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Date: 15/10/2026

DH-DD(2026)1306

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Meeting: 1577th meeting (December 2026) (DH)

Communication from the Ukrainian authorities (14/10/2026) concerning the case of Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (Application No. 20958/14)

Information made available under Rule 8.2a of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements.

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Réunion : 1577^e réunion (décembre 2026) (DH)

Communication des autorités ukrainiennes (14/10/2026) relative à l'affaire Ukraine c. Russie (Crimée) (Requête n° 20958/14) **[anglais uniquement]**

Informations mises à disposition en vertu de la Règle 8.2a des Règles du Comité des Ministres pour la surveillance de l'exécution des arrêts et des termes des règlements amiables.



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DGI

14 OCT. 2026

SERVICE DE L'EXECUTION
DES ARRETS DE LA CEDH

Mr Frédéric Dolt

Head of Department

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Applications nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18 - Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)

Review of the state of execution of the Court's judgment at the 1577th (DH) meeting

Dear Sir,

The Government of Ukraine present their compliments to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

In view of the forthcoming 1577th (DH) meeting of the Committee of Ministers, during which the state of execution of the judgment on admissibility and merits within the inter-State case *Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)*, the Government would like to provide information regarding the human rights situation in the occupied Crimea. Provided information is based on the information received from the domestic authorities (mostly – by the Office of the Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and from open sources.

At their 1521st meeting (DH) in March 2025 the Committee of Ministers examined this case, during which the Committee urged the Russian Federation to:

- immediately release, and ensure the safe return to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian authorities, of all Ukrainian political prisoners whose rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Convention were restricted by an administrative practice in Crimea, for an ulterior purpose not prescribed by the Convention; as well as of all illegally detained Ukrainian soldiers, ethnic Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and journalists;



СЕД АСКОД

Міністерство юстиції України

№ 156067/5.1.3/21-26 від 14.10.2026

Підписувач Сокоренко Маргарита Степанівна

Сертифікат 514B5C86A1E5DA1104000000AFB10000BA990F05

Дійсний з 15.12.2025 12:40:11 по 15.12.2026 12:40:11

- pending such release and safe return to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian authorities, immediately cease all forms of torture and ill-treatment and ensure access of these prisoners to independent legal advice, medical treatment and communication with their families and the outside world; allow independent international bodies to monitor their state of health and conditions of detention and submit the list of persons detained, to enable the Committee to supervise their release into safety;
- immediately cease all transfers of prisoners from Crimea to Russian Federation territory and comply with the indications of the Court under Article 46 to secure the return of the relevant prisoners transferred from Crimea to penal facilities located on the Russian Federation's territory, to safety, namely to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian authorities;
- thoroughly, independently, effectively and promptly investigate the grave and serious violations of the Convention committed, so as to identify all those responsible for the purposes of bringing them to justice, and ensure that perpetrators of enforced disappearances, arbitrary or *incommunicado* detentions, as well as their chain of command, and those complicit are held accountable in accordance with international law;
- fully engage and cooperate with any pending international investigations, including those launched by the international jurisdictional bodies, national investigations brought under the principles of universal jurisdiction, or those pending in Ukraine, and international enquiries and investigative missions;
- immediately cease all the impugned administrative practices and ensure respect of the fundamental rights of all individuals and groups, including the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly, association, thought, privacy, conscience and religion;
- immediately halt any discriminatory practices or ethnic persecution against Crimean Tatars;
- immediately stop illegal expropriation and revert its consequences;
- ensure the right to education in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages in Crimea and cease any persecution of the Ukrainian speaking children and teachers;
- lift the unlawful restriction of the freedom of movement between Crimea and mainland Ukraine;
- ensure the legal possibility to opt-out of Russian citizenship, as well as adequate facilities to do that;
- cooperate fully with all international monitoring bodies and remove any obstacles to monitoring the human rights situation in Crimea by relevant international bodies and organisations;
- fully comply from now on with its procedural obligations under Article 38 of the Convention to furnish all necessary facilities to assist the Court in performing its duties.

