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**Discussion paper** 

# **Cybercrime strategies**

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Panellists in the workshop included Markko Künnapu (Estonia), Christopher Painter (USA), Jayantha Fernando (Sri Lanka), Andrew Cushman (Microsoft), Bill Smith (PayPal) and Zahid Jamil (Pakistan). Many of the 90 participants intervened in the discussion. The present version takes into account comments made during that workshop.

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## **1** Introduction

The security of information and communication technology (ICT) as well as the question of cybercrime have been of concern for some time.<sup>1</sup> However, it was only in the recent past, that governments began to understand the significance of ICT security for societies that are being transformed by technology and that have become reliant on computer networks. The security of ICT is thus becoming a policy priority of many governments.

The 2007 attacks on Estonia<sup>2</sup> were instrumental in this respect. Many countries responded by adopting cybersecurity strategies. For example:

- Australia Attorney General Department (2009): Cyber Security Strategy<sup>3</sup>
- Canada (2010): Canada's Cyber security Strategy<sup>4</sup>
- Czech Republic (2011): Cyber Security Strategy for the Czech Republic for the 2011 – 2015 Period<sup>5</sup>
- Estonia Ministry of Defence (2008): Cyber Security Strategy<sup>6</sup>
- France Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systems d'Information (2011):
   Défense et securité des systems d'information Stratégie de la France<sup>7</sup>
- Germany Federal Ministry of the Interior (2011): Cyber Security Strategy for Germany<sup>8</sup>
- Netherlands (2011): The National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS)<sup>9</sup>
- United Kingdom (2011): The UK Cyber Security Strategy<sup>10</sup>

Other countries, such as India<sup>11</sup> or South Africa<sup>12</sup>, are in the process of developing similar strategies or policies.<sup>13</sup>

Cybersecurity strategies are setting policy goals, measures and institutional responsibilities in a fairly succinct manner. Generally, the primary concern is to ensure the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For example, the first Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was created in 1988 at Carnegie Mellon University; in 1989 the Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers) adopted recommendation R(89)9 on computer-related crime; in the 1990s many governments began to adopt legislation on cybercrime or electronic crime; in 2001, the Council of Europe adopted the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime; in 2002, the OECD adopted "Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks" etc. <sup>a</sup> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007\_cyberattacks\_on\_Estonia

http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(4CA02151F94FFB778ADAEC2E6EA8653D)~AG+Cyber

<sup>+</sup> Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf/\$ file/AG + Cyber + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf + Security + Security + Strategy + - + for + website.pdf + Security + S

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/cbr/\_fl/ccss-scc-eng.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/CZ\_Cyber\_Security\_Strategy\_20112015.PDF

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> http://www.eata.ee/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Estonian\_Cyber\_Security\_Strategy.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2011-02-

<sup>15</sup>\_Defense\_et\_securite\_des\_systemes\_d\_information\_strategie\_de\_la\_France.pdf 8

http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED\_Verwaltung/Informationsgesellschaft/cy ber\_eng.pdf;jsessionid=365A25B8FF75170FF9566570016DDEA9.1\_cid165?\_\_blob=publicationFile

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/dutch-cyber-security-strategy-2011

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> http://www.mit.gov.in/sites/upload\_files/dit/files/ncsp\_060411.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/100219cybersecurity.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Strategies such as the *International Strategy for Cyberspace* of the White House/USA (2011) has a broader scope than cyber security or cybercrime but these are listed as important "policy priorities". <u>http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\_viewer/internationalstrategy\_cyberspace.pdf</u> See also USA – Department of Defence (2011): Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace <u>http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf</u>

confidentiality, integrity and availability (c-i-a) of computer data and systems and to protect against or prevent intentional and non-intentional incidents and attacks. Priority is given to critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP).

Some of these strategies contain also measures against cybercrime. Indeed, measures against cybercrime provide a criminal justice response to c-i-a attacks against computers and thus complement technical and procedural cybersecurity responses.

However, cybercrime comprises also offences committed by means of computer data and systems, ranging from the sexual exploitation of children to fraud, hate speech, intellectual property rights (IPR) infringements and many other offences. These are not necessarily part of cybersecurity strategies.

Furthermore, any crime may involve electronic evidence in one way or the other. While this may not be labelled "cybercrime", a cybercrime strategy would nevertheless need to ensure that the forensic capabilities be created that are necessary to analyse electronic evidence in relation to any crime, or that all law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges are provided at least with basic skills in this respect.

Strategies and measures against cybercrime ("cybercrime control") thus follow a criminal justice rationale. They are linked to broader crime prevention and criminal justice policies and they are (or should be) aimed at contributing to the rule of law and the promotion of human rights.

In short, while strategies on cybersecurity and cybercrime control are interrelated, intersecting and complementary, they are not identical. A cybersecurity strategy does not address the full range of cybercrime issues, and a cybercrime strategy not the full range of cybersecurity issues.

Governments may therefore want to consider the preparation of specific cybercrime strategies or enhance cybercrime components within cybersecurity strategies or policies.

The purpose of the present paper is to add impetus to such considerations. Following discussions at the Internet Governance Forum (Workshop 115 on Cybercrime Strategies) in Kenya, Nairobi, on 28 September 2011<sup>14</sup>, and the Council of Europe's Octopus conference (Strasbourg, France, 22 November 2011),<sup>15</sup> it was updated in December 2011 to feed into the preparation of cybercrime strategies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/chronocontact/?chronoformname=Workshops2011View&wspid=115

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> <u>www.coe.int/octopus</u>

# 2 Cybercrime and cybersecurity: current concepts and strategies

### 2.1 Cybersecurity

A cursory review of cybersecurity strategies adopted or in preparation<sup>16</sup> suggests that these are high-level policy documents motivated by the:

- reliance of society on cyber space which means that the security and resilience of and trust and confidence in ICT is a matter of national interest
- economic role and potential of ICT and the intention of maximising benefits and exploiting opportunities that these offer
- fact that cyber attacks in particular against critical information infrastructure may threaten national security. Thus, cybersecurity strategies are typically linked to national security and defence strategies.

Concepts, aims or definitions of "cybersecurity", therefore, combine political (national interest and security) and technical dimensions whereby cybersecurity is typically defined as the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems in order to enhance security, resilience, reliability and trust in ICT.

Some cybersecurity strategies, in their vision, refer to the need for the protection and promotion of human rights and the rule of law.<sup>17</sup> However, the security, stability or resilience of the Internet so that people can exercise their freedom of expression and other rights seems not to be a primary objective of cybersecurity.<sup>18</sup>

Cybersecurity strategies appear to give highest priority to the protection of public and private sector critical information infrastructure as well as of government computer systems against:

- non-intentional incidents caused by malfunctioning of technology, coincidental failures, human failure, natural disasters and others
- intentional attacks by state and non-state actors, including botnet attacks to disrupt information infrastructure, unauthorised access and interception of data

http://ec.europa.eu/information\_society/policy/nis/docs/principles\_ciip/quidelines\_internet\_fin.pdf See also the US International Strategy for Cyberspace of 2011 6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See in the appendix the overview of cyber security strategies in Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Netherlands, South Africa, United Kingdom as examples. For additional analyses or relevant texts on cyber- or information security see:

ENISA (2010): Country reports – Overview http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/sr/files/country-reports/enisa\_country\_reports\_introduction.pdf

 <sup>–</sup> OECD (2002): Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security. Paris http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/22/15582260.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The need to ensure that the "security of information systems and networks should be compatible with essential values of a democratic society" was already underlined in the OECD principles of 2002. The draft "European principles and guidelines for Internet resilience and stability" state that these principles should be guided by core European values, in particular human rights.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\_viewer/internationalstrategy\_cyberspace.pdf <sup>18</sup> At the same time, the Council of Europe underlines that critical internet resources and the "universality, integrity and openness" of the Internet are to be protected so that everyone can benefit from human rights and fundamental freedoms (see Recommendation on the protection and promotion of Internet's universality, integrity and openness

https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Rec(2011)8&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383

and communications (including computer espionage) or the manipulation or destruction of data and systems (including computer sabotage).<sup>19</sup>

Intentional attacks seem to be the primary concern. Threat actors listed are states, terrorists or criminals, whereby attribution and the blurring line between state and non-state actors are considered problems.

Cybersecurity strategies tend to focus on technical, procedural and institutional measures, such as risk and vulnerability analyses, early warning and response, incident management, information sharing, setting up of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) or Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), increased international cooperation and other measures to ensure protection, mitigation and recovery.

