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**European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour  
at Sports events and in particular at Football Matches (T-RV)**

Portuguese Report on Lessons Learnt from EURO 2004

**UEFA EURO 2004<sup>TM</sup>  
IN PORTUGAL**

**LESSONS LEARNT FROM A  
SUCCESSFUL TOURNAMENT**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The organisation of a European Football Championship, the third major sports event in the world, is one of the most challenging enterprises for any European country.

In a world of risk and uncertainty, the role the security and safety services, grounded in a clear strategy, becomes a crucial factor for the success of a major international sports event.

Last summer, Portugal was the stage of UEFA EURO 2004, acknowledged as a successful tournament, both in sporting and in security terms.

This article develops the main key issues of that success, in the field of security and safety.

Probably the most important factor of the security strategy was the attention paid to clients – both internal and external - and knowledge.

Firstly, empowerment of police officers was always a priority, since human resources must be envisaged as the most important value of every organisation and a crucial condition for the effective implementation of the security strategy.

Secondly, the police approach and attitude was client-oriented, in other words, focused on addressing the expectations and needs of spectators and public in general, thus creating the grounds for a contagious festive and convivial atmosphere.

Thirdly, in-depth and updated knowledge of the risks, threats, public and environment was absolutely vital for an adequate planning and operation. Building up a flexible and efficient co-ordination and co-operation structure, at international, national and local levels, enabled the deciders, from the top political level to the isolated police officer on the front line, to have the information and knowledge needed to adopt the correct behaviour or decision on the spot.

Fourthly, the effectiveness of the police and criminal justice system operators: the rapid police response against foreign troublemakers; the added capacity of the temporary detention centres; the 24-hour criminal justice system able to sentence them in a very short delay, always respecting their fundamental rights; and, at the end of the chain, their deportation ensured by the Alien and Border Service.

Finally, the modern sporting infrastructures and the unique blend of the climate, landscape, culture, gastronomy and warm hospitality of the Portuguese, created the environmental conditions for a new European fan-culture to reveal: a culture of conviviality and fair play.

## INTRODUCTION

The organisation of a European Football Championship, the third major sports event in the world, is one of the greatest challenges for any European country. It requires huge financial, human and technical resources, the review of co-ordination, organisational structures and strategies, the reinforcement of international co-operation networks and, last but not the least, the motivation and mobilisation of the population, so as to create the environment for conviviality amongst many people coming from all over the world.

This championship is a unique opportunity for a country's projection in the international arena, promoting its culture and its ability to successfully organise a major event.

## HISTORIC BACKGROUND

In 1998, the Portuguese FA submitted to UEFA its application for the organisation of the final phase of the Football European Championship, named thereafter UEFA EURO 2004.

The Portuguese Government, in a Resolution from September 1998, acknowledged the national interest of this initiative and, thus, assumed several responsibilities such as:

- supporting financially, in a proportion of 25%, which corresponds to an estimated investment of up to 75 million Euros, to carry out over 5 years, the construction and renewal of the 10 football stadia involved in the application; and
- in accordance with the UEFA *cahier des charges*, adopting the necessary measures, namely in the following areas: Government's support to the organisation of this tournament in Portugal; circulation of persons and goods; security and safety; and protection of UEFA copyright.

In fact, the Government estimated, since the very beginning, that such a major event would bring to Portugal several positive consequences, such as:

- providing sporting infrastructures, able to respond to the requirements of high level international tournaments, even beyond UEFA EURO 2004;
- improving competitiveness of the national football, contributing to its recovery as a sporting crowds event and, through it, to the economic consolidation and strengthening of the sporting actors;
- a positive impact in the economy, namely in the fields of tourism, construction, telecommunications and new technologies, as well as the modernisation of football stadia linked with the urban renewal.

Some days before the kick-off of EURO 2000, held in Belgium and the Netherlands, UEFA officials announced that Portugal had been awarded the organisation of the 2004 European Championship.

The Portuguese police authorities had already integrated the international police co-operation network in the field of major football tournaments, namely during EURO 96 in England, and the World Cup 98 in France. The participation of a Police and Gendarmerie team during EURO 2000, following the national team matches but also

with the aim to study the implementation of the security strategies in Belgium and the Netherlands, was an excellent opportunity to launch the security and safety preparations for UEFA EURO 2004.

Between EURO 2000 and EURO 2004, the Portuguese police authorities were engaged in several international *fora*, seminars and meetings, with previous and future organisers, as well as within the European Union, the Council of Europe and the United Nations frameworks, with a view to collect, share and discuss knowledge and experience in the field of security of football events with an international dimension.

The gathering of international knowledge and expertise in these meetings was of utmost importance for the Portuguese authorities, namely those responsible for the overall security, to have an accurate view of the current challenges and trends, enabling them to draw up a reliable security and safety concept for UEFA EURO 2004.

## **1. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE**

The organisational model chosen for the tournament was completely different from those of the previous tournaments. Instead of assigning the organisation of the tournament to the national FA (model of EURO 96) or creating a specific foundation (model of EURO 2000), UEFA and the Portuguese Government decided that the best option would be to create two different anonymous societies - Portugal 2004 and EURO 2004 – with different social objects:

- on one side, PORTUGAL 2004, S.A. would be accountable for monitoring and controlling the construction programme of the stadia and other infrastructures. The State had a golden share of 98.68% and the Portuguese FA only 1.32% of the shares;
- on the other side, the real organiser of the tournament, EURO 2004, S.A., responsible for the design, planning, promotion and organisation. The following had shares in the society: UEFA: 55%; Portuguese FA: 40%; and State: 5%.

The Portuguese Government estimated that the creation of PORTUGAL 2004, S.A. was crucial for implementing a transparent programme of supervision which would, on the one hand, provide clear guarantees for the Portuguese people that public funds would be properly used in the construction of the stadia and, on the other hand, ensure that these stadia would be completed on time and in compliance with all the prerequisites set down by UEFA.

In the following tables, we can have a more accurate view of the State investments in the ten stadia, which were monitored and controlled by the society PORTUGAL 2004, comparing those estimations with previous and future tournaments:

**Table 1 – Championships, stadia and total investments per country  
(values in € 2003)<sup>1</sup>**

Country	Championship	Year	Stadia	Investments
Portugal	European	2004	10	595,054,237
Germany	World	2006	12	1,451,511,332
Austria	European	2008	4	136,706,624
Switzerland	European	2008	4	256,806,182

The figures suggest some comments: firstly, even for those countries which already had quality infrastructures, the financial investment in the event is quite significant; secondly, the figures of Portugal are quite acceptable if we take into account that the construction/reconstruction covered 10 stadia; finally, it is clear that the organising countries take the opportunity provided by the event to carry out a global investment programme in the stadia, instead of doing it over several years.

