N°7 > 06/2011

Forum21

European Journal on Child and Youth **Research**
Revue européenne de **recherche** sur l'enfance et la jeunesse
Europäische Zeitschrift für **Kinder- und Jugendforschung**

> Child and Youth Research in Poland – Supporting Shaping Policies for the Young
> Child poverty in Poland
> Gedächtnisraum Europa – Eine jüdische Perspektive
> The Bystander in Holocaust History and Education
> Rescued Jewish Children from Nazi-Occupied Western Europe
> The Nordic Youth Research 2010
> Voice and Influence in the Youth Justice System
> Subcultures and their change over time in Estonia
> Disputable Adaptation: Young Muslims and European Identity
> Zwischen Integration und Segmentierung: Ambivalente Effekte juveniler Szenen in einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft
> New authoritarianism-new subculture
> Understanding the appeal of risk for British youth on holiday in Ibiza: some ethnographic observations
> Youth values and lifestyles: aspects of depiction in Russian scientific journals (2000-2010)
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> *Doryoku* and Youth Cultures in Japan
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www.coe.int/youth/forum21
ISSN 1866-7276

Date of publishing: 29th July 2011

Editor
of this transitional electronic issue
Stefan Becsky

This issue graphically reproduced, typset and laid out by
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Contents
Table des matières
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Содержание

Introductory Note _____ p. 5

Child and Youth Research in Poland – Supporting Shaping Policies for the Young _____ p.10
La recherche sur l'enfance et la jeunesse en Pologne – promouvoir l'élaboration de politiques en faveur de l'enfance et de la jeunesse
Kinder und Jugendforschung in Polen – Unterstützung für die Formulierung von Politiken für junge Menschen
Исследования по вопросам детей и молодежи в Польше – поддержка формирования политики для молодежи

Child poverty in Poland _____ p.14
La pauvreté des enfants en Pologne
Kinderarmut in Polen
Детская бедность в Польше

Europe as a Space of Remembrance – A Jewish Perspective
L'Europe, espace de mémoire – Une perspective juive
Gedächtnisraum Europa – Eine jüdische Perspektive _____ p.22
Европа как пространство памяти – еврейская перспектива

The Bystander in Holocaust History and Education _____ p.28
Le spectateur dans l'histoire et l'éducation de l'holocauste
Der Zuschauer in der Holocaustgeschichte und – erziehung
Наблюдатель в истории и преподавании холокоста

Rescued Jewish Children from Nazi-Occupied Western Europe _____ p.36
Les enfants juifs sauvés sous l'occupation nazie de l'Europe de l'Ouest
Gerettete jüdische Kinder aus dem von den Nazis besetzten Westeuropa
Спасенные еврейские дети из оккупированной нацистами Западной Европы

The Nordic Youth Research 2010 _____ p.42
Recherche nordique sur la jeunesse 2010
Die nordische Jugendforschung 2010
Молодежные исследования в Северных странах 2010

Voice and Influence in the Youth Justice System _____ p.48
Voix et influence dans le système de justice pour la jeunesse
Stimme und Einfluss im System der Jugendgerichtsbarkeit
Голос и влияние в системе ювенальной юстиции

Subcultures and their change over time in Estonia p.58
Estonie : les sous-cultures et leur évolution
Subkulturen in Estland und ihre Veränderungen im Laufe der Zeit
Субкультуры и их изменение во времени в Эстонии

Disputable Adaptation: Young Muslims and European Identity p.66
Une adaptation sujette à caution : jeunes musulmans et identité européenne
Zweifelhafte Anpassung: Junge Muslime und europäische Identität
Дискуссионная адаптация: молодые мусульмане и европейская идентичность

Between Integration and Segmentation: Ambivalent Effects of Juvenile Scenes in a Multicultural Society
Entre intégration et segmentation : les effets ambivalents des scènes juvéniles dans une société multiculturelle
Zwischen Integration und Segmentierung: Ambivalente Effekte juveniler Szenen in einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft p.74
Между интеграцией и сегментацией: двойственность ювенальной среды в мультикультурном обществе

New authoritarianism-new subculture p.82
Nouvel autoritarisme – nouvelle sous-culture
Neuer Autoritarismus – neue Subkultur
Новый авторитаризм – новая субкультура

Understanding the appeal of risk for British youth on holiday in Ibiza: some ethnographic observations p.90
Comprendre le goût du risque des jeunes Britanniques en vacances à Ibiza : quelques observations ethnographiques
Die Attraktivität des Risikos für britische Jugendliche im Urlaub auf Ibiza verstehen: einige ethnographischen Beobachtungen
Понимание привлекательности риска для Британской молодежи во время отдыха на Ибице: некоторые этнографические наблюдения

Youth values and lifestyles: aspects of depiction in Russian scientific journals (2000-2010) p.100
Valeurs et modes de vie des jeunes : leurs diverses représentations dans les magazines scientifiques russes (2000-2010)
Jugendwerte und Lebensstile: Aspekte ihrer Darstellung in wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften in Russland (2000-2010)
Молодежные ценности и стили жизни: аспекты презентации в Российских научных журналах (2000 – 2010)

Bulgarian youths and the symbolic capital in the narratives about subcultures p.108
Les jeunes bulgares et la symbolique des narratifs sur les sous-cultures
Bulgarische Jugendliche und das symbolische Kapital in den Erzählungen über Subkulturen
Болгарская молодежь и символический капитал в описаниях субкультур

Doryoku and Youth Cultures in Japan p.114
Le *Doryoku* et les cultures jeunes au Japon
Doryoku und Jugendkulturen in Japan
«*Doryoku*» и молодежная культура в Японии

Global Uncertainties, Youth and the Cultural Renaissance in Sub-Saharan Africa p.122
Incertitudes à l'échelle planétaire, jeunesse et renaissance culturelle en Afrique subsaharienne
Globale Ungewissheiten, Jugend und die kulturelle Renaissance in Afrika südlich der Sahara
Глобальная неопределенность, молодежь и культурный Ренессанс в Африке к югу от Сахары

The articles in Forum 21 are written in either English, German or French, but there is a summary of each article in the other two languages, enabling readers to gain a quick idea of the contents. The full text in all three languages appears on the website of the Council of Europe: www.coe.int/youth/forum21

Any opinions expressed in this journal are those of the author of the specific article and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the editorial board bodies or their national governments.

Forum 21 welcomes suggestions for content on child and youth research in your country for futures issues. Please contact the editorial board who will be happy to discuss your proposals.

Les textes des articles de Forum 21 sont écrits en anglais, allemand et français, mais chaque article fait l'objet d'un résumé dans les deux autres langues, permettant d'avoir une idée rapide du contenu de l'article.

Le texte intégral des articles dans les trois langues se trouve sur le site du Conseil de l'Europe : www.coe.int/youth/forum21

Les opinions émises dans cette revue sont celles des auteurs des articles et ne reflètent pas nécessairement les points de vue du comité éditorial ou ceux des gouvernements concernés.

Forum 21 accueillera volontiers des suggestions pour ses prochains numéros concernant les politiques de jeunesse dans votre pays. Contacter le comité éditorial.

Die Artikel des Forum 21 sind in einer der drei Sprachen Englisch, Französisch oder Deutsch geschrieben, doch jeder Artikel wird auch in den beiden anderen Sprachen zusammengefasst, um einen schnellen Überblick über den Inhalt zu ermöglichen.

Die in dieser Zeitschrift veröffentlichten Meinungen sind ausschließlich die der Autoren; sie reflektieren nicht notwendigerweise die Politik oder die Auffassungen der Herausgeber oder ihrer nationalen Regierungen.

Forum 21 nimmt gerne Ihre Vorschläge zur Darstellung jugendpolitischer Entwicklungen und / oder neuer Jugend relevanter Gesetze Ihres Landes für die jeweils nächsten Ausgaben entgegen. Wir bitten Sie, Kontakt mit dem Redaktionsteam aufzunehmen, das sich freuen würde, diese Vorschläge mit Ihnen zu erörtern.

Introductory Note

In its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) communication released on 30th June 2011, the European Commission presented its proposals for the EU's next seven-year budget. With regards to young people, the Commission announced the integration of education, training, youth and sport programmes for the upcoming framework.

The European Union's education and vocational training programmes will be particularly strengthened by the new budget, with the communication stating that "investing in young people is one of the best business plans". Education programmes will particularly focus on supporting transnational learning mobility – one of the main objectives of the EU 2020 strategy – and fostering co-operation between education institutions and the world of work. Further investment is also planned in the European Social Fund, which provides job opportunities for young people, aims to lower school drop out rates and raise skill levels.

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe plans to reform the Organisation with the aim to revitalise the Council of Europe as a political body, to increase its impact by concentrating its work on fewer projects centred around its fundamental values, and to make the Council of Europe more visible and, very importantly, more relevant to the 800 million Europeans living in its 47 member states.

Youth issues first appeared on the Council of Europe's agenda in the 1960s. Activities with and for young people were stepped up, and 2012 marks the fortieth anniversary of the launch of a European youth policy through setting up of the European Youth Centre in Strasbourg and the European Youth Foundation in 1972.

In accordance with new reform plans for shaping European child and youth related policies and with raising the importance of promoting child and youth policy related dialogue Forum21 is in a process of restructuring and widening the framework of cooperation for setting new future oriented goals for our two worldwide unique Journals.

Especially in times of economic austerity our commitment is also oriented towards reshuffling the financial basis for the production of the Journals. This is why this June 2011 issue is published only in an electronic version to being hosted on the website of the Council of Europe.

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Child and Youth Research in Poland – Supporting Shaping Policies for the Young

Theses:

1. Structure of Research Institutes

A number of institutions and entities are involved in youth research carried out in Poland. Their characteristic is that they focus on particular areas and are looking for specific information. Among the institutions that carry out and request youth research there are specialist research institutes (such as the Educational Research Institute), government agencies (such as the State Agency for the Prevention of Alcohol-Related Problems or the National Bureau for Drug Prevention), bodies responsible for coordination of cooperation with the EU, non-governmental organisations, private research centres and companies as well as academic centres. However, since 1991 there have not been any government research institute in Poland to deal solely with execution, coordination and conduction of wide-ranging youth research. In consequence of this state of affairs there is not any government youth research programme in place that could deliver a comprehensive and balanced diagnosis of the social functioning of youth in Poland.

Academic centres have been trying to fill in the gap that has been created with regard to information exchange and coordination. The Youth Research Centre at the University of Warsaw, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, the University of Zielona Góra, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities must be mentioned here, just to list a few. The Section on Sociology of Youth and Education as part of the Polish Sociological Association also serves as the platform for the exchange of information on Youth Research.

2. Structure of Research Topics

The tradition of social diagnosis of Polish youth goes back to 1958 when a very large-scale study of values and attitudes of Warsaw students has been conducted by the team led by S Nowak from the University of Warsaw. The 1970s and 1980s were a period of intensified research activities focused on such topics as social integration and entry into adult life and the labour market. At that time the only longitudinal panel study so far was initiated. Since the beginning of the 1990s in Poland a number of studies of cultural participation, subcultures, lifestyles and the consumption patterns of youth on the one hand, and a multitude of studies on social problems such as addictions, unemployment and migration on the other hand have been developed. Studies involving young people aged 17 to 18 conducted on a recurring basis by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) since the 1980s constitute the main source of cross-sectional data. Studies carried out in Poland are predominantly related to a limited number of topic areas. Fields such as formal education or pathologies, addictions and subcultural affiliation seem to have been sufficiently described. Dynamic development of research regarding the full-scale evaluation of (both formal and non-formal) educational interactions, intergenerational communication and the shaping of youth policy at the local level, monitoring of the entry into the labour market and the use of new technologies etc. is to be expected.

3. Use of Research to Develop and Evaluate Activities in the Area of Youth Policy

The interrelatedness of social diagnosis and youth policy shaping shall be considered, whilst taking

the structural diversity of the latter into account. The findings of social research on youth have been used to develop government strategies and concepts as well as to evaluate and diagnose the needs whenever action for youth is taken at the local level. One of the first steps taken to develop the State Strategy for Youth was to appoint by the Minister of National Education and Sport a team of experts whose task was to provide a diagnosis based on youth studies carried out by various institutions nationwide in order to complement the guidelines that had been prepared. A source document entitled 'The White Paper of Polish Youth' (2003)[1] was created and it included source material for all undertakings and projects being implemented under the Strategy.

The paper contained a summary and a listing of research findings in the following areas: the demographic diversity of the youth population, education, financial situation and living conditions, the labour market and unemployment, health and the problems of youth with disabilities, crime, pathologies and violence, political activity, youth mobility and the issue of cultural participation, spare time, subcultures and lifestyles. Another edition of 'The White Paper of Polish Youth' (2005)[2] contained a comprehensive research report on the implementation of the EU and national youth policy priorities from the perspective of both young people and the representatives of organisations and institutions working with or for youth.

The research carried out showed the activity structure and youth policy directions at the local level. Attention was drawn to the predominance of actions taken in the areas of culture, sport and recreation as well as to certain deficiencies in promoting a civic-minded attitude, equality and pro-environmental actions. The government documents 'Strategy for Poland 2030' and 'Intellectual Capital of Poland' also resorted to sociological research in its parts dedicated to youth.

The expert team to Minister M. Boni acting as a Head of a Team of Advisors to the Prime Minister is currently working on the guidelines for a government strategy aimed at taking full advantage of intellectual, innovation and economic capabilities of the generation currently in their twenties. As a result of these works a report on life situation of youth entering adult life based on the findings of sociological research is being produced to cover the following areas: the life, reproductive life and family plans, intergenerational relations, migration and mobility, entry into the labour market and education, life plans and priorities.

4. Research Findings, Basic Facts on Polish Youth in the Youth Policy Context

Specific demographics – Poland is currently a country inhabited by young people. The percentage of the population aged 13 to 26 is one of the highest in Europe. An analysis made for the report on the state of education in Poland shows that between 1998 and 2009 the number of people aged 16 to 29 in Poland increased by 3 percent in comparison with other EU countries. Hence, future challenges will be the consequence of current demographic processes (the prognosis of decrease in the number of children and youth in the coming decades). In the context of education and youth policy this drop will act on all education levels, including in particular higher education that has already been affected by the decline in the number of births throughout the 1990s.

As a result, by 2035 (so within the time horizon of the Central Statistical Office's demographic forecast) the number of potential students will fall by one-third[3]. To sum up, in the coming years the share of young people in Poland's population will prevail in comparison with other EU countries, but Polish youth will be growing older. This situation brings not only chances – due to a relatively large number of young employees entering the labour market – but also challenges to be met under youth policy with regard to e.g. the need to develop strategies for labour market inclusion.

Entry into adult life is related to such issues as educational and occupational activities and in particular the problem of unemployment (especially acute for high school graduates) as well as diversified strategies bound up with occupational activity – internal and external migrations, late leaving of the parental home. The analysis of data gathered for the above-mentioned report on the state of education shows that young people undergoing the education-to-work transition in Poland and other EU countries differ substantially in two respects. Firstly, in 2007 Poland had the highest proportion of persons aged 18 being in education or training without being employed of all 27 EU countries (Youth in Europe, Eurostat, 2009). Secondly, the percentage of persons combining education and employment at the age of 18 was decidedly lower than the European average which can be explained by the fulfilment of the obligation of schooling imposed on Polish youth until reaching the age of 18, as well as by a limited number of part-time employment opportunities. Both of these facts make combining educational activity and employment much more challenging in Poland than in other European countries, in particular for the second level students. Poland is among those countries where young people are around three times more at risk of unemployment than an average labour market participant – this is a similar ratio as in almost all OECD countries.

However, in the period 2008-2009 Poland saw a far slower rise in youth unemployment than the average for OECD countries which effectively means that the youth unemployment rate is only slightly higher than the OECD average level[4]. Without question, one of the challenges for youth policy is to create conditions for independent living for young people. Studies show that the average age of 28 or 29 at which young adults in Poland leave the parental home is one of the highest in Europe, whereas most of them keep taking advantage of financial support from their parents even after they have moved out.

Values and Aspirations For twenty years, since the political transformation, the set of prevailing values has undergone slight but significant changes. Having a job and a successful career has gained in importance as a life goal, whilst living a safe and quiet life is becoming less appreciated. Meanwhile, the importance and value of family, love and friendship are growing. Young Poles are heading towards individualism, they are more and more aware of their value and want to lead their own life, but at the same time they maintain strong community bonds[5]. High educational aspirations of young people and relatively high standards of teaching (especially as juxtaposed with expenditure on education in our country) can be observed in Poland. The study 'Youth 2008'[6] shows a tendency – the higher education level of parents, the higher educational aspirations of their children.

Civic and Political Commitments of Young Poles In international studies on civic knowledge and competencies young Poles rank among world's best, but at the same time their commitment to social activities is rated rather low. They may get involved in short-term movements, campaigns or civic and social actions but they are losing their trust in political elites and interest in widely-understood participation in public life. In the study 'Youth 2008'[7], 27% of the surveyed expressed no interest at all in politics and another 20% said their interest was little. All the same, 33% of young people declared their affiliation to organisations, associations, informal and religious groups.

Threats and Social Pathologies – the analysis of the findings from the international HBSC (Health Behaviour in School-aged Children) study carried out by WHO8 in 2005-2006 shows limited involvement in risk behaviours declared by Polish teenagers (the study included 15-year-old schoolchildren). In comparison with other countries, Poland was (right behind Sweden) a country in which girls smoked cigarettes daily most rarely (9%). However, the frequency of getting drunk by Polish boys (4 times a week or more declared by 27% of the surveyed) was relatively high as compared to other countries. In the past few years we have observed that threats and social pathologies to which mainly inner-city youth was exposed tend to infiltrate

rural communities and that there is a growing trend in risk behaviours among young women. It is down to the uniformisation of culture among youth linked to the popularisation of electronic communications, especially the Internet.

5. Youth Research in Poland – Situation Assessment and Directions of Change

The situation of young people in today's changing society is complex. They experience a number of civilisation processes and their consequences much more intensely than the older generations. They are being given unique opportunities, but far more often they reap the harvest of the negative consequences of economic and social processes. Sociological research should not only provide a description in terms of hard, objective data, but also enable understanding of the needs, values, priorities and ways of developing mechanisms of social communication with the young generation. We must therefore go beyond quantitative research designs which obviously does not mean that this kind of data should be disregarded as they are essential both for developing plans for and for evaluation of youth policy.

It seems in Poland that at the level of central authorities there is better understanding of the importance of research findings as a useful instrument for shaping youth policy, whilst it is challenging to develop an efficient system for monitoring research contents and directions. A solution could be to empanel a coordinating body, comprising the representatives of central and local authorities, youth organisations and youth research organisations and institutes.

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M. Fedorowicz, M. Sitek (Eds.), Społeczeństwo w drodze do wiedzy [Society on Their Way to Knowledge]. Report on the State of Education, Educational Research Institute (publication in preparation).

Notes

1 Fatyga B. (Ed.) *The White Paper of Polish Youth*, Ministry of National Education and Sport, Warsaw 2003.

2 Fatyga B., Oliwińska I., Sińczuch M., Zieliński P., *The White Paper of Polish Youth. Research Report*, Ministry of National Education and Sport, Warsaw 2005.

3 See: Chłoń-Domińczak A., Pracz M., „Edukacja a demografia" [Education vs. Demography] (In:), M. Fedorowicz, M. Sitek (Eds.)., *Społeczeństwo w drodze do wiedzy* [Society on Their Way to Knowledge]. *Report on the State of Education*, Educational Research Institute (publication in preparation).

4 See: Chłoń-Domińczak A., Maliszewska A., Siergiejuk M., „Edukacja a rynek pracy" [Education vs. Labour Market], (In:), M. Fedorowicz, M. Sitek (Eds.)., *Społeczeństwo w drodze do wiedzy* [Society on Their Way to Knowledge]. *Report on the State of Education*, Educational Research Institute (publication in preparation).

5 CBOS, *Youth 2008*, Public Opinion Research Centre, National Bureau for Drug Prevention, Warsaw 2009.

6 CBOS, *Youth 2008*, Public Opinion Research Centre, National Bureau for Drug Prevention, Warsaw 2009.

7 CBOS, *Youth 2008*, Public Opinion Research Centre, National Bureau for Drug Prevention, Warsaw 2009.

8 http://www.hbsc.org/

FR

La recherche sur l'enfance et la jeunesse en Pologne – promouvoir l'élaboration de politiques en faveur de l'enfance et de la jeunesse

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En Pologne, plusieurs institutions et entités participent à la recherche sur la jeunesse, avec pour caractéristique de se focaliser sur des domaines précis et la recherche d'informations spécifiques. Parmi les institutions qui effectuent et commanditent des études sur la jeunesse on trouve des instituts spécialisés (comme l'institut de recherche pédagogique), des agences gouvernementales (comme l'agence pour la prévention des problèmes liés à l'alcoolémie ou le bureau national pour la prévention de la toxicomanie), des instances en charge de la coordination de la coopération avec l'UE, des organisations non gouvernementales, des sociétés et des centres de recherche privés ainsi que des centres universitaires. Toutefois, depuis 1991, en Pologne, aucun institut gouvernemental ne s'occupe exclusivement de la mise en œuvre et de la coordination de recherches de grande ampleur sur la jeunesse. En conséquence, il n'existe aucun programme de recherche gouvernemental sur la jeunesse susceptible de fournir un diagnostic équilibré et global de la fonction sociale de la jeunesse polonaise.

DE

Kinder und Jugendforschung in Polen – Unterstützung für die Formulierung von Politiken für junge Menschen

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Eine Reihe von Institutionen und Stellen sind an der in Polen durchgeführten Jugendforschung beteiligt. Sie zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie sich auf gewisse Bereiche konzentrieren und nach speziellen Informationen suchen. Zu den Einrichtungen, die Jugendforschung durchführen und beauftragen, zählen spezialisierte Forschungsinstitute (wie das Institut für Erziehungswissenschaftliche Forschung), Regierungsstellen (wie die Staatliche Agentur für die Verhütung von alkoholbedingten Problemen (State Agency for the Prevention of Alcohol-Related Problems) oder das Nationale Büro für Drogenprävention (National Bureau for Drug Prevention)), für die Koordinierung der Zusammenarbeit mit der EU zuständige Stellen, nichtstaatliche Organisationen, private Forschungszentren und Unternehmen sowie akademische Zentren. Aber seit 1991 hat es in Polen kein staatliches Forschungsinstitut gegeben, das sich ausschließlich mit der Durchführung, Koordinierung und Realisierung breit angelegter Jugendstudien befasst hätte. Infolge dieses Zustandes gibt es kein staatliches Jugendforschungsprogramm, das eine umfassende und ausgewogene Diagnose liefern könnte, welche Funktion die polnische Jugend in der Gesellschaft innehat.

RU

Исследования по вопросам детей и молодежи в Польше – поддержка формирования политики для молодежи

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Ряд учреждений и организаций участвуют в проведении научных исследований в Польше. Их особенностью является то, что они сосредоточены на конкретных областях и осуществляют поиск специальной информации. Среди учреждений, которые осуществляют и заказывают молодежные исследования, имеются специальные научно-исследовательские институты (такие как Исследовательский институт образования), государственные агентства (например, Государственное агентство по профилактике проблем алкоголизма или Национальное бюро по профилактике наркозависимости), органы, ответственные за координацию сотрудничества с ЕС, неправительственные организации, частные исследовательские центры и компании, а также академические центры. Тем не менее, начиная с 1991 года, в Польше отсутствует правительственный научно-исследовательский институт, направленный исключительно на выполнение, координацию и проведение широкомасштабный молодежных исследований. Вследствие этого отсутствует какая-либо правительственная программа молодежных исследований, которая могла бы осуществить всеобъемлющую и сбалансированную диагностику социальных функций молодежи в Польше.

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Child poverty in Poland[1]

In Poland, children are the most victimized by poverty. System transformation in Poland has been accompanied by massive and persistent unemployment and wide-spreading poverty. Income inequality has grown rapidly as measured by the Gini coefficient (0.275 in 1989, 0.345 in 2005). Families with children, particularly with numerous children, have been the most strongly affected by poverty. Social assistance that was reinstituted at the beginning of the system transformation was designed only as a last resort to help individuals and households with small benefits to cover their basic needs.

In 2005 (the first year of Poland's membership in the European Union), child poverty was documented at 29% and was the highest in the EU-25. Since then the rate of poverty risk among children decreased continuously until 2008 when it was as high as 22%. This decrease occurred for all age cohorts except the oldest one. In 2008, the risk of poverty for the total population was 17% as compared with 21% in 2005. For people aged 18-24, the risk was 25% in 2005 and 20% in 2008; for people aged 25-49, 21% and 16%; for people aged 50–64, 16% and 15%; and for people aged 65+, 7% and 12%, respectively. The decrease in child poverty can also be seen in the relative median poverty gap, which for children was 32.5% in 2005 and 21.9% in 2008.

A deeper analysis shows that there was a sharp decline in extreme poverty among households with children, particularly for families with four or more children. Whereas, in 2005, 43% of children living in families with 4+ children suffered from extreme poverty by 2008 that proportion had been reduced to 18%.

The decrease in poverty has not been limited to specific areas of Poland. In 2005 there were 9 (among 16) provinces where the share of children living in poverty was higher than 30%, and 2 provinces among them had a child poverty rate higher than 40%. In 2008 only 2 provinces remained with a child poverty rate higher than 30%.

Both economic and political factors have contributed to the decrease in poverty in general and to the decrease in child poverty in particular. The primary economic factor has been the substantial increase in GDP: in 2005 +3.6%, 2006 +6.2%, 2007 +6.8%, and in 2008 + 5.1%. Another important factor has been the massive out-migration, estimated as 1.500 – 2.000 thousand people who went abroad when the labour market was opened to Poland's citizens. The result was a rapid fall in unemployment: in 2004 – 19%, in 2008 – 8.5% and an increase in salaries. Remittances from abroad were estimated at 6 billion euros per year, a huge amount of capital flow. Also EU subsidies for agriculture contributed to an increase in consumption. Internal consumption was also stimulated by provisions from the European Structural Funds by means of the creation of new jobs and supported employment.

Among political decisions, the following are highly relevant:

① Reform of family benefits (2004)
② Special child benefit for third and subsequent children (2006)
③ Restitution of the Alimony Fund offering child support (2007)
④ Decrease in the rate of health insurance contribution paid by employees (since 2006)
⑤ Child deduction for income tax (since 2008)

Although child benefits have been means tested since the mid-1990s., they offer some financial

support for low income families, particularly single-parent families and multi-children families. Because the threshold income per capita for child benefits is set higher than the poverty threshold, this measure is interpreted as support not only for poor families but also for those located a little bit above the poverty line.

The Alimony Fund was established in 1975 and existed until 2004, when the Bill on Family Support passed. After a massive social movement it was reestablished in 2007, and it has been in force since 2008. It is aimed to support children after parents divorce. When there is an order for a parent to receive child alimony for a given child (or a young adult up to age 25 if in school), but the parent has not been able to collect it for at least two months and meets additional criteria (income threshold per capita set at 725 zl, unknown place of residence of the parent ordered to pay), he/she is eligible to collect part of the child alimony (up 500 PLZ) from the Alimony Fund.

In 2006 a specific benefit was passed to additionally support children living in 3+ children families. This bill lowered the rate of the health insurance contribution paid by employees; thus, income in these families was increased. Also, since 2008 employees paying personal income tax have had the right to deduct a respective sum for each child.

All of these measures were introduced to meet EU requirements to lower the incidence of poverty according to the Lisbon Strategy goals. However, despite the optimism created by the decline in the extent of poverty, especially child poverty, it should not overshadow the fact that Poland still is a country where policy is not friendly enough to children. The risk of poverty for children (22% in 2008 and 23% in 2009) remains one of the highest in EU-27.

When European countries are clustered on the basis of indicators of children's well-being, Poland along with Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary belongs to those where children are deprived in many dimensions. Polish children suffer from poor housing, poor diet, inability to vacation outside their place of residence, insufficient provision of pre-school day care, etc. The message is even more alarming when findings from case studies carried out in disadvantaged communities are taken into consideration.

The case study approach enables greater contextualization of the problem of poverty; thus, it is easier to understand what it means to live in a poor household and to grow up in poverty. Unfortunately, case studies are undertaken rather rarely and are highly situational. An exception is studies that have been carried out for twenty years in the city of Lodz by the research team located in the Institute of Sociology University of Lodz, established by the author. These studies are unique in terms of the methodology used (triangulation of data and methods), the span of observation enabling panel-like research, and coverage of different groups affected by poverty.

In the city of Lodz, the third largest in Poland, there are areas where the poverty rate among children is twice, three and even four times higher than the average for the city as a whole. Such places are called by the research team *enclaves* or *pockets of poverty*. These areas were created in Lodz throughout the 1990s as result of three overlapping processes: deindustrialization, de-welfarization and deinstitutionalization of family. The rapid collapse of the textile industry, formerly the main employer in the town, caused massive lay-offs at the onset of transformation of the system. Because it was tradition in many working class families for work in the same factories to continue in subsequent generations, the collapse of this industry meant that there were numerous families with all adults becoming unemployed.

At the beginning of 1990s, Lodz was the first large Polish city hit so strongly by unemployment. Perhaps because surveys said that on the average, large cities were less affected by poverty than villages and small towns, political leaders were not willing to admit that the city of Lodz required support and that it was not enough to provide laid-off employees with three months gratuity and offer

them an unemployment benefit. It took time for government, after massive violent demonstrations by miners organized in trade unions, to implement financial measures for heavy industry workers to enable them to change their field of work. The loss of work places in Lodz has never been overcome.

When unemployment benefits expired, most people had no recourse except to apply for means-tested social assistance benefits, considered to be a last resort. At the same time there was withdrawal of generous subsidies for housing and widespread commodification of social services, including education, health care, etc. Municipalities suffered from insufficient tax flows and low rent collection. The condition of municipally administered tenant houses, located mostly in the inner-city, got worse and worse. People who were in arrears with rent payments were evicted from apartment blocks and offered housing in these ruined municipal tenant houses. People who had flats in these buildings and who had the resources moved out; they have been replaced by poor people, former prisoners, lone mothers, and others eligible for social housing. In the course of such mobility (partially spontaneous, partially provoked by municipal decisions) these buildings have become spatially and socially isolated places.

Our study in 1998 revealed seventeen enclaves of poverty in the city of Lodz, where the proportion of social assistance beneficiants was higher than 30%. It was children who were most affected by poverty. The rate of child poverty in some enclaves was higher than 50% and two or three times higher than for adults.

Ten years later (2008), all inner-city enclaves of poverty have remained pockets of poverty despite economic recovery in the city and the growth of a new generation. This means that in pockets of poverty we have petrifaction of poverty and that the process of poverty transmission from one generation to another is in progress. The next generation is on relief and their children are in danger of following the path of their parents. Schools attended by children living in poverty pockets are those where the share of pupils provided with free meals, aimed to support poor families, are the highest. In two, more than every second pupil got free meals; in three, close to 40% of pupils were provided with such support. In the remaining schools located in pockets of poverty, the share of pupils supported by free meals was at least two times as high as the average in the city (13%).

In poverty pockets, children suffer from multiple deprivations. They are not street children in terms of being homeless but they are children of the street. It is the street where they spend time and express their agency (playing games, stealing, working, making noise, etc.). They are excluded from goods and activities that other children take for granted. Children growing up in pockets of poverty live in overcrowded flats, many sleeps in the same bed with other children and do not have a place to do homework. The walls in flats where they live are wet and moldy. When those living in these buildings are unable to pay rent, their electricity is disconnected. Some children do not have a stable place that could be called home because they move with their mother from one poverty pocket to another to avoid the violent behaviours of their fathers and grandfathers. Children suffer from stress. In our study at least two generations in the same family reported feeling fearful and unsafe in both family and neighbourhood as a result of alcohol misuse. Violence against mother, arguments between parents, and police interventions were common experiences of people growing up in poverty enclaves.

