"Migrations in the 20th century and their consequences – ways forward for history lessons within a European context"

European Seminar for Educational Staff
Dillingen an der Donau, Germany
29 November - 3 December 1999

Report

Council for Cultural Co-operation

Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century

in association with the

In-Service Training Programme for Educational Staff

Strasbourg, July 2000

The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 to achieve greater unity between European parliamentary democracies. It is the oldest of the European political institutions and has forty-one member states,[1] including the fifteen members of the European Union. It is the widest intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary grouping in Europe, and has its headquarters in the French city of Strasbourg.

Only questions related to national defence are excluded from the Council of Europe's work, and the Organisation has activities in the following areas: democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms; media and communication; social and economic affairs; education, culture, heritage and sport; youth; health; environment and regional planning; local democracy and legal co-operation.

The **European Cultural Convention** was opened for signature in 1954. This international treaty is also open to European countries that are not members of the Council of Europe, enabling them to take part in the Organisation's Programmes on education, culture, sport and youth. So far, forty-seven states have acceded to the European Cultural Convention: the Council of Europe's forty-one member states plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Holy See and Monaco.

The **Council for Cultural Co-operation** (the CDCC) is responsible for the Council of Europe's work on **education** and **culture**. Four specialised committees - the Education Committee, the Higher Education and Research Committee, the Culture Committee and the Cultural Heritage Committee - help the CDCC to carry out its tasks under the European Cultural Convention. There is also a close working relationship between the CDCC and the regular conferences of specialised European ministers responsible for education, for culture and for the cultural heritage.

The CDCC's Programmes are an integral part of the Council of Europe's work and, like the Programmes in other sectors, they contribute to the Organisation's three main policy objectives:

– the protection, reinforcement and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and pluralist democracy;
– the promotion of an awareness of European identity;
– the search for common responses to the great challenges facing European society.

The CDCC's education programme covers school and higher education. At present, there are projects on education for democratic citizenship, history, modern languages, school links and exchanges, educational policies, training for educational staff, the reform of legislation on higher education in central and eastern Europe, the recognition of qualifications, lifelong learning for equity and social cohesion, European studies for democratic citizenship, and the social sciences and the challenge of transition.

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[1] Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

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Report by

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I. Preliminary remark on the concept of the teachers' seminar

As we move into the 21st century it is clear that two apparently inexorable developments are exerting ever greater influence over the lives of people in European States: Europeanisation and globalisation. For the open societies in Europe which already bear the distinct stamp of migration processes, these developments will entail further drastic changes: living together in a multi-ethnic society with a high degree of mobility will become the norm.

We must therefore prepare the rising generations in all countries for this new situation, by:

- fostering understanding for the causes underlying these processes,
- eradicating irrational fears and judgements,
- encouraging a keener perception of the positive effects of migration,
- building a capacity for tolerance in relations with others.

This represents a pedagogical challenge to schools and to education. In their welcoming address, the Director of the Akademie Ludwig Härig and Dr Stefan Krimm, Bavarian State Minister for Education, stressed that the European teachers' seminar "Migrations in the 20th century and their consequences - ways forward for history lessons within a European context" was to be a contribution towards this important task.

As a component of the Council of Europe "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century" project, the seminar focused on the historical dimension of the theme. We must understand the historical roots of drastic change in order to take our bearings in the present. At the same time, historical knowledge is a prerequisite for dealing with future tasks. It was against this backdrop that the seminar sought to find answers to the following questions:

- How can the theme of "migrations", hitherto given rather a subordinate role in history teaching, be made a stronger focal point?
- What useful and innovative teaching approaches can be recommended for addressing and motivating pupils in the age-group 14-17 in particular?
- In what ways can the European dimension of this theme be better dealt with in history teaching?

In view of the relatively low priority attached to this theme in teaching to date, it had to be assumed that there was a need for information. A number of contributions therefore sought to highlight different aspects of migratory movements (cf programme appended). Heavy use was made of plenary and group discussions above all to generate pedagogical and methodological ideas and present practical teaching experiences.

Obviously, given the great number and diversity of migratory movements in Europe in the 20th century, only partial answers could be found to the aforementioned questions. These should provide pointers for identifying practical action within the context of national curricula. The results of the seminar supplement those of the 80th European teachers' seminar held in Donaueschingen on the same theme[2]. At the same time, they are to be incorporated in a teaching pack on "Population movements in Europe in the 20th century", which is being developed within the framework of the Council of Europe project.

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[2] The documentation is published under the reference DECS/EDU/INSET/DONAU (98) 2.

II. The Council of Europe project: Learning and Teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th Century

Dr Carole Reich (responsible for the Council of Europe project) and Claude-Alain Clerc (Chairman of the project steering group) described the objectives of the project "Learning and Teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th Century". The project, which will run for a number of years, was approved at the 19th session of the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education held in Vienna, which placed deliberate emphasis on the importance of history teaching with a European dimension for a Europe developing in unison. The beginning of the 21st century is the ideal starting point for considering content for the teaching of last century's history. In particular, the Council of Europe Education Committee laid down the following aims for the project[3], which was to help young people to:

- understand the forces, movements and events which have shaped Europe in the 20th century,
- understand the historical roots and context of the main challenges facing Europe today,
- develop skills enabling them to
    - think for themselves amidst the wealth of information now available on the Internet;
    - deal critically with statements and historical interpretations;
    - take in others' views and recognise and comprehend any differences;
    - detect errors and prejudices in historical representations.

To achieve those aims, seminars and symposiums have been held and documentation produced, covering themes such as the introduction of new information technologies (Andorra, 1999), using archives and museums (Brussels, 1998), "Use and misuse of history" (Oslo, 1999) or questions of basic and further teacher training[4]. The *Georg-Eckert Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung* (Georg-Eckert Institute for international textbook research) in Braunschweig has produced a comparative study of the presentation of central themes in history textbooks in different European States[5], which identified progress and innovations as well as shortcomings in the incorporation of the European dimension.

In addition, a series of publications providing assistance for the practical work of history teachers in the 47 member states of the European Cultural Convention is being produced. Among those in preparation or at planning stage are:

- a history teacher's manual;
- aids for history teaching on the themes:
    - women in 20th century Europe;
    - nationalism in 20th century Europe;
    - population movements in 20th century Europe;
    - the use of feature films (with a filmography);
    - teaching about the Holocaust;

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[3] The aims are set out in detail in document CC-ED/HIST (96) 14

[4] Documentation on events and further details of the project are available on the web-page http://culture.coe.fr/hist20/

[5] Cf DECS/EDU/HIST20 (99) 2

- case studies for the incorporation of cultural history and the Internet;
- studies on the use of innovative methods such as simulations of the Paris Peace Conference and the Peace of Westphalia.

The full results of the project are to be presented in October 2000, at the Conference of European Education Ministers in Krakow (Poland). They should provide inspiration for teaching programmes and textbooks and impetus for the development of basic and further teacher training and are to be made available to help teachers shape their teaching content and methods.

III. Migration in 20th century European history

Migration - a key characteristic of 20th century European history? This may be surprising for those who equate the theme of migration with present-day migratory phenomena, such as migration on economic grounds, asylum problems or the problem of illegal immigration. But if all transborder population displacements are included, then it quickly becomes clear what a strong mark migratory flows have left on the century. In order to seize the full breadth and meaning of the phenomenon, it is both necessary and useful to begin with a brief look at the suitability of the concept and the significant migratory movements.

1. Suitability of the concept

The concept of "migration" is a modern catch-all concept initially borrowed from the sphere of biology and used ever more frequently to describe all forms of spatial movements of people. The concept has been adopted in geography and demography, is increasingly used in didactics and is superseding older, mostly differentiated descriptions such as "immigration", "emigration", "flight" etc.

In terms of phenomena the concept covers a great variety of processes: both "involuntary" movements, with the use of coercion or violence, as in flight, expulsion, deportation, and "voluntary" movements. The common link is at the anthropological level: people leave their homeland and must become established as "foreigners" in a new pattern of human relations.

The advantage of the concept of "migration" lies in its neutral description and emphasis on features that are common to all the different forms of population movements. Thus it paves the way for a comprehensive approach to the subject and a European and global viewpoint. However, it does mean that differences between the differing forms of migration, eg as regards reasons, the degree of free will, the circumstances, are initially unclear. And a historical view cannot do without such distinctions. It is necessary, therefore, to subdivide the overall concept of "migration", using additional notions.

Various notions are useful in this respect, although they have partly taken on political overtones. In particular, forms of forced population displacement are clearly distinguished according to one's point of view: for example, notions such as "expulsion", "transfer", "deportation", "evacuation" or "resettlement" are used to describe one and same process of "displacement" of Germans from the colonised areas in central and eastern Europe to the four zones of occupation immediately after the Second World War. Further examples of conscious or

unwitting use of notions to strengthen a certain vision of history are easily found. Consideration of the suitability of the concept in the actual area of history teaching is therefore necessary.

But forms of population movements that were subject to a lesser degree of coercion or voluntary are placed on a level footing by the overall concept too. Even so, migration for professional reasons within Europe (possibly within large corporations), migration of the elite (film actors, sportsmen) or certain forms of work-related migration (eg "guest workers" in Germany) are distinctly different phenomena, as regards not only motives and numbers but also consequences.

So how is our use of "migration" to be understood? Since a European viewpoint is taken, the emphasis is above all on transborder population movements, be they prompted by freely taken decisions or forced by certain circumstances or forcibly carried out. That does not mean that migratory movements within states (ranging from movements between regions or towns to deportations) should be overlooked or neglected.

2. Migratory flows in 20th century European history

A historical view makes it clear that migration is a fundamental fact of history. This is also expressed in myths such as the Odyssey, the story of the holy family and in stereotypes (eg "the wandering Jew"). History may therefore be perceived as a sequence of migratory movements. The aspirations of 19th century liberal movements to put a lasting end to emigration as a result of economic necessity and to flight as a result of political oppression, were based on the assumption that a liberal model of society would prevail, industrialisation would provide the necessary means for acceptable living conditions and war would become a thing of the past. The 20th century left their hopes in ruins.

2.1. Overview

Never in the course of world history have there been such substantial and extensive population movements as in the 20th century. With hindsight, this period is described as the "century of refugees" or the "century of displaced persons". It is estimated that in this lapse of time, world-wide, some 250 million people lost their homeland. In recent decades work- and poverty-related migration have taken on much greater importance, as migrants have been drawn to the more prosperous parts of Europe. The developments which have resulted in steady cross-border flows may be identified as follows[6]:

Ethnic displacements, deportations, expulsions

Ethnic population movements set in after the First World War and concerned *inter alia* Armenians, Greeks, Turks and Kurds. Mass deportations became a frequently practised means of policy implementation in the totalitarian systems established before, during and after the Second World War. Examples are the racial/ideological deportations by the Nazi regime, deportations within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, the expulsion of Germans from settled areas of settlement in eastern Europe and the "resettlement" of Poles from the territories allocated to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. The most recent instances have been "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia.

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[6] This information is drawn from a lecture by Prof. Werner K. Blessing, Erlangen-Nürnberg University

Emigration and flight

The prime phenomena here are movements of people fleeing dictatorial and totalitarian systems and also the conflicts and wars triggered by them. Just a few examples are emigration from Germany and flight from the states occupied by the Nazi regime - a fate that concerned Jews in particular. When the Cold War began, people started to flee the territory under Soviet control. Noteworthy examples are the streams of refugees from Hungary and Czechoslovakia following the military interventions to crush reform movements in 1956 and 1968 respectively, and also the flows from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany up to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The swelling number of refugees from the GDR in 1989 was a contributing factor to the rapid collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia gave rise to new groups of civil war refugees. There are also the political refugees from other crisis-hit areas of the world, who seek asylum or a new homeland in Europe. Although flows from Africa, the "continent of refugees", have been on the increase since the 1980s, they represent only a fragment of the total number of refugees within Africa itself.

Return migration and displacements of populations as a result of decolonisation

The borders of colonised areas stretched beyond the confines of peoples, taking no account of traditional ethnic or cultural spaces. Decolonisation and the ensuing political developments led to displacements or the redefinition of state borders. In the course of decolonisation, return migration to the country of origin started up. In addition, displacements among peoples in Africa were triggered and these have continued to the present day and have a strong impact on Europe (see previous paragraph).

Work-related migration

From the mid-fifties onwards, work-related migration became a characteristic feature for western Europe. A total of over 30 million "guest workers", the vast majority from southern European countries and also Turkey, met the demand from the booming northern economies for cheap labour. (In the communist sphere of influence the recruitment of foreign labour, eg in Vietnam, bore a different stamp but was fairly comparable).

The turnover initially envisaged was ousted by another development: only some of those recruited returned to their homeland after a limited period and a substantial proportion settled (lastingly) in the recruiting countries. Both return migration and continued residence affected and continue to affect the societies concerned.

Poverty-linked migration

This category includes migration from outside Europe caused by different factors. It is not really possible to draw a clear-cut distinction between people who leave their country in search of better standards of living and asylum-seekers who are escaping political persecution. It is difficult to place a figure on the proportion living as "illegal immigrants" in different countries. What we can say is that, as a result of circumstances and overall conditions, it is only those people in the better-off groups in their own country that have any kind of chance of reaching Europe.

Migration after the end of the East-West conflict

From 1989 onwards population movements from East to West increased as a result of political changes. It cannot yet be ascertained whether this is a lasting work-related migratory flow that is increasing with the extension of the European Union. Freedom of movement within European Union countries has not yet presented any aggravating consequences in quantitative terms. Migration of the professional elite has always existed. There is a growing "brain drain" from East to West.

2.2. Causes of migration

Migratory movements have many different causes. Overlapping analytical models hinge on the structural shortcomings of systems. In brief, these models may be outlined as follows:

1. *Economic model*: A system no longer guarantees the living standards of population groups or better living standards are hoped for in another system.

2. *Communications theory model*: This analytical approach attributes migratory pressure to a disrupted or dysfunctional dialogue between population groups, which forces one group to leave its homeland.

3. *Political theory model*: The dominance of a given ideology leads to conflict and forces non-conforming groups to emigrate.

As a general principle it is helpful, when analysing the causes of migration to distinguish between *push and pull factors*. Examples of push factors for the 20th century have been:

- Political reasons:
    - The principle of exclusivity of nationalism and the individual right to self-determination of peoples were bases of ethnic displacements, first sanctioned by international law in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
    - The abolition of liberal rights through dictatorial and totalitarian systems (eg the soviet expatriation law of 1922) made living conditions intolerable.
    - The development of war into mechanised mass warfare led to the incorporation of the civilian population in new proportions.
    - Ethnic and/or economic consequences of decolonisation prompted post-colonial migratory movements in the 1950s.

- Socio-cultural factors

    - Ethnically nuanced nationalism and cultural conflicts played a role, for example in the successor states of previously multi-ethnic countries.
    - Similarly, religious fundamentalism (in Arab countries for instance) was (and still is) a cause of migration.

- Ecological factors

These are responsible for population movements in the Third World, for example, with migratory movements mostly limited to large regions and conditioned by a multitude of inter-related factors.

On the whole the different factors are often inter-linked; political and socio-cultural causes of migration are frequently determined by economic factors. The pull factors in the destination countries are constituted by their higher living standards and also the political situation. However, economic factors have been particularly telling in recent decades.

2.3. Consequences of migration

As regards the effects of present-day migration, the following elements are central to public perception:

- consequences for the labour market
- immigration as a source of social burdening/dumping
    - costs to the budget (short, medium and long term)
    - economic climate
- effects on demographic development
- consequences for security within and outside the state
- social and cultural consequences ("multicultural society")

3. A comparative view of migration processes - case studies

While teaching on the subject of migration has overwhelmingly dealt with the theme from a national point of view, a comparison or even the incorporation of other viewpoints seems particularly productive and commendable. Therefore, two closely linked population displacements at the end of the Second World War were examined as exemplary fields of research: flight and expulsion of Germans from the territories to the east of the Oder and the Neisse and the "repatriation" or forced resettlement of Poles from the territories allocated to the Soviet Union in the process of Poland's westward shift. The focus was not solely on the causes and the course of events but also, and in particular, on the processes of integration into the new homelands concerned.

3.1. Integration of refugees and displaced persons in the Federal Republic of Germany[7]

In the case of the displaced Germans, it is now clear today that, despite substantial economic and social problems and not inconsiderable tension between the established population and their new fellow citizens in the post-war period, their integration was thoroughly successful. Decisive factors were identified as: compensation for material losses paid to the displaced persons (spreading of the burden), which provided start-up aid for building a new life; favourable economic development ("economic miracle"); avoidance of ghetto-isation through an even distribution of displaced persons; the catering for their interests by people's parties; the

[7] The integration of displaced Germans was covered by Prof. Rudolf Endres, Bayreuth University

acceptance and fostering of the cultural traditions of displaced groups and also the integration of the second and third generations through school, club membership etc. In that much, the history of refugees and displaced persons in the Federal Republic of Germany can be held up as a case study for successful integration.

3.2. Displacement of Poles and the process of their integration in the post-war period[8] (the full text of this lecture is appended)

Migration to Poland immediately after the Second World War involved the settlement of the "recovered territories", ie the former German territory land acquired by Poland in its westward shift. In particular the integration of the "repatriates" (evacuated from former Polish territory in the east) proved difficult. The frontier issue that was still not definitively settled, fears of German vengeance deliberately stoked by politicians and also hopes of a return to the homeland resulted in many people initially making no arrangements for a lasting stay.

One important factor in integration is finding one's place among the host population. But that population had largely of fled or been displaced. Those Germans who remained were not regarded as fellow citizens but in many cases as individuals responsible for the suffering caused or the consequences of the war, such as the displacement of Poles from the eastern territories. In Upper Silesia, Mazuria and Ermland/Wąrmia the established population were viewed with deep mistrust as "half-poles" or "half-germans" by the new arrivals. In addition, there was tension between the two groups of Polish migrants: those being resettled (migrants from Central Poland) went willingly to the "recovered territories" to build a better life for themselves; the "repatriates" felt that they had suffered an injustice, had to cope with the loss of their homeland, were looked down on by those being resettled and were at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the latter.

The Polish government's first move was to eliminate the divisive factors through a rapid assimilation policy. This met with very little success, particularly in Silesia, and alienation from the Polish state and the parallel existence of the different population groups have lingered on (to the present day), finding a partial safety valve in emigration (of Germans to the Federal Republic for example). It is true, though, that the state has also succeeded in creating a new regional society, albeit in parts. Among the determining factors in this were common work *inter alia* in industry, the growing degree of social levelling and the accompanying assimilation of ways of living, migration to towns, the unifying impact of school education, the fading of cultural idiosyncrasies, partly as a result of the mass media, the common catholic faith and finally the growth of links between groups through marriage, membership of organisations, shared neighbourhood etc.

4. Migration policy and integration strategies

The end of the East-West conflict, progressive European integration and global developments are creating a new framework for migration processes at the end of the 20th century. The diversity of immigration and emigration and also the quantitative aspects are often not taken into account in public discussion. The task at hand, as far as policy is concerned, is to look at historical experience and develop concepts for considering migratory movements[9].