The funding of investments in the stadia is often a matter of great discussion. In Table 2, we present the figures of the funding structure in the four organising countries:

**Table 2 – Stadia funding sources in the four countries (in %)**

	Portugal	Germany	Austria	Switzerland
<b>Promoters' investment</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>38</b>		
Clubs	46			
Cities	38			
<b>State funding</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>	
Central Administration + FEDER	16	14		
Regions		6		
Cities		19		
<b>Others (industry, trade, services)</b>		<b>23</b>		<b>100</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


These figures reflect diverse realities and specific ways of functioning of the sporting market in the four countries. Nevertheless, the common feature is the significant public contribution in the funding of the construction of stadia. Another interesting point in the comparison would be to replicate the analysis on the economic efficiency carried out for Portugal, taking as reference Germany (World Cup 2006) and Austria & Switzerland (Euro 2008).

Starting with the investment by seat, and taking medium values for new and remodelled stadia, we can compare, in Table 3, the profile of each country.

<sup>1</sup> The investment values for Portugal are estimated values, based on the financial chronogram of Portugal 2004, S.A.. For the other countries, those values are mentioned in the application files, corrected according to 2003 inflation. The values for the three tournaments were taken from the respective Internet sites.

Source: Portugal 2004, S.A., [www.fifa.com](http://www.fifa.com) ; [www.uefa.com](http://www.uefa.com)

**Table 3 – Medium investment by seat in the four countries<sup>2</sup>  
(in Euros, 2003)<sup>3</sup>**



The figures presented are compatible both with the dimension of the stadia – more seats in Germany - and their quality and equipment.

Complying with its social objective, PORTUGAL 2004 S.A. fully ensured that public expenditure was duly controlled, that the budget was not exceeded and, last but not the least, that the stadia were finished on time.

The organisational model agreed upon by the Portuguese Government and UEFA ensured a clear distinction between the body responsible for creating the necessary physical and environmental conditions for the event – the State - and the one responsible for organising the event – UEFA and the Portuguese FA.

## 2. TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

In the security preparations of every major event, it is vital that tasks and responsibilities of the different parties are clear and that there are no gaps between the jurisdictions of each.

<sup>2</sup> Due to the type of intervention carried out in the Coimbra and Leiria stadia, it was estimated appropriate, for comparative purposes, to consider them as new stadia. The medium investment by seat has an insignificant dispersion within each of the groups (30,000 seats and more than 50,000), except for the Braga stadium, whose project philosophy was very different from the others, hence it not being included in the above table.

<sup>3</sup> The three tables presented in this chapter were taken from the report published by Portugal 2004, *Avaliação Económica do EURO 2004 - Avaliação da componente financeira - Sumário Executivo* (Economic Evaluation of EURO 2004 – evaluation of financial area – executive summary), available at [www.portugal2004.pt](http://www.portugal2004.pt). This report mentions the following sources: [www.fifa.com](http://www.fifa.com) and [www.uefa.com](http://www.uefa.com)

The Portuguese Government ensured its full responsibility for security and safety out of the security perimeters of the stadia and, in case of public order incident, also inside those perimeters. The organiser would be responsible for security and safety inside those perimeters, under normal conditions, ensuring the implementation of a private security and safety structure and the necessary conditions for the work of the public services inside those perimeters.

As regards the share of responsibilities between the Portuguese FA and UEFA, and according to a new joint venture model between these two sporting bodies, the national association was fully responsible for security and safety inside the stadia perimeters and for paying the work of police/gendarmerie and safety/medical emergency departments in that area.

These perimeters were defined locally, in a consensus between public and private experts, according to the specific conditions of the stadium surroundings.

In every stadium, there would be a minimum of three perimeters, from the outer to the inner one: the deterrence; the body search; and the electronic ticket validation perimeter. According to the physical conditions and location of the stadium, further perimeters could be implemented locally.

It was also agreed that the command and control room would be chaired by the police/gendarmerie commander, who would be responsible for controlling the overall operations and for managing the public order incidents inside the stadia perimeters.

The presence of the police inside those perimeters would gradual increase, from the inside to the outer perimeter, as the presence and role of the stewards gradually decreased.

From the outset, co-operation between the State bodies and the organiser was very fruitful and healthy. Every party was aware of its duties and responsibilities and aware of the fact that security and safety were the major priorities in the organisation of the tournament.

For instance, when the final draw took place, the security officials from the Government and the organiser's side, met immediately after the ceremony to analyse the results in the light of security criteria and ultimately decided to change two of the stadia where higher risk matches would take place.

As a result of this tournament, Portugal could improve radically the stadia security and safety management model, introducing the following new features:

- Clear share of security and safety responsibilities between the organiser and police/gendarmerie;
- Private management of security inside the stadia: implementation of a command and control room and a stewarding system, headed by the stadium security co-ordinator;
- Possibility of a volunteering system, as a complement to stewarding;
- Stadia emergency plans (internal / external);
- Stadia internal regulations;



- Significant improvement of comfort, safety and security in the new stadia.

### 3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

With a view to the security and safety of the tournament, the Government enacted several laws and regulations, with the following purposes:

- implement the co-ordinating structures for the event;
- adopt the principles and guidelines of international regulations and recommendations in the fields of security at football venues and international police co-operation and exchange of information;
- systematise and modernise the national legal framework on security and safety at sports venues; and
- review the private security legal framework and implement the stewarding system under its umbrella;
- temporarily reinforce the police/gendarmerie, judicial and immigration service powers as regards public order, criminal procedure and deportation procedures, respectively.

There was a very significant review and update of the legal framework in the field of security and, more specifically, the security at sports grounds, since law, for its deterring and preventative nature, could reduce the possibility of disorder and violent behaviour during the tournament.

A first topic that was addressed by the legislator was the review of the private security system, including for the first time a stewarding system under its umbrella.

It was quite clear, for the first time, that the organiser was primarily accountable and liable for security and safety inside football venues and, for that purpose, he was compelled to implement his own security and safety concept and structure. Thus, several decrees and regulations were enacted successively, introducing the following main provisions as regards the stewards' status.

- Legal status: private security officer (entitled to the respective professional card);
- Training: 50 hours on private security + 57 hours on stewarding matters (6 modules);
- Every stadium certification defines the minimum of stewards;
- Compulsory stewarding system for stadia with a capacity of 25,000 or more seats;
- Steward ratios: 1 / 300 spectators (for high risk matches) or 1 / 400 for normal risk matches;
- In case of more than 80% tickets sold, a compulsory surplus of 20% stewards;
- Legal sanctions: fines € 500 to € 1000 per steward missing;
- On a first stage, stewards trainers' training courses were provided by universities;
- Volunteers can be hired only for back-office and hospitality duties, complementing the stewards' tasks.

