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
**ЖІНКИ В МЕДІА**

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# KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING OF  
COVERAGE IN ONLINE MEDIA AND THE SOCIAL NETWORK FACEBOOK  
OF THE 2020 LOCAL ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN UKRAINE





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# KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING OF COVERAGE IN ONLINE MEDIA AND THE SOCIAL NETWORK FACEBOOK OF THE 2020 LOCAL ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN UKRAINE

MONITORING PERIOD 5 SEPTEMBER – 25 OCTOBER 2020

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Monitoring was held under the support of the Project  
«European Union and Council of Europe working together  
to support freedom of media in Ukraine»



\*Presentation of the first interim monitoring report, 8 October 2020.  
Photo, Council of Europe.

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
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# INTRODUCTION

The coalition of civil society organisations consisting of the Journalism Ethics Commission, “Human Rights Platform”, “Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication”, “StopFake” (Ukraine) and Association “Women in Media” conducted systematic monitoring of the coverage in online media and the social network Facebook local elections in Ukraine 2020. The monitoring was carried out with the support of the Project “European Union and Council of Europe working together to support freedom of media in Ukraine”.

## THE MAJOR PURPOSE OF THIS MONITORING WAS TO:

- provide the media, participants of the electoral process, the international community and citizens with the criteria for assessing the fairness of coverage of the electoral process;
- reduce the negative impact of disinformation and propaganda on the electoral process;
- help establish a sustainable and effective cooperation and coordination between national stakeholders in order to prevent and eliminate violations in the media coverage of elections;
- contribute to more fair and impartial media coverage of elections in the media.





The monitoring results will help to advocate for important changes and improvements in the media coverage of future elections.

The monitoring was focused on 33 local online media and Facebook pages of a number of subjects of local elections.

20 independent monitoring specialists collected primary monitoring data, which was assessed and analysed by media experts from the coalition organisations.

Data for the final monitoring report was collected from **September 5 to October 25, 2020.**

Monitoring was carried out on a daily basis.



# METHODOLOGY

The monitoring was based on the methodology developed by Council of Europe experts Rasto Kuzel and Oleksandr Burmahin. The methodology is internationally recognised and has been previously used in similar projects in more than 50 countries, including Ukraine, in the course of last 20 years. This methodology offers a systematic and integrated approach and provides an in-depth analysis of pluralism and diversity in media coverage, in particular, to analyse the coverage of specific actors and topics.

The Council of Europe local consultants adjusted the methodology taking into account the peculiarities of local elections. The full version of the monitoring methodology is available at link: [http://www.cje.org.ua/sites/default/les/library/FINAL\\_FINAL\\_UKR\\_Media-Monitoring-Methodology\\_Ukraine\\_17.09.pdf](http://www.cje.org.ua/sites/default/les/library/FINAL_FINAL_UKR_Media-Monitoring-Methodology_Ukraine_17.09.pdf)

The monitoring subjects included:


- 33 local online media (3 web-sites in 12 regions);
- 120 Facebook pages:
  - 5 pages of parliamentary parties;
  - 5 pages of national political parties that are not present in the Parliament;
  - 10 pages of national party leaders;
  - pages of TOP 5 parties in each monitored region;
  - pages of TOP 3-6 candidates for mayors position in regional centres.





Given the complex geopolitical context and the possibility of external influences in the media field of Ukraine, 12 border regions were selected for the monitoring, namely:

- Vinnytsia region (borders Moldova),
- Volyn region (borders Belarus and Poland),
- Zhytomyr region (borders Belarus),
- Zakarpattia region (borders four EU countries - Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Romania),
- Kyiv region (is strategic as the capital Kyiv is situated here, also borders Belarus),
- Lviv region (borders Poland),
- Rivne region (borders Belarus),
- Sumy region (borders Russia),
- Chernivtsi (borders Moldova and Romania),
- Chernihiv region (borders Belarus and Russia)
- Territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by the government of Ukraine (border Russia).