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[8] The displacement of populations and the process of their integration in Poland after the Second World War was dealt with by Dr Monika Choroś, Instytut Śląski in Opole/Poland

[9] The following information is based on the contribution by Prof. Friedrich Heckmann of the Centre for European Migration Studies at Bamberg University.

Further focal points of the seminar were therefore:

- discussion of the problems of migration data,
- a historical analysis of the links between the stance of states vis-à-vis immigrants, the political measures taken and the degree of success of integration processes.

4.1. Apprehending the situation as regards migration

The example of the Federal Republic of Germany reveals that, contrary to prevailing public opinion, the migration situation is very much the result of immigration **and** emigration:
Forms of immigration to the Federal Republic of Germany

Immigration and emigration in 1998

The fact that data are recorded differently is a major problem. Where migration from other countries is concerned, for example, the definition of "foreigner" varies in national statistics. This makes comparison between different European states more difficult. It is interesting to take a look at immigration in absolute terms and the so-called "immigration rate" - insofar, as always when using statistical data, as the categories are properly checked to avoid any misinterpretations. This also provides teachers with a means of fostering method-based knowledge and critical analysis. In addition to specialist publications, recognised organisations[10] provide data and additional links, also available on the following web-sites:

Internet addresses (selection)

http://www.statistik-bund.de
(Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany)
http://www.unine.ch/fsm/mission_d.htm
(Swiss Forum for migration studies)
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/eurostat/eurostat.html
(Statistical Information Office of the European Communities)
http://www.unicc.org/unece/stats/stats_h.htm
(United Nations /Economic Commission for Europe)
http://www.cemes.org
(Centre for European Migration and Ethnic Studies)
http://www.igc.ch/framstat.htm
(Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia)
http://www.ercomer.org
(European Research Centre for Migration and Ethnic Relations)
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/ResFacilities/DemographyPage.html
(The World-Wide Web Virtual Library: Demography & Population Studies)

[10] The European Centre for Migration Studies of Bamberg University, for example, publishes a CD-ROM containing differentiated data and other material on the migration situation in the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.2. Means of integration in different European countries (cf the full text of the contribution by Prof. Heckmann appended)

European societies have known many diverse immigration phenomena since the end of the Second World War. The illusion that immigration is a passing problem is giving way to the assessment that the integration of new groups is becoming a long-term task. That task represents a challenge to established ideas on the formation and identity of a nation and on the welfare state.

Was does "integration" mean? It is the incorporation of new population groups in existing social structures and the integration of those groups in the existing system of socio-economic, legal and cultural relations; a process that generally lasts longer than one generation. The following sub-headings can be distinguished:

- *structural integration*: This entails equal access to positions in the core institutions of the host society, such as the labour and housing market, as well as rights of participation in the political community (civil rights).

- *cultural integration*: this means the adoption of views, standards and values. As a rule, this is a two-way process, as the host society also changes in contact with new population groups.

- *social integration*: this implies the development of personal relations and acceptance in social alliances (friendships, marriage, club or association membership etc).

- *integration through identification*: this is manifested subjectively through feelings of belonging to the host society, nation, ethnic group etc. It completes the process.

"Successful" integration is characterised by increasing degrees of similitude of living standards and ethnic/cultural orientation between immigrants and the long-established population.

As regards the integration of migrants there are differing strategies in Europe which closely reflect the prevailing interpretation of "nation". Three examples illustrate fundamental differences and consequences:

- *The republican model* (example of France)

France has a long history of integration behind it. For demographic reasons, an active immigration policy was pursued in the 1920s and 1930s. After the Second World War the consequences of return immigration from colonies and also work-related migration had to be coped with.

The French understanding of "nation" is founded on the principles of the French Revolution and, since the founding of the 3rd republic in 1875, has expanded to take in the notions of "common language" and "common culture". The secular concept of the state and also of the national education system became key instruments of integration in the making of the nation. Immigrants were incorporated into that process. The political concept of "nation" (cf E. Renan) facilitated integration.

Naturalisation took place quickly on account of the pre-eminence of "jus soli" over "jus sanguinis": any person born in France, even if the parents are illegal immigrants - receives French nationality. Children of non-French parents, who were not born in France, receive French nationality upon reaching the age of 18, as long as they have lived for at least five years in France. Consequently, the fact of belonging to the nation is not defined according to ethnic criteria or simply on the understanding of "jus soli", but is founded on cultural and political socialisation or "assimilation". Accordingly, there is a very strong reluctance to foster minority organisations. At the end of the 1980s the concept was modified to become "assimilating integration", in recognition of interaction between cultures.

Immigrants are expected to swiftly adopt values and patriotic attitudes. Rapid naturalisation facilitates identification. However, the decisive role in the integration of immigrants and their children is the state education system.

- *The ethnic-cultural model* (example of Germany)

Despite frequent utterances to the effect that "Germany is not an immigration country", Germany has a high immigration rate (see 4.1 above). Policy is aimed at both limiting immigration and successfully integrating immigrants already resident in the country. As in France, foreigners living in Germany have basically the same access to welfare state support. At the institutional level (school, work) integration is thoroughly successful. Even so, despite all-out efforts to improve personal relations between Germans and immigrants, there is no incentive of identification for immigrants; those describing themselves as German are very few and far between.

The key difference with France lies in naturalisation and thereby in political integration. The reason is a fundamentally different understanding of "nation". The conventional interpretation dates back to Herder and, since the 19th century, holds that the basis of the nation and therefore of the state is constituted by the same origin of citizens and also a common culture and history. In this vision of things, ethnic and state boundaries should be identical.
But this interpretation has lost ground in recent decades: in the light of experiences with the nazi regime but also owing to the relatively high proportion of immigrants in Germany, the principle of origin is increasingly challenged. Also instrumental in this are the adoption of the western concept of democracy and the growing importance of "constitutional patriotism" as a new form of political identification. This is leading at present to certain adjustments in nationality law, which was previously founded on "jus sanguinis". Discussion continues as to what extent the different groups should be granted their own rights and a special status.

- *The "multicultural" model* (example of the Netherlands)

The Dutch tradition whereby immigrants are integrated into society via "pillars", with religious and political groups organised in their own institutions, has determined both the interpretation of "nation" and migration policy. Everyone has the same access to the "roof" formed above those "pillars" by central political institutions. Conflicts are settled by compromise. This model has been extended to immigrants and has served to develop the idea of a "multicultural society" in the Netherlands.

Nationality legislation was increasingly enriched by elements of "jus soli" after the Second World War. Naturalisation is possible after five years; for the so-called second generation it is very easy to secure and the "third generation" is naturalised automatically. The specific concept of society (the "pillars" model) has the result (contrary to France for example) that targeted

minority policy is pursued and special integration programmes are launched. Most recently, though, the emphasis has been more on improving the integration of immigrants into society as a whole than preparing them for life within an ethnic minority in the Netherlands.

Résumé

Comparative analysis demonstrates *inter alia* the consequences of differing interpretations of "nation" where integration policy is concerned. What is also clear is that there is equalisation at European level. Since the countries examined are all welfare states, many fundamental conditions of integration are identical or similar. Schools, the labour market, public health services are accessible to all migrants and their descendants. Another common feature of European states is that they wish to limit further immigration, as a prerequisite for the successful integration of immigrants already resident in the country. The image of "fortress Europa" does not apply to the past.

The Maastricht Treaty (1993) classified immigration issues as "matters of common interest"; in the Treaty of Amsterdam it was agreed to develop a common immigration and asylum policy within four years. This gave the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice influence over national provisions.

5. International law and transborder population movements[11]

International law came into being as a law of correspondence between sovereign states. Today the international organisations operate on the level of international law as additional subjects of international law. Individuals or groups have no rights of their own at that level. This means that international law and population movements are tangential when people cross borders. First in line are questions of human rights protection and the granting of asylum. Since the situation of minorities are often a cause of migration (examples of flight and expulsion), provision for minority protection and declarations of self-determination of peoples are also significant. In the 20th century international law sought above all to establish provisions covering these complex issues. The incorporation of this development into history teaching can illustrate how hard it is to broaden human rights protection. At the same time it becomes clear, when a historical view is taken, that tireless efforts to secure human rights pay off. The focus should therefore be not only on cases where international law failed but also on the progress achieved.

Refugee law

The sphere of refugees is where international law first succeeded in providing individuals expelled from the solidary societies of sovereign states with legal protection. This began in the League of Nations era and the United Nations Organisation has carried on that work.

The concept of "refugee" has been established in international law since the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. The Contracting states are to afford protection (eg not returning them) and certain rights to "recognised" refugees but have no obligation to grant them asylum. The definition formulated in the European context of that time (flight from totalitarian systems) proved too restrictive, as it excluded other causes and certain forms of flight. It is a tricky business to draw precise distinctions between forced displacement and flight or flight and

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[11] This theme was dealt with in a contribution by Thomas Silberhorn, Bayreuth University

emigration. "National refugees" for example, who are taken in by a state in which they have family origins, do not fall into this category (eg French from Algeria, Poles from the territories allocated to the Soviet Union). Groups forcibly displaced within a state (eg deported ethnic minorities) enjoy hardly any protection from international law today. The United Nations is now working hard to broaden and adapt refugee law.

Human rights and migration

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) contains three articles applicable to migration problems:

- Article 13: "(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country". There is no mention, though, of a right to enter another country. Only international agreements (cf the Schengen Agreement) can provide a basis for the right of the citizens concerned to enter and stay in a country.

- Article 14: "(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution". The article's second paragraph restricts this right to political persecution. Asylum-seekers not claiming political persecution - and these constitute a large part of the migratory movements of the last third of the 20th century - are not granted such a right. One major shortcoming is that a right or entitlement to asylum does not yet exist. Not even the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees enshrines an individual right to asylum, although it does prohibit the expulsion, deportation or return of persecuted individuals to a state in which their life or freedom would be threatened.

- Article 15: "(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality". This counters the problem of statelessness; however, there is no associated right of naturalisation.

Flight and asylum and freedom of movement are also addressed by the European Convention on Human Rights. All Council of Europe member states must ratify the Convention, though not necessarily the additional protocols. In the event of violations, application may be made to the European Court of Human Rights.

Expulsion

Expulsion is defined as any forcible displacement, induced by threat or use of violence or other coercive means, of individuals or groups from their ancestral areas of settlement to unfamiliar territory. Once a solution for mixed ethnic areas had emerged in the first half of the 20th century in resettlement and option treaties (cf the Treaty of Lausanne, which provided for the resettlement of Greeks and Turks), thoughts turned towards a ban on expulsion following the Second World War and, more recently, the civil wars and expulsions effected in the former Yugoslavia. Despite a multitude of efforts, there is still no formal ban on expulsion, although it may be derived from international law concerning war. Article 49 of the IVth Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits transfers and deportations of civilian persons from occupied territory and of a country's own civilian population to an occupied area. It is true that reservations have limited the impact of the Convention to date. In 1977 the Convention was supplemented by two additional protocols, prohibiting expulsion on racist grounds.

Other significant documents are as follows:

- International Covenant on civil and political rights (1966): Article 12 (liberty of movement within one's country and the right to enter one's own country), Article 27 (protection of minorities)

- UN Resolution (1971) prohibiting measures forcing people to leave their homeland

- 4th additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights: Article 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens)

- Council of Europe Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities.

Despite all these promising initiatives, the problem has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, one of the reasons being that those responsible for enforcing international law have only half-heartedly fulfilled their role. Only recently have there been signs of change, with abusive expulsions being punished, for example (Tribunal proceedings concerning Rwanda and Yugoslavia).

Migration with the EU area

Within the EU area there are no restrictions on the freedom of movement of EU citizens. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam immigration and asylum policy was transferred from the 3rd pillar of the European Union to the European Community ("communitarisation") and given extensive law-making competence (see Article 61ff of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community). The integration of the "Schengen Acquis" (*inter alia* the Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen Implementation Convention) was of tremendous significance for immigration policy, and the content of the 1990 Dublin Agreement is important as regards asylum policy.

IV. How can the theme "migrations" be taught?

Discussion of the contributions, and in particular the idea of Council of Europe assistance put forward by Dr Herwig Buntz, and also discussions within the working groups gave rise to the following suggestions and thoughts on history teaching focusing on "Migrations in 20th century Europe".

1. As regards the initial situation

The theme of "Migrations in 20th century Europe" is present in the curricula of all countries, with differing points of emphasis. Knowledge of significant population movements is passed on, therefore, though not only in history teaching but also in other subjects such as geography and sociology. Despite this "tradition", the theme throws down a number of challenges to history teachers:

- Many teaching programmes are constructed on a chronological basis. An overall, in-depth examination of the different aspects of the theme of "migration" is rarely planned for and certainly hardly practised to date.

- Migratory movements become historical subject matter above all where they have had a lasting impact on national history. On the other hand, the "European dimension" is rather considered as being of secondary importance.

- In order to convey the theme in its fundamental facets and introduce a European perspective, additional information and materials are required. The textbooks available do not satisfy these needs, as an international study found: " Students obviously need geographical orientation, factual information and background knowledge about the different groups and various reasons for migration and they should be encouraged to appreciate the richness of the multicultural environments resulting from these population movements. None of the many texts or maps seems to be able to cope successfully with this complex problem in all its ramifications. It would seem that the topic cannot be adequately treated within the confines of a history textbook."[12]

- Pupils' interest in the theme varies considerably. Teaching will have to consider whether migratory movements have left traces in the class or in the pupils' environment or even whether they constitute a topical issue or a matter of little concern for pupils to date. Considerable attention must therefore be devoted to questions of motivation or the development of a suitable starting point.

- Teaching of the theme can be particularly successful when the transdisciplinary aspects are dealt with in conjunction with other subjects. This may apply to demographic, (economic-) geographical, (international) law, political or ethical aspects for example. In addition to the historical side of the theme, the following dimensions should be considered:
    - Spatial dimension: teaching might focus, in conjunction with geography, above all on the changes in certain regions resulting from immigration or emigration.
    - Political dimension: this concerns above all topical discussion on migration and integration policy. Closely related fields such as protection of minorities, human rights, the role of international organisations in protecting refugees and also opposition to immigration within states come under consideration.
    - Ethical dimension: here, it is aspects such as human dignity, tolerance and harmonious social relations that hold sway.
    - Personal dimension: the teaching can link in the pupils' different experiences - many family histories feature migration, pupils may have contact with migrants etc.

- Migration is a sensitive theme and teaching must be tailored accordingly:

    - The study of forcible population displacements throws up questions of historical responsibility or the coherency of national history. In some cases conflicts smoulder between European neighbours on account of population displacements in bygone ages. A great many migratory movements are linked to the development of nations - questions of national identity are touched upon.
    - Current developments (such as asylum problems or the problem of illegal immigrants) are often the subject of emotional public and political debate, and the theme of immigration is also a rallying point for radical and extremist aspirations, of which young people will be aware.

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[12] Falk Pingel: The ways in which the history of Europe in the 20th Century is presented in textbooks for secondary schools, p. 49 (DECS/EDU/HIST20 (99) 2)

- The theme triggers (old) prejudices and fears, among young people too.
- Children of migrant parents may be in the class, and their history and family situation become the subject matter. A tolerant, open atmosphere must be created.

2. Aims of history teaching on the theme of migration

A central goal of history teaching is to impart a considered historical conscience. That implies that pupils are capable of establishing links between the time dimensions of past, present and future and recognising their world as one forged by history. Their historical conscience is "considered" when basic technical standards are available as benchmarks for gauging the interpretation of past events. What learning aims might be pursued in this context when studying the theme of migration?

Cognitive aims

Proper treatment of the theme requires founded and detailed knowledge. This entails a survey of causes, processes and consequences of migratory movements in both national and European history. In addition, circumspect and precise use should be made of concepts in order to avoid deliberate understatement, euphemism or discriminatory language (cf Part III, 1).

Teaching should lay emphasis on knowledge of the following *subject content*, with European references involved where possible:

- knowledge of relevant migratory movements, their causes and attendant circumstances
- effects of migratory movements ("migration balance-sheets")
- migration policy in different countries
- dealings with "foreigners" (prejudices, integration, exclusion etc).
- interplay between migration and the development of international and domestic law (nationality law, asylum law etc).

Instrumental aims

There are many ways of building and further developing subject-specific skills, which can also be applied to the study of history. Pupils should be trained to take a critical approach enabling them to identify tendentious, suggestive, propaganda-oriented or manipulated material. The theme lends itself to open and active forms of study and work, eg excursions in the vicinity of the school, record-tracing in archives and museums, surveys or role-playing (see IV,3 below). The following teaching techniques and media in particular offer methodical learning opportunities:

- Obtaining and evaluating information, be it from academic presentations or the Internet;
- Pictures and depictions are a vehicle for value judgements and trigger reactions in those who view them, often without those persons realising it. Migration is precisely one of the themes frequently presented with evocative photographs and graphic descriptions. Use of the right kind of examples (eg pictograms) makes it possible to illustrate the theme in an exemplary manner and take a suitable approach, backed by such sources.

- Statistics, diagrams and thematic maps present the quantitative and spatial aspects of migration. But a proper evaluation is not always possible for pupils without further information. They must be trained to question representations such as thematic maps: what section of space/time is represented on a map? What is missing? Does the presentation (colouring, symbols used) give a certain impression and suggest an evaluation? How are categories defined and how are they differentiated (eg the notion of "foreigner")?

Affective aims

History teaching focusing on migratory movements in the 20th century cannot side-step a concern with central values and may make a major contribution to the instilling of values. Human rights and their protection are prime concerns. Another key area is dealing with conflicts within society and between societies. Living alongside new population groups demands tolerance and open-mindedness. Teaching can help to reveal prejudices, prompt open encounters with others and better prepare pupils for social and political commitment, for example through voluntary work in organisations fostering the integration of citizens of foreign origin or in organisations aiming to prevent migratory movements in the Third World.

3. Didactic/methodical approaches to the theme

Suggests for teaching approaches may be grouped in four categories:

- Points of entry in teaching sequences
- Suitable materials
- Teaching techniques
- Other ideas

3.1. Points of entry in teaching sequences

When a teacher wishes to deal with the theme of migration, he should not expect pupils to recognise its importance on their own initiative or to share his interest. Therefore, it is important to strengthen motivation through a cleverly chosen point of entry. This can be a means of both illustrating the relevance of the theme and arousing interest and curiosity. The following possibilities exist:

- Brainstorming on the theme of "foreigners"
- Maps showing the direction and quantity of main migratory flows in the 20th century
- Headlines, statements, articles on current affairs, eg on new flows of refugees or political discussion concerning immigration or asylum matters
- Images and photographs, particularly items whose meaning is not clear at first glance but must be inferred by the pupils; this process guides the class towards the theme
- Caricatures, whose pointed features provoke and challenge one to take a standpoint; the use of pictures makes it easier to involve caricatural depictions from other European countries if desired and consider a number of different perspectives

- Discussion of the pupils' own experience; one tried and tested option is to draw up a kind of family tree showing the places/countries of birth of family members, in order to illustrate the family "migratory history" (it can also be useful to sound out pupils' future plans as regards training or working abroad).
- Statistics and data: besides official statistics, showing the scale of migration for example, data documenting changes in the demography of the country and local area are also to be considered. Given the right circumstances, pupils could ask fellow pupils in the class or in the school about their origins. Their findings would provide a starting point for an in-depth examination of the theme.
- Theme-related consideration of attitudes, previous knowledge and prejudices: national and international statistics may be used here (eg reliable statistics are available on young people's attitudes towards foreigners in different European countries)[13]. On similar lines, a survey can be carried out in the class to identify attitudes towards pointed statements. Another previously tested idea is to have pupils estimate the number or proportion of foreigners in a municipality or state and then compare with the actual figures. Material revealing attitudes towards migrants (café conversations, sayings, proverbs, graffiti, stereotypes, jokes etc) could also be gathered.