On the other hand, the legislator took the opportunity to review the law on sport-related violence, which had been enacted in 1998. These are the main innovations of the reviewed law:

- Conditions to enter and remain on premises: for non-abiding spectators, the consequence is no access and expulsion, respectively.
- Organiser's anti-violence regulation;
- Compulsory ticketing system providing information and a computerised control: in its absence, the competition is suspended;
- Promoter's safety regulations, foreseeing stadium ban for non-lawabiders;
- Promoters' obligations: security and safety; stimulate fair-play; apply sanctions/banning orders; protect threatened persons; appoint stadium security co-ordinator; social-educational prevention; and
- Security forces must check security conditions, previously; if missing security measures are not adopted by the organiser, the event is cancelled; police/gendarmerie subsidiary responsibility inside the stadium perimeter, if public order incidents occur, and the police/gendarmerie commander is the only one entitled to take the stadium evacuation decision.

For the first time in this law, several sport-related violent behaviours are considered as crimes, namely:

- Black-market: liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or fine  $\leq$  500 days (note: 1 day fine = € 1500);
- Damage qualified, on a journey to/from match: imprisonment 1-5 years or fine  $\leq$  600 days;
- Participation in fight, on a journey to/from match: imprisonment 6m-3 years or fine;
- Throwing "missiles" into the competition area: imprisonment  $\leq$  1 year or fine;
- Invasion of restricted areas: imprisonment  $\leq$  1 year or fine;
- Riots: imprisonment 6m-3 years or fine  $\leq$  500 days.

The law also innovates in foreseeing the banning order, on one hand, as a coercive measure, if there is strong evidence of crime. It can be cumulated with report at court or a police/gendarmerie station on match days.

On the other hand, there is a banning order as an accessory sentence, for the list of crimes from black-market to riot, which can range from 1 to 5 years. It can include report at court or a police/gendarmerie station on match days.

A national database on sport-violence banning orders is also foreseen for the first time.

On the other hand, several behaviours are only typified as misdemeanours, such as:

- a) alcohol introduction / sale / consumption
- b) introduce / carry / sale of containers made of blunt material
- c) introduce / sale / rent / distribute cushions made of blunt material
- d) motivate to violence / racism / xenophobia / other discriminations

- e) use of powered horns or other noisy fixed devices (...)
- g) introduce / use of explosive devices / fireworks

The size of the fine is set according to three levels of seriousness:

- very serious misdemeanours: par. (a), (d) and (g)): € 1000-1750;
- serious misdemeanours, par. (b) and (e)): € 500-1000; and
- minor misdemeanours, par. (c): € 250-500 (note: for sporting parties, these values are doubled).

This new Act did not affect the Law n° 8/97, April 12th, which criminalises possession, use and carrying of an offensive weapon or firearm at sports events, endangering life or physical integrity.

In the field of the security strategy designed for the tournament, the Government also decided to enact a temporary and exceptional law addressed to improve the efficiency of the police, criminal justice and immigration systems, namely, in order to tackle hooliganism.

This temporary law, whose period of force was 1 June to 11 July 2004, had provisions on: the courts' organisation / functioning; the summary criminal procedure; the banning order, as a coercive measure; the foreigners' deportation procedure; the electronic surveillance devices; the cautionary police measures; and the stadia access conditions for public servants.

In short, this law implemented:

- shift courts, for summary criminal procedures, in the hosting and neighbouring cities;
- coercive measures: possible to prohibit attendance, absence and contacts, as a coercive measure, when there is strong evidence of crime;
- possible temporary banning order, as a coercive measure, when there is strong evidence of using explosive devices / fireworks; it can be cumulated with duty to report before court or police/gendarmerie station, during match days;
- police/gendarmerie are able to use electronic surveillance devices in public places, on a permanent basis, to capture and record image and sound, with a view to reacting promptly to public disturbances and to collect relevant criminal evidence;
- exceptional cautionary police measures: prevention and safety body search, of supporters and their equipment, in public transport, to avoid introduction of dangerous objects; in crowded public places, of violent-prone supporters, their equipment and vehicles; to bring a suspect to a police station, either for complete identification or for preventive reasons; for special security reasons, a police official can forbid suspects from acceding to specific public places / events, for up to 48 hours.

#### **4. NATIONAL CO-ORDINATION**

The co-ordination between the national security and safety agencies, the agencies acting in the different public policies, the national and local level and between the State and


the organiser are a matter of great importance for the overall success of a major tournament involving such different issues and levels.

This is why the Council of Ministers' Resolution n° 109/2002, July 24th, set up the State Committee for the Security & Safety of EURO 2004, responsible for co-ordinating all the national agencies and bodies contributing for the security and safety of the tournament.

This Committee was co-ordinated by the Secretary General of the National Security Co-ordinating Office, which, as general co-ordinator of the Committee, guided the action of:

- i. The national co-ordinators (also representing their agencies) for the following six main areas:
  - (1) *Public Security* (PSP - National Police representative);
  - (2) *Safety* (SNBPC – Fire & Civil Protection Service representative);
  - (3) *Structural & Technological Safety* (PORTUGAL 2004, S.A. representative);
  - (4) *Private Security* (EURO 2004, S.A. representative);
  - (5) *Administration & Logistics* (GNR - National Gendarmerie representative); and
  - (6) *Medical Emergency* (INEM - National Institute for Medical Emergency representative).
  
- ii. The representatives from other national security agencies: PJ (Judiciary Police), SEF (Immigration Service), SIS (Security Intelligence Service), DGAM/PM (Maritime Police) and INAC (Civil Aviation National Authority).

**Figure 1 – SECURITY & SAFETY MACROSTRUCTURE OF UEFA EURO 2004™**



The Committee had the following powers and responsibilities:

- Implement the general guidelines, according to national and international legislation;
- Approve the master plan and the security specific plans of every national agency;
- Advice on the operational scenarios;
- Advice on the internal and external emergency plans;
- Approve the security perimeters of the stadia;
- Advice on the recruitment, training and qualification of stewards;
- Ensure close co-operation with foreign police services;
- Ensure co-ordination between the organiser, police and safety and local authorities;
- Monitor compliance with security and safety laws and regulations, during the construction of the stadia;
- Advise on the ticketing policy (tickets and accreditation); and
- Propose legislative measures.

