The changing face of Europe – population flows in the 20th century

THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE – POPULATION FLOWS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

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The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 to achieve greater unity between European parliamentary democracies. It is the oldest of the European political institutions and has 43 member states,[1] including the 15 members of the European Union. It is the widest intergovernmental and interparliamentary organisation in Europe, and has its headquarters in Strasbourg.

With only questions relating to national defence excluded from the Council of Europe's work, the Organisation has activities in the following areas: democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms; media and communication; social and economic affairs; education, culture, heritage and sport; youth; health; environment and regional planning; local democracy; and legal co-operation.

The European Cultural Convention was opened for signature in 1954. This international treaty is also open to European countries that are not members of the Council of Europe, and enables them to take part in the Council's programmes on education, culture, sport and youth. So far, 48 states have acceded to the European Cultural Convention: the Council of Europe's full member states plus Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Holy See and Monaco.

Four steering committees – the Steering Committee for Education, the Steering Committee for Higher Education and Research, the Steering Committee for Culture and the Steering Committee for Cultural Heritage – carry out tasks pertaining to education and culture under the European Cultural Convention. They also maintain a close working relationship with the conferences of specialised European ministers for education, culture and the cultural heritage.

The programmes of these four committees are an integral part of the Council of Europe's work and, like the programmes in other sectors, they contribute to the Organisation's three main policy objectives:

– the protection, reinforcement and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and pluralist democracy;

– the promotion of an awareness of European identity;

– the search for common responses to the great challenges facing European society.

The education programme of the Steering Committee for Education and the Steering Committee for Higher Education and Research currently covers school, out-of-school and higher education. At present, there are projects on education for democratic citizenship; history; modern languages; school links and exchanges;

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1. Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

educational policies; training for educational staff; the reform of legislation on higher education in central and eastern Europe; the recognition of qualifications; lifelong learning for equity and social cohesion; European studies for democratic citizenship; the social sciences and the challenge of transition; learning and teaching in the communication society; education for Roma/Gypsy children in Europe; and the teaching of the Holocaust.

These multilateral activities are complemented by targeted assistance to the newer member states in bringing their education systems in tune with European norms and best practice. Co-ordinated under a strategy of "partnerships for educational renewal" projects are being carried out, in particular on education legislation and structures, citizenship and history teaching. The priority regions are South-East Europe and the countries sprung from the former Soviet Union.

PREFACE

The changing face of Europe – population flows in the 20th century was produced as part of the Council of Europe's education project "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century". The project aimed to produce innovative teaching resources for secondary schools which would help school teachers and students alike to approach key historical issues, in this case migration, to better understand the nature of the Europe in which they live.

This study examines all aspects of migration, its different flows and types, such as economic, forced and ethnic, as well as its impact on economics, demography and social and cultural life. National policies on integration and naturalisation, and how they are conditioned are examined and compared. From a variety of sources (maps, statistics, first person accounts of migrant life – sometimes humorous, sometimes tragic – novels, films and surveys), a web of causes and effects emerges, depicting migrant life today. In this way, the reader gains an overview and the beginning of a deeper understanding of this complex subject.

In spite of progress made in the perception of migrants and their contribution to society – economic benefits, cultural pluralism, ragamuffin and *raï* – the author does not hesitate to point out the existence of double standards. "High-status nomadic brains" with skills to sell pass borders freely in the name of globalisation, while migrants fleeing political or ethnic persecution may not pass through the ever-tightening nets that immigration countries are erecting.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

The Europe which has been in the making for the last half-century is radically transforming our views on migration. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was not just the founding charter of a huge single market within the European Union. It was also the blueprint for a totally new kind of state: a state based on its citizens, with power more symbolic than real, which is constantly seeking recognition. This project – apparently restricted to neither the European Union countries nor the areas covered by the agreements – is affecting our whole understanding of migration. When internal frontiers go, distinctions in treatment between people go with them, the result being that the legal difference between, for example, a Bavarian and a Sicilian moving to Hamburg is shrinking all the time. This means that the word "migrant" will probably have a new connotation in future, no longer applying to Europeans moving around within this common area, but only to people arriving from outside.

As internal barriers come down to create a European area, a new wall will inevitably rise between Europe and the rest of the world. Managing this new frontier in a manner consistent with respect for human rights will be migration policy's first major challenge in the years ahead.

The second challenge will chiefly affect nation states whose national identity is – or is thought to be – threatened by the European process. In western democracies, this weakening of national identity, which goes hand in hand with a revival of local ties (regionalism) and a reshaping of traditional patterns of labour and labour relations (increased flexibility), sets the scene for a clash between romantic conservatism – often populist in its political expression – and pragmatic management of these processes. In these conditions, constructing a reassuring national identity without a scapegoat – and migrants make an easy target for people who claim that identity is being lost – is a complex and difficult task. In this area, efforts to reach an understanding with the various sectors of the community, and to inform, educate and explain in non-ideological terms, will be decisive in countering the arguments nationalists use on migration. Only a thorough grasp of the way in which our societies are being transformed into multicultural entities will enable us to recognise the specific characteristics of the various groups – religious, linguistic, ethnic or territorial – which make up our societies, and to build bridges, and so create at least an *ad hoc* unity, between them.

The third challenge concerns acceptance of difference. Our society has had to learn to live with difference, though the process has been a painful one for the victims of violence, persecution and intolerance – Jews, black people,

homosexuals and others. The recent racist attacks on hostels for asylum seekers in various European countries remind us that recognition and acceptance of the diversity which migration brings with it are still very much at risk. In future, recognising that diversity is increasingly the hallmark of our societies will not be enough – we shall also have to learn and apply special skills to resolve the conflicts which this situation engenders. To live on better terms with the fact of diversity, we shall have to reinforce democracy, which is never proof against manipulation, and propagate its values throughout the community.

This publication is designed to play a part in this process of opening people's eyes to the new complexity of the societies they live in, and giving them the information they need to understand it. Schools have a key role to play in fostering acceptance of difference and producing democratic citizens – and we hope our work on migration will help them to do that.

Lastly, a word of thanks to our colleagues Gianni D'Amato, Hans Mahnig, Etienne Piguet and Philippe Wanner for giving us the benefit of their wide-ranging expertise, and to Sylvia Stoeckli for her patient checking of the text. Our special thanks to Claude-Alain Clerc, chair of the Project Group of the Council of Europe's project "Learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the 20th century", who supported us throughout.

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READER'S GUIDE

The author has included numerous tables, graphs and other documents for the general reader and for classroom use. This guide is intended to help find them quickly according to title. They have been numbered in order of appearance.

Chapter 5   Migration and home countries

Appendix II: Suggested activities and resources for classroom use

CHAPTER 1

MIGRATION IN THE 20TH CENTURY: A BRIEF HISTORY

Aims:

– to identify the main migration periods in 20th-century Europe: migration during and after the first world war, migration after the second world war and migration since 1973;

– to show that causes may change, but that migration itself is a constant. It is, as its history in Europe teaches us, an on-going, permanent process;

– to provide a general picture of the features and causes of migration movements in 20th-century Europe;

– to plot these movements on maps.

Migration during and after the first world war

General context

Nationalist ideology was the dominant feature of European politics during this period. As the empires collapsed, new nation states emerged. These new political entities generated new ethnic minorities – some of them refused recognition, or even oppressed, by the states to which they belonged.

The nation states also acquired sole authority to regulate all matters with a bearing on migration – freedom to travel, passports, visas, border controls, and so forth. In contrast to the period before the first world war, migration was now subject to serious restrictions. Border checks and compulsory passports for travellers were the chief means used to control it. Political conflict and economic crisis were also major factors during this period. So was the Russian Revolution, which had far-reaching consequences on migration, and particularly forced migration (see chapter 2).

Causes and consequences

Migration in Europe after the Great War was on a wholly new scale, involving millions of people. The collapse of the empires, particularly the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, led to major territorial changes and to the redrawing of many frontiers, and the nation states which succeeded the empires used national

unity to consolidate their position. Both of these factors led to ethnic and/or forced migration.

After the war, the demographic situation of most European countries was alarming: a large part of the working-age population had been killed, and labour was in short supply. This was particularly serious at a time when reconstruction and economic growth were priorities, and industry was in desperate need of manpower. As a result, various countries signed agreements to encourage economic immigration. France, for example, brought in workers from Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1920s.

The economic crisis of the 1930s also had an impact on migration, leading to the return (voluntary or forced) of many immigrant workers to their home countries. Singled out as "foreign rivals" on the job market by native workers, they were the first victims of the crisis. Thousands of Polish immigrants, for example, were obliged to leave France and go home in the next few years.

However, in addition to bringing in foreign labour to help with reconstruction, post-war Europe was also confronted, over a long period, with forced migration, from a variety of causes.

First of all, when the fascists came to power in Italy, many militant anti-fascists – communists, anarchists, socialists, trade unionists and opposition leaders – were obliged to leave the country. In the same way, Hitler's takeover in 1933 prompted various members of Germany's intellectual élite, both Jewish and non-Jewish, to seek refuge in other European countries – but this was a mere prelude to the mass persecution which drove thousands of German and Austrian Jews from the Reich. The civil war which erupted in Spain in 1936 was another cause of forced migration.

Mass deportations, from the 1930s on, particularly within the Soviet Union, must also be mentioned. Between 1936 and 1952, some 3 million people of foreign culture and origin, living near the Soviet Union's western borders, were deported to central or eastern Siberia, or even the central Asian republics. This was deportation on a huge scale, involving more than 20 nationalities and numerous minorities. Accused of spying for the enemy, Volga Germans, Kalmyks and Muslim minorities (Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Meskhetians) were the chief victims of Stalin's policy (see Table 2). Deportations during this period did much to shape the population structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) today.

The following table outlines the main migration flows during the first world war and in the inter-war period.

Table 1: Outline of migration, 1914-45

Country	Year	Description of migration	Type of migration
Germany	1914-18	Germany recruits 100 000 Jewish workers from Poland to bolster its war economy.	Economic
	1918	1.8 million Germans leave Russia, Poland, Alsace and Lorraine.	
Belgium	1914-18	240 000 Belgian nationals are in the United Kingdom.	Forced
	1922	Pole, Yugoslavs, Hungarians and Czechs are employed in Belgian mines.	Economic
	1931	80 000 French nationals are in Belgium	Economic
Bulgaria	After 1918	Thousands of Greeks, Turks and Pomaks leave Bulgaria.	Ethnic
		Similarly, Bulgarians living in Turkey and Greece return to Bulgaria.	
France	1917	France recruits workers from other European countries, including:	Economic
		23 000 Portuguese, 24 000 Italians, 24 000 Greeks, 33 000 Czechs, 67 000 Russians, 67 000 Armenians, 86 000 Algerians, 55 000 Moroccans and Tunisians.	
	1921	46 000 Polish workers in France.	Economic
	1926	France's foreign population rises from 1.5 in 1921 to 2.5 in 1926 with the arrival of Polish, Italian and Czech immigrants.	Economic
United Kingdom	1921	364 747 Irish people in England, 1% of the population.	Economic
Italy	1922	Some 30 000 Italians move to Belgium	Economic
Russia	1917	The civil war and the Bolshevik Revolution drive millions of Byelorussians from their country.	Forced
Germany	1933-40	1 million Germans leave Germany for political, religious and racial reasons, particularly Jews persecuted by the nazi regime.	Forced
Bulgaria	1936-38	Under an agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey, some	Ethnic

(continued)

		12000 Turks leave Bulgaria every year.	
Spain	1920-30	50000 Basques and 20000 Catalans take refuge in France.	Forced
	1936-39	200000 Spaniards leave Spain, 140000 of them for France.	Forced
Italy	1920-30	Refugees from fascism go to France.	Forced
Netherlands	1940	Germany's invasion of the Netherlands leads to an influx of Dutch refugees into England.	Forced
Poland and the Soviet Union	1918-33	Jews flee Poland and Russia to escape anti-Semitism.	Forced
Soviet Union	1933-45	Stalin's policy forces millions of people of German, Caucasian, Tatar and other origins to migrate within the Soviet Union, mainly to Siberia.	Forced
Turkey	1926	65000 Armenians migrate to France.	Forced

Source: http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/migration/chapter71.html; Ohliger, 1996, Temime, 1999

Table 2: Deportations in the Soviet Union, 1941-52

Nationalities/minorities	Year of deportation	Number
Volga Germans	1941	366000
Karachai	1943	68000
Kalmyks	1943	92000
Chechens	1944	362000
Ingush	1944	134000
Balkars	1944	37000
Crimean Tatars	1944	183000
Meskhetians	1944	200000
Poles: Ukraine → Kazakhstan	1936	60000
Koreans: Vladivostok → Kazakhstan / Uzbekistan	1937	172000
Poles/Jews: Ukraine and Belarus → northern Siberia	1940-41	380000

(continued)

Other Soviet Germans: → Saratov, Ukraine → central Asia	1941-52	843 000
Finns (Leningrad region): Leningrad → Siberia	1942	45 000
Other north. Caucasus groups: north Caucasus → Central Asia	1943-44	8 000
Other Crimean groups: Crimea → central Asia	1944	45 000
Moldavians: Moldavia > central/eastern Siberia	1949	36 000
Black Sea Greeks: Black Sea region → Kazakhstan	1949	36 000
Other Black Sea groups: Black Sea region → Kazakhstan	1949	22 000
Total:		**3.1 million**

Source: http://www.unhcr.ch/issues/history/cis9602.htm

Migration from the second world war to 1973

General context

The second world war caused millions of deaths and forced vast numbers of people to flee racial and political persecution by the fascist and other totalitarian regimes, radically altering the political and economic landscape of post-war Europe.

The end of the war was followed by migration on a massive scale, as exiles, especially Germans, returned to their homelands. The redrawing of national boundaries (Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia) also prompted most ethnic Germans, Poles and Czechs to return to their countries of origin.

Two major ideological and political camps emerged when the nazi regime collapsed. While western Europe opted for open, democratic government, the countries of eastern Europe fell prey to closed, authoritarian regimes, under Soviet communist supervision. This ideological division (democracy v. socialism) engendered a wider confrontation between the two sides – the "cold war", which itself became a far from negligible factor in post-war migration, with east-west refugees until the Berlin Wall came down, and ethnic migration after that.

Another factor was the need to rebuild western Europe's economies, badly damaged by the war. The economic strategy adopted by the region's developed countries set out to concentrate investment and increase production (Castles and Miller, 1998). This policy, which left a heavy mark on the period from 1945 to the early 1970s, encouraged economic migration from the underdeveloped or developing countries to western Europe.

Lastly, in the post-war period, especially the 1960s and 1970s, decolonisation had considerable effects on migration patterns in western Europe. While many people (especially Europeans) returned to their home countries, others (especially from the former colonies) left their home countries, mainly for economic reasons, in search of a better life abroad.

Causes and consequences

The causes and consequences of migrations are:

– *the need for labour:* reconstruction and economic development created a need for foreign labour. Millions of people, mainly of working age, had been killed in the war. Emigration from Europe to the United States began to stabilise in the 1950s, and western Europe started to recruit "economic" immigrants;

– *economic disparities between European countries:* Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, followed by Turkey and Yugoslavia in the 1960s, became labour-exporting countries. Germany, Belgium, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden were the main importers of foreign labour;

– *decolonisation:* countries such as the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands were affected by immigration resulting from decolonisation (see migration connected with decolonisation, chapter 2);

– *violations of human rights and freedoms:* thousands of people living under communist rule in eastern Europe fled political oppression in their home countries (see forced migration, chapter 2);

– western Europe became a prime target for immigration, taking in some 10 million people between 1950 and 1973 (see Table 3).

Table 3: Numbers and percentages of foreigners in certain host countries, 1954-74

Host country	Years	Number of foreigners	Percentage of foreigners
France	1954	1 766 100	4.09
	1965	2 683 490	5.48
	1674	4 128 312	7.7
Switzerland	1954	285 446	6.05
	1965	810 243	13.4
	1974	1 064 526	16.5
Belgium	1954	379 749	4.29
	1965	636 749	6.7
	1974	775 185	7.49
Germany	1954	484 819	9.92
	1965	2 318 100	3.96
	1974	4 127 400	6.65

(continued)

Netherlands	1954	106 480	0.98
	1965	134 792	1.12
	1974	282 361	2.11
Sweden	1954	111 111	1.54
	1965	320 580	4.04
	1974	401 158	4.91

Source: Gitmez, 1983 p.50.

Migration since 1973

General context

Several developments have affected migration trends in Europe since 1973. First of all, in the wake of the 1973-74 oil crisis, the industrialised countries of western Europe decided to stop recruiting foreign labour. This decision came at a time when the economic gap between the rich industrial countries of the north and the poor or developing countries of the south had widened considerably, generating substantial migration to the countries of western Europe.

Secondly, the emergence of military, non-democratic and authoritarian regimes, particularly in various Third World countries, made considerable inroads on human rights and individual freedoms. Many individuals and members of political movements who opposed these regimes were forced to seek asylum in the democratic countries of western Europe, which had traditionally tended to adopt a humanitarian stance on asylum. From the 1980s on, Europe became the preferred destination of refugees from the South. Apart from violations of human rights and freedoms, the political persecution of minorities, and ecological and natural disasters, particularly in the poorer countries of Asia and Africa, also played a part in bringing refugees to western Europe.

Finally, the effects of the Berlin Wall's disappearance in 1989 (German re-unification, peaceful change in eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) greatly modified the geopolitical picture in Europe.

Causes and consequences

All these changes clearly had major effects on migration, both into and within Europe. For many reasons (economic, political, ethnic, etc.), migration is again a feature of the scene in Europe today. The best example is the east-west migration which followed German re-unification and the Soviet Union's collapse, and Germany itself is the country most affected.

In Germany, *Aussiedler* (see glossary) from eastern Europe (particularly Poland and Romania) and the former Soviet Union are at present the largest migrant group. Until 1992, east European nationals of German origin were legally entitled to migrate to Germany. Now the rules have changed, and only ethnic Germans resident in the CIS still have the right to resettle in Germany. By the end of 1995, 1 307 000 people had applied to enter the country. Every year, some 200 000 return to live in the *Vaterland*.

Table 4: Return figures for deported groups, 1992-96

Groups	Migration from/to	Number
Germans	Tadjikistan → Germany	13 000
	Kyrgyzstan → Germany	46 000
	Kazakhstan → Germany	480 000
	Uzbekistan → Germany	16 000
	Russian Fed. → Germany	275 000
	Other CIS → Germany	8 000
Crimean Tatars	Uzbekistan → Ukraine (Crimea)	164 000
	Russian Fed. → Ukraine (Crimea)	45 000
	Kazakhstan → Ukraine (Crimea)	12 000
Meskhetians	Uzbekistan → Azerbaijan	46 000
	Uzbekistan → Russian Fed.	25 000

Source: http://www.unhcr.ch/issues/history/cis9602.htm

In the 1990s, war refugees reappeared in Europe. Following the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1990-91, repression, fighting and ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia drove refugees to all parts of Europe; some 4.6 million people left, and nearly 700 000 fled to western Europe (Fassmann and Münz, 1995).