3.2. Suitable materials

Work with literary texts[14]

The theme of "migration" in its broadest sense has often been portrayed in literature. Texts range from poems to full youth novels[15]. In history teaching such texts can be used to broach or illustrate the subject matter. They also provide an opportunity for a more in-depth transdisciplinary approach in conjunction with literature studies, with pupils continuing the text where it left off, transposing into a play or writing their own texts on the subject.

[13] Relevant data and other material feature in the study "Youth and History. A comparative European survey on historical consciousness and political attitudes among adolescents. Magne Anqvik/Bodo von Borries (ed.), Hamburg 1997.

[14] Experiences of a foreign country were conveyed in poetic terms to the seminar participants through a reading of the Italian-born writer Gino Chiellino who has lived in Germany since the 1970s. The reading was kindly arranged by the Robert Bosch foundation.

[15] Here we can quote just a few examples: Henk Barnard: *Hier ben ik dran*. 1987 (story of a Turkish boy living with his family in Rotterdam); Federica de Cesco: *Aicha*. 1985 (the daughter of Algerian immigrants grows up in Paris and must choose between her parents' culture and that of the host country); Judith Kerr: *When Hitler stole pink rabbit*. 1971 (autobiographical presentation of the fate of a family obliged to emigrate in 1933, first to Switzerland and then to France and England); Christobel Mattingley: *No guns for Asmir*. 1993 (the true story of a family's flight from Sarajevo under siege).

Use of supporting items

Objects can provide very tangible starting points for teaching this theme. One of several approaches might be used. Nicholas Gage describes in his autobiography how, when emigrating from Greece to the USA as a young person in 1949, he took four objects to remind him of his homeland. This can prompt thoughts as to what pupils would take with them were they to leave their homeland and lead to discussion of homelands. This can be a particularly worthwhile exercise when foreign pupils are involved. Supporting items of this nature are also to be found in museums and archives.

3.3. Teaching techniques

Use of extramural study areas/one's own area as a field of study

The area around pupils' homes or schools can be investigated in search of traces of immigration and emigration, eg in relation to particular buildings such as churches, synagogues and mosques, shops or restaurants run by immigrants, monuments and memorial tablets, street names etc. Certain museum or archive exhibits may also fit the theme.

Oral history survey

Biographical episodes can give quite immediate access to aspects of the theme. Surveys may take written form (questionnaires) but interviews are also a possibility. A framework for questions should be worked out jointly so that a maximum of information may be gleaned. It should not be forgotten that pupils are generally not familiar with interviewing techniques, so some preparation is necessary. Another problem area is analysing and evaluating information that often carries subjective overtones and fitting it into the historical context[16].

Questions put to experts

A generally less delicate exercise than the oral history survey is putting questions to experts. Questions may be put to experts responsible for immigration and emigration matters in institutions such as public authorities, churches and charity organisations.

Role-play

Role-play is particularly well suited for imagining oneself in situations and comprehending decisions that were taken. For history studies role-play is particularly useful when the situation to be played out is very close to the true situation. Pupils are given as much information as possible to ensure this. Possible scenarios are: a family must decide whether to remain in its homeland or go to live in another country; a family that has been established in a host country for a long time discusses the topic of whether it migrated to its homeland or abroad; a family that has settled discusses foreign fellow citizens in the neighbourhood and whether they regard the latter as foreigners or new neighbours. Information and views are passed on *inter alia* in the preparatory phase and the more detailed discussion following the role-play.

[16] Compilations of video material featuring oral history surveys may also be used for teaching purposes. The following episodes in the series "Bavaria in the post-war period", available from the film archive services, feature interviews about migration: Everyday life in the post-war period; Flight/expulsion/return; Life - a woman's view.

Another means of better understanding others is to imagine oneself as coming from another country. A Dutch pupil, for example, could "assume the identity" of a German, inventing a name and place of birth and realistic biographical details with the help of a history textbook. This might be followed up by the pupil imagining himself in given situations and describing the thoughts and feelings of the imaginary person.

Film/video project

The search for historical traces in the surrounding area or oral history interviews can also be documented on film[17]. The technical costs are justified in that, firstly, an ever reusable document is produced and, secondly, pupils pick up important skills. They learn about the possibilities and limits of the film medium in presenting history and must consider questions as to the choice of sequences, the picture/sound combination etc that will ensure that their work is as objective as possible.

Exhibition/newspaper/photo collection project

Such projects may ultimately differ greatly in terms of content and time spent. It is of key importance that pupils look for, evaluate and present at least part of the material on their own. Forms of presentation include wall newspapers, an exhibition at the school, a newspaper describing the project results or a photo collection. One example put forward at the seminar merits more detailed description: pupils at the Paul-Klee-Gymnasium in Gersthofen (near Augsburg)[18] examined the consequences of migrations in the 20th century on the area around their school. They gathered information, documents and items, took photographs, made a film, interviewed local people and experts. The traces left behind locally by the different migratory movements were presented in an exhibition.

Themes of the project "Migratory movements - problems and opportunities", Paul-Klee-Gymnasium, Gersthofen (extract)

- The fate of forced labourers and prisoners of war after the end of the Second World War
- Flight, expulsion, a new life in Gersthofen
- Work-related migration ("guest workers")
- Settlers from eastern Europe
- Refugees and asylum seekers
- Right of residence for immigrants and refugees
- Demographic development in Germany and Bavaria
- The European Union - borders disappearing in Europe
- Multicultural harmony in Gersthofen
- Foreigners in associations
- "Between two worlds" - everyday life in a multicultural society
- Myself and others - an investigation of dealings with foreigners
- Was Paul Klee "Swiss" or "German"? Emigration among artists

[17] The film "Brettheim" was mentioned as a particularly striking example of the documenting of contemporary history on film. It was made by pupils under the guidance of Thilo Pohle. It forms part of a series looking at the history of the small village of Brettheim near Rothenburg ob der Tauber at the end of the Second World War. English, French and Russian versions are available.

[18] The Paul-Klee-Gymnasium project was presented by the project leader, Dr Bernhard Lehmann

In addition, their findings were summarised in a newspaper. The activity formed part of a Comenius project, in which pupils in different European countries worked on the same theme and exchanged their results.

Joint project within the framework of a school twinning arrrangement or pupil exchange

Activities involving schools in two or more countries are a particular means of attaining a European dimension. It is not always necessary to cover the full breadth of the theme in such cases.

3.4. Other ideas

Other possibilities, in no particular order of priority, are:

- Telephone directory tour:

Using a telephone directory, the pupils try to determine the origin of subscribers; to be used as a means of approaching the theme.

- "Foreigners we would not do without":

Collecting examples can help to highlight inconsistencies in perceptions of foreigners. However, assignments should be well thought out since in certain circumstances they may have the adverse effect of identifying groups then considered as undesirable.

- Comparison of national anthems:

National anthems are examined in terms of the concept of nation to be found within them.

- Computer games:

Commercially available computer games can be examined, for example, to see what image of foreigners or immigrants they convey. There are popular games focusing on migration problems, eg the "Settler" game.

- Feature films:

The life of migrants and encounters with a foreign culture are also depicted in feature films[19].

[19] Examples: *Angst essen Seele auf* (Germany, 1973; Rainer Werner Fassbinder: depicting the relationship between a widow and a young 20 year-old Moroccan "guest worker"); *Elise ou la vraie vie* (France/Algeria, 1970; Michel Drach: story of the romance between a French woman and an Algerian in Paris); *My beautiful launderette* (Great Britain, 1985. Stephen Frears: a young Pakistani in England works his way up to become the owner of a launderette).

- Folk and pop songs

Folk and pop songs are an attractive topic for young people and can be used in teaching[20]. A great many highly problematic, eg extremist, songs have been produced by musical groups lying to the far right of the political spectrum. It must be decided in each individual case to what extent such examples should become topics of discussion.

- Organising a multicultural festival, eg at the end of a teaching module dealing with the theme of migration.

V. Synopsis of recommendations

To sum up, the following teaching approaches to the theme of "migrations in 20th century Europe" may be recommended:

. Migrations should be presented not as exceptional events in history but as the norm. The historical viewpoint makes it clear that the history of mankind is a history of migrations. Migration within countries should also be taken into account, in order to stress that migration is a normal phenomenon and to identify consequences comparable to those of transborder migration. In this context, the vagueness of the concept of "migration" is more of an opportunity than a drawback from the pedagogical and didactic point of view.

. History teaching should counteract the widely held expectation that problems with migratory movements can be definitively settled through a suitable immigration or integration policy. Taking a historical view should strengthen the realisation that migrations and the changes they bring about are lasting and ongoing phenomena. Embedding them in broader links across the 20th century and Europe is desirable.

. The history of migratory movements should not be portrayed overwhelmingly as a history of disasters, conflicts and threats. Viewed in the medium or longer term, it is history itself that provides many examples of the positive consequences of migration. The enrichment of societies through migration should be stressed more clearly and more emphatically, not only to counter the doom-laden scenarios discussed in the media but also to make young people aware that future problems can be solved too.

. Migratory movements are forever bound up with consequences for countries of origin and destination countries. Migrants find themselves in a new, strange environment in which they must become integrated. For the citizens of the destination countries, immigration also means an encounter with foreigners and the unknown other, which is often linked to fears and prejudice. In both cases questions arise in connection with the concept of "nation", relations with other ethnic or religious groups and identity. Teaching on the subject of migration should take up those questions. In that respect, in addition to passing on knowledge, it makes a contribution to sensitive character-forming and educational tasks such as intercultural learning, education for tolerance and the forming of identity.

[20] Good examples of songs fitting the theme by German artists are *Mann aus Alemania* (Reinhard Mey), *Heimatlos* (Reinhard Fendrich), *Vertriebener* (Heinz Rudolf Kunze).

- Historical knowledge contributes to emancipation. Precise analysis of successful or failed processes puts young people in the situation of being able to make up their own minds. Controversy must be presented as such in teaching and dealt with openly. However, cognitive study alone is not enough. The affective level must be constantly involved (eg via theme-related discussion of fears, prejudices and attitudes).

- Study of "foreignness", "otherness" is fruitful in didactic terms, by revealing continuities but also changes. This change can be investigated. Likewise it may be observed in what conditions tendencies towards rejection or more positive views predominate. Teaching on the subject of migration should be seen as a contribution towards intercultural learning.

- Historical processes become meaningful for pupils when a link to their own situation can be established. A learning group's experiences of migration or its consequences form a particularly useful starting point for taking a look back into the past and taking bearings for the future. History teaching too should be derived from the concrete life experiences of pupils. From elements of proximity (experiences, local and regional surroundings), links can be drawn to European and global contexts.

- In order to better integrate the European dimension, the content of textbooks and other educational publications should be more closely adapted. Gender-specific features (women as a special group) also require attention in this connection. Greater consideration should be given to the theme in basic and further teacher training. In addition to a chronological approach, teaching programmes should also cater for in-depth synopsis.

Appendix I

"Bavaria's fourth tribe"
Main features of the integration of refugees and expellees

(Rudolf Endres)

The absorption and integration of more than 12 million refugees and expellees was the greatest challenge and test for the newly emerging German state and society after the defeat of 1945. During those same years, against this background of total collapse and widespread destruction and hardship, the foundations were laid for the equally far-reaching and successful new beginning of what later became the Federal Republic of Germany.

Only a few weeks after the total collapse in summer 1945, 734,000 German refugees from the Polish and Russian-occupied regions east of the Oder and the Neisse were already officially registered in Bavaria. Then, from January 1946 onwards, ethnic Germans from Hungary and above all from the Sudetenland began arriving en masse. The two million expellees from the Sudetenland swept over Bavaria like a tidal wave. Homeless, impoverished people poured into a land in which reconstruction work had hardly even got beyond the stage of clearing away the rubble and locals and exiles could no longer be supplied with food.

On 25 January 1946 the first trains carrying German refugees from Czech assembly camps crossed the border at Hof, Furth im Walde, Passau, Piding bei Salzburg, and trains operated by the Americans in Eger (now Cheb) took them on to Wiesau via Waldsassen. For a period after this there were up to seven trains a day each carrying between 1,000 and 1,500 people and the bare minimum of possessions that they could carry. They travelled on to destinations in Bavaria, sometimes reaching as far as Würzburg and Aschaffenburg. In May 1946 the monthly figure for new arrivals jumped to 137,000 and in June 1946 it reached a peak of over 142,000. By 1 November 1946, 725 trains carrying 754,464 German refugees had been counted and recorded as having arrived in Bavaria. Added to this were the many people who had gone uncounted, travelling by car or crossing the border by foot. A number of the transports contained the populations of entire villages who were concerned to stay together. These communities were usually led by German clerics who had also been expelled. The bishopric of Augsburg alone had to accommodate 136 expelled German priests.

The national census in summer 1950 recorded 1,929,000 refugees and displaced persons, over a million of whom came from Czechoslovakia. One in five of Bavaria's inhabitants were refugees. The words refugees and expellees will be used in this report synonymously. However, many expellees had already left Bavaria and moved into other *Länder*, particularly the Ruhr.

The refugees had fled the eastern front and the atrocities of the Russians, but what was it that had caused the mass expulsion of Germans outside the boundaries of pre-war Germany, thereby fundamentally altering the map of central and eastern Europe?

The background to the expulsion measures is well-known since the records of the conferences of world powers in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam are publicly available. The allies' official post-war programme contained no plans for resettlement or expulsion until the preparation stage of the Potsdam Conference. The main aim was to prevent the revival of the German military and to

weaken Germany militarily, economically and politically to such an extent that it would never be able to wage a war of aggression again. This common allied goal gave rise to many individual plans which were the subject of heated debate within the countries from which they originated and between the allies. These specific questions included the division or dismemberment of Germany, the dissolution of Prussia, demilitarisation, denazification, the punishment of war criminals, reparations, restoring the sovereignty of the German *Länder*, destroying the German arms industry, breaking up industrial monopolies, taking control of the German economy, military occupation for at least a generation and finally, the cession of territory in the east and the west. All of these specific questions were the subject of numerous conferences, memorandums - the Morgenthau Plan, to quote just one example - differences of opinion, directives, arrangements and agreements. In spite of all of this, the records never included the keywords “expulsion”, “resettlement”, or “deportation”. It was only in the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 that this whole issue was first addressed. It provided for the “transfer to Germany of the German population and components thereof which have remained in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary”.

The only relevant episode recounted in the memoirs of those involved is the time at the Tehran Conference of 28 November to 1 December 1943 when Churchill used matches to illustrate the westward shift of Poland. This led Stalin to retort that the Soviet Union wished to maintain the ethnographically correct borders of 1939. Nowhere in all of this was there any mention of the Germans in eastern Europe. And yet there must already have been some discussion of the expulsion of Germans by this time even if it was not mentioned in any of the formal agreements, as the expulsion of Germans from the provinces east of the Oder-Neisse line was an inevitable side-effect of the drawing of the new Polish border.

One of the earliest and strongest advocates of the expulsion of Germans from the eastern territories was undoubtedly the Czechoslovakian president, Edvard Benes, who resigned in October 1938 and went into exile as a private citizen. As the head of the exiled government in London he propagated the idea of expulsion. As early as June 1943 he asked Roosevelt to agree to the expulsion of Sudeten Germans on the false premise that Stalin had already given his consent. In fact, only a few weeks before, he had put Stalin under pressure by announcing that the Americans had agreed to their resettlement. Benes even deliberately deceived the British public.

Until the end of the Potsdam Conference the western allies evidently had no clear ideas about the Polish and Czech expulsion plans and were only very poorly informed about the “unofficial” expulsions which had already occurred. This led them to try to gain a more accurate picture but also explains the extremely vague wording of the Potsdam final communiqué on this subject. However, after this, it was possible to prepare and carry out these “resettlements”, “displacements” or “transfers" of population which were accompanied by all manner of arbitrary acts, pogroms and atrocities.

Nobody knew what should and would happen to the people who were forced to resettle in Germany in the long term. In March 1947 Countess Marion Dönhoff, who was a refugee herself, wrote the following in “*Die Zeit”*: “It is idealistic to believe that a destroyed and dismembered Germany can deal single-handedly with the problem of the refugees who now make up nearly one fifth of the entire population of what remains of the country”. But things turned out differently. As early as in 1960 the integration of refugees and expellees could be regarded as a success. Amid the poverty and hunger of the post-war years it was difficult to imagine that integration would be achieved in so short a time or even that it would be trouble-free and not give rise to civil war.

Integration embraced a wide range of tasks. The first of these was the creation of living space and the provision of food and the other essentials of day-to-day life followed by the elimination of unemployment and occupational integration. A further consideration was the gradual elimination of differences between native Bavarians and new citizens and in particular a willingness to be integrated on the part of the refugees themselves, which it took some time to instil since many hoped that they would soon be returning home.

Although the Potsdam Protocol, the Benes decrees and Soviet policy had clearly set the tone, the refugees wanted to return to their ancestral home and their properties and have a decent roof over their heads again. In October 1946, 150,000 people in Bavaria were living in appalling conditions in camps, including over 1,000 in Plassenburg über Kulmbach alone. In autumn 1946 there were 1,400 such camps in Bavaria. A report by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior found that these camps were totally under-equipped “in straw mattresses, cooking facilities, firewood, beds, clothes and footwear, meaning that the refugees, who were also plagued by rats, bugs and other vermin, were accommodated in a way that was a disgrace for the region and its people”. Individual families of refugees had separated their living and sleeping accommodation from one another by sewing sacks together. Camp quarters, which were predominantly made up of supplies from the national-socialist social welfare and labour services, provided one square metre per person in the worst cases. Somewhat better accommodation was provided in factories, army barracks, schools, function rooms, hangars and cowsheds. Even caves and bunkers were used as accommodation.

Some of the refugees were quartered in private homes and houses - this meant that on numerous occasions the commissioner for refugees was forced to call in the police because the native Bavarians were doing all they could to resist. Because the towns were largely in ruins, most expellees were housed in villages; according to the statistics three quarters of expellees were accommodated in communities of less than 5,000 inhabitants.