Relationships with better-off friends are very limited for these children. They do not visit their school mates and do not invite them to spend time together in their own flats. Informal relegation from school mates' circles pushes those growing up in poverty enclaves to search for peers similar to themselves in terms of socio-economic status and shared experiences; most are close neighbors. Friends from a similar background have a healing effect on the self-esteem of poor children; they become their most important reference group during adolescence.

Much remains to be done in Poland to improve the well-being of children. In addition to those living in poverty enclaves, children who grow up in jobless households, who are disabled, who are residential care leavers, etc. Poland is still behind the EU-25 average in terms (a) of total spending on family benefits, housing and social assistance (6% of GDP in PL, 12% EU-25), (b) of the effect of social transfers other than pensions on poverty reduction among families with children (30% in PL vs. 42% EU-25), and (c) of the contribution of social transfers to the income of households with children (13% in PL vs. 16% in EU25). Although there has been an increase in income, there is still a large population of working poor; income thresholds for family benefits and social assistance are set low and have remained unchanged since 2006 despite the legal obligation to update the index every three years. Large groups are excluded from the child deduction in income tax (farmers and people with very low income) and from decreased health insurance contributions (farmers, self-employed).

Published in 2009, the official government document *Report Poland 2030* identifies child poverty as a challenge to be addressed. But the document does not provide a comprehensive and detailed strategy for how to alleviate child poverty and it does not consider poverty among children as a violation of a child's rights. One has the impression that child poverty ranks low among issues that are perceived as important by the authors of the Report. The research carried out with local government representatives by this Lodz research team leaves no doubt that they consider child poverty a private problem of particular families rather than an important problem affecting the whole community.

To tackle child poverty, political measures have to be implemented. First, policy is needed for prioritizing strategies to promote the well being of children and to tackle child poverty at all levels of governance: central, regional and local. Policy concerning children is fragmented; thus, it is vulnerable to a sectoral approach (education, health, social policy) and it is considered as a part of family policy. Because there is so much political disagreement about family policy, a consistent child oriented policy is hardly possibly. However, the first step could be strengthening the position of the Ombudsman for Children.

At this time, the position of Ombudsman is weak and the office works mostly as an emergency agency than as a representative of children and youth as a category of citizens. The Office of Ombudsman for Children should be provided with the authority to assess the impact of laws on children and youth. It should have the power to turn down legislative initiatives that contribute to worsening the lives of children and the conditions for their development, and they should have the power to initiate laws supporting children. It should also be the institution that monitors the well-being of children and publicizes problems and improvements.

Overcoming this fragmented approach to children is particularly necessary at the local level where interagency cooperation could add value to activities undertaken by each particular public institution and civil society organization. There is an urgent need to strengthen and coordinate activities designed for early detection of risks and for assistance to families, including, in particular, cooperation among schools, physicians, social workers and family courts.

To tackle child poverty effectively, measures undertaken by central government must be complemented by initiatives and actions developed at the local level. Local authorities are of particular importance, if – like in Poland – the process of decentralization of social policy is advanced.

Note

1 This article is a summary of the paper titled "Child poverty in Poland" presented at the EUROCHILD Annual Conference "Brighter futures – Building effective partnerships to end child poverty" from 3 – 5 November 2010 in Örebro, Sweden. The entire research paper can be requested from the author: **zsoul@uni.lodz.pl**

FR

La pauvreté des enfants en Pologne

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En Pologne, les enfants sont le groupe de la population le plus touché par la pauvreté. Le processus de transformation du pays a été accompagné par un chômage important et persistant et une pauvreté largement répandue. En 2005 (première année de la Pologne en tant que membre de l'Union européenne), la pauvreté des enfants était estimée à 29 %, la plus élevée dans l'UE-25. Depuis, le taux de risque de pauvreté parmi les enfants a diminué continuellement depuis 2008, où il atteignait alors les 22 %. Des facteurs tant économiques que politiques ont contribué à cette diminution de la pauvreté en général et à la diminution de la pauvreté des enfants en particulier.

De nombreuses mesures ont été introduites pour satisfaire aux exigences de l'UE d'une moindre incidence de la pauvreté, conformément aux objectifs de la Stratégie de Lisbonne. Toutefois, l'optimisme né du déclin de l'ampleur de la pauvreté, et notamment de la pauvreté des enfants, n'éclipse pas le fait que la Pologne est encore un pays où la politique n'est pas suffisamment attentive aux besoins des enfants. Le risque de pauvreté pour les enfants (22 % en 2008 et 23 % en 2009) reste l'un des plus élevés dans l'UE-27.

DE

Kinderarmut in Polen

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In Polen sind die häufigsten Opfer von Armut die Kinder gewesen. Die Systemveränderung in Polen wurde begleitet durch massive und anhaltende Arbeitslosigkeit und eine weite Verbreitung der Armut. Im Jahre 2005 (dem ersten Jahr der polnischen Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union) wurde die Kinderarmut mit 29 % dokumentiert und war damit die höchste in der EU der 25. Seither hat sich der Prozentsatz des Armutsrisikos von Kindern bis 2008 kontinuierlich verringert, als er sich auf 22 % belief. Sowohl wirtschaftliche als auch politische Faktoren haben zum generellen Rückgang der Armut und insbesondere zum Rückgang der Kinderarmut beigetragen.

Es wurden recht viele Maßnahmen eingeführt, um die EU-Anforderungen zu erfüllen und die Armutshäufigkeit den Zielen der Lissabon-Strategie entsprechend zu verringern. Aber trotz des durch den Rückgang der Armut und speziell der Kinderarmut ausgelösten Optimismus sollte man die Tatsache nicht verhehlen, dass Polen weiterhin ein Land ist, in dem die Politik nicht kinderfreundlich genug ist. Das Armutsrisiko von Kindern (22 % im Jahre 2008 und 23 % im Jahre 2009) bleibt weiter eines der höchsten in der EU der 27.

RU

Детская бедность в Польше

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В Польше наиболее пострадавшими от бедности являются дети. Система преобразований в Польше сопровождалась массовой и хронической безработицей и широким распространением бедности. В 2005г. (первом году членства Польши в Европейском Союзе) детская бедность была зафиксирована на уровне 29% и была наиболее высокой среди 25 стран ЕС. С того времени и вплоть до 2008г. уровень риска бедности среди детей непрерывно снижался, достигнув 22%. Экономические и политические факторы привели к уменьшению бедности в целом и снижению детской бедности, в частности.

В соответствии с целями Лиссабонской стратегии были предприняты значительные меры для удовлетворения требований ЕС по снижению уровня бедности. Тем не менее, возникший в результате снижения масштабов бедности, особенно детской, оптимизм не должен заслонять того, что Польша по-прежнему является страной с политикой, не достаточно ориентированной на детей. Риск бедности для детей (22% в 2008г. и 23% в 2009г.) остается одним из самых высоких среди 27 стран-членов ЕС.



Sabine Aschauer-Smolik/Mario Steidl (Hg.)
Tamid Kadima – Immer Vorwärts – Heading forwards: Der jüdische Exodus aus Europa 1945-1948 – Jewish Exodus out of Europe 1945-1948, Innsbruck 2010, deutsch/englisch, 500 Seiten/500 pages Euro 34,90

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Nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges fand ein in der Geschichte einzigartiger Exodus statt: Aufgrund des ungebrochenen Antisemitismus suchten und fanden Tausende von jüdischen Überlebenden des Holocaust ihre Wege aus ganz Europa u.a. in die USA und nach Palästina/Israel. Zwischen 1946 und 1948 verbrachten zahlreiche jüdische Flüchtlinge auch einige Zeit im Displaced Persons Camp „Givat Avoda“ in Saalfelden. Aus diesem Anlass begaben sich 2009 HistorikerInnen aus Europa und den USA bei einem Symposium in Saalfelden auf die Spuren dieser Menschen. In dem nun vorliegenden Sammelband zu dieser Tagung werden die Fluchtwege aus Osteuropa bis zu den italienischen Häfen, die Rolle der Fluchthilfeorganisation „Bricha“ sowie die Lebensbedingungen der Flüchtlinge auf ihrem Weg durch Europa und nach ihrer Ankunft in den ersehnten neuen Heimatländern beleuchtet.

After the end of World War Two an exodus unique in history, took place: because of the continuing Anti-Semitism thousands of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were striving for ways out of Europe, in order to reach the USA or Palestine/Israel. Between the years 1946 and 1948 numerous Jewish refugees were spending some time in the Displaced Persons Camp „Givot Avoda“ in Saalfelden. For this reason Historians from Europe and the USA gathered in Saalfelden in 2009, participating in a symposium which aimed at investigating the traces of these people. The present volume, an anthology of all the contributions held at the symposium, describes, illustrates and comments the various escape itineraries from Eastern Europe towards the Italian harbours, the role played by the escape support movement „Bricha“; the volume also reveals the living conditions of the refugees on their way through Europe and after their arrival in the new, desired homelands.

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Gedächtnisraum Europa – Eine jüdische Perspektive[1]

Wir leben in finsteren Zeiten – Zeiten, die das jüdische Problem zum Allgemeinproblem werden lassen. Sozialwissenschaftler haben angesichts der neuen Barbarei einen schweren Stand: Unser Handwerkszeug taugt nicht viel, wenn es darum geht, die heutigen Gefahren zu verstehen. So drehen wir uns im Kreis, versuchen die Welt in alten Kategorien zu verstehen, die wir alle noch so fleißig gelernt haben. Ob es nun um Europa geht oder um die Welt, ob es sich um Kosmopolitismus oder Globalisierung handelt. Man erfreut sich an der Vision eines kosmopolitischen Europas, das die Grenzen sprengt, und wundert sich gleichzeitig über die Wiederkehr der Tradition, des Eigenen, des Lokalen, der Kultur.

"Den Juden als Nation muss man alles verweigern; als Individuen muss man ihnen alles zugestehen." So hieß es in Frankreich nach der Französischen Revolution, und dieser Ausspruch wurde zum Inbegriff der gescheiterten jüdischen Assimilation in Europa. Denn letztendlich forderte er eine Konvertierung der Juden: Nur der Jude, der sich dem Prinzip der Staatsbürgerschaft unterwerfe, werde der neue gute Jude sein. Juden als Kollektiv sind ein Relikt einer vergangenen Geschichte. Das ist die Botschaft der Aufklärung an die Juden, wie sie am deutlichsten Nathan der Weise in der Lessing'schen Ringparabel ausspricht: "Wie kann ich meinen Vätern weniger, Als du den deinen glauben? Oder umgekehrt. –Kann ich von dir verlangen, dass du deine Vorfahren Lügen strafst, um meinen nicht Zu widersprechen? Oder umgekehrt. Das Nämliche gilt von den Christen. Nicht?"

Der Jude Nathan wurde seiner partikularen Geschichte beraubt und damit konnte er in die Universalität der Menschheit eintreten – ein Projekt, das der Nationalsozialismus brutal unterlaufen hat. Aber dieses Projekt des europäischen Kosmopolitismus wurde nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wieder in Angriff genommen. Die Versöhnung ehemaliger Feinde, die gegenseitige wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit und die gemeinsame Politik gegenüber dem Ostblock waren die konstituierenden Momente eines kosmopolitischen Europas mit universaler Mission, die in die Welt getragen werden sollte.

Eine gemeinsame historische Erinnerung, die über die nationalstaatliche Erfahrung hinausgehen sollte, wurde zum Grundpfeiler des neuen Europas. Der Krieg als Schreckensereignis, in dem alle Menschen leiden, die Judenvernichtung eingebettet in die universale Erinnerung als Menschheitsverbrechen, in der alle Täter oder Opfer sein können, ja in gewissem Sinne die christliche Vereinnahmung der Judenvernichtung, in der Juden als Individuen, aber nicht als Nation gelten dürfen – all das trägt zu einem neuen kosmopolitischen Europa bei, in der Juden als Juden mit ihren spezifischen Erinnerungen keinen Platz mehr einnehmen können.

Der heutige Kosmopolitismus sieht sich natürlich nicht mehr so homogenisierend wie seine Vorgänger im 18. Jahrhundert, jedoch ist die Spannung zwischen Universalismus und Partikularismus noch nicht überwunden: Oft werden die eigenen Erfahrungen als universal eingestuft. Moralischer Universalismus stellt noch immer eines der begehrtesten europäischen Exportgüter dar, ohne dass dabei aber berücksichtigt wird, dass gerade die partikularen Erfahrungen der Kriegszeit der Grund dafür sind, dass die postnationale Konstellation heute als universale Botschaft in

die Welt geführt werden kann. Das führt dazu, dass kosmopolitische Debatten unhistorisch geführt werden, ja geführt werden müssen, um partikulare Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen in eine universale Schablone einzupressen. In der Menschheit, so kann man sagen, gibt es keinen Ort für die Menschen in ihrer Besonderheit. Das Weiterbestehen und Weiterbestehen wollen von Partikularität wird nur noch als Rückschritt und Reaktion verstanden. Wenn man die europäische jüdische Erfahrung jedoch mit in die Analyse holt, werden Universalismus und Partikularismus, das Allgemeine und das Besondere keine sich gegenseitig ausschließenden Begriffe mehr sein, sondern gelebte Praxis.

Das ist historisch schwierig, denn diese gelebte Praxis, die jüdische kulturelle Existenz in Europa, existiert trotz der physischen Anwesenheit von Juden in Europa nicht mehr. Der gelebte jüdische Pluralismus existiert heute fast nur noch in den USA und in Israel, wo die meisten überlebenden des Holocaust ihr Leben wieder aufnahmen. In Europa blieb kaum noch die Erinnerung zurück. Europa wurde für Juden zum schwarzen Loch, zu einem nicht definierbaren "Dort", das nicht mehr existiert. Deutschland und Europa lebten weiter, die jüdische Kultur jedoch hat dort nicht überlebt und existiert nur noch im virtuellen Raum.

Damit wird auch die Beziehung zwischen Erinnerung und Geschichte neu geschrieben. Es geht nicht mehr um Nationalgeschichte, sondern um Erinnerungsgeschichte. In der Erinnerung können mehrere Geschichten – und damit auch Universalismus und Partikularismus, das Allgemeine und das Besondere – gleichzeitig existieren. Dies ist vor allem bei der Erinnerung an den Holocaust der Fall: War es ein Menschheitsverbrechen oder ein Verbrechen gegen die Juden? Ist das Verbrechen mit anderen vergleichbar? Muss eine besondere Sprache gesprochen werden, um über die Judenvernichtung zu reden? Sind dies moralische oder historische Debatten? Auf der einen Seite hat die Judenvernichtung Begrifflichkeiten der Aufklärung herausgefordert, ja sogar den Begriff der "Dialektik der Aufklärung" mitgetragen. Auf der anderen Seite, fast schon auf paradoxe Weise, wurde die Judenvernichtung zur Quelle nicht nur der Kritik am Universalismus, sondern auch seiner Erfüllung durch Menschenrechte und Völkermordprävention.

Eine zentrale Frage, die sich hierbei stellt, lautet: Gibt es universalistische Mindestvorgaben, auf die man sich einigen kann, ohne partikularistische Mindestvorgaben aufgeben zu müssen? Gerade jüdische Intellektuelle mussten diese Fragen nach dem Holocaust für sich neu verhandeln. Sie taten das sowohl "unter sich" als auch in Auseinandersetzung mit ihrer nichtjüdischen Umwelt.

Die Diskussion drehte sich oft um die europäische Vergangenheit und wie die jüdisch-europäische Vergangenheit in Israel und in den USA weitergelebt werden könnte. Dabei stand jedoch nicht nur das Debattieren im Vordergrund. Vielmehr waren europäische jüdische Intellektuelle auch praktisch an einem Projekt beteiligt, in dem sie von den Nazis beschlagnahmte jüdische Kulturgüter von Deutschland und Europa nach Israel oder in die USA schafften. Man kann sagen, dass diese jüdischen Intellektuellen die Spannung zwischen dem Universalen und dem Partikularen aufrechterhalten und außerhalb Europas weiterleben wollten. Die damit verbundenen Schwierigkeiten und Probleme sowie ihre Unfähigkeit, weder ihre universalistischen Träume noch ihre ethnische Identität aufgeben zu wollen, waren jedoch nicht das Resultat von traumatischer Inkonsequenz und Exil, sondern stellen Überlegungen dar, die noch für heutige kosmopolitische Debatten hoch relevant sind – sie konstituieren die heutigen Debatten geradezu.

Kosmopolitismus ist nicht nur ein nobles Ideal, das von menschlicher Größe ausgeht, sondern eine klare Herausforderung an unser Leben. Es geht darum, wie man nach der Katastrophe weiterleben kann. Wenn Kosmopolitismus in irgendeiner Form überhaupt Sinn macht, dann nur, wenn sowohl das Allgemeine als auch das Besondere bewahrt bleiben, ohne dass man Gefahr läuft, das eine auf das andere

zu verkürzen. Es waren insbesondere die jüdischen Intellektuellen, die diese neue nach-aufklärerische Form des Kosmopolitismus entwickelt haben. Sie mussten dies tun, um weiterzuleben. Und sie taten es im Widerstreit mit ihrer Umwelt.

Dieser neue Kosmopolitismus trägt die Tradition des alten und noblen Begriffs weiter, doch er entstand nach 1945 in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Katastrophe. Die allgemeine Menschrechtserklärung von 1948 ist nur ein Teil davon. Wenn sie in der Präambel davon ausging, dass "die Nichtanerkennung und Verachtung der Menschenrechte zu Akten der Barbarei geführt haben, die das Gewissen der Menschheit mit Empörung erfüllen", dann war die in der Erinnerung noch frische Erfahrung der Katastrophe mitbestimmend für das kosmopolitische Grundrecht auf Leben.

Fast gleichzeitig heißt es in der israelischen Unabhängigkeitserklärung: "Die Katastrophe, die in unserer Zeit über das jüdische Volk hereinbrach und in Europa Millionen von Juden vernichtete, bewies unwiderleglich aufs Neue, dass das Problem der jüdischen Heimatlosigkeit durch die Wiederherstellung des jüdischen Staates im Lande Israel gelöst werden muss, in einem Staat, dessen Pforten jedem Juden offen stehen, und der dem jüdischen Volk den Rang einer gleichberechtigten Nation in der Völkerfamilie sichert."

Hier findet sich dieselbe Katastrophe, jedoch mit anderen Konsequenzen, die heute schon fast als sich wechselseitig ausschließende betrachtet werden. Doch diese beiden Schlussfolgerungen sind nicht die einzigen, die aus der Katastrophe gezogen werden können. Beides – Universalismus und Partikularismus – kann gleichzeitig existieren. Unter anderem wurde dies von der jüdischen Intellektuellen Hannah Arendt gedacht, die in ihren Auseinandersetzungen mit ihrer jüdischen und nicht-jüdischen Umwelt beide Prinzipien zu vereinen versuchte.

Wie Kant wuchs Arendt in Königsberg auf. Die jüdische Gemeinschaft dort war wie viele andere jüdischen Gemeinschaften zusammengesetzt aus orthodoxen Juden, aus Juden, die sich als deutsche Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens verstanden, aus Zionisten und aus radikalen Sozialisten. Es gab dort Juden, die aus Osteuropa kamen, und solche, die dort seit Jahrhunderten lebten. Es gab zudem getaufte Juden. Und auch für Arendts Mutter war es immer klar, dass sie als Juden in Königsberg lebten. Hier lernte Arendt durch ihre eigene Existenz die Pluralität der jüdischen Existenz an der Schnittstelle zwischen West – und Osteuropa kennen.

Arendt versuchte, eine Form des Liberalismus zu entwickeln, der sowohl individuelle Freiheit als auch kulturelle Einbettung widerspruchsfrei integrieren kann. "Nur innerhalb eines Volkes kann ein Mensch als Mensch unter Menschen leben – wenn er nicht vor Entkräftung sterben will", schrieb Arendt 1944 in ihrer Schlussbemerkung zu einem Essay über Kafka. Arendt sah hier den Schlüssel zur verborgenen jüdischen Tradition und hat zeitlebens versucht, als Jüdin auch so zu leben. Sie hat damit versucht, den Kosmopolitismus vom Individualismus zu befreien und an das Partikulare anzubinden. Für Juden war dies lebensnotwendig.

Es ist daher mehr als lebensnotwendig, kosmopolitische Debatten historisch einzubetten und zu verankern. Das gilt insbesondere für Diskussionen über kosmopolitische Gerechtigkeit, die über europäische Ansätze hinausgehen wollen und in denen es auch um die "Tradition der Unterdrückten" geht. Jüdische Stimmen sind daher historisch und theoretisch notwendig – und werden durch die Erinnerung erweckt. Die Rekonstruktion dieser historischen Debatten dient dabei nicht nur antiquarischen Zwecken, sondern stellt den Versuch dar, eine kosmopolitische Theorie durch Erfahrung zu untermauern.

Die Zeit direkt nach dem Krieg ist der entscheidende historische Moment. Dies war die Zeit, in der die Grundlagen des neuen Europas aus den Trümmern des Zweiten Weltkriegs entstanden – die Geburtsstunde des kosmopolitischen Europas beginnt mit der

Kapitulation Deutschlands. Doch war dies auch die Zeit, in der sich das jüdische Gedächtnis neu formieren und in der, jüdische Intellektuelle ihr Verhältnis zu Europa neu zu definieren hatten. In just dieser Zeit hat eine Gruppe jüdischer Intellektueller die letzten Überbleibsel jüdischer Kultur aus Europa herausgeschafft, um ihnen in Israel und in den USA eine neue Heimat zu geben.

Anmerkung

1 Natan Sznaider ist Professor für Soziologie am Academic College in Tel Aviv. Der Text ist die Kurzfassung der Einleitung seines vor Kurzem im Verlag transcript erschienenen Buches "Gedächtnisraum Europa. Die Visionenen des europäischen Kosmopolitismus. Eine jüdische Perspektive" (153 Seiten, 16,80 Euro).

EN

Europe as a Space of Remembrance – A Jewish Perspective

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We live in dark times – in times which have turned the Jewish problem into a general problem. Faced by the new barbarism, social scientists have a tough time: the tools of our profession are not particularly suitable, when it is a matter of understanding the threats of today. Consequently, we turn around in circles, try to understand the world in the old categories we all learned so diligently: Whether it is Europe or the world, whether it is cosmopolitism or globalisation. We rejoice at the vision of a cosmopolitan Europe overcoming the borders, but at the same time we are astounded to see the re-emergence of tradition, of self, of the local, and of culture.

A shared historical memory, which was meant to transcend the experience of the nation states, became the basic pillar of the new Europe. War as a horrific experience, when all people suffered; the Holocaust embedded in the universal memory of the crimes against humanity, when each and everyone may be a criminal or a victim; and to a certain extent even the appropriation of the Holocaust by the Christians, when Jews may be regarded as individuals but not as a nation – all this contributes to a new cosmopolitan Europe, in which Jews may no longer take their place as Jews with their own specific memories.

FR

L'Europe, espace de mémoire – Une perspective juive

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Nous vivons dans une époque sombre – une époque qui transforme le problème juif en un problème d'ordre général. Au vu de la nouvelle barbarie, les sociologues se retrouvent dans une situation bien difficile : nos outils de travail ne sont pas très utiles quand il s'agit de comprendre les dangers d'aujourd'hui. Donc, nous tournons en rond, nous essayons de comprendre le monde dans des catégories d'antan que nous avons toutes apprises avec ardeur. S'il s'agit maintenant de l'Europe ou du monde ou bien du cosmopolitisme ou de la mondialisation. On se réjouit de la vision d'une Europe cosmopolite qui fait sauter les frontières et on s'étonne en même temps du retour de la tradition, de l'individualité authentique, du local, de la culture.

Un souvenir historique commun qui devrait aller au-delà de l'expérience d'un Etat national est devenu le pilier central de la nouvelle Europe. La guerre en tant qu'évènement horrible qui fait souffrir tous les humains ; le génocide incrusté dans le souvenir universel en tant que crime contre l'humanité dont tout un chacun peut être le coupable ou la victime. Oui, dans un certain sens, la récupération chrétienne du génocide dans lequel les Juifs peuvent être considérés comme des individus et non pas comme une nation – tout cela contribue à une nouvelle Europe cosmopolitique au sein de laquelle les Juifs ne peuvent plus trouver leur place en tant que Juifs pourvus de leurs souvenirs spécifiques.

RU

Европа как пространство памяти – еврейская перспектива

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Мы живем в мрачные времена – во времена, которые превратили еврейскую проблему в общую проблему. Перед лицом нового варварства социологи оказались в жестоких условиях: наш профессиональный инструментарий не особенно подходит, когда вопрос касается понимания угроз сегодняшнего дня. Следовательно, мы ходим по кругу, пытаясь понять мир в старых категориях, которые так старательно освоили: это Европа или мир, многонациональность или глобализация. Мы радуемся видению многонациональной Европы, преодолевающей границы, но в то же самое время мы поражены, видя возрождение традиций, личности, локальности и культуры.

Общая историческая память, которая вышла за рамки исторического опыта национальных государств, стала основой новой Европы. Война как ужасный опыт человеческих страданий; Холокост встроен в универсальную память о преступлениях против человечности, когда каждый и все могут оказаться преступниками или жертвами; и в определенной степени даже восприятие Холокоста христианами, когда евреи могут рассматриваться как индивиды, но не как нация – все это вносит свой вклад в новую многонациональную Европу, в которой евреи не могут больше занимать особое место как евреи со своими собственными специфическими воспоминаниями.

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The Bystander in Holocaust History and Education

Modern Holocaust historiography has given today's educator three historical subjects for understanding and teaching about the Holocaust: **Perpetrators**, **Victims**, and **Bystanders**. The lines between these historical subjects are blurry, of course. Where for example, do we put the Nazi industrialist who exploits slave labor for personal gain and profit, even when a byproduct of his production process is that his Jewish slaves are spared deportation and murder at the hands of those he serves? Nonetheless, the typology is a useful one as it provides the educator and the scholar with a common schematic for cutting through the streams of data and historical experience which inundate the immense discourse on this 'unspeakable' event. Though not without risk of oversimplification, these schematics are necessary for historic reflection and teaching success, especially when the subject matter is as complex, and the discourse as massive, as this one. Knowledge begins with, and ends with, simplification.

Among this tripartite categorization of historical actor, however, the victim remains the dominate subject of Holocaust education and research. This is understandable, of course, given the sentimental power of this group and its testimony and the objectives of Holocaust education itself, which remain, I presume, providing the general public and future generations with the sympathy necessary (or thought necessary) to prevent such monumental tragedies as the Holocaust from ever happening again. Still, the disproportionate attention to victims has contributed to a certain neglect of the other two groups; and some have argued that it contributes to the troubling phenomenon of 'Holocaust fatigue' that we as educators – and perhaps as responsible citizens – must ever endeavor to overcome.

In recent years, a number of scholars and educators have started to correct for this deficiency. Johannes Tuchel, Paul Levine, and Simone Schweber, in previous editions of this very journal, have all appealed for a new approach to Holocaust education, one that includes "The Perpetrator" as moral and historiographic subject.[1] This approach is important and good, and I can only hope that my own research on the Nazi Holocaust constitutes a partial answer to their welcome appeal.

Still missing, however, is an appeal for Holocaust education to include the bystander as historical subject. Of course, this deficiency is the most understandable of all, since bystanders, by their very nature, were less involved and had less at stake in the Nazi genocide than either perpetrators or victims, and have thus been less scrutinized by judges and historians alike. The people who 'stood by' or helped as their neighbors were victimized or even those who merely voted in elections that first brought the Nazi regime to power left fewer records of their participation, their complicity, and even their resistance than those who perpetrated the Holocaust and those who suffered most directly at their hands.

Still, insofar as the Weimar Republic, the sadly fertile ground in which extremism became mainstream, was a democracy in which the Nazis garnered significant electoral support and insofar as a mass movement like Nazism required popular mobilization or at least acquiescence to put its ideological vision into political practice, the bystander is at once the 'unsung villain' of Nazi tyranny and the 'unsung hero' of those who resisted it. Less guilty than most perpetrators and less innocent than most victims, he or she personifies the Holocaust's most difficult moral questions – those questions we deftly

and conveniently avoid when we focus more exclusively on the lions and lambs of the Holocaust drama, from Adolf Hitler to Anne Frank: What is our responsibility as democratic citizens? What should we do in the face of great evil? What do we owe our neighbor?

This paper constitutes an appeal to include the bystander in our teaching of the Holocaust. We can do so, I argue, by viewing historical events though a 'bystander lens' and ultimately by breaking down the strict perpetrator/bystander distinction so evident in the historical literature. The point of this approach is to put students in situations where they identify with the perpetrator. This uncomfortable exercise forces the kind of critical self-examination and engagement that we, as educators, seek to instill in our students. I conclude with a report on how I have attempted to do just that.

Focusing the 'bystander lens' on Nazi rule

By remembering the institutional dynamics of parliamentary democracy, even the highest level of the Nazi leadership can be viewed through a 'bystander lens'. While many approaches and biographical histories provide psychological profiles of the Nazi leadership and their ideological heritage, educators and scholars could also focus more on the sources of Nazi political support, bringing attention to the mass publics who voted for Hitler and to the role of antisemitism in the decision-making of those who supported or opposed Nazi policy.

For example, a common trope in discussions of the period is that the Nazis "seized" power or that the rise of political extremism somehow represented a "failure" of Weimar democracy. In fact, few things could be further from the truth. While Weimar democracy was certainly imperfect, and while it was characterized by institutional features that sometimes led to instability, the sad fact remains that Nazism was popular in interwar Germany and won the un-coerced and even fervent support of many ordinary citizens. It is true, of course, that Hitler never won a majority in the Weimar parliament. Multi-party parliamentary democracies are such that governing parties seldom win outright majorities, something as true today as it was then. In the parliamentary election of November 1932, the last free and fair election of the Weimar Republic and the one that brought Hitler to power, the Nazi party won about 34% of the seats in the German legislature, far more than any other political party in Germany at the time. The point is that, though we may not like it, the Nazis represented the general will of considerable segments of the German populace. Hitler was popular. And in some ways, his appointment as chancellor was the only possible outcome at the time.

In switching our attention from Nazi leaders (perpetrators) to the ordinary men and women who elected them, we focus attention on the more incremental and less blatantly repugnant choices that bystanders made to vote for the Nazis in the first place. These people were not perpetrators – at least not in the traditional sense of the taxonomy. They were concerned citizens of a democratic country who, for reasons that sometimes had little to do with Nazi antisemitism (anticommunism, stability, economic and national recovery), voted for the Nazi party. I say this, not to defend the bystanders' political choice – in fact, it might be a measure of their crass indifference to antisemitism that so many of them would vote for the Nazis in pursuit of other political goals. But showing the Nazi voter as an ordinary, maybe even well-intentioned citizen of a country in crisis makes his or her vote more comprehensible, and – and this is the pedagogic point – brings our students closer to understanding how they too, as concerned citizens and bystanders of a political process, remain responsible for their leadership's policy. In closing his thoughtful essay, Paul Levine argues that "democracy is more than a form of government – it is also a form of character." Our role as educators will be partly fulfilled if our students learn – and if we are reminded – that our character as a democratic society will long be measured by the decisions of our elected

leaders. A democracy is only as good or as bad as its citizens permit.

Breaking down the perpetrator/ bystander distinction

Civil servants and functionaries, from Eichmann himself to the militiamen most directly involved in the perpetration of the Holocaust, can also be viewed through the 'bystander lens'. Though clearly perpetrators in the strictest sense of the word, the instructor can highlight their more ordinary social heritage, and there again, bring students closer to understanding how even perpetrators started as bystanders, and thus, how ordinary citizens of any country might be recruited to participate in the greatest of political evils under certain circumstances. In other words, the bystander-approach that I advocate is more of an approach than a choice of subject matter. A clever instructor might find value in blurring the strict boundary between perpetrator and bystander in order to show that the possibility for moral evil exists in all of us.