Between 1991 and 1993, it is estimated that 300 000 to 400 000 Albanians fled their country. Some succeeded in entering other countries legally, but most followed illegal routes to Greece or Italy. Similarly, the recent ethnic conflict in Kosovo has driven thousands of people from the country. Most have been admitted temporarily to other European countries.

The European process and globalisation have both had significant effects on migration in Europe. Nationals of European Union member countries are legally entitled to move freely within the EU area, but migration linked with globalisation is strictly regulated. Globalisation has its winners, and people who work for multinationals (executives, technicians, experts) and "brains" of all kinds have no trouble getting into Europe. But it also has its losers, and visa restrictions are used to keep out the victims of poverty, unemployment and its other negative effects. Deprivation in the south and east, and tighter immigration laws in Europe, have combined to drive many people into illegality. The International Labour Organization (ILO) puts the number of illegal immigrants in western Europe at 1.9 million.

One of the most striking effects of migration pattern changes in western Europe after 1973, with refugees and illegal immigrants arriving in large numbers, was that traditional emigration countries, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and even Greece, became immigration countries. Migration to these countries, both legal and illegal, has been increasing steadily since the late 1980s: Italy had 572 000 legal immigrants in 1990, and 1 095 600 in 1996; Spain, an emigration

country in the 1960s and 1970s, had 200 000 legal immigrants in 1980, and 539 000 in 1996; Portugal, too, has been affected, getting 95 000 immigrants in 1987, and 172 900 in 1996. Most of these immigrants come from other European – and particularly EU – countries, but the overall range is a wide one, and includes Africa and Asia (Wihtol de Wenden, 1999).

> **Document 1: Immigration in central and eastern Europe**
>
> During the communist era, emigration from eastern to western Europe was very restricted, mainly taking the form of sudden influxes of refugees. The changes which came after 1989 suggested that large-scale emigration to the west would follow. Arrivals from central and eastern Europe have indeed increased, but the western countries' restrictive immigration policies have helped to stem the rush which had seemed inevitable.
>
> However, proximity to the west has turned some east European countries – particularly Hungary and the Czech Republic – into destination and transit countries. As a rule, these are emigration countries, but this factor has helped to swell their foreign population [see Table 5].
>
> Among new immigration countries, Hungary stands out. It has taken in 80 000 victims of the war in the former Yugoslavia, and it also – thanks to its relatively sound economy – acts as a magnet for economic migrants, particularly from Romania and the former Soviet countries. It is even attracting Asians: between 1989 and 1992, for example, 25 000 Chinese applied for work permits. To the total must be added all those ethnic Hungarians in other countries (Croatia, Serbia, Romania, etc.) who are anxious to "come home" (Falkenstein, 1997).

Table 5: Number of foreigners in selected central and east European countries, 1987-96 (in thousands)

Country	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Bulgaria			24.1	23.4	28.0		31.4	34.4		36.3
Czech Rep.	34.5	34.9	35.2	35.1	37.7	49.6	77.1	103.7	158.6	186.7
Estonia			602.4						533.7	
Latvia			1278.8						1144.5	
Lithuania			750.5						695.3	
Hungary					73.9	88.2		138.1	140.0	138.0
Poland							30.0			
Romania						3.2	2.7	1.9	1.9	1.7
Slovenia								24.8	48.0	43.0

Source: John Salt, 1997: "Current trends in international migration in Europe". Council of Europe report (CD-MG 99)

(See Appendix II for suggested classroom activities and teaching resources on this chapter)

Further reading

Castles, Stephen and Miller, J., Mark, 1998: *The age of migration. International population movements in the modern world*. Second edition. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Falkenstein, Florian, 1997: "*Südosteuropa*" in Opitz, Peter, J. (ed.): *Der Globale Marsch. Flucht und Migration als Weltproblem*. Munich, Beck, 1997.

Gitmez, S. Ali, *Yurtdisina isçi göçü ve geri dönüsler* (Emigation of workers to foreign countries and their return), Alan Yayincilik, Istabul, 1993.

Ohliger, Rainer, 1996: "*Vom Vielvölkerstaat zum Nationalstaat – Migration aus und nach Rumänien im 20 Jahrhundert*", in Fassmann, Heinz and Münz, Rainer (eds.), 1996: *Migration in Europa. Historische Entwicklung, aktuelle Trends und politische Reaktionen*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, pp. 285-302.

Temime, Emile, 1999: *France: Terre d'immigration*. Paris: Gallimard.

Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine, 1999: *L'immigration en Europe*. Paris: La Documentation française.

CHAPTER 2

TYPES OF MIGRATION: WHY DO PEOPLE MIGRATE?

Aims:

– to discover the reasons for migration in Europe;

– to show that people migrate for many different reasons. There may be several reasons, or just one, for a specific movement at a specific time;

– to show that migration is not just the product of an personal decision, free or forced, to leave one's own country, but is sometimes caused or encouraged by social, economic, political, ethnic or other factors.

Introduction

Migration in the 20th century had so many different causes that trying to classify them exhaustively is futile. Most migrants decided, freely or not, to change country for a combination of reasons, with economic, political or ethnic factors preponderant. The typology given below is intended merely as an outline of the commonest causes in the history of migration.[1]

Migration connected with the colonisation and decolonisation of the Third World

We are talking here about movements encouraged by the process of colonisation and decolonisation. We know that most west European countries once had colonies in the Third World. The colonial period was marked not only by the large-scale movement of soldiers, civil servants, businessmen and other people from the colonising to the colonised countries, but by an equally extensive movement in the opposite direction. This migration started in the colonial era, but it continued, and even increased, during decolonisation and afterwards – particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the migrants in this period were "whites" (colonial officials) going home, but the years following independence saw extensive migration of "coloured" people to western Europe, and especially the former colonising countries. Linguistic and historical ties between host and home countries, and econo-

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1. For this section, we have referred extensively to the classification devised by Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, 1995 and 1996.

mic problems in the former colonies, were major factors in bringing millions of people to Europe.

Pakistanis and Indians made for the United Kingdom, North Africans for France, the Surinamese of Aruba for the Netherlands, Angolans and Mozambicans for Portugal, and so on. These arrivals from the former colonies led to major changes in the demographic make-up of host countries, as ethnic minority groups, culturally very different from host communities, were formed. In 1995, 3.2 million people in the United Kingdom – 5.7% of the total population – belonged to such groups. The Indian community, at 850 000 people and 26% of the immigrant population,[1] is the United Kingdom's largest ethnic group. People of Surinamese origin are the largest ethnic minority in the Netherlands: in 1996, they numbered 282 000, from a total foreign population of 2.6 million.[2]

Table 6: Europeans repatriated from colonies, 1945-62

Nationals	Number	Repatriated from
French	75 000	Indochina
	138 000	Tunisia
	172 000	Morocco
	950 000	Algeria
	15 000	Egypt
	10 000	Guinea
Netherlands	300 000	Indonesia
Portuguese*	500 000	Angola
	300 000	Mozambique
British	150 000	India
	150 000	Rhodesia
	30 000	Kenya
Belgian	100 000	Belgian Congo (former Zaire)
Italians	200 000	Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya and Somalia

Source: Chaliand, Gérard, Jan, Michel; Rageau, Jean-Pierre, *Atlas historique des migrations,* 1994 © Seuil
*Most returned to Portugal, some went to Brazil or South Africa.

"Ethnic" migration

So-called "ethnic" migration plays an important part in the history of population movement in 20th-century Europe. Most migration from eastern to western Europe after 1950 falls into this category. "Ethnic" migrants are people who move from

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1. Withmarsh, Alyson; Harris, Tim; Hill, Catherine; and Whyman, Steve, 1998.
2. Everaers, Pieter 1998

their country of birth and residence to a country with the same ethnic population and/or religious beliefs. It is important to note that, in spite of the term, "ethnic" migration is very often motivated by economic and political factors as well.

The migration of ethnic German nationals of various central and eastern European countries to the Federal Republic of Germany, and the emigration of Jews to Israel, are the most striking examples in Europe. Between 1950 and 1993, about some 3 million ethnic Germans left their countries of birth, particularly in eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, etc.) to settle in the *Vaterland*. Most ethnic migration is fostered by agreements between home and host countries, with the latter granting ethnic immigrants certain privileges to facilitate integration, and particularly acquisition of nationality. Ethnic German immigrants, for example, obtain German nationality at once (though some legal restrictions were introduced in 1992).

Similarly, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and in the wake of the political changes that took place in the former Soviet Union, Russian Jews (the ones who were able to do so) took advantage of Israel's open-door policy and emigrated in large numbers. Between 1960 and 1996, some 700 000 people of Jewish descent settled in Israel, increasing the population by 11%. Israel's integration policy allowed them to settle where they wished (Grynberg, 1998) – and Jewish immigrants are given nationality immediately.

The following table gives an outline of ethnic migration in Europe after 1950.

Table 7: Ethnic migration, 1950-92-93

Country of origin	Host country	Number	Period	Ethnic descent/religion
GDR	FRG	5 275 000	1950-92	German descent (*Übersiedler*)
Poland	FRG	1 430 000	1950-92	German descent (*Aussiedler*)
USSR/CIS	FRG	746 000	1950-92	German descent (*Aussiedler*)
Romania	FRG	402 000	1950-92	German descent (*Aussiedler*)
Former Czechoslovakia	FRG	105 000	1950-92	German descent (*Aussiedler*)
Former Yugoslavia	FRG	90 000	1950-92	German descent (*Aussiedler*)
Bulgaria	Turkey	630 000	1950-92	Turkish descent and Slav Muslims
Former Yugoslavia	Turkey	300 000	1950-92	Turkish descent and Slav Muslims
USSR/CIS	Israel, United States	750 000	1950-92	Jews
USSR/CIS	Greece, France, United States	170 000	1950-92	Armenians, Greek descent, Pentecostalists

(continued)

Romania	Israel, United States	500 000	1950-92	Jews
Western Romania	Europe, (mainly FRG)	240 000	1991-93	Mainly Gypsies
Former Yugoslavia	Hungary	124 000	1988-93	Mainly persons of Hungarian descent
Total		**10 762 000**		

Source: Fassmann, Heinz and Münz, Rainer, "La migration d'Est en Ouest en Europe" (1918-1993), 1995, Volume 11, No. 3, p. 51. Courtesy of the *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*.

Economic migration

Beginning in the mid-1950s, there was a new surge of migration in Europe, mainly for economic reasons – reasons applying both to migrants and to the countries which took them (the former got a chance to improve their living standards, the latter got the workforce they needed to sustain economic growth while keeping demands for higher wages in check).

Labour needs on one side were thus matched by a ready supply of unemployed workers on the other. Looking for workers to help them rebuild their war-damaged economies, the industrial countries of western Europe signed various agreements, legalising immigration from labour-exporting countries such as Turkey, which concluded agreements with Germany (1961), Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and France (1965), and Sweden (1967), enabling thousands of Turks to work in those countries and enjoy better living conditions. In the same way, Switzerland concluded agreements with Italy, attracting Italian workers in large numbers. The industrialised European countries first found the workers they needed in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, and later in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia.

A Turkish worker talks about his economic reasons for moving to Germany in the 1960s:

> I did an apprenticeship. I worked in an army factory for a time. The living conditions were very hard. We didn't even have a house to live in. It couldn't go on like that. To help us get through, I had to leave. I said to myself "I'll work at least till I can build a house". (Gitmez, 1983: 115)

Not all economic migration was covered by agreements, however. Economic development in western Europe also absorbed most of the people who decided to leave their own countries, without being sure of jobs or permits, and find work when they arrived. The majority were able to legalise their situation later, while others worked illegally, but kept up their hopes of getting work permits.

V. A. is one of those who went to Germany as a "worker-tourist" (the Turkish term) at the age of 17, hoping to get a work permit.

Here, I was working as a carpenter's apprentice … I wasn't getting enough money. I said to myself "What shall I do?" I was dependent on my father. He got into debt so I could go. I went to Germany as a tourist. I was 17. It wasn't easy leaving. I only wanted to support myself, to work for myself. We thought there was a lot of money in Germany. It was my father who wanted me to emigrate … I always worked illegally … If I hadn't been there illegally, I'd have stayed another 20 years. (Gitmez, 1983: 117)

Some countries still recruit foreign workers on "economic migrant" terms. This applies to "seasonal workers", who get limited work permits. Switzerland has been phasing this system out since 1990, since seasonal workers are unable to integrate in Swiss society. For one thing, they are not allowed to bring in their families, and this causes resentment in home countries. In Germany, on the other hand, the number of seasonal workers has increased considerably since 1994. Most of them come from eastern Europe.

Table 8: Number of seasonal workers in selected countries, 1986-97 (in thousands)

Country	1986	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Germany				212.4	181	155.2	192.8	220.9	226.0
Austria		38.0	17.6	20.4	15.8				
France	81.7	58.2	54.2	13.5	11.3	10.3	9.4	8.8	8.2
Italy				1.7	2.8	5.8		8.9	
Norway		4.3	4.3	4.7	4.6	4.5	5	5.4	6.1
Netherlands				1.0	0.9	0.5			
United Kingdom				3.6	4.2	4.4	4.7	5.5	9.3
Switzerland	142.8	153.6	147.5	126.1	93.5	83.9	72.3	62.7	46.7

Source: *Trends in International Migration,* Sopemi 1999, © OECD

Economic migration, encouraged by host and home countries alike, peaked in the years before the "oil crisis" of 1973-74, which led many industrialised countries to impose immigration controls. This put an end to official recruitment, but not a total stop to immigration, which still exists in various forms – especially "forced migration", which has major human consequences.

Forced migration

Twentieth-century Europe also saw people on the move for other reasons – particularly the persecution and violence which drove countless thousands from their home countries. These people are refugees, and the term "forced migration" can be applied to them.

Forced migration obviously has many causes. The first is religious, racial and ethnic conflict. When this leads to (civil) war, refugees are often the result. The

second is social tension, usually accompanied by political crisis, with opposition groups rising in protest against the ruling regime, which is often authoritarian and violent. Repression of these groups by their own countries' rulers has always been, and still is, one of the principal causes of "forced migration".

In the first half of the 20th century, most refugees in Europe came from other European countries. In the 1930s, nazi persecution and violence drove many Jews into exile. The second world war, too, made countless refugees, affecting almost all the countries of Europe. From the 1950s, communist oppression in eastern Europe sent a flood of refugees to the west. Some 194 000 Hungarians were forced to leave their country in 1956-57, and the Prague Spring of 1968 produced the same result, with some 160 000 Czechoslovaks fleeing to western Europe.[1]

In the 1950s, most refugees were from the eastern bloc countries. In the 1980s – apart from the Poles who fled political repression in 1980-81 – they came mainly from Turkey, with Africa and Asia next in line. Repression of political opponents and certain ethnic minorities was again a major factor, and ethnic conflicts in various African and Asian countries also made refugees head for western Europe. The number of applications for asylum received by certain European countries gives an idea of the scale of forced migration (see Table 4).

Table 9: Applications for asylum received in Europe, 1987-94

Host country	1987	1990	1997*
Austria	11 400	22 800	6 700
Belgium	6 000	13 000	11 600
Denmark	2 800	5 300	5 100
Finland	100	2 700	1 000
France	24 800	53 100	21 400
Germany	57 400	193 100	104 400
Greece	7 000	6 200	4 200
Italy	11 100	3 200	1 400
Netherlands	13 500	21 200	34 400
Norway	8 600	4 000	2 300
Portugal	500	100	400
Spain	2 500	8 600	3 700
Sweden	18 100	29 400	9 700
Switzerland	10 900	35 800	23 900
United Kingdom	5 900	38 200	41 500
Total	**180 600**	**436 700**	**271 700**

Source: UNHCR
*Sopemi 1998, IGC, ©OECD

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1. Fassmann, Heinz and Münz, Rainer, 1995.

Migration resulting from globalisation: modern nomadism

Mobility, which used to be restricted in countless ways, has now increased considerably. Globalisation of the goods and capital markets is one of the main reasons for this. The effect on migration is twofold: there are now more types of migrant, and more countries are involved. "Proliferating economic, media and cultural networks have fuelled a longing for Europe and stirred a new wanderlust among people who used to stay in one place, in areas with little migration" (Wihtol de Wenden, 1999: 11).

People today are increasingly mobile: some 130 million leave their own countries each year. The world is becoming a "nomad planet". The progress of information, communication and transport technology has certainly contributed to this trend. Changing countries is now commonplace: "Companies go where labour is cheapest; workers north and south go where the jobs are; portability – from personal stereos to mobile phones – makes it easier for consumers to move around … All of this is part of a vast trend towards planetary nomadism".[1]

Company movement, encouraged by globalisation, has also brought a new form of migration which might be called "manager migration". Thousands of highly qualified men and women – top managers, senior executives, company directors, specialists, and so on – migrate against the background of the new mobility created by the spread of investment and multinationals to the four corners of the planet. These are migrants of a special kind, and their numbers are increasing all the time.

> These high-status foreigners are not seen as "immigrants", a term which implies a certain social inferiority. They are "international", which is something quite different. Among the upper classes, being foreign, coming from another country, speaking foreign languages, having friends of all nationalities, are not things to be ashamed of, but assets to be cultivated and exploited. These expatriate managers are the winners in the globalisation game. (Wagner, Anne Catherine, 1998: 22)

Of course, these people are not the only ones who owe their mobility to globalisation. The whole labour force is going the same way, as J. Attali points out. This type of migration, motivated by the need to find work, is certainly nothing new. Indeed, it is the same sort of economic migration we considered above. What is new is that globalisation in the spheres of culture and communication draws on and disseminates western cultural models, encouraging people from developing and under-developed countries to migrate. The lure of western lifestyles, and not just economic need, may well lie behind some people's decision to migrate. It must be emphasised, however, that the restrictive immigration policies applied by the industrialised and western countries, make it harder for migrants in this category to migrate successfully, that is, to migrate legally, and even with the host country's blessing.

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1. Jacques Attali, http://www.attali.com/art17.htm.

Mobility within Europe is strongly favoured by two major factors. The first is cheaper travel, which means that more people can afford to travel more often. The second is the European process, encouraging mobility within the European Union, where freedom of movement between member states allows thousands of people every year to move legally to other countries and settle there. When young people taking part in EU cultural and university exchange schemes are added, the extent of mobility within the EU can easily be gauged.

This section cannot end without saying something about a new sort of nomadism, which is now developing worldwide, and which J. Attali has called "imaginary nomadism". Advanced communications technology, especially the Internet, makes unlimited imaginary travel a possibility. Virtual travel on the Internet allows people to meet, exchange visits and communicate over vast distances, without moving physically. This type of *virtual movement* makes people more mobile than they are in everyday life; virtual exchange is far faster than its real-life equivalent. Advanced technology is creating a new breed of nomads – nomads who migrate virtually.

