MINISTERS’ DEPUTIES

Information documents

CM/Inf(2022)17-rev

4 May 2022[1]

CAHDI Guidance Note to the Committee of Ministers Continued participation of the Russian Federation in ‘open’ conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe

 

 

Introduction

1.            As a consequence of its aggression against Ukraine, the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022 following a respective decision by the Committee of Ministers[2] made in the context of the procedure launched under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe for a serious violation of Article 3 of the Statute. The legal and financial consequences of the cessation of membership were outlined in resolution CM/Res(2022)3 adopted on 23 March 2022 by the Ministers’ Deputies, including the immediate implications for the status of the Russian Federation as a Contracting Party to treaties elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe. In its paragraph 8 the resolution states that the Russian Federation “will […] continue to be a Contracting Party to those conventions and protocols concluded in the framework of the Council of Europe, to which it has expressed its consent to be bound, and which are open to accession by non-member States”. The exact implications of such continued participation of the Russian Federation in these so-called ‘open’ conventions, were, however, left outstanding from the scope of resolution CM/Res(2022)3 as they were considered to require a more in-depth analysis and further clarification.

2.            It is against this backdrop that the Ministers’ Deputies invited, by decision of 6 April 2022, the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI) to provide an analysis to their Rapporteur Group on Legal Co-operation (GR-J) of any relevant public international law issues arising out of the continued participation of the Russian Federation in ‘open’ conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe. As a response to this invitation, this guidance note was prepared and adopted by the CAHDI by written procedure on 2 May 2022.

Impact of the cessation of membership to the status as a Contracting Party to Council of Europe conventions

3.            The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine prompted the exclusion of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe. However, at the conventional level, the consequences are more nuanced. While the Russian Federation ceased to be Party to ‘closed’ conventions to which only member States of the Council of Europe can be Contracting Parties, it remained Party to treaties concluded within the Council of Europe and open to accession by non-member States (paragraph 8 of resolution CM/Res(2022)3). In the practice of the Council of Europe ‘open’ conventions include conventions that allow non-member States to participate either as of right (this possibility is open for example to States with observer status with the Council of Europe, those which took part in the drafting of the conventions or States which are Party to related conventions) or upon invitation by the Committee of Ministers, upon their request.

4.            The conventions and protocols concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe are not statutory instruments of the Organisation but legal instruments which owe their legal existence solely to the will of the Contracting Parties. Therefore, the exclusion from the organisation did not automatically lead to a loss of status as a Contracting Party to ‘open’ conventions. The modalities of participation can nevertheless possibly be restricted, depending on the conventional regime (see paragraph 23 below).

5.            Moreover, the moment at which a State wishes to become a Party to a Council of Europe convention determines the conditions to be fulfilled by it and the procedure to be followed in this regard, e.g., whether a successful request for an invitation to accede is necessary. According to this reasoning, it would make no difference whether the Russian Federation became a Party to these conventions before or after its accession to the Council of Europe.[3]  Hence, the Russian Federation would be considered to retain, even after ceasing to be a member of the Organisation, the validly acquired status as a Party to all those ‘open’ conventions to which it was a Party prior to its exclusion from the Council of Europe. Some CAHDI delegations considered, however, that the status under which a State became a Party to an ‘open’ convention (such as membership in an international organisation) could be seen as relevant when assessing the possibility of the State to remain a Party to the said treaty. If one follows this view, the question then arises whether the continued participation should be limited to conventions to which the Russian Federation became a Party before its accession to the Council of Europe[4] or to be extended to conventions that can be ratified without invitation by the States Parties to the European Cultural Convention (ETS No. 18)[5] or even to conventions in the elaboration of which the Russian Federation participated[6].

6.            Lastly, it is to be born in mind that once the Russian Federation has become a non-member State Party to the ‘open’ conventions it no longer possesses the rights conferred by them to the member States of the Council of Europe. For instance, with regard to some ‘open’ conventions, only member States of the Council of Europe can veto an invitation of accession to a non-member State.[7] However, in other cases the unanimous consent of the Parties to the Convention is necessary.[8]

Instruments the Russian Federation had merely signed but not yet ratified at the time of the cessation of its membership in the Council of Europe