Criminal justice or other measures against cybercrime are usually not among the priorities of cybersecurity strategies. Some make none or only general reference to cybercrime, or specifically exclude cybercrime from the scope of the strategy. Others may include some measures against cybercrime among many others.<sup>20</sup>

Considering the political and technical dimensions of cybersecurity strategies, responsibility for coordinating, managing and implementing typically lays with national cybersecurity "boards", "councils" or "committees" composed of representatives of relevant institutions, including cabinet offices, national defence, intelligence, ministries of interior and others. The technical dimension is covered by institutions such as departments for ICT, information security agencies, as well as CERTs, CSIRTs or similar incident response institutions. Technical institutions tend to play a leading role in the development of cybersecurity strategies. Criminal justice authorities (with exceptions) seem to have only a subordinated role.

### 2.2 Cybercrime

Cybercrime may be defined in a narrow sense as any offence targeting computer data and systems or in a very broad sense as any offence involving a computer system. The first one risks being too restrictive as it would exclude phenomena that do exist in the physical world but have gained a different quality and impact through the use of computers, such as child pornography, fraud or intellectual property right violations. The latter would be too broad as most crime nowadays involves a computer in one way or the other.

It is therefore expedient to apply a definition that covers new types of crime as well as old types of crime using computers without being too broad and therefore meaningless. The definition should be sufficiently robust to cover all relevant types of conduct even if technology evolves and phenomena of cybercrime appear to change almost every day. Finally, it should be possible to operationalise it for criminal law purposes in order to meet the rule of law principle that there cannot be a crime without a law. Only conduct established as a criminal offence can be considered a crime.

A definition should furthermore be widely accepted and not be limited to a specific country and the corresponding domestic legislation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> This type of conduct is broadly covered by articles 2 to 6 of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, that is, illegal access, illegal interception, data and systems interference, and misuse of devices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The UK Cyber Security Strategy of November 2011 is an exceptional case in that it puts major emphasis on measures against cybercrime. See below for more details.

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf

A concept or "definition" meeting these requirements, that is neither too narrow nor too broad, that is normative and that is widely accepted, is available with the Council of Europe's Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.<sup>21</sup> Under this treaty, cybercrime denotes:

- Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems, that is, offences against computer data and systems, including illegal access, illegal interception, data and system interference, misuse of devices<sup>22</sup>
- Offences committed by means of computer systems. This list is limited<sup>23</sup> to those "old" forms of crime that obtain a new quality through the use of computers, that is, computer-related forgery and fraud, child pornography and offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights on a commercial scale.<sup>24</sup>

This concept is capable of capturing cases that consist of a combination of different types of conduct.  $^{\rm 25}$ 

Although the Budapest Convention was prepared by the Council of Europe (with currently 47 European member states), Canada, Japan, South Africa and the USA participated in its elaboration and signed it. The USA ratified it and became a full party in 2006. Other non-European countries are in the process of accession to the Convention on Cybercrime (Argentina, Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Philippines and Senegal). The concept or "definition" of cybercrime as proposed by the Budapest Convention is widely shared and applied in practice.

In addition to offences against and by means of computer data and systems, the Budapest Convention addresses a further issue, namely, the question of electronic evidence in relation to any crime involving a computer system.<sup>26</sup> Obviously, even the broadest definition would not consider an offence where computers play an ancillary role<sup>27</sup> to constitute cybercrime.

However, governments – possibly as part of a cybercrime strategy – would have to address the challenge of creating the criminal justice capabilities necessary for the collection, analysis and use of electronic evidence not only in relation to crimes against and by means of computers<sup>28</sup> but in relation to any crime. This broadens the scope: since any offence may involve electronic evidence, not only a few specialised officers need to be trained, but more or less all law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges.

http://www.m86security.com/documents/pdfs/security\_labs/cybercriminals\_target\_online\_banking.pdf. <sup>26</sup> See Article 14 of the Budapest Convention on the scope of procedural provisions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> www.coe.int/cybercrime

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The misuse of devices (article 6) which refers to the production, sale, procurement or otherwise making available of devices or data for the purpose of committing the above offences, such as "hacking" tools

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> However, the Budapest Convention contains a set of procedural law and international cooperation measures. These apply to any crime involving electronic evidence or committed by means of a computer system. This provides it with a very wide scope (see article 14).
<sup>24</sup> An additional Protocol equation the criminal involving electronic evidence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> An additional Protocol covers the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (CETS 189).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> For example, fraud cases where Trojans are used to steal banking information and intercept online transactions may comprise illegal access, illegal interception, data and systems interference, as well as forgery and fraud. See the case documented by M 86 Security (White Paper): Cybercriminals Target Online Banking Customers (August 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Such an email communication in a case of kidnapping.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Which include mobile and smart phones and similar devices.

As indicated above, measures against cybercrime are often referred to in cybersecurity strategies<sup>29</sup> and include, for example, the strengthening of:

- legislation, including global harmonisation
- operational law enforcement capacities through additional resources and powers
- law enforcement and judicial training
- interagency cooperation
- industry/law enforcement cooperation
- international cooperation.

While cybersecurity strategies address the issue of cybercrime only to some extent and while only few countries adopted specific cybercrime strategies, a wide range of measures has been taken by governments, institutions, the private sector or international organisations that could form part of cybercrime strategies.

These range from reporting and intelligence systems, specific legislation, high-tech crime or other specialised units and forensic capabilities, to law enforcement and judicial training, law enforcement/service provider and other types of public-private cooperation, and international cooperation. Special attention has been given to the protection of children, in particular against sexual exploitation, and is increasingly being given to financial investigations.

Strategies or measures against cybercrime follow a criminal justice logic and should therefore be embedded in rule of law and human rights principles.

Article 15 of the Budapest Convention helps find a balance between an obligation of the state to protect people against crime on the one hand, and the need to limit law enforcement powers on the other hand. It establishes a number of general principles with regard to conditions and safeguards and makes reference to international human rights standards.<sup>30</sup>

General rule of law principles include:

- There shall be no punishment without a law<sup>31</sup>
- Everyone has the right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence<sup>32</sup>
- Any interference in the rights of individual can only be in accordance with the law and as is necessary in the public interest - including crime prevention - or the protection of the rights of others.<sup>33</sup> This means that investigative measures – in particular if they entail an intrusion into rights - must be prescribed by law

<sup>30</sup> See Council of Europe/CyberCrime@IPA: Article 15 – Conditions and Safeguards under the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (discussion paper with examples of Netherlands, USA and Croatia).

"1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Such as those of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India (draft) or Netherlands.

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Reports-

Presentations/2467\_SafeguardsRep\_v18\_29mar12.pdf <sup>31</sup> See Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights or Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights or Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See for example Article 8 of the European Convention of Human rights:

<sup>2</sup> There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

- Anyone whose rights are violated must have the right to an effective remedy<sup>34</sup>
- States need to put in place a framework that allows to reconcile different interests that are to be protected
- States have a positive obligation to protect the rights of individuals, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This may include criminal law and effective enforcement to bring offenders to justice.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to these general ones, a number of principles apply to the procedural powers of law enforcement:

- Principle of proportionality, meaning in particular that "the power or procedure shall be proportional to the nature and circumstances of the offence".<sup>36</sup> For example, particularly intrusive measures, such as interception, are to be limited to serious offences
- Judicial or other independent supervision
- Grounds justifying the application of the power or procedure and the limitation on the scope or the duration
- Powers and procedures must be reasonable and "consider the impact on the rights, responsibilities and legitimate interests of third parties".<sup>37</sup>

If these principles are respected, an appropriate balance can be found with regard to criminal justice measures against cybercrime.

In practice, the balance is the result of a discoursive process. In many countries, legislation and cybercrime enforcement are subject to controversial debates in media and parliaments or challenged before (constitutional) courts. This is a reflection of functioning checks and balances in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

For that reason, Article 15 refers the modalities and implementation or the specific conditions for specific investigative measures in a specific country or situation to the domestic legal and judicial system.

With regard to cybersecurity, however, such a balance appears to be more difficult to find. To the extent that cybersecurity is regarded as an issue of national interest, the risk is that cybersecurity is removed from the criminal justice arena – with its rule of law and human rights safeguards – to the national security arena with its exceptions to rule of law and human rights guarantees.

### 2.3 The UK Cyber Security Strategy (November 2011)

The UK Cyber Security Strategy<sup>38</sup> is different from most other strategies on cybersecurity. Prior to November 2011, the United Kingdom was one of a very few countries that had not only a "Cyber Security Strategy" (2009)<sup>39</sup> but also a separate "Cyber Crime Strategy" (2009).<sup>40</sup> These were replaced by the new strategy in November 2011 combing measures on both cybersecurity and cybercrime.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> See for example, K.U. v. Finland

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> See paragraph 146 of the Explanatory Report

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Article 15 (3) Budapest Convention

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> http://www.cybersecuritymarket.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/css0906.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> <u>http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm78/7842/7842.pdf</u>

#### The strategy is guided by the vision:

"for the UK in 2015 to derive huge economic and social value from a vibrant, resilient and secure cyberspace, where our actions, guided by our core values of liberty, fairness, transparency and the rule of law, enhance prosperity, national security and a strong society."

