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COUNCIL OF EUROPE



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KCOOS (2016) 12

“Keep Crime Out Of Sport”

Regional Seminar 3

FINAL REPORT
(subject to modification)





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Introduction to Report

This was the third regional seminar in a series of five planned for the project. The main aim was to unite all relevant actors from the different participating countries, which included Nordic and Baltic countries encourage networking between the two sub-regions, animated sessions working towards national platforms and their development and working on the implementation of relevant legislation.

Principal stakeholders, notably the sport movement at this seminar, from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden, as well as international actors including Europol, GLMS and Sportradar were present as well as the UK Gambling Commission.


This operational and down to the 'nitty gritty' aspect will demonstrate clearly at a political level the needs required: input for convincing ministers at the Sports ministerial conference in Budapest on 29 November.

Overall feedback:

- Such regional seminars were seen to be a fantastic opportunity to get down to the real operational business of tackling various issues and countries appreciated the direct approach.
- The smaller working groups were, given the feedback from participants, useful, as this allowed for broader questions and a different perspective to be solicited of the national actors. The working groups on developing platforms was very useful, notably given the mix between countries with established platforms, countries in the process of establishing platforms and countries that are in the very early stages.
- Countries appreciated the opportunity to meet and discuss with stakeholders between the Nordic and Baltic regions as this broadens perspectives, yet still remains within the same type of region.
- Much exchange of practical situational experience was exchanged.
- This seminar allowed for fruitful exchange on the one hand, with regard to setting up a national platform (three have national platforms already and a fourth country has an 'unofficial' platform) and on the other hand, making the most of general legislation or developing specific legislation. In addition, some of these countries have a different approach to tackling the cost and human resources issues (i.e. combining more than one sector with match-fixing, such as doping).
- It was a great opportunity for the sport movement to better understand the political news and reasons that currently exist for why the Convention is not yet in force. In addition, the sport movement was enlightened by how useful practically the different articles of the Convention can also be; Sweden has an unofficial platform, despite not having yet signed or ratified the Convention. The points of lobby from the Swedish delegation citing reasons for needing such a platform, among other measures, prove that the convention would be a very useful tool.
- Thanks to the presence of one of the countries that have ratified the Convention, examples were shared on the legal usefulness of the Convention (for example, 'solving' the big question of sharing of personal data information).
- Two countries (Finland, Norway) and the UK Gambling Commission officially supported the Group of Copenhagen (the Network of established national platforms that was set up by the Council of Europe match-fixing secretariat in July 2016 to enhance exchange of information and to assist upcoming

national platforms with their setup and implementation.

- There was general support for the idea of regional networks; these regional networks would not reunite national platforms as this risks creating a confusion and too many subnetworks of national platforms. Rather, the regional networks would reunite based on themes to be discussed and planned. And then put towards each national platform and then the Group of Copenhagen. For example:





Questionnaire Analysis

At the moment of the regional seminar, there were 25 out of a possible 35 possible replies from the seven participating country relevant actors. Three countries have an operational national platform under the convention. A fourth country has an unofficial national platform. There are varied systems of NPs even just in this region (some based within Ministry, some within Anti-doping agency, etc.).

Norway has ratified the convention and uses this legal basis for tackling issues found to exist across countries as discovered from all regional seminars (for example, sharing of sensitive data). Legislation exists specifically in this area among Baltic countries, but less so in Nordic countries.

Identified problems:

- There is a need to cooperate and coordinate more, perhaps among the actors in the region
- Legislation needs to be accordingly drafted
- Cost is a factor
- Because of the size of NPs, coordination is needed with the numerous federations for issues including reporting, supervision within the sport, etc.
- Risk detection and evaluation: data protection on personal information: how to tackle this based on the systems and legislations in place?
- Creating black markets through restrictions rather than regulating.
- Cooperation with certain stakeholders / need for awareness raising across the board – more cooperation between the sports movement and public authorities is needed.



TUESDAY 04 OCTOBER 2016

Roundtable of overview from participating countries

(Reports and presentations in annex)

While Denmark, Finland and Norway have official national platforms, Sweden has an unofficial one, through the Swedish Sports Confederation. All four national platforms have a different central point: in Denmark the Secretariat of the national platform is at the Anti-Doping Denmark Agency; Norway's is in the Ministry of Culture; Finland has an umbrella institution and Sweden within the sport movement. This is interesting in itself given that this is in the same region. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia all have legislation that is more specific to match-fixing, although it does not appear to be well-recognised at higher levels. In Nordic countries, this appears to be more inversed. Coordination between actors appears to be a problem in the majority of the countries in this region, notably with regard to simple information such as the political and strategic situation within each country.

Limited resources are an issue across the board, therefore learning how to establish national platforms with limited human and financial resources is the aim.

Norway, the first country to ratify the convention, tackles sensitive information using the convention as a legal basis, by obtaining a license from the national data protection agency to handle sensitive information.

In Sweden, the national platform operates out of the sport movement (Swedish sports confederation, which means that reporting by athletes appears to be a little smoother, even leading to information for case proceedings. The Crime Prevention Agency (Bra) has provided a toolbox for stakeholders in this domain.

Session 1 – Raising awareness with regard to the link between sports manipulations and the criminal world (Europol)

Europol mandate presented, as well as background. Operational analysis and cooperation with EU Member States and other agencies.

- Organising wide-scale match-fixing schemes requires a high level of sophistication and coordination, and to be in control of many factors.
- Organized crime networks involved / Transnational crime.
- Multiagency approach and international cooperation is very important. Lower level players are hit (sportsmen, etc.); a successful investigation sometimes stops at this level.
- All actors should contribute to assessing and disseminating information. National platforms may represent a great opportunity to enable this process. Depends on national/legal regulatory framework. Desired outcome to have a more comprehensive intelligence picture on suspicious manipulated competitions to enable action. Through NPs, this is more complete.
- This would be very useful and increasingly so for Europol.
- Most countries creating/created NPs, are in the Europol Focal Point on Sports Corruption. This means that the potential is also there for the network. So why not use an existing network?
- How can we enable the international link of NPs?

Conclusions:

- More information sharing between all actors
- Share expertise, experience on successful cases is fundamental
- Enhance strategic knowledge on SC and on OC groups to identify new trends and developments

Questions:

What should be the role of sports bodies in investigations?

Europol: - Information from Sport organisations is important. Then you combine it from other actors and then send it to police. Feedback often cannot be provided by Law enforcement for data sharing limitations and confidentiality of criminal investigations. When it is not secret anymore, they can share it for internal disciplinary proceedings.

ADD: The role for a NP is to create a system where it is possible to exchange relevant information: MOUs, etc. It is an ideal scenario of creating and fostering cooperation. Informally or formally.

There is no visibility of the dangers of the Indian market: Do you know anything about it? Are they affecting European markets?

Europol: based on the (limited) amount of information available in this respect, the level of threat to the EU is considered to be low as this sport is more popular outside the EU, and this is reflected in the betting markets linked to it.