The selection of local online media took into account the bigmir.net rating (by region). When web-sites were not included to the specified rating, the audience was verified using the SimilarWeb tool.

In 10 regions, 3 web-sites with the largest audience were selected. With regard to territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by the government of Ukraine, 3 web-sites were selected that cover the events of the entire region.

Media monitoring provided quantitative and qualitative analysis of the coverage. The quantitative analysis focuses on:

- the space allocated candidates to mayor's position, political parties participating in the elections and other political players such as the president, government, Central Election Commission and others;
- the tone in which these subjects are covered – positive, neutral or negative;
- the thematic structure of news;
- the coverage of hot topics that appeared on the agenda in a particular monitoring period (hot stories);
- the representation of women and men.



The following aspects were studied during qualitative monitoring:

- compliance with journalistic ethics and standards (including the presence of paid journalism – “jeansa”);
- signs of potential external Russian information influence on Ukrainian media;
- violation of electoral legislation (for example, in terms of publishing of the sociological data);
- compliance with gender equality, presence/absence of sexism, correct representation of men and women who are subjects of the electoral process.





The official communication channels of the subjects of the electoral process were also monitored, in particular Facebook pages of the parties with the highest rating in Ukraine (namely, parliamentary ones and those that would have been elected to the Parliament if the elections were held now), leaders of these parties and regional party cells holding leadership positions in the monitored regions and candidates for mayors of regional centres or cities that temporarily perform this function. In each region, the TOP 5 parties and TOP 3 candidates to mayor's positions were monitored (in Kyiv – 6). Their list was determined on the basis of recent opinion polls from reputable sociological research companies and expert assessments and consultations, given the lack of relevant opinion polls in some regions. If the percentage difference between the 5th and the 6th place in the party's rating or respectively the 3rd and the 4th place of candidates to mayor's positions was insignificant (under 1%), both pages were included to the monitoring. During the monitoring process, some pages were replaced or removed from monitoring on the basis of a significant change in ratings or withdrawal of the candidates to mayor's positions. Some pages were replaced following the creation of official public pages instead of personal accounts of candidates.

The topics of candidates' posts, the specifics of their Facebook campaign, the presence or absence of hate speech and incitement to hatred were analysed within the monitoring. It was also focused on how the candidates use advertising posts, whether they provide the voters with educational information, whether there were signs of using trolls or bots. The monitoring team also identified possible signs of external information influence in the candidates' rhetoric.





### Quantitative criteria:

- collecting basic data (number of followers, likes) that would give insight into their presence/popularity in social networks;
- extent to which the parties and candidates used social media (campaign strategy);
- approaching voters through information messages;
- creating specific hash tags to mark elections;
- interaction with voters.



### Tracking actual publications (qualitative criteria):

- counting the number of publications over a certain period of time;
- focusing on what political parties or politicians refer to in their posts – the list of topics and the number of comments generated by the post;
- analysis of official publications in terms of style;
- provocative rhetoric (hate speech);
- disinformation and propaganda;
- focusing on fake news and debunking it;
- focusing on paid political advertising through social media;
- focusing on campaign financing.



