psychological, economical, social) impacts on the health of the population. However, all these effects have led to a dramatic decrease in the health of the population. The highest priority of national and international activity is the reinforcement of health care. 7. In the light of the lessons learned from Chernobyl at national and international level, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive cross section system of measures aimed at minimising the remaining consequences of the accident. Elements of such a system would be:
8. Assessing the effectiveness of the countermeasures carried out is a very important problem. But assessment should take account of not only radiation and economic criteria but also social criteria. Such an approach requires further scientific study and must become one of the important thrusts of future work on substantiating responses and intervention in the event of radiation accidents. 9. The huge experience accumulated during the mitigation of the Chernobyl accident's consequences could serve as a basis for a system of scientific back-up for decision-making in the event of nuclear and other technological accidents. The creation of such a system, based on procedures for assessing and monitoring accidents which are unified at regional and international levels, is an important task. It will be a good example of how the Chernobyl disaster, which has brought so much distress and suffering, can make a positive contribution to the development of society. Appendix 2 SUMMARY OF DOCUMENT AP/CAT (2000) 2
THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGISLATION ON RADIATION PROTECTION OF THE
POPULATIONS OF UKRAINE, BELGIUM, FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM The ICRP recommendations have paved the way for a degree of homogeneity in the regulations on radiation protection. However, the differences inherent in the legal instruments adopted by the national authorities should be noted. The impact of certain traditional political, legal or administrative values will also be noted. While, from an entirely formal point of view, it is possible to state that Ukraine's legal approach offers the best guarantees, a less binding system such as that recommended by the British ("commitments") has proved to be equally effective. At present, it is
undeniable that Ukraine is at the forefront of the countries studied
for this report. It combines the ICRP's latest recommendations with a coherent legislative system covering all aspects of nuclear safety. The deadline of May 2000 for transposing Directive 96/29/EURATOM (which already conforms to the ICRP's recommendations) enables the other countries to bring their legislation into line. A fresh evaluation will be required in autumn 2000. [1] Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Russian Federation, San Marino, Spain, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey, Ukraine. [2] Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Russian Federation, San Marino, Spain, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey, Ukraine.
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