Networks in MF, has it increased?

Europol: - We see it more and more.

Are there trends in the way they fix matches?

Europol - Sport fixing (because of betting, it has increased); Online betting accounts etc. – challenges for law enforcement to get this information.

Session 2 – Working Groups: National Platforms

Moderated by Council of Europe Secretariat

- a) What have been the issues faced in setting up the NP
- b) Who leads the platform
- c) Who is in/should be part of the platform
- d) Discussing the idea of 'contributors' to the platform

Conclusions

1. Meet two-three times a year
2. A problem to tackle is the exchange of sensitive information between NPs with different levels
3. Thus, two levels for a NP works well
 - a. Have an operational unit which deals with daily tasks and exchange of information (this is similar to NL NP for example)
 - b. Have a second, wider sector, which deals with more general/less sensitive information
4. How strategic/operational would the NP be?
 - a. Define roles: same goal, different agendas (similar to working groups on actors in previous regional seminars).
 - b. Both levels should remain operational, although possibly to different extents.
 - c. Unless the hub of the NP is within law enforcement, the sharing of information will be tricky (notable to check the Belgian NP on this point).
5. Solutions?
 - a. Communication and trust is primordial
 - b. Set rules at the start and of the investigation (allows for simultaneous criminal/disciplinary proceedings, perhaps)
 - c. Categorise and agree on common rules for information provided to the NP
6. How do NPs receive personal data from betting operators?
 - a. One possibility is to have legislation making it compulsory for operators to share information/data (for example look at the UK and NL National platforms).
 - b. Consider that betting operators do not want to be connected to negative publicity; offer rewards/confidentiality via the NP.
 - c. The issue for operators lies with their interest in reporting (they want a clean business as well)
 - d. The Norwegian NP tackled the private data issue with using the convention legislation to obtain a licence from the national data protection agency.

7. How can law enforcement receive personal data from operators?
 - a. Create MoUs with the Police: take into consideration governance issues.
 - b. With the existence of the NP and when the convention is in force, there is an article that provides for obligation by betting operators to report. Law enforcement may be able to thus obtain information via the NP (or the NP sensitive information group).
8. Exploring networks of stakeholders
 - a. A network of regulatory authorities already exists and was set up by the CoE in 2014
 - b. Explore other existing networks (task for the CoE Secretariat): such as Europol, Prosecutors network within the CoE Member States, etc.
 - c. What about a 'motherboard platform' for betting: how can we start to build such a thing? (*Explanation by Estonian betting operator in Annex*)
 - d. Thematic approach to a Nordic/Baltic platform that would feed into a NP and then a network and coordinated by CoE. UK, Norway, Finland all support this approach.

Session 3 – Plenary/Working Groups Prioritising and sharing information: a very practical view

(Lorraine Pearman, UK Gambling Commission, presentation pending)

Brief introduction about the UK national platform:

For MF cases, as it is a transnational issue, a single point of contact is important. Personal contact is very important.

Case study example:

Collecting via a NP information from a number of sources is a first step in a procedure. Next, the Sport organisation (the specific federation) inputs their thought. They could ask someone to go to the game and even into the dressing room and inform that the game will be monitored. Then share the information with the relevant federation.

How would we make people aware of where to communicate: should there be a central point of collecting contact points in each country.

Sport needs to be involved earlier in the process.

Fostering collaboration on issues – when to inform certain people e.g. referees etc.

Another suggestion:

- Send information to bookies
- If conduct appears to be suspicious, tell players that everything is being monitored



Session 4 – Rules, legislation and evidence

(Sportradar, presentation in annex)

Conclusions and what could go in a handbook tool:

- Political support is needed for sport organisations, notably in the Nordic region, in order to help implement match-fixing measures
- Denmark has a terms of reference for its national platform, which is a useful tool to exchange with other countries
- The Group of Copenhagen/Network of National Platforms is a very useful and popular idea and should be encouraged towards development
- Such concrete seminars are very welcome and countries appreciate the direct approach taken
- In terms of disciplinary and criminal investigations, if it is a matter for police, sport waits for police. In some countries, it is parallel.
- If it is a matter for police, as a starting point, sport waits for police. However, as a matter of principle, for example in Denmark, nothing in the sporting regulations in place under the NOC & Sports Confederation of Denmark (DIF) prevents the continuation of the (international) disciplinary proceedings despite concurrent police investigations, e.g. in cases in which conclusive evidence on the conduct of the persons under the jurisdiction of DIF is already obtained. Then there are situations in which there is still a conflict with regard to use of evidence, sharing of information, etc.
- Estonia has a bill on MF going through parliament. There is also the question of modifying the gambling act, although the opinion is that this is not enough, as betting-related money is small. The CoE Secretariat could help with coordination across the board. The ministerial conference in November will help hopefully move forward the ratification process.
- Limited resources appears to be a real issue, therefore learning how to establish national platforms with limited human and financial resources is the aim, as was learnt from NPs including Finland, Norway and Denmark about combining resources and departments.
- Lithuania is deep in discussions about the set-up of a NP
- Norway has provided an example of how to tackle sensitive information (using the convention) and also explained how information sharing is facilitated between private and public actors via the NP.
- The sport movement plays an important role, notably in some aspects related to athletes, such as tackling the whistleblowing aspect (see Sweden's report).
- Encouragement for having an English version, perhaps of the Swedish Bra (Crime Prevention Agency)'s toolbox for stakeholders on MF.
- Given the interest in networks of stakeholders, the Coe secretariat should explore existing networks of stakeholders and work on creating those that do not yet exist.

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ANNEXES

Annex I KCOOS Update

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CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

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3rd Regional Seminar

Keep Crime Out of Sport
#KCOOS

4-5 October 2016 – Zagreb, Croatia

Honour the game.
KCOOS
Keep Crime Out of Sport

Joint Project KCOOS
Keep Crime Out of Sport: Together against the manipulations of sports competitions – Towards a culture of information sharing

KCOOS – THE PROJECT

- ❖ Jan 2016 – June 2017
- ❖ Pilot Project
- ❖ EU and COE
- ❖ 10 Partners
- ❖ Within the T-MC Secretariat of the CoE
- ❖ Operational aspect of CoE activities

27-28 September- KCOOS RS 2
Zagreb

Joint Project KCOOS
Keep Crime Out of Sport: Together against the manipulations of sports competitions – Towards a culture of information sharing

KCOOS – A QUICK UPDATE

- ❖ Month 10 of Project KCOOS
- ❖ Questionnaires – over 100 replies
- ❖ Regional Seminar 1 (June 2016): Albania-Belgium-The Netherlands-Slovenia-Spain-Switzerland-The United Kingdom
- ❖ Regional Seminar 2 (September 2016): Austria-Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia-Germany-Hungary-Ukraine
- ❖ Regional Seminar 3 (October 2016): Denmark-Estonia-Finland-Latvia-Lithuania-Norway-Sweden
- ❖ Regional Seminars 4 (Bucharest: Oct 2016) and 5 (Athens: Nov 2016)
- ❖ Study Visits France (ARJEL) 14-15 Nov 2016/Apr 2017 and UK (UK GC) week of 12 Dec 2016 and March 2017