7.            The moment at which a State wishes to become Party to a convention elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe is equally relevant in situations in which a State has signed an ‘open’ convention once it was still a member of the Council of Europe but where no instrument of ratification or acceptance was yet deposited. Prior invitation by the Committee of Ministers is necessary to offer a non-member State the possibility of becoming a Party. A member State that has only signed a treaty, is not yet a Party to that treaty (except where the signature constitutes an undertaking to be bound by the treaty). From the moment when a State loses its membership, it also loses the benefit to become a Party to a treaty without invitation by the Committee of Ministers, as only member States can become a Party without prior invitation. In such cases the Secretary General can no longer accept any deposit of instruments of ratification by the Russian Federation of these conventions which it has signed with reservation as to ratification. However, it is noteworthy in this context that most of the final clauses to recent ‘open’ conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe provide that a non-member State that participated in the negotiations for a convention can become a party to it even without an invitation.[9] Moreover, a State that had signed but not yet ratified an ‘open’ convention open to Parties to the European Cultural Convention (ETS No. 18) before it ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe, must be allowed to deposit the instrument of ratification also after having become a non-member State.[10]

8.            In cases in which the withdrawing or expelled State, already a Contracting Party to a mother convention, had signed an additional or amending protocol thereto whilst still a member State of the Council of Europe, it can finalise the procedure of becoming a Party also to the protocol by depositing an instrument of ratification or acceptance since protocols are open to the ratification/accession by Parties to the mother convention without an invitation by the Committee of Ministers.[11]

Termination/suspension of the operation of ‘open’ conventions in relation to the Russian Federation based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)

9.            As stated above, the cessation of membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe does not automatically change its status as a Contracting Party to ‘open’ conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe.

10.          In the current context, attention is further to be drawn to the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties.[12] Pursuant to Article 3 of these Draft articles the existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties – neither as between States parties to the conflict, nor, as between a State party to the conflict and a State that is not. Only certain treaties may lapse or be suspended on account of their nature (political commercial treaties for example). Article 7 of the Draft articles establishes a link to the annex containing an indicative list of treaties the subject matter of which involves an implication that they continue in operation during armed conflict. Some of the enumerated treaty categories appear noteworthy from the point of view of conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe such as treaties for the international protection of human rights or those relating to the international protection of the environment.

11.          The Russian Federation will only be excluded from the operation of those ‘open’ conventions which it either denounces of its own volition or which are successfully terminated or suspended with regard to it. The latter cannot be easily achieved under the international law of treaties which departs from the premise of consistency of treaty relations as enshrined in the principle of pacta sunt servanda and only exceptionally allows for a departure from this rule.[13] Treaties elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe typically include merely provisions on denunciation but none on termination or suspension of the treaty. It will hence regularly be necessary to have recourse to the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in this respect.[14] The VCLT entered into force for the Russian Federation on 29 April 1986. As can be concluded from Article 4 VCLT, only where regulations of the VCLT reflect customary international law, can these be applied vis-à-vis treaties with regard to which the Russian Federation has expressed its consent to be bound prior to this date.

Fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), Article 62 VCLT

12.          It may be argued whether assistance can be found from Article 62 VCLT in the current context. The said provision, which in its relevant parts may be considered as a codification of existing customary international law, [15] foresees a possibility for Parties to an international treaty to invoke, in exceptional cases, a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of the treaty. The European Court of Justice has held that major hostilities are capable of forming such fundamental change of circumstances on which the suspension of a treaty could be based.[16] The Russian aggression against Ukraine could hence as such trigger the application of Article 62 VCLT.

13.          Yet existing State practice shows bilateral treaties to have been the main field of application of Article 62 VCLT.[17] The logic of Article 62 VCLT appears to suggest that the termination/suspension of or withdrawal from the treaty would occur in respect of the State(s) that invoke(s) the fundamental change of circumstances. The application of the provision to multilateral treaties is, consequently, not without difficulty and it appears convincing to argue that this article cannot be applied to exclude one Party from a treaty against its will while the same treaty continues to apply between the remaining Parties, those invoking the termination/suspension. Even if holding that some assistance could be found from Article 62 VCLT in the context of a multilateral treaty in order to exclude a Party, any application of Article 62 VCLT should take account of the restrictive nature of the provision in view of the importance attached by customary international law to the stability of treaty relations.[18] It would furthermore be necessary to assess, on a case-by-case basis for each treaty, what constitutes the “essential basis” for being Party to the treaty.