Besides the legal provisions, in practice, there was a set of other strategic documents that were submitted to the State Committee's approval or consideration, such as those presented by the organiser (EURO 2004, S.A.):

- Supporters' segregation policy;
- Survey of security and safety facilities in the stadia (police, safety, stewarding and emergency);

- Stewards: tasks, duties and deployment;
- Accreditation policy;
- Stadia internal regulation;
- Fan park concept and structure;
- Organiser's security operational concept;
- Internal / external emergency plans, presented by the Fire & Civil Protection Service; and
- Specific public security operational plans, presented by the different national security agencies.

Apart from the Security Committee, other co-ordinating bodies were set up with a view to carrying out the different public policies:

- High Level Monitoring Committee for Euro 2004 (chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister), which was in charge of the overall Co-ordination of the public agencies involved in the preparations of the tournament;
- Transports Committee for EURO 2004 (hosted by the Ministry of Transports);
- Health Committee for EURO 2004 (hosted by the Ministry of Public Health); and
- Defence Committee for EURO 2004 (hosted by the Ministry of National Defence).

For the Portuguese public administration system, the organisation of such a tournament had a huge impact on the people and public organisations perceived co-operation and co-ordination. The focus of so many different public bodies and agencies, with quite diverse strategies, visions, cultures and processes, in the same objective, forced them to review and change several principles and practices, adapting themselves to work in a more collaborative way, both horizontally and vertically.

The tournament was a real laboratory, in the sense that it enabled the public administration, at almost all levels, to test its ability to co-operate and co-ordinate different people and organisations with the same goal: the success of UEFA EURO 2004<sup>TM</sup>. The outcomes are quite positive, since co-operation and Co-ordination structures and procedures proved to be effective and a new collaborative attitude was implemented in the different national agencies involved, namely, the security and safety ones.

## **5. POLICING MODEL**

The police and gendarmerie profile and approach were key factors for the success of the tournament, since the cool and friendly attitude and behaviour of police officers and gendarmes on the spot prevented several potentially violent situations and minor incidents from escalating.

### **5.1. Tasks of the security forces**

The following tasks were assigned by the Portuguese Government to the security forces and services:

- to provide the security conditions required for the event to run smoothly, protect the physical integrity of persons and protect goods and equipment;
- to contribute to a peaceful and convivial environment befitting the festive nature of the event.

The Portuguese Government also approved the security arrangements for the event.

### **5.2. Planning and implementation**

The planning and implementation of the security procedures and the principles that guided the response of the police forces were the following:

#### **5.2.1. Policing approach/profile**

Taking the assigned task as a starting-point, approval was given for the policing profile that served as the basis for the police forces' planning, training and response.

Attention will be drawn to the following aspects:

- preventive and proactive approach of the security forces, together with low police profile;
- friendly, cordial demeanour, in keeping with the peaceful and festive atmosphere of the event; firm, however, if necessary;
- disclosure of the existence of resources for energetic intervention and the intention to use them against any supporters behaving aggressively or violently.

#### **5.2.2. Principles governing the deployment of police units**

Following on from the policing profile, the following general principles were defined to serve as guidelines for defining police units to work on security for the event:

- continuous monitoring and prevention work in the areas where supporters were most likely to gather;
- deterrence of illegal behaviour, by the presence and attitude of the security forces;
- strong but non-provocative police visibility (provide and gather information and deal with minor conflicts);
- where possible, ensuring police presence on the ground it is not ostentatious;
- ensuring that security forces are highly mobile;
- high reaction and intervention capacity;
- ensuring that security forces' reactions and interventions are measured and selective, and suited to the specific nature of the situation – different intervention levels;

- ensuring that any intervention/response by security forces is preceded by information (to those against whom the action is targeted) and affects solely those responsible for the situation (selective);
- ensuring that tolerance levels (unauthorised behaviour) are clearly defined, publicised and applied;
- police units must have the capacity to obtain, analyse and manage operational information (what is about to happen) and tactical information (what is happening);
- the teams must include a substantial component of plain-clothes officers, thus making possible:
  - a constant unobtrusive presence in the crowds;
  - provision of reliable information in real time;
  - a high capacity for crime prevention and punishment;
  - capacity for low-visibility intervention, involving lower risks and impact (particularly in the event that the results of the intervention are not positive);
  - support for selective or focused intervention/response.

### **5.2.3. Strategy for police force action**

In defining the strategy for police force action, in organisational terms, the following areas were considered:

- 5.2.3.1. Intervention phases,
- 5.2.3.2. Intervention areas,
- 5.2.3.3. Intervention levels

#### **5.2.3.1. Intervention phases**

For planning and implementation of the police and security units, two major security and police force intervention phases were considered:

1.1. The overall event, beginning 5 June (the first match took place on 12 June) and ending 8 July (the final match took place on 4 July), involving general concerns affecting the whole national territory.

- 1.2. A second phase, linked to each individual match, comprising the following stages:
- (a) the day before the match, with concerns mainly focused on the guidance of the supporters and monitoring of risk groups;
  - (b) the day of the match, involving 3 main periods:
    - the period before departure for the sports complex where the match was to take place (3 to 4 hours before), with particular focus on places where supporters gathered, places where alcohol was consumed and transport terminals;



- the period of the match, with particular focus on the sports complex and on places in the city where the match could be watched;
- the period after the game, with particular emphasis on the night- time entertainment areas and bars.

(c) the day after the match, with the main concern focused on the guidance of the supporters and monitoring of risk groups.

### **5.2.3.2. Intervention areas**

In the planning of the police and security units, the following main areas were considered:

#### **5.2.3.2.1. City policing (urban areas)**

Cities and urban areas, with particular emphasis on those in (or near) the vicinity of the stadia where the games were taking place, as well as major tourist cities, were the subject of extremely strict planning, with various security- and safety-related bodies involved.

With the involvement of the bodies specified in the organisational chart on the security structure for Euro 2004, national, regional (district) and local (municipal) security plans were approved.

Special attention was given to the premises (and times) where activities, shows and other events linked to Euro 2004 were to take place, specifically: fan zones, fan embassies, fan parks, refreshment areas, areas with giant screens or where the matches could be watched.

Among other points, the security plans also paid special attention to the terminals and structures of urban public transport (buses, underground trains, city trains) and night-life areas, as well as large open spaces and squares most likely to be occupied by supporters before or after matches.

#### **5.2.3.2.2. Policing the sports venues**

In the security planning at the sports venues where the matches were to take place, the following points were emphasised.