While Hannah Arendt's canonical *Report on the Banality of Evil* is clearly an ideal source for such a perspective, it is also quite complex and arguably too long for some situations. One can, of course, assign excerpts from it. But almost as good, I have found, is an infamous, two-page letter from German Major General Harald Turner, chief of German military administration in Serbia during World War Two, to his friend and fellow Nazi official, Richard Hildebrandt. The letter is well-known and often translated, and is itself quoted in Arendt's work. And while the letter is useful for its gruesome demonstration of wartime brutality and the banality of political evil, the most intriguing parts are the salutations, where it is clear that these men are old friends and truly care for each other, sending one another birthday gifts and inquiring about the other's family.

For new students of the Nazi genocide, there is a clear disconnect between Turner's gruesome depiction of his own genocidal work and the evident humanity and compassion of his friendship with Hildebrandt. If Arendt's Eichmann and Richard Turner have one thing to teach us, it is that there was (and is) little tension between personal and professional morality. The Nazi perpetrators who were 'monsters' by day were ordinary people when their work was done. This is a difficult lesson, both difficult to accept and difficult to communicate. But it is nonetheless vital to breaking down the perpetrator/bystander distinction, and thereby showing students how human beings – not monsters – were ultimately responsible for the Holocaust.

Though the sentimental allure of its story and beautiful cinematography make Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* a tempting addition to a Holocaust syllabus, it is, in fact, decidedly unhelpful in demonstrating the uncomfortable reality of Nazi evil. Because of his valiant refusal to supply Germany with useful weapons (he indicates, towards the end of the movie, that his intention is to make bombs that are defective) and because the effort to save Jews and draw a profit turn out to be mutually exclusive endeavors, the purity of Schindler's motives are never truly questioned. Sure, there is the suspenseful plot-question of whether or not Schindler will eventually do the right thing. But what the right thing *is* is never really in doubt. *Schindler's List*, partly by its Manichean portrayal of characters but even more by its choice of subject matter, presents the central character (and thereby, the viewer) with a false choice to side with the perpetrators (wholly evil) or the victims (wholly innocent).

Absent are the morally difficult situations where guilt and innocence are mixed and where good and evil are served by common motives. (What, you might ask, would we make of a movie where the profiteer made money, and where it was clear that he made his profit because, had he hired German workers, he'd have to pay them?) The choice and portrayal of Schindler as a protagonist allows the viewer to make the comfortable assumption that "Had I been in that circumstance, I would have been Schindler!" Nowhere do we see the actual choice faced by

many bystanders – to witness moral evil and do nothing to stop it – except in the very life that Schindler rejects. Though a tempting tool in teaching about the Holocaust, Schindler's List draws a sharp distinction between perpetrator and bystander where a muddying of that boundary would be more useful and more accurate. Though harder to convey, an admirable goal in teaching about the Holocaust is to convince students – and again, to remind ourselves – that everyone has the capacity for evil and that the Nazi genocide generates difficult moral questions.

Selecting appropriate texts for a unit or course on the Holocaust can be a difficult task. And this, as much as the instructor's approach, must be tailored to the age and sophistication of the classroom. Nonetheless, there exist texts that work better or worse for any given situation. Knowing that an Oscar-winning film poses an attractive and easy temptation for such a situation, I have concluded that this is a case where the more difficult text is also the more valuable one.

The Student as Potential Bystander

Another effective way of breaking down the perpetrator/bystander distinction is to encourage students to think of themselves as potential perpetrators, whereas their natural inclination might be to identify with victims or bystanders. While academic sources such as those described above can be employed to *explain* this concept, a better approach might be to demonstrate it – showing students situations where good people are convinced to do evil things without coercion. Stanley Milgram's study of obedience and the account of Ron Jones's 'Third Wave' experiment do this quite effectively, and I have used both in my instruction to great success.

Psychologist Stanley Milgram's studies of obedience provide a useful tool for students to understand the slippery slope between bystander and perpetrator. The study and others inspired by it are widely referenced, and finding age-appropriate class readings should not be difficult. However, I have found *Obedience to Authority*, a 45-minute documentary about the study filmed by Milgram himself, to be particularly useful. The film is distributed by The Pennsylvania State University.

Directly inspired by the Eichmann trial, Milgram's famous study put subjects in the role of a 'teacher', coaching 'learners' to memorize a number of word pairs. When 'learners' answer questions incorrectly, 'teachers' are instructed to discipline them by administering electric shocks. The 'learners', who are in fact actors and Milgram's accomplices, scream in pain, while teacher-subjects are encouraged to continue with the experiment.

Contrary to the expectations of most psychologists at the time, subjects ('teachers') displayed extraordinary levels of compliance with the experimenter's directives. Even when made to believe that the shocks they were administering were extremely painful or lethal, many subjects continued to follow orders – albeit, not without discomfort – apparently without regard to the pain this caused the innocent learner. "So long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority", Milgram concluded after his now-famous study, most people "do what they are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience."[2]

I have taught the Milgram study in this and similar contexts for years. It is routinely a highlight of the class for my students. But for me, the highlight has always been seeing students react to the film and watching the inevitably-lively discussion which follows. More than any other source, this film is *productively uncomfortable* – in most students, even those who might otherwise just 'go through the motions', it produces the emotional discomfort and reflection necessary for self-examination, engagement and debate. If student engagement is a solution to the 'Holocaust fatigue' we fear *Obedience to Authority* is a partial antidote.

Ron Jones's "Third Wave" is similarly enlightening. Jones was a schoolteacher in Palo Alto, California. Like Milgram, he wanted to test the limits of obedience to authority; however, Jones did so in the context of his own classroom. Jones turned his history class into a movement, 'The Third Wave', asking students to submit to strict rules of behavior and discipline. Much to his surprise, Jones's students were receptive to the idea – and soon developed a special salute, forms of dress, a logo, and other social customs. Students appreciated the discipline, the equality, and the feeling of belonging to something bigger than themselves. But to Jones's dismay, they soon took group membership in directions he never imagined – ostracizing and tattling on other students whose loyalty to the group was more questionable. In the end, Jones had to call off the experiment early, fearing that someone might get hurt.

Jones writes about his experience in "The Third Wave"[3], a chapter of his book. The book was made into an exciting movie that students like, but that would be more useful for educational purposes if it weren't for a certain number of sensationalized and fictional flourishes, which ultimately jeopardize the film's ability to convey its own message. Still, at least when viewed in conjunction with Jones's written account of the experiment, "The Third Wave" can be a useful inspiration for discussion and understanding. Like Milgram's study, it allows students to identify with those who would be perpetrators, and thus forces them into the kind of self-reflection that is the ultimate hallmark of good teaching.

Conclusion

If teaching were easy, none of us would have to write or read about it. This is especially true when the topics we cover are complex and emotionally difficult. I know that, as a college educator, my work is relatively free from concerns regarding the age-appropriateness of the material. And I know that, as an individual, my experience constitutes but one anecdote, not comprehensive data. Still, with patience, creativity, and the passion that comes with knowing that our job is of vital importance, I believe these lessons can be exported to other classrooms by those with the expertise necessary to communicate with younger audiences.

Notes

1 See "Täter des Holocaust – Bedeutung und Probleme des Wissenstransfers von neuen Ergebnissen der Holocaust-Forschung in der historisch-politischen Bildung von Jugendlichen", "Teaching about 'The Perpetrator' in a Global Context", and "Teaching about Perpetrators – An Appeal for New Approaches Based on Research in the United States", all published in Forum 21: European Journal on Child and Youth Research, No. 3 (June 2009): pp. 8-13, 14-19, and 22-28, respectively.

2 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (HarperCollins, 1974).

3 A chapter of his book, No Substitute for Madness (Island Press, 1981): pp. 1-24.

FR

Les spectateurs dans l'histoire et l'éducatoin de l'holocauste

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L'historiographie moderne de l'holocauste a fourni aux éducateurs d'aujourd'hui trois axes autours desquels structurer l'enseignement et la compréhension de l'holocauste : les auteurs des crimes perpétrés dans ce contexte, les victimes et les spectateurs. Dans ces trois catégories d'acteurs, toutefois, les victimes sont restées le sujet dominant de l'éducation et de la recherche sur la question de d'holocauste. L'attention exagérée accordée aux victimes a contribué à négliger quelque peu les deux autres groupes, au point, selon certains, de contribuer à « lasser le public avec cette historie » – phénomène troublant que nous, en tant qu'éducateurs et peut-être en tant que citoyens responsables, devons nous efforcer de dépasser.

Cet article se veut être un appel à l'inclusion des spectateurs dans notre enseignement de l'holocauste. Pour cela, on peut appréhender les événements historiques à travers les yeux des spectateurs pour, en fin de compte, supprimer la distinction tellement évidente entre auteurs et spectateurs établie dans la littérature historique. L'objectif de cette approche est de placer les élèves dans des situations qui leur permettent de s'identifier avec les auteurs. Cet exercice inconfortable les contraint à un auto-examen critique et à un engagement authentique. L'auteur conclut par un rapport sur les démarches entreprises pour y parvenir.

DE

Der Zuschauer in der Holocaustgeschichte und – erziehung

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Die moderne Holocaust-Historiographie hat den Lehrenden von heute drei historische Subjekte an die Hand gegeben, um den Holocaust zu verstehen und zu lehren: Täter, Opfer und Zuschauer. In dieser dreiseitigen Kategorisierung des geschichtlichen Akteurs bleibt in der Holocausterziehung und –forschung jedoch das Opfer der beherrschende Gegenstand. Die unverhältnismäßige Beachtung der Opfer hat zu einem gewissen Maß an Vernachlässigung der beiden anderen Gruppen beigetragen; und manche argumentieren, dass sie auch zu dem beunruhigenden Phänomen der ‚Holocaust-Müdigkeit' beiträgt, deren Überwindung wir als Lehrende – und vielleicht als mündige Bürger – immer anstreben müssen.

Dieser Aufsatz ist ein Aufruf, den Zuschauer in unsere Lehre des Holocaust einzubeziehen. Das kann geschehen, indem historische Ereignisse durch ein ‚Zuschauer-Objektiv' betrachtet werden und letztendlich die starre Unterscheidung zwischen Täter und Zuschauer durchbrochen wird, die in der Geschichtsliteratur so deutlich sichtbar ist. Der Sinn dieses Ansatzes besteht darin, Studierende in Situationen zu versetzen, in denen sie sich mit dem Täter identifizieren können. Diese unbequeme Übung erzwingt die Art von kritischer Selbstprüfung und Engagements, das Lehrende ihren Studierenden beibringen möchten. Der Autor beendet seinen Aufsatz mit einem Bericht dazu, wie man genau dies versuchen kann.

RU

Наблюдатель в истории и преподавании холокоста

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Современная историография холокоста предоставляет современным педагогам три исторические темы для понимания и преподавания холокоста: преступники, жертвы и наблюдатели. Между тем, среди этих трех категорий исторических действующих лиц «жертва» остается доминирующей темой преподавания и исследований о холокосте. Столь непропорциональное внимание к «жертвам» способствовало определенному отрицанию двух оставшихся групп, Существует мнение, что это способствует тревожному феномену «усталости от холокоста», который мы как педагоги и, возможно, как ответственные граждане, должны стремиться преодолеть.

Данная статья представляет собой призыв включить «наблюдателя» в наше преподавание о холокосте. Это можно осуществить, рассматривая исторические события сквозь призму «наблюдателя» и, в конечном счете, разрушая четкое различие между преступником/наблюдателем, столь очевидное в исторической литературе. Суть этого подхода заключается в том, чтобы поставить учащихся в ситуации, когда они идентифицируют преступника. Это некомфортное упражнение направлено на критический самоанализ и обязательства, которые преподаватели стремятся привить студентам. В завершение автор докладывает о том, как была предпринята попытка это осуществить.

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Rescued Jewish Children from Nazi-Occupied Western Europe

The experiences of Jewish children in hiding during the Nazi occupation of Europe have become a staple for sociologists, psychologists, historians and the writers of Holocaust fiction. Diaries and memoirs abound, perhaps because the children survived long enough into an era where their stories were ultimately much sought after and prized as authentic witnesses to the horrors of the 'final solution' by publishers and public alike. Many of these child survivors owed their salvation to the actions of non-Jewish individuals and groups who had risked their own safety to protect innocent victims of Nazi extermination policies. The standard narrative became one of selfless sacrifice on the part of the rescuers with children emerging from the shadows once liberation had arrived and the threat of discovery had gone. However, this seamless and apparently unproblematic picture does not bear close scrutiny. Rescue activities were seldom uncomplicated, either in terms of origin or execution, and the psychological damage done to the children themselves often went unnoticed and unrecorded – often for decades after the event. Rescuers' motivations were also far more diverse than the more hagiographic commentators would have us believe.

The rescue of children from Nazi Germany began even before the outbreak of the Second World War, when evacuations were organised from major German cities after the *Reichskristallnacht*. These so-called *Kindertransporte* were masterminded by individuals such as Truus Wijsmuller-Meyer and Nicholas Winton, who persuaded parents to hand over their children and send them unaccompanied to the presumed safety of countries in Western Europe. The mere fact that parents were prepared to give up their children with no guarantee that they would see them again speaks volumes for their fear for the future. Taken into the care of orphanages and Jewish communities, only those sent to the UK found a safe haven, although some children from these transports were evacuated a second time in advance of the Nazi assault on France and the Low Countries or survived in hiding. Few were ever to see their parents again.

Once the persecution of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe began in earnest, Jewish parents began to look for ways of protecting their children. In France and the Low Countries, the gradual isolation of the Jews gathered pace from 1940 onwards. In Vichy France, non-French Jews were singled out for internment as discriminatory treatment. Help came in the form of Jewish and non-Jewish organisations such as the YMCA, Quakers and CIMADE, who worked tirelessly to assist both adults and children – and when the first deportations began – encouraged parents to hand over their offspring so that they could be hidden in the countryside. This involved priests and pastors as well as the institutions of their respective churches, but also many lay people who offered homes, food and other support for these victims of Vichy and Nazi policies. A variant of this in the French case was that vacation colonies, created to give working-class children summer holidays, merely continued their work on a year round basis. Likewise middle-class parents in Paris often had long-standing arrangements with peasants and farmers in rural areas to send their children there during the school holidays. Here again, these arrangements were put on a permanent footing when conditions deteriorated in the city and the children stayed in their 'summer' homes, being incorporated into the local schooling systems, often with the connivance of teachers and local officials.

In Belgium, Jewish clandestine organisation was somewhat stronger than in France, and the Comité de Defense des Juifs was able to expedite the hiding of more than 12,000 adults and 3,000 Jewish children under threat by using contacts with non-Jewish charities, sympathetic members of the Catholic Church and social workers attached to children's welfare organisations. Its success was also partly attributable to its links to the Independence Front resistance organisation – which provided papers and other material aid. This included the substantial funds required to hide such a large number of people. This allowed set rates to be agreed for sheltering children of different ages.

Other organisations also emerged that specialised in helping children, for example the network established by Father Bruno Reynders which hid large numbers of Jewish children in private homes and Catholic institutions. Reynders operated alone and, contrary to all accepted clandestine practice, kept full details of his hiding places in notebooks. He also refused to work with, or receive help from the CDJ because that would have meant disclosing where his charges were hidden. In the Netherlands, unlike France and Belgium, a Jewish organisation independent of the collaborationist Jewish Council never emerged and most early help afforded to Jews came only from individual contacts with neighbours, friends and work colleagues.

The first organised networks were created by university students in Amsterdam and Utrecht who mobilised family and friends specifically to find foster homes for Jewish children away from the big cities. They were later joined by two other specialist organisations with their origins in orthodox Calvinism; the so-called 'Trouw-groep', and the Naamloze Vennootschap.

In all three countries, the day-to-day sheltering of children was ultimately an activity carried out by committed individuals, but their involvement had varied origins. Network organisers initially recruited helpers from among friends, family and acquaintances. These involved longstanding bonds of trust, but even then the individuals concerned took some persuasion. Over time, organisers had to look further and further afield for appropriate addresses for their charges. This could be assisted by local officials and especially priests and pastors who would know which of their parishioners it would be right to approach. This suggests a degree of consideration and planning, but a different route was an immediate and panicked request from a Jewish neighbour faced with imminent arrest from a raid who would ask if the children could be hidden. These were often instant decisions that set a course that would outlast the occupation itself.

The reasons behind gentiles being prepared to shelter Jewish children were many and various. There were the many cases of outright altruism – because of the children's innocence from any conceivable crime. Anti-Nazi or anti-German sentiment was often invoked but it is Christian values that dominate the narratives. At one level, this was little different from humanistic altruism, but could also be seen to have ulterior motives. Both major confessions in Western Europe saw the Jews as focus for conversion – and the saving of souls was seen as a religious obligation by priests and laymen alike. Children were by far the easiest targets for this, and the rescuers could also earn merit for engaging in such activities. Accounts by hidden children after the war would often mention attempts to convert them, and Jewish organisations placing children with gentile foster parents were always on the lookout for such tendencies.

Children hidden in the Netherlands could sometimes be moved between Protestant and Catholic households and thus learned both the catechism and the Lord's Prayer. Testimonies of this nature do nonetheless need to be treated with caution. While hidden children did not require the identity papers mandatory for adults, they did need a cover story to explain their arrival in a strange household. This was usually that they were (distant) cousins evacuated from another part of the country. However, to make family ties convincing , the 'cousins' needed to have the same religious background as their 'family' and

therefore had to be taught the basics of religion to pass muster when they were taken to church on a Sunday.

This was also, of course, true for children sheltered inside religious institutions. Thus what may have appeared to the young children to have been attempts at conversion may in fact have been no more than standard security precautions on the part of the foster parents. Beyond this were a whole series of baser motives. Some foster parents were keen to acquire 'designer' babies or young children at a time when the normal controls on adoption no longer applied. Others saw Jewish children as a chance to acquire unpaid domestic servants who were effectively trapped in the home. The vulnerability of such children was especially evident among young girls who could often become the targets for unwanted sexual advances from males in the household. How many were affected in this way is impossible to tell, not least because such things often went unrecorded or were airbrushed from memories in the postwar world.

At the liberation, many hidden children could not be reunited with their parents and they remained with foster parents for some time afterwards, often waiting to see if any member of their family returned from the camps in the East. For those who had become orphaned, there were often competing claims for custody; distant relatives could sometimes be found, local welfare authorities also had a duty of care for children who had been orphaned by the war, and the residual members of the Jewish communities also laid claim to their younger generation. Finally, there were also the foster parents who had grown attached to their charges and were less than happy about handing them over. Thus it was only in the post-liberation period that some of their hidden motivations came to light.

There were instances in all three countries of refusals to hand over children once the danger had gone. Anneke Beekman (Netherlands), Rebecca Meljado (Belgium) and the Finaly Brothers (France) were all hidden from the authorities by their foster parents, sometimes with the collusion of the Church, even in the face of judicial pressure and threats of imprisonment. In such cases, the rescuers claimed that the children, having been exposed to Christianity and baptised into the (Catholic) faith, would be doomed to eternal damnation if they reverted to Judaism. These were the most extreme examples, but even famous and highly regarded rescuers such Bruno Reynders went on record as saying that rescued Jewish orphans who had been brought into the Catholic Church should not willingly be returned to the Jewish communities from which they had come.

It would be wrong to suggest that every hidden Jewish child was traumatised by their experiences at the hands of their rescuers. For those old enough to remember, their parting from their families had been trauma enough. In fact, many children found themselves placed in loving and supportive environments where they were treated exactly like a member of the family. Ties were cemented that were difficult to break – even in the small number of cases where children were reclaimed by their immediate families. For those sheltered in institutions – convents, boarding schools, sanatoria, the experience was somewhat different and less personal, but possibly no less supportive. In these cases, the children were kept in as near a normal environment as was possible – integrated into a family and sometimes being able to take a full part in everyday life – including going to school.

These are the examples that can be found represented in the case files of Yad Vashem's Department of the Righteous and commemorated within its memorials. Against this has to be balanced the cases of thoughtless ill-treatment, discrimination and abuse. For example, the Jewish boy who was locked in an upstairs room for nine months by his hosts and fed through a hatch and who had lost the power of speech by the time he was moved. Other children found themselves hidden in similar circumstances, confined in small spaces with little human contact for weeks and months at a time.

This was often the result of fear on the part of hosts trying to minimise the risks they were taking but served to have lasting effects on the children concerned. Even when there was no ill-will, conditions in rural peasant households could be very different and far more primitive when compared with the urban experiences and upbringing of middle-class Jewish youngsters. Resistance to attempts at conversion could also lead to ill-treatment, for example terms of arbitrary punishments or being forced to sleep with the animals on farms.

It is important to remember that there was no correlation between successful rescues and supportive environments. Many children survived the rigours of adverse hiding conditions during the occupation and further traumas when their futures were fought over in its immediate aftermath. While it is only right and proper to celebrate the heroism and self-sacrifice of well-motivated rescuers, this should not blind us to the negative elements that were also an integral element to the story of hidden children during the Second World War.

FR

Les enfants juifs sauvés sous l'occupation nazie de l'Europe de l'Ouest

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Les histoires d'enfants juifs cachés sous l'occupation nazie de l'Europe sont devenues une source d'inspiration intarissable pour les sociologues, les psychologues, les historiens et les auteurs de fiction sur l'Holocauste. Journaux et mémoires abondent, peut-être parce que ces enfants ont survécu jusqu'à une époque où, finalement, leurs histoires étaient très recherchées et prisées par les éditeurs et les lecteurs comme témoignages authentiques des horreurs de la « solution finale ». Beaucoup de ceux qui ont survécu le doivent à des personnes et des groupes non-juifs qui ont mis en péril leur propre sécurité pour protéger les innocentes victimes qu'ils étaient des politiques d'extermination nazies.

Le récit standard met en avant le sacrifice personnel des sauveurs, les enfants sortant de l'ombre après la Libération et alors que le risque d'être découvert avait disparu. Cependant, ce tableau homogène et apparemment « idyllique » ne résiste pas un examen approfondi. Les actions de ces sauveurs allaient rarement sans problèmes, liés aux origines de ces derniers, sans parler des cas d'exécution ; les traumatismes psychologiques subis par les enfants eux-mêmes sont souvent passés inaperçus et il a fallu attendre des décennies pour qu'il en soit pris acte. Les motivations des sauveurs étaient par ailleurs bien plus diverses que les commentateurs hagiographiques ne l'auraient eux-mêmes imaginé.

DE

Gerettete jüdische Kinder aus dem von den Nazis besetzten Westeuropa

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Die Erfahrungen jüdischer Kinder, die während der Besetzung Europas durch die Nazis in Verstecken lebten, sind für Soziologen, Psychologen, Historiker und die Verfasser von Holocaust-Romanen zu einem Standardelement geworden. Es gibt zahlreiche Tagebücher und Memoiren, vielleicht weil die Kinder lange genug und damit bis zu einer Zeit überlebten, in der ihre Geschichten dann von Verlagen und der Öffentlichkeit gleichermaßen sehr gesucht waren und als authentische Zeugnisse für die Schrecken der ‚Endlösung' hoch im Kurs standen. Viele dieser überlebenden Kinder verdanken ihre Rettung den Taten nicht-jüdischer Personen und Gruppen, die ihre eigene Sicherheit aufs Spiel setzten, um unschuldige Opfer vor der Vernichtungspolitik der Nazis zu schützen.

Die Standard-Erzählung war eine Geschichte selbstloser Opferbereitschaft der Retter, und die Kinder traten aus dem Schatten hervor, als die Befreiung gekommen und die Gefahr einer Entdeckung vorbei war. Aber dieses nahtlose und anscheinend unproblematische Bild hält einer genauen Untersuchung nicht stand. Die Rettung war selten unkompliziert, ob es dabei nun um die Ursprünge oder die eigentliche Durchführung ging, und die psychologischen Schäden bei den Kindern blieben häufig unbemerkt und wurden nicht festgehalten – häufig noch Jahrzehnte nach dem eigentlichen Ereignis. Die Motive der Retter waren auch wesentlich vielfältiger, als die eher hagiographischen Kommentatoren uns glauben machen wollen.

RU

Спасенные еврейские дети из оккупированной нацистами Западной Европы

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Переживания еврейских детей, находившихся в укрытии во время нацистской оккупации в Европы, стали основой повествований о Холокосте для социологов, психологов, историков и писателей. Имеется большое количество дневников и воспоминаний, возможно, это связано с тем, что дети дожили до того времени, когда их истории приобрели большую популярность и стали Европы цениться издателями и иной общественностью как подлинные свидетельства ужасов «окончательного решения». Многие из этих выживших детей были обязаны своим спасением действиям нееврейских лиц и групп, которые рисковали своей собственной безопасностью, чтобы защитить невинных жертв нацистской политики уничтожения.

Стандартный рассказ сводился к самоотверженной жертвенности со стороны спасателей, с детьми, вышедшими из укрытия, как только пришло освобождение и миновала угроза обнаружения. Тем не менее, эта ровная и, предположительно, беспроблемная картина, по всей вероятности, теряется при подробном рассмотрении. Действия по спасению лишь в редких случаях оказывались простыми, либо по основанию, либо исполнению, а психологический ущерб, нанесенный самим детям, зачастую оставался незамеченным и неучтенным – как правило, на протяжении десятилетий после события. Мотивации спасителей были также намного более разнообразными, чем нас убеждают агиографические комментаторы.

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The Nordic Youth Research 2010

During the Icelandic presidency in the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2009, the Icelandic Ministry of Education, Science and Culture proposed to initiate, launch and coordinate the first comparative research amongst 16 to 19 year old students in the Nordic countries. The aim of the research was to compare lifestyles and differences in the lives and living conditions of young people in the Nordic countries. Special emphasis was laid on participation of all the Nordic countries including Åland Islands, Faroe Islands and Greenland. The research received excellent support from the Nordic Council of Ministers, as well from NORDBUK (Nordic Committee for Children and Young People). The Nordic Ministers for Social Affairs and for Education, Science and Culture also provided considerable support for the research. Following are a few words about the research project but regarding findings of this extensive research we refer to the report itself and its´ appendixes.

One of the most important factors in regard to this research was that it addressed the transitional age of youth age 16 to 19 in all the countries. Several research projects had compared the lives and living conditions of youth in the Nordic countries but this was the first time that this age group was addressed seperately. The outcome of the research has already reached the attention of the Nordic communities, policymakers and practioners who implement interventions focusing on lifestyles and culture of young people. It is anticipated that the outcome of the research will further emphasize the use of knowledge and information in areas relevant to young people in the Nordic communities.

The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in Iceland made a contract with the research centre Rannsóknir og greining or ICSRA, The Icelandic Centre for Social Research and Analysis at the Reykjavik University, who was responsible for administering and coordinating the study carried out in close cooperation with the participating countries. ICSRA has a long tradition of carrying out research amongst youth and has collaborated with The Ministry of Education on youth research in Iceland for many years. A population database reaching youth in the age between 10 and 20 years now holds comprehensive data reaching back to the year 1992. ICSRA also coordinates the research part of Youth in Europe in 15 cities in Europe since 2006.

In 2009 all Nordic countries nominated research institutions as partners in the research, its preparations, questionnaire and local administration. These institutions are: Denmark, Center for Youth Research, Danish School of Education, Aarhus University; Finland, Finnish Youth Research Network; Iceland, ICSRA; Norway, NOVA; Sweden, Karlstad University; Åland, Ålands fredsinstitut; Faroe Islands; University of Thorshavn and from Greenland, University of Nuuk.

Each participating country was responsible for the collection of local data and the carrying out of the study in their area. Preparations started in January 2009 and the data collection was carried out in October 2009 to February 2010.

Research coordination including data accumulation was in the hands of ICSRA. Locally each of the research partners carried out full administering of the implementation in each country. Research specialists from the partner institutions all contributed to the questionnaire and agreed upon its´ final version. The final questionnaire consisted of around 500 variables in 32 pages covering extensive areas such as

language and culture, education, information technology, gender equality, leisure time activities, substance use, physical and mental health issues, religion, social integration, institutional trust, sexuality, future expectations, community and anomy, violence and delinquency and more.

Data was collected through randomization of classes with 16 to 19 year old students in all the countries.

In total, 13,417 secondary education students participated in the survey. If taking into account the total number of participants, 6,383 (47.6%) males and 6,960 (51.9%) females participated. Information was unavailable on the sex of 75 participants. The number of participants in each respective country is non-uniform, but that is of course a result of the fact that each country has a different population size and the facility with which students could be reached varied from country to country. Participants totaled 592 in the Åland Islands, 1428 in Denmark, 2189 in Finland and 1483 in the Faroe Islands. On behalf of Greenland, 225 students responded; in Iceland 2,134 participated, whereas in Norway 2,700 did so and 2,666 in Sweden.

The survey was given out among Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish, Icelandic, Ålandic, Greenlandic and Faroese secondary education students and contained questions regarding a number of important components connected to the events, life and general state of being of youth in the eight Nordic countries. An initial report has already been published, The Nordic Youth Research, and is available online at **www.menntamalaraduneyti.is** and **www.rannsoknir.is** and can easily be found through **www.google.com**.

The report shows comparative descriptive results between all eight countries in 143 pages, 94 figures and 67 tables. Separated appendix has also been published with easily accessible information with all results from the report in 510 tables. In all instances, results are provided for each country and in several instances they are also presented by gender of the participants. In the report's appendix, all questions arranged by country are displayed in the 510 tables.

Of the 13,138 participants in the study who disclosed their age, the percentage lay most heavily in the 17 year old age group (30.4%). After them, 16 years of age was most commonly reported (28.9%). In figure 3 the average age of participants in each respective country is shown as well as the average for them all combined. If taking all of the concerned countries into consideration, the average age of participants is 17.4 years old. Of the eight countries which participated, six reported an average age around and above 17 years old. Only Greenland and the Faroe Islands did not conform to the trend, reporting an average participant age of about 18 years of age.

In short the findings from the data are interesting and show very well both similarities and differences between young people in the transitional age between 16 and 19 years old, both between countries, age and genders. The report including appendixes can already be of use to those who work with youth matters in the countries but further analysis of data is essential. Those interested in obtaining raw data should contact ICSRA for further information but 1st of January 2012 all the data will be available to the research communities in Europe.

The collaborative group behind this research intends to delve more deeply into individual factors and hopes that project will be repeated within the next few years – for the benefit of young people in the North and Nordic Co-operation.

FR

Recherche nordique sur la jeunesse 2010

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Sous la présidence islandaise du Conseil nordique des ministres en 2009, le ministère islandais de l'Education, des sciences et de la culture a proposé d'initier, de lancer et de coordonner la première recherche comparative auprès d'élèves de 16 à 19 ans dans les pays nordiques. L'objectif en était de comparer les modes de vie et les conditions de vie des jeunes dans ces pays, et d'en identifier les différences. Une importance toute particulière a été accordée à la question de la participation dans l'ensemble des pays nordiques, y compris les îles d'Åland, les îles Féroé et le Groenland. La recherche a bénéficié d'un large soutien de la part du Conseil nordique des ministres, ainsi que de NORDBUK (Comité nordique enfance et jeunesse). Les ministères nordiques des Affaires sociales et de l'Education, des sciences et de la culture ont également apporté un appui déterminant à ces travaux.

DE

Die nordische Jugendforschung 2010

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Während der isländischen Präsidentschaft des Nordischen Ministerrates (Nordic Council of Ministers) im Jahre 2009 schlug das isländische Ministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur (Ministry for Education, Science and Culture) vor, die erste Vergleichsstudie unter 16 – bis 19-jährigen Schülern und Studenten in den nordischen Ländern zu konzipieren, zu beginnen und zu koordinieren. Ziel der Studie war der Vergleich der Lebensstile und Unterschiede im Leben und den Lebensbedingungen junger Menschen in den nordischen Ländern. Ein besonderes Schwergewicht lag auf der Beteiligung aller nordischen Länder einschließlich Ålands, der Färöer und Grönlands. Die Forschung erhielt vom Nordischen Ministerrat und vom Nordischen Kinder – und Jugendausschuss (Nordic Children's and Youth Committee, NORDBUK) herausragende Unterstützung. Die Nordischen Minister für Soziales (Nordic Ministers for Social Affairs) bzw. für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur (Nordic Ministers for Education, Science and Culture) haben das Forschungsvorhaben ebenfalls nachdrücklich unterstützt.