Termination or suspension as a consequence of a breach of the treaty, Article 60 VCLT

14.          Article 60 VCLT, in turn, does allow for the other parties to a multilateral treaty to terminate or suspend the operation of the treaty, due to a material breach, also in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, i.e., the invoking State(s) status as a Contracting Party can be left untouched while the defaulting State’s status is terminated or suspended. In the context of conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe treaties, the possibilities to make use of Article 60 VCLT appear, however, limited in view of the following considerations:

a.      It is arguable to hold that not all provisions of Article 60 VCLT codify existing customary international law. Doubts in this regard appear to exist in particular with regard to Article 60 (2) VCLT regulating the termination or suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty as a consequence of a material breach.[19] Article 60 (5) VCLT limiting the applicability of Article 60 (1) and (2) VCLT, on the other hand, is largely understood as codifying customary international law.[20] In the context of ‘open’ treaties elaborated within the Council of Europe this could lead to a considerably reduced field of application of Article 60 VCLT (under b below).

b.      Pursuant to Article 60 (5) VCLT, generally understood to codify existing customary international law, the operation of treaty provisions “relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character” cannot be terminated or suspended by invoking a material breach of the said convention. Although the wording could be taken to include only treaties codifying international humanitarian law, the drafting history of Article 60 as well as existing State practice in this regard suggest that the provision is commonly understood to include treaties whose primary purpose is the protection of humans, i.e., including international human rights treaties.[21] The CAHDI notes that a large number of conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe could hence be seen to fall under Article 60 (5) with the result that they could neither be terminated nor suspended in reaction to a material breach.[22] With regard to the Russian Federation these would include important conventions such as the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157), the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ETS No. 126) or the Convention for the Protection of

Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108). In any event, Article 60 VCLT could, however, be applied to those Council of Europe treaties that regulate international relations between States, for instance, in the fields of criminal law, culture, sports or education, provided that the other requirements set by the provision are met.

c.      But even outside the humanitarian sphere the scope of application of Article 60 VCLT is evidently narrow due to the restriction to material breaches as defined in Article 60 (3) VCLT. These need to relate, notably, to a violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty (Article 60 (3)(b)). It is hence for instance not possible to use the aggression by the Russian Federation in Ukraine as an automatic, overarching justification to exclude the Russian Federation from all ‘open’ conventions of non-humanitarian character to which it is a Party based on Article 60 (3)(b) VCLT. Instead, a case-by-case analysis should reveal where the behaviour of the Russian Federation, whether directly linked to the invasion of Ukraine or in an ulterior context, amounts additionally and specifically to a violation of provisions of the said convention that could be considered essential and thus form the ground for invoking the exclusion of the Russian Federation from the treaty in question. Under Article 60 (3)(a) VCLT a material breach can, however, also consist in a repudiation of the treaty as such. Whether the behaviour of the Russian Federation could possibly be interpreted as a repudiation of one or another ‘open’ convention elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe would necessitate a careful assessment. Hereby regard should be had to the object and purpose of the convention, the principles and values it protects and whether the behaviour in question negates the possibility to hold that an adequate protection of these values from the part of the Russian Federation can be expected allowing for a continued co-operation in good faith.[23] The wording of Article 60 (1) and (2) VCLT is clear on that a suspension of the operation of a treaty can also be partial. In case a mother convention would be terminated or its operation would be suspended, it is logically necessary that this would need to include the termination/suspension of the protocols thereto whenever such have been ratified by the Russian Federation.[24]

d.      Procedurally it is worth mentioning that unless the other Contracting Parties act collectively, i.e., in the format of the Conference of the Parties, the application of Article 60 VCLT is subject to a quite complex procedure as defined in Article 65 VCLT[25] that is likely to impede effective and swift responses.[26] Moreover, with regard to standard-setting treaties, an equally common treaty category amongst conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe, a suspension or termination is, in general, only possible when the other Contracting Parties act collectively. For an individualised reaction from one or more Contracting Parties only, it is necessary that the violation of these treaties “specially affects” them.

15.          In sum, the CAHDI assesses that international law offers the other Contracting Parties certain possibilities to successfully suspend the operation of ‘open’ treaties or to terminate them in the relations between themselves and the Russian Federation, subject, however, to rather strict material and procedural conditions.