27-28 September- KCOOS RS 2
Zagreb

Joint Project KCOOS
Keep Crime Out of Sport: Together against the manipulations of sports competitions

KCOOS QUESTIONNAIRES

Replies from:

- All stakeholders from almost all countries in this group, among those present and those who could not send delegations
- Sessions have been developed using knowledge acquired from the questionnaires, input from the Conference and general consultations

27-28 September- KCOOS RS 2
Zagreb

Joint Project KCOOS
Keep Crime Out of Sport: Together against the manipulations of sports competitions

KCOOS QUESTIONNAIRES

- At least 3 countries have operational or almost operational national platforms under the Convention
- One country from this group has ratified the Convention (Norway)
- Specific legislation on match fixing exists in some of these countries (E.G. Latvia)
- Varied systems of NPs even just in this region (some based in Ministry, some Within Anti-doping agency, etc)
- Identified problems:
 - Need to cooperate and coordinate, perhaps among the actors in the region
 - Legislation needs to be accordingly drafted
 - Cost is a factor
 - Because of the size of NPs, coordination is needed with the numerous federations for issues including reporting, supervision within the sport, etc.
 - Risk detection and evaluation: data protection on personal information: how to tackle this based on the systems and legislations in place?
 - Creating black markets through restrictions rather than regulating.
 - Cooperation with certain stakeholders / need for awareness raising across the board

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Joint Project KCOOS
Keep Crime Out of Sport: Together against the manipulations of sports competitions

- MAPPING

- Initial mapping conducted by Council of Europe T-MC Secretariat
- Needs to be developed
- Place your institutions

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
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
WHY A NETWORK IS IMPORTANT

- Other projects, including PRECRIMBET and BETMONTALERT – highlights technically specific needs, including monitoring report elaboration, etc. The needs should be in the framework of coordination of the strategy implemented by the CoE Secretariat.
- With regard to needs following various stages of project KCOOS, here are some proposals:
 - Need for a platform within the NP to exchange sensitive information?
 - Need to regularly communicate and know each other?
 - Knowing each other + trust = developing further common activities, such as those proposed by Betmontalert and Precrimbet – not just among regulators, but also in cooperation with other stakeholders.
 - A network will allow for more harmonised or at least a better understanding of various obligations and rules proposed to betting operators for better exchange of information.
 - Common training and awareness-raising activities presenting a more united front can be exchanged and developed – easy in this sort of region.
 - A network will help develop an informal system on exchange of information for illegal betting.



WHAT SHOULD BE DIFFERENT- LOOKING LONG TERM

- Let us know
- This operational and down to the 'nitty gritty' aspect will demonstrate clearly at a political level the needs required: input for convincing ministers at the Sports ministerial conference in Budapest on 29 November.



Annex on Country Reports

Annex II Denmark

The NP creates a home for homeless questions: an opportunity for stakeholders to work together and have more: knowledge, cooperation, reporting, prosecution and investigation.

The NOC and Sport Confederation (DIF) have obliged all 61 sports federations to comply with a central set of match-fixing regulation. To ensure an effective, transparent and cost effective investigation, DIF have chosen to build upon the existing framework already created to investigate cases related to doping offences. ADD role in investigations regarding breaches of the DIF match-fixing code are not, therefore, related to their role as secretariat for the NP.

The NP is already collecting and registering data and passing on selected information. It is important to have trust; for example, the Anti-Doping Denmark offices, which are the secretariat of the NP, are under a high level of security as sensitive information is exchanged here. The NP also facilitates flow of information: it is a clearing house for information concerning MF. The ADD Secretariat is positioned in the centre, so the information could come from anyone. There is also a whistleblower line directly to the NP.

With such a central position, the NP can collect relevant information and decide whether it is disciplinary/criminal/unethical.

Concerning outgoing flow of information, this can go to a number of stakeholders. With regard to cooperation agreements, the wording of the convention gives a regulatory provision to exchange information. It is known that data protection agencies can be difficult. An agreement with the Data Protection Agency will be obtained later. The law already allows handling because ADD is a public authority. Agreements will be obtained firstly with the Police.

Whistleblower Hotlines will be set up for Anti-Doping and MF. Not many things have been received so far.

In Denmark, the legislation related to MF is to be found within the criminal code/provisions against fraud. In 2015, a special legislation on MF was introduced. In addition to the Criminal Code.

In terms of disciplinary and criminal investigations, if it is a matter for police, sport waits for police.

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DENMARK

NATIONAL PLATFORM AGAINST MATCHFIXING

COPENHAGEN, 4 OCTOBER 2016



PARTICIPANTS IN NATIONAL PLATFORM

- Ministry of Culture
- Danish Gaming Commission
- Ministry of Justice
- Danish National Police
- DOGA (Danish Online Gambling Association)
- Danske Spil (Danish State Lottery)
- NOC and Sports Confederation of Denmark
- Danish Football Association
- AntiDoping Denmark (Secretariat)



WHY SECRETARIAT IN ANTI DOPING DENMARK?

- The Ministry of Culture is responsible for the fight against matchfixing in the Danish Government. (As well as sport, antidoping, etc.)
- The Government wanted the Secretariat in an institution under the Ministry of Culture.
- Anti Doping Denmark is used to work with integrity in sport, investigations, handling private information, data security, etc.
- Much synergy can be achieved by combining the fight against both doping and matchfixing
- VERY cost-effective solution

THE SECRETARIAT IN ANTI DOPING DENMARK


- Central national "clearing house" for matchfixing-related data
- Intelligence Manager appointed by ADD
- Intel-database and visualization software
- Receives and validates information and data
- Collects and registers "nice to know" data
- Passes on "need to know" data to relevant parties in compliance with Data Protection Legislation
- Mutual trust is paramount for efficiency
- Comprehensive security in the data processing of ADD



FLOW OF INFORMATION - INCOMING



Matchfixing, overall view:



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
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FLOW OF INFORMATION - OUTGOING



COOPERATION AGREEMENTS AS BASIS FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

- Certain agreements already exist
- Existing agreements have not always been efficient
- Which benefits are to be gained from cooperation agreements? (Building up trust, personal relations, improved access to exchange of information, etc.)
- Which parties should make cooperation agreements? (Secretariat/Police, Secretariat/Gambling Commission, etc.)
- Challenges related to legislation on Data Protection?
- Secretariat (ADD): Responsible for cooperation with the Danish Data Protection Agency



WHISTLEBLOWER-HOTLINE

www.stopmatchfixing.dk
 APP (iPhone and Android)
 Managed by the National Platform's Secretariat in Anti Doping Denmark



FUTURE:

- Increased knowledge about matchfixing
- Increased cooperation between stakeholders (public and private)
- Increased reporting / informing / whistleblowing
- Increased possibilities of investigation
- Increased possibilities of prosecuting
- Increased international cooperation
- Etc.

