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Report

**to the Azerbaijani Government on the visit
to Azerbaijan carried out by the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CPT)**

from 16 to 20 May 2005

The Azerbaijani Government has requested the publication of this report.

Strasbourg, 25 April 2017

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Copy of the letter transmitting the CPT's report

Strasbourg, 21 July 2005

Dear Ambassador,

In pursuance of Article 10, paragraph 1, of the European Convention for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, I enclose herewith the report to the Azerbaijani Government drawn up by the European Committee for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CPT) after its visit to Azerbaijan from 16 to 20 May 2005. The report was adopted by the CPT at its 57th meeting, held from 4 to 8 July 2005.

The CPT requests the Azerbaijani authorities to provide within three months a response to the recommendations, comments and requests for information set out in **bold type** in paragraphs 11, 14, 15, 24, 30, 31, 37, 38, 41, 44 to 55, and 58 of the report. The Committee would also welcome any observations which the Azerbaijani authorities might wish to make on other parts of the report. The CPT would be grateful if it were possible, in the event of the response forwarded being in Azerbaijani, for it to be accompanied by an English or French translation. It would also be most helpful if the Azerbaijani authorities could provide a copy of the response in an electronic form.

I am at your entire disposal if you have any questions concerning either the CPT's visit report or the future procedure.

Yours faithfully,

Silvia CASALE
President of the European Committee for
the prevention of torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment

Mr Agshin MEHDIYEV
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe
2, rue Westercamp
67000 Strasbourg

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In pursuance of Article 7 of the European Convention for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"), a delegation of the CPT visited Azerbaijan from 16 to 20 May 2005. The visit was one which appeared to the Committee "to be required in the circumstances" (cf. Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention) and was the CPT's third visit to Azerbaijan.¹

2. The visit was carried out by the following members of the CPT:

- Marc NEVE, 2nd Vice-President of the CPT (Head of delegation)
- Jean-Pierre RESTELLINI

who were supported by Petya NESTOROVA (Head of Unit) of the CPT's Secretariat.

They were assisted by:

- André VALLOTTON, former Director of the Prison Service of the Canton of Vaud, Lausanne, Switzerland (expert)
- Chahla AGALAROVA (interpreter)
- Seymour BALAMMADOV (interpreter)
- Nigar HUSSEYNOVA (interpreter).

3. The main purpose of the visit was to examine the situation at Gobustan Prison, which holds all of the country's life-sentenced prisoners, as well as other long-term prisoners. The CPT had received reports concerning the treatment of inmates at that establishment, referring, inter alia, to several deaths in custody in the course of 2004, very harsh regimes of detention, and lack of psychiatric and psychological support to prisoners.

The CPT's delegation also visited strict regime Penitentiary establishment No. 15 in Baku. In addition, the visit was an opportunity to take stock of recent developments in the Azerbaijani prison system. In the course of February 2005, the Committee received reports concerning disturbances in penitentiary establishments², followed by security operations which were allegedly accompanied by physical ill-treatment against prisoners. Before and after these events, there had been numerous personnel changes, including the dismissal of the Head of the Department of Execution of Sentences and the management of several establishments.

¹ The first visit, which was of a periodic nature, took place from 24 November to 6 December 2002. The report on that visit, as well as the responses of the Azerbaijani Government, have been made public at the request of the Azerbaijani authorities (cf. CPT/Inf (2004) 36 and CPT/Inf (2004) 37). The second visit, which was of an ad hoc nature, was carried out from 11 to 13 January 2004.

² A riot at Penitentiary establishment No. 11 was suppressed during the night of 15 to 16 February 2005 by Ministry of the Interior troops. A few days later, special squads were apparently sent to Gobustan Prison and penitentiary establishments Nos. 2, 6, 12 and 13 in order to conduct searches and prevent further disturbances.

4. As had been the case during the CPT's previous visits to Azerbaijan, the co-operation provided to the Committee's delegation was of a very high standard. The CPT is grateful for the time devoted to its delegation by Fikrat MAMMADOV, Minister of Justice, Zakir GARALOV, Prosecutor General, Elmira SULEYMANOVA, Ombudsperson, and Shakir MUSAEV, Director of the Forensic Medicine Department, Ministry of Health. Discussions were also held with senior officials of the Ministry of Justice.

The CPT wishes to express its appreciation for the assistance provided to its delegation by the liaison officer designated by the national authorities, Faig GURBANOV, Head of the Division for Human Rights at the Ministry of Justice.

A number of discussions were also held with representatives of international and non-governmental organisations active in areas of concern to the CPT.

A list of the national authorities and organisations consulted during the visit is set out in the Appendix to this report.

5. Further, the delegation received a very satisfactory reception from the management and staff of the establishments visited.

However, in several instances, the information provided to the delegation by certain staff members appeared to be deliberately inaccurate or incomplete. In particular, at Gobustan Prison, the delegation received conflicting and imprecise explanations about the security operation which had taken place in February 2005 (cf. paragraph 9). As regards Penitentiary establishment No. 15, the management initially denied that there was separate accommodation for vulnerable prisoners, and it was only after the delegation came across a distinct unit set aside for such prisoners (more particularly, prisoners considered to be homosexual) that its existence was acknowledged. Actions of this kind are clearly not in conformity with the principle of co-operation laid down in Article 3 of the Convention. The CPT trusts that the Azerbaijani authorities will take steps to ensure that such situations are not encountered in the future.

It should also be noted that the delegation gained the impression that some prisoners interviewed felt unable to speak freely because they had been warned against making any complaints to the delegation and feared repercussions. In this connection, it must be stressed that any kind of intimidating or retaliatory action against a person before or after he has spoken to a CPT delegation would be totally incompatible with the obligations of Parties to the Convention.