It comprises four objectives, the first of which is aimed at cybercrime:

- 1. "The UK to tackle cyber crime and be one of the most secure places in the world to do business in cyberspace
- 2. The UK to be more resilient to cyber attacks and better able to protect our interests in cyberspace
- 3. The UK to have helped shape an open, stable and vibrant cyberspace which the UK public can use safely and that supports open societies
- 4. The UK to have the cross-cutting knowledge, skills and capability it needs to underpin all our cyber security objectives."

With respect to the first objective on tackling cybercrime, the plan of implementation lists 24 action items:

- 1. "Encourage the courts in the UK to use existing powers to impose appropriate online sanctions for online offences
- Create a new national cyber crime capability as part of the new National Crime Agency by 2013
- 3. Encourage the use of 'cyber-specials' to bring in those with specialist skills to help the police.
- Significantly increase the law enforcement agency capability on cyber crime by March 2012, and develop new training, giving more capability to understand investigate and disrupt cyber crime
- 5. More resources will go into working with the private sector and our international partners in 2012, and from now SOCA will increase the focus of cyber crime in its international network
- 6. Promote greater levels of international cooperation and shared understanding on cyber crime as part of the process begun by the London Conference on Cyberspace, in addition to promoting the Council of Europe's Convention on Cyber crime (the Budapest Convention) and building on the new EU Directive on attacks on information systems. Contribute to the review of security provisions of the EU Data Protection Directive and the proposed EU Strategy on Information Security
- 7. Review existing legislation, for example the Computer Misuse Act 1990, to ensure that it remains relevant and effective.
- By the end of 2011, build a single reporting system for citizens and small businesses to report cyber crime so that action can be taken and law enforcement agencies can establish the extent of cyber crime (including how it affects individuals and the economy)
- 9. Commencing this year, the police will mainstream cyber awareness, capacity and capabilities throughout their service.
- 10. Take action to tackle hate crime on the internet with a plan to be published in Spring 2012.
- 11. Exploring the ways in which GCHQ's expertise could more directly benefit economic growth and support the development of the UK cyber security sector without compromising the agency's core security and intelligence mission.

- 12. Starting in January 2012, harnessing the wider private sector joint working initiative on cyber security to ensure that law enforcement fully engages with business in information sharing and minimising the risks from cyber crime
- 13. Working with domestic, European, global and commercial standards organisations to stimulate the development of industry-led standards and guidance that help customers to navigate the market and differentiate good cyber security products.
- 14. Work with business services providers (including insurers, lawyers and auditors) to discuss how they can develop the services they offer to businesses to help them manage and reduce the risks.
- 15. Work with other countries to make sure that we can co-operate on cross-border law enforcement and deny safe havens to cyber criminals.
- 16. Ensure that new national procedures (adopted in May 2011) for responding to cyber incidents, and the developing partnership between government and the private sector, facilitate agile information sharing on threats to business, with mitigating advice aimed at reducing impacts.
- 17. Bolstering (and, where necessary, building at pace) new operational partnerships between the public and private sectors to share information on threats, manage cyber incidents, develop trend analysis and build cyber security capability and capacity. Led by the Prime Minister and representatives of industry, an initial operating capability will be in place by March 2012.
- Support GetSafeOnline.org to become the single authoritative point of advice on responding to cyber threats (for example, the recent publication of an internet safety guide).
- 19. Promote robust levels of cyber security in online public services, allowing people to transact online with government with confidence.
- 20. Enable the UK cyber security industry to thrive and expand, supporting it in accessing overseas markets.
- 21. Develop a better understanding of the cyber security industry's strengths, growth potential and barriers to success.
- 22. Develop a marketing strategy to promote internationally the capabilities of the UK cyber security industry, by March 2012.
- 23. Raise awareness amongst businesses of the threat and actions that they can take to protect themselves including working through strategically important sectors to raise cyber security issues throughout their supply chains.
- 24. Encourage industry-led standards and guidance that are readily used and understood, and that help companies who are good at security make that a selling point."

Like other cybersecurity strategies, the UK strategy is aimed at promoting national interests, comprises measures to protect the critical national infrastructure and foresees a role for the Ministry of Defence. However, unlike in other strategies, equal if not more emphasis is put on measures against cybercrime.

And unlike in many other cybersecurity strategies, respect for human rights and the rule of law is to be ensured through the following "principles":

"... balancing security with freedom and privacy<sup>41</sup>

3.5 At home we will pursue cyber security policies that enhance individual and collective security while preserving UK citizens' right to privacy and other fundamental values and freedoms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> UK Cyber Security Strategy, p. 22

3.6 Internationally the UK will continue to pursue the development of norms of acceptable behaviour in cyberspace. We start from the belief that behaviour which is unacceptable offline should also be unacceptable online. Our position will be guided by the principles proposed by the Foreign Secretary in February 2011 and reiterated at the London Conference on Cyberspace this November:

- The need for governments to act proportionately in cyberspace and in accordance with national and international law.
- The need for everyone to have the ability in terms of skills, technology, confidence and opportunity – to access cyberspace.
- The need for users of cyberspace to show tolerance and respect for diversity of language, culture and ideas.
- The need to ensure that cyberspace remains open to innovation and the free flow of ideas, information and expression.
- The need to respect individual rights of privacy and to provide proper protection to intellectual property.
- The need for us all to work collectively to tackle the threat from criminals acting online.
- The promotion of a competitive environment which ensures a fair return on investment in network, services and content. "

While it remains to be seen how the strategy is implemented in practice, the UK Cyber Security Strategy seems to address some of the issues addressed earlier in this paper. It could serve as an example for combining cybersecurity and cybercrime measures in one strategy while also addressing human rights and rule of concerns.

# 3 Cybercrime policies and strategies: possible elements

The approach to cybercrime in a specific country is influenced by many factors, including the nature of the threat, the state of the criminal justice system, the level of respect for human rights and the rule of law (including the approach to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression), the cybersecurity landscape or the relationship between public and private sectors.<sup>42</sup>

A blue-print or "model" cybercrime strategy may therefore be of limited value. However, the following could be elements of cybercrime strategies and could be further elaborated and adapted to the specific conditions of a country.

### 3.1 Scope of a cybercrime strategy

Cybercrime may be understood to comprise

- offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems (as a minimum illegal access, illegal interception, data and system interference (including denial of service attacks and other botnet and malware activity) as well as the misuse of devices for the commission of such offences<sup>43</sup>
- offences committed by means of computer data and systems, specifically those that have acquired a different quality or scope through the use of computers, including as minimum child pornography or the sexual exploitation and abuse of children, forgery and fraud, and offences related to intellectual property right infringements.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to offences against and by means of computers, electronic evidence can play a role with regard to almost any offence. Even if an ancillary role of computers does not constitute cybercrime, a cybercrime strategy may need to address the question of admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and ensure that law enforcement and other criminal justice authorities are capable of collecting, analysing and presenting electronic evidence.

While offences against computer data and systems gain in impact, in particular when critical information infrastructure is attacked, it is in particular offences committed by means of computers that cause very large damage to individuals and public and private sector organisations. The need to address the question of electronic evidence implies that the vast majority of law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges of a country would need to be trained.

The scope, damage and impact of cybercrime and the wide range of measures to be taken suggest that there is justification for a strategic approach and the allocation of resources to address cybercrime and electronic evidence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Comment made by Monika Josi, Roger Halbheer and Jean-Christophe Le Toquin

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> These correspond to articles 2 to 6 of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> These correspond to articles 7 to 10 of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Article 9 is about "child pornography" while the broader concept of the sexual exploitation and abuse of children is subject of the Lanzarote convention CETS 201 (Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse).

### **3.2 Objective of a cybercrime strategy**

Overall objective: to ensure that the rule of law applies and that legitimate rights are protected also in the ICT and online environment

Specific objective: to ensure an effective criminal justice response to offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computers and by means of computers as well as to any offence involving electronic evidence.

#### 3.3 Measures

#### 3.3.1 Cybercrime reporting and intelligence

Reporting channels should be established to allow users but also public and private sector organisations report cybercrime. This will enhance the understanding of scope, threats and trends and the collation of data to detect patterns of organised criminality.<sup>45</sup>

Given the fast evolution of technologies and with it cybercrime and techniques used by criminals, building intelligence is of particular importance to assess threats and predict trends, and thus to help adjust measures against strategies.