Annex III Estonia Country Report

Estonia has signed the convention. They will soon be able to apply criminal sanctions for the offence of MF. The respective bill was being read in the Parliament in the first week of October. The Gambling Act is under discussion in order to be able to prosecute MF as fraud thanks to the recent case example which caused a conflict of interest with the principle of speciality: The Court had found MF to fall under misdemeanor charges.

No NP has as yet been set up. Dialogue between stakeholders has been lacking in this regard. The Min of Culture had ownership of this process of the convention, but there is no idea on ratification and NP implementation. The gambling regulator is of the opinion that this issue cannot be solved only by regulating the gambling industry, as the amount of money on betting is small.

Annex IV Finland Country Report

Structure of MF organisation in Finland through the new Finnish Centre for Integrity in Sports. Until 2011, there was informal gathering of information from stakeholders. As of 2011, more coordination was proposed. Thus, FINCIS has been set up: OC, Sport Fed, Min of culture and education and sport association. The NP is nominated by the Min of Education and Culture: (Finnish advisory board for Integrity in Sport).

The NP has a new system this year and new ideas on cooperation between FINCIS and the NP. The NOC will also have a role in this NP.

There is no sport specific law on betting fraud – general rules in law, which is difficult to implement with regard to lower leagues (in 4th division football, players DO bet on their own leagues). There is a loophole in legislation (they tried to change it a few years ago but it got stuck in the Ministry of Justice)

FINCIS is financed by the Ministry of Culture and Education. There is no contribution from stakeholders but maybe eventually from betting companies. The exact role of the NP is as yet unsure.

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
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Management of ethics in sport in Finland



Finnish Advisory Board for Integrity in Sport/Government

- › Monitors and develops joint activities with sports (incl. athletes/players), betting operator and public authorities
- › Keeps track on international co-operation
- › Makes recommendations and initiatives
- › *A sub-committee functions as the National Platform referred in the Convention on Manipulation of Sport Competitions*



Members of the Advisory Board

- Public authorities:**
- › Ministry of Education and Culture
 - › Ministry of Justice
 - › Office of the Prosecutor General
 - › Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior
 - › National Police Board
 - › National Bureau of Investigation

Operator: Veikkaus Oy (national lottery)

- NGOs:**
- › Save the Children Finland (dep. The Finnish League for Human Rights)
 - › Valo ry (Finnish Sport Federation)
 - › Finnish Sports Association of People with Disabilities
 - › The Finnish Football League
 - › Finnish Professional Footballers Association
 - › Finnish Football Association
 - › Finnish Ice Hockey Association
 - › Finnish Basketball Association
 - › Finnish Tennis Association

Chair: Heikki Halla, professor
Secretariat: Ministry of Education and Culture/Sports Division





National Platform in Prevention of Manipulations of Sports Competitions

Develops:

1. Monitoring system
2. Rules in sports
3. Overall national action plan

Coordinates:

- › Sharing of relevant information to the fight against manipulation

Cooperates:

- › With relevant stakeholders at national and international levels (incl. other national platforms)



National Platform in Prevention of Manipulations of Sports Competitions

Chair: Harri Syväsalmi, FINCIS

Members:

- › FINCIS
- › Ministry of Justice
- › Office of Prosecutor General
- › National Police Board
- › National Bureau of Investigation
- › Veikkaus Ltd (National Lottery)
- › Valo ry (Finnish Sports Federation)
- › Finnish Professional Footballers Association
- › Finnish Football Association



Chair of the Advisory Board + secretariat

FINADA New Organisation 2016

- › Finnish Center for Integrity in Sports FINCIS implementation of the governmental policy
- › Finnish Anti-Doping Agency FINADA can be used as auxiliary business name
- › FINADA is used in doping controls and material connected to doping control
- › New resources has been allocated to FINCIS



Finnish Center for Integrity in Sports FINCIS

- › Private association/NGO
- › For implementation of the international conventions (Council of Europe Conventions on Anti-Doping, on Manipulation of Sport Competitions and on Spectator Violence; International Convention on Anti-Doping (UNESCO))
- › Prevention of doping, manipulation of sports competitions and promotion of integrated safety, security and service approach at sport events by education and information means
- › Promoting research



Finnish Center for Integrity in Sports FINCIS

Anti-Doping

- › Updating and implementation of the Finnish Anti-Doping Code
- › Responsibility of doping control in Finland
- › Investigation of Anti-Doping rule violations *in sports*

Manipulation of sports competition

- › Prevention activities
- › Clearing house for issues of manipulation of sports competitions
- › Investigations of violations *in sports*

Safety, security and service at sports events

- › Preventive activities
- › Records of entrance prohibition/spectator violence/open
- › Investigation of violations *in sports*



Views on basic functions

– Promoting ethics in sports

- › **Equal opportunities** for pursuing ethically sustainable sporting activity
- › **Promoting** ethics in sports and supporting high moral standards
- › **Ensuring** sport is clean and ethical
- › **Safeguarding** the values of justice and honesty in sport
- › **Implementing international treaties**
 - Antidoping activities
 - Preventing manipulation in sport
 - Promoting spectator safety and comfort
- › Sustainable and ethical sporting culture
- › Ethic, fairness, honesty and equality in sport



Annex V Latvia Country Report

Latvia was involved in the drafting procedure. The criminal code has a definition of Fraud, but it is not enough to deal with all existing problems; now, they have adopted 2 significant amendments to sports law: including the definition of manipulation, based on 3 points:

- What is manipulation,
 - That it is prohibited
 - All persons involved in the process should do everything possible to prevent this
- A new chapter has also been included in criminal law.
- Imprisonment up to one year if person involved
 - Up to 3 years if money is involved
 - In group (organized crime) or with a big amount of money – up to 5 years

Some cases will go to Court. A lot of information is restricted, so not broader information about this. These are the same problems as problems from Estonia and Lithuania.

Latvia is ready to sign the Convention. It is on the work programme of the Ministry: all approvals have been received. The legal procedure to sign and ratify the Convention is now underway.

With regards to Basketball, for example, the federation is involved in a project, partnered by Federbet, called True Basketball Games, with Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden and Finland. Federbet provides all the monitoring. The project is centered on education and awareness raising. The big problem is young players. Information detected was passed on to the federation; Federbet gave all the reports and analyses. This information was given to the police through the federation. In one specific case, the information was given to the Lithuanian police (as both teams were Lithuanian).

Annex VI Lithuania Country Report

- Betting/min/criminal police/sports (basketball) present today
- National laws/signed convention/working on establishing the national platform

Challenges:

- Match-fixing is not systematically recognized
- It is not coordinated nationally
- Many Sports Organisations are not ready to fight Match-Fixing (no regulation/monitoring)
- New criminal provision: exemption from criminal liability
- No appropriate monitoring
- Limited resources from the State
- The criminal legislation is also applicable to legal entities and can result in a large fine.