II. FACTS FOUND DURING THE VISIT AND ACTION PROPOSED

1. Preliminary remarks

6. Gobustan Prison is a high-security establishment specialised in holding life-sentenced and other long-term prisoners, as well as inmates with a history of disciplinary violations who have been transferred from other establishments. It has fulfilled this purpose since 1994 and has a country-wide remit. Situated in an isolated, arid area some 60 km south of Baku, the prison was originally constructed in the 1950s next to a quarry which used to employ inmates. It occupies a series of buildings within an extensive compound at the end of an unpaved road, with no public transport connecting it to any inhabited place.

With an official capacity of 709, on the first day of the visit, the establishment was holding 687 prisoners. Of them, 211 had been sentenced to life imprisonment, 96 were serving long sentences (the first five years of which under a strict regime), and 337 had been transferred from other establishments for periods ranging from six months to three years. All these categories of inmates had been placed at Gobustan Prison by court decision. In addition, there were 43 prisoners serving their sentences under an ordinary regime who had been assigned to work at the establishment on their own request.

7. Penitentiary establishment No. 15 in Baku is a strict-regime facility for sentenced adult male prisoners (first-time offenders sentenced for serious crimes and recidivists). Located in an industrial area on the outskirts of the city of Baku, it was set up in 2000 as a result of the splitting up of the adjacent Penitentiary establishment No. 6. On 19 May 2005, it was holding 770 inmates for an official capacity of 1,100.

2. Torture and other forms of physical ill-treatment

8. At Gobustan Prison, the delegation heard hardly any recent allegations of physical ill-treatment of inmates by staff working at the establishment. Further, the delegation did not observe any particular difficulties in relations between staff and inmates; however, the very restrictive nature of the regime (cf. paragraphs 25 to 29) meant that the amount of contact between staff and prisoners was minimal.

On the other hand, a substantial number of allegations were heard of physical ill-treatment by members of forces external to the prison in the course of a security operation which had taken place on 19 February 2005. Prisoners interviewed independently in different units gave consistent and credible accounts of the manner in which the operation had been carried out. According to them, the operation had started in the early morning hours of 19 February 2005 and had continued for at least five hours. Uniformed members of what the prisoners believed to be Ministry of the Interior troops, wearing masks and accompanied by dogs, had apparently burst into the cells and forced prisoners out of their beds and into the exercise yards. It was alleged that many inmates had received truncheon blows and some had been injured in the process. The cells had subsequently been searched and prisoners' possessions apparently scattered and destroyed as a result.

9. When asked for clarification on the operation of 19 February 2005 and what had provoked it, the Director of Gobustan Prison gave a rather confused account. He initially explained that, following the transfer of an influential prisoner to another establishment, some inmates in units 1, 2 and 3 had staged a protest by setting their clothes on fire and throwing them out of cell windows. Through negotiations, the prison management had managed to calm most of them down; however, several protesters had reportedly refused to obey and the management had asked for external help. According to the Director, the intervention was carried out by members of the prison's perimeter security unit (a detachment of conscripts subordinated directly to the Ministry of Justice). It had reportedly started at 10 p.m. on 19 February 2005 and lasted for about an hour; only a few cells in units 1, 2 and 3 had been searched. The Director maintained that the protest had been settled in a peaceful manner and that he had managed to avoid the interference of Ministry of the Interior troops (which had happened at other prisons). As a result, he stated that no prisoners had been injured, medically examined or sent to hospital, and that no reports had been drawn up concerning the use of force. It should be noted in this connection that the various registers kept at the prison made a rather summary mention of the events of mid-February 2005.

Subsequent inquiries brought to light a number of inaccuracies in the Director's account. It transpired from a discussion with the Head of the prison's perimeter security unit that no members of his unit had entered the establishment during the operation of 19 February. In fact, according to him, the perimeter security had only been reinforced while the operation had been carried out by troops of the Ministry of the Interior.

The delegation later received a copy of an official report drawn up after the operation of 19 February 2005. According to that report, a control action was carried out jointly by forces of the Ministry of Justice and a detachment of the Ministry of the Interior troops, with the involvement of the Prosecutor General's Office. It is clear from the detailed list of items confiscated during the search that all seven units of the prison had been concerned by the operation. However, the report contained no information about other aspects of the operation (in particular, the time at which it had started and ended, and whether force or special means had been used against prisoners). In this context, the CPT is concerned that the security operation of 19 February 2005 was not documented in a detailed manner.

10. The CPT's delegation also discussed the operation on 19 February 2005 with senior officials of the Ministry of Justice, including the Head of the Department of Execution of Sentences. According to the information received from them, the intervention had been planned by the Ministry of Justice on the basis of information that prisoners were in possession of forbidden items and were planning to set up an illegal fund ("*obshchak*"), as well as with a view to preventing a future riot. As regards the involvement of Ministry of the Interior troops - which is provided for in Azerbaijani legislation³ - it was agreed upon between the two Ministries concerned. When asked about the wearing of masks by the members of the forces which had intervened, the officials met by the delegation did not seem to think that this practice posed any particular problems.

³ Cf. Law No. 781/1994 on the status of Interior troops.

Further, the delegation met the Prosecutor General who stated that a representative of his office had been present during the operation at Gobustan Prison (as well as at the other establishments which were the subject of search operations in February 2005). According to him, Ministry of the Interior troops had been used to make a cordon between the different buildings while a special unit of the Ministry of Justice had carried out the search of the cells. He also indicated that the Prosecutor's Office had not observed any irregularities during the conduct of the operation and, consequently, no investigations had been initiated.