#### 3.3.2 Prevention

Public education and awareness, the empowerment of users and technical and other measures should be essential elements of cybercrime strategies. Specific measures should be envisaged for the online protection children<sup>46</sup> and for fraud prevention.<sup>47</sup>

#### 3.3.3 Legislation

States should adopt legislation that is harmonised with international standards  $^{\rm 48}$  in order to:

- criminalise conduct<sup>49</sup>
- provide law enforcement with procedural law tools for efficient investigations
- establish safeguards and conditions limiting investigative powers<sup>50</sup> as well as adopting data protection regulations.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup> See article 15 of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Examples are the Internet Complaint Center

<sup>(&</sup>lt;u>http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2009\_IC3Report.pdf</u>). The "Melde- und Analysestelle Informationssicherung" (MELANI) in Switzerland (<u>http://www.melani.admin.ch</u>), the National Fraud Reporting Centre in the UK (<u>http://www.actionfraud.org.uk/home</u>), or Signal Spam in France (<u>https://www.signal-spam.fr/</u>).

 $http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Protecting\%20 children/Default_en.asp$ 

t\_en.asp <sup>47</sup> For examples of different types of fraud prevention measures see: <u>http://www.ic3.gov/preventiontips.aspx</u>

http://www.stoppbetrug.ch/4/fr/1prevention\_methodes\_descroquerie/40201ventes\_aux\_encheres.php http://www.polizei-nrw.de/koeln/Vorbeugung/kriminalitaet/INTERNET-und-datenkriminalitaet/ http://www.visa.ca/en/merchant/fraud-prevention/index.isp

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Budapest Convention on Cybercrime www.coe.int/cybercrime

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> For example, articles 2 to 10 of the Budapest Convention as a minimum

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> For example in line with the Data Protection Convention 108 of the Council of Europe

http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=108&CM=8&DF=22/08/2011&CL=ENG

#### 3.3.4 High-tech crime and other specialised units

Specialised units, such as high-tech crime units, prosecution services responsible for cybercrime and services for cyberforensics will need to be created.<sup>52</sup>

#### 3.3.5 Interagency cooperation

Cybercrime is not the sole responsibility of a specific (specialised) unit. For example, hightech crime units may provide support to other services investigating fraud, money laundering or child pornography, or cooperate with CERTS or other institutions responsible for cybersecurity. Specific procedures and mechanisms for interagency cooperation would need to be established

#### 3.3.6 Law enforcement training

The objective of a specific law enforcement training strategy could be to ensure that law enforcement officers have the skills/competencies necessary for their respective functions to

- investigate cybercrime
- secure electronic evidence
- and carry out computer forensics analyses for criminal proceedings
- assist other agencies
- contribute to network security.

The first step towards such a training strategy would be a training needs analysis (covering requirements from first responders to generic investigators, specialist investigators, internet crime investigators, covert internet crime investigators, network crime investigators, digital forensic investigators and managers).<sup>53</sup>

#### 3.3.7 Judicial training

A judicial training concept should ensure that all judges and prosecutors have at least basic knowledge to deal with cybercrime and electronic evidence. This means that such training needs to be integrated into the regular judicial training system of a country. A coherent concept would be required to ensure this.<sup>54</sup> The objectives could be:

- to enable training institutes to deliver initial and in-service cybercrime training based on international standards
- to equip the largest possible number of future and practicing judges and prosecutors with basic knowledge on cybercrime and electronic evidence
- to provide advanced training to a critical number of judges and prosecutors

http://www.coe.int/t/dgn/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Reports Presentations/Octopus2011/2467 HTCU study V30 9Nov11.pdf 53 The Council of European under its CyberCrime@IDA joint project with the European

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> The Council of Europe under its CyberCrime@IPA joint project with the European Union and in cooperation with the EU Cybercrime Task Force in 2011 prepared a good practice study on "specialised cybercrime units". http://www.coe.int/t/dqhl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Reports-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> The Council of Europe – under its CyberCrime@IPA joint project with the European – is supporting countries of South-eastern Europe in the development of such strategies.

http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Cyber%20IPA%20reports/2 467 LEA Training Strategy Fin1.pdf <sup>54</sup> The Council of Europe – under its Global Project on Cybercrime – developed such concept in 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> The Council of Europe – under its Global Project on Cybercrime – developed such concept in 2009. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Training/default\_en.asp

- to support the continued specialisation and technical training of judges and prosecutors
- to contribute to enhanced knowledge through networking among judges and prosecutors
- to facilitate access to different training initiatives and networks.

#### 3.3.8 Public/private (LEA/ISP) cooperation

All cybersecurity strategies underline the need for public/private cooperation. With respect to cybercrime, cooperation between law enforcement and service providers is particularly essential. Memoranda of Understanding or other types of agreements could be considered to provide a framework for efficient cooperation that defines expectations, responsibilities, authorities but also limitations and that ensures that the rights of users are protected.<sup>55</sup>

Positive examples of public/private cooperation are available<sup>56</sup> and could be built upon.

#### 3.3.9 Effective international cooperation

Cybercrime is transnational crime involving multiple jurisdictions. Efficient international police to police and judicial cooperation is required to preserve volatile electronic evidence. This includes direct cooperation between high-tech crime units and between prosecutors of different countries. 24/7 points of contact in line with Article 35 of Budapest Convention and as promoted by the G8 High-tech Crime Sub-group should be established.<sup>57</sup>

Chapter III of the Convention on Cybercrime provides a legal framework for international cooperation with general and specific measures, including the obligation of countries to cooperate to the widest extent possible, urgent measures to preserve data and efficient mutual legal assistance. States should also consider accession to this treaty to make use of these provisions.

#### 3.3.10 Financial investigations and prevention of fraud and money laundering

Obtaining financial or other economic benefits has been one motivation of cybercriminals from the very beginning. However, there is general agreement that generating proceeds is now the primary purpose of cybercrime. The type of cybercrime in this respect is fraud.<sup>58</sup>

Public authorities but also private sector organisations should pay particular attention to the prevention of fraud and money laundering but also to financial investigations to search, seize and confiscate proceeds from cybercrime. Such measures may include cybercrime reporting systems; prevention and public awareness; regulation licensing and supervision; risk management and due diligence, harmonisation of legislation, interagency cooperation, public/private cooperation and information exchange<sup>59</sup> and other measures.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> In 2008, the Council of Europe's Octopus Conference adopted guidelines that can help structure such cooperation.

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/LEA\_ISP/default\_en.asp <sup>56</sup> Examples include cooperation with CERTS, Signal Spam in France (<u>https://www.signal-spam.fr/</u>) and others.

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Points%20of%20Contact/567 \_24\_7report3a%20\_2%20april09.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> For an A-Z of fraud schemes see <u>http://www.actionfraud.org.uk/a-z of fraud</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC) for the financial sector <u>http://www.fsisac.com/</u>, <u>http://www.samentegencybercrime.nl/</u>,

http://www.samentegencybercrime.nl/Informatie\_knooppunt/Sectorale\_ISACs/FIISAC?p=content

#### Protection of children 3.3.11

Empowering children and fostering their trust and confidence in the Internet together with the protection of their dignity, security and privacy requires a comprehensive set of measures that go beyond the scope of cybercrime or cybersecurity strategies.<sup>61</sup> However, special attention is to be paid to the prevention and control of the sexual exploitation and abuse of children. The Lanzarote Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse provides a framework for a comprehensive set of measures.62

Countries need criminalise child pornography and other conduct in line with international standards<sup>63</sup> and establish the conditions for effective enforcement.

#### 3.4 Responsibilities for management, coordination, implementation, monitoring

If cybercrime policies or strategies are adopted, responsibilities for implementation need to be assigned and the strategy is to be managed, coordinated and monitored. Public institutions responsible for rule of law matters would need to take the lead while at the same time multi-stakeholder involvement is to be ensured.

#### 3.5 Technical assistance for capacity building<sup>64</sup>

Many countries may need technical assistance in order to create the capacities necessary for the implementation of legislation, the creation of specialised units, training and other measures foreseen under a cybercrime strategy.

A coherent strategy on cybercrime would certainly help mobilise technical assistance and allow public and private sector donors to understand and decide to what they are contributing.65

In short, the adoption of a cybercrime strategy may serve facilitate technical assistance.