##### **a. Control zones**

Three control zones were considered in the stadium areas:

- i) Deterrence zone: the exclusive responsibility of the police forces (with the support of the stewards), defined by the installation of fences. Aimed at controlling and containing supporters' movements, visual checking of tickets and detection of larger and/or visible banned objects.

- ii) *Search zone*: the responsibility of the organisation (stewards), under the control and supervision of the police forces.
- iii) *Electronic entrance-ticket validation zone*: responsibility of the organisation (stewards), with police support.

**b. Co-ordination between police forces, the security manager of the stadium, stewards and others involved (fire-fighters and medical emergency services)**

Responsibilities and mechanisms were defined for co-ordination between all people concerned with the security of the sports venues.

For each stadium, approval was also given and testing carried out for the various security plans (CPX - command and control - and LIVEX - live situations -exercises were carried out) involving all the bodies with responsibilities in the stadia and others outside (hospitals, civil protection, municipal authorities, etc.) that could be affected by incidents at the stadium.

**c. Low police visibility inside the stadium**

It was specified as an operational strategy that the size of security units involving uniformed police (visible to supporters) should clearly drop as they approached the inside of the stadia. Therefore, co-ordination with the stewards had to be extremely precise, police response squads had to be placed strategically, and the CCTV circuits of the stadia and the information that reached the stadia control rooms had to be monitored continuously, so as to ensure, unobtrusively and without excessive visibility of police resources, that preventive capacities were adequate and response capacities effective and rapid.

**d. Strategic deployment of resources**

In view of the strategic approach specified in the paragraph above and the situational studies carried out, deployment plans for the police units were defined for each stadium on the basis of the stadium's characteristics and the control zones established, the capacities of the control room and the CCTV circuit, the location of the police station, the arrest areas, the police vehicle parking zones and the types of access available to the benches and the pitch. In addition to complying with the policing profile and the deployment principles, these deployment plans had to ensure a capacity for effective and rapid response to potential incidents.

**e. Substantial plain-clothes elements (spotters)**

As a police intervention and prevention model for minor incidents, a significant number of plain-clothes police officers were included in the stadium police units. This procedure proved well adapted to the incidents that did occur. Through this plain clothes element it was possible to provide a low-key police presence alongside groups of supporters considered as posing greater risks, to provide continuous and reliable information to the stadium control room, to prevent crimes from being committed (in

particular, petty thefts and ticket selling), and to make arrests and interventions in response to isolated incidents, with low impact and visibility.

**f. Ticketing policy (unauthorised sales and forgeries)**

Questions relating to the issue, distribution, reservation, sale and use of tickets and invitations to the matches, as well as procedures relating to the accreditation of thousands of persons who, for working reasons, would need access to the spaces covered by the security measures, were considered vital for the success of the event.

Thanks to the close attention devoted to this matter, no significant cases of the sale or use of forged tickets were recorded. The few cases that did occur involved crude forgery methods (photocopying), which were easily detected during electronic ticket checking.

As regards the sale, speculative or otherwise, of tickets for the various games, despite the efforts of the police forces (involving the arrest of 101 individuals and the identification of a further 21, as well as the seizure of 1 338 tickets), the black market was a reality, both in internet transactions and in street selling near the stadia and in the areas where the largest groups of supporters congregated in the cities.

**g. Stadium evacuation order – police responsibility**

Finally, the police forces paid special attention to matters concerning the evacuation of the stadia, in terms of analysis of information (e.g., a bomb threat), assessment of incidents (e.g. large-scale disorder, localised fire, capacity exceeded as a result of false tickets), and of the carrying out of the evacuation in the event that such a decision was taken on the responsibility of the police commander at the venue.

**5.2.3.2.3. Approach to organised groups of supporters**

Organised groups of supporters, and in particular those including category B and C supporters, deserved particular attention and monitoring of the police forces, namely the excellent work carried out by teams of plain-clothes officers with, in many cases, the collaboration of spotters from the countries of origin of those supporters.

In addition to the control by plain-clothes personnel, if these groups were large or were in transit, the security units would also add uniformed personnel, though still with a non-provocative low profile.

It was defined as a police strategy that for each identified risk group, the police unit to be detached to the area should continuously provide: reliable information, assessment of any incidents and the capacity to respond to minor incidents or incidents in which few persons were involved.

**5.2.3.2.4. Personal security**

In accordance with the threat assessment made by the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the risk assessment made by the security forces, security units were established, in some cases including personal security teams.

Besides the provision of security personnel for 47 foreign VIPs travelling to Portugal to attend the Euro 2004 matches, special security measures, involving reinforced teams of personal security, were also established for 6 of the participating football teams.

The other football teams were assigned security teams suited to the assessed threats and risks.

#### **5.2.3.2.5. Airport security**

The international airports of Lisbon, Oporto and Faro required special police attention, both in terms of border control and in terms of incident prevention and maintenance of public order.

Proactive procedures were adopted, with supporters being kept in separate areas in the airports, both on arrival and on departure, with special areas set aside for particular flights.

The creation of waiting areas for the period after the matches (buffer zones) in the vicinity of the Lisbon and Oporto airports, to which supporters were driven after the end of the matches and where they waited for transfers (in special buses) to the airports, considerably reduced the likelihood of incidents, and enabled a better management of the boarding procedures.

#### **5.2.3.2.6. Railway security**

The railway stations, particularly the boarding stations and terminals, required special security measures, properly co-ordinated with the units accompanying the supporters to the stadia or to the cities' entertainment areas.

Besides the regular trains, special trains were scheduled for the main matches, which were constantly accompanied by police teams, which moved around inside the trains, and for which exceptional security measures were established at the stations where the trains stopped.

No major incidents were recorded in this particularly sensitive area.

#### **5.2.3.2.7. Opening up of routes (escorts) and access to the stadia**

Creating the conditions for movement of road traffic and access to stadia and parking spaces involved long and complex planning and continuous permanent co-ordination with various other bodies associated in the process.

The movements of senior officials, official entourages, teams and UEFA delegations required the deployment of specialised police teams and continuous co-ordination with the police units assigned to other tasks.

Channelling the movements of supporters before and after the matches involved complex operations, both for pedestrians and for vehicle traffic. Celebrations by supporters which took place on the public highway, usually after matches, required the adoption of contingency plans to prohibit access by motor vehicles to these areas.

#### **5.2.3.2.8. Border controls**

The Portuguese Government decided to implement the exceptional measure provided for in Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention and re-established document checks at all Portuguese borders between 26 May and 4 July.

As a result of that decision, border control posts (land, air and sea) were again set up and document checks other than at control posts were stepped up.