Participation of the Russian Federation in negotiations on amendments to ‘open’ conventions

16.          Article 40 (2) VCLT grants all Contracting Parties with the right to take part in the negotiation and conclusion of any agreement on amendments to the treaty. This rule has, however, not been considered to codify customary international law.[27] Moreover, Article 40 (1) expressly states that the article is only providing for a suppletive rule concerning the amendment of multilateral treaties that comes into play only when a multilateral treaty is silent with respect to the modalities for its modification.[28]

17.          Indeed, most ‘open’ conventions elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe incorporate an amendment clause that hence takes primacy over the regulation in the VCLT. These clauses typically foresee that the non-member States Parties are merely consulted on amendment proposals without any more far-reaching right on their part to be included in the negotiation process, e.g., at the expert level in intergovernmental committees, or at the stage of the decision-taking by the Committee of Ministers.[29] Others, however, provide that an opinion on the proposed amendment shall be given by the Consultation of the Parties, a conventional committee or a steering committee before its consideration by the Committee of Ministers.[30] In such cases also the non-member States Parties, including the Russian Federation, have a convention based right to participate in meetings in which such an opinion to the Committee of Ministers is being elaborated. The exact scope of the non-member States Parties rights in the process of amending ‘open’ conventions should hence be analysed on a treaty-by-treaty basis.

18.          It remains to be underlined that even where a clause concerning amendments has been omitted from a Council of Europe convention,[31] the application of Article 40 (2) VCLT is not mandatory, but the Contracting Parties are at liberty to decide on the procedure to be applied for the adoption of amendments.[32]

19.          An ‘open’ convention can also be complemented or amended through the adoption of additional or amending protocols. In such cases the Committee of Ministers formally approves this initiative and entrusts a steering committee, or a committee of experts acting under the authority of one of the steering committees with the drafting. Non-member States party to the mother convention should normally be invited to take part in the discussions leading to the adoption of the protocol. This could be achieved by giving these States the possibility to appoint a representative within the body (committee of experts or other drafting group) responsible for elaborating the protocol. However, these committees being under the authority of the Committee of Ministers, it would also have some margin to decide whether the Russian Federation should be invited to take part or not. Such a decision would take priority over Article 40 (2) VCLT (see previous paragraph). Indeed, the flexibility to exclude the Russian Federation from negotiations of future protocols seems to be greater, in view of Articles 39 to 41 VCLT in the case of additional protocols than in the case of amending protocols.

Participation of the Russian Federation in the work of conventional follow-up bodies

20.          Many of the ‘open’ conventions to which the Russian Federation remains a Party after the cessation of its membership in the Council of Europe encompass a monitoring or follow-up mechanism of one kind or another.[33] Paragraph 8 of CM/Res(2022)3 foresees that “the modalities of the Russian Federation’s participation in these instruments will be determined separately for each of them by the Committee of Ministers or, when appropriate, by the State Parties”. A case-by-case approach is to be welcomed in view of the variety of mechanisms available across the different convention regimes. Among the different types of convention regimes, there exist: bilateral co-operation without a specific monitoring body, monitoring by a committee of the parties or by a conventional committee, monitoring by independent experts, by an enlarged agreement, joint mechanisms with the OECD and UNESCO. For reference a table containing the treaties to which the Russian Federation is a Party and the respective mechanisms is attached.

21.          It follows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, as enshrined in Article 26 VCLT, as well as the principle of equality of parties, that the Russian Federation will, as a general principle, retain its right to participate in monitoring activities of those conventions to which it remains a Party after the cessation of its membership in the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, this participation could be adjusted in the light of the various convention regimes as well as other technical considerations, e.g., based on the purpose and object of the treaties concerned and the values protected by them. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the observance of remaining treaty obligations or the collaboration of the Russian Federation in Council of Europe fora may remain necessary in some cases also in the future.

22.          Whenever monitoring is performed on the territory of the Russian Federation in the future, the protection of the privileges and immunities of the monitoring delegations should be secured through the conclusion of bilateral agreements[34] to this end given that the Russian Federation is no longer a Party to the ‘closed’ convention General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 2) or the Protocols thereto.[35]