RU

Молодежные исследования в Северных странах 2010

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Во время председательства Исландии в Совете Министров Северных стран в 2009 году Министерство образования, науки и культуры Исландии предложило инициировать и начать проведение первого сравнительного исследования среди обучающихся в возрасте от 16 до 19 лет в Северных странах, а также осуществлять его координацию. Целью исследования было сравнение образа жизни и различий в жизни и жизненных условиях молодежи Северных стран. Особый акцент был сделан на участии всех стран Северной Европы, включая Аландские острова, Фарерские острова и Гренландию. Серьезная поддержка исследованию была оказана со стороны Совета Министров Северных стран, а также NORDBUK (Комитета по вопросам детей и молодежи Северных стран). Значительную поддержку осуществили также министры социальной политики и образования, науки и культуры.

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Voice and Influence in the Youth Justice System

Introduction

Involving service users makes services more effective and can also have benefits for service users too (Clinks 2010)[1]. In the youth justice system, NCB[2] research found that although young offenders have the same right to have their views taken into account as other young people, there is a lack of strategic direction as to how this should be implemented. Expectations are limited to the 'engagement' of young offenders rather than enabling them to have a say in decision-making and there are many barriers to young people's participation within the youth justice system.

During 2009-2010 the Local Government Association (LG Association) commissioned the National Youth Agency (NYA) to undertake research with Youth Offending Teams (YOTs)[3] and service users to examine the extent of service user participation and identify examples of good participatory practice within YOTs.

What is Participation?

Participation in the youth justice system has different interpretations and may be influenced by a range of factors including the professional background and training of staff. Practitioners we interviewed gave a variety of definitions for participation from: compliance with orders, through to those who viewed participation as: *empowering young people to have voice and influence in the services that affect them*. Many interviewees felt it was crucial that:

Participation is absolutely integral to the work we do, we can't do our work without their active involvement and young people won't change without buy-in.

The NYA defines participation in the youth justice system as young people having a voice and influence in line with the UNCRC[4], we believe participation requires young people to have a voice and influence within their individual orders and in service design and delivery.

Young People's Views

As part of our research we consulted with young people from six YOTs representing a geographical spread across England and Wales. To 'practice what we preach' the NYA employed young people with direct experience of the youth justice system to co-ordinate and facilitate the research. The young people consulted were either interviewed at random whilst waiting for their YOT appointments or consulted in small focus groups. Each young person was rewarded with a £10 High Street voucher for their participation. In total thirty three young people; twenty four males and nine females took part in the research, the young people were aged between eleven and nineteen years old with the average age sixteen years. The majority of young people described their ethnicity as White British with only two young people from Black and Minority Ethnic groups. The young people were subject to a wide range of statutory orders including some recently released from custody and those on prevention programmes.

Findings

Many of the young people we spoke to had long histories of statutory service involvement in their lives, often their experiences were negative due to their inability to influence decision makers and perceived adverse decisions made about their own lives, some

also felt they were not listened to when they had requested statutory help. Young people spoke of deep rooted distrust of authority and in particular social services, the police, and schools. Reasons for this included: **not being treated with respect, not being listened to, not being treated equally** and feeling negatively stereotyped by practitioners because of previous bad behaviour: Many young people spoke of feeling disempowered and apathetic towards any statutory intervention and where possible some attempted to disengage with services. It is not therefore surprising that when we asked young people about their participation within the YOT some were very sceptical about the research and what difference it would make, nevertheless they were keen to participate as one stated: **I want to be heard so people understand we're not all bad**.

• Engagement with YOT

Young people were generally positive about their involvement with the YOT when compared to other statutory services and several who had been involved with the YOT for a number of years acknowledged they had become more receptive to the service and staff. For the majority of young people whether their YOT was deemed good and whether they engaged depended very much on the relationship they had with their key worker, as one young woman said:

> *My worker is down to earth, most of them they don't know and they can't connect, mine I speak to her as a friend; I look up to her.*

The qualities young people felt were important in their YOT workers were those who shared similar experiences and who could communicate effectively with them. Young people also said they wanted a YOT practitioner they can trust, is reliable, consistent, with whom they share mutual respect, can have a laugh with and someone who listens. However, not all the young people were positive about their workers, some complained about the rules workers set and complained about double standards where their workers enforced rules that they themselves did not adhere to, which caused resentment and frustration amongst some young people:

> *If we are late we get a warning letter if the workers are late they tell us to get over it.*

Young people felt they had little influence about where or when they met their worker or attended the YOT which they felt could adversely affect their ability to comply with their order. A few young people said they would like home visits but their YOT did not offer them and others felt they would benefit from participating in group sessions but they were not available.

• Participation Experience

Several young people said they felt involved with the individual plans and were able to influence what their individual plans contained but very few young people said they had any involvement in developing or designing the services they were subject to. Many of the young people had realistic ideas of what they would like to do and what would make a difference to them within the YOT programmes and services they received:

> *It's our Saturday, when we come here we want to do something good to make amends for the bad stuff we've done and we can also do something they want to do.*

Some young people found their YOT programmes and contact useful because it made them think about the consequences of their actions and a small number thought because they were not offending whilst attending the YOT that in itself was a positive outcome. Most young people on statutory orders said they did not enjoy their YOT visits or programmes but were resigned to the fact they are required to attend. However young people on prevention programmes were generally more positive about the services they received, as one young woman said:

I enjoy YISP activities, I liked last summer where we went skiing, I loved getting stuck in.

Many young people suggested there were often little or no benefits from the YOT services they received and a few were highly critical of the YOT services suggesting they did more harm than good. Some spoke about their lack of involvement in sessions and how this led to a lack of engagement with the YOT services provided, as one young man stated:

They get all these people to come down here and talk to us without explanation and we don't know anything and if we get asked to do something we just rip it up.

A few young people felt the YOT was not really interested in helping and supporting them, and some felt the support they received was too short term.

Views from Youth Offending Practitioners

In September 2009 we sent an electronic questionnaire to all 157 YOTs across England and Wales asking about participation practice, in total we consulted 27 YOTs and this was followed up with in-depth telephone or face to face interviews with participation leads with 12 YOTs. The consultation asked specifically about participation activities, whether young people are involved in: strategic planning, service development and delivery, individual and group work programmes, staff recruitment, training and induction, how young people are consulted and engaged, does the service have dedicated a participation champion, does the YOT have a participation strategy and what are the benefits and barriers to young people's participation.

Findings

In line with Hear by Right[5] participation standards framework we have grouped our findings around the Seven S model for organisational change starting with shared values which is central to the participation standards framework:

- **Shared Values**

The NYA believe it is vital for YOTs to have a central commitment to the participation of children and young people and should adopt the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognising in particular Article 12. However, only one YOT we consulted had adopted article 12 of the UNCRC as part of the overall mission of the organisation. Overall, YOT practitioners acknowledged awareness of the UNCRC amongst YOT staff was low.

- **Styles of Leadership**

Promoting the participation of children and young people means changing a YOTs culture and requires leadership to champion the cause. Our research identified only a handful of Heads of Service who ensured participation was given a high priority within the YOT although several more suggested participation is a key management priority that features as a standing agenda item on YOT board, management and performance meetings as well as staff supervisions.

- **Strategies**

Our research found very few YOTs had developed a participation strategy and used Hear by Right or any other participation tool to map and plan participation activities. Where strategies and action plans had been developed this usually reflected a strong participation lead within the YOT often supported in the local authority at a strategic level.

- **Structures**

Very few YOTs had developed structures for young people to shape the design and delivery of services, and of those that did involve young people the majority were involved in the design and development of prevention services. However, many YOTs suggested young people

were able to contribute towards their individual orders, as the following example illustrates:

> *Young people and their parents are always involved in the intervention plans. They may not always agree the interventions but are part of the process of identification and understand the processes and principles of what types of interventions are to be used.*

Most YOTs encourage young people to participate via service user consultation and feedback. Some encourage young people to feedback at the end of programme sessions, whilst the majority encourage feedback at review meetings or at the end of the young person's statutory order. Several YOTs suggest service user feedback is systematically fed into YOT management and performance meetings and some display feedback in reception areas.

Most YOTs involve young people in the design of service information leaflets, feedback cards and posters and some involve young people in the redesign of reception areas and interview rooms to make them more inviting and young person friendly.

Several services involve service users in inspections, not only as mystery shoppers within their own services but also as part of wider teams that inspect local youth services. A number of YOTs have, or are in the process of setting up youth forum/ reference group for service users and a few encourage young people to actively participate in forums outside of the YOT.

- **Systems**

A number of YOTs have established systems to support and sustain young people's involvement. For example, some operate motivational programmes specifically to support and sustaining young people's participation, whilst others offer rewards, incentives, activities and accreditation for participation involvement. A few YOTs have developed peer mentoring programmes to support young people and encourage their participation within the service:

> *We have developed the peer mentor service so young people are met by a peer mentor on their 1st visit [to the YOT] to explain the processes from a service user's perspective.*

- **Staff**

Involving young people in the recruitment and selection, induction and training, supervision and appraisal of YOT practitioner are all important ways to help develop participation within a YOT. Many YOTs involve young people in the recruitment and selection of specific YOT roles such as head of service, case workers and participation officers. Although a lot of YOTs were keen to develop young people's involvement in staff induction and training only a small number currently involve young people in this area.

Very few YOTs have dedicated participation staff, and of those several posts were part-time and often short-term funded. More often the role of participation lead is an additional role attached to a YOT manager. Many practitioners suggest that despite participation being integral to the work of the YOT because there is no funding or strategic priority given to participation it is difficult to justify and create a dedicated role.

- **Skills and Knowledge**

Few YOTs provide participation skills and training for YOT practitioners, however, some YOTs access training developed and supported by local authority participation lead officers. Many practitioners admitted their organisations needed to improve participation knowledge, training and skills for staff, volunteers and young people.

Benefits to YOTs

YOT practitioners suggest there are various benefits to increasing young people's participation including structures and systems changed and improved, new services introduced, increased access and use of services, positive experience and feedback about services. In terms of YOT performance participation can

reduce reoffending rates, breach and increase compliance with statutory orders and can reduce paperwork i.e. reduced breach paperwork. YOT practitioners may develop their knowledge, skills, increase job satisfaction, motivation and gives staff an added sense of achievement knowing they are empowering young people.

Benefits to Service Users

YOT practitioners identified many benefits to service users including: improved relationships and the perceptions of young people within YOT and in the wider community, participation can enhance a young person's personal development, motivation, sense of achievement, confidence, self belief and pro-social behaviour. Participation empowers young people to have an increased belief in their ability to create change and levels of control over elements of their lives, and can also improve literacy, gain practical skills, increase positive career choices, employment prospects and reduces breach, increase attendance, compliance and reduce (re)offending.

Barriers to young people's participation

YOT practitioners suggest the main barriers to participation within the youth justice system are YOTs are governed by National Standards and reporting requirements, focused mainly on managing risk and reducing reoffending doesn't encourage user participation. YOTs are multi-disciplinary teams and different organisational employment practices can make it difficult to have consistent participation practices across the organisation. Not all staff understand participation due to different professional training and values, and lack of commitment from management. YOT practitioners suggest they have too little time, appropriate methods and resources to engage with young people in a meaningful way recognise some young people on statutory orders may not want to participate.

Conclusion

Our research found young people were more positive about their involvement with the YOT when compared to other statutory services. Whether a YOT was deemed good and whether young people engaged depended on the relationship young people had with staff. The most important YOT worker qualities are similar experiences, trust, someone who is reliable, consistent, listens, mutually respectful, and can have a laugh with. Young people feel they have little influence about where or when they attended the YOT and some would like home visits and would benefit from group work sessions. Young people generally felt involved with their individual plans but very few had been involved in the design of services they were subject to. Young people were complimentary of some programmes and workers and highly critical of others they feel do more harm than good. Some spoke about their lack of involvement in sessions led to disengaged and sometimes disruptive behaviour and many young people had realistic ideas of what would they would like to do and what would make a difference to them within the YOT programmes and services they received.

Our research has found there is a lack of knowledge about the UNCRC and what participation is amongst youth justice practitioners. Very few YOTs have a clear strategic commitment to participation and only a few YOTs have developed and implemented participation strategies. Young people's involvement in their individual service plans is considered to be established but participation in the development and design of services is underdeveloped and tends to focus on activities such as consultation, designing service literature, recruitment of key staff and decoration of reception areas. Our research identified promising participatory practice where young people were involved in service inspections, commissioning new services, peer education programmes and service user forums.

There are many barriers to participation including lack of strategic commitment, knowledge, skills in

effective methods and too little time to engage with young people in a meaningful way. YOTs are governed by National Standards and reporting requirements and are not sufficiently measured on participation performance. Participation can improve outcomes for young people, youth justice practitioners and YOT services by increasing access, use of services, positive experience and feedback about services. Participation can also contribute towards reducing reoffending rates, by increasing compliance and reducing breach rates.

Recommendations

Through our research we have found a significant level of commitment amongst YOT practitioners for participation to play a more influential role in YOTs and in the wider youth justice system but we also found there needs to be a greater emphasis on removing some of the barriers to participation to make this happen. The following recommendations aim to promote young people's voice and influence within the youth justice system to ensure services better reflect their individual needs:

- YOTs should consider establishing a strategic commitment to participation and may wish to consider developing a participation strategy with the involvement of young people to benchmark current participation practice and plan future participation activities.
- YOTs may wish to appoint a Participation Champion, ideally a dedicated resource with sufficient authority to promote and co-ordinate participation work.
- YOTs should assess whether providing all youth justice practitioners with participation awareness raising and training including article 12 of UNCRC might help them to fully appreciate the potential benefits of service user participation.
- In the current financial climate, YOTs should calculate the pros and cons of additional investment in YOT participation work.
- YOTs should consider consulting with young people about staff and services in a user friendly format and young people's feedback should be included at YOT management and performance meetings.
- YOTs should consider ways to evidence the impact of participation and the outcomes it produces in terms of service quality and effectiveness.
- Wherever possible, opportunities for YOTs to share effective participation practice examples across the youth justice system should be promoted.

Notes

1 Clinks (2010) *Service User Involvement: A volunteering and mentoring Guide*, York, Clinks.

2 Hart, D and Thompson C (2009) *Young People's Participation in the Youth Justice System*, London, NCB.

3 It is recognised that the term Youth Offending Team (YOT) and Youth Offending Services (YOS) are used in England and the term Youth Justice Services (YJS) is used in Wales, for consistency in line with the original terminology in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 the term YOT is used throughout this report.

4 "Children have the RIGHT to say what they think should happen, when adults are making decisions that affect them, and to have their opinions taken into account" Article 12 of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989)5 Hear by Right developed by the NYA is a tried and tested participation standards framework used widely across the statutory and voluntary youth sector to assess and improve practice and policy on the active involvement of young people. Hear by Right enables organisations to map current participation practice and plan improvements. It relies on self-assessment and is based around a core set of values for the participation of young people that need to be owned and shared by all those involved.

FR

Voix et influence dans le système de justice pour la jeunesse

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Sur la période 2009-2010, l'Association des pouvoirs locaux (Local Government Association, LG Association) a chargé l'Agence nationale pour la jeunesse d'entreprendre une étude sur les équipes d'intervention auprès des jeunes délinquants (Youth Offending Teams, YOT) afin d'évaluer l'ampleur de la participation des usagers à ce service et d'identifier des exemples de bonnes pratiques participatives en son sein. L'étude de la NYA a révélé chez les praticiens de la justice pour la jeunesse une méconnaissance de la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant et de ce que signifie la participation. Très rares sont les YOT qui ont un clair engagement envers la participation et qui ont élaboré et appliquent des stratégies dans ce sens. La participation des jeunes y est perçue comme un fait établi mais, en réalité, leur contribution à la conception et au développement des services reste très limitée, notamment à des activités comme la consultation, l'élaboration de la documentation d'information, le recrutement des personnels clés et la décoration des lieux de réception. Pour autant, l'étude a identifié des pratiques de participation prometteuses : participation des jeunes au service des inspections, développement de nouveaux services, programmes d'éducation par les pairs et forums réservés aux usagers.

DE

Stimme und Einfluss im System der Jugendgerichtsbarkeit

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In den Jahren 2009 und 2010 beauftragte der Gemeindeverband (Local Government Association – LG Association) die Nationale Jugendagentur (National Youth Agency, NYA), Studien mit Betreuungsteams für jugendliche Straftäter (Youth Offending Teams, YOTs) und den Nutzern dieser Angebote durchzuführen, den Umfang der Nutzerbeteiligung zu untersuchen und Beispiele für gute Beteiligungspraktiken in den YOTs zu identifizieren. Die NYA-Studie hat festgestellt, dass es bei den Praktikern der Jugendgerichtsbarkeit unzureichende Kenntnisse über die UN-Kinderrechtskonvention (UNCRC) und zum Thema Beteiligung gab. Sehr wenige YOTs weisen eine klare strategische Verpflichtung zur Beteiligung auf, und nur einige wenige YOTs haben Beteiligungsstrategien entwickelt und umgesetzt. Die Einbeziehung von Jugendlichen in die jeweiligen Betreuungspläne wird als fester Bestandteil betrachtet, aber die Beteiligung an der Entwicklung und Konzipierung von Leistungen ist unterentwickelt und konzentriert sich tendenziell auf Tätigkeiten wie Beratung, die Erarbeitung der Literatur über Leistungen, die Rekrutierung wichtiger Mitarbeiter und die Dekoration der Empfangsbereiche. Die Studie identifizierte viel versprechende Beteiligungspraktiken, bei denen Jugendliche in die Überprüfung der Leistungen, die Beauftragung neuer Leistungen, Bildungsprogramme unter Gleichaltrigen und Nutzerforen einbezogen waren.

RU

Голос и влияние в системе ювенальной юстиции

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В течение 2009-2010гг. Ассоциация местного самоуправления (LG Association) поручила Национальному молодежному агентству (NYA) провести исследование среди межведомственных команд по делам несовершеннолетних правонарушителей (YOTs) и пользователей их услуг, чтобы исследовать степень участия пользователей услуг и выявить позитивные примеры положительной практики участия в рамках YOTs. Исследование NYA выявило недостаток знаний о Конвенции ООН по правам ребенка, а также того, что означает участие для практикующих профессионалов по ювенальной юстиции. Лишь немногие YOTs имеют четкие стратегические обязательство по участию, и только некоторые разработали и внедрили стратегию участия. Считается, что должна быть установлена вовлеченность несовершеннолетних в подготовку своих индивидуальных планов служения, однако реальное участие в разработке и проектировании службы недостаточно развито. Все сводится к таким мероприятиям, как консультации, литература по проектированию службы, набор ключевого персонала и оформление зон приема. Исследованием была определена ожидаемая практика участия, что подразумевает вовлеченность молодежи в инспектирование службы, внедрение новых услуг, программы обучения «сверстник – сверстнику» и форумы пользователей услуг.

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Subcultures and their change over time in Estonia[1]

Introduction

This article aims to give a sense of the development and changes in international subcultures in a cultural periphery – in Estonia – over recent decades. At the beginning of the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nation reoriented itself towards the Western world. The younger generation started to integrate into the international youth culture and adopted its prevailing individualistic-hedonistic value orientations. Young people began to produce their own local constructions of global cultures: cultural identities which were created in relation to globally widespread culture on the one hand and the local context on the other. Most of the youth cultural trends in Estonia are adopted from outside and have been somewhat altered in the process of their diffusion. In the development of the subcultures we open up the distinctive idioms of the 'subcultural other', a reference group in relation to which the members of the subculture authenticate themselves.

Glocalisation of subcultures

Our starting point is a decade and more ago, when youth cultural trends were mostly born in metropolises and later spread to cultural peripheries. Our definition here assumes that Western popular culture is centred in Western European and American cities and that Estonia remained outside of it in Soviet time and has stood on its borders in recent decades. Even though subcultures are nowadays global, they are also closely related to the local culture and historical background of their different societies. The global and the local mutually constitute each other and mesh to form the glocal. Glocalisation is defined as the consumption of global products by locally contextualised audiences who create their own meanings and process them to serve their own social and cultural needs (Robertson 1995). Glocalisation can be extended to the consumption and production of international subcultural style in the local context.

Data and Methods

The empirical part of this article is based on interviews and results of participant observation. Fieldwork of club-culture was done mostly in 1998-2000 (28 interviews) and complementary 3 interviews were carried out in 2010. Fieldwork of hip-hop was carried out in Rakvere in 2007-2008 (19 interviews). All of the data has been analysed and systematised by using qualitative data analysis methods with the help of program Nvivo. The diffusion process of club culture and hip-hop culture is divided into four periods (esoteric, underground, mainstream and WEB2) which are constructed on the basis of the interviews.

The Esoteric Period

Everyday life during the Soviet period encompassed quite homogeneous values and tastes while Western hedonistic lifestyles were locked behind the Iron Curtain. With the regaining of Estonian independence in 1991, situation has changed, allowing for the diffusion of different global cultural practices, many of which young people perceived as attractive and glamorous.

During the first period in the beginning of nineties, both club culture and hip-hop culture were characterised by limited access to music, lack

of means for arranging parties, and small groups of devotees who followed the new trends. The stories about the beginning of new subcultures emphasise the enthusiasm despite the low quality of music and events and participants felt that they were witnessing the birth of something new.

Being authentic in this period meant that subcultural youth in Estonia, a cultural periphery, tried to copy the respective Western subculture as closely as possible. For example, Estonian hip-hop artists only performed in English, since this was associated with authentic hip-hop at the time; English symbolised also Western culture and did not evoke Soviet time.

When the diffusion of subcultural practices had only started in Estonia, alternative youth were few in number, they spent time together, and the borders between different subcultures were blurred. Identification was based on the desired cultural practices on a global level and distinctions from Soviet practices on a local level. In club culture a different way of partying – without excessive drinking, violence or sexual content – was emphasised, while hip-hop stressed authentic self-expression which was neither accessible nor allowed in Soviet time.

As the group of the people involved was small and tightly knit, the boundaries of 'us' in subculture were clear, based on affiliation and proximity. Subcultural youth distinguished themselves from their parents' culture, which is characteristic to many youth cultures, and from Soviet culture, which is specific to Estonia and Eastern Europe in general.

The Underground Period

The underground period is characterised by the spread of subcultural style and a greater variety of subcultural members and attitudes as more people became involved with the new cultural practice and subcultures grew more heterogeneous. In this period the distinction from youth cultures started which were perceived as mainstream. In the mid-nineties, commercial popular culture, which was relatively insignificant at the beginning of nineties, rapidly gained popularity on all levels in Estonia, becoming an easily recognisable phenomenon.

It became an important issue to explain the styles to which one did not belong, thereby also giving meaning to one's own position in relation to other subcultures (see also Kjeldgaard 2003). Members of certain subcultures perceived 'us' based on a particular music and style which marked out distinctions and, in extreme cases, lead to fights over music and style. In this period subcultural youth openly emphasised known elements of subculture in their cultural practices. The latter became important as 'tools' for self-validation and identification with the subculture. In connection with this period, drugs, especially ecstasy, began to spread in the context of club culture and became sought-after among young clubbers. Visual style, clothes, acquired huge importance in this period in the construction of the subcultural 'us' in hip-hop.

During this period, it is possible to distinguish between 'early adopters', the original innovators (Wolfe 1999), and newcomers (the second generation). The second generation wanted to prove themselves and to be different from the early adopters. Different styles emerged and further distinction on the basis of style and generation became important.

The subcultural youth now differentiated themselves from people listening to mainstream popular music and also from those of other subcultural backgrounds. As music taste and style was, in this period, important in the construction of subcultural identity, and subculture was becoming heterogeneous in this respect, distinctions within one subculture emerged on the grounds of style and generation.

The Mainstream Period

The mainstream period marks the beginning of the explicit commercialisation of subcultural

style. Large audiences had adopted the new trend locally, and supranational market interests controlled by media culture had influenced it globally. In late nineties club-culture and hip-hop in Estonia became part of the global commercial leisure industry.

In this period, the meaning of 'mainstream' is switched from outside to inside the borders of subcultural style. The core group of early adopters and the new underground start to distance themselves from the commercialised element of subculture, which is believed to have lost its authenticity and events attract mainstream followers, the so-called wannabes. Wannabes are often perceived as following the most easily graspable style elements and attitudes of subculture from the mainstream media without any criticism or true sense of authenticity.

Within the framework of this period, the structure of the subcultures has changed, as has their position in society. It is no longer possible to distinguish 'underground' subculture from 'mainstream' subculture. Both sides are present in the framework of the same subcultural style. At times when the subcultural tasteless 'other' has entered the context of the same subcultural style, it is not easy to establish a continuity of relatively closed semiotic units, as the market immediately incorporates trends and styles from the young through 'trendspotters' and 'cool hunters' (Kjeldgaard 2003).

The WEB 2 Period

The WEB2 period marks the beginning of the considerable impact of technological possibilities on subcultures. Any alternative work or production is available and can be introduced and exchanged through social networks. New music and styles spread rapidly among interested people regardless of their location. In the local context, social networks on the internet enable newcomers (party promoters and DJs) to attract audiences and organise events more easily. Easy access to new music as well as social relations within the underground scene in other countries over internet, have altered the difference between the metropolis and the periphery. It is possible to participate actively in a global underground scene before the new style has been established in Estonia.

Young people are much less bound to one style. It is possible to talk about a specific cultural practice, but this does not mean that a person has to be connected exclusively to one cultural practice. Young people's preferences have become very eclectic in both fashion and music preferences. 'Jumping' or 'juggling' between different styles is easy with the help of technological advances. Similar taste for a particular style of music as a basis for collective identity is replaced with the ability to be fresh and open-minded towards other music and cultures in order to keep up with style innovation and competition.

Today, the hip-hop and club scenes are already mixed; both subcultural styles are constructions of the past rather than relevant characteristics for describing the current underground music scene. In similar scenes it is possible to find house, drum'n'bass and jazz, reggae (dub), UK garage and grime, dubstep, rap and other (sub) styles.

Subcultural identity is no longer bound to a certain style; this is in part a return to a similar situation at the beginning of the nineties – the subcultural 'us' in many cases being based on proximity again. As so many styles are available and new ones are emerging, then 'cool' is constantly being redefined, and the subcultural 'us' embraces those people who are able to keep up with it.

Conclusions

International youth cultural trends spread to Estonia at the beginning of nineties, following the usual pattern. The culture of the metropolis, which might have been a working class culture or a marginal culture in its country of origin, was first adopted by the (sub)cultural vanguard in the periphery. The elitist group of early adopters

shared homogeneous norms and attitudes and built up their subcultural identity on proximity and as creators of something new. In the first period, there was no need to construct specific 'others,' as the group was small and the members closely related.

During the first period of the diffusion of subcultures, which coincided with extensive changes in society after the restoration of independence, subcultural identities offered opportunities for differentiating themselves from former society and their parents' culture, which served the role of 'other' during this period. This distinction was relevant, since at the beginning of the 1990s Soviet culture was still present in society, and the young cultural vanguard yearned to differ from it and identify themselves with Western lifestyles. The 'real subculture' was believed to be in the West; the metropolis, as the local Estonian version of it, was as close a copy of the Western trend as possible. It could be argued that the local early adopters and trendsetters were wannabes in the international sense.

Later, when subcultural styles spread and more people became involved, the boundaries of us extended and subcultural identity started to become loose. When the first markers of distinction no longer worked, a different 'other' was constructed. Commercialised popular culture became visible in society and, once mainstream, it acquired the role of 'other' subcultural youth. During the underground period, the young people involved in subcultures started to identify themselves strongly with a specific music and style which became central in the identification of oneself and others. They drew distinctions between themselves and mainstream youth, representatives of others subcultures, and within the subculture.

Since subcultural style has become mainstream, specific music and style are once again starting to lose their central status. Music and style vary, are performed in different ways and have divided into different sub-styles. The 'other' consists of the commercialised side of subculture and the people connected to it, especially the wannabes. When the 'tasteless other' enters the respective subcultural style, authenticity and 'good taste' become the most important qualities, but definitions for both of these vary among different groups. At this point, since many styles have emerged within the same framework, many different core groups believe themselves to be authentic and other groups to be wannabes. At the same time, any of the core groups might, from someone else's standpoint, be wannabes.

In the WEB2 period, Estonia's position as a periphery has started to change – new emerging styles are distributed using new media channels in networks which exceed the Estonian audience, participants become, at least on some level, part of global culture. Tendencies which began in the mainstream period have become intensified and rapid – new styles are born, diffused, and in part become mainstream very quickly. Participants too – promoters and DJs – can become established and disappear from the scene again quickly. Styles and scenes are mixed. Identification is no longer focused on a specific style, but rather on a particular social network and the qualities which are believed to characterise its people. 'Other' has once again become rather general and abstract, referring to everyone who is uncool. Just as being defined as 'global underground' in times of subcultural industry (Roberts 2005) is a powerful tool in putting oneself in the big picture, subcultural identification might also be a tool for competing in the (sub)cultural field.

Note

1 This article is a summary of the paper titled "The Shifting Perception of ‚Us': How Young People Construct their Subcultural Identities" presented at the international conference "Youth (Sub)cultures in Changing Societies" organised by the Centre for Lifestyle Studies, Institute for International and Social Studies of the Tallinn University from 2 – 4 February 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia. The entire research paper can be requested from the authors: **alina@iiss.ee** and **maarja.kobin@gmail.com**

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Estonie : les sous-cultures et leur évolution

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Cet article vise à donner un aperçu du développement et des changements intervenus ces dernières décennies dans les sous-cultures internationales sur un territoire culturel excentré, l'Estonie. Au début des années 90, après la chute de l'Union soviétique, la nation s'est tournée vers le monde occidental. La jeune génération a alors commencé à intégrer les cultures jeunes internationales et à adopter leurs valeurs dominantes, individualistes et hédonistes. Puis, les jeunes ont entrepris de produire leurs propres constructions locales de ces cultures globales ; des identités culturelles ont ainsi été créées en relation à une culture planétaire largement répandue d'une part et le contexte local, d'autre part. La plupart des tendances culturelles de la jeunesse en Estonie viennent de l'extérieur et ont été quelque peu modifiées au cours de leur transfert. Même si les sous-cultures sont aujourd'hui planétaires, elles n'en restent pas moins étroitement liées à la culture locale et à l'histoire des différentes sociétés.

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Subkulturen in Estland und ihre Veränderungen im Laufe der Zeit

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Dieser Artikel will ein Gefühl für die Entwicklungen und Veränderungen in internationalen Subkulturen in einer peripheren Kultur – in Estland – in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten vermitteln. Anfang der 1990er, nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion, hat sich die Nation neu in Richtung auf die westliche Welt ausgerichtet. Die jüngere Generation begann, sich in die internationale Jugendkultur zu integrieren und übernahm deren vorherrschende individualistisch-hedonistische Wertorientierungen. Jugendliche begannen, ihre eigenen lokalen Strukturen der Weltkulturen aufzubauen: kulturelle Identitäten, die im Verhältnis zu weltweit verbreiteten Kulturen einerseits und dem lokalen Zusammenhang andererseits aufgebaut wurden. Die meisten Trends in der Jugendkultur Estlands werden von außen übernommen und wurden während ihres Verbreitungsprozesses etwas verändert. Obwohl Subkulturen heute global sind, weisen sie auch einen engen Zusammenhang zu der lokalen Kultur und dem geschichtlichen Hintergrund ihrer diversen Gesellschaften auf.

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Субкультуры и их изменение во времени в Эстонии

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Данная статья направлена на обоснование развития и изменений, происходящих в международных субкультурах в течение последних десятилетий на культурной периферии – в Эстонии. В начале 1990-х годов, после распада Советского Союза, нация переориентировалась на западный мир. Молодое поколение начало интегрироваться в международную молодежную культуру и приняло ее превалирующие индивидуалистическо-гедонистические ценностные ориентации. Молодые люди стали формировать свои собственные местные конструкции глобальной культуры: культурные идентичности, которые создавались с учетом глобально широко распространенной культуры, с одной стороны, и местного контекста, с другой. Большинство молодежных культурных тенденций в Эстонии адаптируются извне и претерпевают некоторые изменения в процессе распространения. Несмотря на то, что субкультуры в настоящее время носят глобальный характер, они также тесно связаны с местной культурой и историческим происхождением различных обществ.