11. The divergence in the accounts referred to above is a matter of concern to the CPT. In order for the Committee to be able to obtain a full picture of the situation, **it would like the Azerbaijani authorities to provide a detailed account of the events which took place at Gobustan Prison in mid-February 2005. The CPT also recommends that the Azerbaijani authorities carry out an independent and thorough inquiry into the allegations referred to in paragraph 8 and inform the Committee of its results.**

More generally, the CPT wishes to make clear that it has strong misgivings regarding the practice of members of detachments intervening in prisons wearing masks when conducting searches or dealing with prison disturbances; this will clearly hamper the identification of potential suspects if and when allegations of ill-treatment arise. **Consequently, the Committee recommends that members of detachments intervening in prisons be prohibited from wearing masks on any occasion while exercising their duties.**

The CPT also considers that prison interventions should take place in the presence of an authority which is fully independent of both the security forces concerned and the prison, and charged with observing and subsequently reporting upon the carrying out of the intervention. The presence of such an authority would have a dissuasive effect on anyone minded to ill-treat prisoners and greatly facilitate the investigation of any allegations of ill-treatment and the correct attribution of blame. In this connection, the Committee would like to receive clarification of the precise manner in which the representative of the Prosecutor's Office who was present at Gobustan Prison during the intervention of 19 February 2005 fulfilled his supervising task.

12. Turning to Penitentiary establishment No. 15, the CPT's delegation received several allegations of physical ill-treatment of prisoners by staff. Such treatment was said to be inflicted in particular – but not exclusively – in the establishment's disciplinary isolation unit. The ill-treatment alleged concerned truncheon blows and the cuffing of prisoners to beds for prolonged periods of time.

Particular reference might be made to one case in which the delegation's medical member examined a prisoner who had been released from the disciplinary unit two days previously and who displayed, on the back of each thigh, 3-4 tramline haematomas, violet in colour, with an average length of 10 cm, which were consistent with the recent infliction of blows with an object such as a truncheon or a stick. The prisoner concerned was extremely reluctant to be examined and did not want to talk about the origin of his injuries.

The delegation was informed by the establishment's Director that there had been some 60 cases of the use of truncheons since the beginning of 2005 (i.e. over a period of four-and-a-half months). The lack of a specific register recording the use of "security means" (such as physical force, handcuffs and truncheons) made it impossible to explore this matter in more detail. However, the reported figure would suggest that truncheons are being used excessively. If a prison is run properly, the use of force will be exceptional. A high incidence of the use of truncheons and other "security means" is a warning sign that staff may be abusing their authority.

In this context, it is noteworthy that according to the establishment's Director, there was no practice of medically examining persons against whom "security means" had been used and, consequently, any injuries inflicted as a result of the use of such means would not be recorded (cf. paragraph 15).

13. Further, some prisoners at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 reported incidents of inter-prisoner violence. It should be noted that the general atmosphere at the establishment appeared to be rather tense, which was related to the fact that the establishment was overcrowded and staffing levels in the prisoner accommodation areas were very low (cf. paragraph 52). This made it difficult for staff to control the situation and resulted in the imposition of a military-style discipline. As a result, most inmates appeared over-controlled and resigned.

14. The CPT recommends that the management of Penitentiary establishment No. 15 deliver to staff the clear message that physical ill-treatment of inmates is not acceptable and will be dealt with severely. Further, the Committee recommends that the establishment's Director, as well as the Ministry of Justice's Inspectorate controlling the execution of sentences, be particularly vigilant when examining cases of the use of "security means" and ensure that they are only used when – and to the extent – strictly necessary, and never as a form of physical punishment. In this connection, a specific register recording the use of "security means" should be set up at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 (as well as at other penitentiary establishments where such a register does not already exist).

It should also be stressed that the duty of care which is owed by custodial staff to those in their charge includes the responsibility to protect them from other inmates who wish to cause them harm. **In this context, the Committee recommends that the management and staff of Penitentiary establishment No. 15 exercise continuing vigilance and make use of all the means at their disposal to prevent inter-prisoner violence and intimidation; this should involve investigating complaints made by prisoners, unannounced inspections and checks at all hours, regular presence of prison managers in the detention areas and their direct contact with prisoners, and the improvement of prison staff training.**

15. The CPT has already stressed in previous visit reports the role which prison health-care services can play in the prevention of ill-treatment against prisoners, through the systematic recording of injuries and, when appropriate, the provision of information to the relevant authorities. The delegation's observations from the 2005 visit suggest that the approach followed in respect of the screening for injuries and their recording remains unsatisfactory.

A register of traumatic lesions was kept by the health-care services of each establishment. However, these registers contained practically no information: there was only one entry at Gobustan Prison and no entries at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 since the beginning of 2005. Interviews with prisoners at both establishments bore out that during the initial screening, medical staff apparently contented themselves with asking general questions about the prisoner's health without actually screening the prisoner's body. Further, at Penitentiary establishment No. 15, the delegation learned that, although inmates were medically examined during placement in the disciplinary segregation unit and upon their release from it, their bodies were not being checked for injuries (cf. paragraph 12).

The CPT recommends that steps be taken to ensure that the health-care services of the establishments visited (as well as in the Azerbaijani penitentiary system in general) perform a thorough and systematic screening of prisoners for injuries, both on admission and, when appropriate, during imprisonment. This will involve physically checking the prisoners' bodies for injuries. Further, as already stressed in the past, the medical record drawn up after such screening should contain: (i) a full account of statements made by the person concerned which are relevant to the medical examination (including his description of his state of health and any allegations of ill-treatment), (ii) a full account of objective medical findings based on a thorough examination, and (iii) the doctor's conclusions in the light of (i) and (ii), indicating the degree of consistency between any allegations made and the objective medical findings. Whenever injuries are recorded which are consistent with allegations of ill-treatment made by a prisoner, the record should be systematically brought to the attention of the relevant prosecutor. Further, the results of every examination, including the above-mentioned statements and the doctor's conclusions, should be made available to the prisoner and his lawyer.

3. Conditions of detention

a. Gobustan Prison

i. material conditions

16. Prisoners were distributed among seven accommodation units, each corresponding to a separate building⁴. Units 1, 2, 3 and half of unit 4 were accommodating prisoners transferred from other establishments. Units 5, 6 and the other half of unit 4 held life-sentenced prisoners, in cells designed for single or double occupancy. As for unit 7, it was intended for prisoners serving the first five years of their sentences under a strict regime.