In total, as a result of action by the security forces and services, the following numbers were refused entry into Portuguese territory:

- ✓ at control posts – 3 815 people
- ✓ other than at control posts – 692 people.

#### **5.2.3.2.9. Security for teams and other tournament installations**

In addition to the day-to-day security of the 16 teams (and their supporting infrastructure) taking part in the tournament, security plans were in place for the following:

- ✓ hotels used as team headquarters,
- ✓ hotels used by teams on a temporary basis,
- ✓ team training centres,
- ✓ team training grounds (with or without spectators),
- ✓ UEFA hotels, and
- ✓ VIP accommodation.

#### **5.2.3.2.10. Safety and movement of persons, including supporters and members of the public**

Security of individuals and guaranteed protection of their physical safety were defined as priority tasks of the security forces.

In order to contribute to the creation and maintenance of conditions enabling a festive and harmonious atmosphere among supporters from the various countries, decisions were taken on police procedures and strategic positioning of units which, while continuing to ensure security (prevention and response), could be integrated into the general atmosphere of celebration and tolerance. Hence, particular attention was paid to all the situations considered most likely to generate discontent among supporters, particularly waiting times for access to cities and the areas around stadia and, in particular, for access to stadia themselves.

For the whole period of the tournament and for each match, action plans were introduced in relation to transport routes at national and local level, access routes to Portugal via Spain and to the sports venues, entertainment areas and parking areas. Motorway service areas (in addition to other critical points already mentioned above) were also the subject of special attention.

### 5.2.3.3. Intervention levels

Still in the context of the policing strategy, levels were defined for police forces intervention, so as to facilitate measured and selective action.

Taking as a basis the probabilities of use of coercive methods, 5 levels of action were considered, retaining wherever possible a cross-cutting perspective of resource deployment and police response (possibility of action at more than one level).

For each such level, the following parameters were defined and characterised in tables:

- ✓ the intended objective at that level;
- ✓ the situations and incidents for which the level is suitable;
- ✓ the operational method to be used;
- ✓ the types of unit to be used and their composition;
- ✓ the resources to be allocated to the unit, and visibility (uniform and equipment).

The following levels were considered:

Intervention level 1 – Low probability of use of force, for normal situations, involving routine police interventions;

Intervention level 2 – Medium probability of use of force, for crowd situations without incident or involving minor, low-aggression incidents;

Intervention level 3 – High probability of use of force, for incidents of aggression involving few participants;

Intervention level 4 – Actual need for use of force, involving incidents of aggression with numerous participants;

Intervention level 5 – Need for using extraordinary measures. Intervention in case of actual or potential incidents requiring tactical police intervention (terrorist acts, attacks, kidnappings and hostage-taking, crimes with high levels of violence, etc.), involving use of extraordinary measures:

- ✓ special operations unit,
- ✓ tactical intervention unit,
- ✓ explosives ordnance disposal and underground security units,
- ✓ personal security units.

Procedures were also defined for a 6th level of intervention, concerning plain-clothes staff. Units including plain-clothes staff, properly integrated into the policing and security models, were defined to provide:

- ✓ intervention capability at levels 1, 2, 3 and 4;
- ✓ a cross-cutting perspective of resource deployment and police action (the same resources to operate at more than one level);
- ✓ spotting;

- ✓ a permanent presence in the crowds, intelligence, assessment, accompaniment of groups, inspection, prevention and intervention; and
- ✓ specialised teams for arrests.

## **6. INTERNATIONAL POLICE CO-OPERATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION**

### **6.1. General view**

Information on supporters, namely the violent-prone and violent ones, as well as the adoption of preventative measures in the home countries is vital in organising a peaceful international football competition.

The follow-up of EURO 2000, in several instances, in the field of international police co-operation and exchange of information on football-related violence was very important for enhancing the legal framework of the European Union, for strengthening the national legislations and improving the collaborative approach between the police forces and officials all over Europe.

During the preparation period, close co-operation and informal liaison among police information centres and police experts of organising and participating countries all over Europe was very important for the consolidation of knowledge and effective practical procedures and initiatives.

Under the supervision of the State Committee for the Security and Safety of EURO 2004, a national co-ordinating centre for police intelligence and local police information centres were set up. Several meetings with police delegations from the participating countries were held in order to implement a cohesive and efficient national and international police information network during the tournament.

Besides that, the State Committee followed and linked to various international working groups and initiatives, such as:

- IPO - International Permanent Observatory for Security Measures during Major Events, UNICRI (Turin),
- T-RV (Council of Europe Standing Committee on Spectators Violence),
- Berlin Conferences (FIFA 2006 Football World Championship),
- UEFA and FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe): social work and police training for mediation with supporters' groups,
- EU agencies and working groups, such as: EUROPOL, Task Force of Chiefs of Police and Police Co-operation Working Group.

### **6.2. National police co-operation**

Both in the security planning phase for Euro 2004 and in the final phase of the championship, there was an excellent level of co-operation between all the Portuguese security forces and services.

During the preparatory phase, various simulations took place (CPX and LIVEX exercises) which made it possible to define responsibilities clearly and improve co-ordination between all those concerned.

During the event, because there were no serious incidents, police co-operation mainly took the form of exchange of intelligence, both at national (PICC) and local (PILC) level.

In addition, the different police forces provided back-up for each other (particularly on days when matches were taking place) and various joint operations were carried out.

### **6.3. *International police co-operation***

The general objective of international police co-operation was defined as a decisive contribution to the security of Euro 2004.

The following specific objectives were considered:


- ✓ intelligence gathering/distribution;
- ✓ spotting;
- ✓ tracking and identification of supporters who posed a risk;
- ✓ crowd control, under the co-ordination and authority of the Portuguese police forces;
- ✓ welcoming, guiding and briefing supporters from the country of the police concerned;
- ✓ negotiating or mediating in conflicts involving supporters from the country of the police concerned.

As regards the definition of the size and composition of the foreign police delegations, the following criteria were considered:

- ✓ assessment of the risk from supporters at earlier matches and competitions involving the relevant national teams;
- ✓ earlier cases of major incidents of public order disturbances involving supporters from the country concerned;
- ✓ expected scale of presence in Portugal of category B and C supporters from that country;
- ✓ overall number of supporters from that country expected in Portugal during the championship;
- ✓ prior experience in spotting and expertise regarding the risk supporters on the part of the police authorities of the supporting country.