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Disputable Adaptation: Young Muslims and European Identity[1]

Introduction

The initial understanding of the then European Economic Community when it was founded as Christian Democratic, thus as Catholic, is no longer valid. In fact, from a social constructivist perspective, the presence of Muslims has posed a challenge and led to numerous debates relating to what has been promoted as European identity. Accordingly, this paper focuses on the coexistence of the two identities and questions to what extent young, EU-born, Muslims are ready to accept European identity, or, by contrast, continue to cultivate their own Muslim identity. The paper argues that young Muslims can be divided into three different groups – traditionalists, neo-traditionalists and liberals, a division that is easily ignored by society and, more importantly, policy makers, who consider only the first category when portraying Islam as a serious challenge to European identity. Conclusively, the paper notes that bigger efforts are needed on behalf of both Europeans and Muslims, efforts that will lead to successful co-existence and validate the EU's cosmopolitan approach towards its otherness.

Traditional young Muslims

The majority of the traditionalists continue with the life-style of their parents or, in many cases, grandparents. When their ancestors came to Europe, they represented what Milton Esman describes as labor diaspora, "composed mainly of undereducated, unskilled individuals of peasant or urban proletarian backgrounds" (2009: 16). Being aware of their position in their host countries, they accepted the lower wages and living standards that soon became one of the main characteristics of their presence. Today, European capitals such as Berlin, Paris and Brussels host big Muslim communities with an image corresponding to Esman's understanding of labor diaspora in Europe. Numerous Turkish supermarkets, Moroccan restaurants and Algerian dry-cleaning shops employ first generation grandchildren or close relatives. As noted by one of the respondents that took part in my research, there were various reasons for continuing with these family owned businesses: first, Islam promotes strong association with traditional home and family values; second, the parents never managed to adjust to life in the host society to the extent that their children would feel a sense of belonging; and, finally, family businesses represented an economic security that at various stages seemed inappropriate to compromise.

Apart form revealing some of the main characteristics of Muslim identity, the above mentioned aspects offer additional conclusions. Over time, the decision to stay close to family led to the idea that integration into European society was not even necessary. Muslims were comfortable in their own Muslim neighborhoods as they realized that they represented the majority. From the other side, as soon as the Europeans had realized that the Muslim guest workers were obtaining permanent residence permits, they decided to take the first steps in order to protect their own identity. As Wiener (1997: 539) points out, the 1973 idea of a European identity "was then approached by a citizenship practice that included the adoption of the two policy objectives of 'special rights' for European citizens and a 'passport union'." However, the main problem with this project was that it focused too much on the Europeans and too little on the **Others**.

Many traditional young Muslims agree that their strong links with their own communities' representatives in the host country, in most cases supported by the country of origin, foster the existence of parallel societies. As one group of Muslim students in Brussels admitted, traditionalists are primarily concerned with maintenance of their own Muslim identity and therefore any attempt to undermine it from the outside will face strong opposition. Alongside this, traditionalists do not perceive the process known as ghettoization as something negative. In her study, Sue Kenny correctly warns that "[t]he anxiety generated by fear of the Other, of course, also generates its own solidarity, that is, the solidarity of anxiety … [that] can be the driver of political movements, including nationalistic and racist ones" (2010: 100).

The process of ghettoization comes hand in hand with Islamophobia. Still, Islamophobia became a matter of serious discussions only after the 2001 terrorist attacks against the US and subsequent attacks in Madrid and London, in 2004 and 2005. Following these attacks, the Council of Europe presented its definition of Islamophobia as "the fear of or prejudicial viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion" (2005: 6). Thus, although less broad, the post-September 11 definition is relevant for two reasons in particular: first, it linked Islamophobia to violations of human rights and, second, it underlined the linkage between Islam and social cohesion.

Neo-traditional young Muslims

Neo-traditional Muslims believe in coexistence of different traditions and values. In fact, they are not concerned with strict definitions of Islam and Christianity, but are interested in prerequisites that will allow for their coexistence. Understandably, in this scenario both sides are expected to make some significant compromises. For example, Bernard Lewis suggests that "[i]t is not the West's business to correct them, still less to change them, but merely to ensure that the despots are friendly rather than hostile to Western interests" (2004: 91). This rather harsh statement encourages numerous comments. First, although not clarified whose business the correction of the Muslims should be, it should be noted that some of the involvements of the Western powers to 'correct' some European, non-Muslim, countries and societies in the Western Balkans, have failed. Second, the attempt to change a society is more likely to produce a counter-effect rather than the desired outcome and in this case radicalization of Islam would most probably be the consequence. Finally, seeing Muslims as despots – when the term 'despot' is often associated with a tyrant or a dictator –does not really help the attainment of the overall objective: coexistence.

Neo-traditionalists, as a group of young respondents from London noted, do not reject their background, but try to compromise and thereby benefit both from their Muslim background and present circumstances. Indeed, they feel enriched by this opportunity. This adaptation can sometimes be a long and difficult process. As Pauline Kollontai summarized in her study, the "[c]ommunity and identity can provide the individual with a sense of belonging, stability and meaning. It can also cause a struggle for individuals as they attempt to balance their religious heritage with secular and humanistic concepts and values, or incorporate aspects of other religions into their lives" (2007: 67). Here one of the main differences between the traditionalists and neo-traditionalists becomes exact: while for the former bringing two different religions closer is almost an unacceptable concept, for the later it represents a prerequisite for coexistence. This is why neo-traditionalists sometimes attend celebrations of non-Muslim character.

In order to take this argument further and demonstrate the relevance of the neo-traditional thinking amongst young Muslims across Europe, I note their appreciation for Tariq Ramadan, an Oxford scholar, who believes that the presence

of numerous Muslims in Europe will imply the establishment of a new, Westernized, Islam (2002). This standpoint, sustained by reconsideration and democratization of political systems existing in Islamic countries, is likely to bring Muslims and Europeans together. As a group of them from the Free University of Berlin wrote:

> ***In our view, a Westernized Islam represents a joint venture for successful coexistence. Many young Muslims, who were born in Europe, do not even know what "real" Islam is, as their parents or even grandparents had decided to integrate themselves as much as possible in European society … On the other hand, some European governments that openly show antipathy towards Muslim communities in their states refer to the Muslims that rejected and continue to reject any connection with their host societies, thus the West.***

At this stage, it is also important to note the position of Europeans and, more relevantly for this article, the advocates of a European identity. As indicated in Susan Condor's qualitative analysis, Europeans themselves distinguish between different Muslim societies: "In particular, it was notable that when respondents spoke in favor of Turkey's membership of the EU, this was often justified by arguing that Turkey was not a 'very' Muslim country, that it was somehow 'better' than 'other' Muslim counties, or that the peoples of Turkey were gradually 'developing' and becoming 'less' Muslim" (2004: 2). All these neo-traditional observations complement Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's ideas (adopted as Kemalist ideology) that sought to establish Turkey as a secular nation-state. In addition, European appreciation for Turkish society and its Western values resulted in the 1999 EU decision to grant Turkey candidate status.

Liberal young Muslims

Liberal Muslims represent the smallest of the three groups addressed in this paper. This is important as it makes the existence of a different, liberal, form of Islam almost invisible. Contrary to the traditionalists and neo-traditionalists, who have already strengthened their programs and managed to spread them further, liberal Muslims represent a category that is often marginalized. As Bassam Tibi, a German scholar, has argued:

> ***Liberal Muslims living in Europe – like myself – do not want to belong to a peripheral minority, but rather want to be members of the European polity itself with its respective rights and duties… I see no contradiction between being at the same time a European and a Muslim. In contrast, the Islamist groups under issue are not interested in the role of Muslim migrants as a bridge between the society they are living in and the civilization they are coming from (2001: 205).***

Liberal Muslims are fully aware of their Muslim background, but more importantly, have a very strong commitment to the idea of a European society. In this respect, Islam has become a less relevant element in the process of their integration. They do not face some of the previously outlined issues related to successful acculturation and assimilation. As some of the respondents recalled, St. Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, had once said: "When in Rome, do as the Romans do!" By recalling this proverb, the respondents actually agreed to accept the local culture and lifestyle. Born in families that had left strict Muslim homelands in the 1960s and 1970s and aware of the efforts their parents invested to integrate into Western host societies, these young people face almost no background boundaries. They do not wear the burqa, they drink alcohol and can talk openly about (homo) sexuality.

Strong incentives to assimilate are seen in a growing interest to participate in educational, economic and political institutions. Liberal Muslims are now graduates of Western universities where they focus on Western philosophy, European history and the politics of their European homeland. Many of them

work in economic institutions dealing with the progress of the European Union. In regard to political activism, as some of them acknowledged, they are active members in political parties whose programs support greater integration of immigrants. These ambitious people are often misjudged and here Esman has another valid point when stating that some Europeans view the Muslim diaspora "as 'Islamofascists,' forerunners of a vast conspiracy to Islamize Europe," as there is, in their view, a risk that these Muslims could use democratic institutions across Europe to gain control of various governing bodies and then destroy them and impose Islamic rule on them (2009: 105).

When it comes to religion, the situation is more complex. This is the point where many liberal Muslims – although sound advocates of Christian values – discuss the state of Islam. To begin with, liberal Muslims maintain that Islam and democracy are compatible. Based on their European experience, they fully support Tibi's (2002) scholarship that invites non-liberal Muslims in Europe to reinterpret Islam – a new interpretation that will help Muslims to be perceived and judged as European citizens and not as Muslims only, thus based on their democratic identity, not their religion. In this view, religion would have to shift from being a collective denominator to being an individual denominator. In this new form, religion would complement cultural pluralism, characterizing the society where various Muslim communities are accommodated. In her study, Kim Knott (2007: 10) underlines that it is normal that the new environment affects religious and cultural traditions of the homeland. Accordingly, most female liberals admit that they do not possess a burqa and would not even know how to place it on their head properly.

The rejection of a traditional Muslim outfit is due to their awareness of its negative image across various European countries, regions and cities, and their own willingness to integrate into European society as much as possible. Furthermore, alcohol consumption which is understood by the traditionalists to be prohibited and neo-traditionalists as a practice to be discouraged, is something that leaves liberal Muslims indifferent. Finally, acceptance of homosexuality, which many Muslim countries consider a crime, is needed as most liberal Muslims agree with the analysis of James Neill concluding that actually "the circumstances of Muslim society strongly encouraged homosexuality, especially among young men" (2009: 301).

Conclusion

This paper examined the position of three different groups of young Muslims in the European Union and their perceptions of European identity. From traditionalists, to neo-traditionalists and liberals, it is clear that all have contrasting views that can be accepted or rejected by the policy-makers and public. Muslim tradition, which usually comes hand-in-hand with religion, cannot be ignored. As correctly argued by Ramadan, the decision to abandon tradition could easily cause confusion within Muslim society and end in conflict. In order to avoid such scenarios, adjustments that would not compromise traditional values, but rather modernize them, seem to be the only solution.

In 2001, for example, members of the European Parliament met with international experts to address the growing role of religion in European policy. As the press release observed, this meeting took place 'at a time when religious institutions are increasingly interested in participating in policy debates within Europe even as the positions of some religious institutions are at odds with the values that form a European consensus on critical issues' (EP 2001). During the meeting, Camillo Ruini, Italian cardinal, criticized the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted in December 2000 for not having included the "historical and cultural roots of Europe, in particular Christianity, which represents Europe's soul and which still today can inspire Europe's mission and identity" – a criticism complementing an earlier point offered by Joseph Ratzinger, then Cardinal and now the Head of the Catholic Church, for whom "God and our responsibility before God" should have been "anchored in the European constitution" (Ibid).

There is no need to explain here what kind of discord the above quoted words might provoke amongst non-Catholics or non-Christians. If applied to the Balkans, they could signify that Turkey, although a candidate country for European Union membership, will remain a candidate country forever. If applied to the Western Balkans, then surely Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania will have to pass different tests to convince Europeans that being different, including Muslim, will not negatively affect either their own integrationist vision nor the basics of European identity. In this respect, compromise again appears to be a prerequisite for a successful coexistence, but who is going to make the first step?

Note

1 This is a summary of the paper presented at the conference "Youth (Sub)cultures in Changing Societies," organized by the Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University, Estonia, 2-4 February 2011. The full paper can be requested from the author: **B.Radeljic@uel.ac.uk**.

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Une adaptation sujette à caution : jeunes musulmans et identité européenne

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La perception initiale démocrate chrétienne, et donc catholique, de la Communauté économique européenne d'alors, au moment de sa création, n'est plus valide. En fait, du point de vue du constructivisme social, la présence des musulmans s'est avérée problématique et a alimenté de nombreux débats en relation avec ce qui avait été promu en guise d'identité européenne. Partant, cet article s'intéresse à la coexistence de deux identités et soulève la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les jeunes musulmans, nés dans l'Union européenne, sont prêts à accepter l'identité européenne ou, à l'inverse, continuent de cultiver leur propre identité musulmane. L'article affirme que les jeunes musulmans se répartissent en réalité en trois groupes : les traditionalistes, les néo-traditionalistes et les libéraux – division allègrement oubliée par la société et, plus grave encore, par les décideurs, qui ne prennent en compte que la première catégorie lorsqu'ils décrivent l'islam comme une menace sérieuse à l'identité européenne. En conclusion, l'article note que des efforts plus soutenus sont nécessaires de la part tant des Européens que des musulmans, afin de parvenir à une coexistence harmonieuse et de concrétiser l'approche cosmopolite de l'UE face à son altérité.

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Zweifelhafte Anpassung: Junge Muslime und europäische Identität

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Das ursprüngliche Verständnis der damaligen Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die bei ihrer Gründung christdemokratisch und damit katholisch war, hat keine Gültigkeit mehr. Tatsächlich stellte die Anwesenheit von Muslimen von einer sozial konstruktivistischen Perspektive aus eine Herausforderung dar und gab zu zahlreichen Debatten darüber Anlass, was als europäische Identität unterstützt wurde. Dementsprechend konzentriert sich dieser Aufsatz auf die Koexistenz der beiden Identitäten und hinterfragt, in welchem Umfang junge, in der EU geborene Muslime bereit sind, die europäische Identität zu akzeptieren oder – im Gegensatz dazu – weiter ihre eigene muslimische Identität kultivieren. Im Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass man junge Muslime in drei unterschiedliche Gruppen aufteilen kann – Traditionalisten, Neo-Traditionalisten und Liberale – , wobei diese Unterscheidung von der Gesellschaft und insbesondere von Politikern leicht vernachlässigt wird, die nur die erste Kategorie betrachten, wenn sie den Islam als große Herausforderung für die europäische Identität darstellen. Der Aufsatz stellt abschließend fest, dass größere Anstrengungen sowohl für Europäer als auch für Muslime erforderlich sind, d.h. Anstrengungen, die zu erfolgreicher Koexistenz führen und den kosmopolitischen Ansatz der EU zu ihrem Anderssein bestätigen.

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Дискуссионная адаптация: молодые мусульмане и европейская идентичность

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Начальное восприятие Европейского экономического сообщества, сформированное при его основании: христианско-демократическое, следовательно, католическое, – уже больше неправомерно. В действительности, исходя из социально конструктивистской перспективы, присутствие мусульман стало вызовом и привело к многочисленным дебатам относительно того, что продвигается в качестве европейской идентичности. Соответственно, в данной статье основное внимание уделяется сосуществованию двух идентичностей и обсуждению того, насколько молодые мусульмане, рожденные в ЕС, готовы принять европейскую идентичность или, напротив, они будут продолжать культивировать свою собственную мусульманскую самобытность. В статье утверждается, что молодых мусульман можно разделить на три различные группы: традиционалисты, неотрадиционалисты и либералы. Такое деление легко игнорируется обществом и, что более существенно, политиками, которые рассматривают только первую категорию, изображая ислам в качестве серьезного вызова европейской идентичности. В заключении статьи отмечается, что необходимо предпринять большие усилия от лица как европейцев, так и мусульман, усилия, которые приведут к успешному сосуществованию и утверждению многонационального подхода ЕС в отношении своего отличия.

The Nordic Youth Research 2010

© ICSRA, Icelandic Centre for Social Research and Analysis, October 2010, 142 p

The aim of the The Nordic Youth Research 2010 is to compare lifestyles and differences in the lives and living conditions of young people in the Nordic countries. Special emphasis was laid on participation of all the Nordic countries including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the Åland Islands, Faroe Islands and Greenland.

The outcome of the research has already reached the attention of the Nordic communities, policymakers and practitioners who implement interventions focusing on lifestyles and culture of young people. The outcome of the research further emphasizes the use of knowledge and information in areas relevant to young people in the Nordic communities.

The Nordic Youth Research is available online at **www.menntamalaraduneyti.is** and **www.rannsoknir.is** and can easily be found through **www.google.com**

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Zwischen Integration und Segmentierung: Ambivalente Effekte juveniler Szenen in einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft[1]

HipHopper, Punks, Emos in der Fußgängerzone, Skaterparks, Graffitis, Technopartys, Ska Konzert oder Rockabilly Festival, das Szenenleben in Luxemburg ist bunt und vielfältig. 2010 brachte zudem der Kinofilm ‚Hamilius' einem breiteren Publikum die HipHop-Szene und Community in Luxemburg näher. Zeitgleich widmete das städtische Museum den Jugendkulturen eine einjährige Ausstellung. Das Squatting eines leerstehenden Hauses 2009 in der Hauptstadt zeigte zudem, dass Jugendliche für ihre Interessen kämpfen und so für Aufruhr und Diskussionsstoff sorgen (können). Juvenile Szenen in Luxemburg sind präsent und aktiv. Gleichwohl wird ihnen von Seiten der Politik und der Forschung bisweilen wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt.

Juvenile Szenen sind, in Anlehnung an Hitzler und Niederbacher, als thematisch fokussierte soziale Gesinnungsgemeinschaften zu verstehen. Szenen strukturieren sich in einem 4-Stufenmodell (‚Friends & Heavy Users' – Freizeitszene – Sympathisanten) um Organisationseliten herum. Eine Szene besteht aus einem Netzwerk aus unterschiedlich vielen **Szenegruppen**. Szenegruppen kommunizieren und interagieren untereinander mehr oder weniger intensiv innerhalb einer Szene. Szenegruppen können ebenfalls Verbindungen zu Mitgliedern aus anderen Szenen und deren Szenegruppen aufweisen.

In den luxemburgischen Jugendstudien und Forschungsberichten[2], treten juvenile Szenen meist nur marginal in Erscheinung. Das Augenmerk dieser Publikationen liegt vornehmlich auf den formellen und institutionalisierten Jugendorganisationen und – aktivitäten. Juvenile Szenen finden meist nur in Zusammenhang mit (delinquenten) Freizeitaktivitäten und Jugendgangs Erwähnung. Dabei geht aus diesen Studien hervor, dass inländische aber insbesondere auch ausländische Jugendliche in Luxemburg ihre Freizeit größtenteils in informellen Cliquen und Peergroups verbringen, wozu unter anderem eben auch juvenile Szenen gehören.

Vieles deutet darauf hin, dass juvenile Szenen, genauso wie formelle Freizeitgruppen, die bestehenden gesellschaftlichen Segmentierungstendenzen in Luxemburg reflektieren bzw. reproduzieren. Szenegruppen weisen z.B. maßgeblich eine homogene Struktur und Zusammensetzung der Anhänger auf. Gleichzeitig aber, und hierin zeigt sich ihre Ambivalenz, vermögen sie eben diese Segmentierungstendenzen zu überwinden. Der integrative Charakter dieser (homogenen) Szenegruppen zeigt sich sowohl in der Interaktion der Szenegruppen auf lokaler Ebene als auch in der heterogenen Gesamtszene z.B. bei Events, ein elementares Element des Szenelebens. Darüber hinaus bedürfen die juvenilen Szenen auf Grund der oft fehlenden ‚kritischen Masse' des Zulaufs sowie der Kooperation mit Szeneanhängern aus den angrenzenden Gebieten bzw. der Großregion[3]. Sie agieren transnational. Die bereits große ethnische Vielfalt der landeseigenen Szenegruppen wird folglich noch erweitert.

Eben diese ambivalenten Effekte der juvenilen Szenen in Luxemburg will der vorliegende Beitrag aufzeigen. Bei den verwendeten Daten handelt es sich um erste Forschungsergebnisse aus dem fortlaufenden Dissertationsprojektes des Autors an der Forschungseinheit INSIDE der Universität Luxemburg zu juvenilen Szenen in Luxemburg. Sie stammen aus der quantitativen Online-Pilotstudie sowie aus leitfadengestützten Interviews mit Mitarbeitern

aus der professionellen Jugendarbeit. Die Besonderheit der Ergebnisse lässt sich anhand einiger zusätzlicher Hintergrundinformationen zur gesellschaftlichen Situation in Luxemburg verdeutlichen.

Hintergrundinformationen zu Luxemburg

Das Großherzogtum Luxemburg ist eines der kleinsten (2586 km2) aber auch eines der wohlhabensten Länder der Europäischen Union. Das Land ist durch seine sehr heterogene Bevölkerung gekennzeichnet. Mehr als 50% der 500.000 Einwohner haben einen Migrationshintergrund. Dieser ist in vielen Fällen auf die großen Einwanderungswellen im 20. Jahrhundert überwiegend von deutschen, italienischen und portugiesischen Gastarbeitern sowie auf die Aufnahme von Kriegsflüchtlingen aus dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien zurückzuführen.

Die Vielfalt der Nationalitäten wird durch Funktionäre aus den EU-Mitgliedstaaten an den EU-Institutionen und die Angestellten im internationalen Bankensektor ergänzt. Ein neueres Phänomen stellt die zunehmende Aufnahme von Asylbewerbern dar. Aus politischer Sicht soll die verstärkte Zuwanderung der zunehmenden Überalterung der luxemburgischen Bevölkerung entgegenwirken, das Rentensystem sichern und ökonomische Stabilität garantieren. Zusätzlich pendeln täglich etwa 130.000 Menschen aus den Grenzregionen nach Luxemburg. Sie stellen etwa 40% aller Arbeitskräfte des Landes.

Eine weitere Besonderheit ist die offizielle Mehrsprachigkeit des Landes. Neben den offiziellen Landessprachen Luxemburgisch, Deutsch und Französisch gewinnt Englisch, auf Grund Luxemburgs Rolle als Finanzplatz und Europäisches Zentrum, zusehends an Bedeutung. Im Gegensatz zu anderen multilingualen Ländern bestehen in Luxemburg keine Sprachregionen, sondern Sprachsituationen und Sprachbereiche. Dies erfordert im Alltag einen ständigen Wechsel zwischen den Sprachen. Die Beherrschung des Luxemburgischen, einer vorwiegend gesprochenen Sprache, ist für Erwachsene dabei keine zwingende Notwendigkeit. Für Kinder und Jugendliche hingegen ist sie, z.B. in der Schule und der Ausbildung, nahezu unerlässlich.

Ist diese ethnische, kulturelle und linguistische Vielfalt auch Bestandteil des Alltagslebens in Luxemburg, lassen sich in vielen Bereichen Tendenzen einer ethnisch-kulturellen Segmentierung bzw. einer Co-Existenz identifizieren, wie etwa des Wohnens, der Bildung, der Arbeit oder der Freizeitgestaltung. Ethnische Unterschiede in der Sozialisierung der Personen, ihre Sprachenkenntnisse, ihr Bildungshintergrund sowie ihre juristische Status beeinflussen diese Segmentierungstendenzen zusätzlich.

Jugendliche in Luxemburg

Jugendliche erleben Vor – und Nachteile dieser ethnischen, kulturellen und linguistischen Heterogenität und Vielfalt unmittelbar in ihrem Alltag, insbesondere in der Schule aber auch z. B. in der Nachbarschaft und den Freizeitaktivitäten.

Der ‚European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights' Report' beispielsweise attestierte dem luxemburgischen Schulsystem eine offensichtliche Benachteiligung der Kinder und Jugendlichen mit Migrationshintergrund. Nationale Experten und die Politik ihrerseits identifizierten diesbezüglich einen Zusammenhang zwischen den Ungleichheiten in – und ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlichen und u.a. der sozio-ökonomischen Situation, den Sprachkompetenzen sowie dem Bildungshintergrund der Erziehungsberechtigten. Die im Erziehungs – und Schulbereich aufzeigten Segmentierungstendenzen, wirken sich ihrerseits wiederum hinderlich auf die Interaktion und Annäherung in – und ausländischer Jugendlicher aus.

Die luxemburgischen Jugendstudien zeigen, dass die Wahl der Freizeitbeschäftigungen der Jugendlichen mit den Segmentierungstendenzen

im Alltag einhergeht. Es lassen sich, nebst anderen, insbesondere 3 größere Strömungen herauskristallisieren:

- **Traditionelle, formelle und öffentlich geförderte Jugendvereinigungen liegen insbesondere bei inländischen Jugendlichen im Trend**, z.B. Sportvereine, christliche Organisationen und Wohlfahrtsverbände sowie künstlerische und musikalische Aktivitäten. Ältere Jugendliche engagieren sich oft zudem im regionalen selbstverwaltenden Jugend-Club. Inländische Jugendliche sind üblicherweise gleichzeitig in mehreren unterschiedlichen Aktivitäten bzw. Organisationen aktiv. Die Teilnahme ist allerdings oft finanziell aufwändig und der Einstieg oftmals durch eine ‚Vererbungspraxis'[4] geprägt. Zudem sind viele dieser Organisationen durch die luxemburgische Kultur und vor allem die luxemburgische Sprache gekennzeichnet.
- **Peergroups, Cliquen und Freundesnetzwerke sowie Strukturen der offenen Jugendarbeit, die landesweiten Jugendzentren, bilden eine wichtige Alternative vor allem für ausländische Jugendliche**. Sie greifen weit weniger auf die formellen Strukturen und Angebote zurück, was vornehmlich auf die erwähnten finanziellen, kulturellen und linguistischen Hürden zurückzuführen ist. Ferner begünstigen Unterschiede in den pädagogischen Prioritäten und kulturellen Ansichten der Erziehungsberechtigten die eher langsame Annäherung der Jugendlichen auf dem Gebiet der Freizeitbeschäftigungen.
- **Für Kinder und Jugendliche von EU-Funktionären und ausländischer Angestellten in hohen Positionen, wie z.B. dem Banksektor treffen diese Unterschiede und Benachteiligungen weniger zu**. Sie besuchen meist internationale Schulen und bewegen sich größtenteils in eigenen geschlossenen Netzwerken. Auf Grund der Familiensituation leben diese Jugendlichen oftmals lediglich auf begrenzte aber eben auch unbestimmte Zeit in Luxemburg. Sie co-existieren folglich eher neben den inländischen Jugendlichen. Im Alltag sowie in der formellen aber wahrscheinlich auch in der informellen Freizeitgestaltung finden sich dem zur Folge selten bis kaum Berührungspunkte. Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass sie häufig nicht die luxemburgische Sprache erlernen.

Juvenile Szenen in Luxemburg

Die Jugendstudien haben gezeigt, dass sich die gesellschaftliche Segmentierung in den formellen Freizeitaktivitäten der Jugendlichen durchaus wiederfindet. Wie gestaltet sich dies nun aber bei informellen Freizeitgruppierungen, insbesondere bei juvenilen Szenen? Gelingt es juvenilen Szenen soziale, kulturelle und linguistische Hürden und Grenzen zu überwinden?

Ausgehend von einer quantitativen Online-Befragung in fast allen schulpsychologischen Diensten der Sekundarschulen[5] sowie fast allen Jugendzentren[6] des Landes und einigen Schülerräten[7] wurde eine erste allgemeine Übersicht juveniler Szenen in Luxemburg ermittelt. Die Pilotstudie fokussierte vornehmlich auf 12-20 jährige, da Jugendliche dieser Altersstufen als ‚Szenefreaks' gelten und folglich unterschiedliche Level einer Szene erreicht werden können. Die Ergebnisse der Pilotstudie bestätigen einerseits die eingangs beschriebene Vielfalt der Szenen und weist ebenso auf weniger bekannte oder weniger sichtbare Szenen hin.

Anhand der Aussagen der Interviewpartner lässt sich nachzeichnen, dass juvenile Szenen die bestehenden gesellschaftlichen Segmentierungen wie folgt reproduzieren:

- Szenegruppen weisen in Bezug auf ihre Mitglieder eine starke ethnische und soziale Homogenität auf.
- Es gibt regionale Unterschiede in der Intensität der Szenegruppen-Homogenität. Sie ist zum Teil an die sonstigen Kultur – und Freizeitangebote der jeweiligen Region gekoppelt. Die Szenegruppen aus eventstarken Regionen weisen offenere Strukturen auf als jene aus eventschwachen.

- Die Identifizierung der Jugendlichen mit der Szene(gruppe) und die Intensität ihrer Bindung an die Szene(gruppe) weisen regionale Unterschiede auf. In eventschwachen Regionen konzentrieren sich Jugendlichen intensiver auf die Szenegruppe.
- Die Identifizierungsintensität und –dauer der Jugendlichen mit einem Stil und der Szene(gruppe) in eventschwächeren Regionen ist stärker ausgerichtet auf ethnische (z.B. Hautfarbe), kulturelle (z.B. die Offenheit der Familie gegenüber der Aufnahmegesellschaft) und soziale (z.B. den Zukunftsperspektiven der Jugendlichen) Komponenten.
- Der ethnische Kulturkreis der Jugendlichen wirkt sich darauf aus, ob die Jugendlichen ihre Zugehörigkeit zu einer juvenilen Szene eher als Transition oder Moratorium auf dem Wege zum Erwachsensein oder aber als Lebensphilosophie erleben.
- Einige juvenile Szenen stellen auf Grund der gering benötigten finanziellen Mittel, insbesondere für Jugendliche aus benachteiligten sozialen Milieus, eine reelle Alternative der Freizeitgestaltung dar.
- Die Integration der Jugendlichen in die Gesellschaft kann auf Grund der erfahrenen Benachteiligungen im Alltagsleben über die Zugehörigkeit zu einer juvenilen Szene erfolgen.

Inwiefern es sich bei den jugendkulturellen Gruppierungen in Luxemburg jeweils um etablierte Szenen oder eher temporäre Erscheinungen handelt, lässt sich dabei nicht immer unmittelbar feststellen. Bei offensichtlich größeren Szenen wie z.B. HipHop lassen sich die einzelnen Szenelevel durchaus nachzeichnen. Ebenso weist die Szene intensive Verbindungen und Beziehungen in der Großregion auf. Bei ‚kleineren' Szenen ist hingegen nicht unmittelbar erkennbar, ob sich beispielsweise der Szenekern im Inland befindet, oder die luxemburgischen Mitglieder eher eine Szenegruppe, im Rahmen der Szene der Großregion, bilden. Befindet sich der Szenekern jedoch im Inland führt die fehlende ‚kritischen Masse' in Luxemburg als auch in den Grenzregionen dazu, dass sich die Anhänger im Großherzogtum als Szene zusammenfinden und kooperieren.

Hier zeigt sich deutlich, dass juvenile Szenen in Luxemburg sich nicht auf sich und die Lage vor Ort konzentrieren können. Um den (Fort-)Bestand der Szene zu garantieren bzw. größere Events zu organisieren, ist die Kooperation der Szenegruppen untereinander im Inland sowie mit den respektiven Szene(gruppe)n im benachbarten Ausland meist unerlässlich:

- Große lokale Events vereinen die landesweiten Szenengruppen unterschiedlicher Couleur und vereinen auf der Ebene einer gemeinsamen Gesinnung und Themas.
- Aktionstreffen finden in den unterschiedlichen Städten der Großregion statt. Oder ein großes Event wird gezielt in eine bestimmte Stadt der Großregion verlegt, um sich so das notwendige Publikum zu sichern.
- Es entstehen transnationale Szeneverbindungen und Kooperationen innerhalb der Großregion.
- Die Zunahme von Konzerten, die unterschiedliche Musikstile miteinander kombinieren, ermöglicht zudem die Zusammenführung unterschiedlicher Szenen und Szenegruppen. Und bietet neue Möglichkeiten zu (transnationalen) Querverbindungen
- Die ethnische und kulturelle Diversität in Luxemburg fördert zudem kulturell geprägte Szenegruppen, die neue eigene Stilkreationen und – variationen hervorbringen, und ihrerseits die Gesamtszene bereichern.