(See Appendix II for suggested classroom activities and teaching resources on this chapter)

Further reading

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CHAPTER 3

EUROPE AND ITS IMMIGRANTS

Aims:

– to present various aspects of integration policy;

– to set out and compare the main features of various integration strategies;

– to tackle the question of racism and discrimination against immigrants and, in so doing, increase pupils' respect for other cultures. To encourage them to reject stereotypes and racial prejudices, particularly those affecting immigrants.

Introduction

Although most western countries with large migrant communities (Germany, France and Switzerland, to take just a few) do not officially regard themselves as "immigration countries", Europe has become, *de facto,* an immigration continent (see Table 1). This is clear, not just in population figures, but also in changes in the pattern of migration. The large number of immigrants in certain towns, neighbourhoods and schools[1] reflects the fact that immigration is no longer "temporary" (the assumption till 1973), but "sedentary" – in other words, that immigrants are permanent, not fixed-term, residents. The urge to go home is still there, especially among first-generation migrants, but going home "for good" has become a myth – immigrants are here, and here they are going to stay. Family reunion and children born in the host country are two important factors in permanent residence.

This is the basic situation, and it raises a number of social problems which affect immigrants directly. The first is integration in the host community, and here we have to answer two questions: do we want an exclusive or inclusive society? What rights must immigrants be given, if they are to integrate successfully? The second is the racism and discrimination which immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees face in Europe. Unlike the first two chapters, which dealt with population flows, this one will be looking at the social problems that appear when immigrants settle in host communities.

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1. Amsterdam, for example, had a 45% immigrant population in 1995.

Table 10: Number of foreigners in selected countries (in thousands) and as percentage of total population, 1980-95

Country	1980		1995		1997	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Austria	282.7	3.7	723.0	9.0	732.0	9.1
Belgium	…	…	909.7	9.0	903.1	8.9
Denmark	101.6	2.0	197.0	3.8	237.7	4.5
Finland	12.8	0.3	62.0	1.3	81.0	1.6
France	…	…	…	…	…	…
Germany	4453.3	7.2	7173.9	8.8	…	…
Greece	213.0	2.2	153.0	1.5	…	…
Ireland	…	…	96.1	2.7	114.4	3.1
Italy	298.7	0.5	991.4	1.7	1240.7	2.2
Luxembourg	94.3	25.8	132.5	32.6	142.8	34.1
Netherlands	520.9	3.7	728.4	5.0	…	4.5
Norway	82.6	2.0	460.8	3.7	…	3.6
Portugal	49.3	0.5	157.0	1.6	172.9	1.7
Spain	182.0	0.5	499.8	1.2	609.8	1.5
Sweden	421.7	5.1	531.8	6.0	522.0	5.9
Switzerland	892.8	14.1	1363.6	19.3	1372.7	19.4
United Kingdom	…	…	2084.0	3.6	2066.0	3.5

Source: Salt, John, 1999: "Current trends in international migration in Europe", Council of Europe report (CD-MG (99)29)

Integrating immigrants: a major challenge for host communities

Definitions: assimilation and/or integration?

When it comes to immigration, terms are never fixed and final; their meanings are relative and are changing all the time. Up to the 1970s, "assimilation" was the term used to denote the absorption of immigrants into host communities. Since the mid-1970s (that is since immigrants have stopped being regarded as "temporary" residents), "integration" has been preferred. One of the reasons for the change is the culturally pejorative connotations of the word assimilation.[1]

Assimilation: the emphasis here is on sameness. In fact, the word suggests that, to become full members of the host community, immigrants and their descendants

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1. For a detailed discussion of these terms, see Schnapper, 1991, and Tribalat, 1995.

must adopt its cultural standards. This also implies that immigrants must abandon their own culture (language, traditions, etc.), to adapt to the host community. Take linguistic assimilation. The assumption here is that immigrants should stop using their own language in order to become more proficient in the language of the host country or region. According to this theory, hanging onto one's own language may make it harder – especially for immigrants' children – to learn the host language (see chapter 4).

Integration: unlike assimilation, integration emphasises respect for difference. It suggests a process of adjusting to, and joining, the host community without losing one's own culture or identity. Taking language again, it does not make dropping one's own language a condition of learning the new one: on the contrary, keeping up one's own language is respected, and even desirable, especially with family and friends. Most immigration countries today speak of integrating immigrants rather than assimilating them.

Integration policies and models

Integration is one of the most important aims of public policy in host countries. However, integration policy – that is, a series of measures and legal provisions directly or indirectly intended to make things better for immigrants in various areas of life – varies from country to country. The differences are obviously conditioned by a number of factors; a country's past, a nation state's configuration, political systems and cultures, institutional traditions, and so forth – all of these can play a major role.[1]

Hammar divides integration policy into two types – direct and indirect. The first covers measures specifically designed to improve the position of immigrants; the second relies on measures which apply to everyone, but also have positive effects for immigrants (Hammar, 1985: 9).

Generally speaking, European integration policies follow one of three models: the assimilationist model, the model of differential or the multicultural model.[2]

The assimilationist model

This is often known, also, as the republican or universalist model. France is regarded as offering the best example – which is why most French sociologists call this model the French integration model.

It is assimilationist, because it assumes that a common foundation is needed for social and national cohesion; it is also universalist, because it puts the emphasis, at least in theory, on individual rights and equality, which are regarded as the source

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1. For a comparative analysis of integration policies in different countries, see Mahnig, 1998, and Vermeulen, 1997.
2. Based on the typology proposed by Castles and Miller, 1993.

of shared values which transcend all differences. In this model, as Brubaker puts it (1992), political incorporation and cultural assimilation are combined.

Its characteristics are the following:

– the nation is regarded as a territorial and political community. It is not determined by cultural or ethnic criteria. It is contract-based, and assimilating republican values suffices for the conclusion of a nationality contract with the host country's government (see naturalisation below);

– the institutions of the community or state, such as schools and the army, fulfil an assimilating function;

– naturalisation (acquisition of the country's nationality) is seen as a means to integration and accordingly encouraged. The formal criteria and conditions for acquiring nationality are relatively non-restrictive;

– regardless of their culture or ethnic origin, people join the nation as individual citizens, and not as members of an ethnic or cultural community;

– a shared, universal culture is the hallmark of the public sphere, and the latter is therefore closed to ethnic and cultural diversity. The specific cultures and identities of individuals or groups are, however, tolerated in private life.

The model of differential

This model emphasises that the host culture cannot assimilate immigrant cultures. The absorption of other cultural and ethnic groups into one nation is not desired, since this would run counter to the conception of the nation as something defined by ethnic and cultural criteria.

Indeed, the countries which are generally regarded as embodying this model (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) refuse to be considered immigration countries. This makes it very hard for them to accept the presence of immigrants as permanent.

This model may be described as follows:

– it is based on an ethnic and cultural conception of the nation;

– it is based exclusively on blood. Naturalisation is traditionally very restrictive, and nothing is done to facilitate or encourage it;

– integration is considered, above all, a social and economic matter. The main instrument of integration is the labour market, which is supposed to create conditions favourable to social integration;

– it is based on cultural particularism, and sees the community as an organic entity, defined by a specific culture and language. The preservation of immigrants' languages and cultures is considered only with a view to their reintegrating, if they go home. No effort is made to promote and build on their cultural diversity.

The multicultural model

The multicultural approach to integration first appeared in a programme launched by the Canadian Government in 1971. The concept won favour in Europe in the 1980s, and is now widely applied, since its key element is respect for the rich diversity which immigration, in particular, brings with it.

However, the word "multiculturalism" can mean several things. It can be purely descriptive, meaning that a particular community is culturally very diverse. Seen in those terms, Europe today has no culturally homogeneous societies; on the contrary, cultural diversity and multiple identity are the typical features of modern societies. But the term can also denote a specific approach to managing these multiple cultures and identities within a given society. It denotes, in other words, a public policy based on recognising immigrant cultures in the public sphere, and particularly schools, and ensuring that individuals are taught in their own language. In Europe, Sweden applies this model.

This model has three main characteristics:

– it aims at inclusion. It recognises the principle of place of birth, and it also encourages naturalisation of immigrants by making conditions and formalities relatively straightforward;

– it uses special measures, also known as "positive discrimination" (see glossary) to promote the socio-economic integration and emancipation of ethnic and cultural minorities;

– it actively promotes immigrant languages and cultures. Children are taught (in) their native language at school.

Where the three models coincide and differ

In theory, at least, cultural homogeneity is the principle behind both the assimilationist and the differential model. In the first, homogeneity results from assimilation of republican, universal values. In the second, the view that cultural diversity cannot be assimilated leads to homogenisation of a community which wants to be culturally separate.

Unlike the model of differential, the assimilationist and multicultural models apply relatively liberal naturalisation policies.[1] Furthermore, although the assimilationist/universalist model naturally relies on universalist measures to combat social and economic inequalities between individuals, it sometimes (as it has done in France) uses specific, non-universal measures as well – that is, measures targeting particular groups.

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1. In practice, the principles traditionally governing naturalisation are to some extent being challenged. The French Nationality Code has been amended several times to restrict application of the principle that birth in France confers nationality (*jus soli*), while Germany has moved a long way from its original position that descent confers nationality (*jus sanguinis*), by inserting in its nationality code an article providing that immigrants' children born in Germany are entitled to German nationality.

Culture is the area where the models differ most. Here, the multicultural model stands out from the others by actively seeking to promote cultural and linguistic diversity.

Like all models, these three are neither exclusive nor absolute. They enable us to differentiate trends in theory, but diversity of policies and approaches is the norm in practice.

The various aspects of an integration policy

Although the term "integration" is defined in several ways and no consensus exists on its usage, all integration policies, whatever form they take, cover more or less the same aspects. Three aspects seem particularly important.

First, social integration: this covers measures to make things better for immigrants in terms of housing, schooling, etc., and to promote social rights in such fields as unemployment and old-age insurance. While these benefits are more or less guaranteed in all host countries, specific measures in the various social fields differ from country to country, and even from town to town in the same country.

Education plays a major part in efforts to eliminate social inequality. For this reason, it is considered an effective – perhaps the most effective – instrument for integrating immigrants, and especially their children (see chapter 4, effects on school life).

Second, economic integration: this means integration within the labour market. Unemployment rates, distribution of activities in the various economic sectors, mobility, and so forth, are important indicators in evaluating economic integration (see chapter 4, economic impact).

Third, political integration: this means immigrant participation in political decision-making. Different countries regulate this differently. In Europe, there seem to be two general approaches to managing the political integration of immigrants, although these are not mutually exclusive: some countries (the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have decided to give immigrants the right to vote and stand for election, at least at local level; others (France, Germany and Belgium) are against giving them these rights, but have set up advisory councils on immigrant participation (Lapeyronnie, 1992).

However, political integration is not just a matter of being allowed to vote. Access to nationality via naturalisation is another vital aspect. Unlike the right to vote, which is often limited to local elections and does not necessarily include the right to stand for election, naturalisation seems to hold the only key to full political integration of non-nationals, giving them all the rights conferred by formal citizenship, determining the legal bond between the state and the individual on the basis of rights and obligations.

Since integration became a priority for host countries, access to nationality, that is, acquisition of formal citizenship through naturalisation, has been a major

component of integration policies. Given the nature of this question and the debate it generates in almost every country, we shall look at it in slightly greater detail in the following sections.

Naturalisation in Europe[1]

Since the early 1990s, Europe has witnessed two opposing trends, which partly cancel each other out. In western Europe, the process of economic, social and political unification was strengthened by the Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) treaties. Lifting national restrictions has also had effects on the principle of citizenship and on the right of European Union citizens to live and work where they like. Indeed, some people see Europe's political modernisation as a series of stages in improving the civic, political and social rights of all EU residents (Meehan, 1993).

The opponents of European unity disagree, however. They stress the still extant nations' legitimacy, and also the national dimension, which they see as primarily ethnic, and vested in a certain group, itself exclusively entitled to sovereignty. As they see it, the right of peoples to self-determination remains the paramount principle in Europe. The new states which emerged when the communist regimes in eastern Europe collapsed, and the nationalist regions, are both trying to create an alternative to the nation-state, on the basis of their own identities (Lübbe, 1994).

Two ways of building national identity

However, emotional ties and a sense of belonging must not be linked solely with a narrow conception of national identity. On the contrary, the various types of identity – regional, national and even European – are proof that the concept of belonging to a state or community can take many forms. Generally speaking, there are two ways of belonging to a nation, both very important in connection with naturalisation: one sees national identity as *demos,* the other as *ethnos* (see glossary) (Francis, 1965).

In the *demos* model, the nation is, above all, a territorial and political community. This is a political conception of the nation, and it allows individuals to decide for themselves to join a given political community. Ethnic and cultural criteria do not affect the principle of belonging. However, this concept of belonging does require some identification with democratic principles, the idea of one justice for all and respect for human rights.

The *ethnos* model is essentially a conception of the nation based on ethnic and cultural criteria. It does not see the nation as a congeries of individuals, but as a shared value taking precedence over individuals. These two conceptions of the nation obviously affect states' approaches to the political integration of immigrants.

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1. This section was prepared by Gianni D'Amato (Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies).

Naturalisation as a means of integration

Naturalisation would seem the best way of integrating immigrants, since possessing civic rights is the only thing which can give a foreigner the same rights, and also the same duties and responsibilities, as nationals.

There are only two ways of giving immigrants the host country's nationality. The first is that current in the traditional immigration countries, which give nationality to all persons born on their territory; this principle (*jus soli*) also applies in France, although France is less of a traditional immigration country.

Countries which have recently become immigration countries, and do not regard themselves as such, do not give nationality to immigrants' children born on their territory. They make *jus sanguinis* the only basis for having it.

Nationality can also be acquired through naturalisation, which may be regulated more or less restrictively. Switzerland and Austria have restrictive policies on naturalisation: the state has the right to decide whether granting it is in its own best interest. The procedure in these countries is long and complex, and naturalisation is not encouraged. On the contrary, prohibitive charges are levied to discourage it. Sweden and France apply a different principle, and applicants who satisfy the requirements are naturalised without difficulty.

Germany used to have very restrictive laws on naturalisation, but has recently recognised it as a right and, on 1 January 2000, introduced the *jus soli* principle for the German-born children of immigrants. This shows that a traditional *ethnos* nation can change its laws in response to internal social change, and it highlights the need to adapt to European standards.

Germany actually has two types of naturalisation. The first is based on the "right to naturalisation", and the second grants nationality on the basis of an assessment procedure, in which the authorities review the application and decide if the formal conditions are satisfied. The main requirements are that applicants must have had residence permits for at least eight years, have a reasonable knowledge of German (be capable of carrying on a conversation), not be reliant on social welfare, not be unemployed, recognise the liberal and democratic order set out in the German Constitution, and be prepared to give up their previous nationality (for more details, see "Die Ausländerbeauftragte der Bundesregierung" (2000)). It should be noted here that the German Parliament has not been able to secure national consensus on the recognition of dual nationality, within the meaning of the European Convention on Nationality, 6 November 1997 (European Treaty Series No. 166) – although most European countries accept this.

Germany's refusal to recognise dual nationality is out of keeping with modern lifestyles, which are typified by mobility and transnational citizenship (see glossary), since multiple identities are formed by mobility and acquisition of nationality when couples with different nationalities produce children (Kleger, 1997).

Table 11: Naturalisation in selected western European countries, 1997

Country	Number of persons naturalised
Germany*	37 534
Austria	16 274
Belgium**	24 581
Denmark	5 482
Spain	10 309
Finland	1 439
France	83 676
Hungary	8 658
Italy	9 237
Luxembourg	749
Norway	12 037
Netherlands	59 830
Sweden	28 867
Switzerland	19 170

Source: Sopemi, *Trends in international migration,* 1999, ©OECD
*excluding naturalisation of persons of German descent
**figures for 1996

In the eastern European countries, migration is numerically less important. As a result, the question of nationality mainly arises in connection with unsolved problems concerning minorities. The desire to achieve self-determination by setting up homogeneous national territories is one potential source of conflict (Münz and Ohliger, 2000). Some states see assimilation as the only answer – but this is simply forced naturalisation, consigning non-national cultures, old and new, to oblivion. Trends are diversifying, however. The Slovak Republic's approach, for example, is inclusive, giving ethnic Hungarians the right to naturalisation – but the Czech Republic's policy in the last few years has been exclusive, particularly concerning equality for the Roma/Gypsies.

Finally, I think it important to emphasise that opinions on naturalisation in western Europe are tending to rally behind acceptance of the *jus soli* principle, and simpler naturalisation procedures, especially for second-generation immigrants born in the host country. This trend is accompanied by more widespread acceptance of the principle of dual nationality. Most host countries consider that giving immigrants nationality is an important part of integrating them successfully within modern societies. This is why, for some years, "Europeanising citizenship" has come to seem a necessary prelude to giving "European citizenship" its full meaning.

Racism and discrimination

The idea of race and racism

The idea that some races are superior to others was first voiced in the 16th century, and specifically when the colonies were being established, but it was not until the 19th century that the first attempts were made to prove it "scientifically". The theory assumed the existence of a hierarchy of superior and inferior races – and its proponents claimed that "racial superiority" gave the first the right to dominate the second (d'Appollonia, 1998; Wieviorka, 1991). Racism's best-known founding father was Arthur de Gobineau, whose ideas were swallowed gleefully by the nazi theorists in Germany. In his famous *Essay on the inequality of human races,* Gobineau considered mixing of the races – and concluded that it would spell ruin for humanity. Today, these racist theories are mere ideological twaddle, with no scientific foundation. For modern science, indeed, the concept of race is meaningless (Wievorka, 1991).

> A race would be a genetically homogenous group of individuals (genes are the only biological element we pass on to our children). But, when we try to find these famous races, we can see no trace of them: that is a scientific fact. If we took the 5.5 billion people on this planet and tried to divide them into races, we simply could not do it This is not to say that we are all the same. Obviously, someone from Senegal does not look like someone from the Jura, Brittany or Tahiti. We are all different. But the differences are not where we think they are. They are within groups, not between them. Of course, I am not like a Senegalese! You only have to look at me: my skin is white, his is black. But I am not like another native of the Jura either. We may have the same skin colour, but we do not necessarily have the same blood group, the same immune system, etc. Defining races is a totally arbitrary business. As far as geneticists are concerned, the concept of race does not exist.

> …The one sure thing is that the people we regard as "different" are hardly more different than the people we regard as part of our group. True, differences exist. True, racism exists. But fighting racism is precisely a question of recognising those differences and seeing them for what they truly are – a huge asset.[1]

Racism and immigrants

Race may be a meaningless concept for scientists, but there is general anxiety in Europe at the increase in racism and discrimination. In fact, a certain view of difference is the main source of what some authors call the "new racism" (Balibar and Wallenstein, 1989; Taguieff, 1988). It is the negative traits ascribed to others, who are considered different, which fuel racism. These negative traits are linked to physical (such as skin colour) and/or cultural (religion, customs, etc.) criteria, usually founded on prejudice, and are used to justify rejection and fear of others.

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1. Albert Jacquard. From Déclaration de Berne (Service Ecole Tiers-Monde), 1993: Regards pluriels (38 educational activities on prejudice, discrimination, racism and exclusion), Lausanne.