The district of Schwaben took in 25.4% of the refugees, Lower Bavaria 24.5%, Upper Franconia 23.5%, Upper Palatinate 20.8%, Middle Franconia 18.0% and Lower Franconia 16.7%. In the villages the high proportion of “foreigners” or “refugees” upset the balance of close-knit communities and altered denominational patterns. Although the influx of refugees made little difference to the denominational make-up of the population of Bavaria as a whole - the proportion of Catholics decreased from 73 to 71% - the settlement and establishment of refugees did transform the denominational profile of certain districts of Bavaria in a manner that had not been witnessed since the counter-reformation. In the formerly purely Catholic district of Lower Bavaria, 12% of the inhabitants were now Protestant. In 1939 there were still 1,424 purely Catholic communities in Bavaria. In 1946 there were only nine.

In the countryside the refugees, who mostly came from an industrial or craft background, remained outsiders and yet because of their large numbers they aroused fear, mistrust and hostility. For instance, some of the older Bavarian mayors had to be reminded that expellees were entitled to be buried in the village cemetery and not somewhere outside the cemetery walls. Soon posters and leaflets appeared in which the population was called on to throw “these Prussians, Silesians and Sudetens” out of the country. In the upper Bavarian village of Egmating, you could read: “Get the refugees out of our village. Give this Sudeten riff-raff a good thrashing, not accommodation!” And in 1948 even the military authorities had to acknowledge that “The refugee problem has become a potentially explosive issue”. “What is currently emerging in Bavaria is a new proletariat, a large group of destitute people”.

The refugees' indignation came to a climax after the currency reform in autumn 1948 in the so-called Dachau camp revolt. The inmates of the Dachau camp, the former concentration camp, held a protest meeting to demand better accommodation and more food. When their demands were not met, they threatened a hunger strike. Their leader, Egon Hermann, reacted by organising meetings of envoys from all the camps in Bavaria. He also contacted the press. However, Hermann was arrested and found guilty of breaching the peace. The Bavarian regional government would not negotiate with radicals. None the less, Hermann had succeeded in drawing broader public attention to the inhumane living conditions in the refugee camps and prompting the Bavarian Government to step up its effort.

From the outset, the Bavarian Government appointed by the Americans tackled the refugee problem with a vengeance. As early as autumn 1945, the Minister of the Interior, Seifried, had set up a "State Commissioner's Office for Refugee Issues" and, on 15 December 1945, appointed Wolfgang Jaenicke as its head. Jaenicke was a former principal regional administrator from Silesia, an extremely capable government official who became the "father of refugee management". All principal regional administrators, heads of district authorities and mayors were now assigned a refugee commissioner in an advisory and executive capacity. In general, the refugee commissioners coped very well with their extremely delicate task. The total of 166 commissioners at the local level with a staff of 3,000 were composed in almost equal measure of Bavarians and Sudetens. They represented and championed the interests of refugees, which led to frequent conflicts and quarrels with native Bavarians, particularly when it came to compulsory quartering. In these cases the Red Cross, Caritas or the workers' welfare association could act as mediators and conciliators.

Jaenicke was soon appointed state secretary in order to strengthen the position of the refugee department, which was incorporated into the state civil service hierarchy. After Jaenicke's retirement in 1950 he was replaced by Theodor Oberländer, an expert on eastern Europe, who was known to have a "dark-brown past".

The basis for this general state refugee authority was a law on the absorption and integration of German refugees, the so-called "Refugee Act" of 19 February 1947, which was applied uniformly throughout the American zone. The law set the commissioners clear goals. It stated that: "The relevant authorities are duty-bound to do everything they can to promote the integration of refugees, particularly as regards the employment of civil servants and manual and non-manual workers." The much-coveted refugee identity card did indeed entail a whole series of benefits which added to the feelings of envy and resentment among the native population towards the refugees, whether their privileges were real or imagined.

Once they had been accommodated in more decent housing, the next decisive step that had to be taken was the economic and occupational integration of the refugees. The result of the regional distribution of the expellees and refugees was that their occupational background and qualifications rarely corresponded to the needs of the area in which they had arrived. Native Bavarian farmers were looking for workers who knew something about agriculture and the mostly very well educated refugees were looking for jobs in industry or craft trades which did not exist in the villages. For some years the result of this was constant changes in the workplaces and geographical distribution of the workforce, until the 1950s when the situation began to stabilise and many refugees had moved from outlying villages into towns where they had found jobs in industry.

However, one of the essential characteristics of the movement of refugees and expellees was the establishment of branches of industry in areas in which such branches were unheard of before. These refugee businesses brought about the so-called imported industrialisation and modernisation of Bavaria after 1945. As a result the refugees themselves took a step down on the social ladder in many respects. For example, formerly self-employed farmers from Silesia were forced almost without exception to accept downgrading in the form of work as a farm-hand or casual labourer followed by a few years as a semi-skilled industrial worker in one of the towns. Many highly qualified doctors, lawyers or senior civil servants from Sudetenland also had to work as labourers, thus having to undergo a reduction in their professional and social status. In 1950 one in five native Bavarians were self-employed and 40% were employees. At the same time only one in fifteen refugees were self-employed while 74% were employees. This situation only changed after some years and, in many cases, only for the refugees' children.

The state government could do very little for the refugees in the first few years because of a shortage of money. What it was able to do was to identify former military sites and quickly issue licences to set up businesses on them. This led to the establishment of the well-known new towns of Geretsriet, Traunreut, Waldkraiburg, Neutraubling, Neubaglonz, Neuwildflecken and the settlements of Weidenberg and Bubenreuth. In these new resettlement sites, solidarity among refugees from the same region was shown to its full advantage as a motivating factor for industrial revival.

Highly skilled manufacturers of finished products requiring little heavy transport of raw materials such as the production of musical instruments or jewellery were most quickly able to make up their disadvantage in term of location. For instance, an industrial estate grew up in Neugabloz with over 400 glass and jewellery manufacturers from Gablonz, while a whole range of businesses from the Sudetenland set up in Waldkraiburg. Self-help again proved invaluable here. Traunreut on the other hand became the site of a new Siemens factory which soon became the largest employer.

Particularly unusual events occurred in Neutraubling bei Regensburg. The Americans had captured an almost totally destroyed airfield but gave up the site and the remaining buildings. The work-hungry refugees saw this as an employment opportunity. They improvised, repaired the structural damage and, as early as December 1946, certain exiled entrepreneurs began setting up temporary production sites, most of which were leant against the remains of the walls of the former airport buildings. The runway was removed, the bomb craters were filled and refugee farmers began farming. In 1947 an emergency organisation was set up to help people settle in and find jobs.

After the currency reform the Bavarian State provided considerable investment aid and financial support aimed specifically at these "new towns" by means of the post-war compensation fund. From 1949 to 1979 some 18 million deutschmarks (DM) were provided under the emergency relief act of 1949, the war-damage compensation act of 1953 and the establishment act. 70% of this went to refugees and expellees. The reconstruction loans provided for under the compensation act proved to be of particular value for the recovery and modernisation of the Bavarian economy.

Amazingly, by the end of 1946, more than two-thirds of the refugees or expellees had found accommodation or work. However, it should be recalled that many of the local men had been killed in combat or taken prisoner and that many Nazis had had to relinquish their posts whereas it was difficult to prove that refugees had a Nazi past. Above all, many teachers were able to take up teaching again, with the result that, soon, more than a half of all those employed

in the education system were refugees or expellees. It is estimated that some 40% were able to return to their former profession, though the situation became more complex when the prisoners of war returned expecting to take up their former positions. In addition to this, the denazification system was operating increasingly efficiently.

In the end, one third of all the industrial concerns set up by expellees were based in Bavaria, and some 22,000 expellees had also established craft trade enterprises there. Bavaria was by far the region in which the economic and occupational integration of refugees was achieved most promptly and successfully, although the currency reform had caused a major interruption in the economic recovery. At the end of the 1970s there were still more than 4,000 businesses that were originally established by refugees, representing some 20% of Bavarian industry. Apparently, the newcomers really did make a decisive contribution to Bavaria in the form of "imported industrialisation".

The refugees and expellees were in search and in need of jobs and found them above all in craft industries, trade and transport, and industrial manufacturing. At first the 400,000 or so new employees overstretched the struggling local industries but things soon began to improve with previously unknown products such as fine porcelain, glass and jewellery, musical instruments, synthetic materials processing industries and the latest electronics industries.

As a tangible example of the many problems and business dilemmas encountered by a refugee company, I would like to single out the building firm, W Markgraf, based in Bayreuth. In September 1945, Wilhelm Markgraf, a graduate engineer, fled with his family from Eger to Waldsassen. He was the co-founder of the firm Markgraf and Heger in the Egerland, which was one of the most economically successful building firms in Sudetenland. In 1945 this firm was expropriated by the Czechs. However, Markgraf's reputation had gone before him and so he was rapidly granted permission to set up a new building firm in Regensburg and Munich. He was even granted a bank loan despite the fact that he could offer no collateral. As the building company in Eger had specialised in railway track construction the new firm soon received orders in Upper Franconia and Upper Palatinate to help reconstruct the destroyed railway network. As the firm still had contacts with the Rhineland and Munich that it had established in Eger the number of orders increased, meaning that the company's trusted employees from the Sudetenland were joined by more and more Bavarian construction workers and company headquarters had to be moved to Bayreuth. Today Markgraf has nearly 2,000 employees and is one of the most important firms in the region. Significantly, the present owner, Dr Gerhard Markgraf, is chairman of the Bavarian building federation. However, not all firms were so successful and some of the newly established companies soon turned out to be flops.

The economic situation in the 1950s also accelerated the construction of housing for the large number of new citizens who, above all, needed to be given the opportunity to get out of the inhumane camps. Alongside state building grants and loans, the churches made a major contribution in this area, with their own housing programmes, in the form of the Protestant housing scheme on the one hand and the housing construction companies in each of the Bavarian dioceses, such as the St Joseph Foundation in Bamberg and the St Bruno company in Würzburg, on the other. Very early on the young bishop of Würzburg set the tone with his remark that "The cathedral building of today is house building", and immediately after this the first houses for refugees and people who had been bombed out of their homes began to spring up. Many priests began building first and only then began to think about where they would get the money to pay for it. A great deal of money was collected and spent by churches during this period. The collections in the diocese of Würzburg raised half a million marks and with this money the St Bruno company built 915 apartments for rent and 758 houses for sale for refugees

and the bombed-out homeless. More than 10% of the houses constructed in Bavaria at this time were built under church housing schemes. The fact that the Catholic housing companies also built houses in the Protestant towns of Bayreuth, Hof and Nuremberg deeply disturbed many Protestant ministers.

None the less, most of the housing for refugees and expellees was built with state support financed out of the compensation fund. Compensation was a major social effort and ultimately a good compromise because it aimed for fairness, prevented any radicalisation and promoted the integration of the exiles. Though many refugees were incensed at the inadequate compensation for their losses, bandying about the slogan “A tree trunk in exchange for a forest”, on average they were compensated for some 20% of their lost property, and the funds came from the assets of native Bavarians. The property compensation scheme was a clear act of solidarity with the dispossessed refugees and expellees.

However, economic and occupational integration are only one side of the coin. On the other side there are social integration and assimilation, cultural heritage issues and political integration, implying active participation by refugees in the reconstruction of democratic Bavaria.

The so-called micro-census of 1950 and the micro-census and additional survey of 1971 are excellent sources of information on the integration process. Not only did they differentiate between refugees and native Bavarians but they also gave details of schooling and vocational qualifications. The survey on educational qualifications revealed quite clearly that the influx of expellees and refugees to Bavaria led to an increase in the overall standard of education of the population. This was because the new citizens from the east were generally more highly qualified than the men and, above all, the women of Bavaria, whose economy had been largely structured around agriculture until this point. Qualifications were particularly high among the migrants from the Soviet-occupied zone because it was mostly the intellectual elite who fled from here. So it was that the influx of refugees and expellees had a clear “modernising” effect on the level of education and skills in Bavaria. This applied equally in the economic, artistic and cultural fields, an example being the Bamberg Symphony Orchestra.

If we follow individual career profiles, it emerges that, in their early years in their new homeland, as mentioned above, refugees and expellees had to accept professional downgrading and a commensurate decline in social status. However, during the economic miracle, many of these people, particularly the young and the middle-aged, managed to climb back up the economic and social ladder. Both immigrant men and women improved their professional standing significantly faster than native Bavarians so that by 1971 they had drawn level with them. And those who were not able to achieve this themselves transferred their ambitions and their increased expectations from life on to their children’s careers.

Exiled women in particular adapted considerably faster and more thoroughly to working life than native Bavarian women who had long acted as what German sociologists termed “assisting family members”, mostly as housewives or farmworkers. As the micro-censuses of 1950 and 1971 reveal, many refugee women, in particular young women and men, made their way up to senior civil service and administrative posts, set themselves up as independent professionals or founded their own firms.

Perhaps the best signs of successful integration were marriage trends or, to be more precise, the extent of mixed partnerships or marriages between the immigrant and native populations. Between 1948 and 1953 some 5 to 6% of marriages were between locals and refugees while, by 1971, 14% of all marriages were between native Bavarians and expellees or their children, including many interdenominational marriages.

This intermingling between native Bavarians and refugees obviously had lasting effects on the cultural heritage of the expellees, although cultural integration was not supposed to mean making refugees conform but, on the contrary, defining and reflecting on their specific cultural heritage. As a result, refugee associations nurtured customs from the homeland right from the outset, particularly in the newly established refugee settlements. Their common past was evoked in music, dance and play at popular folk evenings. The folk songs and music, dances and costumes, dialects, arts and crafts of the various exiled communities were actively preserved. Folk clubs and small museums were set up and annual gatherings were organised which were attended by hundreds of thousands of people. But interest declined sharply among the younger generation.

During the occupation, however, there was a thriving cultural life for expellees, which the military government positively encouraged because the US regulations stated that the expellees should set up social and cultural organisations but not political ones. The Americans wanted to prevent political activities or even calls for repatriation or revenge at all costs.

This led initially to the emergence of the *Landsmannschaften,* cultural and welfare associations set up by groups such as the Sudetens, the Silesians and the Banater Schwaben to preserve their traditions. However, at local and district level, more and more expellees and refugees became involved in politics, so that by 1950 the BHE, the Block of Expellees and Disenfranchised, and the ZvD, the Central Alliance of Expelled Germans, were officially acknowledged and authorised to engage in political activities throughout the country. The Cold War and the iron curtain made it impossible to return home and the refugees and expellees now had to settle down permanently in their new home and were expected to take part in the building of the Federal Republic.

However, the political activities of the *Landsmannschaften* and the refugee associations were characterised by constant quarrels and rifts. It was only in 1952 that Lodgmann was able to set up an Association of *Landsmannschaften,* which merged in 1957 with Linus Kather's Federation of Expelled Germans to form the Federation of Expellees, United *Landsmannschaften* and National Community Associations (the BdV).

Although they were still divided along *Landsmannschaft* lines, all of the organisations for expellees were now gathered together under the same roof. A major contributor to this unification was Theodor Oberländer, who was initially the Bavarian State Secretary for Refugee Affairs and then appointed Federal Minister for Expellees in Bonn.

As mentioned above, at first the Americans would not allow the expellees to set up a single political organisation or party. Only in 1948 were refugees entitled to vote for the first time in municipal elections, and this was a decisive step towards their political integration. Besides this, some individual expellees or refugees had already become heavily involved in politics during the occupation via existing parties. Early representatives included Hans Schütz and Walter Rinke in the CSU, Willibald Mücke and Richard Reitzner in the SPD and Walter Zawadil in the FDP. Volkmar Gabert also distinguished himself among the Young Socialists. The Sudetens were

particularly active, setting up their own political associations in the form of the social-democratic *Seliger* group and the CSU-affiliated *Ackermann* group.

At 25%, the SPD had the highest proportion of expellee members among the political parties in Bavaria. However, whenever there was any doubt, native Bavarian candidates were always preferred to expellees in political assemblies and committees. At local level the newcomers, who still felt like “marginal citizens”, were at least allowed to form associations of electors. When in spring 1948 the American military authorities finally allowed independent refugee lists to be presented at municipal elections, the Bavarian Prime Minister, Dr Hans Ehard, who was concerned about the compensation issue, made a personal comment on Bavarian Radio: “What could be more harmful for the gradual overcoming of foreignness than the idea of wishing to bridge the gap of foreignness with parties for foreigners”. The refugee parties gained nearly 12% of the vote in the 1948 municipal elections and in the district elections they even obtained over 15%. As a result they became the third strongest political force behind the CSU and the SPD in Bavaria’s villages and country towns.

A particular attraction was exerted over the refugees and expellees by the WAV, the Economic Reconstruction Union, headed by Loritz. For the parliamentary elections of 1949, he presented a parity-based Bavarian regional list thanks to which many refugees were able to gain seats in the *Bundestag*. Then in 1950 the BHE was founded in Bavaria and immediately became the fourth most powerful party in the Bavarian state parliament, the *Landtag*. The BHE set out the basis for its policies as follows: “The BHE shall never renounce its claims to an ancestral home in the east. … The federation is revisionist but rejects the idea of war to achieve its ends”. As a rule, however, the more the integration of refugees and expellees progressed, the more these parties became superfluous. The established parties also made every effort to get the refugees on their side. Before this, however, the BHE reached its high point in the 1953 parliamentary elections with nearly 6% of the vote and still gained 11% of the vote in the Bavarian regional elections in 1954. The most powerful men in the BHE were Walter Becher, Walter Stain (State Secretary) and Willi Guthsmuths, who was a state secretary at the Ministry of the Economy in Munich from 1950 to 1962.

Most of the BHE’s votes came from low-income retired people and pensioners. Protestant associations were also over-represented within the BHE while Catholics were more inclined to vote for the CSU. When Oberländer went over to the CDU in 1955, the BHE lost many of its supporters. The political end came in the regional elections of 1962 when the BHE failed to clear the 10% hurdle in any of the districts.

In the last part of this report I would like to show how the refugee question and the integration of refugees were perceived by the general public and in the media and how the matter was viewed and dealt with in newspapers and on the radio. This was important because the radio and the press made a decisive contribution towards shaping opinion among the government and society.

As early as 12 May 1945, Radio Munich, the military government broadcaster, began providing the Bavarian public with information and opinion again. None the less, everything that was to broadcast had to be checked first by an American press officer.

A licence from the military government was required to publish a daily newspaper and the first of these licensed newspapers appeared in autumn 1945. However, it turned out to be considerably harder for expellees to set up their own newspapers because the allied “coalition ban” of spring 1946 prohibited refugees from organising themselves in any way. Only in July 1948, when the

Americans finally granted expellees the right of association at local level, could the refugees begin to set up their own papers.

As a result of the direct influence exerted by the American press officer, Bavarian Radio broadcast very few programmes on the refugee issue, even though an in-house eastern European affairs department was set up under Dr Herbert Hupka. In 1949 this department produced highly detailed reports on the old homelands and the current situation there and on east German customs but had little or nothing to say on the integration of expellees into the Bavarian state, economy and society and the related problems and difficulties.