17. Material conditions varied from one unit to another, but, in general, the establishment was overcrowded (despite the fact that the number of prisoners held at the time of the visit was below the official capacity).

⁴ With the exception of unit 1, which was accommodating some 150 inmates, each unit held between 70 and 90 prisoners.

The best conditions of detention were observed in unit 7, which was located in a one-floor building which had been constructed a few years previously. There were 23 cells measuring some 14 m² each and designed for four-prisoner occupancy. At the time of the visit, some of the cells were holding only two or three prisoners; however, in the cells which were used according to their envisaged occupancy level, conditions of detention were cramped. Access to natural light, ventilation and artificial lighting were appropriate, and the cell equipment was adequate (bunk beds, storage space for personal effects, table, chairs and a partitioned sanitary annexe). Further, many prisoners had a radio. The whole unit was clean and tidy, and the presence of pictures in the corridors contributed to an easing of the custodial setting.

18. Unit 4 had been recently refurbished and was also in a relatively good state. However, the other units holding life-sentenced prisoners (i.e. units 5 and 6) were showing signs of dilapidation. Life-sentenced prisoners were accommodated in cells intended for double occupancy (measuring some 8 m²). The equipment comprised a bunk bed, table, chairs and a semi-partitioned floor-level toilet and sink.

The remainder of the units held prisoners transferred from other establishments in cells of varying capacity (from two to eight places). Overcrowding was observed in many of the cells visited by the delegation (e.g. four prisoners in a cell measuring 14 m²; six prisoners in a cell measuring some 16 m²; eight prisoners in a cell of 20 m²).

Material conditions were particularly poor in the oldest and most dilapidated section, Unit 1, a two-level building which was holding some 150 prisoners. In the majority of the cells, the plaster on walls and ceilings was crumbling. The Director indicated his intention to have the building refurbished or demolished and replaced by a new construction; however, there was no concrete plan for future works.

19. A problem experienced in all the units (except for unit 7) related to the fact that cell windows were rather small, which restricted access to natural light and in particular ventilation. According to inmates, the cells became oppressively hot in the summer. In an attempt to compensate for the poor ventilation, prisoners asked staff to keep open the cell-door hatches; however, this was apparently not always allowed. Further, the cells were not adequately heated in the winter: a narrow pipe running along the wall was the only source of heating. As for artificial lighting, it appeared to be generally adequate.

20. On the ground floor of unit 1, there were two quarantine cells intended for holding prisoners in the first fifteen days after their arrival at the establishment. The cells (measuring 10-12 m²) were in a deplorable state: dark, badly ventilated, damp and dirty. Their equipment consisted of dilapidated bunk beds (3 in the first and 2 in the second cell) and a disgustingly filthy toilet on a raised platform. When seen by the delegation, the quarantine cells were not accommodating any prisoners; however, the delegation received allegations that up to 12 inmates had been held at a time in one cell. The cells in question had apparently been in use only a day previously and several working prisoners were busy giving the impression of repainting one of them.

21. The unit housing working prisoners could be considered as acceptable. There was a spacious dormitory with 60 beds and, adjacent to it, a dining/recreation room where the prisoners in question took their meals and associated. The premises were clean and well-maintained.

22. Each unit had a bathroom to which prisoners could have access once every ten days to two weeks. Prisoners in unit 1 in particular complained about very infrequent possibilities to take a shower; the bathroom in that unit had only two shower heads and was in a very run-down state. The delegation was also told that there were problems with the pumping of water to the prison (the water supply was apparently limited to a few hours a day).

23. Some of the prisoners interviewed alleged that the food provided by the prison was insufficient and of poor quality, and said they depended to a large extent on food products supplied by their families. However, according to other prisoners, the food was adequate.

24. The CPT recommends that steps be taken at Gobustan Prison to:

- **progressively reduce cell occupancy levels, aiming at a standard of 4 m² of living space per prisoner in multi-occupancy cells;**
- **continue the refurbishment of the prisoner accommodation, with a high priority to be given to unit 1 and in particular the quarantine cells;**
- **ensure adequate access to natural light and ventilation in all prisoner accommodation;**
- **enable all prisoners to have access to the shower facility at least once a week.**

The CPT also invites the Azerbaijani authorities to verify the provision of food at Gobustan Prison.

ii. regime of activities

25. The CPT is seriously concerned about the situation observed by its delegation in respect of the regime of activities for prisoners held at Gobustan Prison, which was characterised by almost total inactivity and very limited possibilities for human contact.

Apart from the 43 prisoners assigned to work at the establishment, none of the inmates were offered any form of organised activity. As a result, the overwhelming majority of them spent 23 hours (or more) a day locked up in their cells, being allowed to communicate only with their cellmates.

26. In-cell activities were mostly limited to listening to the radio and playing board games; TV sets were not allowed and very few books were in view. The prison had a small library with some 200 old books, mostly in Russian. This facility was clearly underutilised (there was not even an inventory of books lent to prisoners); in fact, most prisoners interviewed by the delegation appeared surprised when told about the existence of a library at the establishment.

27. The only regular out-of-cell activity was outdoor exercise of one hour per day which prisoners took on a cell-by-cell basis. Each unit had several small exercise yards (measuring between 10 and 25 m²) which were of an oppressive design and devoid of any equipment or means of shelter against inclement weather. Some inmates alleged that in practice outdoor exercise was limited to 20-30 minutes a day; the number of cells and yards in each unit (e.g. 40 cells and 4 yards in Unit 6) and the limited hours during which outdoor exercise took place rendered these allegations plausible.

It should also be noted that prisoners held under quarantine or placed in disciplinary isolation did not benefit from outdoor exercise at all, for periods of up to 15 days.

28. No educational classes were offered to inmates and there were no possibilities for vocational training. In this context, it is difficult to understand the policy of prohibiting prisoners from following distance-learning courses (the delegation learned that a request from a life-sentenced prisoner to follow a university course by correspondence had been rejected by the establishment's Director and the first-instance court).