This new type of racism, based on a view of difference which turns "others", "foreigners" into a threat, can be displayed by anyone, regardless of religion, culture, or even skin colour – and seriously imperils peaceful coexistence of immigrants and natives in western societies.

Apart from the violent, racist attacks on hostels for asylum seekers, which have become common in nearly all west European countries, two incidents stand out as particularly tragic examples of the racism faced by immigrants in Europe.

The first took place in Germany. On 29 May 1993, in Solingen (a town with 170000 inhabitants, 7000 of them Turkish) a house occupied by Turkish immigrants was fired by skinheads. Five Turkish nationals died in the flames.

The second, more recent incident occurred in El Ejido (Spain). From 5 to 7 February 2000, following the killing of a Spaniard by a young North African, a wave of racist violence swept through the town, with immigrants as target.

> …for 72 hours, hordes of farmers, armed with iron bars and joined by school-age adolescents, chased their victims through the streets, beating them and hunting them down in the greenhouses. Barricades were thrown across the roads and set on fire. All contact with the outside world was severed, and North African shops in El Ejido were laid waste, North African homes wrecked and torched, the mosque ransacked and the sacred texts profaned. Some people fled for their lives along the mountainside. Others hid out in the greenhouses, or tried to stop the tide of destruction reaching their homes ….[1]

Attacks on immigrants are obviously fuelled by racist talk ("They've taken our jobs", "They're all criminals", "They cost more than they bring in", "They're bleeding our social security dry", etc.), but social conditions in some of the poorer, run-down neighbourhoods, where most of the inhabitants are immigrants, also give racists – particularly far-right and xenophobic parties – an excuse to sound off about "threats" and "dangers", using these as a pretext for hatred and rejection of immigrants.

In a report published in June 1999, Almeria Acoje (an association providing help for immigrant workers) had already suggested that the social situation in El Ejido was potentially explosive:

> Only 33% of the 260 dwellings in which 1 150 people live can be considered up to standard; 42% are just farm outbuildings, 15% are houses which are half-destroyed and uninhabitable, and 10% are ruined *cortijos* [farmhouses]. Most have no running water; 60% are scattered in outlying areas, well away from the town-centre, where most people live. … This means that immigrants have few, if any, chances of becoming part of the community in Almeria … Many locals regard immigrants as outsiders 'because they live in houses we wouldn't want'. There is still time to head off the conflicts that immigration has sparked in other countries. But we are doing nothing.[2]

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1. Victor Angel Lluch, *"Ratonades à El Ejido. En Espagne, un apartheid sous plastique"* (Attacks on immigrants in El Ejido. Plastic-wrapped apartheid in Spain). *Le Monde diplomatique,* March 2000: 6.
2. Ibid.

The racism and discrimination from which immigrants suffer do not come solely from groups with explicitly racist ideologies, such as parties on the far right. They also occur in public life, where some people may face discrimination, because of their colour or their ethnic or cultural background, in their dealings with police, courts, schools, the army and other public institutions. Sir William MacPherson's 1999 report on police investigations into the death of Stephen Lawrence, a young Briton of Jamaican origin who was murdered in London in 1993, makes it clear that racism exists among the British police, whose handling of the case was negligent in the extreme.

Racism and discrimination are woven into the daily lives of immigrants and ethnic or other minorities. The list of examples is endless. The following two stories are typical.

A young girl talks about the kind of racism she encounters all the time.

> Just now, at the supermarket checkout, I heard two women talking. They were talking about immigrants. They were saying they were sick of all these foreigners, that they grab other people's jobs, that they're dirty – all the old stuff people keep saying about us. These people all talk without thinking: they talk about individual cases, but they never see what the real problem of immigration is. They take one "bad" immigrant and end up saying they're all bad. Not all Moroccan fathers are like mine: I know some who really care about their families, who don't despise their wives, and who talk to their children.

> Why do most people go for the racist leaders, the politicians without any sense of humanity? Why do they let themselves be duped by those bastards who take advantage of economic problems to get themselves elected at the immigrants' expense? If the immigrants and all the others had jobs, there'd be no problem. Without the crisis, those politicians wouldn't be able to keep blaming us. It makes me sick to see "Arabs go home" or "Fuck Arabs" on walls in town. No good ever comes of insults and viciousness. I'm afraid of the violence that this sort of attitude could lead to.[1]

A young man explains how changing his first name landed him a job as a marketing manager – a position he would probably never have secured under his old name, Abdelatif.

> It's a shame, but all I had to do was change my first name – and suddenly I started getting interviews. I don't look too much like an Arab, and my surname doesn't sound particularly Arab, so the interviews are going pretty well. But afterwards, when I get home, I'm ashamed – I feel I've denied my real identity, just for the sake of fitting in and getting on.[2]

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1. Extracts from *Le Journal de Jamila,* edited by Franck Andriat, Le Cri, Brussels, 1986, in Libouton, Chantal, 1993: *Immigration et intégration*. Marcienelle-Belgium: Dossier Presse Actualquarto No. 87: 32.
2. From Nasser Negrouche, "Changer de prénom pour trouver un emploi. Discrimination raciale à la française", *Le Monde diplomatique,* March 2000: 7.

The fight against racism

Many European countries are worried about racial discrimination. It not only tells against the integration process and peace in the community – it also undermines the principle of human equality. This makes it a major threat to democracy in host countries. This is why various European countries have passed laws to ban racial discrimination, protect immigrants and make racist acts criminal offences.

However, laws alone are not enough. They are effective, of course, but other measures – individual and collective – are needed as well. Individually, people must see what the dangers are, and avoid prejudices, stereotypes and discriminatory talk. Collectively, schools have a major role to play in combating racial discrimination. If they accept racial, cultural and ethnic diversity, and manage it without discrimination, then that is the best collective guarantee of success in the fight against racism.

(See Appendix II for suggested classroom activities and teaching resources on this chapter)

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CHAPTER 4

MIGRATION AND HOST COUNTRIES: THE BENEFITS

Demographic impact[1]

Aims:

- to form a picture of the main population flows in Europe, by asking: which regions do European foreigners come from?; what are the features of population flows?; what are the features of immigrants?
- to see how migration affects the size and structure of a country's population through quantitative impact and the effects on age structure;
- to pinpoint the specific demographic behaviour patterns of foreigners in host communities, such as the fertility of foreign women.

Typical migration flows in Europe – background

According to the estimates, the world figure for people leaving their home countries was 4 million every year from 1945 to 1970; from 1970 to 1990, it was 6 million. The total number of migrants rose from 65 million in 1965 to 125 million in 2000 – in other words, 1 person in 50 lives outside the country where she or he was born. At the same time, immigration and emigration rates (see glossary) vary enormously from country to country.

Total migration balances within the European Union countries are estimated at 11 million people for the period 1960-94 (Eurostat, 1996). This figure refers to *net migration,* that is, the difference between immigration and emigration (see glossary). The main population flows at present are from the Maghreb countries, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia.

People migrate for various reasons – economic, political, family-related. Migration itself may be temporary or permanent. This is why there is no one pattern of migration, but a multiplicity of individual situations. Similarly, there is no world system of population flows, but flows which last a certain time, for example:

- European migration to America marked the early 20th century;

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1. The section "Demographic impact" was written by Phillipe Wanner (Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies).

– east-west migration occurred in the 1920s, spurred by increased economic activity, particularly mining (northern France, Germany);

– in the 1930s, the world economic crisis led to the return of many migrants;

– at the end of the second world war, rebuilding and economic recovery led to short-range migration from southern to western Europe;

– more recently, population flows have diversified, and Asia and Africa are increasingly involved;

– migration for political reasons has been a century-long constant (Spaniards to France during the civil war, *pieds noirs* to France during the Algerian war, refugees from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, etc.).

Not all European countries attracted immigrants to the same extent: from the end of the second world war into the 1980s, they could be divided into *labour-exporting countries* (Italy, Spain, Portugal), which often had negative migration balances, and *labour-importing countries,* which were rebuilding or doing well economically, and had positive migration balances. In the mid-1990s, all the European Union countries – except Ireland – had positive migration balances, with Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in the lead.

Diversity of current population flows

Various factors help to explain the structure of current population flows in Europe. They include:

– labour market requirements (arrival of relatively skilled labour); increasingly, European countries are attracting, and indeed looking for, highly-skilled workers from outside;

– historical and political links between home and host countries; these account for movements between former colonies and European countries (Algerians in France, Dutch nationals from Surinam in the Netherlands, Indians and West Indians in the United Kingdom);

– political crisis in home countries (refugees): this partly accounts for migration from eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall and during the war in the former Yugoslavia;

– immigration policies in host countries (it is worth noting that 64% of European countries say that their policies are designed to reduce immigration). Specifically, since the end of the second world war, many countries have concluded bilateral agreements to control population flows;

– geographical proximity (such as Irish migration to the United Kingdom);

– migration networks, both official (run by migration offices) or family-based (such as following other young people from the same region, joining relatives in Europe).

Document 2: Case study 1– Polish migration to France

In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles restored Poland's independence and its old frontiers. But the economic situation encouraged or forced many Poles to leave the country. At the same time, in France, population loss was stalling the economy, and the demand for labour rose sharply. On 3 September 1919, the Polish Emigration Office signed a first agreement with various committees of French miners and farmers. From 1924 on, the Société générale d'immigration, a private company run by French employers, organised immigration from Poland to France.

Between 1920 and 1931, the number of Poles in France rose from 45 000 to approximately 500 000. They worked in the mines of Lorraine and the north, and, less frequently, on farms.

When the Depression hit France in the 1930s, Polish workers were among the first to suffer: some were expelled overnight, and close on 130 000 left before the second world war, followed by almost 100 000 others immediately after the war. The remainder settled down in France, and the *jus soli* principle gave the second generation French nationality.

The fact that so many Poles went into mining produced some alarming statistics: in 1980, a Pole was 2.5 times likelier to die from a respiratory disease than a Frenchman, while mortality from lung diseases caused by external products was over 12% higher.

The characteristics of Polish migration to France may be summarised as follows:

– it involved nearly half a million people (almost 20% of France's foreign population at that time);

– it was limited in time, starting in the 1920s and ending around 1930;

– it responded to a clear "demand for labour" by employers, and was essentially limited to one occupation, mining;

– it was organised by firms, which took charge of the process and concentrated the immigrants in the northern mining villages;

– it was selective, and primarily open to young working-age men (mostly small farmers), who were strong enough to do the work required of them;

– it brought secondary migration (families, priests, teachers) in its train; the Polish settlements tried to recreate the patterns of life at home with the help of clubs, choirs, sports associations and newspapers;

– it was followed by a high level of return migration, after the second world war;

– France's Polish population is disappearing, mainly as the result of naturalisation. The 1968 census showed that over 200 000 Poles (including children of immigrants) had taken French nationality.

Impact of migration on Europe's population

Since 1987, the migration balance in most west European countries has exceeded the natural surplus (births to deaths ratio). In other words, any increase in the population of European countries is primarily due to migration.

The links between migration and demography are complex. A country's population level "encourages" emigration when the number of young people entering the labour market exceeds the number of jobs it can offer; this means that net immigration and the birth rate twenty years previously are linked: the economy cannot always "absorb" young people when they reach working age.

Examples

North African countries – fertility around 1975-80: 6 children per woman; annual number of departures around 1995-2000 – 126 000.

South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.) – fertility around 1975-1980: 5.2 children per woman; annual number of departures around 1995-2000 – 924 000.

Conversely, a country "encourages" immigration when it needs foreign labour; this is particularly true in countries with strong economies, where the number of young people reaching working age is not sufficient to meet the demand.

Migration can have radical effects on national population profiles; migrants do not have the same sex or age structure as either the home or the host community. Significant imbalances may result: in Qatar, for example, there are two men for every woman. But migration can also create a new balance in communities where age structures have major social consequences; it may, for example, partly compensate for ageing of the population by bringing in young people.

Last, it can also alter a community's demographic behaviour patterns (particularly as regards marriages and births) by introducing different norms.

54

> **Document 3: Case study 2 – Impact of migration**
>
> The impact of migration on a country can be visualised by taking a limited group of people, such as a school class, and identifying:
>
> – pupils born in another country (immigrants), regardless of nationality;
>
> – pupils whose parents (one or both) were born in another country (second-generation immigrants), regardless of nationality;
>
> – pupils whose grandparents were born in another country (third-generation immigrants).
>
> The impact of immigration will then be equal to the proportion of pupils born in other countries, or whose parents or grandparents were born in other countries:
>
> – the direct impact comes from immigrants proper (first-generation immigrants);
>
> – the indirect impact comes from second- and third-generation immigrants.

Immigration as a factor in demographic balance

Migration affects demographic structures in host countries in two ways. First, directly, by bringing in people who are generally young and healthy – which helps to reduce demographic ageing by striking a better numerical balance between young and old. Secondly, it can affect it indirectly, through births among immigrants, whose reproductive patterns often differ from those of host countries, with families tending to be larger than the European norm.

This means that the demographic significance of migration in Europe is not just a matter of numbers: even when the demographic balance is zero (that is, when every arrival is offset by a return), migration generally has a rejuvenating effect in immigration countries. The ones who leave are older than those who come in. In emigration countries, the reverse is the case: those who come home are older than those who leave.

Thus, it is estimated that migration since the second world war has contributed, directly or indirectly, to two-thirds of demographic growth in immigration countries (such as Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland), and has halved the demographic ageing rate. Not all European countries have benefited, however. Italy, for example, had a negative migration balance in the three decades following the second world war (see table 12). The main thing is that host communities are very different, in demographic terms, from what they would have been without migration's input (see graphs below).

Table 12: Total population increase, and increase due to migration in some European countries since the second world war

Country	Period	Increase (in millions)		Rate of annual increase	
		Total	Due to migration	Including migration	Without migration
Belgium	1950-1984	1.4	0.6	0.45	0.26
France	1946-1983	14.5	5.1	0.84	0.57
Germany	1951-1984	11.2	7.8	0.62	0.2
Italy	1951-1981	9.4	-1.9	0.61	0.72
Sweden	1950-1984	1.3	0.6	0.5	0.28

Source: Le Bras, 1991, "L'impact démographique des migrations d'après-guerre dans quelques pays de l'OCDE ", in *OCDE, Les migration: aspects démographiques*, Paris, OECD

Graph 1: Swiss population change, with and without international migration, 1945-98

Source: Wanner (in print) Federal Statistics Office, Neuchâtel

Graph 2: Comparison of the Swiss population's age structure at the end of 1998 – with migration (census figure) and without (simulation)

Source: Wanner (in print), Data: Federal Statistics Office, Neuchâtel

Demographic patterns among foreign population groups – fertility of foreign women

International migration propels people into new communities, and a clash between different demographic norms may follow. For example, African women who have grown up in Europe, or who come to Europe before starting to have children, are faced with two reproductive norms: those of the host country (on average, women in Europe have less than two children) and those of the home country (where families of 5 or more children are common).

Women and couples may react in various ways:

– they may stick to their own country's reproductive pattern;

– they may gradually adjust to the host country's pattern;

– they may partly adjust (such as the timing of births may follow the home pattern, but the number change);

– they may follow reproductive patterns which differ from those of both home and host country.

The reproductive behaviour of foreign women has been the subject of considerable research, since it provides an insight into the social, cultural and economic factors behind changes in fertility levels in Europe (see document 18 on fertility among Turkish women).

Economic impact[1]

The prospect of higher wages is one of the factors which may persuade people to leave their own countries. Similarly, the need for more workers to keep factories and businesses going is one of the mains reasons which make countries open their borders and let immigrants in. And so, after the second world war, many countries in western European had little difficulty in finding immigrants to help them rebuild and rekindle their economies. As we saw in the section on "demographic aspects of migration", immigrants arrived in very large numbers, putting their strength and their skills at the disposal of prospective employers. This is what makes it interesting to look at the effect of these arrivals on host countries' economies.

The proportion of foreigners in the working population varies greatly between countries. While a national shortage of manpower obliged many small countries (Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg) to recruit large numbers of foreigners, the larger countries were often able to find the workers they needed in their own rural or outlying areas, and relied less on immigration. Some countries imported labour from their former colonies (for example France from Algeria, the United Kingdom from the Commonwealth countries); although these workers were immigrants, many of them had the host country's nationality, and so did not count as foreigners. Economic setbacks (such as the oil crisis in the early 1970s) put a brake

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1. The section "Economic impact" was written by Etienne Piguet (Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies).

on arrivals, and sometimes led to mass departures – but there are many countries where foreign workers or workers born abroad now make up a significant proportion of the workforce, and so have major effects on the economy.

Table 13: Number of foreign workers in selected OECD countries (in millions and as a percentage)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Germany	2025.1	2179.1	2360.1	2575.9	2559.6	2569.2	2559.3	2521.9
% of total	7.1	7.5	8.0	8.9	8.9	9.0	9.1	…
Austria	229.5	277.2	295.9	304.6	316.5	352.2	328.0	326.3
% of total	7.4	8.7	9.1	9.3	9.7	9.9	10.0	9.9
Belgium	…	…	…	…	…	328.3	341.7	333.0
% of total	…	…	…	…	…	7.8	8.2	7.9
Denmark	68.8	71.2	74.0	77.7	80.3	83.3	88.0	…
% of total	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1	…
Spain	85.4	171.0	139.4	117.4	121.8	139.0	166.5	176.0
% of total	0.6	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1
France	1549.5	1506.0	1517.8	1541.5	1593.9	1573.3	1604.7	1569.8
% of total	6.2	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.3	6.2	6.3	6.1
Hungary	31.7	33.4	15.7	17.6	20.1	21.0	18.8	20.4
% of total	…	…	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Italy	…	285.3	296.8	304.8	307.1	332.2	…	…
% of total	…	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	…	…
Ireland	34.0	39.3	40.4	37.3	34.5	42.1	52.4	51.7
% of total	2.6	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.9	3.5	3.4
Japan	…	…	85.5	95.4	105.6	88.0	98.3	107.3
% of total	…	…	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
Luxembourg	84.7	92.6	98.2	101.0	106.3	111.8	117.8	124.8
% of total	45.2	47.5	49.2	49.7	51.0	52.4	53.8	55.1
Norway	46.3	46.3	46.6	47.9	50.3	52.6	54.8	59.9
% of total	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.8
Netherlands	197.0	214.0	229.0	219.0	216.0	221.0	218.0	208.0
% of total	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.1	2.9
Portugal	51.8	54.9	59.2	63.1	77.6	84.3	86.8	87.9
% of total	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8
Sweden	246.0	241.0	233.0	221.0	213.0	220.0	218.0	220.0
% of total	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.2
Switzerland	669.8	702.5	716.7	725.8	740.3	728.7	709.1	692.8
% of total	18.9	17.8	18.3	18.5	18.9	18.6	17.9	17.5
United Kingdom	882.0	828.0	902.0	862.0	847.0	899.0	878.0	949.0
% of total	3.3	3.0	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.6

Source: Sopemi, *Trends in International Migration,* Annual report 1999, ©OECD

The proportion of people leaving their own countries to look for work abroad has varied over time. In the 1960s, most of the people who came to western Europe were workers. Now, there are many refugees as well, and also relatives – husbands or, more frequently, wives and children – coming to join people who arrived earlier. Migration, in these cases, is not primarily economic, but it does have indirect economic consequences, since many of these people enter the labour market. Indeed, all forms of migration, even those which do not involve workers, have economic consequences, since migrants become consumers, tenants, etc.