23.          When rendering decisions concerning individual conventions, the deciding organ or body should be guided by the following considerations:

a.      Partial limitations of participation rights of the Russian Federation can already be justified whenever a monitoring body is entrusted, by the Committee of Ministers, with tasks not directly mandated by the respective convention, e.g., with standard-setting activities.[36]

b.      Concerning follow-up undertaken by other bodies or organs of the Council of Europe, e.g., by the Committee of Ministers[37] itself or via intergovernmental committees[38] or a governing body of a partial agreement[39], the cessation of membership in the Organisation entails the loss of rights to participate in the work of such organs or bodies. Such limitations cannot, however, automatically reduce the participation rights to zero. The Russian Federation needs to retain its right to participate at least to the extent that its own compliance is being monitored and where it can derive such right from the ‘open’ convention in question. An additional level of complexity in this regard is present in cases in which a right of representation of the Russian Federation in an intergovernmental committee is stemming directly from a convention.[40] The possibility to curtail rights is further without prejudice to the convention-based rights of the Russian Federation to participate in the consideration of amendments to some of the ‘open’ conventions (see above paragraphs 16 et seq.).

c.      All partial limitations of participation rights as mentioned under a. and b. above can be decided either by the Committee of Parties, where such a committee exists, or, after discussions in the competent steering committee or governing body of a partial agreement, by the Committee of Ministers.[41] The competence of the Committee of Ministers to take such decisions can be based on its authority as the Organisation’s decision-making body (see Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1)).

d.      Wherever monitoring is, however, performed by a body created under the convention itself, i.e., by a Conference/Committee of the Parties[42] or by a conventional committee[43], the Russian Federation shall, as a rule, retain full rights conferred to States participating in the work of such bodies, including such follow-up mechanisms established by Conventions elaborated jointly in the framework of the Council of Europe and other international organisations.[44] This is without prejudice to the specific rules in the text of the convention or in the procedural rules related, inter alia, to the election and mandate of the members of a conventional committee providing for an earlier termination of the membership because of the failure to meet the requirements set for individuals serving on the committee.[45]

e.      A total and continuous exclusion of the Russian Federation from bodies created under an ‘open’ convention appears only possible in cases in which the Parties to the respective convention – not, for instance, just the members of an expert committee – have collectively made use of the possibility to suspend/terminate the participation rights based on Article 60 VCLT (for non-humanitarian/human rights treaties, see paragraph 14.b above). [46]^{, [47]}

f.       For reasons of legal certainty, the decisions made for each treaty must be clearly communicated to the Russian Federation. In case of a suspension/termination of the operation of a treaty, this will be done by the depositary upon decision of the competent authority (i.e., by a Conference/Committee of the Parties or by a conventional committee, cf. under d.), in other cases, i.e., with regard to decisions mentioned under b. and c., by the deciding body directly.

24.          Lastly, it may be noted that, beyond the law of treaties, the question of how to react to Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine raises issues under the law of international responsibility. This is particularly true with regard to the question of whether States can, under international law, adopt collective countermeasures against the Russian Federation. This question, to which there is no obvious answer, is however beyond the scope of the present analysis, which is concerned exclusively with measures to be adopted under international treaty law.

Appendix

Modalities of participation of the Russian Federation in Council of Europe treaties open to non-member States

(status as of 7 April 2022)

No.	Title			Follow-up Commitees
218	Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (CETS No. 218)			TS-4
	Signature: 03/07/2016	Ratification: 03/10/2017	Entry in force: 01/12/2017
217	Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 217)			Consultation of the Parties
	Signature: 27/07/2017	Ratification: 24/01/2020	Entry in force: 01/05/2020
212	Fourth Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (CETS No. 212)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up
	Signature: 24/02/2015	Ratification: 29/05/2017	Entry in force: 01/09/2017
211	Council of Europe Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats to public health (CETS No. 211)			T-Medicrime
	Signature: 28/10/2011	Ratification: 20/03/2018	Entry in force: 01/07/2018
208	Protocol amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (CETS No. 208)			Joint Treaty with OECD Co-ordinating Body (CB) The CB composed of representatives of the competent authorities of the Parties monitors the implementation and development of the Convention ETS 127, under the aegis of the OECD (Art. 24.3 of Convention 127).
	Signature: 03/11/2011	Ratification :04/03/2015	Entry in force: 01/07/2015
206	Protocol No. 3 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning Euroregional Co-operation Groupings (ECGs) (CETS No. 206)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up
	Signature: 08/06/2012	Ratification: 20/03/2017	Entry in force: 01/07/2017