An agreement has been reached on the model of the NP (2016 end) – a roundtable on NP issues will be taking place soon.

There is a survey on match-fixing with sport organisations.

Future: Convention ratification expected in 2018; Baltic platform is an interesting concept.

Only 10% of athletes in Latvia are professional, so this is a gap that should be adjusted. The ministry lobbies to change this aspect or to make it more detailed.



Lithuania – among the 15 „Front Liners“, who signed the Macolin Convention on the 18th of September, 2014.

Our progress (1):

- Cooperation Agreement among the main State Authorities (April 2015)
- Recommendations for Lithuanian Sport Organisations aiming to assist them in the fight against *Match-Fixing* (July 2015)
- Lithuanian Focal Point for Sports Corruption in Europol (November 2015)
- National Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programme in the area of Sport and its Implementation Plan, which include the *Match-Fixing* issues (January 2016)
- Revision of the relevant National Laws (Spring 2016)
- Criminalization of *Match-Fixing* activities (June 2016)

Article 182¹ “Manipulation of Sports Competitions” (Lithuanian Criminal Code), valid as from 1 January 2017

Article 182¹ Manipulation of Sports Competitions

1. A person, who illegally influences a fair course of a *professional* sports competition or its results, shall be punished by community service or by a fine or by restriction of liberty or by arrest or by imprisonment for a term of up to four years.
2. A person, who commits the act indicated in Paragraph 1 of this Article may be released from criminal liability where he voluntarily notifies a law enforcement institution about it before he is found a suspect and actively assists in detecting this criminal act.
3. Legal entities shall also be held liable for the acts provided for in Paragraphs 1 of this Article.

National Challenges

- The Match-Fixing phenomenon is not systematically recognized;
- The Match-Fixing phenomenon is not coordinated at the national level (there is no National platform in place), the main stakeholders do not cooperate effectively;
- The most sports organizations are not ready to resist the Match-Fixing;
- There is no appropriate *Monitoring* (24/7).
- No additional contributions from the State for the relevant purposes.
- Uncertainty with regard to the blockage within the EU.

Actions underway

- Agreement on the model of the National Platform (end of 2016)
- Survey on Match-Fixing (November 2016)

Future

- Ratification of the Macolin Convention (expected in 2018)
- Baltic Platform?

Annex VII Norway country report

A coordinated approach in 2012 was established. In December 2012, a national action plan against match fixing was established: A joint effort between SO, SBOS, BRA and the NMOC and Min of Justice. One of the main measures in this action plan was the establishment of a National Cooperation Forum, established in 2013. The stakeholders in this NCF are the Confederation of Sport (umbrella organization for all organized sport), FA, Norsktipping, the Regulatory authority, the police (CIS), the trotting association, NMOC.

The forum meets twice a year formally, but there is continuous contact between stakeholders bilaterally and multilaterally. The forum realized meeting twice a year wasn't enough for operational cooperation. Therefore, an operational cooperation was envisaged: December 2014, Norway ratified the CoE Convention and considered Art. 13 to establish a NP. The National authority was tasked to set up a NP in 2015. The NP was operational in Jan 2016, with 2 full time staff.

Now there are 2 levels of cooperation:

- National cooperation forum (strategic, discussing problems of common interest, etc.)
- Operational cooperation through the NP.
 - o Funded by NMOC through gaming revenues/annual funding
 - o Tasks include setting up and running a centralized information hub with a purpose of creating a database to produce source analysis, through a simplified intelligence cycle, all the stakeholders are the main information Providers.
 - o The Purpose of the database is to allow the NP to detect and prevent concrete cases of MF; and allow for conducting risk assessment analyses.
 - To build this DB, sensitive information is involved. So the NP started going into dialogue with the DP authority; how to collect and store sensitive information in a way that was compliant with national DP laws. They received a license from the DPA to collect and store sensitive information.

The NP receives tips and information from betting operators and transmits it to stakeholders. NP doesn't do criminal investigation. If there are criminal offences, they will send it over to the police.

Norwegian state lottery: all of the information is combined with the federation – everything goes into the Hub, which is allowed to receive the information. it is important to note (for EU countries) that Norway is also bound by the EU Data Protection Directive, but there are different approaches. The national Data protection authority is operating according to EU law.

The NP is important for international dialogue. They were in the international conference. Visited UKGC, ADD came to Norway.

The Network to be built by NP is very important. Every stakeholder does its job.

Legislation –there is no specific legislation against MF, but in the Criminal Code, there are provisions against fraud, corruption, etc. The first official case of MF in 2012 was in Football (3rd division). 5 persons were convicted of according to general provisions. The case was postponed to January 2017 (3rd).

Annex VIII Sweden Country Report

First cases were identified in 2012/13, in Football, basketball, etc. Between 2013 and 2015, many cases (almost 100) were identified as suspicious, so the sport confederation started acting, and the number already decreased in 2016. It is very hard to convict: only 3 cases and only 2 convictions. Although 8 footballers were suspended by RIN: here an athlete REPORTED. Preventative measure!

The government in Sweden has appointed an inquiry into the possibility of a licence system. Some sport federations and danske spiel pointed out a few things from a MF perspective. Do we need a new legislation? There is a lobby for limitation in betting amounts. The Swedish Crime Prevention Agency (BRA) has produced a toolbox for stakeholders. In addition, Svenska Spel, the lottery required mandatory registration of operators. Sweden followed in Denmark's footsteps: they have put sport

regulations in place against MF and unauthorized betting: covering all 71 sports in SSC. No cases have been tested yet. All cases so far are under the old system.

There is an anonymous whistleblowing system in place, via email, telephone and web.

Sweden has an unofficial NP since 2014 – with all stakeholders. The reason it is unofficial is because it hasn't been recognized by the government. It is strategic, with meetings 4 times a year. The Sports Confederations main task is to provide information and education.

A useful website to consult is Minmatch.SE, Now translated into English

Current Status

- First cases in late 2012/early 2013
- About 70 suspicious matches in Swedish football between 2013-2015
- About 10 suspicious matches so far during 2016
- 8 footballers suspended by RIN (sports supreme court in Sweden)
- 2 convictions in the Court of Appeal
- The Government has appointed an inquiry of the gambling market in Sweden:
 - New legislation against manipulation?
 - Limitation in betting offers and betting amounts?

Sweden's main actions against match-fixing

- Study from Brå (The Swedish Crime Prevention Agency)
- Mandatory registration/customer identification at Svenska Spel
- Sports regulations against match-fixing and unauthorized betting
- System for reporting of alleged match-fixing
- "Unofficial" national platform.
- Information and education.



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Annex IX Session 1 – Raising Awareness with regard to the link between sports manipulations and the criminal world



- Background and remit of FP Sports
- Corruption
- Sports Corruption as a serious crime
- Information sharing – how?