# KEY FINDINGS

## ONLINE MEDIA

- **43,056 news items in 33 online media outlets** were analysed during the entire monitoring period **from September 5 to October 25, 2020.**
- The monitoring results showed that **elections were not the main topic in the local online media, despite an active character of the local electoral campaign.** The topic “Elections” was only the sixth in terms of coverage (which amounts to 5.72%, or 2,462 news items) in the list of other topics. The amount of election-related news at the start of the electoral campaign was minimal and began to grow together with the developments of the electoral campaign.
- **Online media outlets focus on the news style coverage of elections.** There is virtually no analytics. There are also almost no educational materials explaining to the voter the rights and procedure of voting under the new electoral legislation, as well as other important and complex election-related aspects.
- Instead, **“dzhynsa” remains the main media problem of election campaigns.** Online media in all monitored regions posted content with signs of paid journalism from various political forces and candidates to mayor’s position.
- **The TOP 3 topics included topics having a negative connotation.** “COVID-19” topic is in the first place in terms of coverage (15.25%, or 6,566 news), in the second – “Disasters, incidents, accidents” (13.80%, or 5,941 news), in the third – “Crime” (11.10%, or 4,780 news). Also, the online media paid a lot of attention to the topic “Transport/infrastructure”. It was in the fourth place in terms of coverage (7.45%, or 3,206 news items) due to coverage of the “Big Construction” project. **Instead, the important topics of Crimea** (0.03%, or 11 news items in two months of monitoring on all 33 online media), national minorities (0.04%, or 17 news items), Operation of Joint Forces (former ATO; 0.65%, or 281 news items), Russian aggression against Ukraine (0.96%, or 415 news items), corruption (0.95%, or 407 news items) **do not reach even 1% of the local online media coverage.**



- “Hot stories” analysis showed that the **news agenda of the local online media significantly differs from the agenda of Kyiv media**. Thus, the local media paid the most attention to the topic “Problems of school education during COVID-19” (531 news items). The topic of election violations, including physical violence (310 news items), is in the second place. In the third place - “AN-26” plane crash (234 news items). Local online media wrote very little about the presidential poll (5 questions), which took place on the election day: monitors recorded only 63 news items. Local media are least interested in the international topics: in particular, the topic of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan had the lowest level of coverage (9 news items in 33 online media for the entire period); not much more attention was given to the protests in Belarus (24 news items). There were only 20 news stories about the high-profile court decision in the case of Vakhtang Kipiani’s book about Stus.
- **Citizens at the local level did not receive enough information about the subjects of the electoral process**. Despite the fact that 194 parties officially participate in the election race, the diversity of political forces represented on local web-sites was very limited. Most web-sites promoted one or two candidates to mayor’s position or several political forces. All other election participants were out of the media field. Accordingly, if citizens read only one local web-site, they will never have full information about the actual political process in the country and which political forces are competing for their votes.
- **Online media outlets incorrectly label political advertising**, in particular in such a way that it is difficult for the reader to understand that this is political advertising.
- **Two political forces received the most attention from local online media: “Servant of the People”** (the party was covered in different range of tones: there was positive, neutral, and negative coverage) and **“Batkivshchyna”** (the tone is mostly positive).
- Among the candidates to mayor’s position, **the current mayor of Kyiv Vitalii Klychko received the most coverage**. He was in the first place in terms of coverage with a wide margin from all other candidates; such information was dominated by a neutral tone (55.71% of all news about him), but there was positive (37.99%) and negative tone (6.30%) as well.



## SOCIAL NETWORKS

- The main characteristic of the local electoral campaign in 2020 **is the competition of proposals of local political teams and candidates to mayor's position with brands and messages of the national-level parties.** Often the latter was beyond the powers of local deputies – and this looked like a “rehearsal” of parliamentary elections.
- **The party leaders in the social network were relatively inactive with a few exceptions.** The main activity was focused on the national or local levels party pages. The activity of party leaders was a part of the electoral campaign, but was not its basis (with the exception of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Ihor Smeshko, Oleh Liashko).
- **The rhetoric of local party cells had its own features.** For example, **“European Solidarity”** actively promoted the party agenda in all regions with no less active presentation of the candidates. **“Servant of the People”** has chosen “Big Construction” as the central topic, with focus on local facilities in the region and promises for further steps followed by “5 questions from the President”. **“Batkivshchyna”** almost entirely built its campaign on the personality and messages of Yuliia Tymoshenko. **“Opposition Platform – For Life”** adapted its rhetoric to the region: if in Luhansk region the party ran a very radical campaign, promoting the entire set of messages of the party's central office that resonate with the Kremlin's narratives, in Zakarpattia and Vinnytsia region the pages were maintained in Ukrainian and had relatively moderate rhetoric, although they became more radical closer to the election date. In the local campaign, the **All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”** focused on the success of “Svoboda” representatives as mayors and only then promoted the party's ideas of “fighting collaborators” and “countering revenge”.
- **Most of the candidates to mayor's position built their campaigns around local problems or newsworthy information.** The exception is the “Servant of the People” party, where almost all cells and party candidates used the party's rhetoric about “Big Construction”. They often used administrative resources and actively demonstrated proximity to the President, and sometimes the candidates were the incumbent heads of regional administrations.