Congress/Documents/A CONF.213 18/V1053828e.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> In March 2012, the MONEYVAL Committee of the Council of Europe adopted the typology study on "Criminal Money Flows on the Internet" prepared by MONEYVAL and the Global Project on Cybercrime and which contains specific proposal to address this issue.

http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Reports-Presentations/MONEYVAL(2012)6\_Reptyp\_flows\_en.pdf

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Protecting%20children/Defaul t\_en.asp

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=201&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> See Article 9 of the Budapest Convention and the Lanzarote Convention <sup>64</sup> The question of capacity building was addressed in Workshop 23 at the IGF 2010 (Lithuania)

http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/chronocontact/?chronoformname=WSProposalsReports2010Vi ew&wspid=23

The need for a global capacity building effort was furthermore underlined by the Octopus conference 2010 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy-activity-Interface-2010/2079 IF10 messages 1p%20key%20prov%20 26%20mar%2010 .pdf

The United Nations Crime Congress 2010 (Salvador, Brazil) also showed that there was broad agreement on the need for capacity building against cybercrime

http://www.unodc.org/documents/crime-congress/12th-Crime-

Examples of specific projects include those of the Council of Europe, including joint projects with the European Union (www.coe.int/cybercrime). The Commonwealth is currently preparing a Cybercrime Initiative (http://www.commonwealthigf.org/blog/the-commonwealth-cybercrime-initiative/)

# 4 Cybercrime and cybersecurity strategies: complementarity

At this point, one may conclude that cybersecurity and cybercrime control are different but interrelated and intersecting concepts (at least in the way they are understood and applied so far). Measures for cybersecurity and cybercrime control complement each other.

The primary interest of cybersecurity strategies is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability ("c-i-a") of ICT (in particular critical information infrastructure) and the services built on it. They are covering non-intentional ICT security incidents and, more importantly, intentional attacks by state and non-state actor, including criminals and terrorists. In terms of measures, the focus is on technical, administrative and procedural measures to protect systems, in particular critical information infrastructure, to increase their resilience, to prevent, detect and manage incidents, to ensure coordinated responses to incidents and recovery, as well as building confidence and trust in ICT and the digital economy, and finally on national security and defence. Given the reliance of societies on ICT, cybersecurity strategies are contributing to larger political, security, economic and social interests of countries. Cybersecurity strategies are thus interdisciplinary and comprise multiple stakeholders.<sup>66</sup>

The primary interest of cybercrime strategies is crime prevention and criminal justice, that is, to ensure that the rule of law applies also in the ICT and borderless online environment. Like cybersecurity strategies they cover attacks against the confidentiality, integrity and availability against ICT by state and non-state actors. However, cybercrime strategies – while also covering preventive and not excluding technical measures – would focus primarily on the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of offenders. This means that cybercrime strategies and measures put emphasis on rule of law and human rights principles, including safeguards and conditions regarding investigative and other procedural measures. It is indicative that public authorities responsible for the rule of law (ministries of justice and interior, prosecution services, law enforcement agencies) have primary responsible for cybercrime matters but play only a secondary role in cybersecurity strategies.

Cybercrime control goes beyond attacks against ICT and addresses offences also by means of ICT. This is particularly true for offences that have acquired a new scope and quality in cyberspace such as the sexual exploitation of children, fraud, the terrorist use of the Internet, infringements of intellectual property rights and other offences. Offences by means of ICT would normally not be covered by cybersecurity strategies.

Moreover, cybercrime strategies may need to address the fact that any offence may involve electronic evidence which entails a large-scale effort to enhance criminal justice capabilities. $^{67}$ 

Nevertheless, cybersecurity and cybercrime strategies complement and reinforce each other cross-wise and at different levels.

The complementarity is obvious with respect to the response to c-i-a attacks: while cybersecurity covers a wide range of technical and procedural measures to respond to

<sup>66</sup> Comment made by Markko Künnapu.

 $<sup>^{67}</sup>$  In this sense, cybercrime strategies would need address a challenge that is not even considered cybercrime.

intentional attacks against ICT and to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of ICT (ranging from prevention to protection and recovery), cybercrime strategies focus on the criminal justice response to c-i-a attacks.

Or to develop Vinton Cerf's metaphor further, if a cybersecurity strategy is about "fire brigades" ('When a house is on fire, the priority is to put down the fire to mitigate the damage, to repair the house and make it functioning again. Cybersecurity is about efficient fire brigades')<sup>68</sup>, then a cybercrime strategy is about criminal justice: if somebody puts one house after the other on fire it is necessary and effective to investigate and prosecute the offender and put him or her behind bars to prevent further damage.



However, this complementary goes further than that. It is also obvious with regard to higher level objectives of cybercrime and cybersecurity strategies. For example, increased reliability, resilience, security and trust in ICT contribute to crime prevention and criminal justice and vice versa, but these also contribute to the rule of law and human rights (including privacy and the freedom of expression). Or increased cybersecurity contributes to crime prevention and criminal justice and vice versa. And the rule of law and human rights serve (or should serve) national interests and security.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> During a workshop at the 2010 Internet Governance Forum in Vilnius, Lithuania, on international cooperation on cybersecurity. For the background paper see: http://www.afilias.info/webfm\_send/135

## 5 Conclusion

As proposed earlier in this paper, cybersecurity and cybercrime control are related but nevertheless different concepts. The same applies to the respective strategies. They pursue different objectives and comprise different measures. A cybersecurity strategy does not address the full range of cybercrime, and a cybercrime strategy not the full range of cybersecurity issues. At the same time, they are intersecting and interrelated and complement each other.<sup>69</sup>

All of this suggests two options to promote both cybersecurity as well as the prevention and control of cybercrime:

- Option 1: Governments to develop specific cybercrime strategies in addition to those for cybersecurity. If this option is chosen, synergies and complementarity between otherwise separate strategies need to be built in; or
- Option 2: Governments to enhance cybercrime components within cybersecurity strategies. However, this would require reconsidering and broadening the concept of cybersecurity to encompass criminal justice objectives and principles and to "take cybersecurity out of the national security corner".<sup>70</sup>

With regard to both options, the following may be taken into account:

- A distinct approach to the prevention and control of cybercrime will help identify the measures to be taken, establish responsibilities for such measures and ensure that criminal justice considerations are fully taken into account. These include rule of law and human rights principles.
- It would seem that when cybersecurity and cybercrime are dealt with by entities specialised in ICT, rule of law and criminal justice requirements tend to be neglected. Not everything that is technically feasible is also acceptable from a rule of law point of view. Rule of law authorities (such as ministries of justice or interior or prosecution services) should therefore take a leading role in cybercrime strategies.
- Cybersecurity including the protection of critical information infrastructure is increasingly considered an issue of national interest. This focus carries the risk that cybersecurity measures are removed from the criminal justice arena – with its rule of law and human rights safeguards – to the national security arena and its exceptions to rule of law and human rights guarantees. Separate cybercrime strategies or strong cybercrime components in cybersecurity strategies may help strengthen such guarantees.
  - Cybercrime understood as offences not only against but also by means of computer systems causes major damage to societies. And most other types of crime involve electronic evidence in one way or the other. The cost of cybercrime and the issue of electronic evidence, therefore, justify major investments in cybercrime strategies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> This section takes into account the discussions in "Workshop 115 – Cybercrime strategies" at the Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi, Kenya, 28 September 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Comment made by Roger Halbheer, Microsoft.

The UK Cyber Security Strategy of November 2011 may serve as a good example for such an approach.

- The adoption of a cybercrime strategy may help mobilise technical assistance for capacity building.<sup>71</sup>
- While criminal justice is a prerogative of criminal justice authorities, it involves a multitude of other actors, including private sector entities. Multi-stakeholder approaches should therefore be pursued when designing, implementing and managing cybercrime strategies. This may help avoid over-regulation and encourage agreements below the level of formal regulation and, in particular, of criminal law.<sup>72</sup>
- Attribution of an attack or intrusion to individual offenders, criminal or terrorist organisations or a foreign state remains a major problem. Treating an attack as cybercrime to start with may help de-escalate situations and prevent open conflicts.
  - The confusion of the concepts of cybersecurity and cybercrime seems to have been hindering international agreement in recent years. A clarification of the concepts of cybersecurity versus cybercrime may thus facilitate progress in this respect: it would allow states to make use of existing international treaties on cybercrime – that is, the Budapest Convention – while engaging in negotiations on principles or norms for state behaviour that are primarily aimed at preventing conflicts between states in cyberspace.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> This point was made repeatedly at the Nairobi Internet Governance Forum: a number of African countries have adopted legislation on cybercrime but are not in a position to apply.
<sup>72</sup> These points were underlined at IGF workshop 115 by Bill Smith.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Such norms of state behaviour and confidence building measures limited to the politico-military dimension are being discussed at the level of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE.
 Some states proposed in September 2011 to negotiate a non-binding code of conduct within the United Nations. <a href="http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/UN-infosec-code.pdf">http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/UN-infosec-code.pdf</a>