FP Sports Corruption Background

- The existence of OCGs involved in sports corruption for the purpose of fraudulent betting is not a recent development
- Growing impact on the European Union
- Risk posed is perceived so high that on 14 March 2013 the European Parliament adopted a dedicated "Resolution on match fixing and corruption in sport"
- Europol called to play a critical role in addressing sports corruption at EU level (LE perspective)

Remit of FP Sports Corruption

1 April 2014

Focal Point Sports Corruption was established

"Preventing and combating forms of criminality within Europol's mandate relating to current investigations into sports corruption, including fraud and swindling as well as associated criminal activities uncovered in the course of these investigations"

Europol Support – FP Sports Corruption

- Operational Project under the Analytical Work File SOC (Serious and Organised Crime) endowed with:
- Analytical capabilities to collect, store, and analysis criminal data
- Database (Ibase)
- Objective: Development of intelligence packages

- The main focus is to support:
- live investigations on sports corruption
- intelligence gathering activities initiated by MS and our operational partners
- Entirely depending on MS contributions –Customer driven approach!
- Operational analysis
- Operational meetings
 - facilitation
- financial support for MS and TPs
- Cooperation with Eurojust
- Supportive role in JITs (Joint Investigation Teams)

Legal Framework – Member States

- Legal landscape not uniform across the EU MS (criminal code, ad hoc sport laws, special criminal laws)
- Criminal sanctions may vary noticeably depending on the criminal provisions applied (e.g. fraud, corruption, organised crime, match-fixing)
- It poses a challenge for law enforcement and judicial authorities

Sport Manipulation and organized Crime

- Wide match-fixing schemes require high-level coordination, expertise, and readily available funds
- Many factors to be in control of:
 - Availability of key players (sportsmen, officials, referees, coaches, clubs executives)
 - Access to facilitators, money couriers
 - Corruptive influence/intimidation
 - Knowledge of the sports environment
 - In-depth know-how of betting markets (offline/online)
 - Financial network, use of LBS, money laundering techniques

Key features of sports corruption

- Led by Organised Criminal Groups (OCGs)
- Highly transnational crime
- High-profit/low risk crime



- Criminal activities to be mapped as a whole
- It prompts international police cooperation and multi-agency approach
- Law enforcement investigations are very challenging
- Lower level players hit by law enforcement

The betting element

- Betting element is seen as the 'engine' of sports corruption
- Annual turnover of sports betting, for soccer only, is quantifiable in approximately 300 to 500 billion Euro per year, and the percentage on fixed matches is estimated to be little less than one per cent (0,7%)
- OCGs largely place bets in the Asian market (legal/illegal)
- Traditional bookmakers but also Bet exchange markets exploited



Sports Corruption and Money Laundering

- Sport betting is a huge global business with (conservative) rough estimates of over €750 billion bet worldwide every year on all sports, while €400 is bet on football only
- Recent academic studies claim that \$140 billion is laundered annually through sport betting
- Sports corruption is increasingly seen as a low cost and low risk method to both generate and launder money by OCGs from in and outside the EU

Multi-partner co-operation

- All sports can be potentially affected if there is a profitable illicit gain to be made through betting
- It requires joint efforts from all key stakeholders (law enforcement and judicial authorities, Gaming Regulatory authorities, sports organisations, betting operators, betting monitoring operators)
- Every piece of information may be crucial to start an investigation!

Co-operation public/private sector

- May 2014 MoU signed between Europol and UEFA
- March 2015 MoU signed between Europol and Sportradar
- May 2015 MoU signed between Europol and Tennis Integrity Unit

Information-sharing: National level

- All relevant actors should ideally contribute to collect, assess, disseminate information/data on possibly manipulated sports competitions
- National Platforms can be regarded as an ad hoc platform to enable this process at national level
- Based on national legal/regulatory framework
- Desired outcome: more comprehensive intelligence picture on suspicious manipulated competitions to enable action

Information-sharing: International level

- Relevant information/data on possible criminal cases with observed international links should be timely provided to LE to enable international police cooperation (e.g. through Europol)
- Information further exploited for intelligence / investigation purposes
- Desired outcome: facilitating info-exchange amongst MS/Third States as well as providing analytical feedback (when Europol is involved)

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
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Europol National Units Europol Liaison Offices



Europol/FP Sports Corruption and National Platforms

NPs

Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Netherlands
Norway
Malta
Spain
Sweden
UK

FP Sports Corruption

Denmark
Finland
France
Netherlands

70%
Spain
Sweden
UK

Europol Public Information



Conclusions

- Efforts need to be made to achieve increasing levels of information sharing between all actors
- Sharing of expertise, experience on successful cases is fundamental
- Enhancing strategic knowledge on sports corruption and on OC groups is paramount to identify new trends/developments
- Engaging in international cooperation at an early stage as the only way to tackle effectively manipulation of sports competitions

The way forward

- Delivering the maximum support to MS' investigations
- Exploring new and different areas of sporting events vulnerable to sport corruption and sporting fraud
- Expanding cooperation with MS and other TPs operational partners

Annex X Session 3 –Working Groups Prioritising and sharing information: a very practical view Lorraine Pearman – UK Gambling Commission

The scenario

The UK's SBIU has been contacted by one operator about an alert regarding irregular betting patterns relating to a sporting event being held in your jurisdiction later this afternoon.

There is only one UK betting account holder identified as having placed a bet on the match. It is likely, unless new intelligence is received, that SBIU will take any further action.

SBIU want to pass on the information to the relevant national platform for them to take any appropriate action.

- *Who in your jurisdiction would be the point of contact?*

First inject after 10 minutes

The SBIU has now provided you with the information they have about the alert. You now know:

- The betting relates to a low tier sporting match between Team A and Team B
- The number of bets placed is higher than would normally be expected
- That the event is taking place in a town in your jurisdiction
- That the bets relate to the final score being Team B to win
- That the liquidity is much higher than would be expected on this match
- Involves bettors in your jurisdiction in and around the location of the match

- *What action would you take?*

Points to bring out:

- How would they confirm if there was irregular betting patterns with operators in their jurisdiction
- How would they/can they access betting data in their jurisdiction
- What information would they want
- What information would they receive
- How quickly would you receive it
- What would trigger an investigation by the national platform
- Which other stakeholders would be informed/involved at this stage (i.e. the SGB, police etc.)
- What Info is available on teams involved that might make this unusual rather than irregular e.g. is it a local derby, are there injuries in Team A or are they due to play a cup match so are fielding a weakened side, is it a dead rubber,

Second Inject

You now have confirmation from that:

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- There are irregular betting patterns in your jurisdiction on the match between Team A and Team B
- The bettors include individuals that appear to have links with Team A, including team members that are playing in the match

Points to bring out:

- What would operators offer you in terms of detailed information
- What would you do with this information
- Have you notified the sport by this stage
- If not, would you now involve the sport – who would you contact
- What information would you/could you give to the SGB?
- How would you transfer it
- Are there SGB rules around betting
- If this was pre match what action might the SGB take?
- What action might be taken post-match?
- Does the intel indicate criminality
- Would you involve other national platforms – if so how.