- **The COVID-19 pandemic was a cross-cutting topic for both parties and candidates.** All parliamentary parties criticised the state authorities for misuse of funds from the “coronavirus fund” and a “failed fight against the pandemic”. The candidates to mayor’s position and local parties also used this topic to criticise local authorities or inform about the situation. Subsequently, the topic of **the Russian COVID-19 vaccine** was added.

Other hot stories were **possible election frauds**, **“5 questions from the President”**, **the dismissal of Vitold Fokin from the Trilateral Contact Group**, **fires in Luhansk region** (party cells in Luhansk region, “Opposition Platform - For Life”, “European Solidarity”), the ban on **Vakhtang Kipiani’s book “The Vasyl Stus Case”** (it was “noticed” only by parties that are focused on patriotism).

- **Almost all all-Ukrainian parties based their rhetoric on criticism of the current government, in particular the ruling “Servant of the People” Party and President Volodymyr Zelenskyi.** “European Solidarity”, “Golos” (a pro-European vector) as well as the pro-Russian forces “Opposition Platform-For Life” and the “Party of Sharii” expressed the most distinct messages about the country’s future. “Batkivshchyna” proposed “economic nationalism”. The pro-Russian parties actively spread the populist messages: reduce tariffs, raise wages and negotiate peace. Other parties mentioned the latter topic much more cautiously than during the 2019 presidential election. Instead, the social theme was also used by “Batkivshchyna”. Local parties and candidates actively criticised the local authorities for local problems or offered their own ideas for improving the situation on the ground. To solve them, it was most often proposed to “eliminate corruption”.
- Most parties and their leaders **tried to discredit their opponents and used offensive language.** The “Opposition Platform - For Life” and the “Party of Sharii” actively disseminated it. Their theses resonated with the Russian propaganda and disinformation. In particular, the narrative of discrediting Ukrainian reforms and institutions was promoted by mentioning that Ukraine is a “Nazi state”, a “failed state” and is under “external control”.
- Almost all parties disseminated the educational information about how to use the new ballots. The pages of certain party cells told about the election mechanism. **None of the parties provided broader educational information to voters about how to make informed choice.** The parties and candidates warned about clone candidates and fake pages in social



networks. At the same time, some parties disseminated the sociological data of little-known companies or “their headquarters”, according to which they “win” and tried to discredit the sociology of their opponents.

- The parties and their leaders, both at the national and local levels, **actively used advertising posts to promote their election theses**. Some of them echoed the disinformation of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Advertising activity of the majority sharply intensified on the eve of the elections.
- **Most local cells of the national parties gradually increased their activity in the social network as the election date approached**. Their pages have been filled with content several times more actively in the last two weeks than at the beginning of the monitoring. At the beginning of the campaign, it seemed that most parties have little control over the information factor; there were no standards and requirements, which indicates the lack of systematic work with voters in the social network during the period between elections. Over the time, the situation improved and became more balanced.
- **Local pages of the parties actively used visual party symbols and party-specific colours and formats**. Almost all of them shared short, professionally edited Instagram videos that are well perceived by the social network algorithms. The “Party of Sharii” and individual candidates to mayor’s position actively used the social network’s options and various formats.
- **A large number of candidates at the local level and individual party leaders at the national level maintained personal accounts instead of public pages**. This did not allow posting advertising messages and seeing from which country and how many people are maintaining the page. Another typical phenomenon is that advertising of certain candidates or parties was spreaded not from their official pages. Individual candidates maintained several personal and public pages, which “blurred” their communication with voters in the social network.
- **The popularity of gender-related topics has increased**: posts about women in politics, gender quotas, meetings with women, about the facts of support of candidates by women, etc.