In contrast, the later refugee newspapers had an understandable tendency towards exaggeration, extremely negative assessments of their situation and excessive demands on the Bavarian government and people. Practically all the licensed newspapers called for the rapprochement of the refugees with the local population, greater understanding for the plight of the expellees and help for them in their efforts to build new lives for themselves. This attitude was particularly manifest in the refugee charity or relief schemes which were supported by all the newspapers. At the same time the licensed newspapers and the later expellees' newspapers in particular, but also church magazines, repeatedly criticised the resistance and unwillingness to help the expellees among the local population.

However, very soon other opinions were voiced, particularly in readers' letters. Doubts were raised as to whether the refugees were really German, Silesians were branded as "Piasts" and there was speculation as to whether Gauleiter Hanke was the only Nazi party member in Silesia. Soon the following joke was doing the rounds: "Were you a party member? - No I'm a Silesian".

However, during the heated debate on the compensation law the Passau-based newspaper, the *Passauer Neue Presse*, published an article entitled "The Mountain of Misery" which contained the following comment: "A reasonably fair balance between well-stocked china and linen cupboards and the pitifully empty cases of the refugees is not a form of interference in bourgeois family life which can be rejected as 'undemocratic coercion', but a necessity for all those who go through this world with open eyes, which has inevitable, grave implications for those who recognise it, particularly the wealthy."

Particular problems were encountered by both churches in Bavaria and these were reflected in the parish magazines. They were particularly alarmed at the prospect that the refugees might set up their own churches. This prompted the Protestant regional synod held in Ansbach from 9 to 13 July 1946 to come to the following conclusion: "… We wish to adopt them as brothers and sisters but we should also expect that they will not lead some form of separate existence within our church or even attempt to set up separate churches, but instead will be content with our ways, grow fond of them, and merge together with our communities to form a whole." The Catholic church also anticipated difficulties with the common liturgy and the organisation of services and had difficulty in integrating expelled clerics, all of which was also reflected again and again in parish magazines.

By 1950, however, all the media had begun focusing on various aspects of the situation of the new citizens in their new homeland. The main focus of attention was the housing and living conditions in the collective accommodation provided, as well as progress on integration. From 1948 onwards, when the expellees were allowed to present their own lists at the municipal elections in Bavaria, it was only natural that the media should monitor the political role of the refugees and highlight this theme. Apart from a few refugee newspapers all the daily

newspapers came out against the creation of a refugee party or the establishment of an "emergency assembly". In this respect the newspapers were following the instructions of the allies to the effect that they should promote the integration of the expellees and refrain from anything which might have fostered a special status for the refugees.

Once allied press supervision was done away with, not only the refugee newspapers but also most of the daily newspapers demanded the amendment of the Potsdam Agreement and increased aid from abroad. Practically all the daily newspapers had a monthly refugee supplement and refused to comply with the allied order of 31 January 1946 demanding that the word "deportee" should be used instead of "expellee". When in June 1946, the Munich-based newspaper, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, denounced the Czech authorities' actions during the expulsion of the Sudetens in unusually stark terms, this gave rise to no more than a reprimand from the American authorities. The influence of American press censorship should therefore not be overestimated.

After the 1949 parliamentary elections the Bavarian press became less concerned with the day-to-day problems of refugees and more with the passing of the various compensation laws. However, the newspapers did follow the development of the "refugee towns" very closely. After 1951 the newspapers' interest in the refugee question declined noticeably - except in the expellee press.

When we talk about "Bavaria's fourth tribe" we are implicitly acknowledging that the refugees and above all over a million expelled Sudetens have their own traditions which were and still are a major asset in their cultural integration and acculturation. Under the Federal Expellee Act of 1953 the promotion of the cultural activities of refugees and expellees was even advocated by the state and, although there were other problems and concerns to be dealt with before this, Bavaria went ahead with this cultural promotion. As early on as the Sudeten German Rally in Munich in 1954, Bavarian State Prime Minister Erhard announced Bavaria's patronage of the Sudeten German community on the basis of the centuries-old historical and cultural links between Old Bavaria, Franconia and Sudetens. This patronage is still exercised today.

I shall now come to my conclusion. In the immediate post-war period in Germany the integration of refugees and expellees was one of the greatest challenges in the country's history. Bavaria alone had to take in some two million people who had to be accepted, accommodated and cared for in the same way as the native population, if they were not to become a threat to the newly emerging democracy.

Occupation, denazification and regulations in practically all economic fields as well as Germany's international isolation compounded the difficulty of the integration process. For many people, flight or expulsion meant not only giving up their homeland but also a major setback in their lives, a change of occupation, and a reduction in social status. Only with the economic miracle did new sources of livelihood emerge via the "imported industrialisation" process. Young expellees and refugees in particular made a substantial contribution during the reconstruction to the creation of modern Bavaria. The "integration miracle" really did take place.

Appendix II

Population displacement and problems of integration in Poland after the second world war

by Dr Monika Choros (Opole)

The century now coming to an end can rightly be referred to as, among other things, the century of expulsions, since more people have been (and are unfortunately still being) expelled from their homes in this period of history than ever before. The terms "expulsion", "resettlement", "evacuation", "repatriation", "forced displacement" all imply the same thing: the loss of one's home. However, they are understood and interpreted differently and have different emotional connotations. They remind people both in Germany and in Poland of suffering and injustice, trigger a heated and painful discussion and are linked to one of the most difficult chapters of our common history.

When reference is made, especially in Germany, to people fleeing or being expelled this is mainly taken to mean the compulsory displacement of Germans from the parts of eastern Germany lost in the war. Germans think of the suffering and injustice to which the German civilian population, especially women and children, were exposed. However, do they give any thought to the causes of the disaster, the shifting of the borders in large parts of Europe and the loss of their homes suffered by people of other nations?

Enforced population displacement as a political strategy is nothing new. People have been compelled to emigrate since the early years of the modern era. At that time, the usual reason was that they were of a different faith (Huguenots, Hussites and Protestants, some of whom found new homes in Silesia), but later grounds included their membership of the "wrong" nationality or ethnic group. As early as 1855, the German nationalist Paul de Lagarde expressed a view still held and acted upon today: *It is doubtless wrong for one nation to exist within another; it is doubtless necessary to remove those who ... have encouraged decay. It is every people's right to be lord and master of its own territory and to live for itself and not for strangers*.[21]

In the Balkans, forced mass migrations were already commonplace from the middle of the 19th century onwards. In 1913, after the Balkan wars, treaties were concluded on mutual transfers of populations, and in 1923, in the Treaty of Lausanne, population displacements were sanctioned for the first time by the international community. The next step on the way to the large-scale migration of peoples from East to West - which is the subject under discussion - was the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939, in which eastern central Europe was divided into a German and a Soviet sphere of interest.

In 1939 and 1940, approximately half a million Germans living between the Baltic and the Black Sea were called "home to the Reich". They formed the vanguard of the millions who were compulsorily displaced, fled or were expelled during and at the end of the war.

When the protocol to the German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty was signed on 28 September 1939, the planned compulsory displacement of Germans from Volhynia, Galicia,

[21] Quoted from Philipp Ther, "Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene", p. 31.

Bessarabia, Dobruja, the Baltics and Bukovina began. Hundreds of thousands came "home to the Reich", that is to say to the newly formed Reich districts of Wartheland and Danzig-West Prussia. The resettlement plan stated: *You Germans from Volhynia will be resettled in Poland in the new district of Warthegau. Your farms will be taken by Ukrainians returning from the Lublin and Kholm areas. The Poles, on the other hand, on whose farms you will be settled will be sent to this Lublin-Kholm area and may settle there*.[22] In reality, the Polish inhabitants of these areas (over a million) had to leave their homes and were compulsorily displaced to the *Generalgouvernement*. Many ultimately died in concentration camps or became slave labourers in the Reich. In many cases, the German families who arrived at the farms and housing vacated for them in Poland observed that *the fires left by the previous occupants were still burning*.[23]

In 1941, the city of Lublin and the district of Zamo** were declared the main German resettlement area, in which about 90,000 "returning" settlers from the Soviet Union, Bosnia and Croatia were to be housed. From November 1942 to August 1943, approximately 110,000 Polish peasants from 297 villages, including 30,000 children, were evacuated - divided into four groups according to "racial characteristics", from "inferior" to "capable of being Germanised". Most of them were sent to concentration camps.

It was not only Poles who stayed in the German sphere of influence who had to leave their property and belongings: as a result of the agreements concluded between the German Reich and the Soviet Union, Poland was occupied by both states after the invasion and divided up, with 51% of its territory being incorporated into the USSR. As early as October 1939, the Soviet security authorities began preparing the "*deportations of anti-Soviet Polish elements*". Four mass deportations were carried out, the first on 10 February 1940. They involved railway workers, foresters, forest wardens, forestry workers, medium- and low-ranking civil servants and the families of army personnel (about 250,000 people). The second took place in April and included factory owners, bank clerks, politically and socially active people and the families of police officers, of army personnel and of persons already in detention (about 300,000 people). Mainly affected by the third deportation, which was carried out in late June/early July 1940, were Poles and Jews who had fled from the areas occupied by the Wehrmacht, as well as large sections of the population living on the German-Soviet demarcation line (approximately 300,000-400,000). The fourth deportation took place on the eve of the German-Soviet war in July 1941. According to estimates, between 280,000 and 300,000 civilians were removed at that time. About 1.2 million Poles (including 200,000 children) living in the areas to the east of the river Bug were deported to Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Far East and other areas of central Asia. A similar fate befell people of German extraction in the Soviet Union. The deportation of these Poles was also an expulsion, because the deportees were not allowed to return to their homes after the second world war but were taken as settlers to the former German territories in the east.

The flight and expulsion of Germans from the German territories east of the rivers Oder and Neisse

[22] "40 Jahre nach Flucht und Vertreibung", pp. 16-17.

[23] "40 Jahre nach Flucht und Vertreibung", p. 18.

In 1939, the population of the eastern German provinces, which became part of Poland in 1945, was approximately 8.5 million. At the end of 1944, the figure had risen to 10.5 million, including about one million foreigners, predominantly Poles, who had been moved there as foreign workers.

When the major Soviet offensive began, the front approached very rapidly. It was assumed that the arrival of Soviet troops in the German-populated areas would lead to intolerable suffering for the inhabitants - ie, women, children and the elderly - and that they could be saved only if they fled or were evacuated. However, the orders to clear the areas came too late, when work on preparing the evacuation had hardly begun. The situation was worsened by a very severe winter, and roads and tracks were blocked by columns of Wehrmacht troops.

Few of those who suffered the miseries and horrors of the attempted escape succeeded in reaching safety in the west. Most refugee columns were overrun by the Red Army in the cold winter of 1944/45. Many refugees tried to return to their home towns and villages, mostly on foot. At the end of June 1945, an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 refugees from the Soviet-occupied zone had trekked back to their homes east of the Oder and Neisse. The numbers returning from Czechoslovakia after the cease-fire were much higher (about 800,000).[24]

Their flats and houses had been looted, and some demolished, burned down or left empty. However, some were already inhabited, either by people looking for a temporary roof over their heads, or by those who had lost their homes. Living with the new arrivals led to fears and apprehensions on both sides, as well as feelings of hatred and humiliation.

In the personal reminiscences of immigrant Poles we read: *As the house we were supposed to live in was occupied by Germans, we were split up. One person had to go to a German family for a few nights ... Putting us up with the Germans was humiliating and made us feel sick, but we were told they would be leaving and we would get the house for ourselves and our families*.[25] And they did go: firstly to other housing for a brief period in a part of the town set aside for Germans, then to a camp and later on a long way from home in the new Germany made up of occupation zones.

They had to leave because their fate had already been decided in Tehran in 1943, and later at Yalta (February 1945). At these conferences, the Allies laid down the new ethnic and territorial order in Europe. The decisive factor here was that national and ethnic boundaries were to coincide as far as possible. It was agreed that the border between Poland and the Soviet Union was to run along the Curzon Line, that Germany would cede territory in the east, that Germans would leave these areas and that German minorities in various countries of eastern central and south-eastern Europe would be expelled. Shifting the border a long way to the east inevitably meant that there had to be a big change in Poland's western border and that, at the same time, considerably more Poles and Germans would be affected by a population transfer than initially planned. Since important details of the new territorial order in Europe were still undecided (such as whether the Glatzer or the Görlitzer Neisse was to mark Germany's eastern border, and who was to be given Lwów/Lemberg), the powers that be resorted to a fait accompli policy in order to prepare the later allocation of territory. In spring and summer 1945, the Polish authority subordinate to Moscow set up its own administration in the eastern parts of Germany. The first

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[24] "Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neiße", vol. 1, pp. 74, 76 E.

[25] "Tu jest nasza ojczyna", Pozna*, p. 264.

Germans were moved out in May, while the rest were not allowed to return to their places of residence. 250,000 Germans were evacuated before the Potsdam Conference, which approved the expulsion of the German population. (Skubiszewski, drawing on German sources, puts this figure at about 400,000.) A further 550,000 followed in the period between the Potsdam Conference and the end of the year. After reaching a high point of approximately 2 million in 1946, including 1.1 million from Lower Silesia and 160,000 from Upper Silesia, the number of expellees gradually decreased in the following years, as did that of transports. The figures fell to approximately 500,000 people in 1947 and 150,000 in both 1948 and 1949. In the so-called "Link" operation, from March 1950 to the end of 1951, about 44,000 people, mainly women and children, were evacuated (4,228 from East and West Prussia, 4,023 from East Pomerania and East Brandenburg, 15,368 from Silesia, 12,744 from Wartheland and 5,964 from central Poland).[26]

The majority of the Polish-speaking population living in the area, the fate of which had been determined by referendum in 1922, encompassing Upper Silesia, Ermland and Masuria, were not affected by the compulsory evacuation. The Polish authorities' standpoint on this issue was clear from the outset: We do not want to keep a single German, nor do we want to give up a single Pole.[27] These people faced a dramatic choice in 1945 between staying together in their home region or roaming in foreign parts. It was only possible to stay if they agreed to be subjected to the national verification process, the main criterion of which was the use of the Polish Upper Silesian dialect or the standard Polish language. However, those concerned had to obtain a provisional certificate, or subsequently apply for permanent Polish citizenship. By the end of 1949, 850,000 people in Upper Silesia and 15,000 in Lower Silesia - more than 85% of all persons verified in the new western and northern areas of Poland - had been successfully verified.

In addition, skilled German workers, and their families, considered vital to the economy stayed behind. They mainly worked in the mining and food-production industries. According to the 1950 census, there were 106,500 in the whole of Poland, almost 80,000 of them in Silesia. Most lived in the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) coal-mining area (25,000) and Jelenia Góra (Hirschberg) (about 12,000). After October 1956, almost all of them left for the Federal Republic of Germany. Very few went to the German Democratic Republic.

However, this was not the end of the displacement of the population to western Europe. Migration from Poland began in 1956, when people were allowed to leave for the west to rejoin their families. It continued until the end of the 80s and eventually led not only to a percentage, but also to an absolute, reduction in the Polish population. Between 1952 and 1955 10,800 persons emigrated from Poland to the GDR and 737 to the FRG. In the next year 20,615 left, of whom 14,992 went to the Federal Republic; in 1957 the figure rose to 113,297, 22,962 to the GDR and 90,113 to the FRG; in 1958, 119,236 persons left, but only 8,483 went to the GDR.

In the following years the Polish state made emigration difficult (the final decision on whether a person was allowed to leave was taken by the Ministry of the Interior). As a result, the number of emigrants (known in Germany as "late emigrants" [*Spätaussiedler*]) declined. Between 1959 and 1970, 110,752 persons emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany, most of them from

[26] Source: "Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung", vol. 1, p. 155 E.

[27] According to the estimates made by H. Rogmann, of *Bund Deutscher Osten*, about 550,000 Poles lived in the German part of Upper Silesia in 1935. See M. Lis, "Wach auf mein Herz und denke", Berlin/Opole, p. 471.

the provinces (*województwa*) of Olsztyn, Opole and Katowice. In the next five years, the figure was 12,437, and under the agreement signed by Edward Gierek and Helmut Schmidt in Helsinki in August 1975, 124,493 persons left the country.[28] The wave of emigration to Germany lasted until 1991. To these figures must be added the political emigrants of the 80s and over 13,000 Jews who left Poland after March 1968.

Settlement of the so-called regained areas

On 21 July 1944, the Polish National Liberation Committee (*Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego*) was set up in Moscow. This was a Polish Government completely dependent on the Soviet Union. Its head, E. Osóbka-Morawski, had already accepted the Curzon Line as the Polish eastern border in a secret agreement with Molotov, which meant that he had given up such Polish cities as Wilno (Vilnius), Grodno and Lwów (Lvov). In return the Soviet Union had promised that it would try to establish the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border. Poland thus lost 50% of its pre-war territory to the Soviet Union. No final decision on the addition of territory in the west had yet been taken.

Shortly afterwards, in September, agreements on displacing the Polish population from Germany's former eastern regions to post-war Poland were concluded with the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania. According to these agreements, the resettlement of the Poles was to be completed in the spring of 1945. Those concerned were, if they were from country areas, permitted to take cattle and two tonnes of luggage with them, while town-dwellers were allowed one tonne. The Soviet authorities were obliged to give them sufficient food for their journey. It was also laid down that all those concerned were entitled to compensation equivalent to the value of the property they left behind, excluding land. The voluntary nature of the "evacuation" to Poland was largely fictitious. Many people left their homes and farms for fear of being terrorised by Ukrainian nationalists, had had awful experiences in the Soviet state (collectivisation, mass deportation) and saw no future in their homeland. Anyone who wanted to stay also had to become a Soviet citizen. Many had to accommodate people who were not supposed to take over their houses and flats until after their "repatriation". In addition, many had given up any hope of their homeland becoming part of Poland again.

The first people to be evacuated came from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The main reason for this was the civil war that had started in 1943. In autumn 1944, the Ukrainian nationalists attacked Poland with renewed vigour, and unparalleled atrocities were committed. Even members of the same family and neighbours fought one another. In many cases Ukrainian units first issued an ultimatum to people to leave their village. Any who failed to comply had to expect capture of their village and immediate expulsion, with no regard for human life. The Poles who lived in scattered settlements first fled to the self-defence centres and then to the larger towns, where ethnic Poles formed a clear majority. Their attempts to escape took place in stages, often lasting several months, and resulted in the loss of all their property and, in many cases, of their lives. The civil war meant the end of centuries of neighbourly co-existence. In 1944, it no longer seemed possible for Poles and Ukrainians to live together in mixed communities.

[28] All figures from J. Bielski, "Emigranci ze *l*ska Opolskiego do Republiki Federalnej Niemiec", Opole 1986.

Even before the first transports of Poles arrived from western Ukraine in October 1944, ie during the war, approximately 300,000 Poles had fled from the Ukrainian nationalists across the rivers Bug and San. In that year, about 120,000 Poles gave up their homes in the east and were transported to south-eastern Poland, because the eastern regions of Germany designated by the Polish and Soviet Governments as the expellees' future home had not yet been captured.