Graph 3: Changes in immigration profiles in Switzerland, 1960-98

What migrant workers do: the example of Switzerland

At the beginning of the 20th century, many migrant workers were self-employed or ran small businesses. In 1910, Zurich had 3 691 tailors, and 50% were foreign. The percentage was the same in St. Gall, and 60% in Basel. There were also many self-employed foreign tradesmen, particularly jewellers, booksellers, stallholders and second-hand dealers. Moreover, 20% of dentists and 31% of chemists were foreigners. Most of the post-war migrants, however, worked for other people. They were often taken on to do the work that Swiss nationals did not want – jobs which were hard, done at night, or poorly-paid. In many countries, foreigners are still concentrated in certain occupations (see table below). Increasingly, however, foreigners are also being recruited to highly-skilled and specialised posts: senior business executives, computer experts, and so forth.

Table 14: Salaried foreign workers by economic sector in France, 1989

Sector	Number	Indicators		
		a*	b*	c*
Farming, forestry, fishing	29 120	2.7	17.1	9.8
Agri-business and food	20 824	2.0	29.5	3.8
Consumer goods	46 280	4.3	38.5	6.2
Car industry	27 018	2.5	4.4	9.5
Capital goods	29 816	2.8	10.7	3.9
Intermediate goods	98 738	9.2	15.3	6.8
Energy	3 448	0.3	8.1	1.5
Construction	163 593	15.3	2.7	15.2
Trade	107 449	10.1	43.7	4.4
Transport	31 783	3.0	17.6	3.6
Finance	15 946	1.5	44.1	2.4
Real estate	39 075	3.7	71.5	15.6
Business services	143 752	13.5	41.2	6.1
Individual services	173 134	16.2	69.8	11.4
Education, health, social work	91 309	8.5	66.5	2.4
Administration	47 333	4.4	47.4	2.0
Total (incl. unspecified activities)	**1 069 239**	**100.0**	**37.8**	**5.4**

Source: André Lebon, 1998: "Immigration et présence étrangère en France 1997/1998". Paris,
Courtesy of *La documentation française*.
*a: relative weight of each sector
*b: proportion of women in the foreign workforce
*c: proportion of foreigners in total employed workforce

Immigrant workers: effects on the labour market

The imaginary case of one man, coming to work in a farming area, helps us to see
how immigration may affect the labour market.

> **Document 4: The immigrant's tale – first version**
>
> One day, a foreigner turns up in a farming area. He stops at a farm, and sees that the paint on the gate is peeling off. He rings, says good-day to the farmer and offers to paint the gate for a small sum – wages in his own country are in fact very low. The farmer thinks for a moment and agrees. He was going to tell one of his own hands to paint the gate tomorrow in any case; instead, his own hand will make cheeses and sell them at the market. This will certainly bring in more money than the foreigner is looking for! And there will be a few cheeses left over to share out…
>
> Story based on Julian L. Simon, 1989. *The economic consequences of immigration,* University of Michigan Press.

This little tale illustrates one important initial phenomenon: when an extra worker arrives, productivity almost always increases (cheeses get made and the gate gets painted). So the host country's economy as a whole benefits. In this example, the farmer, his employee and the immigrant all benefit. In a second, however, the benefits are not distributed so equally:

> **Document 5: The immigrant's tale – second version**
>
> In a near-by country, the same thing happens, with one difference: seeing how little the foreigner wants, the farmer decides to get rid of his own hand, and hire the foreigner instead. To find another job, the dismissed farmhand has to take lower wages from a second farmer.

Here again, immigration leads to greater productivity: the gate gets painted, as it would have without the immigrant, and the dismissed worker produces something else for another farmer. The benefits, however, are not shared out fairly: the farmers come off best, since the first gets his gate painted cheaply, and the second gets a cheap worker. The immigrant benefits as well: he probably gets more money than he would at home. The local worker, however, gets less… An even worse scenario is conceivable: he cannot find work and is left jobless.

A rule can be deduced from these two examples. Immigration is harmful only when the immigrant replaces a national worker and the latter cannot find another job at the same wage. As long as the immigrant does a new job (for example makes the cheese) or frees the national worker to do something else (such as painting the gate, while the latter makes the cheese), immigration benefits everyone, employers and employees alike.

Most research by economists shows that, in practice, *the second situation has been commonest in Europe and the United States in recent decades*. In general, the governments of immigrant countries have not admitted immigrants who are likely to compete with nationals. In Switzerland in the 1960s, the arrival of immigrants to take on low-grade jobs allowed nationals to switch to more skilled occupations, with better prospects and higher wages.

One simple fact confirms this: the European countries with the most foreigners are by no means the ones with the highest unemployment. In other words, high immigration does not mean that jobs are stolen from nationals.

Table 15. Foreign workforce and unemployment rates in selected countries, by sex (in thousands and percentages), 1995

	Foreign workforce		Unemployment rates			
			Women		Men	
Country	Number	% of total	Foreigners	Nationals	Foreigners	Nationals
Austria	352.2	9.9	7.8	4.6	6.2	3.7
Belgium	328.3	7.8	31.5	11.0	…	…
Denmark	83.8	3.0	…	8.4	16.2	5.4
France	1573.3	6.2	24.4	13.6	20.2	9.2
Germany	2569.2	9.0	14.8	9.2	15.1	6.1
Italy	322.2	1.7	22.6	16.2	…	9.2
Netherlands	221.0	3.2	24.3	8.2	23.1	5.3
Portugal	84.3	1.8	…	7.7	…	6.5
Spain	139.0	0.9	27.0	30.3	20.7	18.0
Sweden	220.0	5.1	15.6	7.0	23.5	8.1
United Kingdom	899.0	3.5	11.7	6.7	16.4	9.8

Source: Sopemi, *Trends in international migration,* Annual Report, 1999, ©OECD

Social and cultural impact: growing cultural diversity[1]

Aims:

– to give pupils an idea of the cultural impact of immigration on European societies
– to highlight, as well, the tensions and problems which immigration can cause, and encourage pupils to think about solutions.

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1. The section "Social and cultural impact: growing cultural diversity" was prepared by Hans Mahnig (Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies).

Western Europe's rapid economic development after the last war (expressed in such terms as *les trente glorieuses* or *Wirtschaftswunder*) could not have been achieved without immigrants. A key factor in prosperity, immigration has also made for greater cultural diversity in European societies. This is clearest in cities, where the advent of multiculturalism is signalled by the presence of people with various national backgrounds, dressed in various national styles – not to mention shops and restaurants, where one can buy things, and taste food, which only long-range travellers would have encountered just a few decades ago.

These signs are obvious, but there are other, deeper changes too. For one thing, modern popular culture (especially music) has been powerfully influenced by immigrant performers. Reggae (now ragamuffin) was brought to the United Kingdom by Jamaicans, *raï* was brought to France and Belgium by Algerians, and American rap has been taken up and reworked throughout Europe by young musicians – many of them second-generation immigrants. Dance, too, has been strongly influenced, and the impact of African and Asian traditions on contemporary dance is indisputable. Film-makers and writers from immigrant families are also increasingly prominent on the European cultural scene.

In a more general sense, migration is not just a transfer of people, but a transfer of history and experience too. Immigrants think differently and see the world in different ways. Recent decades have brought new religions (for example Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism) to Europe, and their followers' views on life are not the same as those of European Christians. Without realising it, European societies have become more diverse and pluralistic.

In this way, immigration can be seen as enriching our societies – but it has also caused conflicts. In most European countries, the native reaction to newcomers has at some stage been hostile, usually taking the form of discrimination, but sometimes erupting into violence (see racism and discrimination in chapter 3).

The arrival of people with other cultures and religions also means that institutions in European countries have had to decide how to react to unfamiliar customs and beliefs. Should Muslim girls, for example, be allowed to wear headscarves at school? Should Sikhs be exempt from wearing crash helmets because their religion prescribes the turban? The answers to these questions must, as far as possible, respect both European principles and immigrants' convictions.

Migrants often have problems of adjustment: coming from a very different social and cultural context, they need to find their bearings in the host country. Fluency in the local language undoubtedly holds the key to doing this. Learning the host country's language is often very hard for first-generation immigrants, but usually less so for their children – especially if they are born, and go to school, in the new country. For them, however, adjustment may have an extra aspect. In many cases, their parents take it for granted that the whole family will eventually return to the home country. Often, these plans prove unrealistic, as the children settle down in the host country and cannot imagine going back. These differing viewpoints

between parents and children may generate tensions and disagreements within immigrant families. These tensions are often felt most sharply at school, the main area where immigrant children come face to face with the new society.

Document 6: An immigrant child at school

We enter the classroom in twos. The teacher sits down at his desk. This morning we have ethics, he says – after calling the roll and stumbling over the Arab names. He starts talking about ethics, the way he's done every morning since I started at the big school. And I blush when I hear him, the way I do every morning. The things he's saying, and the things I do outside – you could get a whole *wadi* between them! I'm not good enough for ethics. A discussion gets going between the French children and the teacher. They all stick up their hands and start talking, telling what they've done and seen, and showing they agree with the lesson. We Arabs in the class have nothing to say. I take in everything they're saying. I know I live in a shantytown, with sheds made of planks and corrugated iron – and I know that's the way poor people live. I've been to Alain's several times – his parents live in a house on the Avenue Monin. I could see it was a whole lot better than our shacks. And the size! His house is as big as the whole of our *chaaba*. He has his own bedroom, all to himself, a desk with books on it, a wardrobe for his clothes. I'm ashamed to say where I live – which is why Alain has never been to the *chaaba*.

Le gone du chaâba, by Azouz Begag, Editions du Seuil, Paris, pp. 58-59.

It is problems like this which give schools a central role in helping immigrant children to integrate in the host country (see effects on school life in chapter 4). And this is why many European countries have information and mediation bodies to support immigrant populations during the settling-in process, and so help them to integrate.

Effects on school life: schools and the challenge of cultural and linguistic diversity

Aims:

– to work for better integration of immigrant pupils;

– to promote and legitimise immigrant pupils' languages and cultures in the classroom;

– to make pupils aware of cultural diversity and tolerance;

– to make pupils aware of children's rights.

Immigrant children and their place in the classroom

Immigration, and specifically the schooling of immigrant children, have had substantial effects on host countries' school systems. The first one is obvious: the percentage of immigrant children in classes, which has increased significantly in nearly all the immigration countries. In Germany, for example, 11% of pupils were foreign in 1992. In some areas, particularly big-city districts with a high concentration of immigrants, the figure is now over 50%. In some schools in Berlin and the Ruhr valley, the proportion of foreign pupils tops 75%.[1] In Switzerland, to take a small country, 22% of pupils in compulsory schooling were foreign in 1995, as compared with 16% in 1980. In Geneva, for instance, which is known as a very cosmopolitan city, the proportion of foreign pupils in compulsory schooling is 45%.[2]

This is not just a straightforward demographic effect on the composition of classes, but a complex social phenomenon, affecting several aspects of school and community life. Take the diversity of cultures and languages that immigrant children bring with them. Classes with a mainly national intake, which used to be culturally and linguistically homogeneous, have become increasingly heterogeneous in both respects,[3] especially in countries with high immigration levels. This situation represents a major challenge for schools – that of integrating the new arrivals into the school system, so that the school system itself can play its part in integrating immigrants within the host community.

This task is not always an easy one for schools, and school failure among immigrant children is still a problem. The children themselves also find it hard to adjust to the new school system. Teachers and educators have had to try and find ways of escaping from a vicious spiral compounded of school failure, which affects immigrant more than local children, and integration problems.

The question here is whether a causal link exists between failure at school and cultural and linguistic background. Generally speaking, this problem has been approached in two opposing ways.

In the assimilationist climate of the 1960s and 1970s, immigrant children's cultures and languages were seen as obstacles to success at school. The schooling they had received at home was considered insufficient for integration within the host country's school system. Similarly, their skills in their home language were seen as a brake on acquisition of the host country's language, which was regarded as holding the key to success. This cultural, social and linguistic "deficit", on which immigrant pupils' failures were blamed, led certain teachers and educators

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1. See Flitner-Merle, 1992: "Scolarité des enfants immigrés en RFA. Débats et recherché", *Revue française de sociologie,* vol. XXXIII-1:38-48.
2. See Lischer, Rolf, 1997: *Intégration: une histoire d'échecs?*, Berne, Federal Statistics Office.
3. It would be wrong to assume that classes were totally homogeneous in linguistic or cultural terms prior to immigration. Most European societies contain cultural and linguistic minorities, and their children's presence in schools meant that classes were heterogeneous. Migration only reinforced linguistic and cultural diversity in the classroom.

to devise "special teaching methods" to facilitate integration and reduce the failure rate. These new methods, collectively known as *Ausländerpädagogik*, were intended to help children overcome the "handicap" of being socialised in their home language and culture. They were used, with the help of special tools, to assimilate immigrant pupils into the school system.

Starting in the 1980s, *Ausländerpädagogik* came in for serious criticism, and its validity was questioned. The main objection was that it denied the heterogeneity, and the cultural and linguistic diversity, of immigrant children – indeed blamed their failures on those very factors.

Unlike *Ausländerpädagogik*, which aimed at assimilation, "intercultural teaching", which is now in favour, aims at integration. There is no more talk of cultural and linguistic "deficits", but of "equality of cultures" and "wealth of cultures and languages". As a result, having a different culture and language is no longer seen as an obstacle to integration at school – and so cannot be blamed for any failures. On the contrary, inter-cultural teaching sees linguistic and cultural diversity as an asset in itself, and contends that schools should build on it.

Inter-cultural teaching is principally concerned with the complex link between language, cultural identity and belonging (Perregaux, 1997), in relation to cultural contacts between individuals. As Abdallah-Pretceille (1994) notes, this covers "relations and interactions between individuals and groups, rather than cultural definition of these groups". A person confronted with several cultural references is in a state of permanent cultural conflict (Abdallah-Pretceille, 1994). In this situation, marked by permanent interaction of cultures, the educator's main objective is to develop concepts which will enable pupils to find their bearings more successfully and to take their place in a society typified by a high level of cultural and linguistic diversity (Krüger-Potratz, 1994).

Inter-cultural teaching accordingly promotes teaching of the home language, which is primarily seen as "a source of exchange, mutual understanding, shared development and shared acquisition of new perceptions, involving different linguistic and cultural groups" (Perregaux, 1991: 132). Teaching the home language is also seen as a way of helping pupils to grasp the fact of cultural and linguistic variety, and so overcome difficulties and misunderstandings in their dealings with people from other cultures.

Although teaching the home language produces beneficial results, both in guaranteeing equality of cultures and in acknowledging immigrant cultures within the school system, one still has to ask whether teaching home languages and cultures is in itself enough to overcome school failure. That said, research has pinpointed the role which social class plays in the success of all pupils, including immigrants. Almost all of it shows that, social class being equal, immigrant children do quite as well as locals.

68

Finally, and without denying the importance of the policies and teaching methods applied, it should be noted that an understanding and friendly attitude to immigrant children on the part of native teachers and pupils is vital to their successful integration in the school environment.

Multilingualism: an educational asset in the modern world

Classes which have become linguistically mixed are another potential asset. They are an asset because children who speak only one language also gain from linguistic interaction, and because this interaction can itself promote understanding and tolerance of cultural diversity (Hawkins, 1987). Experiencing diversity may not only encourage pupils to learn other languages, but may also open their eyes and minds to the many different ways in which people express themselves.

The assumption here is that, in today's world, personal mobility is increasing all the time. In this situation, people who speak several languages have a definite advantage over those who speak just one (Hawkins, 1987). In communication terms, the first have access to a wider and richer language environment than the second. Multilingualism has become an indisputable asset on the labour market, where a knowledge of several languages is increasingly required. Fluency in several languages also brings certain economic benefits for the individual – and this is not necessarily limited to (business) English, which is becoming an international lingua franca (see glossary).

Immigrants' languages are also beginning to gain ground at work. As a recent study on immigration languages in the workplace has shown, Turkish and Italian immigrants in Switzerland are very likely to use their home languages in professional activities (Grin, Rossiaud, Kaya, 2000). This study quotes an immigrant working in a Swiss chemical plant: "Keeping up one's home language is very important. I can't imagine giving it up. My whole working life now depends on Turkish". The study adds: "This means that, for him, keeping up his home language has no adverse effects on the integration process. On the contrary, fluency in Turkish holds the key to vocational integration in Switzerland".

Long considered a handicap, bilingualism is now actively encouraged. Psycholinguistic research into the links between cognitive development and bilingualism (Hamers and Blanc, 1995) has concluded that the fact of using the home language promotes the bilingual child's cognitive development. Similarly, the research done on bilingualism among immigrant children emphasises the need to maintain the home country's language and culture, and suggests that teaching the home language can improve classroom performance and help immigrant children to integrate at school. Several Council of Europe texts have highlighted the importance of this approach, urging member states to promote multilingualism among immigrant children and maintain their home languages.

(See Appendix II for suggested classroom activities and teaching resources on this chapter)

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CHAPTER 5

MIGRATION AND HOME COUNTRIES

Aims: to understand the general effects of migration on home countries and, more specifically, the role migrants can play in their home community's economic development.

Introduction

In the last chapter, the emphasis was on migrants' economic and cultural contribution to host countries. However, host countries are not the only ones to benefit from migration. The impact on home countries is quite as multiform and varied. Usually, it is considered from two angles: firstly, the "brain drain" of emigration, which is clearly a major loss for home communities,[1] secondly, migrants' contribution to change and development in their own countries, which is, quite as clearly, a boon. This contribution is not restricted to first-generation migrants. More slowly, with more difficulty, family, cultural and economic ties continue to be formed with the home country, even when several generations have passed. Indeed, the first migrants' descendants may well take an interest in the socio-economic and cultural situation of the countries where their roots lie.

How immigrants contribute to the social and economic development of home countries

Earlier studies on migration have considered migrants' economic and social contributions to home countries (Council of Europe, 1975). We shall touch on a few aspects which strike us as important.

Emigration reduces unemployment in home countries. The assumption here is that the people who leave for economic reasons are either jobless or likely to become so. If this "unemployed army" stays at home, it may well become a source of social problems in the economically weak home country.

By sending money home (savings and investments), migrants contribute directly to the home community's economic development. These financial transfers are actually regarded as their main contribution to the home community. "Remittances

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1. Between 1961 and 1983, about 700 000 highly qualified people (scientists, engineers, doctors, etc.) emigrated from developing countries to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. For more details, see Stalker, 1994, op. cit. in section 5.

[are a] form of international 'trade' second only to crude oil and significantly larger than coffee, the next most important primary commodity" (Stalker, 1994, quoted by Fibbi and Piguet, 1995).