No.	Title			Follow-up Commitees
201	Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201)			Committee of the Parties
	Signature: 01/10/2012	Ratification: 09/08/2013	Entry in force: 01/12/2013
198	Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198)			Conference of the Parties
	Signature: 26/01/2009	Ratification: 28/09/2017	Entry in force: 01/01/2018
196	Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196)			Consultation of the Parties
	Signature: 17/11/2005	Ratification: 19/05/2006	Entry in force: 01/06/2007
182	Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS No. 182)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 01/12/2017	Ratification: 16/09/2019	Entry in force: 01/01/2020
173	Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 173)			GRECO According to Resolution CM/Res (2022)3 the Russian Federation may continue to participate in the plenary meetings of GRECO only when the latter examines evaluation and compliance reports on the Russian Federation as foreseen in Article 8 (1) i. of the GRECO Statute with a view to providing and receiving information concerning such reports, without the right to participate in the discussion or the adoption of reports under Article 15 of the GRECO Statute, and without the right to vote (Para. 6). System of visits requiring an agreement on privileges and immunities.
	Signature: 27/01/1999	Ratification: 04/10/2006	Entry in force: 01/02/2007
169	Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning interterritorial co-operation (ETS No. 169)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 04/10/2006	Ratification: 27/11/2008	Entry in force: 28/02/2009
167	Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (ETS No. 167)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 07/04/2005	Ratification: 28/08/2007	Entry in force: 01/12/2007
165	Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region (ETS No. 165)			Joint Convention with UNESCO Two bodies, the Committee of the Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region and the European Network of National Information Centres on Academic Mobility and Recognition (the ENIC Network) are to oversee, promote and facilitate the implementation of the Convention (Arts X.1 to X.3).
	Signature: 07/05/1999	Ratification: 25/05/2000	Entry in force: 01/07/2000
159	Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (ETS No. 159)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature : 04/10/2006	Ratification : 27/11/2008	Entry in force : 28/02/2009
157	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157)			Committee of Ministers Advisory Committee (AC) The AC is composed by 18 independent experts elected and appointed by the Committee of Ministers for 4 years according to Resolution (97)10. System of visits requiring an agreement on privileges and immunities.
	Signature: 28/02/1996	Ratification: 21/08/1998	Entry in force: 01/12/1998
147	European Convention on Cinematographic Co-Production (ETS No. 147)			No follow up body
	Signature: 30/03/1994	Ratification: 30/03/1994	Entry in force: 01/07/1994
143	European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised) (ETS No. 143)			No follow up body
	Signature: 16/01/1992	Ratification: 12/10/2011	Entry in force: 13/04/2012
141	Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141)			No follow up body
	Signature: 07/05/1999	Ratification: 02/08/2001	Entry in force: 01/12/2001
138	European Convention on the General Equivalence of Periods of University Study (ETS No. 138)			No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 07/11/1996	Entry in force: 01/01/1997
135	Anti-Doping Convention (ETS No. 135)			T-DO
		Ratification: 12/02/1991	Entry in force: 01/04/1991
127	Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (ETS No. 127)			Joint Convention with OECD Co-ordinating Body (CB) The CB composed of representatives of the competent authorities of the Parties monitors the implementation and development of the Convention, under the aegis of the OECD (Art. 24.3 of Convention 127).
	Signature: 03/11/2011	Ratification: 04/03/2015	Entry in force: 01/07/2015
126	European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ETS No. 126)			CPT CPT members are independent. The CM elects one member in respect of each State Party from a list of names drawn up by the Bureau of the PACE. Where a member is to be elected to the Committee in respect of a non-member State of the Council of Europe, the Bureau of the PACE shall invite the Parliament of that State to put forward three candidates, of whom two at least shall be its nationals. The election by the Committee of Ministers shall take place after consultation with the Party concerned. (Art. 5 of the Convention). System of visits. Privileges and immunities found in the annex to the Convention
	Signature: 28/02/1996	Ratification: 05/05/1998	Entry in force: 01/09/1998
121	Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe (ETS No. 121)			No follow up body
		Ratification: 13/11/1990	Entry in force: 01/03/1991
112	Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (ETS No. 112)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 07/04/2005	Ratification: 28/08/2007	Entry in force: 01/12/2007
108	Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108)			T-PD
	Signature: 07/11/2001	Ratification: 15/05/2013	Entry in force: 01/09/2013
106	European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (ETS No. 106)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 03/11/1999	Ratification: 04/10/2002	Entry in force: 05/01/2003
099	Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS No. 099)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 10/12/1999	Entry in force: 09/03/2000
098	Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (ETS No. 098)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 10/12/1999	Entry in force: 09/03/2000
086	Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (ETS No. 086)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 10/12/1999	Entry in force: 09/03/2000
073	European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (ETS No. 073)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 11/12/2000	Ratification: 26/06/2008	Entry in force: 27/09/2008
065	European Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport (ETS No. 065)			Consultation of the Parties (discontinued)
		Ratification: 13/11/1990	Entry in force: 14/05/1991
063	European Convention on the Abolition of Legalisation of Documents executed by Diplomatic Agents or Consular Officers (ETS No. 063)			No follow up body
	Signature: 22/01/2016	Ratification: 08/12/2020	Entry in force: 09/03/2021
062	European Convention on Information on Foreign Law (ETS No. 062)			No follow up body
		Ratification: 12/02/1991	Entry in force: 13/05/1991
049	Protocol to the European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas leading to Admission to Universities (ETS No. 049)			No follow up body
	Signature: 19/02/1998	Ratification: 17/09/1999	Entry in force: 18/10/1999