Although the Russian Federation ceased to be a Party to the Convention on 16 September 2022, it remains bound under Article 46 of the Convention to abide by the judgment, including by putting an end to the administrative practices found by the Court and affording redress to their victims. The information below concerning events after that date is submitted not as evidence of new violations, but to demonstrate that the practices found by the Court have not been discontinued and have, on the contrary, intensified.

(i) The wholesale application of Russian law in Crimea

The vast majority of the violations found in the present judgment were caused by administrative practices perpetrated or officially tolerated by the Russian Federation, in the context of the application of Russian law in Crimea. The Court held that Russian law could not be regarded as “law” in Crimea within the meaning of the Convention, as the “courts” and bodies involved in the enforcement of administrative practices in Crimea were required to continue to apply “the whole of the law (civil law and penal law)” of Ukraine and not to replace it with Russian legislation unless “necessary”. The above findings have been later confirmed and developed in *Bazhenov and Others v. Russia and*

*Ukraine*¹. At present the Russian law continue to apply in Crimea and continue to produce further numerous human rights violations.

(ii) Persistence of the violations found by the Court in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC]

More than two years after the Grand Chamber's judgment of 25 June 2024, the Respondent State has not discontinued any of the administrative practices found by the Court. The Russian Federation continues to apply its legislation and its law-enforcement and "judicial" system in Crimea. It denies access to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission and other international monitoring bodies. Since February 2022 the repressive practices described below have markedly intensified.

1. Enforced disappearances, incommunicado detention and ill-treatment (Articles 2, 3 and 5; §§ 950-999 of the Court's Judgment²)

The Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea informed that they received information regarding cases of arrest and detention incommunicado of at least 23 residents of Crimea during the period between 2023 and 2026: their relatives are not notified, no charges are brought and they have no access to a lawyer, often for weeks or months. Most are held in pre-trial detention facility No. 2 in Simferopol. At least 53 further persons transferred to Crimea from the temporarily occupied parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are held in the same way.

A journalistic investigation published in September-October 2026 described a closed detention system for civilians in Simferopol, including a facility formally placed under the control of the FSB in 2026.³

None of the enforced disappearances of 2014–2015 found by the Court has been investigated by the respondent State. Investigations opened by Ukrainian prosecutors into the disappearance of at least six persons in that period, including Vasyl Chernysh, Timur Shaimardanov, Seyran Zinedinov, Ivan Bondarets, Valeriy Vashchuk and Eskender Apselyamov, remain open but cannot progress without access to the territory and to the persons implicated.

Since 2014, the OHCHR has documented 55 cases of torture in Crimea, including mock executions, beatings, electric shocks and sexual violence⁴.

Detainees in "espionage" and "sabotage" cases are routinely tortured during the first days of detention and filmed making "confessions" for broadcast in Russian media. No FSB officer has been held accountable.

According to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, at least 40 Crimean political prisoners suffer from serious chronic illnesses and are denied adequate medical care. And at least two have died in custody: Dzhenil Gafarov in February 2023 and Kostiantyn Shyrinh.

2. Politically motivated prosecutions before "courts" not established by law (Articles 5, 6, 7 and 18; §§ 1239-1278, 1328-1382 of the Court's Judgment)

¹ See *Bazhenov and Others v. Russia and Ukraine*, nos. 20092/18 and others, §§ 60-63, 16 July 2026.

² Hereinafter reference to *Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)* [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024.

³ Last Seen in Crimea: Kyiv Independent documentary investigates Russia's secret detention system for Ukrainian civilians: <https://kyivindependent.com/last-seen-in-crimea-kyiv-independent-documentary-investigates-russias-secret-detention-system-for-ukrainian-civilians/> (Last accessed: 14 October 2026)

⁴ Ten Years of Occupation by the Russian Federation: Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024-02-28-OHCHR-Ten-Years-Occupation-Crimea.pdf>

As of October 2026, at least 322 persons from Crimea are under investigation or have been convicted on politically motivated charges. Of these, 171 are Crimean Tatars. It is important to emphasise that they constitute more than half of those persecuted, but Crimean Tatars only make up about 13% of the population of the peninsula. At least 146 of them were detained after 24 February 2022.