It should also be noted that there were no possibilities for religious practice.

29. In addition, the regime applied to prisoners serving life sentences was characterised by an almost total deprivation of human contact, save for contacts with one cellmate and occasional visits (cf. paragraph 54). This is all the more disquieting in view of the fact that, under the legislation in force, such prisoners cannot expect any liberalisation of their regime before having served ten years of their sentence. Such a situation may be fully consistent with the provisions governing the treatment of life-sentenced prisoners in Azerbaijan, but this does not alter the fact that it is totally unacceptable.

The CPT can see no justification for indiscriminately applying restrictions to all life-sentenced prisoners (such as their separation from the rest of the prison population and the prohibition of communication with more than one other prisoner) without giving due consideration to the individual risk they may (or may not) present.

More generally, the Committee wishes to stress that any lengthy term of imprisonment, and particularly a life sentence, can have desocialising effects upon inmates. In addition to becoming institutionalised, such prisoners may experience a range of psychological problems (including loss of self-esteem and impairment of social skills) and have a tendency to become increasingly detached from society, to which most of them will eventually return.

In the CPT's opinion, the regimes offered to life-sentenced and other long-term prisoners should seek to compensate for these effects in a positive and proactive way. The prisoners concerned should have access to a wide range of purposeful activities of a varied nature (work, preferably with vocational value; education; sport; recreation/association). Moreover, they should be able to exercise a degree of choice over the manner in which their time is spent, thus fostering a sense of autonomy and personal responsibility. Additional steps should be taken to lend meaning to their period of imprisonment; in particular, the provision of individualised custody plans and appropriate psycho-social support are important elements in assisting such prisoners to come to terms with their period of incarceration and, when the time comes, to prepare for release. Moreover, the provision of such a regime to prisoners serving long sentences enhances the development of constructive staff/inmate relations and hence reinforces the security within the prison.

30. The current absence of a regime of activities at Gobustan Prison constitutes the negation of what a prison system should be seeking to achieve; at present, the establishment could more aptly be described as a warehouse for human beings rather than a penitentiary facility. **The CPT recommends that the Azerbaijani authorities take urgent steps to develop the regime applied to life-sentenced and other long-term prisoners at Gobustan Prison, taking due account of the remarks made in paragraph 29. If necessary, the relevant legislation should be amended.**

Further, the Committee recommends that efforts be made to ensure that prisoners transferred to Gobustan Prison from other establishments benefit from a developed programme of activities (work, preferably with vocational value; education; sport; association/recreation). This is an essential part of the process of social rehabilitation.

The CPT also recommends that immediate steps be taken to ensure that all prisoners benefit from at least one hour of outdoor exercise per day, in conditions which enable them to physically exert themselves. The establishment's extensive compound should make it possible to create more spacious exercise yards and sports facilities.

In addition, the Committee invites the Azerbaijani authorities to allow prisoners to have TV sets in the cells and to introduce possibilities for religious practice.

31. Finally, the CPT has misgivings about the fact that all life-sentenced prisoners, as well as other long-term prisoners, are placed at Gobustan Prison by court decision for fixed periods of time (at least 10 years in the first case and 5 years in the second). The Committee does not question that it may be necessary for some prisoners to be subject, for a certain period of time, to a special security regime. However, the application of such a regime should be the responsibility of the prison administration in the light of the behaviour or dangerousness of each individual prisoner, and not be made part of the catalogue of criminal sanctions to be imposed by courts.

Further, it is axiomatic that prisoners should not be subject to a special security regime any longer than the risk they present makes necessary. This calls for regular reviews of placement decisions, based on an individual risk assessment of the prisoner by staff specially trained to carry out such assessment. Moreover, prisoners should as far as possible be kept fully informed of the reasons for their placement and, if necessary, its renewal; this will, inter alia, enable them to make effective use of avenues for challenging that measure.

The CPT recommends that the Azerbaijani authorities take steps to amend current legal provisions and practice in the light of the above remarks.

b. Penitentiary establishment No. 15, Baku

i. *material conditions*

32. Prisoners were accommodated in large-capacity dormitories, most of which were workshops converted as a result of the closing down of the production facilities of the neighbouring Penitentiary establishment No. 6. Although the establishment was holding fewer prisoners than its official capacity, the delegation observed that conditions in the dormitories were very cramped. There were five dormitories measuring some 220-250 m² and accommodating between 112 and 156 prisoners, and a somewhat smaller dormitory for elderly and handicapped inmates (holding 65 prisoners). The equipment consisted essentially of bunk beds, which occupied most of the floor space; in addition, each prisoner had a bedside locker and a stool. Access to natural light, artificial lighting and ventilation were just about acceptable. Further, the dormitories were maintained in a clean and orderly state (although many of them were in clear need of refurbishment). However, the delegation heard many complaints about insufficient heating in the winter.

The sanitary annexes attached to the dormitories were often in a poor state repair and dirty. Further, the number of toilets and sinks (4-5) in each sanitary annexe did not appear to be sufficient for the numbers of prisoners held.

33. Conditions were particularly poor in the unit set aside for vulnerable prisoners (cf. paragraph 5). It was accommodating 28 inmates at the time of the visit (for some 70 m²) and was dark, badly ventilated, damp and extremely dilapidated. The roof had partially fallen through and was covered by various pieces of material to stop water leaking in. Further, the sanitary annexe was in a very bad state of repair. On the positive side, the dormitory featured a TV set (apparently to compensate for the fact that the prisoners accommodated in it did not go to the hall where other inmates watched TV) and a stove.

34. The delegation was also concerned by material conditions in the quarantine unit, which was used to hold prisoners admitted to the establishment for the first time during the first two weeks following their arrival. At the time of the visit, the unit was accommodating 14 inmates in a dormitory which had no windows and was very run-down (as was the adjacent sanitary annexe).