Until July 1945 about 742,000 "repatriated persons" - that is to say, people returning to their fatherland - came "from the other side of the Bug" (the region annexed by the Soviet Union) into the previously German territory east of the Oder and Neisse. Here it is clear how the word "repatriation" was misused: these people were not returning to their homeland at all, but were human beings forced to leave an area where their ancestors had lived for centuries.

When the Polish population was resettled from the areas annexed by the Soviet Union, it was planned to transplant entire villages or neighbourhoods into the "regained" areas. For example, the inhabitants of Lwów were resettled in Wroc*aw and those living in Stanis*awów were moved to Opole. In addition, the authorities endeavoured to move those being "repatriated" to places at approximately the same latitude as their former homes, so that the similar geographical position, landscape, climate and nature of soil would make it easier for them to settle in. For example, people were transported from Ukraine to Silesia and Upper Silesia, from Belorussia to East Brandenburg and from Lithuania to East Prussia (Masuria, Ermland, Pomerania and Pommerellen).

According to the official repatriation statistics, from 1944 to 1948 a total of about 1,526,000 people were resettled from Poland's eastern regions. 810,000 of them were from Ukraine, 274,000 from Belorussia, 178,000 from Lithuania and about 300,000 from other areas of the Soviet Union. The last-named group included about 260,000 Poles who had been deported to the interior of the Soviet Union during the war. However, to these official statistics must be added about 600,000 Poles who fled of their own accord and kept their identity secret for fear of persecution. The estimated overall total is therefore at least 2.1 million people.

The evacuation agreements were bilateral, that is to say the members of each neighbour nation were to be evacuated to their own state. In reality, only the Ukrainians living to the west of the Bug and the San had to leave their homes. Up to 1946 they totalled 481,000. Of those who stayed in the People's Republic of Poland, a further 150,000 were deported to the western areas of Poland between April and July 1947 as part of "Operation Vistula". In addition, 37,000 Belorussians and almost 20,000 Lithuanians were resettled in the Soviet Union.

As well as the Poles from the east, more than two million people who had been forcibly removed by the Germans (foreign workers, slave workers, prisoners of war, concentration camp detainees) flooded back into the country. Furthermore, about 235,000 people re-emigrated to Poland from France, Belgium and the Ruhr. They were among those who had emigrated before the war to earn their living. Approximately 500,000, mainly officers and men of the Polish armed forces in the west, did not return. Many of them stayed in the United Kingdom.

"Homo migrans" was a characteristic figure of this period, both for Germany and for Poland. The journey into the unknown, with an uncertain future in a foreign country, often took several weeks or even months. People travelled with their family, their possessions, their cattle and chickens in ordinary goods trucks, which were in many cases just open wagons. Each train contained hundreds of people, all of them dirty, lice-ridden and unsure of their future. The conditions of the "journey" to the west were very similar for both victors and vanquished.

One of the Polish resettlers remembers that time: *The inhabitants of S*dowa Wisznia set out on their journey, as did those who had found a place to live there in the chaos of the war. The wagons were surrounded by armed guards, whose purpose was to protect us from barbarians and ensure we were not murdered on the way. We were held up for quite a while at the frontier barrier at Medyka, which was now the Polish-Russian border. The Russians searched the wagons, allegedly for weapons. They took this opportunity to rob us of everything we had, from things of value - if anyone still had something hidden - to all our documents (...) All the refugees gathered in Przemy*l, which was where the population of East Galicia, Podole and Wo*y* had assembled, waiting for rail transport to the west. We waited for two months.*[29]

It was painful for everyone to leave their parents' home and everything they held near and dear: *Finally, the day before we were due to leave arrived. It was early in the morning. The sun was shining "to order", as if in a novel. After a last look at the house, the orchard and the lilac in front of the house, we pulled away in our cart, drawn by a wretched little horse. An indifferent Ukrainian was standing on the threshold. We could not see him because of the tears in our eyes, which welled up; and we felt choked. We had been living there for so many years. Memories of our happy childhood, the sad times we went through and our house flashed across our minds in rapid succession. I still cannot banish the image of my house from my tear-filled eyes.*

When we reached the station we unloaded our luggage and placed it in a very long line of boxes and people waiting along the tracks. ... We waited at Stryj station, out in the open, for two weeks. The transport did not come. People cursed, but there was no point in going back home, as the Ukrainians were already living in our houses. We waited ... It rained ... Finally, we decided to bribe the stationmaster to get him to speed things up and provide the transport. We collected food and drink, such as vodka. The next day our transport arrived.

When the train came we were speechless: the wagons were simple coal trucks, some high, some low, and had no roofs. Nevertheless, people ran to them, happy that something was now finally happening and the waiting was over.[30]

When they finally arrived at their destination they looked for vacant housing or an uninhabited farm, but only those who got there first were lucky. As a rule, the expellees found a place to settle by moving out into the surrounding area from the railway stations at which they had been unloaded, until they discovered somewhere to stay. However, in many cases resettlers from central Poland had already secured for themselves the best houses, flats and farms. They had been induced to go west (or, to be more accurate, to the "wild west") with the promise that everyone from central Poland would be given a farm. These resettlers therefore really did come of their own free will in the hope of a better life. They often made a spontaneous decision to settle somewhere and took what they needed to start afresh from the property the Germans had left behind. In many cases, they did not want to stay permanently, but only to make some money and then take the cattle, machinery and anything of value to central Poland. At the end of 1945 there were more than 700,000 of them, and they were the largest group among the new arrivals.

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[29] K. Tyszkowska, "Das Los der Umsiedler". From the history competition "Repatriierte - die polnische Ansiedlung im Westen und Norden Polens", Wroc*aw 1993, p. 13.

[30] "Pami*tniki osadników Ziem Odzyskanych", Pozna*, 1963, pp. 197-198.

The most disadvantaged among the resettlers were the so-called *sybiracy*, a term used to describe the Poles who had spent the war as deportees in detention camps in the northern and eastern regions of the Soviet Union. They differed in many respects from the other Polish settlers. Even in post-war Poland, their poverty could not be overlooked. Their six-year exile had robbed them of everything, including their health. In many cases they were only individual members of a family and orphaned children, and they arrived completely debilitated. The political situation was also extremely unfavourable for them, because the Soviet Union, the main cause of their misfortune, was now Poland's great ally and protector. In addition, when they arrived in 1946, the intact and well-equipped flats and houses that had been vacated by Germans were no longer available. Many were accommodated with other settler families. The propaganda was wrong, and the new places for them to settle in did not constitute a Promised Land full of good prospects for the future.

Problems of integration

Integration is a process in which individual parts are put together to form a whole or are inserted into an existing entity. It means participation in the national economy, in the distribution of property and in the culture of the host country. The term should, in the broader sense, encompass the society of the region, in which people have a relationship with their surroundings, and therefore the feeling of being able to identify with the area in which they are living. This identification is shown by their willingness to assume responsibility for their living environment and place of work.

The political situation in spring 1945 was not in Poland's favour. The settlement of the new areas was characterised by a hasty effort to meet political objectives, one of the results of which was that it was badly planned and only carried out in stages. The effects of this were felt from the very start of the coexistence of the different population groups who came together in the new areas, and made their subsequent coexistence more difficult.

When we refer to integration in the new western and northern areas of Poland we should actually speak of two different types. The above definitions show that the host population plays a very important role in integration. In the new areas of Poland, the only indigenous resident population was in Upper Silesia and Ermland-Masuria, while in the other parts of these areas there were virtually none of the old inhabitants left. Although a large number of Germans were still living there, it was planned to resettle them, and this duly happened a short time later. The new arrivals did not regard the Germans as fellow citizens, often viewing them as people who were to blame for the suffering they had endured in the war. The centuries-old relationship between the victors and the defeated was reflected here: *For the moment we can see Germans again and hear their language. How we used to fear them. Now it is they who are afraid.*[31]

In these areas we can speak of the integration of two different groups of Poles: firstly, the "resettlers" from central Poland and, secondly, the "repatriated", meaning people expelled from Poland's former eastern regions. The two groups were fundamentally different, and not only culturally (in terms of their customs, traditions, clothing and dialect). The former had come to the west to build a better life for themselves. They did not have to cope with the shock of losing their home, were more numerous and better represented in all areas of the administration, the party and the militia. In many cases they arrived earlier and were able to choose better

[31] "Tu jest nasza ojczyzna", Pozna*, p. 264.

accommodation. They were convinced that they represented all things Polish and the Polish state, and they were dynamic and mobile - ie, simply "first-class" pioneers. This is also how the government saw them.

The "repatriated", on the other hand, were weighed down by the feeling of having suffered injustice and by the impression that they were aliens living in a foreign country and were superfluous. A young woman from Lwów (Lemberg) wrote in June 1945: *If only we could remove everything foreign, everything German and sweep it out of every nook and cranny. ... Wherever I go, I come across objects that belong to someone else and are evidence of someone else's life, a life I know nothing about, people who used to occupy this house, who used to live here and may now no longer even be alive. How are we to begin a new life here? No, I cannot imagine being able to say one day that this is my home.*[32]

In the hope of being able to return home, and given the widespread uncertainty about the future of the "regained" areas, many people did not take permanent jobs, and everything was only temporary. This was also evident in the fact that they only did as much work as was necessary for their immediate survival. This led not only to differences in their material situation, but also to contempt from the other inhabitants, and manifested itself, inter alia, in the expressions *chadziaj* and *zza Buga*. This is also confirmed by a report submitted in summer 1946 by a commission of inquiry set up by the ministry responsible for the "regained" areas: *Apart from a small group of speculators, the immigrant population have a very low standard of living. Some detach themselves from life; they do not settle down and they live from hand to mouth (...) without any future prospects, homeless like wandering Gypsies and the proverbial Jew*.[33]

The differences and tensions resulted in society being organised according to the origin of the person concerned: the repatriated helped other repatriated people and the resettlers helped other resettlers.

As time went by, these antagonisms were overcome, and a new regional society developed in these areas. An important role was played by the fact that people worked together, especially in industry, by the increasing levelling out of social differences and the resulting similarity of habits, by migration into the cities, by the unifying effect of the school system, by the Catholic faith to which everyone adhered, by the change from one generation to the next and, no doubt, partly by the "common enemy", namely "German revanchism", which was outrageously exploited in propaganda. A particular role was also played by the reconciliatory function of language as a means of communication and by the mass media. In the first phase of integration, schools, radio and the press contributed to a considerable reduction in the number of dialect speakers. Ethnographers also point to the links created through mixed marriages, contacts with neighbours, markets, church festivals and involvement in the work of the various organisations.

[32] "Wach auf mein Herz und denke", Berlin/Opole 1995, p. 439.

[33] Quoted from P. There, "Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene", p. 131.

The policies of the state also contributed to the integration process: the state created new jobs, made it possible for people to advance socially and to continue their education, and, in the initial post-war years, attempted to bring about "external integration" (ie the establishment of strong links between the north-eastern regions and other parts of Poland) by emphasising patriotism and the important tasks that needed to be carried out to develop the new state. The collectivisation of agriculture also had a positive effect on integration processes by creating a sense of solidarity in the entire population and helping the various groups to forget the conflicts that had existed between them until then.

In Upper Silesia, Masuria and Ermland the situation was different. In addition to the above-mentioned factors that led to disintegration, there was a problem of coexistence with the indigenous population, who were not regarded as Poles by the new arrivals but as half Germans and half Poles. They were not trusted, because they were different. Their language (especially their vocabulary) contained Germanic elements, and their lifestyle was characterised by German cultural patterns. In particular, their attitude to work and to duty was different.

A particular problem that arose between the new and the old inhabitants was that of the disputed farms. Under an order issued by the Upper Silesian provincial governors, all farms and property abandoned by their owners in Upper Silesia were placed under the provisional administration of the state, and the farms were accordingly given to the indigenous population to settle on. However, in the spring and summer, and in many cases later on too, the owners, who had fled from the front or had been evacuated by the National Socialists, interned in labour camps or taken away to the Soviet Union, returned. After their identities had been verified, they were entitled to claim their former property, and those who had settled on the farms in question had to leave. In the part of Silesia centred on Opole, 5,024 families, all of them people who had been repatriated, had to leave the farms they were living on. It hardly needs to be pointed out that this did not help integration. Like the campaign to make Poland Polish again, one of the few positive steps taken by the state for the native population ultimately led to further disintegration.

In 1945, a priority task was to involve indigenous people in the life of the state and the nation and give them the feeling they were their masters in their own home. As part of the campaign to make Poland Polish again, courses were held to train staff for local administration, office work, the "people's own" trading system, and educational and cultural work. Unfortunately, all this was just wishful thinking. In reality, the path to a career and social advancement was in most cases blocked for the indigenous population. Quite often, the Upper Silesian dialect and regional cultural patterns were despised in the schools, leading the indigenous population to keep themselves to themselves. Under its integration policy, the state strove only to bring about swift and complete assimilation, with the result that disappointment and alienation towards the Polish state increased among large sections of the local population. The state's economic policy also had an extremely adverse effect on integration processes. Visible ineptitude in the organisation of work and in factory management, differences between economic development and its results in the People's Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany were seen by the native population as a consequence, not of the politico-economic system in Poland, but of the stereotype of the *Polish economy*.

In Upper Silesia, the Church contributed a great deal to help people become integrated and better assimilated and to level out the considerable differences between the indigenous and immigrant population. It assisted in the integration process not only through the exercise of the Catholic faith, but also through its impact on community life. One example was the joint effort to rebuild the churches and presbyteries that had been damaged or destroyed. However, this

positive effect was lacking in Masuria and the district of Kluczbork (Kreuzburg) in the part of Silesia centred on Opole, where the local people were mostly Protestant. In Poland, Protestantism was identified with German, and Catholicism with Polish, culture. (Even today, there is still a widely held view that "a good Pole is a Catholic".) For this reason, the resettlers in these regions were more disposed to classify the native population as Germans in spite of their Polish origin. The year 1956 aroused new hopes, but it did not change very much as far as the situation of the Silesian population was concerned. The disintegration processes gained strength, and the fact that it was made possible for people to leave for the west to join their families resulted in a wave of emigration from Poland that led to a further split in Polish society.

Since 1945, the problem of integration in the northern and western regions of Poland, especially Upper Silesia, has been the subject of many scientific studies. Here, we shall just mention the results of one of these investigations.[34] The research was carried out between 1982 and 1984 in a small village located in the part of Silesia centred on Opole, in which half the inhabitants are Silesians and the other half resettlers from eastern Poland.

Although they had been neighbours for forty years, it was discovered that both groups lived separate lives. There were no open conflicts between them, but there was no familiarity either. The reasons were cultural differences (which made mutual contacts difficult), government policy (which favoured the resettlers) and barriers to understanding (which could be explained by the different forms of Polish spoken). The separation of, and the differences between, the groups even existed in the second and third generation. The Silesians only identified with their own ethnic group, and attached great importance to the external features that showed they were different (their dialect, their clothing, the appearance and furnishing of their homes). The resettlers did not want to be perceived as Silesians and described themselves as Poles. The indigenous population compared themselves with the Germans and the resettlers with the Poles. The statements made by the Silesians showed their disappointment with the Polish state and the Poles. The existing differences, which they stressed, were evidence of the lack of integration.

The fact that there has been no integration between the native and immigrant population is best shown by the decades of increasing emigration by the former group to the Federal Republic of Germany, and by the emergence of the German minority in Poland. This latter fact has once again led to suspicion among some of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia.

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Appendix III

Integration Policies in Europe:
National Differences or Convergence?
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1. Introduction

European societies have experienced large scale immigration since the end of World War II. The illusion of temporary migration has disappeared and confronts the new immigration societies with the necessity of integrating the new groups. The integration of immigrants is a challenge to the established patterns of nation building and welfare state policies. European societies are struggling with the problem of how to best include the immigrants in their social structures.

In this situation, a search for "models" has occurred and different national "strategies" of integration are discussed as to their relative merits or problems. A prevailing discourse in Europe compares different national "strategies": for instance, a French republican, culturally unifying, universal model is confronted with British or Dutch "multiculturalism", and with a German social policy orientation towards migrants. According to the national difference paradigm there is an "Intégration à la Française" linked to the tradition of nation building since the foundation of the Republic and aiming at a culturally homogenous nation. British or Dutch "multi-culturalism", on the other side, supposedly are willing to retain cultural differences and ethnic identities of immigrants. And Germany, due to its "Volk"-centered ethnic nation concept, will not accept immigrants as citizens, but nevertheless includes them in almost all social policy measures.

The different "strategies" are supposed to be linked to traditional ways of macro societal integration, to specific national ideologies and to certain key decisions during the immigration process (Brubaker 1994; Heinelt 1994; Köppinger et al. 1992; Wihtol de Wenden 1999).

This paper is interested in the question whether the idea of different national "models" or strategies of immigrant integration can be upheld, or whether there are processes of convergence which point towards the development of a common European immigrant integration policy. We shall look at key aspects of the policies of France, Germany and the

Netherlands to answer these questions. Before analyzing the three cases we will introduce some conceptual suggestions as to the meaning of integration, integration policy and "mode of integration". On the basis of these suggestions we will present a scheme for analyzing national integration policies which we will use for the country analyses.

We shall not present any newly collected data for our study, but will utilize existing research and literature. The new perspective that we bring in is to look at trends of convergence towards a possibly European pattern of integration policy in an area of research and writing that has been dominated by the national difference paradigm.

2 Integration, integration policy and mode of integration: conceptual suggestions

We suggest a concept of integration that leans partly on ideas of "assimilation" as formulated by Gordon (1964) and Esser (1990), and on a general and formal understanding of integration. For pragmatic reasons we do not use the term "assimilation" because it almost immediately evokes emotional reactions and connotations of cultural suppression in many publics.

Integration as a general and formal concept may be defined as a) forming a new structure out of single elements; or b) as "improving" relations within a structure and c) as adding single elements or partial structures to an existing structure and joining these to an interconnected "whole". Integration refers both to the process of connecting the elements as well as the resulting degree of interconnectedness within the "whole". In the context of immigration integration refers to the inclusion of new populations into existing social structures and to the kind and quality of connecting these new populations to the existing system of socio-economic, legal and cultural relations.

Connecting the new populations with the existing structures and the resulting quality of connectedness involve a process of acquiring a membership status in the core institutions of the immigration society (economy and labor market, education, qualification system, housing market, citizenship as membership in the political community) and the learning and socialization necessary for participating in the new society. Thus integration means the acquisition of rights and the access to positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society by the immigrants and their descendants: *structural integration*.

Rights can be used and positions and statuses can be taken only if certain learning and socialization processes take part on the side of the immigrants. In relation to these preconditions of participation integration refers to processes and states of cognitive, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal change of individuals: *cultural integration or acculturation.* Acculturation primarily concerns the immigrants and their descendants, but it is an interactive, mutual process that changes the receiving society as well.