The main categories of cases are:

- 119 persons in the so-called “Hizb ut-Tahrir” cases;
- 72 persons charged with “high treason”, “espionage” or “confidential co-operation with a foreign State”, of whom 64 for “high treason”;
- 39 persons in the “Noman Çelebicihan battalion” case;
- over 50 persons in “sabotage” and “terrorism” cases;
- some 20 persons prosecuted for social-media posts, “discrediting” the Russian army or donations to the Ukrainian armed forces;
- 39 Jehovah’s Witnesses, among whom 13 are currently deprived of liberty.

Sentences are exceptionally severe. Of the 255 persons whose sentence is known, 186 received ten years or more, among them 91 – fifteen years or more; the longest sentence is 26 years.

Convictions rest on the testimony of anonymous witnesses, FSB “expert” reports, confessions obtained under duress and, in the “Hizb ut-Tahrir” cases, recordings of private conversations on religious subjects. No evidence of any violent act is produced in those cases.

They are directed primarily against civic activists, citizen journalists and relatives of political prisoners. “Terrorism” cases are tried by the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don, in the Russian Federation.

At least 127 convicted persons are held in penal colonies in the Russian Federation, thousands of kilometres from their families, contrary to the Court’s findings on the transfer of prisoners (Article 8; §§ 1279-1305 of the Court’s Judgment). After release, former prisoners are subjected to the following: administrative supervision of up to eight years; bans on public activity; listing as “terrorists and extremists” by the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation.

In at least nine cases recorded as of 23 January 2026, mostly concerning Crimean Tatars, the Russian citizenship imposed on prisoners was revoked during their sentence and they were then expelled with an imposed ten-year entry ban. This effectively prevents them from returning to their homes in Crimea.

Since 2014, only ten Crimean political prisoners have been released through exchanges or negotiated arrangements. Some political prisoners already served the full “sentence” imposed by the Russian Federation and two had died in detention.

3. *Freedom of expression* (Article 10 (also Article 18 in relation to Ukrainian political prisoners); §§ 1078-1104, 1306-1382 of the Court’s Judgment)

By 28 September 2026, the occupation “courts” in Crimea had received 1,804 cases under Article 20.3.3 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences (“discrediting” the Russian armed forces). 1,650 individuals were penalised, with fines totalling RUB 54.4 million.

People are punished for: saying “Glory to Ukraine!” (at least 161 decisions); anti-war statements such as “No to war” (at least 112 decisions); displaying the Ukrainian flag or its colours; playing or singing Ukrainian songs, including at private weddings; private messages found during searches of mobile phones at the Armiansk checkpoint, which accounted for 264 of the 518 cases (51%) in 2025.

Repeat “offences” lead to criminal prosecution: at least nine cases under Article 280.3 of the Russian Criminal Code, and five convictions under Article 207.3 (“fakes”) with sentences of up to five and a half years. The Crimean Tatar newspaper *Qırım* was fined RUB 300,000 (and its chief editor for RUB 110,000) for an article in the Crimean Tatar language expressing disagreement with the war.

4. Freedom of assembly (Article 11 (also Article 18 in relation to Ukrainian political prisoners); §§ 1105-1128, 1306-1382 of the Court’s Judgment)

Peaceful assembly in Crimea has in practice been eliminated.

Under Article 20.2.2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences, 301 individuals have been penalised, of whom 254 (84%) are Crimean Tatars. They are typically punished for gathering outside “court” buildings in support of defendants. On 25 January 2023, 34 activists were detained outside a Simferopol “court” and 26 of them were sentenced to administrative detention.