## SIGNS OF POTENTIAL RUSSIAN EXTERNAL INFORMATION INFLUENCE

- The online media monitoring team noticed several trends. They include the following: lack of references to the Russian aggression in some Donbas online media when covering the hostilities, but, instead, providing an information platform to the representatives of the self-proclaimed Donetsk Peoples's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic for expressing their version echoing the **Kremlin's narrative about the absence of Russian troops in Donbas**.
- Another trend is the expression of disinformation narratives by providing a platform for certain speakers, in particular for the representatives of the "Opposition Platform - For Life" party. They promoted theses about the need to take off sanctions, the need **to make concessions to Russia in the Trilateral Contact Group, «external governance of Ukraine», discrediting the Ukrainian authorities**, and so on.
- Some media outlets spread the news from Russia and the occupied territories, which, in particular, **normalised the occupation of Donbas** and portrayed the obtaining of Russian passports as a desirable goal for many residents of the region.
- **The "Opposition Platform - For Life", the "Party of Sharii"**, their leaders and candidates from these political forces spread theses of Russian disinformation about Ukraine on their official Facebook pages. To promote them, they actively used the function of political advertising on Facebook.
- Despite the local character of elections, the disinformation narratives that were distributed had a national scale, even when it came to certain regions, such as the Donbas or Zakarpattia. Among them: **"Ukraine is a Nazi state", "Ukraine is a failed state", "external governance of Ukraine", "medical reform failed", a narrative of discrediting Ukrainian institutions: the government, the army, the local church, "conspiracy theories" about coronavirus, Pentagon biolabs in Ukraine**, etc.



## GENDER EQUALITY

- The topic “**Gender Equality in Politics**” was included in the **TOP 3 least discussed topics in the regional online media**, along with the topics “National Minorities” and “Crimea”. In particular, only 37 publications, or 0.09% of the total 43,066 materials analysed, were devoted to discussing the increase in women’s political participation.
- For the entire monitoring period of September 5 to October 23, 2020, **the number of mentions of female subjects to monitoring was only 12%**, or 2,137 mentions, while men received 57% of media attention or 9,725 mentions.
- Other monitoring subjects, such as the CEC or political parties that were not monitored in terms of gender, contained 5,200 mentions, or 30%.
- The size of space provided to the subjects of monitoring in regional online media also shows an uneven distribution. In particular, **women received 838 million pixels, or 14%, while men – 3,677 million pixels, or 62%**.

## COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL AND JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS

- During the monitoring process, **125 materials that contained signs of violations of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalist** were identified.
- **5 decisions were made by the Journalism Ethics Commission** as a self-regulatory body of journalists and editorial teams; other cases are being processed. The decisions are published on the Commission’s website: [http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/rishennya\\_cje](http://www.cje.org.ua/ua/rishennya_cje).
- The main ethical violations recorded by the monitoring specialists during online media coverage of the electoral campaign concerned paragraphs 6, 7 and 10 of the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalist. In particular, it concerns: a) violation of the public’s right to complete and objective information on facts and events; b) violations in terms of separating information and analytical materials from advertising; c) violation of the balance standard (after all, the opponents’ viewpoints, including those who have become the object of a journalist’s criticism, must be presented in a balanced way).