The London Conference on Cyberspace (1-2 November 2011) discussed such principles as well. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/london-conference-cyberspace/

# 6 Appendix: Examples of cybersecurity and cybercrime strategies

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility		
Australia	<ul> <li>High risk to Australian economy from malware</li> </ul>	The strategy was	Strategic priorities are:	Under the priority "legal and law
Cyber Security	and computer intrusion by state and non-state	prepared by the Attorney	<ul> <li>Improve the detection, analysis,</li> </ul>	enforcement" measures include:
Strategy	actors	General's Department	mitigation and response to	<ul> <li>providing additional resources</li> </ul>
(2009) <sup>74</sup>	<ul> <li>Cyber security defined as: "Measures relating</li> </ul>	and represents the	sophisticated cyber threats, with a	for security and law
	to the confidentiality, availability and integrity	strategy of the Australian	focus on government, critical	enforcement agencies to
	of information that is processed, stored and	Government	infrastructure and other systems of	enhance operational capabilities
	communicated by electronic or similar means"		national interest	<ul> <li>ensuring linkages and</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>"The aim of the Australian Government's cyber</li> </ul>	Two new organisations	<ul> <li>Educate and empower all Australians</li> </ul>	intelligence sharing between
	security policy is the maintenance of a secure,	created:	with the information, confidence and	cyber security and law
	resilient and trusted electronic operating	<ul> <li>CERT Australia as the</li> </ul>	practical tools to protect themselves	enforcement efforts
	environment that supports Australia's national	national coordination	online	<ul> <li>ensuring Australia's criminal and</li> </ul>
	security and maximises the benefits of the	point within the Gov	<ul> <li>Partner with business to promote</li> </ul>	civil legal framework is robust
	digital economy"	for security	security and resilience in infrastructure,	and keeps pace with
	<ul> <li>The objectives of the cyber security policy are</li> </ul>	information and more	networks, products and services	developments
	that:	effective international	<ul> <li>Model best practice in the protection of</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>providing Australian legal with</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>"All Australians are aware of cyber risks,</li> </ul>	cooperation	government ICT systems	the requisite level of
	secure their computers and take steps to	<ul> <li>Cyber Security</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Promote a secure, resilient and trusted</li> </ul>	technological knowledge and
	protect their identities, privacy and finances	Operations Centre to	global electronic operating environment	understanding to effectively
	online	identify sophisticated	that supports Australia's national	administer these laws
	- Australian businesses operate secure and	attacks and facilitate	interests	<ul> <li>promoting the harmonisation of</li> </ul>
	resilient information and communications	operational responses	<ul> <li>Maintain an effective legal framework</li> </ul>	Australia's legal framework for
	technologies to protect the integrity of their		and enforcement capabilities to target	cyber security with other
	own operations and the identity and privacy		and prosecute cybercrime	jurisdictions and internationally
	of their customers		<ul> <li>Promote the development of a skilled</li> </ul>	to facilitate information sharing
	- The Australian Government ensures its		cyber security workforce with access to	and law enforcement
	information and communications		research and development to develop	cooperation across geographical
	technologies are secure and resilient."		innovative solutions	borders.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> <u>http://www.aq.qov.au/www/aqd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(4CA02151F94FFB778ADAEC2E6EA8653D)~AG+Cyber+Security+Strategy+-</u>+for+website.pdf/\$file/AG+Cyber+Security+Strategy+-+for+website.pdf

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility		
Canada	<ul> <li>Canada's economy relies heavily on the</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Public Safety Canada</li> </ul>	– Securing Government systems:	Combating cybercrime is one
Cyber Security	Internet	will coordinate	- Establishing clear federal roles and	component under the pillar
Strategy	<ul> <li>"Cyber attacks include the unintentional or</li> </ul>	implementation of	responsibilities	"helping Canadians to be secure
(2010) <sup>75</sup>	unauthorized access, use, manipulation,	strategy	<ul> <li>Strengthening the security of federal</li> </ul>	online"
	interruption or destruction (via electronic	– Other stakeholders:	cyber systems	
	means) of electronic information and/or the	- Canadian Cyber	- Enhancing cyber security awareness	Measures include:
	electronic and physical infrastructure used to	Incident Response	throughout Government	<ul> <li>Equipping police to protect</li> </ul>
	process, communicate and/or store that	Centre (within Public	<ul> <li>Partnering to secure vital cyber</li> </ul>	against identity theft and
	information."	Safety Canada)	systems outside the federal	transnational cybercrime with
		Communication	Government	legislative authorities and
	– Main risks:	Security	<ul> <li>Partnering with the Provinces and</li> </ul>	financial resources
	<ul> <li>State sponsored cyber espionage and</li> </ul>	Establishment	Territories	<ul> <li>Establishment of a centralised</li> </ul>
	military activity	Canada	<ul> <li>Partnering with the private sector</li> </ul>	Integrated Cyber Crime Fusion
	- Terrorist use of the internet	- Canadian Security	and critical infrastructure sectors	Centre to respond to cyber
	<ul> <li>Cybercrime by organised criminals</li> </ul>	Intelligence Service	<ul> <li>Helping Canadians to be secure online</li> </ul>	attacks against Government or
	- Threat is evolving	- Royal Canadian	- Combating cybercrime	critical infrastructure
		Mounted Police	<ul> <li>Protecting Canadians online</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Further legislative reforms on</li> </ul>
	– Three pillars to meet this challenge:	- Treasury Board		- Sexual exploitation of children
	- Securing Government systems	Secretariat		- Requiring ISPs to maintain
	- Partnering to secure vital cyber systems	- Foreign Affairs and		interception capabilities
	outside the federal Government	International Trade		- Requiring ISPs to provide
	- Helping Canadians to be secure online	Canada		customer identification
		- Department of		information
		National Defence		- Increase cooperation with
		and the Canadian		treaty partners in fighting
		Forces		serious crimes

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> <u>http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/cbr/\_fl/ccss-scc-eng.pdf</u>

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility		
Czech Republic	<ul> <li>ICTs have a major effect on the functioning of</li> </ul>	The implementation,	<ul> <li>Legislative framework</li> </ul>	Under legislative framework:
Cyber Security	advanced societies and economies	operation and security of	<ul> <li>Strengthening of cyber security of</li> </ul>	
Strategy for the	<ul> <li>ICTs and ICT-dependent societies are</li> </ul>	credible information and	public administration and of ICT of	"The Czech Republic will improve
Czech Republic	vulnerable	communication systems	critical infrastructure	legislative and procedural steps so
for the 2011 –		is a duty of the Czech	<ul> <li>Establishment of national CERT</li> </ul>	that the cyber security field
2015 Period <sup>76</sup>	"The Strategy represents an institutional	Republic and a	<ul> <li>International cooperation</li> </ul>	ultimately comprises prevention,
	framework, which constitutes a part of the Czech	responsibility of all levels	<ul> <li>Cooperation of the State, private sector</li> </ul>	detection, reaction and
	Republic's security system. The framework	of government and	and academia	measures designed to identify and
	document marks the beginning of an active	administration, the	<ul> <li>Increased cyber security awareness</li> </ul>	combat cyber crime."
	national cyber defense policy."	private sector and the		
	Cyber security "needed to build up a credible	general public		
	information society with solid legal foundations,			
	which is committed to a secure cyber		<ul> <li>Adequacy of measures: risk analysis</li> </ul>	
	transmission and processing of information in all		and international standards to protect	
	domains of human activities and makes sure that		and guarantee national cyber security	
	the information can be used and shared freely		and respect privacy, respect privacy,	
	and		fundamental rights and liberties, free	
	safely."		access to information and other	
			democratic principles. The Czech	
	Objectives include		Republic will focus on their adequacy,	
	<ul> <li>"protection against threats which information</li> </ul>		balancing the need to guarantee	
	and communication systems and technologies		security against respect for	
	(hereinafter "ICTs") are exposed to, and		fundamental rights and liberties.	
	mitigation of potential consequences in the			
	event of an attack against ICTs."			
	<ul> <li>"to maintain a safe, secure, resistant and</li> </ul>			
	credible environment that makes use of			
	available opportunities offered by the digital			
	age. The strategy focuses mainly on			
	unimpeded access to services, data integrity			
	and confidentiality of the Czech Republic's			
	cyberspace and is coordinated with other			
	related strategies and concepts."			

