Ministers’ Deputies
Information documents
CM/Inf(2004)21 (confidential) 4 June 2004
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Informal Ministerial Meeting (Strasbourg, 12 May 2004) -
Exchange of views with Mr Harri Holkeri, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Kosovo
Document prepared by the Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers
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1. The Secretary General welcomed Ministers to the informal exchange of views (see appendix for the list of participants). On this occasion the exchange of views was taking place in the middle of the Ministerial Session as a result of the new experimental formula of a single Session per year with two co-Chairmen. His guest for the evening was Mr Harri Holkeri, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Kosovo, who had just returned from New York where he had been reporting to the UN Security Council on the execution of his mandate. He felt sure that everything was being done to apply the same standards to all the inhabitants of Kosovo. This position had been clearly stated by the Parliamentary Assembly.
2. Mr Holkeri said that the UN Security Council had defined the policy towards Kosovo in its Resolution 1244 adopted in 1999. Since that date many developments had taken place in the area. Those attracting most attention had occurred in March 2004 when the Serbian population had suffered serious maltreatment. The main reasons for these acts of violence by the Kosovo Albanians had been frustration about the current economic situation and the fact that there was no prospect for the solution of the status of Kosovo. In fact, the prospect of a solution was no closer than in 1999. The situation now remained calm but fragile.
3. What could be done to ensure that there was no repetition of the March events? The political leadership as well as public opinion in Kosovo considered the situation serious and were definitely not in favour of such events recurring. Since the events steps had been taken to isolate the wrong-doers, 270 people had been arrested leading to international prosecution of 50 of them. Despite the evidence of the seriousness of the situation at that time, a number of events had been reported by the media in an unprofessional way.
4. A second event occurred in April which was damaging to the general situation but even more to the UN police force itself because it was evidence of existing dissent. An attack by a Jordanian police officer (allegedly belonging to Hamas) on American members of the police force had led to casualties.
5. Amongst the most difficult problems facing Kosovo at the moment was first of all the reform of local government on the basis of multi-ethnicity as foreseen in Resolution 1244. In this context he took note of the recent “plan” adopted by the Serbian Parliament containing a comprehensive set of proposals, as well as the rich report submitted by Ambassador Civiletti, on behalf of the Council of Europe. All those proposals were important contributions to future discussions which had to find a solution to the central problem of multiethnicity.
6. Standards before status remained the other priority issue. There was still the implementation plan for the eight standards and Kosovo Serbs had unfortunately not yet joined the process. They must join this political dialogue, in particular in view of the forthcoming elections. It was up to the new government to bring about the conditions (i.e. the implementation of the standards) to open the way for the handling of the status question as from mid 2005.
7. Top of the list of standards/conditions figured the question of the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps and the (interrupted) direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on practical co-operation. The latter included the working group on missing persons which was essential for creating a new climate after the ethnically motivated violence. Further practical matters concerned energy, traffic and telecommunications. Kosovo Serbs still had to change licence plates when travelling in Serbia and pay extra insurance. A protocol addressing this problem had not yet been worked out.
8. If the Kosovo Serbs had still not decided to participate in the political process, there were indications that they were ready to join a security advisory group. A similar group seemed to be in the process of being created in Belgrade. The reconstruction of private housing for the Serbs after the damage of March was a top priority. Provision had been made by the government in the budget for this reconstruction and real advances needed to be made by the summer. Agreement had not yet been reached on how to pay for religious sites which had suffered during the disturbances. Talks were under way with the orthodox church authorities and UNESCO.
9. What lessons could be learnt for UNMIK? Mr Holkeri felt that it could certainly not just continue as before and one had also to consider that UNMIK could not stay for ever. There was a need to look into the present four- pillar structure:
- UN with overall responsibility for law and justice,
- UN as a provider for public administration services,
- OSCE with particular reference to elections and education,
- EU with particular reference to rebuilding the economy and reconstruction.
10. In the medium term the number of pillars should no doubt be reduced with one UN pillar and possibly an OSCE pillar and one under the responsibility of the European Union.
11. In conclusion Mr Holkeri drew the attention to the paradoxical economic situation in Kosovo. The total sum of investments by the UN, NATO, OSCE, the European Union and individual countries made the presence in Kosovo per capita the most expensive international assistance in the world. However, there had been little improvement in the economic situation in Kosovo since 1999. 20 percent of the population lived below the poverty line.
12. There was an urgent need to give local authorities more responsibility for economic development. Privatisation had to be started. This, however, needed the involvement of the government of Serbia if it concerned mines, airport infrastructure, telecommunications and energy production. The worst scenario for Kosovo was maintaining the status quo.