Membership of immigrants in the new society in the private sphere is reflected in peoples' private relations and group memberships (social intercourse, friendships, marriages, voluntary associations): *social integration.*

Membership in a new society on the subjective level shows in feelings of belonging and identification, particularly in forms of ethnic and/or national identification: *identificational integration.*

Thus integration means an acquisition of rights, access to positions and statuses, a change in individual characteristics, a building of social relations and a formation of feelings of belonging and identification by immigrants towards the immigration society. It is dependent on a number of conditions on the part of the receiving society which could generally be described as its "openness" to the new group of people. A "successful" or progressing integration process could also be characterized as increasing similarity in living conditions and ethnic-cultural orientations between immigrants and natives, and a decrease in ethnic stratification.

We shall not touch upon the question of "transnational migration". Supposing that this type of migration would be a relevant phenomenon in present day's migration questions of integration will have to be discussed differently for this group.

Integration in modern societies is mostly a market process, the result of individual choices, often with motives that do not seem to be related to integration at all.

"... to discuss assimilation (in the sense of integration, F.H.) prospects intelligently, we need to recognize that assimilation can take place despite the intentions of ethnics to resist it. Assimilation can occur as the often unintended, cumulative by-product of choices made by individuals seeking to take advantage of opportunities to improve their social situations. This sort of assimilation was exemplified when socially mobile European ethnics departed from urban, working-class, ethnic neighborhoods for middle-class and more ethnically mixed suburbs. As the example suggests, assimilation most often occurs in the form of a series of small shifts that take place over generations ..." (Alba 1999).

Besides integration as a kind of market process over generations there is a politically promoted process that sets conditions and gives incentives for individual choices and decisions: *integration policies*. On the one hand, there are special measures and institutions that are directly devised for immigrants. We shall call these *special integration policies.* Much more so, however, integration is promoted by the inclusion of immigrants in the general system of nation state integration, in social policy measures and - in case of need - in the welfare system: *general or indirect integration policies* according to Thomas Hammar (1985, 9).

Integration policies thus consist of special (direct) and general (indirect) integration measures. The concept does not include the effects of "positive" or "negative" external influences, like a change in relations between the immigration and emigration countries or in the state of the economy.

The term "national integration strategy" that is often used in a comparative European discourse seems to be rather problematic. "Strategy" implies planning and consistency. National strategy would imply such conscious planning, consistency, systematic organized and goal minded action on a national scale. In that sense, integration strategy does not seem to exist in any European country. National strategy is unlikely for another reason: migration and integration policies very often are in the center of political battles, are subject to serious political conflict. Content and direction of migration and integration policies are changing according to the political climate in the society and according to power relations.

Still, we work with the hypothesis that there are certain consistencies and common characteristics in integration policies on a national level that derive from basic sociostructural principles ("social order") like "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" in Germany, from French étatism and republicanism, or from Dutch "pillarisation" of society: we assume that the "social order" and a particular "sense of nationhood" determine the general integration policies. "Sense of

nationhood" or concept of nation is particularly relevant for inclusion or exclusion toward resident foreigners (naturalization, citizenship). Consistencies and common characteristics on a national level also seem to derive from what I would like to call "the societal definition of the immigration situation" (Examples: The USA are "a nation of immigrants"; "Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland"), which is clearly historically rooted.

The complex whole of direct and indirect integration policies as they are related to the social order of the society and to the societal definition of the immigration situation we suggest to call *"national mode of integration".*

3 How to analyze national mode of integration

On the basis of the preceding conceptual suggestions we can proceed to construct a kind of checklist for integration policy analysis. For that purpose we simply cross tabulate our dimensions of integration with general and special policies of integration (Table 1).

Table 1: Checklist for the analysis of integration policy

Dimensions of integration	Integration policies	
	general	specific
structural	1	5
cultural	2	6
social	3	7
identificational	4	8

With *general integration policies* we refer to the whole of policies of a modern state for the integration of its people as they effect natives and immigrants. We will, of course, lay special emphasis on the effects on immigrants. Besides adapting existing general institutions to needs of a new "clientele" - what we count as general policy - another policy has been to create new institutions exclusively for the integration of immigrants. We call these *special integration policies*. To give some examples from Germany: "Ausländerbeiräte", immigrant services by welfare organizations or "mother-tongue" afternoon schools. Examples from other European countries would be the creation of an integration administration in Sweden or the institutionalization of obligatory integration courses in the Netherlands for certain groups of "newcomers".

Under the influence of American minority policies affirmative action and anti-discrimination laws are being introduced in some European countries or their introduction is being discussed. Anti-discrimination laws are also foreseen by §6a of the Amsterdam treaty as a European standard. I will call these policies equality promoting policies and treat them as one form of special integration policy.

On the basis of the preceding arguments we can now suggest three items for the analysis of national mode of integration:

1. Societal definition of the immigration situation
2. Principles of the "social order" and sense of nationhood
3. Checklist for integration policy analysis (Table 1).

We have chosen France, Germany and The Netherlands for country analyses because they stand for sharply different cases of immigrant integration policies in the public discourse. Due to limitations of this paper we cannot go into an analysis of all the categories of Table 1. In addition, we will not be able to discuss the above three items with equal weight in each of the selected countries.

4 Mode of integration in France

4.1. Societal definition of the immigration situation

Due to an early demographic transition in the second half of the 19th century France has a century long tradition of de facto immigration and integration. As to the societal definition of the immigration situation France never understood herself - like the United States - as a country or nation of immigrants. The large recruitment of foreign workers in the 60s and 70s "... was viewed and often felt as work immigration limited in time ..." (Schnapper 1995,99). France halted the recruitment of foreign workers in 1974 after the "oil shock" of 1973. A political battle developed over the question whether the recruited workers should be allowed to stay in the country. "Would legal migrants be allowed to settle permanently in French territory and society? Indeed for many politicians the question was: can we accept the permanent settlement of undesirable North African immigrants? After a period of hesitation, President Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing attempted, for racialist reasons, a forced repatriation of the majority of legal North African immigrants, especially Algerians between 1978 and 1980 ... However, due to a strong reaction from the political Left, the labor unions, the RPR and CDS, the initiative failed" (Weil 1997,4). Temporary migration of the 60s and early 70s changed into immigration and settlement.

France has not lifted the recruitment ban since 1974. And, like all other European countries, she believes in the continuation of restricting inflows as a condition for the integration of those who are already in the country (Schnapper, Krief and Peignard 1998,13).

4.2. Social order and sense of nationhood

France is a centralized, modern welfare state with an étatist tradition, that is the state takes an active role in society. France is a welfare state for both citizens and resident (legal) foreigners. If immigrants are still foreigners they are entitled to the same social rights as French people: "They benefit from social security (illness, invalidity, pension, death, unemployment, widowhood ...), family allowances and social assistance (medical, for children, old persons, single mothers ...) foreigners, immigrants have the same rights as nationals to have access to low rent housing" (ibidem, 14).

The French concept of nation is built upon the political principles of the French Revolution, but particularly upon the social construction of nation by the III. Republic starting in 1875. Ideological, religious, regional, linguistic and strong urban-rural differences had been continuously threatening the political and social integration of French society and state during

the 19th century. The concept of nation building by the III. Republic was thus founded upon the establishment of a common national language and culture. Secularism and a unified national school system became major institutions for the project of national integration (Heckmann and Tomei 1997,34/35).The integration of immigrants was only an implicit part of this program. "National integration as a whole is political: members of the national society are being integrated by individual citizenship, following a universalist view of the citizen. This principle, stemming from the founding myth of the French Revolution, is the ideological foundation of the so-called 'assimilation' policy. It is by individual citizenship that this policy tries to transform a population of foreign origin into French people" (Schnapper, Krief and Peignard 1998,27).

4.3. General integration policies

General integration policies are those policies that the modern nation state "normally" applies for the integration of its people as they affect natives and immigrants. It will not be possible in this paper to cover all the dimensions of table 1. We shall look at aspects of structural and cultural integration policies and briefly touch upon identificational policies. As *to structural integration* we shall discuss legal integration (or citizenship policies) and schooling and briefly comment on the integration into the labor market and the housing system.

Legal membership in the state community, that is *citizenship* or legal integration is the basis for general integration in state and society. We have learned from Marshal (1950) that in the past the extension and expansion of citizenship and the achievement of civil, political and social rights has been the major integrating "mechanism" of conflict-ridden capitalist society. The inclusion into citizenship - at first applied in Europe for working class integration - thus is a very basic, traditional integrating institution with a long history of success.

Nationality laws in France have been very open since 1889. Traditionally, ius sanguinis and ius soli combine so that anyone born in France who wants to become French - even from foreign parents in an illegal status - can become French. The present *Code de la Nationalité* states that children who are born in France from foreign parents not born in France obtain French nationality automatically when they are 18, on condition that they have lived in France for at least five years. A child born from foreign parents themselves born in France is automatically French at birth. Another aspect of the openness of the naturalization process is that France accepts double nationality. What is specific about the French model of ius soli is that it founds nationality on socialization and not on ethnic origin. Thus it is also different from the American case which might be called a simple ius soli model (Schnapper, Krief and Peignard 1998, 12).

With many former integrating institutions loosing influence - like factory, working class organizations, army and church - the *school* has become the core institution for the integration of immigrants and their children. "The school may be considered as the main instrument and the symbol of the French model of integration; *l'école républicaine* was supposed to create a cohesive French nation " (ibidem, 15); "Based on the principle of centralization, educational programs are ... the same in the 36000 French cities and villages. In this conception, school is to provide apprenticeship of French language, of calculus, of rights and duties of citizenship. But it is also seen as the very place of socialization to French culture and of social advancement" (ibidem, 14/15).The school's influence upon socialization has been intensified with the extension of years children spend in public school or pre-school. Obligatory *école maternelle* as kindergarten/pre-school begins at the age of three and obligatory schooling lasts till the age of 16. In addition, schools are all-day institutions which increases the time children spend there (Heckmann and Tomei 1997, 40).

Concerning *labor market* integration as an important aspect of general structural integration France has a serious problem of transition from a purely scholastic training system into the job market. Apprenticeships and a dual qualification system are only marginal phenomena. A very high unemployment rate for youth, and particularly for immigrant youth, is an indicator of that problem. The French governments have started many programs to tackle the problem, but without much success. The most recent program which is very important for young descendants of immigrants is "L'Emploi Jeune"; it is directed, however, towards all young unemployed.

As to *cultural integration* the school again is the major integrating institution. French language, French literature and French history are regarded as important means of creating a culturally homogeneous nation. Nation building traditionally was synonymous with "assimilation". In the mid-seventies, however, "assimilation" increasingly was questioned as a goal of cultural integration. Under the influence of a young Beur generation *"insertion"* as a minority group oriented concept ("le droit a la difference") gained ground for about 10 years. With the *Front National* picking up this slogan of difference and increasingly successful reinterpreting it in a racist way the slogan was withdrawn and substituted for with a new demand for "the right not to be different" ("le droit a l'égalité"). This helped to bring forth a new model of *"intégration"* which has become widely accepted as a political concept of cultural integration since the end of the eighties (Weil and Cowley 1994, 14). "Intégration" is different from "assimilation" in that it recognizes that there is an interaction process between cultures and that French culture is changed as well under the influence of immigrant cultures (Weil 1997, 13). Still, "intégration" is quite assimilationist: There is, for instance, no room in France for programs of bi-lingual education or for minority languages as languages of instruction, or for head scarfs.

We take *policies toward religion* as an important aspect of cultural integration. Since the III. Republic secularism has been installed as a fundamental principle of the relation between state and society.

"Religious organizations can then only be considered as social actors, such as unions, political parties or associations, with which the state, in an egalitarian way, may negotiate, collaborate or provide financial means to help perform their functions. For instance, Catholic or Jewish schools benefit from grants. Muslim schools would have the same rights - although they have not been created till now. Since the mid-70s the state has encouraged Islamic practice in factories and (F.H.) immigrant residences ... in order to favor the establishment of a 'quiet Islam' ('Islam tranquille') ..." (Schnapper, Peignard and Krief 1998, 5).

Identificational integration policies as part of the general mode of nation state integration include a variety of practices to arrive at subjective feelings of belonging to the nation and nation state. Political socialization, the teaching of history, the internalization of symbols and the development of particular emotions can be given as examples of general nation state practices to achieve identificative integration within the population. As to identificational integration France seems to have a solid tradition of patriotism with an inclusive tendency towards immigrants to identify as French as well. The policies against minority formation or maintenance are consistent with that tradition. The general openness of naturalization or acquisition of citizenship by birth make identification easier.

If this and other aspects of general integration can be seen as tendency toward the goal of "intégration" or acculturation, housing policy seems to totally run counter to this goal. It clearly leads to a marked pattern of segregation (Heckmann und Tomei 1997, 48).

4.4. Special integration policies

Integration of immigrants in France traditionally "just happened" as part of the overall process of societal integration and nation building. "The main implicit principle of the French republican model of integration is that the lack of a specific integration policy is the better way to integrate ... migrants, as they are simply considered as French citizens" (Schnapper, Krief and Peignard 1998, 14). In the 1970s, however, with the proclamation of the "le droit à la différence" a trend for migrant specific measures developed, which got weaker again afterwards (Mahnig 1998, 35). Today there are still some specific programs that are directly targeted at the immigrant population.

As to *structural integration* there are some special integration policies in schooling. For immigrant children who hardly speak French there are special classes (*"classes d'accueil")* to ease their entrance into the regular school system. The *ZEP* program (*"Zone d'education prioritaire*") gives extra funds to schools in poor areas, particularly suburbs. This program is not officially designated for immigrant children, but one criterion for receiving such funds and additional staff is the proportion of immigrant children in an area.

Concerning *cultural integration* the so-called *"Langues et Cultures d'Origine"* program since 1974 runs counter to the general acculturation philosophy. It permits the teaching of Arabian, Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish and Italian languages in school and can be regarded as an expression of some multicultural tendencies of the mid-70s (le droit à la différence). These courses - which seem to be rather a failure - are financed and organized by the countries of origin with teachers from these countries.

In the area of special integration policies the organization FAS (Le Fonds d'action sociale pour les traveilleurs immigrés et leur familles) has to be mentioned as an important body which acts under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affaires. It has a budget of more than one billion francs. Its policies are related to all four dimensions of integration and include social work, housing, education, language training, help for newly arrived immigrants and cultural activities. FAS works through financial grants attributed to associations led by French or foreigners (Lebon 1994, 69/70).

5. Mode of integration in Germany

5.1. Societal defintion of the immigration situation

In relation to the societal definition of the immigration situation in Germany the most often heard phrase is: "Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland". And this is thought to be a highly specific characteristic of the German situation. Yet, when comparing "work immigration limited in time" (Schnapper) in France with the guest worker status in Germany, the near simultaneity of the ban on recruitment (1973 in Germany, 1974 in France) and the "surprise" of an ensuing settlement with family reunion and family formation in both countries, the societal definition of the immigration situation in Germany and France are not far apart. In addition, the German authorities hold the same position on the connection between limited entry and successful integration of those who are already in the country. The new government has accepted a position that we formulated already in 1982 as "Einwanderungs-situation", meaning that the people who have come are immigrants and that there will be some immigration in the future, but that Germany will not make any conscious effort to recruit new immigrants, for instance via quotas.

5.2. Social order and sense of nationhood

Societies have certain basic ways of securing macro-social integration and of defining and tackling social problems and tensions. These derive from some fundamental principles of the social order. *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* as a system of economic, social and political relations is a basic element of the social order in Germany. The role of the state is understood in that system in an interventionist sense, i.e. to help provide social security, social justice and to improve opportunities for disadvantaged groups. The most important aspect of the welfare system for immigrant integration is that non-citizen residents are generally included in it. To give a few examples that are particularly important for second generation migrants: The right for kindergarten attendance; German and non-German children and youth are entitled for support according to the children and youth support act (KJHG); German and non-German students may receive student loans; the huge programs of vocational and occupational qualification and requalification according to the "Arbeitsförderungsgesetz" do not make a difference between citizens and non-citizens (Staudt 1995, 63).

The system of Soziale Marktwirtschaft at present, however, is facing certain challenges that have direct implications for immigrants. An American economist observer, Phillip Martin, has clearly described these challenges by way of a German - American comparison:

"Globalization as well as demographic changes have forced a restructuring of some of the major institutions developed over the past century, including the expectation that many workers would have lifetime jobs with one large company. Many Germans continue to expect such lifetime careers, and they receive an extensive and long term assistance while waiting for 'good jobs' to become available. There are too few such good jobs ... Germany is discussing creating more good jobs by encouraging early retirement and restricting overtime. However, creating good jobs in this manner will not move foreigners forward in the queue ... The alternative is to deregulate the labor market so that employers create more jobs, even though some of the new jobs created may pay lower wages, offer fewer benefits, and not be career options. In the more flexible US labor market unskilled immigrants have little trouble finding jobs or beginning small business, but they may find it hard to earn sufficient wages to achieve above poverty level incomes" (Martin 1999, 11).

Sense of nationhood: The traditional nation concept in Germany since the 19th century has been an ethnic nation concept. Ethnic nationalism stands for common ethnicity as a basis for state organization. Ethnic and state borders should be the same. The ethnic nation concept defines nation as a people with its own state. Since nation defines itself as a community of descent with a common culture and history, belonging to the people and legal membership in the political community, that is citizenship, are closely connected to one another. One of the consequences of this principle is that the inclusion into a nation that understands itself as a community of descent and culture is difficult or defined as an exception to the rule.

Nation as a cultural concept (Schulze, 1995) and nationalism as social and political movements are not constant phenomena, but change historically in relation to their contents and goals. The delegitimation and deconstruction of the old concept of nation and nation state became a broader cultural movement in the 60s and 70s: a major influence for the deconstruction of the old concept of nation was the intellectual reflection of and reaction to totalitarian naziism with its extreme forms of nationalism.

A second major factor that put pressure on the old concepts of nation and citizenship was Germany's integration into the Western world. Democracy and constitutionalism as political principles of the "*West*" could be related to the early national and democratic movement at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but were in total opposition to the aggressive nationalism that developed afterwards. To become an integral part of the Western community the concept of nation that had dominated for the past 100 years had to be changed.

Thirdly, a pressure for change resulted from migration. Migration not only evokes the question "Who are they?", but also "Who are we?" In addition, the assertion of being a democracy and at the same time excluding large parts of the population from full political participation questions the legitimacy of citizenship based on descent.

What I have described so far are pressures for change, for deconstructing the old concepts. From the very beginning of the Federal Republic there were attempts at a reconstruction of the nation concept, which coexisted with a position of a refusal to ever again consider nation and nation states as valuable ideas. One of the key words for this reconstruction process was and is *Verfassungspatriotismus* (constitutional patriotism). It means to identify with nations and nation state because of its constitutional order, because of the rule of law, to feel pride in one's democratic institutions. For an increasing part of the public that believes in the continuing relevance of nation and nation states *Verfassungspatriotismus* has been expressing a new kind of political identification with Germany. Apart from that new kind of patriotism economic success and the building of good institutions became objects of identification around which a new kind of national consciousness could develop.

The historian Mommsen has described this new national consciousness in the year of German unification: " A new kind of national consciousness has developed in the Federal Republic. It is no longer under the influence of political and legal traditions of imperial Germany. This new national consciousness relates primarily to economic success and to a democratic and liberal political system. It is no longer in conflict with the political cultures of Western Europe and the USA, as has been the case for so many years" (Mommsen 1990, 272).