35. According to the timetable for the use of the bathroom, prisoners had access to it once a week; however, the bathroom had only 10 shower heads, which could not be considered as sufficient for the establishment's population.

The delegation was informed that the establishment provided each prisoner with a mattress, blanket and pillow. However, some prisoners in the quarantine unit had apparently received only a mattress. It became clear that, due to the lack of supplies, the establishment was not in a position to provide prisoners with bed linen, personal hygiene items and appropriate clothing. The state of the bedding – which was almost invariably the prisoner's own – was often very poor.

36. A number of prisoners complained about the quality and quantity of the food provided at the establishment. An examination of the food products acquisition inventory revealed that the dietary norms in force were far from being respected, in particular as regards meat, fish, eggs, oil and sugar. Further, the kitchen was rudimentarily equipped (e.g. there were only three boilers for preparing food for 770 prisoners).

37. The CPT recommends that steps be taken at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 to:

- **substantially reduce dormitory occupancy rates, the objective being to provide a minimum of 4 m² of living space per prisoner;**
- **refurbish as a matter of priority the unit set aside for vulnerable prisoners and the quarantine unit; as regards the latter, immediate steps should be taken to provide access to natural light and ventilation;**
- **ensure that there is adequate heating in all prisoner accommodation;**
- **improve the state of repair and cleanliness of the sanitary facilities and enlarge the bathroom;**
- **provide all prisoners with mattresses, blankets, pillows, bed linen and clothing adapted to the season;**
- **improve the quality and quantity of the food provided to prisoners and upgrade the kitchen equipment.**

38. More generally, it should be noted that the CPT has strong reservations vis-à-vis the practice of accommodating inmates in large-capacity dormitories. No doubt, various factors – including those of a cultural nature – can make it preferable in certain countries to provide multi-occupancy accommodation for prisoners rather than individual cells. However, there is little to be said in favour of – and a lot to be said against – arrangements under which scores of prisoners live and sleep together in the same dormitory.

Large-capacity dormitories inevitably imply a lack of privacy for prisoners in their everyday lives. Moreover, the risk of intimidation and violence is high. Such accommodation arrangements are prone to foster the development of offender subcultures and to facilitate the maintenance of the cohesion of criminal organisations. They can also render proper staff control extremely difficult, if not impossible; more specifically, in case of prison disturbances, outside interventions involving the use of considerable force are difficult to avoid. With such accommodation, the appropriate allocation of individual prisoners, based on a case-by-case risk and needs assessment, also becomes an almost impossible exercise. All these problems are exacerbated when the numbers held go beyond a reasonable occupancy level; further, in such a situation, the excessive burden on communal facilities such as washbasins or lavatories and the insufficient ventilation for so many persons will often lead to deplorable conditions.

The CPT invites the Azerbaijani authorities to take into consideration the above remarks, in particular in the context of plans for the reconstruction of existing penitentiary establishments and for the construction of new ones. The objective should be to have smaller accommodation units.

ii. regime of activities

39. At the outset of the visit, the Director stated that the major problem confronting his establishment was the absence of workshops enabling the provision of jobs to prisoners.

The delegation was informed that only 44 prisoners were working (cleaning, gardening and other maintenance tasks). It transpired during the visit that these jobs were performed almost exclusively by prisoners who were considered to be homosexual (and who apparently received little or no payment for their work). Further, the delegation was surprised to learn that all newly arrived prisoners placed under quarantine were obliged to work (without payment); according to the establishment's Director, this was provided for by law. Such an approach appears to be at odds with the very purpose of "quarantine", which is intended to serve as a period during which newly arrived prisoners are medically examined, assessed for risk and informed of their rights, obligations and the internal regulations. On the other hand, given the current material conditions in the quarantine unit (cf. paragraph 34), it is preferable that prisoners held there spend as long as possible outside the unit.

40. Inmates spent the day outside their dormitories (the rule being that only sick prisoners could remain in bed during the day). Their main occupation was to loiter in the courtyard around which all the living units were situated, play board games and occasionally have a game of volleyball (one corner of the yard was equipped with a net). There was a clear shortage of sports facilities.

The establishment had two large halls, with 130 and 200 places respectively, where prisoners watched TV. Further, the establishment had a small library with some 500 books (mostly old and in Russian). As at Gobustan Prison, the lack of any inventory of books gave the impression that the library was not used very often.

The delegation was told that many prisoners were illiterate; however, no education courses whatsoever were offered.

On the positive side, it should be noted that a small mosque was in the process of being set up at the establishment.

41. To sum up, the regime at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 was extremely impoverished. It is clear that the shortage of staff heavily circumscribed the provision of organised activities.

The CPT recommends that a thorough examination be made of means of improving the regime of activities offered to prisoners at Penitentiary establishment No. 15. Above all, strenuous efforts should be made to provide more prisoners with work and to develop programmes of education and vocational training. The provision of a satisfactory regime of activities for prisoners will require having an adequate staff complement.

4. Health-care services

42. At Gobustan Prison, the health-care team consisted of a Head doctor, five other doctors with different specialities (e.g. internal diseases, cardiology, radiology, etc.), a dentist and a feldsher. A newly created post for a psychiatrist was currently vacant. Further, there was a vacant post for a psychologist.

The delegation was told that one doctor was always on duty at night and at weekends, and an ambulance could be called in an emergency. It was also possible to call outside medical specialists from a centralised team set up at the level of the Penitentiary Medical Department. According to the Head doctor, an average of three such consultations took place every fortnight, above all in surgery, neurology and psychiatry.

Medication was supplied centrally by the Penitentiary Medical Department. According to the Head doctor, the situation had improved in recent months, but nevertheless remained unsatisfactory. As regards medical equipment, the X-ray machine was said to be considered too dangerous by the ICRC and was not being used. Further, there was an ECG machine which was antiquated but functioning, and relatively modern dental equipment.