Emigration countries acknowledge the positive role which such transfers play in the trade balance. The World Bank estimates that the total sum sent back by migrants to home countries through official channels in 1999 amounted to 71 billion dollars – and non-official transfers (via friends, relatives, etc.) make the figure even higher. In 1990, Tunisia and Morocco were two of the countries where these transfers made good the trade deficit. In the same way, Malians in France sent 21 million dollars home, and Zairians in Belgium 1.8 million dollars (Niessen and Mochel, 1999).

Table 16: Capital transfers by migrant workers, in selected countries and as a percentage of exports, 1989 (in millions of dollars and percentages)

Country	Transfers	% of export
Europe		
Cyprus	93	13.0
Greece	1387	23.1
Italy	3926	2.8
Portugal	3706	29.1
Spain	1861	4.3
Turkey	3040	26.1
Yugoslavia	6290	46.4
Others		
Algeria	306	4.0
Bangladesh	771	59.1
India	2750	23.1
Morocco	1454	43.9
Pakistan	1897	38.7
Tunisia	488	16.6

Source: Figures taken from: Peter Stalker, 1994: *The work of strangers: A survey of international labour migration,* Table 8.2, p. 138, © ILO, Geneva

Document 7: Example – development projects launched by immigrants' associations

Some communities make collective transfers to fund specific projects. In such cases, migrants contribute to an association, which then funds development projects in the home country. In France, this kind of transfer is mainly carried out by the Malian community, and has had a decisive impact on development in the Kaye region, where most of the migrants come from. They devote over 20% of their monthly wage to development at home.

Acting through village associations, these contributors are the prime movers behind local development in the region, and are credited with 60% of its infrastructure. The Malian community has been highly successful in organising itself on home village lines. The village chief has his representative among the migrants in France, and the village has its association, which adopts its hierarchy and social structure. In fact, emigration is a formal contract between the home community and the individual who leaves, and emigrants are accordingly obliged to help with their village's development – which they do very successfully. In Kaye, they have funded 146 different projects, at a total cost of 19.4 million French francs. Specifically, they have helped to develop the irrigation network, in order to increase agricultural output. In addition to the material progress produced by these projects, migrants have done much to change attitudes and propagate democratic values.

From: Niessen and Mochel, 1999: pp. 65-66

Returning migrants take the know-how and technical skills they have picked up in the host country with them, and the home country can put these to good use. On the individual level, this know-how and these skills sometimes enable returnees to make a better use of the savings accumulated in the host country. Some use them to start small businesses, like the Friulan below, who went home after working for some time in Switzerland.

Orlando: Now 45, he left home with an electrician's certificate in his pocket and went to work in Switzerland, where he stayed 13 years. Working all the time for the same metal company, and used his savings to buy a house and also to buy up slightly damaged machine tools, which came cheap, and which he could then repair himself. When his children reached school age, he decided to go home, and suggested that his company employ him to service and repair machines sold in his region. Once he got home, he combined this activity with production proper, using the equipment he had collected. Soon after that, having to some extent automated the production process and left the family to watch it, he started travelling round the region to meet present and potential clients. He had the feeling that his entrepreneurial role ought to focus on relations

with the market, at the pre-production (suppliers) and also the post-production (custo-mers' needs) stage. (Excerpts from Fibbi and Piguet, 1995, p. 36).

On the community level, returning migrants can also play a positive part in up-dating outlooks and attitudes by bringing in the social and cultural values of the modern industrial countries (Hoffman-Nowotny, 1970).

Thanks to the comings and goings of these thousands of workers, European culture is penetrating the country's social fabric … Carried by these people, western culture is also penetrating the villages and districts through personal contacts. (Tuna, quoted by Gitmez, op. cit.)

(See Appendix II for suggested classroom activities and teaching resources on this chapter)

Further reading

Council of Europe report, 1975: "Action taken by the Council of Europe in connection with the return of migrant workers to their home countries".

Fibbi, Rosita, Piguet, Etienne, 1995: *La contribution des immigrés au développement dans leurs pays d'origine: le cas de la migration italienne en Suisse*. Paris. Report for the OECD Development Centre.

Hoffman-Nowotny, H.J., 1970: *Migration: Ein Beitrag zu einer soziologischen Erklärung*. Stuttgart, Enke.

Niessen, Jan, Mochel, France, 1999: *Les relations extérieures de l'Union Européenne et les migrations internationales*. Brussels, Migration Policy Group.

Stalker, Peter, 1994: *The work of strangers*. Geneva, ILO.

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY AND WEBSITES

Glossary

Alien: A person who does not have the nationality of the country in which she or he resides. A legal term used to distinguish non-nationals from nationals.

Assimilation: A process of absorbing individuals into a community; it assumes that they will become like the members of that community, and shed their significant cultural, social and ethical differences.

***Asylum: A place where someone is safe from danger. To give asylum is to provide protection in a safe country for people who are in danger in their own country.

Asylum seeker: A person of foreign nationality who, for one of many possible reasons, has been forced to flee her or his place of residence to seek refuge elsewhere, and whose application for asylum has not yet been processed by the host country.

Aussiedler: Immigrants of German origin from former socialist countries in eastern Europe, who move to Germany on the strength of their "German roots".

*Decolonisation: In the 20th century, the colonial empires established by the European powers were dismantled. This process led to independence for the former colonies.

Demos: Membership of a nation, based on the political will of individuals to live together and decide on a communal future.

*Discrimination: The result of action, deliberate or unintended, which produces inequalities between social groups, leading to rejection of some of them. Discrimination may be economic, and may result from intolerance or racism.

Emigration: Leaving one's country for another.

**Emigration rate: Number of emigrants leaving their home region per 1 000 inhabitants of that region in a given year.

Ethnos: Membership of a nation based on the shared culture and history of a group which excludes others.

Forced migration: Non-voluntary migration, caused by persecution, war, and so forth. (see forced migration, chapter 2).

Immigrant: A person who leaves her or his home country and settles in a host country.

**Immigration: Entering a country to reside in it.

**Immigration rate: Number of immigrants arriving in a place per 1 000 inhabitants of that place during a given year.

Integration: Process of incorporating individuals into a host community which assumes that they will play an active part in it, but allows them to retain significant differences (cultural, social, ethical, etc.). This term contrasts with assimilation.

**Internal migration: The act of leaving one administrative sub-division in a country (such as a region or district) to take up residence in another.

Intolerance: A tendency to reject other people and their opinions, not to respect their lifestyles, or even withhold rights from them. Intolerance leads to exclusion.

Lingua franca: An auxiliary language, or one accepted by various groups who have no common language, for example English or French, as used in diplomacy.

Migrant: A person who migrates within a country, or from one country to another (see economic migration, chapter 2).

Migration: Movement of a person from one place or country to another, for the purpose of settling there.

**Migration (demographic definition): Movement of persons crossing a certain border to establish a new permanent residence in another place. Sub-divided into international migration (between countries) and internal migration (within a country).

**Migration balance: Difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants.

Nationality: The legal concept which defines a person's legal membership of a nation. National status, enabling a person to participate actively in the host country's political life. Immigrants with foreign nationality acquire it through naturalisation.

Naturalisation: The act of granting nationality to a person of another nationality. It can also be used to integrate immigrant communities within the host nation. Some countries have simplified naturalisation procedures for certain immigrant groups (for example children of immigrants).

**Net migration: Effect of immigration and emigration on a region's population, expressed as an increase or decrease in a given year.

Positive discrimination: A series of specific, practical measures to integrate a given community. The best-known example is the quota system for black people in the United States.

****Prejudices: As the word implies, prejudices are based on preconceived ideas. Laws cannot eliminate prejudices, but they can prohibit the discriminatory behaviour and practices to which they give rise.

Racism: Racism is a theory which claims that the human species is sub-divided into races, some of them inferior to others. Discredited by modern science, this theory still lies behind serious acts of intolerance towards others, especially foreigners.

Refugee: A person of foreign nationality who, for one of many possible reasons, has been forced to flee her or his place of residence to seek refuge elsewhere, and who has been granted refugee status under the asylum laws of a particular country.

Second generation: Immigrants' children, born or mainly schooled in the host country.

****Stereotype: Refers to a ready-made image of a certain group of people. These images are usually based on false or incomplete information, and are generally negative.

Transfer of funds: transfer of immigrants' savings to their home country.

Transnational citizenship: In connection with migration, denotes a process in which immigrants constitute a social reality, combining features of both the home and host countries.

Übersiedler: Nationals of the German Democratic Republic, who emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany before German reunification (3 October 1990).

*Xenophobia: Hostile behaviour or feelings towards foreigners.

*(Definitions based on: Henri Renoud-Lyat, 1994: *L'immigration en France,* Editions Periscope, publication de l'Ecole Moderne Française, Mouans-Sartoux)

**Population Reference Bureau, 1980: Demography Guide (designed for students), Washington, 1980

***http://www.unhcr.ch/french/teach/faims.htm

****http://www.gov.nb.ca/hrc-cdp/f/ditesnon.htm#racisme

Websites

Amnesty International
http://www.amnesty.org

An atlas of immigration history
http://barthes.ens.fr/atlasclio

Centre pour l'égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme
http://www.antiracisme.be

Council of Europe and the fight against racism and intolerance
http://www.ecri.coe.int/

European Council on Refugees and Exiles
http://www.ecre.org

History of international migrations
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/migration

IOM – International Office for Migration
http://www.iom.int

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
http://www.unhcr.ch/

Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies
University of Neuchâtel
www.unine.ch/fsm

APPENDIX II

SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCES FOR CLASSROOM USE

Chapter 1 - Migration in the 20th century: a brief history

Workshop 1: Set up three groups. Ask each to describe the characteristics (causes and consequences) of migration in their country/region in the following periods: during and after the first world war, after the second world war and since 1973.

Compare the characteristics of migration at different times in your country's or region's past: how do these periods differ?

Workshop 2: What percentage of the people who live in your country/region/district are immigrants? Where did they come from? When did they arrive? Why did they come?

Is yours an emigration or immigration region? Interview staff from your region's immigration or population service and ask them about the characteristics of its emigrant or immigrant community.

Collect illustrated material on emigration or immigration in your country or region today and discuss it in the classroom.

## Document 8: Areas of tension and refugee movements today

Source: Chaliand, Gérard, Jan, Michel; Rageau, Jean-Pierre, 1994: *Atlas historique des migrations,* p. 123, © Seuil

Document 9: Migration from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to the west, 1948-89

Source: Chaliand, Gérard, Jan, Michel; Rageau, Jean-Pierre, 1994: *Atlas historique des migrations,* p. 124, © Seuil

Document 10: Migration in the CIS (former Soviet Union) 1989-93

Commonwealth of Independent States
Border of the former USSR before 1989
Areas of conflict with refugees

CHINA

LAKE BALKHACH

Alma Ata

KIRGHIZIA

Tadjiks

AFGHANISTAN

Tashkent

UZBEKISTAN

Samarkand

TURKMENISTAN

Russians returning from central Asia

ARAL SEA

IRAN

RUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Meskhetians

Germans returning from Siberia and central Asia

CASPIAN SEA

Bakou

AZERBAIJAN

Azeris, Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh

Moscow

Armenians

Ossetians

Volgograd

Abkhazians

GEORGIA

Tiflis

ARMENIA

WESTERN EUROPE

BELARUS

Kiev

MOLDOVA

BLACK SEA

TURKEY

ISRAEL

Istanbul

Jews

ROMANIA

Bucarest

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Source: Chaliand, Gérard, Jan, Michel; Rageau, Jean-Pierre, 1994: *Atlas historique des migrations,* p. 125, © Seuil

Document 11: Migrants from central to western Europe, 1990-93

Population movements from eastern and central Europe:

Poles, Gypsies from Romania, Albanians, Yugoslavs, Hungarians from Voivodina

Source: Chaliand, Gérard, Jan, Michel; Rageau, Jean-Pierre, 1994: *Atlas historique des migrations,* p. 126, © Seuil.

Chapter 2 – Types of migration: why do people migrate?

Workshop 1: Pupils interview parents, grandparents or neighbours, to find out if they have ever migrated and, if so, why.

Classify these reasons to establish a typology of reasons for migrating.

Find material on events in your region which have caused or encouraged migration. Try to establish causal links between these events and the type of migration they engendered.

Which of the types of migration described in chapter 2 is currently occurring in your region?

Workshop 2: Ask an immigrant to come and tell your class why she or he came to your region.

Interview an international company executive who has migrated for business reasons. How does she or he differ from other "economic" migrants"?

Discuss the advantages and drawbacks of "virtual nomadism" in class. Is this likely to reduce people's urge to travel?

**Document 12: Economic migration in western Europe 1960-75**

Table 17: Migration survey: Ukraine

*Migration survey: Ukraine – Ages 18-29*

What country would you most likely go to?

Source: International Organisation for Migration 1993: *Profiles and motives of potential migrants*

Table 18: Migration survey: Albania

Migration survey: Ukraine – Ages 18-29

What country would you most likely go to?

Source: International Organisation for Migration 1993: *Profiles and motives of potential migrants*.

Chapter 3 – Europe and its immigrants

Integrating immigrants: a major challenge for host communities (p. 36)

Workshop: Set up two groups in the class. The first interviews a few immigrants/foreigners or members of minority communities in your region to find out how integrated they are in the community. What social rights do they have? Do they face restrictions on the job market? Can they participate in public life? How?

The second group interviews a relevant official on action taken to integrate immigrants. Discuss both groups' findings, relating them to the various integration models.

Table 19: Integration or assimilation

Document 13: The problem of integration in the Russian Federation

Towards an integration policy for foreigners

Boris Zhukov

Immigrants are flocking to the Russian Federation from the former Soviet republics, but attitudes still have to be changed.

The experts predict that Russia's active population will fall by 500 000 over the next ten years. Sooner or later, we shall have to ask ourselves: who is going to feed the federation in the 21st century? In response to this threat, utopian schemes to "stimulate the birth rate", sometimes accompanied by gloomy talk about "the demise of the Russian people", are surfacing once more. Some economists suggest solving the labour-shortage problem by raising the retirement age and relaxing the laws on the employment of minors. When the countries we are trying to emulate today were laying the foundations of their economies, they had the benefit of soaring productivity and high birth rates. But nearly all of them encouraged immigration too.

In this area, Russia can still hope: in the mid-1970s, immigration started to overtake emigration. In those days, of course, the only immigrants came from the other Soviet republics. However, neither the possibility of leaving for "far-off foreign lands" nor the collapse of the Soviet Union have fundamentally changed the picture: in the last few years, legal immigrants have outnumbered emigrants by 350 000 to 400 000 each year. Most of the immigrants still come from the former Soviet republics, but China and Vietnam are among the "far-off foreign lands" which also contribute large quotas.

Most of today's immigrants hope to make a living from running small businesses, working for others – or joining gangs of criminals. Refugees, too, are substantially represented. As a rule, young people are the largest group. Old people make up the second, far smaller, group. But Russia also gets middle-aged people with school-age children. This group counts as the least mobile, and it takes exceptional circumstances to persuade them to leave their own country for another one (clearly, exceptional circumstances are no rarity among our neighbours). The proportion of graduates among the immigrants is 1.5 times higher than the Russian average. "This is one clear sign that the people who leave are among the most energetic, the most enterprising, the most self-confident", explains Janna Zayonschkovskaya, Director of the Study Centre on Forced Migration Problems in the CIS.

(continued)

"We have no statistical proof, but it looks as if the immigrants who make a go of things often do better, career-wise, than the natives – even though the conditions in which they started were far harder." This does not apply solely to immigrants with diplomas – a high level of economic activity typifies all categories. In Novo-Vassilevskoye (a town near Moscow), a holiday home site, on which building work had stopped, was turned over to refugees from the Caucasus. The settlement quickly became the main source of milk and vegetables for the locals: while the men looked after the buying and selling, the women worked the kitchen gardens.

The Russian Federation's policy of sending immigrants into the country reflects a general lack of humanity and common sense. On the one hand, Russia says that it is ready to take in, not just the refugees, but also the 25 million Russians scattered through the CIS (most of whom, fortunately, are in no hurry to take up the offer); on the other, immigrants face a solid wall of totally artificial obstacles, when it comes to getting papers, finding a job or a house, or sending their children to school. "Experience shows," Ms Zayonschkovskaya goes on, "that immigrants in big towns try their hand at everything for a couple of years and then find a stable job, or set up their own businesses and provide employment for locals. In the country or small towns, they can't find their feet." None the less, the government stubbornly persists in sending refugees (other immigrants are simply ignored) far out into the country, preferably en masse. This creates some absurd situations: in one refugee village, the primary teacher comes out by bus from the town every day. This case is an exception, but it fully reflects the general attitude to "foreigners": they are expected to cause problems and nothing else, and the only effort made is to keep them as far from the towns as possible, and leave them with no resources of their own. They create, it is said, a climate which encourages crime.

It is true that people uprooted from their original social environment are always likelier to set up criminal networks. But this is mainly a response to xenophobia and discrimination, and cases in which artificial obstacles make immigrants turn to crime are not unusual. When the authorities in Primoria (a region in far eastern Russia) give a Chinese trader a three-day "tourist" visa – knowing full well he needs at least two weeks to sell his stock – it is hard to see this as anything but an invitation to bribe the police wholesale.

The only way of eliminating these abuses is to integrate foreigners into Russian society – which would also serve the state's economic interests. A nation, after all, is not the product of a single biological system: in the

(continued)

course of their history, the Russians have absorbed Finno-Ugrians and Turks in considerable numbers.

It is not too soon to start preparing laws on conditions for entering the country, getting residence permits, obtaining nationality, etc., based on the principles of an open society. No special resources are needed for this – just more goodwill and less prejudice. Doing that would indeed be looking after the Russian people's destiny.

From *Courrier international,* No. 505, 6-12 July 2000.

Naturalisation in Europe (p. 41)

What is the situation in your country? What are the formal conditions for naturalisation? Is there a "simplified" naturalisation procedure for some people?

Interview someone recently naturalised in your country. Find out why she or he applied, how things went, and what the procedure was. Discuss the question: "Can one belong to two nations without denying one's cultural origins?"

Apart from belonging to a historical and cultural community, can you think of other ways of belonging to a nation?