5. Human rights defenders and independent media (Articles 10 and 11; §§ 1078-1128 of the Court’s Judgment)

Russian legislation on “foreign agents” and “undesirable organisations” is applied in Crimea against the remaining independent human rights community:

- in 2025, citizen journalist Lutfiye Zudiyeva was designated a “foreign agent”;
- in 2026, Crimean Solidarity, a civic initiative that for a decade had provided legal support to political prisoners and their families and documented searches, arrests and trials, was designated a “foreign agent”;
- in July 2026, Crimean Solidarity announced that it was ceasing its activities, stating that continuing its work had become impossible;
- in June 2026, citizen journalists Zedin Achykelyamov and Ruslan Paralamov, who cover political trials, were entered in the register of persons “affiliated with foreign agents”;
- 26 organisations registered in Ukraine are designated “undesirable”, including the Crimean Human Rights Group, KrymSOS, the Crimean Tatar Resource Center and the ZMINA Human Rights Centre. Any co-operation with them exposes residents of Crimea to administrative and then criminal liability.

6. Crimean Tatars (Article 14; §§ 1176-1190 of the Court’s Judgment)

The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people has been banned as “extremist” since April 2016. Its leaders Mustafa Dzhemilev (until 2034) and Refat Chubarov remain barred from entering Crimea.

Commemorative events on the anniversary of the 1944 deportation are prohibited, including in schools. While the occupation authorities authorised mass military parades on 9 May even under pandemic restrictions, Crimean Tatars have been detained for commemorating the anniversary of the 1944 deportation on 18 May.

Only 3.35% of pupils receive education in the Crimean Tatar language.

7. Freedom of religion (Article 9; §§ 1054-1077 of the Court’s Judgment)

Compulsory re-registration under Russian law has operated as a filter of loyalty: of some 2,220 religious communities active in Crimea in January 2014 (of which 1,546 were officially registered), only 912 are now registered under Russian law.

The Crimean eparchy of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has been all but eliminated:

- of its 49 parishes before February 2022, seven remain, and four of its 23 clergy;
- its cathedral in Simferopol was seized in May 2023 and its dome dismantled in April 2024;
- its church in Yevpatoria was demolished in 2024.

The occupation-controlled Muslim administration announced in January 2023 the “liquidation” of ten mosques outside its control “with the assistance of law-enforcement bodies”.

Communities that did re-register remain exposed to administrative sanctions. In approximately 83 cases, imams, pastors and believers have been penalised for “unlawful missionary activity” (Article 5.26 § 4), for instance for holding services without “permission” or outside “designated places”.

The Court has found the application of these Russian provisions on missionary activity incompatible with Article 9 of the Convention⁵ and applied to the situation in occupied Crimea.⁶

The Russian ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses, which the Court found incompatible with the Convention in *Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia*⁷, is applied in Crimea with the same methods. At least 39 believers have been criminally prosecuted under Article 282.2 of the Russian Criminal Code (“organising the activities of an extremist organisation”) for taking part in worship, including online services, and for reading and discussing the Bible with acquaintances.

The prosecutions rely on covert FSB video recordings of religious services, on anonymous witnesses whose identity the “courts” refuse to disclose and, in at least one case, on the “expert” opinion of a Russian Orthodox priest.

Most of those convicted have been sentenced to six to six and a half years’ imprisonment. On at least three occasions, the appellate “court” in Crimea replaced a fine or a suspended sentence imposed at first instance with six years’ imprisonment.

Russian legislation on “undesirable organisations” is also used to punish ordinary religious practice.

In August 2021, the Russian authorities declared “undesirable” four entities of the New Generation Christian movement, registered in Ukraine and in Latvia. Since the second half of 2022, the occupation “courts” in Crimea have received 22 cases under Article 20.33 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences (participation in the activities of an “undesirable organisation”), and 16 persons have been penalised. Nine of these cases concern believers of the New Generation movement, prosecuted for taking part in religious gatherings or sharing the movement’s materials. Repeat “offences” entail criminal liability under Article 284.1 of the Russian Criminal Code.

8. Education of children (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1; §§ 1152-1165 of the Court’s Judgment)

The Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea indicated that at the start of the occupation, in the 2013/2014 school year, 12,694 pupils in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (7.2%) and 994 pupils in Sevastopol (3%) were educated in Ukrainian.