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/CZ\_Cyber\_Security\_Strategy\_20112015.PDF

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility		
Estonia	Cyber attacks against advanced information	<ul> <li>Strategy prepared by</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The development and large-scale</li> </ul>	"The Cyber Security Strategy does
Cyber Security	societies aimed at undermining the functioning of	the "Cyber Security	implementation of a system of security	not include national measures to
Strategy	public and private sector information systems	Strategy Committee"	measures	target cyber crime; this is because
(2008) <sup>77</sup>	pose a threat to international security.	led by the Ministry of	- Protection of critical information	the Ministry of Justice has already
	Coordinated large-scale attacks against Estonia	Defence with Ministries	instrastructure	devised a criminal policy
	of 2007 and recurrence of incidents beginning of	of Education and	- Development and Implementation of	addressing the fight against cyber
	a new era where the security of cyberspace	Research, of Justice, of	a System of Security Measures	crime and also because the
	acquires a global dimension and protection of	Economic Affairs and	- Strengthening of Organisational Co-	Ministry of Internal Affairs has
	critical information systems becomes a matter of	Communication, of	operation, including setting up of	prepared a draft of Estonia's
	national security	Internal Affairs and of	Cyber Security Council	internal security priorities until
		Foreign Affairs	<ul> <li>Increasing competence in cyber</li> </ul>	2015″
	Cyber security is about "reducing the	<ul> <li>The Committee, in</li> </ul>	security	
	vulnerability of cyberspace, preventing cyber	cooperation with the	- Organisation of training in cyber	However, the strategy comprises
	attacks in the first instance and, in the event of	private sector	security	some international measures to:
	an attack, ensuring a swift recovery of the	responsible for	- Enhancing research and development	<ul> <li>raise awareness of cybercrime</li> </ul>
	functioning of information systems".	developing	<ul> <li>Improvement of the legal framework</li> </ul>	and cyber security
		implementation plans	for supporting cyber security	<ul> <li>develop international</li> </ul>
	Cyber Security Strategy linked to national	<ul> <li>Cyber Security Council</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Development of international co-</li> </ul>	cooperation
	security and defence policies but also to Estonian	to monitor	operation	<ul> <li>promote the Budapest</li> </ul>
	Information Society Strategy 2013 of 2007.	implementation	- Promoting cyber security and defence	Convention on Cybercrime
			globally	worldwide and to provide
			- Promote Budapest Convention on	assistance to accession by
			Cybercrime globally	countries
			- Estonian expertise in international	
			organisations	
			- Participation in the work of	
			international organisations	
			<ul> <li>Raising awareness on cyber security</li> </ul>	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> <u>http://www.eata.ee/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Estonian Cyber Security Strategy.pdf</u>

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility		
France	Cyber security is defined as the ability to ensure	Strategy prepared by the	Seven axes of efforts :	<ul> <li>The fight against cybercrime is</li> </ul>
Défense et	the confidentiality, integrity and availability of	Agence Nationale de la		considered one of the bases of
sécurité des	information systems against incidents emanating	Sécurité des Systems	1. Anticipate and analyse	cyber security.
systèmes	from cyber space:	d'Information (ANSSI)		<ul> <li>Objective 4 refers to</li> </ul>
d'information –	« état recherché pour un système d'information		2. Detect, alert and react	improvement of legislation and
Stratégie de la	lui permettant de résister à des événements			international cooperation with
France <sup>78</sup>	issus du cyberespace susceptibles de		3. Improve and make sustainable	respect to cybercrime
	compromettre la disponibilité, l'intégrité ou la		scientific, technical, industrial and	<ul> <li>Axis 6 refers to international</li> </ul>
	confidentialité des données stockées, traitées ou		human capacities	cooperation against cybercrime
	transmises et des services connexes que ces			
	systèmes offrent ou qu'ils rendent accessibles »		4. Protect information systems of the	
			State and of operators of critical	
	The four objectives of the strategy are :		infrastructure	
	1. To be a global power in the field of cyber		5. Adapt legislation	
	defence			
			6. Develop international cooperation	
	2. To guarantee the freedom of decision-making			
	by public authorities of France by protecting		7. Communicate to inform and convince	
	information related to national sovereignty			
	(ensuring confidentiality of communication)			
	3. To reinforce the cyber security of critical			
	national infrastructure			
	4. To assure security in cyber space			

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2011-02-15\_Defense\_et\_securite\_des\_systemes\_d\_information\_strategie\_de\_la\_France.pdf

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility	
Germany	"Cyber security" defined as a situation "in which	Strategy prepared by the	Ten strategic areas: Strategic area #6 on Effective
Cyber Security	the risks of global cyberspace have been reduced	Federal Ministry of	1. The protection of critical information Crime Control also in cyberspace:
Strategy for	to an acceptable minimum".	Interior	infrastructures as the main priority of $-$ strengthened capabilities of law
Germany			cyber security enforcement, Federal Office for
(2011) <sup>79</sup>	Need to ensure confidentiality, integrity and	Implementation of the	2. Secure IT systems in Germany Information Security and private
	availability of IT systems.	strategy under the	3. Strengthening IT security in the sector
		overall control of a new	public administration – joint industry/law enforcement
	Risks include malfunctioning of information	National Cyber Security	4. New National Cyber Response Centre institutions
	technologies, the breakdown of information	Council	5. New National Cyber Security Council – projects to support partner
	infrastructure or coincidental IT failures	composed of the Federal	to enhance cooperation between countries
		Chancellery and state	Federal institutions as well as – major effort for global
	Main risk is cyber attacks directed against one or	secretaries from the	between the public and private sector harmonisation of criminal law
	several IT systems and aimed at damaging IT	Foreign Office, Ministries	6. Effective Crime Control also in based on Council of Europe
	security:	of Interior, Defence,	cyberspace Cyber Crime Convention
	<ul> <li>Attacks against the confidentiality of IT</li> </ul>	Finance, Economics and	7. Effective coordinated action to ensure examination of need for
	systems ("cyber espionage")	Technology, Justice,	cyber security in Europe and additional conventions at UN
	<ul> <li>Attacks against the integrity and availability of</li> </ul>	Education and Research,	worldwide level
	IT systems ("cyber sabotage")	reps of States as well as	8. Use of reliable and trustworthy
		the private sector as	information technology
		associate members	9. Personal development in Federal
			authorities
			10. Tools to respond to cyber attacks

http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED\_Verwaltung/Informationsgesellschaft/cyber\_eng.pdf; jsessionid=365A25B8FF75170FF9566570016DDEA9.1\_cid 165?\_\_blob=publicationFile

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility		
India	- Relevance of IT sector for economy. India as a	Draft prepared by	3.0 Enabling processes:	Section 3.5 Security legal
Discussion Draft	global player for world-class technology and	Department of	<ul> <li>Security threat and vulnerability</li> </ul>	framework and law enforcement:
on National	business services.	Information Technology,	management	<ul> <li>Legal framework</li> </ul>
Cyber Security	<ul> <li>Threat of attacks and malicious use of IT by</li> </ul>	Gov. of India	<ul> <li>Security threat early warning and</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Dedicated cybercrime units</li> </ul>
Policy (2011) <sup>80</sup>	criminals, terrorists or States.		response	<ul> <li>Training facilities for law</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Threat of attacks against government or</li> </ul>	13 types of stakeholders	<ul> <li>Security best practices, compliance and</li> </ul>	enforcement and judiciary
	critical information infrastructure	are listed	assurance	<ul> <li>International cooperation for</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Need for cyber security eco system.</li> </ul>	(e.g. National	- Critical information infrastructure	information sharing and
	<ul> <li>Need for cyber intelligence and cyber defense.</li> </ul>	Information Board,	protection	prosecution
		National Crisis	- Information security assurance	<ul> <li>Strategy on combating hi-</li> </ul>
	"Cyber security is the activity of protecting	Management Committee,	framework	tech/cybercrime:
	information and information systems (networks,	National Security Council	- E-governance	<ul> <li>E-crime reporting</li> </ul>
	computers, data bases, data centers and	Secretariat, CERT-IN,	<ul> <li>Secure software development and</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Crime reduction and prevention</li> </ul>
	applications) with appropriate procedural and	sectoral CERTs) with a	application	<ul> <li>Legislation</li> </ul>
	technological security measures."	focus on incident	<ul> <li>Security crisis management for</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Business-industry-public</li> </ul>
		management and	countering cyber attacks and cyber	cooperation
	Priorities:	response	terrorism	<ul> <li>International cooperation</li> </ul>
	Awareness, legal environment, protection,		<ul> <li>Security legal framework and law</li> </ul>	
	compliance, incident/emergency response,		enforcement	Section 3.6 Security information
	security techniques and technologies, culture of		<ul> <li>Security information sharing and</li> </ul>	sharing and cooperation
	cyber security, cyber crime prevention and		cooperation	<ul> <li>CERT – law enforcement</li> </ul>
	prosecution, data protection		4.0 Enabling technologies	cooperation at domestic and
			5.0 Enabling people	international level
			6.0 Responsible action by user	
			community	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Discussion draft published by the Department of Information Technology for public consultations. http://www.mit.gov.in/sites/upload\_files/dit/files/ncsp\_060411.pdf