Table 20: Acquisition of Swiss nationality by country of origin

	Period		Sex		
	1981-91	**1992-98**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**
Overall	**129 875**	**114 165**	**121 961**	**122 079**	**244 040**
Europe	**110 521**	**84 709**	**96 378**	**98 852**	**195 230**
Including:					
Italy	30 759	28 051	29 409	29 401	58 810
Germany	21 918	5 251	13 184	13 985	27 169
France	10 881	6 631	8 885	8 627	17 512
Former Yugoslavia	5 685	10 627	8 234	8 078	16 312
Former Czechoslovakia	10 614	1 552	6 450	5 716	12 166
Turkey	2 117	8 939	6 182	4 874	11 056
Austria	7 228	2 041	4 302	4 967	9 269
Spain	5 788	2 951	3 668	5 071	8 739
United Kingdom	2 625	2 043	2 383	2 285	4 668
Hungary	2 940	1 639	2 529	2 050	4 579

(continued)

Poland	1 142	2 331	1 640	1 833	3 473
Netherlands	2 146	477	1 047	1 576	2 623
Portugal	1 162	1 454	927	1 689	2 616
Greece	1 289	1 263	1 380	1 175	2 552
Romania	713	1 773	1 213	1 273	2 486
Africa	**3 112**	**7 578**	**6 915**	**3 775**	**10 690**
Including:					
Tunisia	387	1 439	1 398	428	1 826
Algeria	502	1 200	1 190	512	1 702
Morocco	444	1 234	1 149	529	1 678
Egypt	365	727	776	316	1 092
America	**6 830**	**7 094**	**6 520**	**7 404**	**13 924**
Including:					
United States	1 593	1 217	1 347	1 463	2 810
Brazil	977	1 265	913	1 329	2 242
Colombia	915	717	809	823	1 632
Chili	576	878	706	748	1 454
Peru	538	519	487	570	1 057
Asia	**9 041**	**14 448**	**11 803**	**11 686**	**23 489**
Including:					
Vietnam	1 165	4 596	2 995	2 766	5 761
India	1 709	1 099	1 203	1 605	2 808
Iran	901	1 113	1 173	841	2 014
Lebanon	577	1 212	1 278	511	1 789
Philippines	674	699	349	1 024	1 373
Sri Lanka	791	462	518	735	1 253
Cambodia	151	1 087	607	631	1 238
Thailand	554	627	312	869	1 181
Israel	646	532	777	401	1 178
Oceania	**294**	**168**	**206**	**256**	**462**
Stateless people	**77**	**168**	**139**	**106**	**245**

Source: Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies

Document 14: Personal accounts

One passport, four stories

Laure Lugon Zugravu

As a child, Marcello "commuted" between Italy and Switzerland – between two school systems, two cultures and two languages. Then one day, around the age of 14, he "came down", as he puts it, on the Swiss side. When his parents went back to Umbria for good, he stayed on in Lausanne, got married and had two daughters. "At that time, there wasn't any dual nationality in Italy, and I didn't want to lose my Italian passport – so I didn't ask for Swiss nationality", he explains. It was only later, when Italy accepted dual nationality for Italians, that he decided to apply for the red passport with the white cross on it. "At the customs, for example, my wife and I had to go through different gates. If we'd had to come suddenly from a trip abroad, we mightn't have been able to stay together. It didn't make sense. So I decided to ask for Swiss nationality – for practical reasons, not sentiment. The civic rights aspect also helped to make my mind up – I was sick of politicians taking the decisions without getting a say myself." Since Marcello's wife was Swiss, the simplified naturalisation procedure applied, and cost him a mere 360 Swiss francs.

When you have lived in Switzerland for 12 years without ever going home, when you have been in daily dread, first of being sent back, then of not getting your refugee permit renewed, when you have settled down and paid back the money the state lent you when you were looking for asylum, when you have a steady job and a daughter whose roots are just a few dim memories – then getting a Swiss passport is a natural step, and a form of recognition too. "This passport? It helps me to feel a whole person", says Edith. "I was Romanian to start with, but my life is here now. This passport just stands for a part of myself – the present." And when you have fled a dictatorship and police-state, a new passport is a deliverance as well: "Having Swiss nationality makes me feel safer", Edith goes on. "Before, whenever I had to see an official or policeman, I automatically felt scared – even though they treated me just the way they do now!"

The voting urge

Since they became Swiss, the Popescus have not missed a single ballot. "You obviously want to get involved in civic life once you start settling in and seeing what makes people tick", Edith goes on. And, at the risk of making a dangerous admission, she adds, "I think myself you need a good

(continued)

four years to integrate properly. Before that, you confuse integrating with wanting to be like other people. But it all depends where you come from, how close your culture is." Malvina, who was 9 when she came to Switzerland, is now 23, and was the first to be naturalised, sees things more simply: "The only difference between me and my classmates was when the school was arranging a trip abroad, and I couldn't go because I didn't have a visa." Today, Vlad and Edith's mixed cultural background is symbolised by their two passports, which cost them about 6 000 Swiss francs – and a fair amount of worry.

From *Illustré*, 26 January 2000

Racism and discrimination (p. 44)

Workshop 1: Ask pupils if they themselves have ever been the victims of discrimination. Ask them to say exactly what happened, so that the kind of discrimination involved – racial, ethnic, institutional, etc. – can be determined.

Ask pupils if they have ever witnessed racist behaviour, heard racist jokes or insults, or seen racist graffiti in their schools or neighbourhoods.

Carry out a small survey, to find out what people think about immigrants or ethnic minorities. People with racist and discriminatory attitudes usually conceal them, so ask closed, indirect questions, like the ones below: a "yes" indicates a discriminatory attitude. Discuss the findings in class.

Questions:

Do you think there are too many immigrants/foreigners in our region?

Do you think foreigners commit more crimes than nationals?

Do you think immigration should be restricted?

Do you think the presence of foreigners is a threat to our national culture?

Do you think foreigners cost the community more than nationals?

Do you think foreign workers take our jobs?

Degree of expressed racism
(by country, in %, no-answers excluded)

	Very racist	Fairly racist	A bit racist	Not at all racist
B	22	33	27	19
DK	12	31	40	17
D	8	26	34	32
GR	6	21	31	42
E	4	16	31	49
F	16	32	27	25
IRL	4	20	32	45
I	9	21	35	35
L	2	12	33	54
NL	5	26	46	24
A	14	28	32	26
P	3	14	25	58
FIN	10	25	43	22
S	2	16	40	42
UK	8	24	34	35
EU15	9	24	33	34

Question:
Some people feel they are not at all racist. Others feel they are very racist. Would you look at this card and give me the number that shows your own feelings about this ? If you feel you are not at all racist, you give a score of 1. If you feel you are very racist, you give a score of 10. The scores between 1 and 10 allow you to say how close to either side you are.

To edit this chart, we kept the "not at all racist" category (1 on the scale) and we did the following clusters.
"a bit racist" (2&3), "fairly racist" (4 to 6) and "very racist" (7 to 10)

Document 15: Against intolerance

all different
all equal

European
Passport
against
Intolerance

Source: Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, www.ecri.coe.int

Document 16: Music and the fight against racism

Anti-racist music in France – pro-mix message

Of course, the first "anti-racist music" was not written in the 1980s. Pierre Perret had tackled the subject well before that, in his song *Lilly*, and so had Georges Brassens in *Les imbéciles heureux qui sont nés quelque part* [The happy fools born somewhere or other]. The list includes Jean Ferrat* in *Nuit et brouillard* [Night and fog] or, more recently, *J'ai froid* [I'm cold], in which he attacks resurgent racist persecution, and *Vipères lubriques* [Lustful vipers]. Nor must we forget Enrico Macias: *"ils construisent des maisons qu'ils n'habiteront jamais, les étrangers qui s'exilent pour leurs enfants"* [they build houses they will never live in, the foreigners who leave home for their children's sake] and Alain Souchon with *Poulailler's Song* [Henhouse chanson].

But the 1980s were the time when attacking racism, xenophobia and the new, tougher immigration laws (1986), and calling for a blending of the cultures and for tolerance, became fashionable. The Brazilian Gilberto Gil sang *Touche pas à mon pote* [Hands off my mate], echoed, in a different style, by Alain Bashung in *Tu touches pas à mon pote* [Get your hands off my mate] – his song for the association SOS Racisme, whose yellow-hand symbol appeared on the record cover. There were others too: Francis Cabrel (*Saïd et Mohamed*), Daniel Balavoine (*L'Aziza*), Bernard Lavilliers (*Noir et blanc*) [Black and white], Louis Chedid (*Anne, ma soeur Anne* [Anne, sister Anne], Maxime le Forestier (*Né quelque part*) [Born somewhere], Michel Berger and France Gall (*Babacar*), Yves Simon (*Nés en France*) [Born in France], written in protest at plans to limit *jus soli,* Renaud, Les Rita Mitsouko (*Le petit train*) [The little train], Jean-Jacques Goldman (*Si j'étais né en 1917*) [If I'd been born in 1917], Julien Clerc (*Free demo*), Marc Lavoine (*C'est ça la France*) [That's France for you], Les Innocents (*Colore*), Massilia Sound System (*Ma ville est malade*) [My town's sick], and a few rap groups too. Comedians Coluche, Guy Bedos and Smaïn appeared symbolically together at a 1985 concert, given in the Place de la Concorde (Paris) by performers from a broad range of cultural and ethnic backgrounds, which attracted 300 000 people, and marked SOS-Racisme's highpoint – before a certain disenchantment took over in the 1990s. They also backed Les Restos du Coeur, an association founded by Coluche to feed the destitute in winter, as part of a wider campaign against all forms of exclusion.

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*His father, a Russian Jew who had taken French nationality, was deported during the second world war.

In Lyon, a number of *Beurs* [naturalised second-generation North Africans] set up a band, *Carte de séjour* (residence permit). Proclaiming their "Frenchness", they recorded (with his approval) an "ironic" version of Charles Trenet's *Douce France* [Sweet France], blending raï with Mediterranean rock. Lastly, Amina (a Tunisian singer and actress) and Khaled (born in Oran, who became famous with *Aïcha*, the song he wrote with Jean-Jacques Goldman) represented France at various international cultural events.

In other countries, too, music committed to causes (famine in Ethiopia, Aids, Amnesty International, the release of Nelson Mandela) attracted unprecedented media attention – and the backing of stars such as Simple Minds, Sting and Johnny Clegg.

From: Taïeb, Eric, 1998: *Immigrés l'effet générations*. Paris : Les Editions de l'Atelier, p. 72

Also useful: the anti-racist video clip made for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by the rap group *Soul II Soul,* to make young people more aware of diversity. Available from the UNHCR, Branch Office in Germany:

Telephone and fax: +49 (0) 30/20 22 02-26

E-mail: gfrbe@unhcr.ch

Document 17: Thoughts on xenophobia in Switzerland

Xenophobia came in with the century

Pierre-André Stauffer

In the space of a few years at the end of the last century, a total change took place. Switzerland, which had traditionally sent its surplus peasants abroad to serve in foreign armies, became an immigration country. Industrialisation and large-scale engineering projects attracted foreign workers, particularly from Italy and Germany, and they soon amounted to some 15% of the country's population – western Europe's highest figure. Foreigners became too visible, there were just too many for people to ignore them.

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In 1893, the people of Bern went after Italians, in the so-called Käfigturm riots, which left 40 injured. Three years later in Zurich, a trivial quarrel led to the ransacking of Italian-run cafés and groceries, whose owners took refuge in the woods outside the city. The delusion that there was "a foreigner problem" took hold. Xenophobia reared its ugly head, and stuck to Swiss politics – like gum on a shoe – right through the 20th century.

Up to 1880, people could go more or less where they wanted in in western Europe and Switzerland. A Frenchman could move to Lausanne, without being checked at the frontier, and set up as a grocer, provided he had a police permit – and that was the merest formality. As historian Alain Chavien explains, "the legal apparatus was still very abstract", indeed barely real. What exactly was a foreigner, anyway? In 1880, few people really knew. They made little distinction, if any, between Swiss and non-Swiss migrants. "In spite of the flight from the land, many people still died in the places they were born, and military service was the only thing which occasionally took them out of their home cantons." In these conditions, one did not have to come from very far away to be considered a foreigner. Research by Valais historian Gérald Arlettaz shows that between 1889 and 1904, 34 966 Swiss sought naturalisation, simply to become official residents of the cantons or towns where they had settled – in other words, to feel a little less "foreign" outside their home cantons.

But economic expansion, based on the processing of finished goods for foreign markets, changed the very nature of migration. Italians, for example, tended to work on the big building sites, and to concentrate in certain districts or in shanty-towns. They had little contact with locals. At work, they attracted increasing complaints and resentment from Swiss workers, because they accepted lower wages or were taken on as strike-breakers. Their lower level of education, reflected in behaviour and poor hygiene, was also a frequent cause of contempt. The tensions sometimes led to tragedy, as they did in Bern in 1893, and Zurich in 1896.

Foreigners, being numerous, were seen as a threat to Swiss society – and also, increasingly, as the carriers of new, "un-Swiss" ideas and customs. The debate to which their presence gave rise soon spread throughout the country and, in Gérald Arlettaz's view, led directly to "a questioning of the cultural characteristics of an imperilled Helvetian identity". But the Swiss authorities' answer to the "foreigners question", as it was called at the time, was again an assimilation policy. Secure in the liberal, republican and democratic ideals of 1848, all they had to do was turn every foreigner into a good Swiss – and that would be that. The trouble is that this kind of policy

works only in a self-confident society, and Switzerland had lost its self-confidence since the industrial revolution of 1880.

When war broke put in 1914, the Swiss – ever-faithful to the myths of 1848 – still refused to keep a systematic check on foreigners entering the country. But the introduction of partial rationing in 1917 inflamed the social tensions. "Immigration stopped being an economic and diplomatic issue, and became a cause of national concern in a social and economic context which was deteriorating seriously", explains Gérald Arlettaz. Labour demonstrations, in which foreign deserters and draft-dodgers sometimes played an active part, sparked a strong reaction among the bourgeoisie, who launched a violent campaign against the "undesirables" (the term used at the time by the *Journal de Genève*).

The aim was now to get rid of these "undesirables", who were equated with Soviet revolutionaries. This was no longer presented as a question of public opinion, but as a question of the people's will. The people – promoted, as Gérald Arlettaz puts it, to "hidden god" status – became the idol of the high priests of opinion. The leader-writers were already kowtowing to it. They spoke of righteous anger to come, and of their own tireless pleas for action to avert the meting-out of a terrible punishment.

The scale of these protests found the Federal Council with its back to the wall. On 21 November 1917, it used its supreme authority to pass a first edict, subjecting foreigners to stringent entry and residence conditions. These were to be enforced by a new department within the Department of Justice and the Police: the Office Central de la police des étrangers (Immigration Police Office).

This opened the way to an immigration policy founded on protectionist principles. Originally intended as a special wartime measure, this policy was confirmed on 25 October 1925, when a new constitutional article, giving the confederation the right to legislate on the admission, departure, residence and settlement of foreigners, was approved by referendum. Introduced between 1917 and 1925, this policy totally supplanted the policy of assimilation through naturalisation. Its aim was to forestall "foreign overpopulation", a concept which had more to do with ideology than with demographic fact. The Federal Council itself declared that the state of the labour market must obviously be considered, but that the country's capacity to absorb immigrants and the defence of Swiss identity were equally – and perhaps more – important.

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The state founded on reason and liberty, which had existed in 1848, gave way to reasons of state, the state itself being seen as the sole repositary of the public interest. And this public interest was the yardstick by which foreigners presenting themselves at the border were now judged worthy of admittance or turned away. The full significance of this became apparent in 1938, when the first Jewish victims of the Austrian *Anschluss* were turned back, and again in 1942, a few months after the final solution had been launched, when the frontiers were closed on the pretext that "the boat was full".

In the 1950s and 60s, the country's general interests, which coincided with those of its economy, were best served by a general *laissez-faire attitude*. The immediate post-war boom created a massive need for foreign labour. No one complained, except the trade unions – and their protests against cheap imported labour were, to say the least, half-hearted.

And then, things suddenly went wrong. A new xenophobic movement sprang up in Zurich, led by James Schwarzenbach, who, in a matter of months, became the country's new oracle. The Federal Council and the other authorities were riveted on the economy, and were taken completely by surprise. A few months before a ballot was due on a referendum requested by Schwarzenbach, the government realised that, unless it did something, the people would say "yes" – and might well turn the whole economy upside down by putting 200000 foreign workers out of the country. In the hope of pacifying the masses, it issued a decree, limiting the proportion of foreigners in the total population. No actual percentage was named: it simply had to be *balanced* – would, in other words, vary with the situation. The number of new admissions would be renegotiated annually by trade unions, employers, political parties and other interested groups. This system still operates today.

The Schwarzenbach initiative was rejected with a very small majority, which increased in each of the three ensuing referendums, held up to 1974. Then, as a result of the economic crisis, the foreign population fell temporarily, and the far-right nationalists lost much of their influence. Xenophobia revived when asylum-seekers came on the scene in the late 1980s. According to political analyst Hans Mahnig, of the Swiss Forum for Migration Studies, "The big problem for the Federal Council in the last ten years has been handling the refugee question in a way which ensures that the xenophobia which surrounds asylum-seekers does not rub off onto foreign workers too."

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The fear of blurring the dividing lines is actually so strong that Peter Arbenz's famous report, calling for a global immigration policy, which was published in the early 1990s, has remained a dead letter. The Federal Council has contented itself with tinkering at intervals with the law on asylum. Today, it faces a call for a referendum by Christoph Blocher's Democratic Union of Centre Parties (UDC) – near-identical in tone to the things the leader-writers were saying at the start of the century.

L'Hebdo, No. 48, 26 November 1996.

Chapter 4 – Migration and host countries: the benefits

Demographic impact (p. 51)

Workshop 1: Compare the migration of various groups to your country with the migration of Poles to France, described in case study 1 (chapter 4 p. 53).

Workshop 2: On the basis of your own experience and observations, describe the behaviour patterns of the various groups of foreigners you know, concerning: reproduction, marriage and divorce.

Document 18: Fertility among Turkish women

Turkish women who have moved to western Europe live in countries with fertility norms very different from those they knew at home. In the early 1980s, the average woman in Turkey was still giving birth to more than 4 children (the figure now is around 2.5). At that time, many migrant women were going to countries (particularly Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and France) where families had one or two children (an average fertility of 1.5 children per woman).

Various studies in these countries have shown that Turkish women adjust their reproductive behaviour, gradually bringing it into line with host country norms. This is a step-by-step process, and depends on how long migrants have been arriving.

A few figures will illustrate this. In 1981, the fertility rate for Turkish immigrants in Switzerland was around 3.5 children per woman (that is,

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close to the Turkish norm of 4.2, and a long way from the Swiss norm of 1.5). Fifteen years on, Turkish women averaged fewer than 2 children each, and were half-way between the Swiss (1.5) and the Turkish home figure (2.5).

The rate of adjustment to the host country's pattern is conditioned by various factors, including the husband's nationality, length of residence, where the woman was born and grew up, level of education, links with the home country, plans to return or stay on in the host country, and social and family relations.

Despite this rapid adjustment, a number of typically Turkish features are still present. For one thing, Turkish women start their families far earlier than their contemporaries in the host country. For another, most children are born to married women; births outside wedlock are very rare – in contrast to the situation for women in the host country. In other words, although there has been some adjustment, the reproductive behaviour of these women is still very strongly rooted in their home culture.

Going beyond these findings, one might speculate on the factors which determine changes in fertility, and ask oneself, in particular, whether women culturally conditioned to want larger families can actually have as many children as they want in Europe, or whether financial, economic or social factors limit the size of their families.

Source: Philippe Wanner, Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies

Economic impact (p. 59)

Workshop 1: Identify members of the class who are immigrants or descended from immigrants: what are their parents' occupations?