13. The Secretary General thanked M. Holkeri for his reference to Council of Europe work in local democracy. Reference could also be made to ongoing attempts at ensuring the review of the implementation of Council of Europe standards, as contained in various instruments, in particular the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities and the "Anti-torture" Convention. In addition, the Council of Europe was ready to provide assistance in the field of cultural and architectural heritage with regard to the reconstruction of churches.
14. The Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Dr. Bot, said that also in European Union circles the worst enemy had been identified as the status quo. He agreed that work must continue on standards before decisions were taken on the status of Kosovo but in the meantime the economy must prosper to provide people with a perspective. The international community could not continue to fund assistance at the present rate There was also the risk of condoning a “beggar mentality”. It was important to stimulate local economic initiative in the perspective of improved standards and avoiding paralysis in the life of the community. Corruption and the different kinds of trafficking must stop.
15. Mr Holkeri said that the only way forward was progress on standards. The standard implementation programme was a living document and economic problems continued to exist. This included the Kosovar Protection Corps of 5000 members with only 500 needed: an example of disguised employment. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1244 continued to be the only framework for action and implementation of programmes.
16. The incoming Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Mr Petersen, asked if there were any warning signals before the violence in March erupted.
17. Mr Holkeri said he had been shocked by the violence and taken by surprise. There had been no warning, even through intelligence channels of countries represented in Kosovo. Could it happen again? Preparations must be made to avoid a recurrence. UNMIK itself had no intelligence apparatus and KFOR troop availability had been reduced to 17,000. Was this sufficient?
18. In reply to the Secretary General’s invitation, six participants took the floor to put questions and make comments. They are summarised below.
- The situation in Kosovo was bleak. If the enemy was the status quo, the international community as the decision maker had to take action.
- Criticism against UNMIK was unfair. It did what it could with the means at its disposal.
- No hasty discussion on the future status must be taken, because the international community must be aware of what it wants Kosovo to become. A black hole? A centre of extremism and organised crime? This was certainly not the wish of Council of Europe members.
- ”Standards before status” was a catchy slogan. It could, however, only become credible by real changes in the practice of standards.
- During the last five years the majority had tried to eliminate the minority and recent violence had even the effect of ethnic cleansing.
- Security was not a matter of even more soldiers for Kosovo, but of a clear message to be sent to Albanian leaders that the rights of minorities were the mirror image of those of the majority.
- All individuals in Kosovo must have their rights and the Serb population must not pay the price for the sins of Milosevic.
- There had been no international opposition to the changes of the communist external borders of the former Yugoslavia. Therefore why could there be no discussion of the communist municipality borders within Kosovo? A high degree of local autonomy provided serious chances for better protection of individual rights.
- The great majority of the population in Kosovo desired the return to a normal life and reconciliation; however, no short-term solution for Kosovo should lose sight of the possible disastrous long-term effects of neglecting the fact that the Serbian state had been born in Kosovo.
- Kosovo must not become the “black hole” in the region, but become an integral part of regional stability.
- In that context, implementing standards also meant promote co-operation.
- The Vienna dialogue on practical co-operation must be resumed.
- There was enough space for Serbs and Albanians to live together.
- Serbs must learn to live with their neighbours and avoid self imposed apartheid.
- Europe offered functioning democratic institutions and a new mentality of living peacefully together. They were the keys to the future.
- With this in mind, a number of standards for the region must be developed which would open the way for the UN Security Council to discuss the status question.
19. Mr Holkeri, in connection with the various points made, said that it was important to talk of future status and not the final status. Any change had to start in the mind. The reform of local government was essential with equal rights for all communities of Kosovo. Highest priority must be given to the development of the economy. The PISG and Prime Minister Rexhepi were committed to this agenda, but active participation of the other communities was indispensable.
20. The Secretary General agreed that multi-ethnicity must start at local level and here the proposals made by the Civiletti report were extremely apposite.
21. The situation in Kosovo was serious. But, however difficult, progress should continue to be made. The contribution of the Council of Europe in the observation of elections, in decentralisation, in the protection of human rights and assistance in the preservation of the cultural heritage were modest but all were valuable. He had noted that Kosovo had been described as receiving most per capita assistance in the world. Surely the main solution in Kosovo should not be the provision of more soldiers. It was rather learning the lessons on how to live in peace together. That was the challenge to us all.
22. The Secretary General thanked Mr Holkeri and all participants for their contributions. Discussions on Kosovo and the remaining items on the agenda of the Ministerial Session could continue over dinner.