Groups come back into plenary session to discuss outcomes of their discussions.

Discussion around any learning points, particularly anything that could be incorporated into the KCOOS tool.



ANNEX XI Proposal of an 'ideal' model of how the whole bet/risk management could look like on a pan-European level: Vladimir Dratsjov, Head of Sportsbook, Olympic Casino Eesti AS

- 1) Ideally all regionally licensed operators in every one of the European states (local licensing) should send the basic data of the bets to a pan-European platform. This would be just a raw data in a format similar to this one:

Date	Type	Status	Live	Client	Bet amount	Won amount	Odd	Currency	COUNTRY
01.10.2016 00:39:16	Single Bet	Won	Yes	3345014 (LR)	0.8	3.54	4.42	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:39:28	Multi-bet	Loss	No	2264006 (LR)	0.1	0	225.01	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:39:30	Single Bet	Won	Yes	3427766 (N)	1.5	2.7	1.80	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:39:36	Single Bet	Won	Yes	3321235 (LR)	80	97.6	1.22	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:39:57	Single Bet	Loss	Yes	2381310 (LR)	11.32	0	2.25	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:40:02	Single Bet	Won	Yes	3415166 (LR)	3.9	4.99	1.28	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:40:03	Single Bet	Won	Yes	2925407 (LR)	25	52.5	2.10	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:41:11	Multi-bet	Loss	Yes	2914372 (LR)	3.5	0	2.987	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:41:13	Multi-bet	Loss	No		5	0	139.504	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:41:18	Multi-bet	Loss	No	2264006 (LR)	0.15	0	88.742	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:41:30	Multi-bet	Loss	No	2168109 (...)	2	0	7.16	EUR	RU
01.10.2016 00:41:47	Multi-bet	Loss	No	2227142 (LR)	0.3	0	6.034	EUR	RU

Start time	Game	Event	Odds	Status	Competition	Info	Sport
30.09.2016 23:00:00	Llaneros FC Villavicencio - Leones FC	Asian Handicap 2 (0)	2.11	Won	Colombia - Primera B (LIVE)	2 : 2, (1:2) (1:0);...	Football

As you can see, this is a very basic information without any specifics. In this format you do not violate any data protection rules or even come near reaching any thresholds. However i would add an additional column, the one that you see on the Picture in multicolour.

This column represents the status of the client and trust me, each bookmaker has it in one or other variation. Why is it important? Because most fixed matches are being bet on with new accounts and on other hand the ones which are not fixed but have a lot of movements due to inside information, are usually being bet by „shark“ clients who are already or will be marked in the future after placing the respective bets. Once the task force is in place in each country they would be able to make a difference between these client groups very easily. In my example you have some Basic client categories such as „(N) for New“, „(LR) for low risk“ etc.

This kind of data would be gathered somewhere in the central servers of the EC or the EU for that matter and would be completely anonymous acting as a beacon once the questions about the integrity of the match arise. If suspicious betting patterns take place in more than 1-2 countries, it would be possible to trace the real people behind those bets on the national level which would also be easier for the national platforms, the police and the prosecutors.

The row below represents the information about the bet – which match the bet was placed on, at which odds, at which minute of the match and on which market and selection.

- 2) The info provided would simply sit in the database until some of the national platforms raise a question about the integrity of the specific match. Once that's done the bets could be double-checked on the pan-European level and the total range of fluctuation of the odds would be established. The information could be further analysed and possible cumulative loss for the bookmakers easily calculated. Once this is done, i am sure we would for the first time be able to comprehend the true scope of the total damage on the European level that a fixed match or even the match violated through information trading could result in.
- 3) Once it becomes evident that a 3rd division match in Lithuanian basketball cost each of the Lithuanian bookies 3-5k euros and same amount to another 10 of the dot.com bookies we would immediately see the damage rolling over a certain threshold starting from which the Europol could be interested in handling the case. This would also allow central handling of all such cases from Europe rather than a tiny prosecutor's Office somewhere in Macedonian district of Kumanovo which quite often causes a lot of problems.

The specific framework behind this kind of the setup would obviously be the topic of hot political discussions however I'm more than certain speaking from my own experience that this stream of information is very easy to share for the bookies as it would simply be an encrypted xml data. Countries like Belarus, Italy, France and Latvia (in a passive way) already demand it from all bookies holding their regional licenses.


Annex XII Session 4 – Rules, legislation and evidence (Sportradar)

Laws, Rules and Evidence: Some Perspectives

Introduction

A Tricky Process


- Dealing with matchfixing allegations is difficult as it is based on issues of responsibility, visibility, jurisdiction and of course information sharing
- But issues around laws, rules and evidence play a critical role in the success or failure or indeed commencement of any investigations or prosecutions
- This Presentation looks at some case studies, outlines challenges and presents some solutions



1. Legislation

Some interesting points...


- Full range of laws and legislation and offences that 'cover' matchfixing and match manipulation
- But specificity/impacts on funding, resourcing, priority and chances of success
- In Nepal, four players and a coach are being tried for treason – powerful deterrent BUT chances of success?
- Southern Stars case in Australia, English FA encountered problems getting law enforcement on board as UK has no specific matchfixing law
- Victoria had just passed new legislation – within 48 hours of receiving FDS Reports, they had started a police investigation



2. Regulations

An interesting development...

Summer 2016: Based on BFDS reports and expert performance analysis, CAS upholds Federation's decision to sanction club and a number of its players for match-fixing.



Key Points

- The sanctions were imposed without actual proof of match-fixing but because match-fixing was presumed
- Federation had adjusted the wording of their disciplinary code to lower the threshold of evidence – sanctions can be imposed where there is "sufficient data to confirm match-fixing"
- The CAS decision ultimately verifies that BFDS reports (along with performance analysis) can be used to identify match-fixing and therefore to impose proportional sanctions on clubs and players

2. Regulations

Old Federation Disciplinary Code Rule

Article 44 (3) - In the case when match-fixing is confirmed, the Participant of the Match, the behaviour of whom during the Match (as shown by the analysis of the Match) allows presuming that such a Participant could have committed the infringements specified in Clause 1 of this Article, shall be sanctioned with Match suspension (disqualification) from 8 (eight) Matches and/or a ban from taking part in a particular or any football-related activity up to 3 (three) months.

Section 44 (5) – In the case when there are sufficient data to confirm match-fixing, the Participant of the Match, the behaviour of whom during the Match (as shown by the analysis of the Match) allows presuming that such a Participant could have committed the infringements specified in Clause 1 of this Article, shall be sanctioned with Match suspension (disqualification) in up to 12 (twelve) Matches and/or a ban from taking part in a particular or any football related activity for up to 6 (six) months

CAS Decision

Section 88 – "...the Players were sanctioned because they were found guilty of the infringement contemplated by..... Article 44.5 of the New Disciplinary Code on the basis of the evidence which under the Disciplinary Code allows such conclusion (the reports of the Experts and of BFDS)."