Einigen Jugendlichen ist der Zugang zu szenerelevanten Events und transnationalen Aktionen wenn auch nicht gänzlich verschlossen, so doch mehrheitlich erschwert zugänglich; z.B. durch unzureichende öffentliche Strukturen der Mobilität und landesweiten Infrastrukturen. Dies trifft insbesondere auf Jugendliche aus ländlichen Regionen zu, da sich der Großteil der Szenelokalitäten und Events nach wie vor auf die Hauptstadt und den Süden des Landes, um die Stadt Esch, konzentrieren.

Auf informelle Art werden in juvenilen Szenen in Luxemburg durchaus gesellschaftliche Segmentierungstendenzen überwunden, indem ethnisch homogene Szenegruppen auf Landesebene und auf der Ebene der Großregion sich verständigen und miteinander kooperieren (müssen), um Projekte und Events, ein unverzichtbares Szeneelement, zu verwirklichen. Das Potential der juvenilen Szenen auf der Ebene der ethnischen und kulturellen Verständigung, wird von der Gesellschaft und der Politik unterschätzt und/ oder nicht erkannt. Die formellen Projekte und Programme auf gesellschaftspolitischer Ebene erreichen diese oftmals benachteiligten und marginalisierten Jugendlichen häufig nicht bzw. sprechen sie nicht an. Juvenile Szenen stellen hingegen eine beachtenswerte und förderungswürdige Alternative dar, an der innovative Politik ansetzen kann.

Trifft diese Überbrückung der gesellschaftlichen Segmentierungen auch nicht auf alle Lebensbereiche und nicht integral auf alle Szenegruppen zu, so sind dennoch sichtbare Tendenzen in die Richtung zu erkennen. Im weiteren Verlauf des Forschungsprojektes stehen Interviews mit Szenejugendlichen an. Sie werden zeigen, inwiefern diese Beobachtungen ‚von außen' der ‚inneren' Szenerealität gerecht werden, und umgekehrt.

Anmerkungen

1 Dieser Beitrag ist eine Zusammenfassung des bei der internationalen Konferenz „Youth (Sub)cultures in Changing Societies" vorgetragenen Forschungsberichtes „Between integration and segmentation: The ambivalent effects of youth subcultures in a multicultural society". Die Konferenz wurde vom Centre for Lifestyle Studies, Institute for International and Social Studies of the Tallinn University, vom 2 – 4 Februar 2011 in Tallinn, Estland, organisiert. Der Gesamtbericht kann vom Autor angefordert werden: **Jean-Claude.Zeimet@uni.lu**

2 Stellvertretend sei hier der ‚Nationale Jugendbericht 2010' von Willems & al. genannt. Er bietet einen ausführlichen als auch den aktuellsten Gesamtüberblick zur Situation der Jugendlichen in Luxemburg.

3 Die Großregion umfasst das Land Luxemburg, sowie Teilgebiete von Nordrhein-Westfalen und des Saarlandes (DE), der Lorraine (FR) als auch der Wallonischen Region (BE).

4 ‚Vererbungspraxis' meint, dass bereits andere Familienmitglieder in der Organisation, dem Verein aktiv sind oder waren.

5 Jede Sekundarschule in Luxemburg verfügt über einen eigenen schulpsychologischen Dienst.

6 Die Jugendzentren (Maisons des Jeunes) sind ein flächendeckendes Angebot der offenen Jugendarbeit.

7 Der Schülerrat ist ein obligatorisches Gremium an jeder Sekundarschule in Luxemburg.

EN

Between Integration and Segmentation: Ambivalent Effects of Juvenile Scenes in a Multicultural Society

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In youth studies and research reports from Luxembourg, juvenile scenes mostly play only a marginal role. The focus of these publications is primarily on formal and institutionalized youth organisations and activities. Juvenile scenes are generally mentioned only in the context of (delinquent) leisure activities and youth gangs. These studies show that Luxembourg youth and, especially, foreign youth in Luxembourg spend their leisure time primarily in informal cliques or peer groups, and these groups also include juvenile scenes – among others.

FR

Entre intégration et segmentation : les effets ambivalents des scènes juvéniles dans une société multiculturelle

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Dans les études sur la jeunesse au Luxembourg et dans les rapports de recherche, les scènes juvéniles n'apparaissent que rarement. L'accent de ces publications est mis avant tout sur les organisations et les activités de jeunesse formelles et institutionnalisées. Des scènes juvéniles ne sont mentionnées la plupart du temps qu'en rapport avec des activités de loisirs (de délinquants). Il ressort de ces études que les jeunes Luxembourgeois d'une part mais aussi et avant tout les jeunes étrangers vivant au Luxembourg d'autre part passent leurs loisirs en majorité au sein de cliques informelles et dans des peergroups dont font partie aussi notamment des scènes juvéniles.

RU

Между интеграцией и сегментацией: двойственность ювенальной среды в мультикультурном обществе

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В молодежных исследованиях и научных докладах Люксембурга обстановке среди несовершеннолетних отводится лишь второстепенная роль. Основное внимание в данных публикациях уделяется главным образом формальным и институциональным молодежным организациям и мероприятиям. Ювенальная сфера упоминается главным образом лишь в контексте (противоправных) досуговых мероприятий и молодежных групп. Данные исследования показывают, что люксембургская молодежь, особенно иностранная молодежь в Люксембурге, проводит свое свободное время прежде всего в неформальных кругах или среди групп сверстников, и такие группы также включают, наряду с другими, несовершеннолетних.

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New authoritarianism-new subculture[1]

Introduction

In autumn 2010 the New Authoritarianism project was launched by the Centre of Conflict Research at ELTE (Hungarian acronym of Eötvös Loránd University Budapest) and the Sociology and Social Policy Department at the University of Debrecen.

Previous sociological and social-psychological studies conducted in Hungary examined authoritarianism (and/or prejudices, anti-Semitism) solely in the majority population (Erös-Fábián, 1999; Fábián, 1999; Enyedi et al., 2002, 2004). In the course of the project launched in 2010 three samples were investigated. In addition to a national representative sample consisting of 1,000 respondents, members of two sub-samples were questioned. Members of sub-sample No.1 were members of a paramilitary organization, and openly identified with the ideology of national radicalism. This organization was founded in the spring of 2007 in Eastern Hungary. The organization currently has approximately 160 members. According to their self-characterization, the members of the organization consider themselves guardians of traditions. They attribute the highest importance to the values of law, order, property and loyalty to the nation defined by ancestry.

Members of sub-sample No.2 were selected for the sake of comparison. The best match for this purpose was a civic organization whose members were for the protection of environment (officially called E-mission Nature and Environment Conservation Association). The association was founded in 1986 by thirty students, and was legally registered in 1989. The organization has about 300 members (including fee-paying members, supporters, and activists), and it is mostly active in the region of eastern Hungary where the national radical group can also be found. The organization's activities are as follows: environmental education, environment protection polls, ornithological works, power management, public guidance, selling environment-friendly products, social communication about environmental questions, environment protection projects, campaigns, and coordinating civic organizations.

The same questionnaire was given to all samples. Respondents were asked questions about the locus of control, dogmatism, authoritarianism and the role of the state in the solution of grave social problems (such as poverty, decreasing birth rates, and Roma-related issues). In the course of data analysis we focused on the embedded cognitive and sociological nature of social dominance orientation.

Social dominance orientation

Social dominance orientation (SDO) stems from the theory of social dominance considered by Sidanius and Pratto to be a theory of interdisciplinary approach, a "coherent theoretical framework" that holds together the various levels (individual personality and attitudes, organizations, and social structure). Sidanius and Pratto do not want it to be particularly identified as a psychological or sociological theory, as opposed to the theories often mentioned as primary sources (authoritarian personality theory, Rokeach's theory of political behaviour, Blumer's group position theory, Marxism, neoclassical elite theories, political attitude studies, poll results, social identity theory, evolutionary psychology theories). According to Social Dominance Theory, every society is *"organized as systems of group-based social hierarchies."* The distinguishing characteristics determining dominant and

subjugated groups is the unequal possession of social values (power, wealth, rank), as well as material and symbolic goods. The theory does not exclude the role of personal characteristics (such as ability) in possession of these goods, but considers it as a group function.

Social Dominance Orientation, connected to social dominance theory, is attributed to individuals and legitimizes unequal and hierarchic social group interactions and expresses judgement of group dominance (Sidanius-Pratto, 1999). SDO corresponds to a general attitude orientation to intergroup relations, which approves or disapproves of the stratified nature of social intergroup relations. A high level of social dominance orientation corresponds to reinforcement of hierarchy between groups while a low level of social dominance corresponds to support of ideologies and policies which weaken hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994).

Public opinion polls carried out in Hungary have shown that equality is one of the most popular values in contemporary society. Moreover, the Hungarian obsession with equality is conspicuous in international comparisons as well (Tóth, 2009; Roska-Tomka, 2010).

The results of our study on new authoritarianism again demonstrate the perseverance of Hungarians' obsessive egalitarianism. Comparing the average rates of agreements with the statements of SDO between the national sample and the two sub-samples, we found egalitarianism to be rampant in all samples.

Two patterns of social dominance orientation

Averages, however, do not tell anything about the inner structure of attitudes determining orientation toward equality and inequality between social groups. In order to reveal hidden patterns of social dominance-orientation among the respondents, primary component analyses were carried out in all three datasets.

Two hidden patterns emerged from primary component analysis. Both patterns concerned attitudes toward equality and inequality between social groups. The two patterns, however, differ according the ideological nature of the argument justifying group inequality. The first pattern centred on the argument of collective inferiority and superiority. This argument is the key element of racial ideology. According to racism the individual cannot do much to achieve his/her position in the social hierarchy, because the individual cannot resist to the genetic heritage stemming from his/her ancestry. Consequently, we believe that this pattern can be identified as the pattern of *ethnic social dominance orientation* (ESDO). In contrast, the second pattern seems to be organized by the argument of equality of chances which is, according to Gellner, a principle of modern social organization (Gellner, 1983). Belief in equality of chances opens the way for upward social mobility and reflects an orientation of social dominance in terms of class structure. Consequently, we identified the second pattern as the pattern of *class social dominance orientation* (CSDO).

On the basis of CSDO, there was no difference between the sample of national radicals and environmentalists. ESDO, however, proved to be a watershed between the two groups. National radicals were significantly much more in favour of the justification of inequality in terms of racial superiority, while environmentalists rejected the argument legitimizing group inequality in terms of superiority.

Before investigating the cognitive and sociological determinants of the ESDO and CSDO we will take a look at the simple statistical divisions of the samples according to their attitude toward group inequalities. Four groups were to be distinguished. In the first group we find those who resist supporting any social inequality on the basis of group membership. The second group is comprised of those who support group inequality on the grounds of ethnicity, but reject inequality on the basis of class. The third group holds respondents who support class inequality but reject ethnic inequality. Last but no least, in the

fourth group we find respondents who support both types of group inequality.

In the representative sample 38% of the respondents rejected both types of group inequality. Conversely, 25% of respondents were prone to justify both types of group inequality. Compared with the proportion of believers of ethnic inequality, the proportion of believers of class inequality was smaller (25% vs. 16%). 34% of respondents in the sub-sample of national radicals were not supporting any form group inequality as opposed to respondents of the environmentalist organization. In this sub-sample, 52% of the respondents rejected group inequality on any grounds.

This result gives evidence of the nature of differences between the subculture of authoritarian and non-authoritarian grouping in contemporary Hungary (in the northeast of the country, at least).

Cognitive determinants of social dominance

To reveal the nature of cognitive embedment of the patterns of ethnically based and class based social dominance orientation, results of regression analyses will be presented on the three samples. In the national representative sample, ESDO was found to be determined by five major variables of authoritarianism. The strongest determining influences were found to be a function of locus of control. Support of inequality between groups was found to be strongest in relation to external control. The more people felt that their own lives are out of their own control, the more they approved ethnic inequality. Moreover, the acceptance of ethnic inequality was found to be a function of dogmatism as measured by the Rokeach scale. A closed minded, romantic-heroic world view, and existential loneliness make people prone to think in terms of ethnic inequality. State intervention aiming to solve social problems is not approved by these people. Conversely, people who resist justifying ethnic inequalities are those who tend to be the masters of their own lives, their minds are open, and they lack romanticism and heroism. These people are not suffering from loneliness, and are in favour of state intervention in social problems.

The regression analysis carried out in the sub-sample of national radicals demonstrated that loneliness and anxiety have a determining role in justification of ethnic inequality. Environmentalists, however, were prone to support ethnic inequality only if they were influenced by romantic and heroic fantasies.

When we looked for determinants of class-based SDO in the national representative sample, we found them to be variables of classic dogmatism and attitudes toward state intervention. People with CSDO were open minded and felt solidarity with other people. The romantic-heroic attitude is accepted among them. The idea of state intervention in solving grave social problems was rejected by them. The lack of heroic attitudes, and of closed minds or the belief in state intervention make them prone to reject inequality between people on class grounds.

Class-based SDO among members of national radical group was found to be a function of romanticism and heroism (as was the case of the national sample). No support for CSDO can be expected among national radicals who suffer from anxiety and loneliness (they are inclined to support ESDO).

In the case of the environmentalists, results of the regression analysis show no determination of any of the variables on SDO. SDO in any form simply does not fit into the subculture of the environmentalist group.

Sociological determinants of SDO

The structure of sociological determinants of social dominance orientation seems to be simple. In the case of the national representative sample, three sociological variables played a role in determining ESDO and CSDO. Settlement size,

level of education and gender influenced both versions of SDO.

People living in smaller settlements were less prone to both versions of SDO, in contrast with those who live in urban settings.

How can we explain this relationship?

People living in urban environments are incessantly involved in anonymous encounters during which they have no other means of social perception than group categorization along class or/and ethnic lines. In contrast, people living in rural environments have personal experience of everyone they meet regularly in public places. Consequently, social perception does not require the application of ethnic or class categories because everyone knows everyone personally. People in rural settlements appear as individuals, as "Uncle Peti" or "Aunt Mari", instead of stereotypically as a "Gypsy" or a "manager", a "public servant", etc.

Level of education has a two-fold effect. In the case of ESDO: the lower the level of education, the stronger tendency to support group inequality on the basis of ethnic origin. In the case of CSDO: the reverse is true. Educated people are more prone to justify class inequality than people of a lower level of education.

Social dominance orientation is more pronounced among males than females. Women are less likely to support any form of social dominance orientation. This gender difference seems to indicate the perseverance of the sense of superiority among men, who are more likely to justify group superiority than women, who are for their part more likely to support equality between groups. This result shows that, at least in Hungary, the new authoritarianism cannot get rid of the gender legacy of the old authoritarianism, which was inseparable from masculine role expectations.

Members of the national radical group certainly cannot be considered as an ordinary sample. Being mainly men, they perpetuate a kind of social dominance orientation where superiority and inferiority prevail in ethno-nationalist terms. Conspicuously enough, members of the environmentalist group are devoid of such orientation.

Note

1 This article is a summary of the paper titled "New Authoritarianism – New Subculture" presented at the international conference "Youth (Sub)cultures in Changing Societies" organised by the Centre for Lifestyle Studies, Institute for International and Social Studies of the Tallinn University from 2 – 4 February 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia. The entire research paper can be requested from the author(s): **csepeli.gyorgy@tatk.elte.hu and muranyi.istvan@arts.unideb.hu**

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FR

Nouvel autoritarisme – nouvelle sous-culture

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A l'automne 2010, le projet « nouvel autoritarisme » a été lancé par le Centre d'études des conflits de l'Université de Budapest ELTE et la Faculté de sociologie et de politique sociale de l'Université de Debrecen. Les résultats de notre étude sur la question démontrent une nouvelle fois la persistance obsessionnelle de l'égalitarisme chez les Hongrois.

Lorsque l'on compare, entre un échantillon national et deux sous-échantillons, les taux moyens d'individus qui reconnaissent le rôle de l'orientation à la dominance sociale (ODS), on constate que l'égalitarisme est omniprésent dans l'ensemble des échantillons.

DE

Neuer Autoritarismus – neue Subkultur

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Im Herbst 2010 hat im Zentrum für Konfliktforschung (Centre of Conflict Research) an der Eötvös-Loránd-Universität (ELTE) in der Abteilung für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik an der Universität Debrecen das Projekt 'Neuer Autoritarismus' begonnen. Die Ergebnisse unserer Studie zum neuen Autoritarismus zeigen nochmals die Beharrlichkeit des zwanghaften Egalitarismus der Ungarn. Beim Vergleich der durchschnittlichen Zustimmungsprozentsätze für Aussagen zur Orientierung an sozialer Dominanz (Social Dominance Orientation, SDO) zwischen der nationalen Stichprobe und den beiden Teilstichproben haben wir festgestellt, dass in allen Stichproben der Egalitarismus grassierte.

RU

Новый авторитаризм – новая субкультура

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Осенью 2010 года проект «Новый авторитаризм» был начат совместно Центром исследований конфликтов Университета Будапешта имени Лоранда Этвеша и отделом социологии и социальной политики Университета Дебрецена. Результаты проведенного нами исследования по новому авторитаризму снова демонстрируют непоколебимость венгерской приверженности к эгалитаризму. Сравнивая средние уровни согласия с утверждениями SDO («ориентации на социальное доминирование») между национальной выборкой и двумя подвыбоками, мы обнаружили, что эгалитаризм существенно превалирует во всех выборках.

World Youth Report: Youth and Climate Change

Copyright © United Nations, 2010,
Printed by the United Nations, New York
United Nations publication: Sales No. E.10.IV.11
ISBN 978-92-1-130303-2

This publication (192 pages) is available for download at www.un.org/youth

This new World Youth Report, Youth and Climate Change published by the UN Programme on Youth highlights the important role played by youth in addressing climate change. The report also offers suggestions on how young people might be more effectively integrated as agents of change within the realm of climate change adaptation and mitigation.

The report states that it is essential young people contribute to the process of addressing climate change as it is: they who will feel its impact most acutely throughout their lives. In recent years, youth advocates have become more vocal and have been recognised as a constituency, albeit with probationary status, at the annual UN Framework Conventions on Climate Change. Young people must continue to move forward, strengthening their position as a stakeholder until they occupy a secure place in the decision making process. The report offers examples of youth organisations the world over who have made a difference in the fight against climate change, and suggests steps youth can take toward mobilising more collective action. Finally, the role of education is also underlined as critical in raising environmental awareness and promoting conscientious attitudes towards the environment and sustainable development amongst youth.

The **World Youth Report: Youth and Climate Change** represents a collaborative effort, made possible by the input and feedback received from experts in the field of youth and climate change and from partners throughout the United Nations system working on issues relating to youth development and climate change. The contributions from youth around the world were invaluable in the preparation of the Report.

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Understanding the appeal of risk for British youth on holiday in Ibiza: some ethnographic observations [1]

Introduction

I try and guess who's on the Ibiza flight while I'm sat at Birmingham airport. There's a group of three girls sat opposite me in the departure lounge. They're all in their early 20s and clearly ready to party. The one on the left dips into her hand luggage and pulls out three spotty plastic cups and an unopened bottle of Malibu. They're all laughing and the one in the middle gets a camera out as a big gulp is taken directly from the full bottle. The girl on the right stretches out a bangled-arm and takes her spotty cup of Malibu. She's already dressed for the sun with long, tanned legs exposed by high-cut denim shorts. She takes a swig, looks at me and winces; 'Fuck! That's a strong one!' I smile back and ask if they're Ibiza-bound. They all laugh and nod". [Field notes Tim Turner 'Birmingham airport' 25.7.10]

Later that day, Tim (Author and Interviewer) arrives at the hotel in San Antonio, Ibiza and wanders over to a local bar:

I sit on a tall stool at an outside bar. Cindy is fixing the drinks alone until midnight. She's a friendly 25 year-old from Leeds, with long hair dyed black and blonde. This is her third summer working in Ibiza. We chat about the local area and she tells me that the real 'madness' is only a fifteen-minute walk away [on Sunset Strip]. She doesn't like the scene there at all: 'I'm so embarrassed to be British sometimes…the lads are worse than the girls, they just drink as much as they can then end up fighting, it's like they're in a competition with each other'. She says drugs are 'incredibly easy' to get and the police turn a blind eye. I take the barfly role for a good three hours, chatting to Cindy and sometimes the promo duo James and Kerry (both self-confessed pill-heads). A steady stream of good-humoured single sex groups roll by, usually in fours and fives. Most punters go for €3 cocktails. The offer of a free shot of schnapps isn't refused in the three hours that I'm camped at the bar. Cindy, like all Ibiza bar crew, free-pours her drinks the European way; two bottles are held upside down in the glass simultaneously, for what seems like an eternity. These are big measures. She's armed with a string of shots around her neck, like some kind of bandit from a spaghetti western. Although a free shot only follows your first drink, Cindy sneakily hits me with a few extra freebies after each beer. It's midnight and the bar is starting to fill up. The free shots have hit me and I leave to get my head straight for tomorrow. [Field notes Tim Turner 'The bar' 25.7.10]

This was Tim's experience after only a few hours of arriving in Ibiza, a renowned holiday destination for British youth that has an international reputation for nightlife and easy access to illegal drugs. Historically, the economy of Ibiza relies heavily on the commercial promotion of clubs and DJs as well as the drug market. For British youth, the pull of Ibiza remains to be the hedonistic excess associated with the diverse dance music scene on the island. The little research that has been done in Ibiza has relied on survey data, with large-scale epidemiological studies constructing drug use as inherently pathological, with the young people who use them portrayed as vulnerable and in need of control. However, scholars within cultural studies argue that young people actually heighten the pleasures of intoxication by making informed, knowledgeable decisions to temper potential negative effects of substance use. There is currently a paucity of ethnographic analysis of the behaviour and perspectives of British youth holidaying in Ibiza.

This study adopts an ethnographic approach to show how the aggressive marketing of

hyper-intoxication in Ibiza enables British youth to construct identity within a late-modern context characterised by fluidity and ontological insecurity. The aims of the research project were to examine the drinking attitudes among British youth abroad; investigate reasons that underpin these attitudes; explore the role of bars and clubs, and tour operators in the promotion of alcohol. The research also explored narratives of drug use, sex and other risk behaviours. The research was carried out from June 2010 to July 2010.

Methods

This short research study employed an ethnographic methodology and included three stages. The first stage involved gathering relevant material on the subject area. The second stage used six pilot focus groups with young people who had experience of such holidays. The third and final stage used focus groups and observations in San Antonio, Ibiza. Observations were conducted in bars, clubs, beaches, and other tourist locations. These areas were public and as far as possible, activity was observed which would have occurred irrespective of the researchers' presence. Low inference descriptors (field notes) recorded precise detailed descriptions of participants and their activities. Researchers' thoughts and impressions accompanied these notes, as well as summaries of conversations.

Seventeen focus groups were undertaken in Ibiza (n=97, aged between 17 and 31) over one week. The focus groups were digitally recorded with signed/verbal consent. Purposive sampling strategy was used, with groups recruited into the study on an opportunistic basis. All participants were given pseudonyms. Once transcribed, interview and observation data was categorised thematically, with the key areas of investigation providing the overall framework for coding. Analyses were inductive, which meant that themes emerged from the data rather than being hypothesised.

Findings

❶ *Ibiza: a break from the banality of reality*

Daniel [Interviewer and author]: Why come to Ibiza?
GG 1: For the experience … Ibiza is the place to be.

For many young people, visiting Ibiza was an experience that should not be missed. Many participants had visited the island on multiple occasions, and for many it was an annual event. Many were driven to come out of a desire to experience the infamous super-clubs, the bars, the drugs and the general hedonistic atmosphere of Ibiza. The majority were willing to spend very large sums of money (€14,000 in one month between two young British men) to capture the experience:

Hugh [puts head in hands]: [I spent] £500 [in one day] … it's a joke, ain't it … see we always say 'we're gonna be careful [with money], we're gonna do this' but it never happens.

Constructing the Ibiza experience as a hiatus from the banality of work and home-life in the UK emerged as a consistent theme within the interviews. Typically, Neil said 'You are working all year … you're away for two weeks. You think about nothing else but you on holiday. Go away, get hammered, get laid [have sex].'

In the absence of the usual parameters that regulate behaviour, many young people saw their time in Ibiza as an opportunity to embrace anonymity and 'become' someone different, albeit temporarily. There appeared to be a symbolic code of secrecy amongst friends there, with the well-rehearsed 'what happens in Ibiza stays in Ibiza' mantra frequently expressed (ironically made public via constant live status updates on Facebook).

Man 1: There is no restriction here, back home there is restriction. Here, no one looks at you twice. [Back home you] Got to think about work, bills, pressure, but here [in Ibiza] you don't think about shit

Del Boy: Anything goes in Ibiza because you'll never see them again.

In Ibiza, it seems that British youth could change their identities and be whoever they wanted to be. In fact, behaviour that was often laden with variable degrees of risk was actively encouraged within the group context. In this conversation, these young Scottish men describe women as 'holes':

Dan: Right, so how many 'holes' have you had?

Scot 1: Two. Bad ones. Smelly ones, stinking fucking ones. Came all over them. Hookers.

Scot 2: Whatever happens in Ibiza, stays in Ibiza!

Scot 1: [High fives Scot 2] Fucking right. Fuck the STDs [sexually transmitted diseases]

They went onto explain how such activity at home in Scotland was avoided as this would represent a significant threat to their reputation. In Ibiza, however, such experiences seemed to facilitate strong group bonds as memorable Ibiza experiences were rehearsed, ready to be recounted with peers on their return. In another example, there was evidence of group bonds being reaffirmed via extreme levels of illicit drug use. We spent a period of eighteen-hours with a group of young men who used Ibiza to push intoxication to extreme limits. Their night in a super-club involved a heady combination of ecstasy, cocaine, alcohol and ketamine and culminated in an early morning trip to the beach:

"When they got back to the hotel at 7am they went to get the CD player and headed down to the beach ... As Simon took the Ketamine there was a thud as he hit the floor. His mates grabbed his arm and dragged him in the sea while he was still semi-conscious – laughing while they did it…When we return later that morning, we find Simon decorated in nail clippings, sun tan lotion and cigarette ash. He also cut his own hair with scissors" [Field notes Daniel Briggs 'Nightclubbing' 27.7.10 and 'The recovery' 28.7.10]

Some participants appeared to take a strange reassurance in their construction of the Ibiza 'experience' – often in the face if what appeared to be quite traumatic events. One group of young girls in our sample vividly described being molested by 'foreign men' and then assaulted by nightclub bouncers and then the police. Although this had happened only five-hours prior to our interview, the girls' anger about their victimization visibly altered as they recounted the events. It became clear that this was rapidly becoming a narrative that would be recounted over and over again to peers; similarly as a form of identity construction:

Blue eyed 1: In the car, on the way home from all this [the police station] I thought about it [facebook status]. Mines going to be: 'Arrested and assaulted in Ibiza … very typical me'.

Sunglasses 1: Mine is going to be: 'Welcome to fucking Ibiza … already been molested and arrested'.

Indeed, even in the police car, they had started to imagine a suitable facebook status to magically transform a traumatic night of assault and incarceration into a 'great story'.

❷ *Ibiza: the commodification of sex and hyper-intoxication*

Girl 1: I didn't want to get pissed [drunk] [but] there was nothing else to do. So we ended up getting pissed for nothing. There are no places to go.

Daniel: Is it designed for you to get pissed?

Girl 2: Yeah but I like that, fucking right I like that.

The data shows that British youth are heavily influenced and shaped by a social context that aggressively promotes alcohol, drugs and sex. So while young people actively engage in behaviours that they perceive as expected within the social context, so Ibiza endorses and facilitates these behaviours. However, it is

clear that whilst the island actively promotes this hedonistic carnival the police maybe less inclined to deal with the aftermath with any empathy.

In these few minutes spent on the main drinking strip in San Antonio, it was clear just how aggressively both alcohol and illicit drugs are marketed. While some career Ibiza goers (a few coming each summer for the last 12 years) suggested that there is now an increased regulation of the drug market, illegal substances nevertheless remain overtly available. Many young people receive drug offers on the streets, in alleyways, bars, cafes, clubs and hotels. If they are not drug aware before their trip to Ibiza, they certainly were by the end of their holiday:

Tim: How many times a day do you receive offers for drugs?

Matt: About ten times a day ... On the street, anywhere. Pills, coke, weed.

Many of our participants said that they knew drug dealers in Ibiza. Others just met with local dealers through word of mouth. Yet even with the rumoured increased regulation of drugs, little seemed to impact on how participants use drugs to enhance the atmosphere, the music, and the clubs in Ibiza – for many the euphoric carnival experience of dance music was inextricably linked to the use of dance drugs (i.e. ecstasy, cocaine, amphetamines, LSD, and ketamine).

A sea of people move before me, waving and dancing to techno music. Some hide their eyes (their state) with sunglasses. Others just close their eyes. Everyone seems to be worshipping the DJ who is placed like a god at the centre of the club. We walk through, passing droves of people who don't acknowledge us – they focus on the music ... I walk into the toilet ... They are all locked and a giant sniff is heard behind one ... They are taking drugs and this is confirmed when I start talking to the female cleaner: [In Spanish] "They are taking drugs [she says nonchalantly]... of course they are, every night the same".

More young people pile into club and there seems to be no regulation on numbers. I come into even closer physical contact with people ... Whereas these actions may cause some upset in the clubs back home [in the UK] there seems to be nothing but love in the club [Daniel Briggs Field notes 'Nightclubbing' 27.7.10].

The data also points to the aggressive promotion of sex:

As we approach the main drinking strip in San Antonio, promo reps and prostitutes maul us eager for business. Eventually we settle in a bar. It is now about 3am.

Tara: There is a girl walking around in her G-String [the stripper outside the gentleman's club], throwing herself at all the men and they are not having it [tolerating it] ... She is off her face on drugs [We look over and the girl cannot stand up straight. She rearranges her hair and pulls her G-String back into place].

It is now about 5am and I get completely harangued by [prostitutes] [who are] mostly African women ... They tug my arms, asking if they can 'suck me off' ... As I walk around trying to find everyone, strippers also approach me with sexual offers. [Daniel Briggs Field notes 'A night on the town' 26.7.10]

Several young men in the sample said they had sex with prostitutes – all said they were drunk at the time. They play down the risks, suggesting it is something they do for the 'experience'. Local businesses, to some extent, tolerate these behaviours because the British bring immense capital to the island. Many British youth spend hundreds of pounds every night in clubs, taxis, drugs, drink, and food. Therefore, the clubs, the bars, the taxi-drivers – the economy – need this income and therefore happily stomach the behaviours the British bring because it is good business.

Discussion

In view of its international reputation for nightlife, this study has attempted to provide an understanding into the reasons why British youth engage in high levels of alcohol use, drug use, risk and sex behaviours while on holiday in Ibiza. As researchers we were clearly involved to some extent in the social milieu, however we endeavoured to avoid influencing the direction of the data. Instead we attempted to document and understand the behaviour and perspectives of British youth, and how the social context shaped the 'Ibiza experience'. In doing so, the study provides a snapshot and some explanation of this particular culture.

The data show that British youth in Ibiza express themselves through high levels of alcohol consumption and drug use, and engage in risk and sex behaviours to create a series of experiences that can be shared to construct both group and individual identity. These alcohol/drug/sex events appear to liberate British youth from the banality of work and family constraints in the UK as they embrace the seduction of youthful risk taking. In Ibiza, young people are free to be whoever they want to be and to do whatever they want to do; an ethos eulogised within the lyrics of Loaded, Primal Scream's classic 1990 acid house track. It is our contention that Ibiza therefore represents a temporary 'wild zone', where young people are free of the usual parameters that constrain hedonistic excess. There is no 'weekend' and therefore no need to worry about work on a Monday morning. There is no reaction of disapproving parents (or partners) to be concerned about. Financial restraint appeared to be absent for many of the young people we met. Many young British tourists in Ibiza therefore seem to actively embrace a temporary loss of control that differs from the 'controlled-loss of control' identified by scholars in the UK.