According to the occupation authorities’ own data, in 2025/2026 only 163 of 226,800 pupils in the so-called “Republic of Crimea” (0.07%) are educated in Ukrainian, a nearly eighty-fold decrease, together with 24 pre-school children. In Sevastopol, according to the monitoring of the so-called “Institute for Education Development” for 2024/2025⁸, all schooling is conducted exclusively in

⁵ See *Ossewaarde v. Russia*, no. 27227/17, 7 March 2023.

⁶ See *Ashyrov and Skokov v. Russia*, nos. 11890/21 and 24345/22, 13 May 2026.

⁷ See *Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia*, nos. 32401/10 and others, 7 June 2022.

⁸ “Results of monitoring of the state and development of native languages of the peoples of the city of Sevastopol in the 2024/2025 school year”, Sevastopol “Institute for Education Development”: https://www.sev-iro.ru/files/12.02.2025-iskh.1153_20241003-1.pdf (last accessed: 14 October 2026).

Russian, and Ukrainian has been removed from the curriculum entirely, both as a language of instruction and as a subject. No pre-school, vocational or supplementary education is available in any language other than Russian, and no teachers are trained to teach in other languages.

Parents who apply for Ukrainian-language education are pressured to withdraw their applications.

The curriculum is directed against Ukraine and includes the following:

- compulsory weekly “Conversations about important things” classes;
- a single Russian history textbook (2023) that denies Ukrainian statehood and justifies the aggression;
- since 2024, a compulsory subject “Fundamentals of security and defence of the Motherland”, with elements of basic military training.

As of April 2025, there were 260 cadet classes in Crimea. In 2026, children were trained to operate drones, including at the “Artek” children’s centre and in the “Zarnitsa 2.0” games, which included a competition for operators of strike drones.

The Court is also examining the situation of ten children who were in Crimean institutions at the time of the occupation, were subjected to Russian citizenship and whose whereabouts remain unknown⁹ (*Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union on behalf of ten Ukrainian children v. Russia*, no. 6719/23, hearing held on 22 September 2026).

9. *Property* (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1; §§ 1129-1151 of the Court’s Judgment)

The Court found an administrative practice of expropriating, without compensation, the property of civilians and private enterprises in Crimea. Since November 2022, this practice has been placed on a systematic legislative footing and considerably expanded.

Mechanism. The so-called “State Council of the Republic of Crimea” has adopted successive “resolutions” amending its resolution No. 2085-6/14 of 30 April 2014 “On issues of property management of the Republic of Crimea”. The amendment of 2 November 2022 allows any property held by foreign States and their nationals as of 24 February 2022 to be declared “property of the Republic of Crimea”. The lists of property are drawn up on the basis of checks carried out by an “anti-terrorist commission”. Owners are not heard, receive no compensation and have no remedy against the decision.

Furthermore, expropriation continues through several complementary mechanisms:

- *Ban on land ownership by “foreigners”.* Under Presidential Decree No. 201 of 20 March 2020, nearly all of Crimea is designated a “border territory” where “foreigners”, including Ukrainian nationals without Russian passports, may not own land. In claims brought by “prosecutors” alone, 97 of the 128 published “decisions” granted the claim in full and 6 in part, and a further 91 cases have no published decision. Proceedings were discontinued where the owner sold the land, died or acquired Russian citizenship. The owner’s ability to keep the property is thus made conditional on accepting the citizenship of the occupying Power. Those affected include at least 65 Ukrainian nationals and nationals of several member States of the Council of Europe, including Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia, the Republic of Moldova and Armenia. The actual scale is larger, since local occupation authorities bring similar claims.
- *Annulment of titles to former “defence lands”.* In some 30 cases brought on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the occupation “courts” have annulled private titles to land

⁹ *Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union on behalf of ten Ukrainian children v. Russia*, no. 6719/23, hearing held on 22 September 2026.

lawfully acquired under Ukrainian law after 1991. They did so either on the basis of Soviet acts of 1949 allocating the land to the military, or on the ground that the original title deeds could not be found in the Ukrainian registration archives now held by the occupation authorities.