Section 91 - "The Appealed Decisions found that the Matches had been fixed for betting purposes and that the Player's conduct was such as to allow the finding of presumed match-fixing, in the absence of evidence of actual match fixing. Therefore the conditions....were considered to be satisfied and the Players could be sanctioned....In that respect the Panel agrees with the conclusions of the Appealed Decisions..."

- In the past, there have been countless cases of suspected match-fixing that have gone un-sanctioned due to evidence not satisfying the burden of proof.
- In conjunction with actual match-fixing provisions, presumed match-fixing provisions can serve as a vital function when there is not enough evidence to prove actual match-fixing.
- This structure and concept of presumed match-fixing allows for these types of situations to be sanctioned based on the rules of the Federation (if updated to include this approach), such was the case with this Federation and endorsed by CAS.

Levis, Rules and Biases: Some Perspectives

3. Evidence



An important ruling...

Summer 2016: Based on our reports and investigative activities, KS Skenderbeu's ban by UEFA for match fixing is upheld



Key Points

- The priority was put on securing sufficient amount of BFDS Reports to showcase a pattern of behaviour
- The CAS decision ultimately verifies that a number of BFDS reports can be used to identify match-fixing and therefore to impose proportional sanctions on clubs

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Levis, Rules and Biases: Some Perspectives

3. Evidence



Official UEFA Press Release on 6th July 2016

"...After a thorough investigation undertaken by UEFA in close cooperation with its partner Sportradar, the ethics and disciplinary inspectors identified certain betting patterns which were in total contradiction with those expected in a regular betting market..."

"...With this decision CAS upholds the efforts taken to protect both domestic and UEFA competitions from match-fixing. It also shows the confidence CAS has in the UEFA BFDS - developed in conjunction with Sportradar - which is an instrumental tool in helping guarantee the integrity of competitions..."

UEFA welcomes the Court of Arbitration for Sport's decision to dismiss the appeal lodged by KF Skenderbeu against the UEFA Appeals Body decision of 3 June 2016.

Consequently CAS confirms the decision taken by the UEFA disciplinary bodies to ban Skenderbeu from the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League due to its involvement in activities aimed at manipulating the outcome of matches (Article 4.1.2 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League).

This case affirms the validity of UEFA's betting fraud prevention system (BFDS) in identifying presumed betting patterns played by the Albanian club of European and domestic competitions.

After a thorough investigation undertaken by UEFA, in close cooperation with its partner Sportradar, the ethics and disciplinary inspectors identified certain betting patterns which were in total contradiction with those expected in a regular betting market. This case was first analysed by the UEFA Appeals Body and then by CAS.

With this decision CAS upholds the efforts taken to protect both domestic and UEFA competitions from match-fixing. It also shows the confidence CAS has in the UEFA BFDS - developed in conjunction with Sportradar - which is an instrumental tool in helping guarantee the integrity of competitions.



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Laws, Rules and Evidence: Some Perspectives

4. Discerning Quality

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Evaluating Solutions...



Laws, Rules and Evidence: Some Perspectives

4. Discerning Quality

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The Difference between....



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5. Points for Discussion

- Have other delegates been restricted/blocked by legislation issues?
- Should new regulations with a lower burden of proof be introduced in order to secure prosecutions? Is it worth it?
- Does the Regulation case wording form a template for other federations and associations?
- Do these decisions embolden federations and associations to use these type of reports and launch prosecutions?
- These decisions refer to Sportradar-developed BFDS Reports. Which other systems/reports, if any, have the requisite level of credibility to secure the same treatment/gravity?
- What minimum requirements does a system need to meet in order to secure similar treatment/gravity?

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Annex XIII Final Programme

Strasbourg, 27 September 2016

KCOOS (2016) 07

“Keep Crime Out Of Sport”

Regional Seminar 3

Dates and working hours:

Tuesday 4 October 2016 14:00 – 17:00

Wednesday 5 October 2016 09:30 – 17:30

Copenhagen, Denmark

(House of Sport, Brøndby Stadion 20, 2605 Brøndby)

<http://www.idraettenshus.dk/da>

FINAL PROGRAMME

(Please note that possible additions and modifications may occur)





TUESDAY 04 OCTOBER 2016

- 13:30 – 14:00 Arrival and Registration of Participants
- 14:00 – 15:00 OPENING AND INTRODUCTION
- Welcome
Representative of Danish Ministry
 - Introduction, Objective-setting and adoption of agenda Presentation of state of play (following questionnaire replies) , mapping
Cassandra Fernandes, KCOOS Senior Project Officer, Council of Europe
- 15:00 – 16:00 Roundtable – part 1
Short presentations from Participant countries: 10 minutes each. Participants will discuss the current status of fighting match-fixing nationally, within the competencies of each of the stakeholders; as well as why they haven't yet ratified the convention (if applicable). Some statistics on match-fixing cases will be useful.
- 16:00 –16:15 COFFEE BREAK
- 16:15 – 17:15 Roundtable – part 2
Short presentations from Participant countries: 10 minutes each. Participants will discuss the current status of fighting match-fixing nationally, within the competencies of each of the stakeholders; as well as why they haven't yet ratified the convention (if applicable). Some statistics on match-fixing cases will be useful.
- 17:15 Visit to GLMS / bus transportation
- 19:30 ORGANISED EVENING PROGRAMME – TBC in Copenhagen city



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WEDNESDAY 05 OCTOBER 2016

- 9:00 – 9:30 Arrival at conference rooms
- 9:30 – 10:30 Session 1 – Raising Awareness with regard to the link between sports manipulations and the criminal world
Sergio D’Orsi - Europol
- 10:30 – 10:45 Coffee break
- 10:45 – 12:00 Session 2 – National Platforms
Moderated by Council of Europe Secretariat
- e) What have been the issues faced in setting up the NP
 - f) Who leads the platform
 - g) Who is in/should be part of the platform
 - h) Discussing the idea of ‘contributors’ to the platform
- 12:15 – 13:15 LUNCH BREAK
- 13:30 – 14:30 Session 3 – Plenary/Working Groups Prioritising and sharing information: a very practical view
Lorraine Pearman – UK Gambling Commission
- 14:30 – 15:30 Session 5 – Plenary: Creating a Baltic Network
a) Working methods, best practices, new tendencies etc.
b) Creating a Networks of networks
- 15:30 – 15:45 Coffee break
- 15:50 – 17:15 Session 4 – Rules, legislation and evidence
Alex Ingot - Sportradar
- 17:15 – 17:30 Creating a ‘handbook tool’

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Participating countries:

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

Latvia

Lithuania

Norway

Sweden

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