5.3. General integration policies

As a first dimension of *structural integration* we shall look at *citizenship* and naturalization. This discussion, of course, is closely related to the previous chapter on sense of nationhood.

A most influential way of defining the so-called integration problem (of immigrants) was (and is) to define it as a problem of a foreigner's status, as a question of citizenship. Political parties, unions, churches, immigrants' organizations, social scientists, jurists, intellectuals, journalists and many other representatives of an intellectual public stimulated a debate on the necessity of changing the citizenship law. Ius soli should be added to the principle of descent, naturalization should be eased and double citizenship should be tolerated. It was a vivid debate in the nineties, but the discussion had already begun in the eighties. The process can be roughly described as one in which the camp of reformers slowly but steadily gained ground. Already in the former Bundestag legislative period from 1994-1998 there was a majority in the parliament for a reform of the citizenship law, only so-called coalition arithmetics hindered the reform to be realized. The Bundestag in 1993 with a conservative majority had passed a reform of the foreigners' law creating a right for naturalization for second generation migrants (16-23 years old) with eight years of stay and six years of schooling in Germany. This was a first major deviation from the ethnic nation and ius sanguinis principles.

This spring Germany's new citizenship law has been passed. It will be coming into effect on January 1, 2000: it has introduced ius soli, it eases naturalization and, to some degree, tolerates double citizenship. This means a new principle of belonging to the nation is introduced: not only descent, but living in the same society and on the same territory are recognized as rules of inclusion. Whereas the ethnic nation concept tends to see ethnic-national belonging as a kind of primordial tie, the new law explicitly understands its regulations as an instrument of integration of immigrants. The old view still propagated by the opposition, viewed naturalization as the concluding act of a successful process of integration.

The big rouse over double citizenship was actually leaving almost unnoticed the truly revolutionary part of the law, namely the introduction of ius soli. Interesting enough, what the opposition was suggesting as an alternative to ius soli was not far away from this territorial principle either. Their concept was called "*Einbürgerungszusicherung*" which meant to give to newly born children a paper guaranteeing them citizenship at maturity and giving them an unconditional right to live in the country till then.

Next we shall look at integration policies in the *educational system*. The federal states are the main actors in educational policy. Coordination efforts on the national level are regularly undertaken by the *Kultusministerkonferenz*. The conference of ministers for culture in 1976 took basic decisions for the educational policy toward the migrants‘ children. One major decision was that the children of the "guestworkers" were obliged to attend school. There is no such obligation, however, for pre-school attendance. The significance of pre-school or kindergarten attendance for school performance of children of immigrants has been shown in several studies (Esser 1990). It has been the policy of the state on all levels of government to increase the numbers of kindergarten. At the moment Germany is approaching a situation in which statistically every child could attend.

According to the 1976 decisions the children of "guest workers" should be integrated into the regular school system. Preparatory and parallel German language training should be given to them, if necessary. They should be offered training in their mother languages on a voluntary basis in special courses after the regular classes. The understanding of these decisions was to avoid social problems with a population that would temporarily live in Germany.

An exception to the system are the so-called national or bilingual classes in Bavaria and the rather large system of private Greek schools in several German cities. Instruction in these systems is given in the respective national languages: in the bilingual Bavarian system the concept is to start with the mother language and then introduce instruction in German progressively. In relation to the size of the migrant school population of over 1 million only a very small proportion of students does attend these schools. In Bavaria only 4% of the migrant student body is in the bilingual system at present; figures were, however, much higher in the past. While the Greek private school system clearly originates from forces within the Greek community in Germany - supported by the Greek government - the Bavarian national classes were installed to enable migrant workers‘ children to easily return to their "home countries". The labor market concept lying behind this structure was that of a labor rotation system.

Such a labor rotation system never came into effect. Generally speaking, immigrants have access to and are - with few exceptions - fully integrated into the *labor market* and labor market policies, for instance according to the so-called Arbeitsförderungsgesetz which, among others, helps to qualify or requalify unemployed people.

Cultural integration: The cultural dimension of integration is a process that encompasses the learning of cognitive abilities and knowledge of the culture of a society. Language is of prime importance here. Cultural integration also includes the internalization of values, norms, attitudes and the formation of belief systems. For the second generation schools are of prime importance in this context. Germany has not understood itself as an immigration society giving schools, like in classical immigration countries, the explicit job of integrating ("assimilating") the children of immigrants. The basic understanding of these policies in Germany was to avoid social problems. The "latent curriculum" of the schools in terms of what happens in the classroom, however, always has been and is today the same as in classical immigration countries and in France, namely cultural integration or acculturation.

Policies of religion also play a role in the cultural and "ideological" reproduction of society, despite Germany understanding herself as a secular state. The Christian churches and Judaism play a role in public life that is defined legally and by tradition, including a role in the educational system. No such role as yet has been established for the most prominent religion of the immigrants, Islam. A process is under way, however, which could result in an institutionalization of Islam according to the general patterns. Already since 1985 the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen is teaching Islam by Islamic teachers under supervision from the state government. Very recently, a high court in Berlin has ruled that Islam should be treated in analogy to the Christian churches and to Judaism and has allowed an Islamic federation to start organizing the teaching of religion in the public schools of Berlin. In Bavaria, for the first time, Islamic instruction is being offered in schools under similar conditions as in Nordrhein-Westfalen. On the whole, however, it is safe to say that the relation of German state and Islam is still in a conflictual state of search for a clarification and definition. The continuation of a development to treat Islam in analogy to the established religious communities would mean to adopt the traditional general mode of cultural-religious integration in Germany. So far, most religious education among Islamic migrants has been in the hands of private Islamic associations in afternoon classes.

Identificational policies: In Germany the dominant tendency to define national belonging has been via common ethnicity. This, of course, is exclusive toward the foreign migrants. What is more: The continuing official denial of the de facto immigration situation in Germany ("Germany is not an immigration country") has been regarded by the immigrants as a continuous denial of the legitimacy of the "presence of foreigners" in the country. This has not been an invitation for identification. What is lacking is a model of national belonging, a model of becoming and being a German that is based on continuously living and working there and thus could include migrants as well. The general mode of identificative nation state integration has not included the foreign migrants. It has only included one large group of migrants: those defined as ethnic Germans (Aussiedler).

5.4. Special integration policies

As to *structural integration* transitory classes ("Übergangsklassen") that prepare for participation in regular classes have to be mentioned as special institutions in the area of *education.* On the level of single municipalities as well as federal states (Länder) a multitude of programs exists for the support of immigrant children. The "Regionale Arbeitsstellen zur Förderung ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlicher" in Nordrhein-Westfalen can be given as an example. The Bavarian program of national classes and bi-lingual education had some regional importance in the 80s, but has lost attraction continuously in the 90s. It is not pushed forward any more by the Bavarian ministry of education.

Special measures relating to the *labor market,* and qualification include "Pro-Qualifizierung", a training program for people between 25 and 45 to adopt them to technological changes, programs for migrant women, incentives for employers of migrant background to create apprenticeships for second general migrant youth and many regional and local initiatives for the same purpose.

Are there special institutions in the area of *cultural integration*? "Muttersprachlicher Unterricht" is by far the most relevant institution in this area. It consists of mother-tongue language instruction and cultural studies on a voluntary basis in afternoon classes, financed by the federal states and organized in cooperation with the respective national consulates. Roughly 30-35% of the migrant children (first and second generation) take part in this instruction (Kupfer-Schreiner 1996).

Policies of *social integration* refer to measures of newly created institutions and organizations in relation to the development of "positive" personal social relations between natives and immigrants, "intercultural relations", and to the increase of immigrant membership in associations. The reduction of prejudice and discrimination in everyday life is part of this work. Newly created organizations in Germany, whose activities are mainly centered in the area of social integration are *Ausländerbeiräte* (foreigners' councils) and *Ausländer-beauftragte* (foreigners' commissioners). They exist on the local, federal state and federal level. In addition, a lot of NGOs were founded whose activities center around social integration. A lot of organizations, including the federal interior ministry have lead campaigns against xenophobia, ethnic prejudice and racism, particularly after the violence of 1992.

As can be seen from this discussion special integration policies have a much lesser weight in Germany - as in other European countries - compared to the inclusion of migrants in the system of general nation state integration.

6 Mode of integration in The Netherlands

6.1. Societal definition of the immigration situation

Though having been a country of immigration in the past The Netherlands started off being a country of emigration in the 20th century. "Even during the the 1960s and 1970s, when considerable numbers of guest workers arrived, the government tried to stimulate its citizens to move abroad to countries like Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Population forecasts made many fear that the country would not be able to accommodate all; in terms of geographical space and in terms of labor market needs. The paradoxical nature of having policies for both importing and exporting labor, at the time appears not to have been noted or publicly discussed" (Doomernik 1998, 54).

In 1974 a ban on recruitment was ordered. In contrast to some other European countries The Netherlands did not install any program for return migration incentives. Due to family reunification or family formation immigration continued similar to France and Germany and a settlement process occurred. Still, like in Germany, the illusion of the temporariness of the immigration continued. In 1979 a scientific advisory committee to the government urged to give up the fiction of the return of the migrants and advised the government to develop an active integration policy. By formulating a program for minority policies in 1981 the government recognized the immigration situation and responded to it (Entzinger 1996, 147/148).

6.2. Social order and sense of nationhood

The Netherlands are a highly organized welfare state that has gone through different processes of modernization in the 1990s. Immigrants, be they citizens or not, generally have access to the main institutions of society and to the system of social security and welfare.

The tradition of a "consociational democracy" and a "pillarisation" of society have been important principles of the social order that have not only influenced "sense of nationhood", but integration policies towards immigrants as well. "Pillarisation" historically means that the main ideological and political camps - Catholics, Protestants, liberals and socialists - have their own institutions like political parties, unions, schools, associations, hospitals, media and welfare organizations. For the pillars to form a temple a "roof" is needed. The common political institutions of the state form this roof where conflict and cooperation are mediated. The main characteristic of this consociational democracy is that conflicts are settled by pacification and compromise, leading to equal access to the state's resources for all groups involved. This principle has been extended to the newcomers and has been conducive to formulating the idea of a Dutch multi-cultural society (Entzinger 1996; Doomernik 1998). One has to add, however, that most observers agree that pillarisation structures are getting weaker in the nineties.

6.3 General integration policies

Similar to the cases of France and Germany we shall begin with *structural integration* and discuss citizenship and schooling. After the Second World War *citizenship* law was based mainly on the principle of ius sanguinis. Since then more and more elements of ius soli have been introduced. All four major reforms in the last 50 years aimed at easing conditions for either acquiring citizenship by birth or through naturalization (Groenendijk 1999). Naturalization is possible after five years, very easy for second generation and automatical for third generation. After a very liberal attitude the rules concerning the toleration of dual citizenship have been much restricted.

According to the pillar system it is possible for minorities to form their own, publicly financed *schools*. But with the changes of the pillarisation system and the state control exercised the schools are very much the same independent of who is organizing it. Only a small minority of the immigrants sends their children to such (elementary) schools anyway. Schools thus are institutions of general socialization and integration and not reinforcing ethnic identities.

Due to its multicultural tradition The Netherlands started off by special programs for immigrants. "... many policies that were put in place in the 1980s that specifically aimed at the integration of immigrants were substituted during the mid-1990s by general integration policies for all disadvantaged persons, natives and immigrants alike" (Doomernik 1998, 7). This refers to housing policies as well as to programs of labor market integration. In 1992 a so-called Youth Employment Guarantee Law was enacted which makes work available for every person under 21 who has been unemployed for six months. Not accepting an offer from this program means loosing social security benefits for three months. In 1995 a nwe program for the long-time unemployed was begun. Many of these jobs are created in the public sector and are financed by the reallocation of social security jobs that people would otherwise be entitled to (ibidem). These general programs are of particular importance for migrants since their unemployment rate is more than double as that as that of the native population.

6.4. Special integration policies

The minority policies at the beginning of integration policies correlated much with a tendency for special integration programs. These have not totally disappeared, not even in *structural integration.* For primary *schools* with a disproportionate rate of immigrant children special funds allow for additional staffing and a decrease in classroom size. As to labor market integration a special program existed in the 80s when a quota of public sector jobs was reserved for Moluccan immigrants. Since 1987 the government tries to increase the number of employees of immigrant origin in the public sector. Attempts to expand rules of higher immigrant employment in the private sector failed. As a substitute the government enacted a law in 1993 obliging all employers with a workforce of more than 35 to register their employees' ethnic background (Entzinger 1996, 155).

As to *cultural integration* the multicultural orientation of the beginning phase has lost much of its force since the 1980s. Funds for social and cultural activities of ethnic minorities have been reduced or canceled. In addition, there is a new discussion about the relevance of mother-tongue language programs that have been cut down already anyway. "There is a change today in the country's integration philosophy. It seems that the 'minority model' is substituted for by an 'integration model' ... For historic reasons pluralism in education or the mass media is stronger in The Netherlands than in most European countries. Most probably, however, ethnic minorities will have to strive themselves for the institutionalization of this pluralism, instead of being supported by the state like till now" (Entzinger 1996, 156).

In 1996 The Netherlands installed a special immigrant integration program ("Inburgerings-beleid") which is directed at persons who are accepted as immigrants or refugees. The program is obligatory and has to be taken upon arrival in The Netherlands. It consists of courses in language training, courses on the culture and institutions of the country and relates to all dimensions of integration. It is a special program, yet its goal is early participation in the general society, not a preparation for life in an ethnic minority culture.

7 Conclusion: The emergence of a European integration policy

There is clear evidence in the three cases presented for a Europeanization of integration policies:

1. Summarizing those conditions that strongly influence integration policies we can say that the *societal definitions of the immigration situation* in the context of labor migration in France, Germany and The Netherlands have not been as far apart as the image and public discourse of different national integration "strategies" may suggest. "Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland" has often been portrayed as a particular German attitude, but nowhere has there been a clear recognition of the immigration situation by governments or societies when the settlement process came under way in the 1970s. Germany has only been (much) slower in recognizing the immigration situation.

2. As to *social order* and sense of nationhood all three countries are modern welfare states. Their *concepts of nation* have much approached in the last three decades. Germany has added a strong political component to its sense of nationhood and the Dutch pillarisation structure has been weakening.

3. The inclusion of immigrants in *general integration policies* is far more important for immigrant integration than any targeted special policies. Since the countries are all modern welfare states who include the immigrants in their systems many basic integration conditions are similar or the same. School, labor market, business, health services or social benefits are all open to immigrants and their descendants.

4. Differences that can be found in degree or quality of integration of immigrants between the countries are more likely to be the result of remaining differences in general integration conditions - like for instance the particular labor market conditions in a country - than the result of any special measures.

5. There is a trend for *special policies of integration* to decrease. Special policies have never been strong in France and have lost influence in Germany. The Netherlands who had a very marked minority policy orientation has changed that toward a general approach to support potentially marginalized groups in general. New special policies to promote equality (of an affirmative action type) do not (yet?) play a significant role in Europe.

6) There has been a remarkable trend of *convergence of citizenship laws* on the basis of ius soli. This convergence includes the "philosophy of naturalization" within the integration process, namely to regard it as an instrument of integration, not as a finishing act.

7) There is strong agreement between the countries that a *restriction of further immigration* is a precondition for the "successful" integration of those immigrants who are already in the country.

Trends of convergence or Europeanization that we identified for integration policies resemble processes of Europeanization in immigration control. The Amsterdam treaty has included the Schengen agreement that was a bilateral accord between single states into the EU structures. In the Amsterdam treaty as well most items of immigration and asylum policies have been "communalized", though still on the basis of a unanimous vote. The control over access to its territory is one of the core aspects of nation state sovereignty that nation states still cling to.

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Appendix IV

Programme

Monday, 29 November 1999

2 pm — Welcoming address and opening of seminar
Ludwig Häring
Head of the Academy for In-Service Teacher Training and Staff Management, Dillingen

Address
Dr Stefan Krimm
Ministerialrat, Bavarian Ministry of Education and the Arts, Munich

Address
Dr Carole Reich
Council of Europe, Strasbourg

The seminar as part of the "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century" project
Claude-Alain Clerc
Chair of project group

The seminar arrangements
Siegfried Münchenbach
Studiendirektor, Academy for In-Service Teacher Training and Staff Management, Dillingen

3 pm — Schools and intercultural education in Bavaria
Johanna Heiss-Wimmer
Institutsrektorin, Academy for In-Service Teacher Training and Staff Management, Dillingen

4 pm — Presentation round
Ralf Kaulfuss
Studiendirektor, State Institute for Educational Theory and Research

Migration in various European countries. Discussion of personal experiences, of the public perception and assessment of migration and of the situation in schools.

Working groups, reports and statements from various countries; plenary discussion

Tuesday, 30 November 1999

9 am — Forms of European migration policy co-operation
Strategies with regard to the integration of migrants in Europe
Professor Friedrich Heckmann
European Forum for Migration Studies, University of Bamberg

2.30 pm — Migration in Europe in the 20th century
Professor Werner K Blessing,
University of Erlangen

7.30 pm — "Bavaria in the post-war period" - Eye-witnesses report on the people who fled, were expelled or returned home. Presentation of a video project
Studiendirektor Siegfried Münchenbach, Academy for In-Service Teacher Training and Staff Management, Dillingen

Wednesday, 1 December 1999

9 am — Bavaria's fourth tribe. Basic features of the integration of refugees and expellees after the second world war
Professor Rudolf Endres,
University of Bayreuth

Population displacement and problems of integration in Poland after the second world war
Dr Monika Choro*, Silesian Institute, Opole

Discussion of comparative potential and limits

2.30 pm — 1. International law lessons learned from the century of expulsions, as regards ethnic groups and the protection of minorities

2. European law and migration

Thomas Silberhorn, Assistant Lecturer, University of Bayreuth Department of International and European Law

8 pm — The author reads from his own works
Dr Carmine Gino Chiellino reads from his book "Sich die Fremde nehmen" and his as yet unpublished collection of poems "Canti per M.".

Thursday, 2 December 1999

9 am — Drafting of a handout on the subject of "Migration in the 20th century and its effects - proposals for a European history course"
Dr Herwig Buntz, Ohm-Gymnasium, Erlangen, seminar leader

"Expulsion - integration - worldwide migration" teaching project at the Paul-Klee-Gymnasium, Gersthofen (Comenius Project)
Dr Bernhard Lehmann, Paul-Klee-Gymnasium, Gersthofen

2 pm — Suggestions for the handout, corrections and additions
Participants divide into working groups

7.30 pm — Experience with video projects as action-based forms of teaching
Thilo Pohle

Friday, 3 December 1999

9 am — Young people's attitude to "foreigners". Evaluation of a survey conducted among school pupils in Belgium
Jozef van Dooren

Experience with teaching about migration in Dutch schools. Educational and methodological considerations
Dr C E M Ineke Veldhuis-Meester

10.15 am — Presentation and discussion of conclusions drawn by working groups.

11.30 am — End of seminar