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility	
Netherlands	Cyber security is defined as to be free from	Responsibility will be with	Action lines are: Action line 5 specifically addresses
National Cyber	danger or damage caused by disruption or failure	a new Cyber Security	cybercrime:
Security	or abuse of ICT, that is, from a limitation of the	Board in which all	1. Setting up the Cyber Security Board and – Expert pool and register of
Strategy, NCSS	availability and reliability of the ICT, breach of	relevant parties will be	National Cyber Security Centre experts from government,
(2011) <sup>81</sup>	the confidentiality of information stored in ICT or	represented	2. Preparing threat and risk analyses private sector and academia
	damage to the integrity of that information.		3. Increasing the resilience of vital – Focus on cross-border
		A National Cyber Security	infrastructure investigations
	Action is required because:	Centre to be created with	4. Response capacity for withstanding ICT – Focus on international legislation
	<ul> <li>ICT is of fundamental importance for society</li> </ul>	public and private parties	disruptions and cyber attacks and regulations for cyber crime
	and economy		5. Intensifying investigation and – Steering group to be established
	<ul> <li>Society is vulnerable (threats include botnets,</li> </ul>	GOVCERT.NL to be	prosecution of cyber crime at national level for priority
	attacks against infrastructure by other states	reinforced and to be	6. Stimulating research and education crime
	(Stuxnet), denial of service attacks	placed in this Centre	<ul> <li>Sufficient specialists in the</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Need for cooperation between parties in digital</li> </ul>		entire criminal justice chain to
	society at domestic and international levels		tackle cyber crime
			– Public Order & Safety
	"The goal of this strategy is to reinforce the		Inspectorate to review
	security of the digital society, in order to increase		functioning of police
	confidence in the use of ICT by citizens, the		<ul> <li>Shift of budgetary resources to</li> </ul>
	business community and government. Toward		enhance investigation and
	this end, the Dutch government wants to work		prosecution of cyber crime
	together more effectively with other parties on		<ul> <li>Cyber crime programme</li> </ul>
	the security and the reliability of an open and		approach:
	free digital society.		– Knowledge centre within the
	This will stimulate the economy and increase		police
	prosperity and well-being. Good legal protection		– Reinforcement of police
	in the digital domain is guaranteed and social		organisation and shift of
	disruption is prevented or adequate action will be		resources
	taken if things were to go wrong."		<ul> <li>Specialised prosecutors,</li> </ul>
			judges and cyber law
			magistrates
		1	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/dutch-cyber-security-strategy-2011

Country/	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
strategy		responsibility		
South Africa	<ul> <li>Need for coordinated approach in dealing with</li> </ul>	Draft policy developed by	<ul> <li>Creating institutional capacity to</li> </ul>	Cybercrime is referred to and
Draft	cybersecurity	Department of	respond to cybercrime and threats	defined as the acts covered by
Cybersecurity	<ul> <li>Legal challenges to deal effectively with</li> </ul>	Communications	- National Cybersecurity Advisory	Chapter XIII of the Electronic
Policy of South	cybercrime	Published in the	Council	Communication and Transactions
Africa (2010) <sup>82</sup>	<ul> <li>Need for enhanced international cooperation</li> </ul>	Government Gazette for	- Computer Security Incident Response	Act 25 of 2002 (unauthorized
	for cybersecurity	public consultations	Teams	access to, interception of or
	<ul> <li>Business/government/civil society partnerships</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Reducing cybersecurity threats and</li> </ul>	interference with data, including
	required to address cybercrime		vulnerabilities	misuse of devices (Section 86),
	<ul> <li>Need for cybersecurity standards and protocols</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Coordinated local and international</li> </ul>	computer-related extortion, fraud
			partnerships	and forgery (Section 87) and
	<ul> <li>The aim of the policy is to establish an</li> </ul>		- Foster cooperation and coordination	attempt, and aiding and abetting.
	environment that will ensure confidence and		between government, private sector	
	trust in the secure use of ICTs.		and citizens	Some general measures are
	<ul> <li>Objectives:</li> </ul>		- Promote and strengthen international	foreseen in this respect:
	<ul> <li>Facilitate the establishment of relevant</li> </ul>		cooperation	<ul> <li>Development of proactive</li> </ul>
	structures in support of Cybersecurity		<ul> <li>Continuous innovation, skills</li> </ul>	measures for the prevention and
	- Ensure the reduction of Cybersecurity		development and compliance	combating cybercrime
	threats and vulnerabilities		- Promote compliance with appropriate	<ul> <li>Public-private partnerships</li> </ul>
	- Foster cooperation and coordination between		technical and operational	<ul> <li>Research and development to</li> </ul>
	government and the private sector		cybersecurity standards	enhance skills to mitigate
	- Promote and strengthen international			cybercrime
	cooperation on cybersecurity			
	<ul> <li>Build capacity and promoting a culture of</li> </ul>			
	cybersecurity			
	- Promote compliance with appropriate			
	technical and operational cybersecurity			
	standards			

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/100219cybersecurity.pdf

Country/ strategy	Vision/objectives/issues to be addressed	Institutional responsibility	Strategic priorities and measures	Measures on cybercrime
United	Vision is "for the UK in 2015 to derive huge	Specific institutions	Under each of the four objectives the	Most actions are related to
Kingdom	economic and social value from a vibrant,	responsible for different	approach and a range of actions is	cybercrime. Objective 1 is to be
Cyber Security	resilient and secure cyberspace, where our	measures, including:	defined:	achieved through 24 action items,
Strategy	actions, guided by our core values of liberty,			including:
(2011) <sup>83</sup>	fairness, transparency and the rule of law,	<ul> <li>Cabinet Office</li> </ul>	1. Cybercrime	<ul> <li>Courts to use existing powers</li> </ul>
	enhance prosperity, national security and a	<ul> <li>Department for</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Tackling cyber crime (lead: Home</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New national cyber crime</li> </ul>
	strong society."	Business, Innovation	Office)	capability within new National
		and Skills (BIS)	<ul> <li>Making it safer to do business in</li> </ul>	Crime Agency by 2013
	Objectives to be achieved by 2015:	<ul> <li>Ministry of Defence</li> </ul>	cyberspace (lead: BIS)	<ul> <li>Cyber specialists to support</li> </ul>
		(MOD)		police
	1. The UK to tackle cyber crime and be one of	<ul> <li>Foreign and</li> </ul>	2. Resilience and protection against	<ul> <li>Law enforcement training</li> </ul>
	the most secure places in the world to do	Commonwealth Office	cyberattacks	<ul> <li>More resources for working with</li> </ul>
	business in cyberspace	(FCO)	<ul> <li>Defending national infrastructure (lead:</li> </ul>	private sector and international
	2. The UK to be more resilient to cyber attacks	<ul> <li>Department for</li> </ul>	Cabinet Office)	partners
	and better able to protect our interests in	Culture, Media and	<ul> <li>Capability to protect UK interests in</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Promote international</li> </ul>
	cyberspace	Sports	cyberspace (lead: MOD)	cooperation (London
	3. The UK to have helped shape an open,			Conference, Budapest
	stable and vibrant cyberspace which the UK		3. Open cyberspace	Convention, EU Directive)
	public can use safely and that supports open		<ul> <li>Helping to shape the development of</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Review existing legislation</li> </ul>
	societies		cyberspace (lead: Department for	<ul> <li>Single reporting systems for</li> </ul>
	4. The UK to have the cross-cutting knowledge,		Culture, Media and Sports)	citizens and small business
	skills and capability it needs to underpin all		<ul> <li>Protecting our way of life (lead: FCO)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cyber mainstreaming in police</li> </ul>
	our cyber security objectives			<ul> <li>Action against hate crime</li> </ul>
			4. Knowledge	<ul> <li>Private sector/LEA joint</li> </ul>
	Internet central to economy and society. Cyber		<ul> <li>Extending knowledge (lead: BIS)</li> </ul>	initiatives
	attacks are "Tier I" threats affecting prosperity,		<ul> <li>Enhancing skills (lead: BIS)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cross-border cooperation</li> </ul>
	key infrastructure, places of work and homes.		<ul> <li>Expanding capability (lead: Cabinet</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Support GetSafeOnline.org</li> </ul>
	Threats by criminals, states, terrorists,		Office)	<ul> <li>Robust cyber security in public</li> </ul>
	hacktivists.			services
				<ul> <li>Enable UK cyber security</li> </ul>
				industry
				<ul> <li>Awareness among businesses</li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf

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