Foreign police delegations were properly trained by Portuguese police and were integrated into the intelligence structures, taking the following organisation chart as a model:



In terms of overall numbers, in the field of international police co-operation, the delegations from England and Germany were the largest, as the following table shows:

**International Police Force Delegations present in Portugal:**

COUNTRY		TOTAL
Bulgaria	BG	4
Croatia	HR	4
Czech Republic	CZ	6
Denmark	DK	3
England	ENG	22
France	F	11
Germany	D	18
Greece	GR	2
Italy	I	9
Latvia	LV	2
Netherlands	NL	11
Russia	RU	4
Spain	SP	11
Sweden	S	6
Switzerland	CH	4
Europol		1
Interpol		1
<b>GLOBAL TOTAL</b>		<b>119</b>

Also in this area, following several meetings between the authorities of the two countries, with particular credit due to the diligence of the Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Portugal, a Protocol was signed between Portugal and the United Kingdom on police co-operation, exchange of information and judicial co-operation.

The protocol was designed to contribute to the security of Euro 2004, in its various aspects, by means of close and effective co-operation between the Governments and the authorities responsible for law enforcement in Portugal and the United Kingdom.

The following subjects were covered in the Protocol:

- ✓ status of the English police delegation in Portugal;
- ✓ exchange of police intelligence and other intelligence before, during and after the championship;
- ✓ banning orders and exit orders against violent England supporters intending to travel to Euro 2004;
- ✓ gathering and sharing of indicators;
- ✓ judicial co-operation;
- ✓ co-operation in the field of aliens and borders;
- ✓ relationship with the media.

International police co-operation, involving all the participating countries, proved essential to the success of Euro 2004.

The Portuguese Government and the police forces highlight the contribution made by the police forces and intelligence services of the participating countries, in the following areas:

- ✓ intelligence,
- ✓ spotting,
- ✓ orders banning access to Portugal.

#### **6.4. *Intelligence model for Euro 2004***

On the basis of national intelligence structures and of European Union Directives and Council of Europe Recommendations, an intelligence model was drawn up for Euro 2004, with the aim of obtaining and processing the following information:

##### **i) Strategic information:**

Relating to teams and their supporters

- ✓ past history,
- ✓ usual behaviour of supporters as a whole, and
- ✓ usual behaviour of problem supporters.

***What could happen?***

For the purposes of risk assessment, an analysis framework was drawn up with the following headings:

- nationality of the team,
- risk analysis of earlier matches,
- National Football Information Point (NFIP),
- behaviour of supporters,
- movements of supporters,
- high risk supporters (B and C),
- organised groups of high-risk supporters,
- identification of organised supporters' groups,
- transport and movements of organised groups,
- attitude towards other countries' supporters,
- international contacts (with other groups of high-risk supporters),
- usual reactions (to police, stewards and journalists),
- usual behaviour (before, during and after matches and on days when no matches are taking place)
- description of previous incidents.

**ii) Operational information:**

on the tournament in general and each match in particular

- ✓ number and category of supporters (A, B or C),
- ✓ how they will travel,
- ✓ where they will stay before, during and after matches,
- ✓ expected behaviour.

***What will happen, and when and where will it happen?***

**iii) Tactical information:**


Information which will enable the commanding officer or head of operations to take appropriate action.

- ✓ confirmation of operational information,
- ✓ what the supporters are doing,
- ✓ how to deal with the supporters (in particular the high-risk ones).

***What is happening and when and where is it happening?***


As regards the model and system adopted for obtaining and processing information, the following aspects stand out:

The **intelligence model** adopted is shown in the following table:



Regarding the **intelligence structures and flows**, attention should be drawn to the creation of the Police Intelligence Co-ordination Centre (PICC) at the national level, with direct links to the Police Intelligence Local Centres (PILC) situated in each of the cities where the matches were taking place, the national police force directorates, the National Football Information Point (NFIP) and the Euro 2004 Security and Safety Committee.

The following diagram is intended to illustrate the information flows and structures that applied:



The following overall objectives were defined for the **Police Intelligence Co-ordination Centre (PICC)**:

- ✓ Co-ordination of all the intelligence flows (among national security forces and other security services);
- ✓ National Football Information Point (NFIP) for Euro 2004; and
- ✓ Co-ordination of international police co-operation as regards football.


The following tasks were assigned to it:

- ✓ intelligence gathering: from other countries' NFIPs, Interpol, Europol, spotter teams, local police services and other sources;
- ✓ continuous analysis of threats and risks related to the football supporters, together with the liaison officers – risk assessment for each country and for each game;
- ✓ dissemination of all the information relevant to support and planning and operational procedures on the ground;
- ✓ preparation and presentation of daily briefings with sector co-ordinators and foreign and Portuguese liaison officials;
- ✓ management of data on high-risk supporters – in accordance with the Portuguese and international regulations;
- ✓ central Co-ordination of the work to be carried out by foreign police delegations during Euro 2004.

The operational structure of the PICC and the co-ordination of spotter teams with the PILC and the local police services may be summarised as follows:


## POLICE INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATION CENTRE

### PICC Structure



The following table is also designed to summarise the matrix structure defined for the PICC:

**POLICE INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATION CENTRE**  
**PICC – Matrix Structure**



The following overall objectives were defined for the **Police Intelligence Local Centres (PILC)** (for each PILC):

- ✓ reception, analysis and dissemination of the intelligence on the city and the match;
- ✓ local co-ordination of the intelligence channels between the various security services with responsibilities relating to the events.

The following tasks were assigned to them:

- ✓ gathering and processing the intelligence collected locally by investigation units and by the teams of spotters;
- ✓ confirmation of intelligence (and of rumours);
- ✓ maintaining continuous information exchange with the PICC (and other PILC's) on facts relevant for security and public order; and
- ✓ total integration of the teams of spotters in the information circuit (providing and receiving information).

From the very beginning, the Portuguese authorities estimated international police co-operation extremely important for the success of the event, particularly in the following fields:

- ✓ intelligence;
- ✓ spotting;
- ✓ banning orders.

Basically, the international co-operation model was based on the following instruments:

- ✓ European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches, Strasbourg, 19 August 1985;
- ✓ Handbook with Recommendations for International Police Co-operation in connection with Football Matches, EU Council Resolution of 6 December 2001;
- ✓ Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning Security in connection with Football Matches with an International Dimension (*Establishment of the National Football Information Points*); and
- ✓ Previous experiences (*in particular Euro 2000*).