- “*Unclaimed*” land shares. Since 1 January 2025, land shares not re-registered under Russian law pass to municipal ownership without any court proceedings. By July 2025, about 39,000 hectares had been taken over in this way.
- “*Nationalisation*”. The property of at least 836 individuals and legal entities has been “nationalised”. By an act of 11 June 2024, the property of 110 persons was seized expressly on the ground that they “support the Armed Forces of Ukraine”. In 2024 alone, more than 1,200 seized objects were sold for RUB 4.8 billion, and a significant part of the proceeds was directed to military needs. In December 2025 the Sevastopol authorities seized the property of more than 30 persons for “unfriendly actions”.

Grounds based on nationality and political opinion. The initial criterion was the owner’s nationality. It applied to Ukrainian nationals and companies but also to nationals of other States: a hotel in Yalta belonging to a Lithuanian national was seized and put up for auction. Since 2023, the stated grounds have become openly punitive. The “resolution” of 11 June 2024 targeted, in the words of the head of the “State Council”, persons “who support the Kyiv regime and sponsor the Armed Forces of Ukraine”. It included:

- the house and land of the father of the Crimean Tatar singer Jamala, who is herself prosecuted in Russia for “fakes” about the Russian army;
- the property of the family of a Ukrainian member of parliament, on the express ground that her son serves in the Ukrainian armed forces.

Sale and use of proceeds. Seized property is sold at open auctions on the official Russian platform torgi.gov.ru. Sales brought RUB 4.8 billion into the budget of the so-called “Republic of Crimea” in 2023–2024, and rental income from seized property reached RUB 938 million as of 2025.

The heads of the Russian occupying administration have repeatedly and publicly stated that the proceeds are used to support the “special military operation” and the families of Russian servicemen killed in the war against Ukraine. The property of Ukrainian nationals is thus being converted into resources for the continuing aggression against Ukraine.

The transfer of seized property to third parties makes restitution progressively more difficult. Far from providing restitution or compensation to the victims, the respondent State has expanded the practice found by the Court and is acting to make its consequences irreversible, contrary to Article 46 of the Convention.

10. Use of Russian criminal law on “crimes against the foundations of the constitutional order and State security” as an instrument of persecution in the temporarily occupied Crimea

In addition, the Government would also like to refer the Committee of Ministers to the issue, which is also relevant in light of the Court’s findings in *Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)* and demonstrates the aggravation of the situation in occupied Crimea due to actions of representatives of the Russian Federation.

The Court found that the Russian Federation unlawfully extended Russian law, including criminal law, to Crimea, and that the “courts” operating there are not “tribunals established by law” (Article 6; §§ 920-946, 1000-1022 of the Court’s Judgment). It also found an administrative practice of persecution of persons perceived as opposing the occupation (Articles 6, 7, 10, 11 and 18; §§ 1239-1278, 1328-1382 of the Court’s Judgment). These practices continue and have intensified since February 2022.

As of 2024 the publicly available registers of the occupation “courts” in Crimea and Sevastopol contain at least 198 criminal cases under Chapter 29 of the Russian Criminal Code (“crimes against the foundations of the constitutional order and State security”), the overwhelming majority of which ended in convictions. The provisions most frequently applied are Article 280 (“public calls for extremist activity”), Article 282 (“incitement to hatred or enmity”) and Article 275 (“high treason”). Further cases concern “espionage” (Article 276), “confidential co-operation with a foreign State” (Article 275.1), “calls to violate the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation” (Article 280.1), “discrediting the Russian armed forces” (Article 280.3); “participation in organisations designated as extremist” (Article 282.2).

These provisions are applied to criminalise:

- expressions of loyalty to Ukraine,
- support for its territorial integrity,
- criticism of the occupation and
- peaceful religious practice.

Treating support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity as a criminal offence reflects the very extension of Russian law to occupied territory that the Court found incompatible with the Convention.