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## TO THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE:

By means of amending current legislation, developing and adopting the relevant regulatory legal acts:

- To renew the legislation on elections and start regulating the activities on Internet during elections, both with regard to campaigning and informing, as well as monitoring the spending of election funds on such activities, and, especially, funds from other sources and countries.
- To determine the need to introduce the regulator in the field of Internet in strict compliance with the international principles and standards of regulating the worldwide web. The regulator should have a balanced composition, act in an unbiased, independent and transparent manner, investigate violations and approve decisions promptly, as well as have reasonable, adequate and effective sanctions at its disposal. It should act with aim to ensuring pluralism and the freedom of speech, conducting monitoring (the subject and duration of speeches of candidates and their supporters, conditions of access to the media, i.e. absolute or proportionate equality), searching for new ways of covering the electoral process taking into account the media developments.
- To provide for a system of adequate and effective sanctions for violations of the electoral legislation in the field of election campaigning, informing voters and covering the electoral process, including on the Internet.
- To improve the current legislation with a view to clearly distinguishing between pre-election campaigning and informing the voters, introducing efficient mechanisms of countering hidden advertising and “jeansa” (paid materials).
- To consider the possibility of introducing a special regime of placing campaign-related materials before the start of the electoral process.
- To foresee measures aiming to minimise abuse during campaigning on the Internet and social networks (use of personal data, voter targeting, use of bots, trolls and other technologies that manipulate the voter).
- In terms of gender equality, to improve the norms of electoral legislation, in particular, to define certain concepts and terms, such as “sexism”.



## TO THE SUBJECTS OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS – IN SOCIAL NETWORKS:

- During the campaign in social networks, to focus on personal position and program items with important aspects of life in the community where the elections are held. Make efforts to raise the audience's awareness on how the local election mechanism works, what powers the winners receive, without using manipulations. This would increase the level of electoral debate in the region and contribute to the increased level of trust in society, transparency in elections, State governance, and the consolidation of democracy.
- To carry out systematic communication with voters in social networks not only on the eve of elections, but also during the period between elections, introducing their candidates, work and program items, and building trust among voters.
- By criticising, to remember the meaningful side of criticism: it must be evidence-based, not purely emotional, and not contain hate speech. The latter increases the polarisation and radicalisation of the society, promotes tension and does not contribute to the development of democracy.
- To initiate meaningful and detailed discussions, debates on key issues of communities' development involving media, the public and opinion leaders, including social networks, creating a culture of political debate in the regions.
- To increase the transparency of the campaign on social networks. In particular, create public pages instead of private profiles, limit the number of accounts, and conduct consistent communication. This includes an open advertising policy for candidates and political forces, which should not be conducted from third-party accounts.
- On the day of silence and election day, to refuse to campaign from both personal and third-party accounts, as well as from hidden campaigning under the guise of educational content using party symbols, colours and slogans.



## **TO JOURNALISTS AND EDITORIAL OFFICES:**

### **REGARDING THE EDUCATION OF JOURNALISTS AND OTHER EDITORIAL STAFF:**

- To improve the level of knowledge of journalists in the electoral field.
- To improve the journalists' knowledge on how social media work, in particular in election campaigning. This will allow journalists to consciously treat social networks as sources of information and not become an easy object of manipulation, which results in better coverage of the electoral process.
- To increase the knowledge of journalists on how propaganda and external information influences work. Get acquainted with the main narratives of Russian propaganda and manipulative techniques for the rapid identification of such possible influences.
- To carry out/encourage journalists to participate in trainings that increase the level of critical thinking.
- To improve the journalists' knowledge on fact-checking.

### **REGARDING THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN POLITICAL ADVERTISING/CAMPAIGNING AND INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS:**

- To separate clearly the political advertising/campaigning and information and analytical materials. Political advertising should not be present in the news feed. It should be allocated under the separate heading marked as political advertising. In the overall structure of the home page, this heading should not “merge” with others. The reader should distinguish it, including visually.



- To label properly political advertising, in particular, place the direct title “Political advertising”. Not to cover up such materials in one way or another with different designations like “\*” or abstract headings.
- Not to publish hidden pre-election campaigning materials in the form of “paid journalism”. Detailed recommendations on preventing unfounded accusations of distributing “jeansa” or hidden campaigning are contained in the handbook for editors and journalists “Coverage of Elections in Ukraine”, which the Commission developed based on the results of two previous electoral campaigns in 2019. The handbook can be downloaded here: [http://www.cje.org.ua/sites/default/files/poradnik\\_final\\_0.pdf](http://www.cje.org.ua/sites/default/files/poradnik_final_0.pdf).