43. Penitentiary establishment No. 15 employed only two doctors, and it is noteworthy that no doctor was present on the first day of the delegation's visit. The single feldsher's post was currently vacant and a prisoner (without any special training) fulfilled the function of a nurse. Further, there was no dentist working at the establishment. Apparently, it was possible to call in outside medical specialists.

The health-care service was rudimentarily equipped (there were no X-ray or ECG machines). Further, the stocks of medication were very limited and it was indicated that prisoners' families provided most of the necessary drugs.

44. To sum up, Gobustan Prison is in principle adequately staffed with doctors (however, cf. paragraph 46). In contrast, the resources in terms of doctors at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 cannot be considered adequate to cater for a population of up to 1,100 prisoners. Further, both establishments suffer from a severe shortage of nursing staff. The fact that neither establishment employed a psychiatrist and psychologists also raises doubts as to whether prisoners can benefit from appropriate ambulatory psychiatric and psychological care.

In view of the above, **the CPT recommends that the Azerbaijani authorities:**

- **reinforce the team of doctors working at Penitentiary establishment No. 15;**
- **substantially increase the number of nursing staff at both Gobustan Prison and Penitentiary establishment No. 15;**
- **ensure that someone qualified to provide first aid, preferably with a recognised nursing qualification, is always present on the premises of Penitentiary establishment No. 15, including at night and weekends;**

- **employ a dentist at Penitentiary establishment No. 15;**
- **ensure regular attendance by a psychiatrist and employ psychologists at both establishments;**
- **ensure the supply of appropriate medication and equipment to both establishments.**

Further, the CPT wishes to stress that the employment of inmates in a prison's health-care service should be seen as a last resort. Prisoners should not be involved in the performance of health-care tasks which require specialised training, and under no circumstances should they perform the distribution of medicines. **The Committee recommends that the position of the prisoner working as a nurse at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 be reviewed, in the light of these remarks.**

45. It should be noted that at both establishments, the delegation received numerous complaints about considerable delays in gaining access to a doctor and the standard of treatment and care provided. Further, prisoners alleged that they had to pay in order to be examined, receive medication and be hospitalised in the establishments' infirmaries or an outside hospital facility. **The CPT would like to receive the comments of the Azerbaijani authorities on this matter.**

46. There had been seven deaths at Gobustan Prison in 2004 (including three suicides and one homicide by hanging) and two since the beginning of 2005 (one of which was suicide by hanging). The prosecutor's office had carried out an inquiry in respect of each case and an autopsy had been performed. The CPT's delegation had the opportunity to examine the autopsy reports from 2004 and 2005 at the Forensic Medical Department of the Ministry of Health in Baku.

One of the prisoners who died in June 2004 had apparently felt unwell during the night but was only seen by a doctor at 10.30 a.m. In this connection, the delegation was concerned to learn that the procedure for opening cell doors at night was rather complicated: night duty guards did not have keys on them and, in an emergency, informed the officer on duty who in turn requested special authorisation from the Director to open the safe where the keys were kept and enter the cell with reinforced staff. In this context, it should be noted that soon after the visit in May 2005, the delegation received reports according to which one more prisoner had died at the establishment, during the night of 30 to 31 May, apparently following a heart attack. It would appear that his cellmates had alerted staff but it had taken some 45 minutes for the cell door to be opened.

Further, the examination of the autopsy reports revealed that three of the above-mentioned cases concerned persons between 30 and 43 years of age who were suffering from non-acute diseases (e.g. pneumonia) which apparently caused their death. This raises serious doubts as regards the adequacy of the medical care provided at Gobustan Prison (despite the high number of doctors employed at the establishment).

The CPT recommends that a thorough examination be made of the provision of health care at Gobustan Prison, in the light of the above remarks. In this context, immediate steps should be taken to ensure that the security arrangements are such that prisoners in need of urgent medical care are assisted without delay.

47. The CPT also has serious concerns about the approach followed as regards tuberculosis. The delegation was informed that prisoners suspected of being BK-positive were transferred to the Specialised medical establishment for prisoners suffering from tuberculosis in Bina. After their return from Bina, such prisoners were initially placed under observation in the prison's infirmary before being relocated to the ordinary living units.

It should be noted that at Gobustan Prison, an inmate had died in July 2004 some two months after being transferred back from Bina; the microscopic examination performed during his autopsy was compatible with the diagnosis of active tuberculosis. Further, the doctors at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 informed the delegation that it was not rare for prisoners to be sent back from Bina while still coughing up blood. Medical staff interviewed at the establishments visited implied that inmates who did not have enough money to pay for their stay at Bina would be transferred back to prison before being cured (cf. also paragraph 53).

The CPT recommends that the Azerbaijani authorities take urgent steps to ensure that all prisoners who are BK-positive are promptly transferred to the Specialised medical establishment for prisoners suffering from tuberculosis in Bina and remain there until the completion of their treatment.

48. Concerning medical screening on admission, at Gobustan Prison, the delegation was informed that all newly arrived prisoners were seen by a doctor soon after arrival. The initial examination involved measuring the prisoner's weight and asking questions about his medical history. Particular attention was said to be paid to screening for tuberculosis, on the basis of instructions issued by the ICRC (which involved, in the event of suspicion, the submission of three sputum samples for microscopy at an outside laboratory).

At Penitentiary establishment No. 15, the initial screening of prisoners was reportedly performed within a week of arrival and appeared to be rather superficial. The delegation met several inmates in the quarantine section who had arrived some five days previously and who claimed that they had not yet been seen by a doctor.

The CPT recommends that measures be taken to ensure that all newly arrived prisoners at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 and Gobustan Prison are seen by a doctor within 24 hours of their arrival.

49. As regards the keeping of medical documentation and the observance of its confidentiality, at Gobustan Prison, a personal medical file was compiled for each inmate and, in the event of transfer, forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment. Access to medical documentation was reserved for health-care staff.