Three features of this practice deserve particular attention:

- *Intensification*: More than half of these cases (110 of 198) reached the so-called “courts” between 2022 and 2024, and 48 in 2024 alone.
- *Lack of transparency*: Only 6 of the 198 judgments (3%) have been published, and the names of the convicted persons are concealed in 145 cases. This prevents public scrutiny, impedes the defence of the persons concerned and makes it difficult to identify victims.
- *Deterrent purpose*: Arrests and trials are publicised to intimidate the wider population, while the reasoning of the “courts” remains inaccessible.

These figures cover Chapter 29 only. They do not include the large number of prosecutions, notably of Crimean Tatars, brought under the “terrorism” provisions of the Russian Criminal Code (in particular Article 205.5).

These findings are consistent with, and understate, the data collected by independent human rights organisations. The broader record shows a steady and accelerating increase in politically motivated criminal prosecutions in Crimea since February 2022.

According to the Crimean Tatar Resource Center, the number of verified victims of politically motivated criminal prosecution in Crimea has grown as follows:

- 238 persons as of 15 February 2022;
- 334 persons by August 2024;
- 431 persons by August 2025;
- 520 persons as of 20 April 2026, including 277 Crimean Tatars.¹⁰

Of these 520 persons, 351 were in pre-trial detention or serving sentences in penal colonies at that date. In the first quarter of 2026 alone, the occupation authorities carried out 57 arrests, 18 of which targeted Crimean Tatars.¹¹

¹⁰ Crimean Tatar Resource Center cited in Euromaidan Press, “Russia keeps arresting Crimeans. The count just hit 520: <https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/04/21/russia-keeps-arresting-crimeans-the-count-just-hit-520/> (last accessed: 14 October 2026); and for August 2024 and August 2025 figures: RISU, “Russia holds 157 Crimean Tatars behind bars”: https://risu.ua/en/russia-holds-157-crimean-tatars-behind-bars_n158196 (last accessed: 14 October 2026).

¹¹ Ibid. (Euromaidan Press).

The Crimean Human Rights Group reported at least 155 Crimean political prisoners held in Crimea or in the Russian Federation, compared with at least 127 on the eve of the full-scale invasion¹². It has further verified at least 91 civilians abducted and subsequently prosecuted, mostly on charges of “espionage”, “high treason” and “sabotage” under Chapter 29 of the Russian Criminal Code¹³.

The trend in Crimea reflects a wider pattern. According to the Russian human rights organisation First Department, convictions for high treason and espionage across the Russian Federation nearly doubled in the first quarter of 2026, and at least a quarter of those convicted were Ukrainian nationals¹⁴.

The space for independent documentation and legal assistance has meanwhile been eliminated. In July 2026, Crimean Solidarity announced that it was ceasing its activities. For a decade it had been the main civic initiative in Crimea providing legal support to political prisoners and their families and documenting searches, arrests and trials. It explained that continuing its work had become impossible under Russian legislation applied in Crimea¹⁵. This development directly concerns the persecution of human rights defenders and journalists found by the Court and further reduces the possibility of monitoring the situation of victims.

The overall scale of politically motivated prosecutions in Crimea is therefore significantly greater. The respondent State has taken no steps to discontinue these practices or to provide redress to their victims, contrary to its obligations under Article 46 of the Convention.

11. Further aggravating developments

The described above practices also take place against a background of forced conscription of the residents of an occupied territory. At least 55,000 persons have been conscripted over 22 campaigns. Year-round conscription was introduced in 2026, and a unified electronic register automatically prevents registered persons from leaving. Of 701 criminal cases for evading conscription, 392 were opened after 24 February 2022.

At the same time, the demographic composition of the peninsula is being altered: the population of Sevastopol has increased by about 45% during the occupation, mainly through settlement from the Russian Federation.

Also, it is important to emphasise that the respondent State has taken no individual or general measures to put an end to the violations found by the Court or to afford redress to their victims. It continues to disregard its unconditional obligation under Article 46 of the Convention to abide by the judgment.

(iii) Conclusions and requests

The information set out above demonstrates that, more than two years after the Grand Chamber judgment of 25 June 2024, the respondent State has taken no measure to put an end to the administrative practices found by the Court or to afford redress to their victims. On the contrary, these

¹² Crimean Human Rights Group, cited in: CEPA, “Behind the lines: defiance on walls and skin as Crimea resists Russian occupation”: <https://cepa.org/article/behind-the-lines-defiance-on-walls-and-skin-as-crimea-resists-russian-occupation/> (last accessed: 14 October 2026).