### **6.5. Best practices**

Experience at UEFA EURO 2004 reinforced the following best practices in the field of international police co-operation:

- effective national policies, like the British one, based on the identification and prosecution of violent supporters, preventing them from leaving the country before and during the tournament, and on maximising the positive role of socio-educational initiatives;
- the role of bilateral agreements, which facilitates the relationship and practical procedures in the fields of exchange of police intelligence, criminal justice co-operation and deportation of citizens;
- the importance of selecting and training skilled and motivated members for the national police delegations;
- the role of spotters in assisting and supporting local police/gendarmerie in the field, namely through the identification, liaison, prosecution and guidance of their national supporters;
- the extensive interpretation of the EU legislation as regards the constitution of police delegations, including new areas of co-operation such as terrorism, immigration and liaison with international judicial co-operation;
- the importance of previous meetings and discussions between police forces of the organising and participating countries, together with the leaders of the relevant supporters groups, in order to exchange useful information, mutual expectations and needs;
- the increasing role of the diplomatic representatives in the preparation of the tournament, ensuring the liaison and implementing services for adequate response to their nationals before and during the tournament.

## **7. TECHNOLOGY**

Communication and information technologies and systems are more and more important for the effectiveness of the police work and for the adequate management of a major international event.

According to the national regulations on security and safety conditions for the construction or reconstruction of stadia, command and control rooms, thousands of CCTV cameras inside and outside the stadia, electronic turning styles and other safety technologies were implemented in the sports infrastructures.

Besides that, new communication systems and jamming devices, video- conferencing between the local and national police headquarters' command and control rooms were set up, all connected with the national police information network, enabling the security and safety services to have updated and relevant information. Explosive device detectors, accreditation and ticketing were other areas where new technologies were very important tools for safe and secure environment.

Nevertheless, national authorities and the organiser of the tournament were always very keen to ensure the balance between security and safety, on one hand, and the civil liberties and the festive nature of the event, on the other.

## **8. MEDIA POLICY**

At the strategic level, the relationship with the national and international media was ensured by the general co-ordinator of the State Committee for the Security and Safety of EURO 2004 and his deputy, respectively, in order to make sure that the message was the same.

This relationship between the security national officials and the media was built in a consistent way and based on mutual truth, confidence and objectiveness. In terms of media policy, there was always a clear separation between the information on the security policy, which was up to the heads of the Committee or the political level, and the technical or policing issues, which were up to the police and gendarmerie commanders or their press and public relations officers.

The media were part of the security strategy as a relevant tool for passing over, both internally and abroad, the message on the security concept, the police/gendarmerie profile and approaches, the national authorities' expectations of the foreign supporters' behaviour. These systematic contacts with the international press proved to be efficient, as a complement of information for the national authorities and a relevant source for the supporters of the participating countries to build more accurate perceptions of the country, the police authorities and the tournament.

During the tournament, it was very important to explain, through the press, that certain incidents that were occurring, like the murder of an English citizen by a homeless Ukrainian in downtown Lisbon, or certain disorders in the Algarve caused by drunkenness were not connected or necessarily linked with football fans or the tournament itself, in order to avoid an escalation of football-related violence.

## **9. PREVENTION AND HOSPITALITY POLICIES**

The security concept drawn up by the State committee, as well as the security concept of the organiser considered social-educational prevention measures, like the contacts with the leaders of relevant supporters' groups, fan embassies, fan coaching and the cities' events programmes were critical factors for creating a relaxed and friendly atmosphere.

The set of socio-educational prevention measures and actions forewritten in the Council of Europe Standing Committee's recommendation, enacted early 2003, had an



important impact not only on the organising country but also on the fan NGOs and on UEFA.

In fact, UEFA sponsored, for the first time, the implementation of a European-level coordinating structure, headed by FARE, which worked together with some of the major national football fans' associations in the implementation of fan embassies during UEFA EURO 2004<sup>TM</sup>.

Moreover, there was an important political engagement of the Secretary of State of the Interior and the head of the State Committee in raising the awareness of local mayors and local authorities of the hosting and lodging cities, on the relevant role of the local hospitality policies, which proved to be quite effective in the preparation of the cities for the event, in providing attractive events programmes and, last but not least, in mobilising the local communities for the tournament.

## **10. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT**

The mobilisation of the vast majority of the Portuguese around the tournament, contributing in a significant way to the friendly and convivial atmosphere, and, more specifically, around the Portuguese national team, was a very interesting phenomenon, from several perspectives.

One of the factors behind this sociological phenomenon was the communication ability of the coach of the national team, whose wishes mobilised every Portuguese person around the national team, and, through this, around the national symbols, raising national pride and self-esteem of the people to unprecedented levels. The positive results of the Portuguese national team seemed to be, at the same time, the consequence and the cause for that collective positive wave, which also had a positive impact on the welcoming way local people hosted foreign supporters.

Another positive factor for engaging the whole community was the television broadcasting policy, agreed upon by the public and private channels, which enabled the free broadcasting of all the matches of the tournament on one of the four channels.

Last but not least, the high quality of the players, the excellent work of the referees, high competitiveness and the increasing uncertainty of the results, focused press and public attention on the pitch, on pure football, rather than on lateral and accessory issues like football-related violence.

## CONCLUSIONS

Ten key-issues were developed in this article as, in our perspective, the main factors for the success of UEFA EURO 2004<sup>TM</sup> and, consequently, the critical factors for the success of future tournaments.

This was considered by experts, officials and international public opinion in general as a very successful tournament in terms of general organisation, security and fair-play.

The few minor disorders in tourist sites, mostly due to drunkenness of a few dozen people, were very far from the scenarios of hooliganism and intolerance we have seen at some football competitions around Europe, and were the tiny exception to the general rule.

Behind this apparently amazing success is the planning and operational capacity, the willingness and professional attitude of the organiser, the State agencies and their personnel, the national community and the supporters.

Besides the favourable environment created through the motivation and engagement of the vast majority of the Portuguese people and the very good sporting results of the Portuguese national team, perhaps the most important factors, as regards security on the field, were the low profile of policing and a pre-positioning, gradual and quick response to incidents, and an effective international police co-operation and exchange of police intelligence (exit bans), which prevented several thousands of identified hooligans from travelling abroad during this period.

For Portugal, the benefits of having a new model of security and safety of football venues, better equipped and motivated police forces, an enhanced knowledge and culture of management, co-ordination and co-operation, at all levels, as well as ten excellent football stadia, are extraordinarily relevant. Nevertheless, we believe that the emotional and economic impact, as well as the positive image of the country at the international level, although difficult to predict and quantify in the medium-long term, are undoubtedly the most important added-value brought by UEFA EURO 2004<sup>TM</sup>.

In short, the success of the tournament in terms of security can be summarised by these 6 'C's: **Capacity, Communication, Co-ordination, Co-operation, Confidence and Conviviality**.

**For further information**

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Photos: Portuguese supporters at EURO 2004 Portugal-Holland match, Lisbon's Jose Alvalade stadium, 30 June 2004

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