Appendix
INFORMAL MEETING / REUNION INFORMELLE
(Strasbourg, 12 May / mai 2004)
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS / LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS
HOST / HOTE
Mr Walter SCHWIMMER Secretary General / Secrétaire Général
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CHAIR (THE NETHERLANDS) / PRESIDENCE (PAYS-BAS)
Dr Bernard BOT Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Mr Johannes LANDMAN Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe / Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire, Représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l’Europe
VICE-CHAIR (NORWAY) / VICE-PRESIDENCE (NORVEGE)
Mr Jan PETERSEN Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Mr Torbjørn FRØYSNES Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe / Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire, Représentant Permanent auprès du Conseil de l’Europe
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GUEST / INVITE
Mr Harri HOLKERI Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Mission in Kosovo / Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général, Mission des Nations Unies au Kosovo
ALBANIA / ALBANIE
Mr Luan HAJDARAGA Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs / Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
ANDORRA / ANDORRE
Mr Juli MINOVES Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
ARMENIA / ARMENIE
Mr Vartan OSKANIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE
Mr Johannes KYRLE Permanent Under-Secretary of State / Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat permanent
AZERBAIJAN / AZERBAÏDJAN
Mr Elmar MAMMADYAROV Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA / BOSNIE-HERZÉGOVINE
Dr Mladen IVANIĆ Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
BULGARIA / BULGARIE
Mr Petko DRAGANOV Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs / Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
CROATIA / CROATIE
Mr Miomir ŽUŽUL Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
ESTONIA / ESTONIE
Ms Kristiina OJULAND Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
FINLAND / FINLANDE
Mr Erkki TUOMIOJA Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
GEORGIA / GEORGIE
Ms Salome ZURABISHVILI Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
GREECE / GRECE
Mr Yannis VALINAKIS State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Secrétaire d’Etat, Ministère des Affaires étrangères
HUNGARY / HONGRIE
Mr András BÁRSONY State Secretary for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Secrétaire d’Etat des Affaires politiques, Ministère des Affaires étrangères
IRELAND / IRLANDE
Mr Dick ROCHE State Minister responsible for European Affairs / Ministre adjoint délégué aux Affaires européennes
ITALY / ITALIE
Mr Roberto ANTONIONE Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs / Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
LATVIA / LETTONIE
Mr Rihards PIKS Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
LITHUANIA / LITUANIE
Mr Šarūnas ADOMAVIČIUS Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat, Ministère des Affaires étrangères
MALTA / MALTE
Mr John DALLI Minister for Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion / Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Promotion des Investissements
MOLDOVA
Ms Eugenia KISTRUGA First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs / Premier Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
POLAND / POLOGNE
Mr Jan TRUSZCZYŃSKI Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs / Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
PORTUGAL
Mr Carlos COSTA NEVES Secretary of State responsible for European Affairs / Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires européennes
ROMANIA / ROUMANIE
Mr Bogdan AURESCU Secretary of State responsible for European Affairs / Secrétaire d’Etat chargé des Affaires européennes
RUSSIAN FEDERATION / FEDERATION DE RUSSIE
Mr Vladimir CHIZHOV Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs / Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO / SERBIE-MONTENEGRO
Mr Vuk DRASKOVIĆ Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
SLOVAK REPUBLIC / REPUBLIQUE SLOVAQUE
Mr Eduard KUKAN Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
SLOVENIA / SLOVENIE
Dr Dimitrij RUPEL Minister for Foreign Affairs / Ministre des Affaires étrangères
SPAIN / ESPAGNE
Mr Bernardino LEÓN State Secretary for Foreign Affaires / Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires étrangères
SWEDEN / SUEDE
Mr Hans DAHLGREN Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs / Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE
Mr Paul SEGER State Secretary / Secrétaire d’Etat
“THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA” /
« L’EX-REPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE DE MACEDOINE »
Mr Igor DZUNDEV State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Secrétaire d’Etat, Ministère des Affaires étrangères
TURKEY / TURQUIE
Mr Nabi ŞENSOY Deputy Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Sous-secrétaire Adjoint, Ministère des Affaires étrangères
UKRAINE
Mr Oleg SHAMSHUR Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs / Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères
UNITED KINGDOM / ROYAUME-UNI
Lord GOLDSMITH Attorney General / Procureur Général
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PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY /
ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE
Mr Peter SCHIEDER President / Président
Mr Mateo SORINAS Director General / Directeur Général
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION /
COMMISSION EUROPEENNE
Mr Ján FIGEL Member of the European Commission / Membre de la Commission européenne
OSCE
Mr Ján KUBIŠ Secretary General / Secrétaire Général
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SECRETARIAT
Mr Leonard G DAVIES Secretary to the Committee of Ministers / Secrétaire du Comité des Ministres
Mr Klaus SCHUMANN Director General of Political Affairs / Directeur Général des Affaires politiques
Mr Jan KLEIJSSEN Director of Private Office / Directeur de Cabinet