¹³ Crimean Human Rights Group, Monitoring review of the human rights situation in Crimea, January–March 2025: https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2_ua-2.pdf (last accessed: 14 October 2026).

¹⁴ First Department, “48 verdicts in one month – a new record for Russian courts in high treason and espionage cases. All known data for the first quarter of 2026”: <https://dept.one/story/izmena-I2026/> (last accessed: 14 October 2026).

¹⁵ Crimean Solidarity statement of July 2026, reported in: Espresso, “Crimean Solidarity movement declared cessation of its activities due to the pressure of occupiers”: <https://espresso.tv/suspilstvo-ruk-krimsk-solidarnist-ogolosiv-pro-pripinennya-roboti-cherez-tisk-okupantiv> (last accessed: 14 October 2026).

practices have continued and, since February 2022, have intensified and extended to new categories of victims. At the same time, the Russian Federation has ceased all communication with the Committee of Ministers.

In these circumstances, the Government of Ukraine invites the Committee of Ministers:

- (a) to reiterate that, notwithstanding the cessation of its membership of the Council of Europe, the Russian Federation remains bound by its unconditional obligation under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention to abide by the judgment, and to call upon its authorities to put an immediate end to all the administrative practices found by the Court and to resume cooperation with the Committee in the execution of the judgment;
- (b) to call upon the Russian authorities to cooperate with international and national investigations into the violations committed in Crimea. The Committee should also call upon them to remove all obstacles to access to Crimea, and to persons detained in connection with it, for international monitoring bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the OSCE, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross;
- (c) noting the absence of any engagement by the Russian authorities, to stress that international cooperation is essential for the execution of this judgment, and to invite once again the authorities of member States and international organisations to work collectively to explore all possible means to ensure its execution;
- (d) to bring its decisions in this case to the attention of the relevant international bodies and organisations, notably the United Nations, the OSCE and the European Union, in accordance with the approach adopted by the Committee for the supervision of judgments against the Russian Federation, and to invite them to take the Court's findings into account in their activities;

Procedural request

The judgment establishes administrative practices in breach of number provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. These practices affect thousands of persons and continue to this day. Examining the judgment as a single item does not allow the Committee to consider each group of violations in the necessary depth, or to follow developments in each area over time. This is all the more important since, in the absence of any participation by the respondent State, the Committee's assessment depends entirely on the information available to it on each group of violations.

The Government therefore requests the Committee to supervise the execution of the present judgment by thematic clusters, as it has done in *Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia* [GC]. Subject to the views of the Secretariat, the Government proposes the following clusters:

- (i) enforced disappearances, ill-treatment and unlawful detention (Articles 2, 3 and 5);
- (ii) the extension of Russian law to Crimea and politically motivated prosecutions before "courts" in Crimea which are not "tribunals established by law" (Articles 6 and 7);
- (iii) the continuing unlawful deprivation of liberty, prosecution and conviction of Ukrainian political prisoners on the basis of Russian law applied in Crimea, including their (and other persons) transfer to penal facilities in the Russian Federation (Articles 5, 6, 8 and 18);
- (iv) the lack of an effective procedure to opt out of Russian citizenship, and arbitrary raids and searches of private dwellings (Article 8);
- (v) freedom of religion, expression, assembly and association, including the situation of human rights defenders and the media (Articles 9, 10 and 11);
- (vi) discriminatory treatment of Crimean Tatars (Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4) and education in the Ukrainian language (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1);
- (vii) protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1);
- (viii) freedom of movement (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4).

The Government invites the Committee to consider this proposal with a view to ensuring more effective supervision of the judgment, combined with a periodic review of its execution as a whole. For its part, the Government undertakes to submit updated information on each cluster in advance of its examination.

Yours faithfully,

Marharuta Sokorenko
Agent of Ukraine before
the European Court of Human Rights