British youth in Ibiza invest great importance in the experience irrespective of the cost (financially, practically, physically and mentally). Regardless of the consequences, these experiences appear to help construct life biographies and social discourse (both in reality and on social networking forums). These narratives are therefore integral to identity construction and are heavily shaped by the social context – in particular, by the aggressive marketing of alcohol, drugs and sex across the island.

Note

1 This article is a summary of the paper titled "Understanding the appeal of risk for British youth on holiday abroad: Some ethnographic observations" presented at the international conference "Youth (Sub) cultures in Changing Societies" organised by the Centre for Lifestyle Studies, Institute for International and Social Studies of the Tallinn University from 2 – 4 February 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia. The entire research paper can be requested from the authors: **t.turner@coventry.ac.uk; d.briggs@uel.ac.uk**

FR

Comprendre le goût du risque des jeunes Britanniques en vacances à Ibiza : quelques observations ethnographiques

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L'étude s'appuie sur une approche ethnographique pour démontrer comment, à Ibiza, le marketing agressif qui favorise l'intoxication alcoolique aiguë des jeunes britanniques les conduit à se construire une identité dans un contexte postmoderne que caractérisent le changement et une insécurité ontologique. L'objectif en était d'examiner les habitudes de consommation d'alcool des jeunes britanniques à l'étranger, d'étudier les raisons qui sous-tendent ces attitudes, d'explorer le rôle joué dans la promotion de l'alcool par les bars et les clubs, ainsi que les voyagistes. La recherche examine également les récits relatifs à la consommation de drogue et de sexe, et d'autres comportements à risque. Elle a été conduite de juin 2010 à juillet 2010.

DE

Die Attraktivität des Risikos für britische Jugendliche im Urlaub auf Ibiza verstehen: einige ethnographischen Beobachtunge

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Diese Studie verwendet einen ethnographischen Ansatz um zu zeigen, wie die aggressive Vermarktung von Koma-Trinken auf Ibiza britische Jugendliche in die Lage versetzt, in einem spätmodernen Kontext ihre Identität zu konstruieren, der sich durch Fluidität und ontologische Unsicherheit auszeichnet. Die Ziele des Forschungsprojekts waren die Untersuchung des Trinkverhaltens bei britischen Jugendlichen im Ausland; die Untersuchung der Ursachen, die diesem Verhalten zu Grunde liegen; die Ermittlung der Funktion von Bars und Clubs sowie der Reiseveranstalter bei der Förderung des Alkoholkonsums. Die Studie befasste sich auch mit Erzählungen über Drogenkonsum, Sex und andere Formen von Risikoverhalten. Die Studie wurde zwischen Juni und Juli 2010 durchgeführt.

RU

Понимание привлекательности риска для Британской молодежи во время отдыха на Ибице: некоторые этнографические наблюдения

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В данном исследовании используется этнографический подход, чтобы показать, как агрессивный маркетинг гипер-интоксикации на Ибице позволяет британской молодежи построить идентичность в условиях новейшего контекста, характеризуемого текучестью и онтологической небезопасностью. Цель исследовательского проекта заключалась в изучении отношения к употреблению спиртных напитков среди британской молодежи за рубежом; расследовании причин, лежащих в основе этих отношений; изучении роли баров и клубов и туроператоров в продвижении алкоголя. В исследовании также изучены нарративные писания приема наркотиков, сексуального поведения и других форм рисков. Исследование проводилось с июня по июль 2010 года.

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Youth values and lifestyles: aspects of depiction in Russian scientific journals (2000-2010)[1]

Recent years of rapid changes in Russian society lead to increasing of interest towards youth and different aspects of its representation. Although the discussion about permanent transformations is still in process, it seems like a time for first comprehensions and overviews. The situation of reforms gives a chance for critical evaluation of existing groundwork, stimulates development of new themes and approaches. But structuring and systematization of obtained results in the research field after two decades of transitions is really important for making further steps in development of Russian youth studies.

The idea of generalization became a ground for conducting an overview of wide explorative scene depicted in the scientific journal "Sociological Studies" ("Sociologicheskie issledovaniya") during the last ten years.

The choice of information source was very simple and clear. "Sociological Studies" ("Sociologicheskie issledovaniya") is one of the most serious and fundamental Russian journals in the field of sociological studies. It is a monthly research, social and political journal of the Russian Academy of Science founded in 1974. The journal issues articles on the theory and history of sociology, results of sociological research and field work in areas of economical, political and spiritual aspects of society in Russia and abroad. Also it contains study and methodology materials for teachers of sociology; bibliography reviews and information on research events (partial translation from the official web-site of the journal – **http://www.isras.ru/socis.html**).

This journal represents a specific kind of mainstream routs of contemporary sociology in Russia. The motivation for its analyses was the idea of re-construction of the framework of youth studies which are recognized by the official Russian Sociological Society. We overviewed 155 articles by sorting out main research directions and its content analysis. Traditional document analysis, with elements of content and structural analyses were implemented as key research methods.

Ten years is rather long period for creation of all-embracing equivalent suitable for all studied materials. For example, the interpretation of 90s changes was focused on political and social youth self-determination, borders between national interests and nationalism, tasks of new research paradigm construction. At the beginning of 2000s heritage of Soviet period, elements of nostalgia and protest connected with the previous epoch appeared. Ideas of "transition period", growth of "new" Russian "first" generation became arguments for confirmation of conducted research topicality.

The formal overview of articles with youth focus shows the dynamics of thematic development from problematic field of crime and drugs in the beginning of 2000s to youth involvement into new economic, social and political processes at the end of the decade.

The youth system of values, its' content and dynamic are dominant themes in the most observed papers. In accordance with frames of contemporary (sub)cultural and lifestyles discussions the first tendency of Russian approach can be marked as ***youth values versus (sub)cultures/lifestyles***. In the last ten years the issue of values was prevailing in comprehension of youth theme. Even the task of sociology of youth was formulated as study of youth social and cultural guidelines and orientations in logic of values scale.

Depicted values can be divided into two trends – "external" and "internal". The "external" values are constructed by scholars and considered by them as really important, playing significant roles for youth: healthy way of life, education and career choices. "Internal" values are sorted out of sociological qualitative and quantitative data: family, religion, national identity, moral values.

Social and political inquiries define tendencies of increasing of attention towards some kind of values. This fact can be confirmed by series of articles devoted to values of family, healthy way of life education and profession choices in overviewed journals.

The following values are considered as first-priority:

- **Family:** In accordance with findings of articles with wide variety of themes and approaches family is a value of a high importance for Russian youth. It is observed in general, without special subdivision into parents and youth families. This theme accompanied by investigations of youth sexual behavior and culture, marriage attitude and fertility issues.
- **Health:** The main attention is paid to absence of connection between healthy way of life and value of health and long life among youth. An additional idea is the correlation between healthy way of life and values of criminal world. Healthy way of life becomes authoritative choice of referent criminal groups and ground for perspective types of youth self-identification.
- **Education:** Scholars discuss issues of motivation for choice of education, special features of governmental (free) and private (for fees) education and create students typologies in accordance with major disciplines and fields of further careers choices. The main research finding displays instrumental character and value of education for youth. It supplies replacement of real content of education by applied tasks of social and economic achievements in contemporary society.
- **Religion:** It is really not a very important component of youth scale of values. Orthodoxy in all its representations is a dominant theme of papers examining religious values. Research findings show the probability of comparison of Orthodox values with Russian youth culture. As a conclusion we can see cultural, historical, institutional (social and normative) aspects prevalence over moral or ethic regulations of religion.
- **Western values "Reach the success in life, live in 'kaif', get everything and straight away!":** Even articulation of "Western values" supposes some kind of contradiction with "non-Western values" and demands separate discussion, which would be later.

In spite of the dominance of value approach in Russian youth studies some research materials focused on youth (sub)cultures and life styles can be found. Russian youth subcultures are mostly examined in comparison with western analogues and prototypes. As reason of development of Russian youth subcultures scholars consider political and economic instability, special routes of social mobility, anomie as a lost of normative values basis, necessity for identity creation.

Youth life styles are studied through following groups of features: social and economic (youth employment, housing conditions, incomings, education, career and vocational mobility); moral and ethic (gender and family relations, political and civil activities, and worldview); daily life (habits, music choices, pleasure time and communication). In the whole components of life styles depicted in observed articles partly repeat youth scale of values.

The next tendency of sociological approach in Russian youth studies is the Regional focus. Anyway it can be explained by the geographical character of the Russian Federation with large territories and impossibility to apply only one research scheme towards different areas. In ten years sample there is a wide range

of regions: large megalopolises – Moscow and Saint-Petersburg; regional and district centers Ekaterinburg, Toliyatti, Murom, Gorno-Altaisk, Tula, etc.; relatively homogeneous and claim regions – Kalmykia, Siberia, Yakutiya, Khabarovsk territory; multiethnic and multi religious territories – Buryatiya and Chita, North Caucasus, Krasnodar Territory, Far East, Tatarstan, Primorye, Mordovia; and also some former Soviet Republics – Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Mogilev Region (Belorussia), Lithuania.

The main issues of discussion can be marked as strategies of construction of ethnical and civil identities in the regions, creation of new forms of patriotism, cultural and religious self-determination. Special attention is paid to comparative analysis of rural and urban youth, examination of territorial influence, stratification of cities' spaces in accordance with types of youth groups and movements dissemination.

Values and regional schemes are filled in by content which can be united into two mostly actualized research discourses:

"Critical approach" and "Improvement focus"

Most of articles and research reports are oriented on exploring roots of overcoming of youth behavior/values/way of thinking, etc. deviated "norms". The aim of such discussion is to create grounds for achievement and implementation of "correct" strategies in work with youth. This approach is presented in following subdivisions:

► Deviant behavior

Deviant behavior is depicted through research of different kinds of denial, which are explained by changes occurred in the entire society. Youth groups and (sub)cultures are studied as "positive" in social participation and "negative" with marginal and even asocial behavior. Besides criminal groups, such youth representations as "Emo", "Roleviki", "Flesh-mobs", "R-n-b", "Tolkienists", "Goths" and others are considered as "negative" ones. ***There is no clear system of concrete criterions of classification and scholars are focused on ideas of improvement instead of structural research and implying understanding strategies.***

► Opposition of Western and Russian values/decreasing of values level in society

The basis for such research projects and results interpretation is an initial idea of decreasing of moral level in Russian society. For example, analyzing punk scene the author of the paper in Vol.2 2010 implemented such construction: "Punk's way of life is the same unspiritual as the way of life of the whole contemporary mass. Punk subculture can be considered as a subculture only because less people are involved into it, but in the whole it's as low, anesthetic and primitive as kitsch-culture".

Western "market values" (pragmatism, materialism, consumerism) are depicted as a source of danger which can destroy ethnical cultural and moral basics of Russian culture, articulated by Russian philosophers of 20th century, implemented in Russian mentality, depicted in Russian rural regions ("glubinka"). Such values as maternity, respect towards seniors, collective responsibility, patriotism and antibourgeois attitude are considered as "traditional" ones.

In the whole this research approach is close to the phenomenon of "moral panics", actualizing the ideas of deep systematic social degradation as a result of crises of universal social values, generally important ideals and mass development of consumer interests in Russian society.

► Elements of destruction in youth culture

Political forces, criminal world, mass-media, IT and popular culture are considered as destructive elements, providing negative influence on Russian youth.

It is possible to suggest several quotations depicting music as a criterion of youth evaluation

for illustration of destructive factors: "rock music in 90s has lost its protest character and became less a voice of contra-culture and more manifestation of social infantilism, lingered over "teenager position" (Vol. 3, 2000); "today we can observe youth weakness for light music genres which are the parts of popular culture instead of high (elite) music culture (classical, national, etc.) which plays an important role in the process of development of universal values and is not in demand among youth" (Vol. 6, 2006); "on youth music concerts (rock-, pop-, rap-) mostly primitive music can be found. Such music is aggressive, it destroys psychics, disharmonies inner world, provokes negative asocial forms of behavior" (Vol. 10, 2009).

Overcoming of negative influence on youth and prevention of its further involvement into "marginal" and "destructive" trends scholars see in restoring government youth policy, creation integrated program for youth education and socialization and new forms and models of collective life.

Because of themes diversity of observed materials it is not easy to assign clear theoretical basis for further youth studies. Total prevalence of quantitative methods with use of certified methods of related sciences (i.e. psychology) and different types of data analyzing include only few ideas for **theoretical models**.

► Youth movements versus youth (sub) cultures

The importance of definition of difference between youth movements and youth subcultures is obvious for this approach. Structural analysis of both phenomenon leads to the following conclusion: firstly, youth movements are connected with the mechanisms of self-organization while youth subcultures can be adopted from (in situation of global world – exported) or artificially created as a commercial or political project. Secondly, the important feature of youth movements is special worldview position in contradiction with subcultures, based on musical scenes and lifestyles. *Such approach allows studying Russian youth independently from western subcultural conceptions and in accordance with peculiarities of social and cultural space.*

► Stratification as research approach

Stratification approach has several representations. Firstly it is based on more traditional generation approach, which study inter-generation connections, roles and positions of youth in renewal of social structure. Secondly, stratification is based on principle of creation and analyzing of symbolical borders of social and youth space (familiar/stranger). Youth stratification is implemented in accordance with structure and content (youth groups and life styles), territory (central districts and suburbs), history and culture (traditional culture, youth culture).

► Paradoxical character (irony) as a framework for youth research

Paradoxical aspects of self-determination and behavior can be used as a basis for new approach in youth studies. It is grounded on the idea of paradoxical integrity, when the "future situation image" becomes more important than values scale, created by surroundings (generation).

► "Youth about youth"

The several papers which belong to post-graduate students display specific elements of youth cultures. Among such elements are DJ culture, toys and its role in students' everyday life and some others. The main distinction of this approach is use of qualitative methods (semi-structured interview, observation, verbal history).

Conducted analyses permit to underline the fact that through the last ten years the theme of youth became integral part of Russian sociological scene. At the same time the breadth of research views and approaches did not favor the creation of systematic youth studies in sociology. Methodological and regional diversity, theoretical instability,

author's voluntarism made impossible the comparison of obtained results.

Summarizing conducted work it's important to raise the question how we can get in touch with diverse youth (sub)cultures and does it make sense of development of new approach in Russian youth studies?

It is also important to think over lagoons which still are empty in studying youth (sub)cultures in Russian research discourse. Although there are many research practices most of them are still focused on overcoming youth deviance and looking forward at some "normal", "right" ways of social and cultural development. Evaluation discourse prevents from understanding diverse youth (sub)cultures and developing new approach in Russian youth studies.

Note

1 This article is a summary of the paper titled "Youth values and lifestyles: aspects of depiction in Russian scientific journals (2000-2010)" presented at the international conference "Youth (Sub) cultures in Changing Societies" organised by the Centre for Lifestyle Studies, Institute for International and Social Studies of the Tallinn University from 2 – 4 February 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia. The entire research paper can be requested from the author: **aglukhanyuk@yahoo.com**

FR

Valeurs et modes de vie des jeunes : leurs diverses représentations dans les magazines scientifiques russes (2000-2010)

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Ces dernières années, les rapides changements intervenus dans la société russe ont généré un intérêt croissant pour la jeunesse et ses différentes représentations. Même si le débat sur la transformation continue se poursuit, le temps est venu des premières tentatives de conceptualisation et d'étude générale. Le climat de réformes offre la possibilité d'une évaluation critique du travail mené, tout en stimulant le développement de nouveaux thèmes et approches. Mais, après deux décennies de transition, la structuration et la systématisation des résultats obtenus sur la question de la jeunesse sont essentielles pour que la recherche russe progresse encore. Les analyses conduites permettent de mettre en évidence que, ces dix dernières années, le thème de la jeunesse s'est imposé sur la scène sociologique russe. Pour autant, la multitude des conceptions et des approches scientifiques ne favorise pas l'étude sociologique systématique de la jeunesse. De plus, la diversité méthodologique et régionale, l'instabilité des théories et le volontarisme des auteurs rendent impossible la comparaison des résultats obtenus.

DE

Jugendwerte und Lebensstile: Aspekte ihrer Darstellung in wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften in Russland (2000-2010)

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Die vergangenen Jahre mit ihren schnellen Veränderungen in der russischen Gesellschaft haben zu einem steigenden Interesse an der Jugend und verschiedenen Aspekten ihrer Darstellung geführt. Obwohl die Diskussion über dauernde Veränderungen noch weitergeht, scheint die Zeit für erste Einblicke und Übersichten gekommen zu sein. Der Zustand der Reformen bietet die Möglichkeit zu einer kritischen Bewertung der vorhandenen Basisarbeiten und fördert die Entwicklung neuer Themen und Ansätze. Aber eine Strukturierung und Systematisierung der in der Forschung gefundenen Ergebnisse ist nach zwei Jahrzehnten des Übergangs von großer Bedeutung, um weitere Schritte für die Entwicklung der Jugendforschung in Russland einzuleiten. Die durchgeführten Analysen erlauben uns, die Tatsache hervorzuheben, dass das Thema Jugend in den vergangenen zehn Jahren zu einem untrennbaren Bestandteil der soziologischen Forschung in Russland geworden ist. Gleichzeitig war die Bandbreite der Ansichten und Ansätze in der Forschung für den Aufbau einer systematischen Jugendforschung in der Soziologie nicht günstig. Methodische und regionale Vielfalt, theoretische Instabilität und Voluntarismus der Autoren haben den Vergleich der gefundenen Ergebnisse unmöglich gemacht.

RU

Молодежные ценности и стили жизни: аспекты презентации в Российских научных журналах (2000 – 2010)

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Последние годы стремительных изменений в российском обществе привели к увеличению интереса к молодежи и различным аспектам ее репрезентации. Несмотря на то, что дискуссия о непрерывном процессе трансформаций все еще актуальна, нам представляется возможным подвести первые итоги и сделать обзор существующих направлений исследования вопросов молодежи. Ситуация изменчивости и реформ позволяет критически оценить имеющиеся наработки, является источником новых тем для анализа и стимулом для развития новых подходов. По прошествии двух десятилетий можно сделать первые выводы, которые не только позволят структурировать и систематизировать имеющиеся данные, но и наметят пути и перспективы развития гуманитарного знания о молодежи в России. Проведенный анализ позволяет говорить о том, что в прошедшее десятилетие тема молодежи стала неотъемлемым компонентом социологической сцены. При этом широта исследовательских взглядов и подходов не способствовала созданию системного социологического знания о молодежи. Разрозненность методик, обилие региональной специфики и теоретическая неопределенность, нередко и исследовательский волюнтаризм авторов привели к невозможности сопоставления полученных данных.

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Bulgarian youths and the symbolic capital in the narratives about subcultures[1]

This article is the result of a collective research on subcultural phenomena in Bulgaria, based on two types of collected data: in-depth semi-structured interviews (15-25 years old) and internet research in online discussion forums of subcultures[2]. The analysis will not interpret a specific subculture, but the narratives about subcultures as a whole, so it will focus on the goals, strategies and effects of the process of speaking about subcultures and the "subcultural" as an action.

What made us a strong impression from the interviews with youths was the easy way they made subcultural maps: which are the subcultures, where are they, who they like and hate, how they dress, what is their attitude etc. At the same time the subcultural identification for each respondent was definitely forced – they all claim to have their "own" style and the fact that their friends group includes people with different musical, stylistic, ideological preferences. Then why the narratives about subcultures remain so many, why boundaries between different youth groups seem so clear?

It turned out that subcultures as we know them in the sense of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Bulgarian case exist mainly at discursive level. Most often they are not personally experienced, but only discussed with friends and precisely the "knowledge" or "expertise" about subcultural styles (even if we look at it only as a translation of "western descriptions") constitutes a symbolic capital, derived from the fact of being "modern". This seems close to these youths idea of the West. They do not have references to a recent past when they did not feel as a "periphery". In this sense the "imitative" perception is rooted and stays resistant. Thus, imported from the West, subcultural models are appropriated as "high" or "elite" culture.

On the other hand, the idea of dominance, developed in the subcultural theory of the Birmingham CCCS on the basis of class distinctions, is interpreted in Bulgaria in a framework of culturalist distinctions. Respondents typically distinguish a "unified" subculture (as they see it) of the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria – Roma and Turkish minorities. Here on the discursive level, the power relationships are interpreted through the variety of subcultures of the Bulgarians equaling the successful adaptation of western models, as opposed to the practices of other ethnic groups who have not appropriated these models and therefore stay out of the processes of "modernization" (hence a hidden negative evaluation of these groups).

Mass culture

To be part of a subculture in Bulgaria is considered to be elitist. This fact could be explained mostly by respondents' desire to distinguish themselves from "the masses". It was interesting to see that everybody had a quick and obvious answer to the question which was for him/her the mass culture – the so-called *chalga* culture – after the name of the pop-folk music style chalga, an expression with pronounced negative connotation in Bulgaria. By *chalga culture* youths usually understand specific way of dressing, accessories and haircut (there are many detailed narratives about the look of the woman and the man *chalgari*); it also includes the idea of characteristic status roles (woman takes profits of man's welfare and at the same time is very strong and independent).

Chalga culture is even seen as a collective image of "vulgarisation" ("chalgisation") of Bulgarian

nation. *Chalga* plays the role of that basic and corporal, back to which everybody returns at the end of the parties, when cultural sanctions lose their strength. However this music is unanimously chosen as the discursive enemy of each cool young person. The negative image is fed up from many internet sites, especially dedicated to the *anti-chalga* subject. In the perspective of statements we have already made, *chalga* is taught to be something native, Bulgarian or from the Balkans, and definitely not as something western, modern, global.

Parental culture

It should be outlined that young people cannot articulate some clear distinctions to the culture of their parents' generation. Even more, it is exactly this previous generation who was agent of the first subcultural actions that in some way have revolutionalized the communist idea of a model youth. Today their children usually speak about similar music tastes, political preferences, ideas.

The answers of the question how was their generation different from that of their parents, were not related to the force or the authenticity of their subcultural participation. Even the opposite, what is interesting is that almost unanimously youth define older subcultures (those of their parents) as "true" (these are for example the groups of rockers and metals); and express much more doubts about newer groups, which for them have bigger tendency to become "mass" culture and in that way to lose their subcultural charm. In this sense we could conclude that distinctions from parental culture are made in its favor. Its revolt seems much more true, nowadays all respondents note with regret that it is difficult to speak about an "ideology" of the community, that it is even difficult to speak about community, because there are too many inauthentic members who just "pose". "Poser" is actually the most frequently repeated word in the interviews.

Subcultural seems to be part of a lifestyle. At the same time for youths a "true" subculture needs to have an ideology. In this way there are two types of subcultures – the modern and the "really alternative". As an example of the second is the independent punks forum **http://subculture.4umer.com/** which "represents a whole epoch for the subcultures", according to the statement of one of its moderators. It considers itself to be the meeting place for different "alternative subcultures" such as Punk, Oy!, RAC, Reggae/Ska.

It is in this forum that we find the most animate political discussions, alongside sharing information about music and forthcoming concerts. Members express the idea that their subcultural identification makes them adepts of a certain ideology, which is both social (related to their social origin) and political ("left" or "right"). It seems like their auto-identification as a subculture is related to the understanding that this is a collective form of resistance. As we have already said, it can be suggested that only these "true" or "alternative subcultures" share the old romantic vision of the symbolic rebel, inherent in the neo-marxist theory of subcultures.

Dominant culture

The main paradox we found in our research was the fact that on the discursive level the first generation in Bulgaria, socialized online and with pale memories from the totalitarian regime, paradoxically could see the image of dominant culture in the parents' narratives about the normative culture of communism. These youths have heard much about sanctions at school if you do not have a neat uniform, if your haircut is longer than admitted, if you are conductor of western influence. In this sense the discourse of "liberty", which often is not politically based, but rather conceptualized as a generational specificity, find a fertile soil. Another discourse, simultaneously related to the opposition to the past and the technical possibilities of the future is that of "unlimited access to information and goods". Naturally it exists in a global level, but could be easier adapted ideologically as a generational emancipation in post-communist countries, where the discursive legitimating of sanctioning and censuring refusal seems obvious.

At the same time, however, in contrast to socialist normative cultural system of values (and corresponding symbolic and physical repression), the generation of young Bulgarians born around 1989 considers the period after the fall of communism, the so-called 'transition', as a time of cultural anarchy, when the collapse of political and economic structures is accompanied by a deterioration of the educational system, an aesthetic of the vulgar, and moral decay. "I'm sick of this! I feel like the days of my youth will be gone in some kind of transition that nobody knows what it is and no one knows what is happening. I don't like this and I went to this protest [a rally in front of the Parliament on January 14th, 2009]"[3].

There are at least two possible paths for youths to build their opposition to the idea of the normative culture in communist period. The first is the development of so-called "project culture", which is very popular and prestigious among young people in Bulgaria. The second, often connected with this project culture, is the new idea of political and civil subject whose actions should distinguish from the manifestations of former generation, so to create new forms of resistance, not related to old political organizations and institutions neither to traditional media.

In a research on youth protests in Bulgaria in the period from 2006 to 2010 we observed types of organization of protests through the means of digital media and in particular of their spreading as information in Facebook. Actually it turned out that there are no organizations to support such initiatives, no leaders, no political parties involved. Just one user (or group of friends) creates "an event" in the social network and distributes it among personal networks of acquaintances, they do the same and so on. Discussions on event's page usually happen on the eve of the protest, confirmed guests reach usually about one thousand.

After the end of the protest, however, the initiative as well as the discussion and the event page stop functioning. Protests mediated through Facebook are much more a result of the coordination of individual efforts than a preliminary mediatized collective action. The digital technologies mediated operations remain isolated events and although they are numerous, they vanish very fast, the same way they appear and are no more than immediate reactions against unacceptable public policies.

Such kind of protests demonstrate another discursive distinction from the idea of communist normative culture – today "political" is a "dirty", "unprestigious" word, associated only with corruption and personal benefits, with vain promises.

The new young describe themselves in a different way: she/he is someone "who cares" and for whom going to protests is related to individual consciousness. As a result, these civil causes could be only general enough – to save Bulgarian nature, against phone and internet tapping, for animal protection, against genetically modified food, causes which could hardly provoke any opposition because of they rely on universal human values. This is exactly the reason they are indisputably prestigious. That is why they are initiated and lead by "more modern", "more European" subcultures. But such subcultures which differ from the idea of communal, restricted, organized and think themselves rather as provisional groups of interests in which "subcultural" is just one prestigious label.

Notes

1 This article is a summary of the paper titled "Digital media and subcultures: ‚real' and ‚virtual' resistance and escape" presented at the international conference "Youth (Sub) cultures in Changing Societies" organised by the Centre for Lifestyle Studies, Institute for International and Social Studies of the Tallinn University from 2 – 4 February 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia. The entire research paper can be requested from the author: **nia_neykova@abv.bg**

2 "New youths, new cultures, new causes" project, MON and Sofia University, 2009-2012.

3 Interview with M.L., 20 years old, taken on 14.04.2009.

FR

Les jeunes bulgares et la symbolique des narratifs sur les sous-cultures

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Cet article, fruit d'une recherche collective sur le phénomène des sous-cultures en Bulgarie, repose sur deux types de données, collectées au moyen d'une part d'entretiens semi-directifs approfondis (15-25 ans) et, d'autre part, de recherche en ligne sur les forums de discussion des sous-cultures. Cette analyse n'interprète pas une sous-culture spécifique mais, globalement, les récits au sujet des sous-cultures ; elle est donc focalisée sur les objectifs, les stratégies et les effets des processus narratifs sur les sous-cultures et le « sous-culturel » en tant qu'action.

DE

Bulgarische Jugendliche und das symbolische Kapital in den Erzählungen über Subkulturen

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Dieser Artikel ist das Ergebnis gemeinsamer Forschungen zu Subkultur-Phänomenen in Bulgarien und stützt sich auf zwei Arten von gesammelten Daten: semi-strukturierte Tiefen-Interviews (mit 15 – 25-Jährigen) und Internetstudien in Online-Diskussionsforen über Subkulturen. Die Analyse interpretiert keine spezielle Subkultur, sondern die Erzählungen über Subkulturen insgesamt, und konzentriert sich daher auf die Ziele, Strategien und Wirkungen des Prozesses, über Subkulturen und das „Subkulturelle" als Handlung zu sprechen.

RU

Болгарская молодежь и символический капитал в описаниях субкультур

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Данная статья является результатом коллективного исследования феномена субкультур в Болгарии, которое основано на двух типах сбора данных: углубленных полуструктурированных интервью (для возраста 15-25 лет) и интернет-исследований дискуссионных форумов по субкультурам в режиме он-лайн. В ходе анализа интерпретировались не особые субкультуры, а нарративы по поводу субкультур в целом, поэтому он был сосредоточен на целях, стратегиях и действиях процесса разговора о субкультурах и «субкультурном» как действии.

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Doryoku and Youth Cultures in Japan[1]

1. Introduction

Doryoku[2] is a concept often used to explain the Japanese society. The Japanese society is said to value Doryoku, and the concept has been treated as a principle and social norm. However, recently, the traditional form of Doryoku has lost its value in the society.

Using quantitative data analyses, this study investigates whether contemporary Japanese youths consider Doryoku to be valuable from the perspective of the youths' hobbies and status (such as residence, gender, educational background, and stratification). The analyses reveal the position of the youth in the contemporary Japanese society and describe the implications to study transformations in Japanese society and the contemporary youth in late modernity.

2. Previous Studies and Research Questions

The value of Doryoku depends on the Japanese society's educational and selective systems. As Takeuchi (1995) described, to enable maximum participation in entrance exams, structures and mechanisms have been developed to assuage losers' feelings of dissatisfaction and rekindle their motivations. In the sociological sense, the function of Doryoku in communications is to appease and encourage losers (e.g., "You did not achieve a good result, but you did your best! That is, your result may actually indicate a better chance next time." "Doryoku would not let you down. Doryoku would be rewarded." "Apart from people who are born talented, the point that only Doryoku is one's property is universal for everyone and all through the ages, isn't it?") Doryoku is a universal property, and its notion of equality encourages many people not to give up participating in competitions.

However, since the end of the 20th century, the Japanese society has shifted toward other values in the late modern society (e.g., globalization, informatization). Using data from the National Survey of Social Stratification and Social Mobility, Sato (2000) analyzed social mobility in Japan and pointed out that it has become closed and stratified. Yamada (2004) argued that the contemporary Japanese society can be called "**Kibō Kakusa Shakai** (Society of Hope-Disparity)," indicating that losers in the society have less confidence to work hard to bridge the economic gap; the social challenge is how to recover losers' motivation. Kariya (2001) revealed an **incentive divide** by analyzing the amount of time spent studying. In addition, Honda (2005) explained the rise of new competencies in the late modern meritocracy (in her original term, "**hyper-meritocracy**") and maintained that the social image of Doryoku linked to egalitarianism was being transformed to an ability-based image.

These arguments recognize that Doryokou emphasizes equality and motivation in the Japanese society, and it assumes a meritocratic meaning. Through most of the 20th century, belief in its equality prompted winners to perform more Doryoku and encouraged losers to accept defeat and not to drop out of a competition. Some studies have linked the transformation of Doryoku to the existence and widening of disparity between winners and losers. From these studies, I define the transformation of Doryoku as a semantic transformation from a strong sense of hard work to one of effort. Nowadays, people who can adapt to the sense of effort tend to succeed, whereas those who cannot adapt tend to fail.