What kinds of work are done by immigrants in your district/town?

Compare their occupations with those of nationals.

There are always some immigrants who do very special things (football champions, founders of firms, performers). Can you think of examples?

Workshop 2: "Foreigners steal our jobs!" This is often said.

Have you heard people say this? What do you think about it?

Table 22: What Europeans think of "others" – social security benefits

Source: Eurobarometre: *Racism and xenophobia,* November 1989, Courtesy of the European Commission

Table 23: What Europeans think of "others" – unemployment

Their presence in our country increases unemployment

Country	Value
B	21
DK	29
D	31
GR	19
E	39
F	37
IRL	46
I	26
L	43
NL	50
P	38
UK	29

Source: Eurobarometre: *Racism and xenophobia,* November 1989, Courtesy of the European Commission

Document 19: What immigrants contribute

Foreigners give Switzerland more than they get out of it

Le Temps: **Switzerland has always seen foreigners mainly as manpower. Is that really so unusual?**

Jean-Pierre Tabin: I believe that this highly utilitarian view of foreigners is unique to our country. Switzerland sees itself as a family, where blood is what counts, and it's hard to get in. There's an intrinsic element in the Swiss character which expresses itself, more than that of other countries, in keeping foreigners out – perhaps because Swiss nationhood is not based on a shared language or religion.

Le Temps: **Exclusion is reflected in the low rate of naturalisation…**

J.-P. T.: Yes, we have one of the lowest rates in Europe, and it makes foreigners' presence highly visible. Nineteen per cent of the country's population are foreigners, and about a quarter of them were born here. In France, they would be French. The procedures have been improved, but they're still some of the world's most complicated. The kind of thing shown in the film *The Swissmakers* still goes on. And there's the kind of absurdity you get when local votes are taken, and people born and brought up in Switzerland are turned down for naturalisation, because their parents came from Yugoslavia. We've got a million and a half foreigners in Switzerland, and about half of them have been here long enough to qualify for Swiss nationality – but they're never really encouraged to go looking for it.

Le Temps: **What do you think about the crisis in the Federal Committee for Foreigners, with half of the members resigning because it has been attached to the Federal Office for Foreigners?**

J.-P. T.: It's blatant proof that Switzerland has no integration policy. The committee's proposals to the Federal Council contradict the general view of foreigners as people who are there to be useful, to be watched and eventually sent home. It's true that an article on integration has just been included in the law on foreigners, but the budget set aside for this is three times lower than the sum announced: 5 million the first year, 2.5 million every year after that – it's laughable!

Le Temps: **What might the main features of a Swiss integration policy be?**

J.-P. T.: Giving foreigners who settle here political rights – at local level to start with. Other European countries do this, and it's perfectly possible.

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Next, getting rid of all discrimination against foreigners in the social security field. Indeed, Switzerland has to do this, since it has given international commitments. After that, the law on foreigners should be amended to help stabilise the situation, accepting that foreigners are not just passing through, but are here for a very long time. Finally, the official line on foreigners, which systematically highlights the problems they cause, and never the things they contribute, must be changed.

Interview by Yelmarc Roulet, from *Le Temps,* 31 January 2000.

Jean-Pierre Tabin is the author of *Les paradoxes de l'intégration,* Editions EESP, Lausanne, 1999.

Document 20: Polish workers in France and the employment of foreigners bill

The Society of Polish workers in France, based in Lille, has sent us a copy of a letter it sent to Mr Léon Blum, head of the Socialist Group in the Chamber of Deputies, on 10 December. After outlining the way, and the circumstances, in which Polish immigrants helped the French economy to recover immediately after the war, the society goes on:

"Polish workers in France are mainly employed in coal-mining, iron ore and potassium extraction, battery-making, ironworks – and on all the jobs that French workers have left for something better. For example, about 75% of the Ostricourt mining company's workforce are Poles, and our compatriots make up, on average, about 40% of other companies' underground workforce. We do not believe that French unemployed workers in the major cities are willing to go down the mines instead of Poles. Nor do we believe that the proportion of Polish workers in industries favoured by French workers is significant. Checks on foreigners have already eliminated many Poles in French factories, now that foreigners are forbidden to change trades. In some cases, workers have been unable to move from wire-making factories to factories which make farm machinery, and many workers have been dismissed because there are too many foreigners in France, as some northern French companies note on the dismissal notices. Is it really still necessary to bring in a new law limiting the number of foreigners in companies to 10%, and launch a press campaign whipping up hostility to foreigners, who are loyal to France and to the French working class?

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We believe, on the contrary, that working class solidarity must be kept intact at all costs, and that there are other effective ways of protecting French workers – namely an immediate halt to immigration – without affecting the equal rights of foreign workers. This is the spirit behind the law drawn up by Belgian socialists to reduce unemployment in Belgium.

There is no denying that some states are trying to limit immigration for the purpose of protecting their nationals: however, we know of no case in which socialists – who profess international solidarity – have produced a law which creates two categories of legally resident workers in a single country.

A distinction between national and foreign workers may be justified for selfish, national reasons – but we remember that France has always been the home of the democratic ideal of human freedom, that France has always given political fugitives asylum, and that it was France which launched the idea of a United States of Europe, a project which can never be realised if every country is determined to raise a wall against immigrants. For these reasons, the French socialists' draft law, which sets out to weaken the position of foreign workers, is unjustified. We ask you to examine our comments, which are inspired by deep concern regarding the fate of our compatriots in France, and assure you of our unqualified respect for France and fraternal sympathy for the French working class.

St. Rejer, President of the Society of Polish Workers in France

P. Kalinowski, General Secretary of the Society of Polish Workers in France."

Source: http://barthes.ens.fr/clio/docim/entrguer.html
Revue de l'immigration, December 1931, No. 42. p. 18

Social and cultural impact: growing cultural diversity

Use talks, reading and discussion (based on documents given below) to get the class thinking about the following questions: What impact has immigration had on Europeans' daily lives? What problems can it cause? How have European societies reacted to these problems?

Find first-hand accounts (in press articles, videos, radio programmes, etc.) by immigrants and their children of life in host countries and discuss them in class.

Make connections with books, music and films produced by people of immigrant origin.

Table 24: What Europeans think of "others" – customs

Their customs are difficult to understand

Country	Value
B	16
DK	6
D	20
GR	23
E	42
F	24
IRL	21
I	18
L	26
NL	27
P	41
UK	14

Source: Eurobarometre, *Racism and xenophobia,* November 1989, courtesy of the European Commission.

Document 21: Personal view

I'll give you this for starters… I'm a regular at doors. Not any old doors, just the watched ones – the ones with 200 pounds of muscle out front. When there's too much meat, it's true I'm not that keen. And I know what I'm on about. I know my doors, I go through them every day – but more often I get them slammed in my face. I'll tell you how it goes when I turn up – I mean at clubs.

"Please come in, Sir – it's an honour to have you".

Naa, I'm joking – that's not the way it goes. Me, at clubs, I'm always caught by some plonker who decides he's going to pick on me, and comes out with: "I think that's not going to be possible". Not going to be possible! And that's not all – here comes the best bit. Like everyone, I've worked hard for the little I've got. So I started looking for a flat, just to have a decent place to live. I cobbled up a really good CV, did it in colour on a Macintosh – the works! And to top it off, not a stain on my character. Even a few payslips – the lot! Go on, Dad – give him the flat. "I'm honoured – let me show you the patio". Naa, I'm joking again, it's never like that. Once he got a look at me, I saw the picture'd changed. He saw I'm no Bible reader, and he said "I think it's not going to be possible." Not going to be possible!

It's always tomorrow things get better, so I'd put some cash on one side. To get a little place with a balcony and a view across the river – OK, so a pool wouldn't hurt either!

But the good times are a bitch – they're always out of reach. I called "the bank that likes to say yes" for a loan. But the banks are all the same. I don't have the words to tell you. Anyway, here – very quickly – is the way those big-heads operate: "You don't have enough contributions for a full pension. I think you ought to bring your payments up to date and pay off all your debts." And then he gives me this smile and says "It's a shame, but…"

"I think it's not going to be possible." Not going to be possible! But I'm not giving up, brothers and sisters. I've got more punch than a Duracell battery, and I'm not pulling out, like that guy in the film – in the heat of the night. I know all the names they call us, and I know – one day – we'll be the ones having a ball with all these people who act like they live on another planet. I'll have them round to my birthday party, and there'll be no more "What's he up to? What's wrong with him?" and – here we go again – "Who's that fellow?" And all the jerks who judge you by your colour – I'll give them the kicking they deserve. And when they try to get away, it'll be rich. I'll just say "I think that's not going to be possible". Not going to be possible!

From *Zebda,* "Je crois que ça va pas être possible", the Essence ordinaire album, 1999

The following could also be used as teaching resources:

– Azouz Begag, *Le gone du chaâba,* Editions du Seuil, 1986 (novel and film);

– Asian Dub Foundation, *RAFI*, Virgin, 1998 (CD);

– Bisso Na Bisso, *Racines*, V2 Distribution, 1999 (CD);

– Damien O'Donnell, *East is east,* 1999 (film).

Effects on school life: schools and the challenge of cultural and linguistic diversity (p. 66)

Ask a person from another culture, who lives in the same region or town, to come to the class and talk about her or his country and culture. Get a discussion going on "being different";

Ask grandparents about their origins: where they came from, whether they have links with other places, cultures, etc;

Look at the first names of pupils in the class. Try to find out what they mean, and how they are translated into other languages. Note borrowings from one language to another;

Organise a game among the pupils and reverse the roles: get them to imagine and describe the problems they might face if they had to continue their schooling in another country and language; get them to discuss the source of these problems.

Table 25: What Europeans think about "others" – education

The presence of their children reduces the level of education

Country	Value
UK	25
P	54
NL	33
L	28
I	50
IRL	45
F	39
E	59
GR	43
D	30
DK	16
B	28

Source: Eurobarometre, *Racism and xenophobia in Europe,* November 1989, courtesy of the European Commission

"Nearly 60% of respondents said that minorities made cultural life richer, and 70% agreed that 'when schools make the necessary efforts, all children can benefit from the presence of children from minority groups'. However, 53% said that 'when there are too many children from minority groups in schools, the quality of education suffers'."

Source: Eurobarometre, *Racism and xenophobia in Europe,* December 1997, courtesy of the European Commission

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Document 22: Migrant children in Danish schools

Immigrant children are now in the majority in 25% of state schools in Copenhagen. Ten years or so ago, the figure was barely 16%. At one state school in the suburb of Norrebro, about 87% of all the pupils have immigrant parents. The children come from a wide range of countries, including Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and other Arabic-speaking countries. Nationally, the percentage figure for immigrant children at state schools is 8% – double the 1990 level.

Some of these children have problems because they are not fluent in Danish, which is the official classroom language in state schools. The Danish Education Authority has set up a special system to teach them Danish quickly, so that they can go to school with native children. Children in pre-school centres below the age of 4 also get special language lessons, to ensure they know enough Danish before they start primary school. In addition, local authorities run language development courses for children who are not in pre-school or day-care centres. At least 15 hours a week are spent on these.

In state schools, immigrant children also get about five hours' teaching a week in their own language. The Danish Education Ministry reports that about 50% of immigrant children are taught in their home language. As a rule, only people with school certificates are eligible for jobs in Denmark. However, immigrants who arrive with certificates from their own countries have great difficulty finding work. Most of them have to start their schooling again from scratch. Some take jobs, such as cleaning, which require little education. This means that immigrant children who go to school in Denmark and get Danish certificates have better employment opportunities than their parents, who brought certificates from their own countries.

Beauty Chanda Lupiya

Source: GRIOT Special issue: "Migrant children in European schools", No. 25, 18.08.2000
http://www.amarc.org/vsf/Griot/Fre/Archive/Issue25.htm#story3

Document 23: Difficulties faced by immigrant children

Do the children have any special problems at school?

They are raised in family and social environments which do not make for success at school. Two-thirds of immigrant children have parents who have no schooling themselves, and so cannot really help them when they first go to school. One practical result of this is that 52% of these children repeat at least one year of primary school. However, these initial difficulties tend to disappear as their schooling goes on. Immigrant children do quite as well in lower secondary school as French working-class children. Parental attitudes are important here, and immigrant parents are just as keen as French parents to see their children get on by doing well at school.

Geneviève Goëtzinger
Source: http://www.rfi.fr.txt/Kiosque/Mfi/CultureSociete/270396-0.html

Multilingualism: an educational asset in the modern world (p. 68)

Workshop 1: Make a list of the languages spoken in your class or region. Get pupils thinking about the use and value of these languages in the family, in the community and at work. How can their status in the community be improved?

Workshop 2: Make pupils aware that there are different home languages, make them recognise the various accents in the class. Set up two groups to discuss the importance of knowing and using one's home language.

Workshop 3: Set up two or three groups to discuss the following incident, involving a Turkish mother: they should note the positive/negative attitudes of the mother and teacher to the home language:

> At the parents' evening, the teacher asked me if we spoke Turkish at home. When I said we did, he said we ought to speak French with the children, so that they'd learn French more easily – he said we were in Switzerland, not Turkey. I said that, instead of talking bad French to them, I'd rather talk good Turkish. It isn't my job to teach them French, and I really speak it badly. (Quoted in Grin, Rossiaud, Kaya, 2000: p. 275)

119

Document 24: Use of the home language at work

One important point must be made first: most of the immigrants in our sample use several languages at work, and the home language always comes second after French, that is, before English or German. About 56.8% of the respondents use at least two languages at work, 29% use at least three, and just over 9% use four – if only occasionally. [The following tables] contain replies to the question "what is your main (second, third, etc.) working language?

Grin, Rossiaud, Kaya, 2000: p. 189.

Table 26: Main working language used by persons from Italy and Turkey in French speaking Switzerland, based on a survey of 840 persons

Main language used	of Italian origin		of Turkish origin		Total (n=840)
	Foreigners	Naturalised as Swiss	Foreigners	Naturalised as Swiss	
French	**301**	**97**	**274**	**81**	**753**
	94.06%	87.39%	88.96%	80.20%	89.64%
German	**2**	**1**	**4**	**0**	**7**
	0.63%	0.90%	1.30%	0.00%	0.83%
Italian	**10**	**6**	**1**	**0**	**17**
	3.13%	5.41%	0.32%	0.00%	2.02%
English	**5**	**7**	**10**	**10**	**32**
	1.56%	6.31%	3.25%	9.90%	3.81%
Turkish	**0**	**0**	**18**	**8**	**26**
	0.00%	0.00%	5.84%	7.92%	3.10%
Others/ no answer	**2**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**5**
	0.63%	0.00%	0.32%	1.98%	0.60%
TOTAL	**320**	**111**	**308**	**101**	**840**

Numbers and percentages

Table 27: Second working language used by persons from Italy and Turkey in French speaking Switzerland, based on a survey of 477 persons

Second language used	of Italian origin		of Turkish origin		Total (n=477)
	Foreigners	Naturalised as Swiss	Foreigners	Naturalised as Swiss	
French	**15**	**4**	**23**	**16**	58
	7.39%	4.88%	18.85%	22.86%	12.16%
German	**23**	**15**	**9**	**7**	54
	11.33%	18.29%	7.38%	10.00%	11.32%
Italian	**120**	**31**	**6**	**3**	160
	59.11%	37.80%	4.92%	4.29%	33.54%
English	**37**	**28**	**19**	**24**	108
	18.23%	34.15%	15.57%	34.29%	22.64%
Turkish	**0**	**0**	**61**	**19**	80
	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	27.14%	16.73%
Others/ no answer	**8**	**4**	**4**	**1**	17
	3.94%	4.88%	3.28%	1.43%	3.56%
TOTAL	**203**	**82**	**122**	**70**	**477**

Numbers and percentages
Source: Grin, Rossiaud, Kaya, 2000: pp. 190-91

Document 25: The importance of the home language: perceptions

We asked all the people we interviewed why they thought it was important to know and use one's home language. We have divided the reasons given into four categories: "identity" reasons, that is to assert one's continuing membership of a community; "psychological" reasons, that is, to preserve or construct a positive self-image; "educational" reasons, that is, to acquire the ability to use two or even more languages with less effort; and "economic" reasons, that is to make the most of this specific skill on the job market.

Generally, the people we interviewed thought that the home language was primarily important for "identity" and/or "psychological" reasons. This applied equally to people of Italian and Turkish origin.

However, people of Italian origin all agreed that their home language had no economic value, while over half the people of Turkish origin thought that using Turkish had significant economic value, and that it would therefore be useful for them or their children to make the most of it.

Table 28 below shows the distribution of replies to this question. Again, it should be noted that they are in no way representative and are, at most, indicative.

Source: Grin, Rossiaud, Kaya, 2000

Table 28: The importance of knowing and using one's home language: reasons given

Type of reason	Persons of Italian origin (n=20)	Persons of Turkish origin (n=20)	Total (n=40)
Psychological	19	10	29
Educational	15	5	20
Identity/cultural	20	19	39
Economic	0	13	13

Source: Grin, Rossiaud, Kaya, 2000, pp. 273-4.

Document 26: Tuition in their home language for immigrant children in Sweden

All immigrant and refugee pupils are entitled to tuition in their home language as a school subject, and can obtain study materials in that language.

As well as developing skills in their own language, home-language tuition is intended to help them to build a positive self-image, and promote their development as bilingual individuals with a dual cultural identity and dual cultural competence. Another aim is to familiarise them with their home cultures, and to help them keep abreast of developments in their home countries.

The organisation of home-language tuition varies between municipalities. It may be taught in the "free choice" slot on the timetable, as an extra language after Swedish and English, or completely outside the timetable. Over 100 different home languages are represented in Swedish schools.

Attendance at home-language classes is voluntary. The municipalities are legally obliged to provide home-language tuition for all pupils who speak a language other than Swedish with their parents on an everyday basis. They are not obliged to do so, however, if no teacher is available, or if there are fewer than five pupils in the group.

Pupils who take home-language classes outside the normal timetable are entitled to a total of seven years' teaching during compulsory schooling.

Source: http://www.skolverket.se/fakta/faktablad/francaise/immigres;shtml

Chapter 5 – Migration and home countries

If your region has been, or is, an emigration region, list the effects on it. Ask a few families with relatives abroad how the latter have contributed

Visit a firm/shop/business run by a returned migrant. Ask her or him about the kind of work she or he did on getting home. What use did she or he make of the experience gained?

Taking the example of the Malian community in France (see document 7, chapter 5), get the class talking about migrants' role in the economic development of home countries or regions. How can this role be promoted?

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This study examines all aspects of migration, its different flows and types, such as economic, forced and ethnic, as well as its impact on economics, demography and social and cultural life. National policies on integration and naturalisation, and how they are conditioned are examined and compared. From a variety of sources (maps, statistics, first person accounts of migrant life – sometimes humorous, sometimes tragic – novels, films and surveys), a web of causes and effects emerges, depicting migrant life today. In this way, the reader gains an overview and the beginning of a deeper understanding of this complex subject.

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