### **TO ENSURE THAT VOTERS ARE PROPERLY INFORMED ABOUT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND ITS PARTICIPANTS:**

- To extend the genre palette of materials on the electoral topic and not being limited to news formats only, but practising long-read formats for analysing the electoral process.
- To carry out educational and explanatory work on electoral procedures and voting mechanisms.
- To comply with the professional standards during elections coverage, first of all to provide unbiased and balanced representation of all participants in the electoral process.
- To avoid favouritism (giving preference to one or more subject to electoral process), provide the voter with as much information as possible about different participants in the electoral process to ensure pluralism.



## TO ENSURE GENDER EQUALITY:

- To cover the activities of candidates and their programs as widely as possible, regardless of their gender, and ensure that they are treated equally and impartially.
- To avoid:
  - a) Disrespectful or trivial reporting about women's appearance, clothing, and behaviour;
  - b) Portraying women and men in stereotypical roles within the family and community.
- To present a balanced and informed views and opinions of both female and male candidates. In addition, make efforts to ensure a balanced representation and meaningful participation of women as commentators and experts.
- To indicate the authorship of materials, so that the readers understand the perspective from which these materials were written, and trust this or that media more.
- To use gender sensitive language (feminitives) when referring to women by their professions, positions, and types of occupation in journalistic materials, as this is an important indicator of determining the level of gender sensitivity of regional media editorial offices.
- To develop and adopt a written policy for the use of feminitives in the editorial office.
- To conduct systematic trainings for editorial teams on gender-related topics.
- To the Journalism Ethics Commission, as a self-regulatory body for journalists and editorial offices in Ukraine, – to receive, analyse and initiate consideration of complaints related to sexism in the media, as well as to recommend that the media remove or change the sexist content.

The full version of the report is available at link <https://rm.coe.int/nal-report-independent-monitoring-online-media-and-fb-local-election/1680a0841d>


# KEY GRAPHS

## ONLINE MEDIA

5 September – 23 October 2020




### TOP 10 TOPICS covered by all monitored on-line media



5 September – 23 October 2020



### HOT STORIES covered by on-line media








5 September – 23 October 2020



## TOP 10 PARTIES

with the largest coverage in on-line media




5 September – 23 October 2020



## TOP 10 CANDIDATES TO MAYOR'S POSITION

with the largest coverage in on-line media






# FACEBOOK

5 September – 25 October 2020



## FACEBOOK

INTERACTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR LEADERS ON FACEBOOK PAGES




5 September – 25 October 2020



## FACEBOOK

INTERACTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR LEADERS ON FACEBOOK PAGES






5 September – 25 October 2020



## TOPICS OF THE POSTS ON ALL\* MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES

\*Facebook pages of national parties, regional parties, leaders of political parties and candidates to mayor's position

### MOST POPULAR TOPICS OF THE POSTS






5 September – 25 October 2020



## TOPICS OF THE POSTS ON ALL\* MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES

\*Facebook pages of national parties, regional parties, leaders of political parties and candidates to mayor's position

### LEAST POPULAR TOPICS OF THE POSTS



Total number of posts **14887**

Total number of topics **33**


5 September – 25 October 2020



# FACEBOOK

TOPICS DISCUSSED ON THE NATIONAL PARTIES' PAGES

## TOP 10 topics



## Total number of posts

2220




## GENDER

5 September – 23 October 2020



### Space allocated to the monitoring subjects: women and men in regional on-line media



\* More graphs are available in the full version of the report at the link:  
<https://rm.coe.int/final-report-independent-monitoring-online-media-and-fb-local-election/1680a0841d>

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**ЖІНКИ В МЕДІА**

EU and Council of Europe working together to support freedom of media in Ukraine

Funded  
by the European Union  
and the Council of Europe



Implemented  
by the Council of Europe