In addition, particularly with respect to the problem of unemployment among young people, which began in the 1990s, disparity and lack of confidence, as Yamada mentioned, are critical issues for the younger generation because Japanese society (in addition to other Asian societies) has adopted a seniority system. Although these norms and rules have weakened to some degree today, they still remain strong. Additionally, major parts of the Japanese social security system are based on the above traditional educational and employment system. Thus, it can be inferred that from the perspective of social and generational structure, young people are disadvantaged. In particular, a widening disparity is observed in the younger generation. It is suggested that young people are divided between effort-oriented and traditional hard-work-oriented groups, and the problem of disparity is linked to the difference in the meaning of Doryoku as an object of confidence. This denotes the problem from the viewpoint of the increased gap between people who can adapt to the late modern meritocracy and those who cannot. The increased gap will not make some people believe the importance to do things step by step and respect some gains in processes to goals.

The previous studies are significant in that they reveal the transformation of Doryoku's value as a generational structural problem. However, many previous studies lacked attention given to the following two points.

First, they often focused on and studied social structural aspects; however, few described the real everyday lives and cultures of the youth related to socializing and the shaping of their values. In other words, many studies have considered macro or structural perspectives but few have considered micro or interactive perspectives that focus on Doryoku's meanings for the people or on the processes of everyday communications.[3]

Second, much of the previous research treats only some educational and occupational cultures, not distinctive youth cultures. During the age of the rapid economic growth and high-pressure entrance examinations (until the 1970s), single-track socialization was presumed. In this case, the issue of Doryoku was one of education, home, and community in the standardized life course. These were the only places for socialization. However, since the 1980s, as Miyadai (1997) argued, areas of adolescent cultures and activities were no longer limited to school, home, and the community; their areas were becoming commercialized. Some traditional studies grasped this transformation simply as the market's penetration of the worlds of innocent children and adolescents. These studies considered that shaping youths' values related to social norms like Doryoku is an issue of socialization by adult societies. **In addition, youth cultures in Japan lost their nature of resistance**. Hence, the focusing on sociality in youth cultures weakened.[4]

This study tries to examine the possibility of youth cultures because these days, many young people spend time in their hobby worlds, and these worlds are places for socializing.

In consideration of Doryoku, if this study confines the discussion to the second point above, it is necessary to examine the following two research questions:

1) **Are young people's values of Doryoku divided into two oriented groups? If so, what type of young people support each type of Doryoku?**
2) **Are meritocracy and disparity as the differences in values of Doryoku merely the problem of educational and economical gaps? Do youth cultural factors relate to them?**

3. Research Method

3.1 Data Set

The analyses in this study use "Wakamono no Seikatsu to Bunka [The Survey of Youth Lives and Cultures]" data set. This survey was conducted in 2009 by the Social Survey Office[5] in the Faculty of Humanities of Matsuyama University

for understanding youth cultures and values by comparing the urban and rural youth. The areas surveyed were Suginami ward and Matsuyama city. The former is in Tokyo, the Japanese capital, and the latter is a rural city.[6] The sample included approximately 1,000 people aged 20[7] in each area by the stratified random sampling method. The response rate for Suginami was 30.8% (308[8] responses) and that of Matsuyama was 25.0% (250 responses). The survey covered only 20-year-olds for the following reasons: (i) to minimize small gaps by age and (ii) it is assumed that at this age, people have adjusted to their current environment after graduating from high school.

3.2 Measures

The measures used in the analyses are described below:

- **Face sheet items**
  Gender (male/female), marital status (single/married), level of education (less than college or university/at least some college or university), occupation (student/not student), standard of living (high/relatively high/relatively low/low), disposable income (less than 30,000 yen/greater than 30,000 yen)

- **Hobby**
  We asked the following question, using a list of 32 hobby items: What are your current hobbies? Please choose all that are applicable from among the following items (multiple answers), and then choose your most important hobby (single answer).

- **Value placed on Doryoku (the Doryoku scale)**
  We asked the following question. Here, (a) represents the effort-oriented group and (b) represents the hard-work-oriented group.8 If you can, do you want to become (a) a person who always achieves results irrespective of whether he/she performs Doryoku or (b) a person who always performs Doryoku even though he/she does not always achieve good results? Scale: 1: (a) 2: relatively (a) 3: relatively (b) 4: (b)

3.3 Analytic Plan

Analyses were conducted according to the following procedure:

1) Check the sample characteristics: check face sheet items.
2) Check the distribution of the Doryoku scale.
3) Conduct factor analysis, extract factors of hobbies, and calculate factor scores.
4) Conduct multiple regression analysis whose dependent variable is the Doryoku scale. Use factor scores calculated in step (3) as independent variables.

4. Results

4.1 Sample Characteristics

Sample characteristics were examined for both areas. No statistical differences by area are found for gender, marital status, or disposable income. However, for the other items, the differences between the two areas are statistically significant. Compared with the youth in Matsuyama, the youth in Suginami are more likely to live with their parent(s), have high educational careers (also, there are more students), and estimate their standard of living as high. These are predictable consequences resulting from differences between the urban and rural youth; however, the analysis verifies that predictable consequences are true.

4.2 Youths' Views on Doryoku

With respect to the scale of Doryoku, as described above, (a) can be regarded as the effort-oriented type, which is Doryoku in the new age, and (b) can be regarded as the hard-work-oriented type, which is traditional Doryoku. The results show that the rates of (a) and (b) in the two areas are approximately equal. However, the rates of "relatively (a)" and "relatively (b)" differ between them. A chi-squared test reveals that this difference is statistically significant (5% level). The response "relatively (a)" accounts for 30.3% of the total number of respondents in Suginami and 22.3% of the total number in Matsuyama. "Relatively (b)" account for 20.2% of the total number in Suginami and 27.5% of

the total number in Matsuyama. Based on this finding, it can be inferred that the urban youth tend to support Doryoku that is effort-oriented, whereas rural youth tend to support traditional Doryoku that is hard-work-oriented.

4.3 Japanese Youth Hobbies

Factor analysis was conducted to statistically classify youth hobbies. First, I examined the distribution of question items of 32 hobbies. The most popular answer on the multiple answer question was "listening to music, audio" (Suginami: 72.3%, Matsuyama: 66.0%). Other popular answers included "fashion," "comics," "movies, theatrical shows" (Suginami), "internet" (Suginami), "games" (Matsuyama), and "karaoke" (Matsuyama). On the single answer question, the popular answers were "playing sports," "listening to music, audio," and "fashion," among others. Based on these results, we find that "listening to music, audio" is widely supported by the youth in both areas, although it does not rank first on single answer question. On the other hand, "playing sports" is not among the top five items; however, it ranks first on single answer question. This may be related to the time required for each hobby: it is easy to listen to music while simultaneously working on other tasks; hence, this is a popular hobby.

Next, the hobbies were statistically classified. For the factor analysis, I selected the hobby items whose value in the multiple answer item was greater than 10% in one of the two areas. Then, after filtration, 22 hobbies remained. Using these hobbies, I extracted factors using the principal factor method and varimax rotation. I define the standard of adopting factors as an eigenvalue score of over 1.0. If a hobby item has a factor loading of over 0.35 then I consider it a variable to contribute a factor.[9] The results yield seven hobby factors from the Matsuyama sample: "indoor," "cooking," "consumption," "audience, sports," "saunter," and "hoodlum," and eight hobby factors from the Suginami samples: "otaku," "traveling," "urban pop," "cooking," "sports," "reading," "musician," and "gamble." In both areas, the factor including anime, comics, and games (these are part of the famous culture of "cool Japan" and "otaku" contents) has the highest eigenvalue score. However, some differences also exist. For example, in Suginami, the factor of reading is an ingenerate one; in contrast, in Matsuyama, items regarding reading are included in "otaku" factor.

4.4 Effect of Hobbies on the Value Placed on Doryoku

Finally, we examine effects on the value placed on Doryoku as a dependent variable. To examine the effect of only face sheet items as the control variable, this analysis is conducted with two models: model (i), whose independent variables are only face sheet items and model (ii), which adds the factor score of hobbies to model (i).

For the Matsuyama samples, model (i) is statistically significant: only gender is statistically significant variable, whereas model (ii) is not statistically significant. For the Suginami samples, neither model is statistically significant.

5. Conclusion and Future Directions

This study examined the relationship between the two types of Doryoku, the Japanese youth, and the effects of youth hobbies on the disparity of Doryoku.

In regard to research question (1), while the rural youth tend to support traditional Doryoku i.e., hard work, the urban youth tend to support Doryoku, which is ability-based and suitable to the late modern meritocracy. The urban youth have higher educational careers and enjoy a higher standard of living than the rural youth. In regard to research question (2), the results are inconclusive and are not fully examined in the analyses. However, it is not true that the disparity of Doryoku depends on educational and economical gaps, as some studies have described. In regard to the rural youth, gender difference causes this disparity. Moreover, in regard to the urban youth, not only youth hobby but also educational and economical factors are irrelevant to the disparity of Doryoku. These results imply that we need to study this issue

from the perspective of differences between urban and rural situations. For example, the existence of gender gap depends on whether the setting is urban or rural.

A limitation of the above analyses is the treatment of youth cultures without distinguishing between their solitary hobby activities and their activities performed in hobby groups. Each youth culture consists of youths devoting their interest to hobbies by themselves, communicating with others through these hobbies, and identifying themselves through these activities. Balances and tensions between these elements are also believed to differ depending on the gender and urban/rural setting. Future studies should consider the relationships and other factors (e.g., friendships, views on identity). In addition, allowing the youths to self-report their favorite hobbies is itself a topic of discussion. Hobbies are social activities and received as the label "hobby" only when presented to other people. The youths' views on hobbies and the sociality of presenting a "hobby" are important issues for the study of youth cultures. Based on these perspectives, further discussions on the issue of Doryoku are warranted.

Notes

1 This article is a summary of the draft paper presented at the conference "Youth (Sub) cultures in Changing Societies" held in Tallinn University on February 2-4, 2011. The complete paper can be requested from the author: mikitot@qg8.so-net.ne.jp

2 It is difficult to explain this concept adequately because people in Japan use it mundanely and the concept is ambiguous. However, this study defines Doryoku as primarily the notions of hard work and effort. As explained later, I believe that the latter is being strengthened today. Because of these contexts and distinctive meanings, in this study, Doryoku is not translated.

3 Here, the comparison between "macro" and "micro" does not refer to quantitative vs qualitative data and methods or whether or not the methodology is ethnographic. For example, in historical approaches, researches with document data are meaningful. My main research is a semasiological description of the transformations of the meanings of Doryoku in the modernization of Japan.

4 However, despite this situation, there are anomalies on the research on subculture and character types by Miyadai's research team and the current research on ties through hobbies and social capitals by Asano's research team.

5 This office's head was Izumi Tsuji (now an associate professor at Chuo University). I am indebted to him for allowing me to use this data set.

6 The population sizes are as follows (referred from each office's data).
Suginami: 528,000 (total). There are approximately 5,000 20-year-olds (male-to-female ratio is 1:1).
Matsuyama: 515,000 (total). Information regarding the size of the population of 20-year-olds is undocumented.
Both populations have approximately the same size.

7 They were born in 1989. Miura (2008, 2010) defined the generation born from 1985 to 1993 as the "Generation Z" in Japan.

8 At first, it may seem that in this question item, only (b) represents Doryoku. However, depending on the level of the respondent, this will have the traditional meaning of Doryoku.

9 I adopt a sequence of these methods, as per Tsuji (2008).

FR

Le Doryoku et les cultures jeunes au Japon

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Le Doryoku est un concept souvent employé pour expliquer le fonctionnement de la société japonaise. La société japonaise est connue pour accorder de l'importance au Doryoku, au point que le concept s'est imposé comme un principe et une norme sociale. Toutefois, récemment, la forme traditionnelle de Doryoku a perdu de sa valeur. A partir de données quantitatives, cette étude examine si, pour les jeunes Japonais d'aujourd'hui, le Doryoku présente un intérêt du point de vue des loisirs et de la position sociale des jeunes (lieu de résidence, genre, instruction et hiérarchie des classes). L'analyse met en lumière la place de la jeunesse dans la société japonaise contemporaine ainsi que ses conséquences, l'objectif étant d'étudier les transformations intervenues dans la société japonaise et concernant la jeunesse d'aujourd'hui dans l'ère postmoderne.

DE

Doryoku und Jugendkulturen in Japan

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Doryoku ist ein Konzept, das häufig zur Erläuterung der japanischen Gesellschaft herangezogen wird. Man sagt, dass die japanische Gesellschaft Doryoku sehr hoch schätzt, und das Konzept wurde als Prinzip und soziale Norm behandelt. Aber in der jüngsten Vergangenheit hat die traditionelle Form von Doryoku ihren Wert in der Gesellschaft verloren. Mithilfe von quantitativen Datenanalysen untersucht diese Studie, ob die heutigen japanischen Jugendlichen Doryoku unter dem Aspekt ihrer Hobbies und ihres Status (wie Wohnort, Geschlecht, Bildung und Bevölkerungsschicht) als wertvoll betrachten. Die Analysen zeigen die Stellung der Jugend in der heutigen japanischen Gesellschaft und beschreiben die Auswirkungen, um so die Umbrüche in der japanischen Gesellschaft und der heutigen Jugend in der Spätmoderne zu untersuchen.

RU

«Doryoku» и молодежная культура в Японии

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«Doryoku» – это понятие часто используется для объяснения японского общества. Считается, что японское общество отдает должное «Doryoku», и концепция рассматривается как принцип и социальная норма. Однако в последнее время традиционная форма «Doryoku» потеряла свое значение в обществе. На основе использования количественного анализа данных в данном исследовании рассматривается, считает ли современная японская молодежь «Doryoku» ценным с точки зрения молодежных привычек и статуса (например, место жительства, пол, образование, и стратификация). Анализ показывает положение молодежи в современном японском обществе и описывает последствия для изучения преобразований в японском обществе и современной молодежи в новейшем обществе.

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Global Uncertainties, Youth and the Cultural Renaissance in Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

In the last decade or so, the field of African studies has witnessed a renewed interest in the subject matter of youth, marked by several researches illuminating new cultural architectures by young people in various places all over the continent. But this return to the theme of youth in postcolonial African studies is indeed of a different tenor, very unlike the initial discourse of youth culture in the continent which privileged the powerful and complementary role of the African youth in energizing liberationist agendas in the 1950s and 60s during the fight for independence from colonial powers.

Today, the African youth, like their counterparts all over the world, are being framed not only as people "at risk," but also as "risk itself".[1] Underlying the new moral panic about young people is the idea that the new generation of African youth are not only threatened by the ongoing global socio-economic and political changes unfolding around the world, they also have become a 'threat' to the same global socio-economic and political structures threatening the stability and certainty of their futures. And we really do not need to look very far to see why there's a sudden emergence of this moral panic about the African youth. All over the continent, what we have witnessed in the last decade or so has been "the dramatic eruption of young people in both the public and domestic, spheres" (Diouf 3), threatening both global and local economic flows and structures and entrenched political orders and regimes.

From the explosive rebellious activities of militant youth in the Niger-Delta area in South-eastern Nigeria between 2004-09 to the xenophobic outburst of youth in Johannesburg and Soweto, South Africa; from the dare-devilry of Somali pirates in the high seas of the horn of Africa to the killing fields of Sudan; from the heart-chilling violence and rituals of Liberian and Sierra-Leonean child soldiers to the Para-military activities of Mande hunter – guards in Cote d'Voire and Guinea; from the somewhat Mephistophelian proportion of religious violence by youth in Northern Nigeria to the homelessness and gang culture of street youth in Morocco; it is obvious that young people in Africa now stand at the very heart of the continent's social imagination, generating new concerns and anxieties about the future and stability of the entire continent (Durham 2003).

Almost everywhere one turns in the continent, there seem to be a rising crystallization and spread of criminality and violent geographies triggered by young people, igniting new concerns again about the proverbial 'Heart of Darkness' and it intrinsic primeval instincts for violence and cultures of brutality.[2] Although the tiny ruling class in the continent have often framed the rise of these new 'military principalities' (see Mbembe 2001) as criminal acts by irresponsible miscreants threatening fledgling democracies all over the continent, there's something to be said about the value of these new countercultural geographies triggered by the African youth. While acknowledging growing changes in the behaviour of youth, we must also trace the social roots of those changes (Miles 2000). I will therefore argue that emerging youth conflicts in the continent are in many ways novel signatures of social struggles by young people desperately finding meaning, hope and certainty in their lives in the face of a merciless neoliberal economic order and the continuous systemic violence unleashed by unjust postcolonial governmentality.

Global Context

Indeed, the crisis of culture we are currently witnessing in Africa, especially in relation to young people, is not peculiar to the continent. Since the early 1980s, international organizations like the United Nations, social scientists, public intellectuals and even the new wave of moral entrepreneurs sprouting all over have all been unanimous about the gripping threats or effects of global changes on young people all over the world. The new and bourgeoning sociology of youth now reflects a serious concern that the normative routes to adulthood have been fractured by globalization and Postmodernity. Globalization, marked by the intensification of global market competition, the transnationalization of markets, privatization, liberalization and/or deregulation it was argued, will lead to the democratization of wealth thereby spreading prosperity across class, gender, age, and race/ethnicity.

Paradoxically, almost three decades after the popularization of the globalization rhetoric, the poor are getting poorer and the old empires and economic and political hegemonies have reinvented themselves, constant on the compass and indomitable as ever. As Manfred Max-Neef and Philip Smith have argued in *Unmasking Economics* (2011), nothing has really changed. They argue that the new global economic and political structures and their operations are 'not one iota different from old-fashioned colonialism' (104). It is perhaps for this reason that Steven Miles (2000), in paraphrasing E. Wilson (1992), describes our contemporary society as being characterised by "a culture of contradictions, a culture where capitalism appears to have triumphed, where everybody appears to be better off, alongside a parallel and empty feeling that somehow everything is actually getting worse" (51). In all of these, it is young people without appropriate financial, political and cultural capital that have become the real victims.

Globally, we're beginning to see how youth are reacting in different ways and in varying degrees to not only the contradictions of a global economy that promises so much and gives nothing, but also the great ironies of a postmodern civilization where youth are living a paradox, with either their futures on permanent hold or actually on the reverse to a bottomless abyss. In the face of a new world order of neo-liberalism, young people are increasing being asked to "turn inwards—to themselves and in some cases their families—in order to respond to the uncertainties and risks associated with the precariousness of modern life" (Kennelly, Poyntz and Ugor 257). Young people are increasingly being reminded of the Kennedean dictum to ask what they can do for the government and not the other way round.

It is now obvious that late modern society, with all its uncertainties and risks, is not necessarily a dependable civilization for the world's youth. And here we are witnessing a complete reversal of history in which anxieties about youth are triggered by economic uncertainties rather than excess prosperity. When the discourse of youth culture gained traction in the 1950s, it was in a moment of phenomenal prosperity. It was post Second World War, and the defeat of countries like Germany, Italy, France, and Japan meant that Britain and the United States were the sole global players in the world market. This monopoly in global trade also meant extraordinary national profits for both countries which in turn translated to astonishing prosperity for its citizens (UNESCO 1981; Chawla & United Nations 1986; United Nation 1993). Even the working classes in these countries suddenly found themselves with huge amounts of disposable income. The major cultural outcome of this prosperity was consumerism, especially amongst young people. ***And excess materialism led to hedonism, consumerism and a general culture of irresponsibility among the existing generation of youth***. In other words, when discussions about youth first took centre stage in the 1950s, it was about how young people were mismanaging excess wealth and wasting opportunities. But instead of excess wealth, the youth of the modern world have had to deal with nothing but 'cruel scarcities' dominated by the sudden and urgent concerns with 'survival,' 'under-employment,'

'defensiveness,' and 'anxiety' (Acland 1995). Therefore, the disturbing evidence of the outburst of the African youth in both public and domestic spaces which I tracked at the beginning of the paper is in a sense part of the symbolic response by young people all over the world desperately searching for new certainties and survival in a global neo-liberal economy that stakes nothing on the future of young people.

The African Youth: A Lost Generation?

In 1996 Donal Criuse O'Brien had declared that the African youth were 'a lost generation.' This unsettling summation of the fate and future of the African youth was based on the recurrent cycles of political idiocies and declining economic fortunes of most postcolonial African states. While a small clique of postcolonial ruling elites have benefitted and continue to benefit from, while misappropriating the enormous resources of many African states, the mass of common people were (and still are) condemned to a life of misery marked by joblessness, poor healthcare facilities, insecurity of lives and property, lack on quality education, poverty, and a general life of hardship. The real victims of this sordid socio-economic environment, scholars argue, are the millions of young people all over the continent.

Although the harsh circumstances that shaped Cruise O'Brien's prognosis 14 years ago have continued in varying degrees in many African countries, it will be a serious error of judgement, Jon Abbink (2005) argues, "to deny African youth intentionality of action and agency, as has so often happened in Africanists discourse" (2).

While difficult political, economic and social conditions persists across the entire continent, Africa's youth, like their counterparts all over the world, are finding new and ingenious ways of making sense of not only their own lives, but also those of their families and communities at large. It is these new existential metrics and cultural stratagems of survival amongst marginalized youth in sub-Saharan Africa that I focus on in the next segment of my paper. Here I am concerned to demonstrate how the African youth, in the midst of an uncertain global modernity and ruthless postcolonial governmentality, have remained resilient, making meaning of their lives in "a climate of social instability and endemic conflict" (De Boeck & Honwana 2005, 2). I will offer one instance of the resilience of the African youth using Nigeria's booming video industry, now popularly known as Nollywood.

Culture Production, Youth and Agency in West Africa

Perhaps more than any other contemporary popular art form in Africa today, Nollywood stands at the very hub of the continent's culture industry. From its very modest beginnings in the late 1980s, this local video film industry triggered by creative youth has transformed into the third biggest film industry in the world, next only to India's Bollywood and America's Hollywood (UNESCO 2008), grossing something close to $50 million US dollars annually (Okome 2007a; 2007b). As one of the most artistically rich visual traditions and popular art forms in sub-Saharan Africa today, Nollywood is a classic example of what Robert Stam calls "the aesthetics of Detritus," where young people all over the developing world squeeze beauty, entrepreneurship, and survival from the very guts of deprivation.

First begun by jobless youth in Lagos, Nigeria and devoid of any institutional support from either the Nigerian state or independent economic actors, the cultural appeal of Nollywood as an alternative postcolonial visual practice lies in its power to illuminate the existential tensions that resound with the everyday life struggles, contradictions, hopes, anxieties, and contemporary mentalities of its audience. As Pierre Barrot (2008) puts it, Nollywood "is about lived realities, not creative or artistic fantasies" (8). And the 'lived realities' narrativized in Nollywood films most often are the social struggles of young people battling

to make a headway in life in the big, turbulent and treacherous postcolonial urban landscapes like Lagos. In these postcolonial metropolitan domains, Jonathan Haynes (2007) argues, "class divisions are extreme but permeable" and "enormous wealth does not buy insulation from chaos and misery" (131).

Nollywood is particularly aligned to African youth and their cultures in many ways. First, digital video, the technology of the industry, is very youthful. Digital video is not only cheap and portable, it allows for the endless experimentation associated with an industry dependent on modest budgets and improvisation. Second, with its production base firmly rooted in cities, the industry's audience is also youthful, drawing a lot from the mass of youth besieging the many urban centres sprouting all over the continent for jobs and good life. Third, from this large pool of urban youth the industry also draws it endless stream of local talents and artisans working as directors, actors/actresses, camera wo/men, stage designers, costumiers, and other such related jobs in the field. It is estimated that the industry now employs something between '200,000 to 300,000' workers every year (Okoye 2007, 23), relieving the country from the relentless rise in youth unemployment. Fourth, the industry's audience base is also youthful in character. Although patronised by both the old and young, 60 percent on Nollywood's patrons are young people between the ages of 12 and 35, and precisely so because the melodramatic nature of the films resonate with a threatened generation trying hard to keep afloat in the midst of very inauspicious circumstances. The emphasis on the everyday, foregrounding the experiences of ordinary people, significant emotional content often privileging affects like suffering and emotional pain, and 'personalised' moral lessons are all key characteristics of the melodramatic genre (Cvetkovich 2003) embodied in Nollywood films that resonate a lot with the mass of local youth that watch them.

One of the very popular films about youth struggles in Nollywood repertoire is Issakaba, an epic story in four parts drawn from the real life story of adventurous youth in South –Eastern Nigeria who took laws into their hands in bringing about order and justice in a crime-infested and corrupt society. In many ways Issakaba is a visual narrative of the sometimes ambivalent constellations of what Achille Mbembe (2001) has described as new "forms of territoriality and unexpected forms of locality" (261) taking shape all over Africa, especially in response to broken relationships between postcolonial states and it citizens. As a specific story of the social struggle for security of lives and property in Nigeria, Issakaba points poignantly to the "creative potentials of youth… in not only surviving but inventing and restructuring disorder" (Gore and Pratten 240) especially for purposes of securing their citizenship rights which the state can no longer offer. Infused with disturbing images of the fragrant violation of the sanctity of human life and the rule of law, the film is a visual testament to how youth in the continent have reacted to and reinvented not just the privatization of sovereignty but also the instrumentalization of disorder by ruling postcolonial elites.[3]

Apart from Nollywood, the music industry has also become one veritable domain of cultural activism by young people all over the continent. From Senegal through Uganda, South Africa, Cameroun, and Nigeria, music now offers a new social space for both survival and social critique (See Ntarangwi 2009). With a modest PC and music software downloaded free from the internet, young people in the continent now not only tell stories of their own social struggles, failures and victories, but also comment on the political idiocies and terrors of the postcolonial state on its own citizens. In Nigeria, the likes of 2face Idiabia, Timaya, Olu Maintain, Idris Mohammed, and others have continued the amiable tradition of combining entertainment with social critique pioneered by the late Fela Anikolakpo Kuti in the 1970s up until the late 1990s. Timaya, the famous braggart and music maestro in Nigeria is one youthful voice that has carved a niche for himself, combining postmodern

self-reflexivity, irresistible party lyrics, and intense political critique of the devastation caused by the repressive force of the Nigerian state on the oil-rich Niger Delta area in Nigeria.

The Niger Delta area is now the hot bed of violent youth activists seeking to change forty years of the political culture of exploitation and marginalization of minority peoples and their resources (i.e. crude oil). Since 1958 this area has remained the main source of national wealth for the entire country, where more than 2.4 million barrels of crude oil have been drilled daily in the past five decades, making Nigeria the 10th oil-producing nation in the world. But this area remains a national disgrace as the environment has been destroyed by noxious gases from drilling by multinational oil companies. In spite of the huge wealth derived from this region, local populations have continued to live without electricity, water, health care, education and other basic infrastructure. To make matters worse, seventy percent of the youth population in the region are jobless while the Nigerian state and multi-national companies continue to exploit the natural resources from the area. When the youth of one of the tiny villages in this area protested by picketing the offices of multinational corporations like Shell and Chevron, the entire Udi village was mowed down by the nation's military. This single event became the template for Timaya's hit album, "Dem Mama", an acerbic political critique of the vicious treatment of the over 1500 communities in the delta where oil has been drilled for five decades.

My main point here is that although our current global economic order is a highly contradictory one for the current generation of world youth: where good education and retooling does not necessarily guarantee a job anymore; where we're being told to depend less on the government while big corporations who have mismanaged public funds get lifelines from the same state; where stupendous wealth and egregious poverty live side by side almost at every corner in every nation; where people mouth their love for social and economic justice while committing unimaginable acts of injustices against minority people; where there's easy access to an AK47 than clean water; in the midst of all these, young people in Africa are still trying very hard not only to survive, but also to be part of global processes of the search for social change and social equity. The staggering social and political upheavals triggered by creative youth in North Africa using postmodern cultural tools like the internet and other small media technologies is a palpable example in this regard.

For the contemporary African youth, it is in the cultural domain therefore that we must all turn to in ascertaining the resilience and ingenuity of a continental generation whose futures have been on hold for several decades. This is not to suggest that culture is the only answer to the enormous challenges facing the continent and its teeming youth population. But I do believe that paying attention to the politicization of culture in everyday life in the continent would offer us not only deep insights into the daily concerns and struggles of young people, but also critical maps for thinking through ways of solving the crisis of culture in the continent. Investments in culture, be it in video film production, theatre, dance, music, literature, or fine art, should be an important point of interest in any policy direction for the continent. For it is in the continent's culture industry: that we see the startling energies, unwavering determination and resilience of the African youth which could be harnessed in reinventing the future and fortunes of the continent.

Notes

1 For notions of endangered youth see Macdonald et al. (1993); Cieslik & Pollock (2002); & Wulff (1995).
2 See for example Robert Kaplan's ill-researched The Coming Anarchy (2001) where he describes Africa as the 'natural point' of departure for any discussion about contemporary violence in the world.

3 For insights on the instrumentalization of violence and privatization of sovereignty in Africa see Chabral and Daloz (1999) and Mbembe (2001)

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FR

Incertitudes à l'échelle planétaire, jeunesse et renaissance culturelle en Afrique subsaharienne

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Alors que les difficultés économiques, politiques et sociales persistent sur tout le continent, les jeunes d'Afrique, comme leurs homologues dans le monde entier, trouvent des moyens novateurs et ingénieux de donner du sens non seulement à leurs propres vies, mais également à celles de leurs familles et communautés au sens large. C'est sur ces nouveaux stratagèmes de survie existentiels et culturels des jeunes marginalisés d'Afrique subsaharienne que l'auteur a axé son article. Son article démontre comment la jeunesse africaine, confrontée à une modernité incertaine à l'échelle planétaire et à des régimes postcoloniaux impitoyables, est parvenue à rebondir et à donner du sens à sa vie dans un climat d'instabilité sociale et de conflits endémiques, offrant un bel exemple de l'aptitude à surmonter la diversité des jeunes Africains – comme au Niger, avec son industrie vidéo en plein essor connue aujourd'hui sous le nom de Nollywood.

DE

Globale Ungewissheiten, Jugend und die kulturelle Renaissance in Afrika südlich der Sahara

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Während der gesamte Kontinent weiter durch schwierige politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Bedingungen geprägt wird, finden Jugendliche in Afrika wie gleichaltrige Jugendliche in der ganzen Welt neue und geniale Wege, um nicht nur ihrem eigenen Leben, sondern auch dem Leben ihrer Familien und Gemeinschaften insgesamt einen Sinn zu geben. Und mit diesen neuen Existenz-Metriken und kulturellen Hintertüren für das Überleben unter marginalisierten Jugendlichen in Afrika südlich der Sahara befasst sich der Autor schwerpunktmäßig in seinem Artikel. Der Artikel zeigt, wie die Jugend Afrikas sich inmitten einer ungewissen globalen Modernität und der rücksichtslosen postkolonialen Mentalitäten der Regierenden ihre Belastbarkeit erhalten hat und in einem „Klima sozialer Instabilität und endemischer Konflikte" ihrem Leben einen Sinn gibt, und er beschreibt ein Beispiel für die Robustheit der afrikanischen Jugend, das sich in der boomenden Videoindustrie in Nigeria zeigt, die jetzt allgemein Nollywood genannt wird.

RU

Глобальная неопределенность, молодежь и культурный Ренессанс в Африке к югу от Сахары

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Несмотря на то, что на всем континенте сохраняются сложные политические, экономические и социальные условия, африканская молодежь, как и их ровесники во всем мире, находит новые и нестандартные способы осмысления не только своей собственной жизни, но также жизни своих семей и сообществ в целом. В данной статье автор проводит анализ именно этих новых экзистенциальных метрик и культурных хитростей выживания у маргинальной молодежи в Африке к югу от Сахары. В данной статье показано, как в эпицентре глобальной неопределенности современного мира и жесткого постколониального управления африканская молодежь остается устойчивой, определяя смысл своей жизни в «атмосфере социальной нестабильности и эндемичного конфликта». Рассматривается один атрибут устойчивости африканской молодежи, потребляющей бурно развивающуюся видеоиндустрию Нигерии, в настоящее время широко известную как Нолливуд.

N°7 > 06/2011

Forum 21

European Journal on Child and Youth **Research**
Revue européenne de **recherche** sur l'enfance et la jeunesse
Europäische Zeitschrift für **Kinder- und Jugendforschung**

www.coe.int/youth/forum21
ISSN 1866 - 7260

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