No.	Title			Follow-up Commitees
032	European Convention on the Academic Recognition of University Qualifications (ETS No. 032)			No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 17/09/1999	Entry in force: 18/10/1999
030	European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS No. 030)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 10/12/1999	Entry in force: 09/03/2000
024	European Convention on Extradition (ETS No. 024)			Bilateral cooperation No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 10/12/1999	Entry in force: 09/03/2000
021	European Convention on the Equivalence of Periods of University Study (ETS No. 021)			No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 17/09/1999	Entry in force: 17/09/1999
018	European Cultural Convention (ETS No. 018)			Three steering committees (CDEDU, CDCPP and CDEJ/CMJ Youth)
		Ratification: 21/02/1991	Entry in force: 21/02/1991
015	European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas leading to Admission to Universities (ETS No. 015)			No follow up body
	Signature: 07/11/1996	Ratification: 17/09/1999	Entry in force: 17/09/1999

41 treaties

Source : Treaty Office on http://conventions.coe.int - * Disclaimer.

Types of treaties:

1.         Treaties without a follow up body

ETS 15; 21; 32; 49; 62; 63; 121; 138; 141; 143; 147.

Mainly bilateral cooperation:

Criminal matters ETS 24; 30; 73; 86; 98; 99; 112; 167; 182; 212

Transfrontier co-operation ETS 106; 159; 169;206

2.         Treaties with a follow up body (Highlighted in grey)

A.         Follow up by a Committee of the Parties or by a Conventional Committee

A.1 Committee of the Parties

ETS 65 (discontinued); 196; 198; 201; 217.

A.2 Conventional Committees

ETS 108 (T-PD); 135 (Antidoping T-DO) ; 211 (T-Medicrime) ; 218 (TS-4)

B.         Follow up by intergovernmental Committees

ETS 18 (Three steering committees: CDEDU, CDCPP and CDEJ/CMJ Youth)

C.         Follow up by independent experts

ETS 126 (CPT); the CPT’s members; The CM elects one member in respect of each State Party from a list of names drawn up by the Bureau of the PACE; each national delegation of the Parties in the PACE shall put forward three candidates Where a member is to be elected to the Committee in respect of a non-member State of the Council of Europe, the Bureau of the PACE shall invite the Parliament of that State to put forward three candidates, of whom two at least shall be its nationals. The election by the Committee of Ministers shall take place after consultation with the Party concerned. (Art. 5 of the Convention).

System of visits. Privileges and immunities in the annex to the Convention.

ETS 157 (FCNM, Advisory Committee + Committee of Ministers).

The AC is composed by 18 independent experts elected and appointed by the Committee of Ministers for 4 years according to Resolution (97)10.

System of visits needing agreement on privileges and immunities.

D.         Follow up by an Enlarged Agreement

ETS 173 (GRECO)

System of visits needing agreement on privileges and immunities.

E.         Joint Conventions with other International Organisations

ETS 127; 208 Joint treaties with OECD. The Coordinating Body composed of representatives of the competent authorities of the Parties monitors the implementation and development of the Convention, under the aegis of the OECD (Art. 24.3 of Convention 127).

ETS 165 Joint convention with UNESCO. Two bodies, namely the Committee of the Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region and the European Network of National Information Centres on Academic Mobility and Recognition (the ENIC Network) are to oversee, promote and facilitate the implementation of the Convention (Arts X.1 to X.3).