At Penitentiary establishment No. 15, there were also personal medical files opened in respect of prisoners. However, the files contained only brief entries concerning the initial examination performed upon arrival; there was no information concerning any other examinations or treatment that the prisoners had undergone. **The CPT recommends that steps be taken at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 to ensure that prisoners' personal medical files contain diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the prisoner's state of health and of any special examinations he has undergone.**

It should also be noted that a number of medical registers were kept at both establishments, but most of them contained very succinct information or were practically empty (cf. also paragraph 15). **The CPT invites the Azerbaijani authorities to take appropriate steps to improve the keeping of medical registers at the penitentiary establishments visited.**

50. In the course of the visit, the delegation learned that a new instruction had been issued by the Ministry of Justice in 2004 concerning hunger strikes by prisoners. The instruction follows in broad lines the Malta Declaration on hunger strikers of the World Medical Association. According to it, prisoners who go on hunger strike have to be transferred to the establishment's infirmary and offered food three times a day. The refusal to take food is noted on an observation report. Force feeding can only be performed upon the doctor's decision when the hunger striker is unable to make an unimpaired decision and his life is in danger.

However, it should be noted that the above-mentioned instruction provides that if the reasons for announcing a hunger strike are "not justified", the prisoner's action is to be considered as a violation of the regime. Thus at Gobustan Prison, the delegation noted in the register of disciplinary punishments that an inmate who had arrived at the establishment some two weeks previously had been given 10 days of disciplinary segregation because of having announced a hunger strike. The delegation interviewed the inmate concerned, who indicated that his hunger strike was in protest against conditions of detention at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 (where he had been held previously).

When met by the delegation, the inmate had just been transferred to the prison's infirmary and was being kept in a cell in principle reserved for prisoners who had been transferred from the Specialised medical establishment for prisoners suffering from tuberculosis. This was pointed out by the delegation and the inmate in question was promptly moved to another cell.

The CPT wishes to stress that hunger strikes should in principle be approached from a therapeutic rather than a punitive standpoint. Consequently, the Committee invites the Azerbaijani authorities to reconsider their approach vis-à-vis prisoners on hunger strike.

51. Finally, since May 2004, the Penitentiary Medical Department has been independent of the Department of Execution of Sentences and responsible directly to the Minister of Justice. As a result, prison health-care services are no longer subordinated to the establishments' directors. However, during the visit, the delegation learned that all transfers of inmates to an establishment's infirmary or outside hospital facilities required the endorsement of the establishment's Director. **The CPT would like to receive the comments of the Azerbaijani authorities on this issue.**

5. Other issues of relevance to the CPT's mandate

a. staff

52. The delegation observed that in the two establishments visited, the number of staff serving in prisoner accommodation areas was rather limited. At Penitentiary establishment No. 15 in particular, the number of staff working in direct contact with prisoners was very low: only 4 guards and some 12 educators were present in the prisoner accommodation areas during the day.

The CPT wishes to stress that ensuring positive staff-inmate relations will depend greatly on having an adequate number of staff present at any given time in detention areas. An overall low staff complement will certainly impede the development of positive relations; more generally, this will generate an insecure environment for both staff and prisoners, which in turn is likely to exacerbate the tension inherent in any prison environment. Further, prison staff shortages have a negative influence on the quality and level of development of activities and of therapeutic work inside penitentiary establishments. **The CPT recommends that the Azerbaijani authorities take steps to considerably improve prison staffing levels within prisoner accommodation areas.**

53. During the 2005 visit, numerous allegations were once again received from prisoners that they had been asked to pay money to prison/medical staff in order to be allowed to benefit from services provided for by law (e.g. family visits, access to medical care, transfer to a hospital, etc.) or to be granted certain privileges. Further, some prisoners alleged that certain staff members had requested payment in order to move them out of disciplinary segregation cells or the quarantine unit.

The CPT is aware of recent measures taken by the Azerbaijani authorities to address the problem of corruption, such as the adoption of specific legislation as well as, in the context of the Council of Europe, the signing of the Conventions on Corruption. **The CPT trusts that the Azerbaijani authorities will step up their efforts to combat corruption and would like to be informed of concrete steps taken to eradicate this problem in places of deprivation of liberty.**

b. contact with the outside world

54. Under Azerbaijani law, the visit entitlement of life-sentenced prisoners is three short-term visits (of up to 4 hours) and one long-term visit (of up to 3 days) per year. More visits can be allowed as a reward after the prisoner has served ten years of his sentence. As regards other categories of prisoners at Gobustan Prison, they were entitled to four short-term and two long-term visits per year.

Prisoners serving their sentences under a strict regime at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 could receive one short-term visit per month and two long-term visits per year. However, the delegation was informed that, in practice, only some 10% of prisoners benefited from their monthly short-term visit entitlement.

Given the crucial importance of prisoners' contacts with the outside world in the context of their social rehabilitation, **the CPT recommends that the entitlement to visits of life-sentenced prisoners and other prisoners serving their sentences in a high-security prison (such as Gobustan Prison) be increased, so as to ensure that such prisoners can receive at least one visit (either short- or long-term) per month.**

55. The visiting facility for short-term visits at Gobustan Prison was not adequate. The room used for such visits was divided in the middle by a corridor encircled with wire mesh; such conditions are scarcely propitious for maintaining normal human contact. Further, it was clear that the room could become very noisy during visits. There were also four rooms for long-term visits which left much to be desired as regards their state of repair and cleanliness.

The CPT recommends that the visiting facilities at Gobustan Prison be enlarged and improved; the aim should be to enable prisoners to receive visits, as far as possible, under reasonably open conditions.

At Penitentiary establishment No. 15, the room for short-term visits – which was quite small and comprised four tables with benches on each side – was currently undergoing refurbishment. As regards facilities for long-term visits, there were two suites (each comprising a bedroom, kitchenette and bathroom, all recently decorated and equipped with high-quality furniture) and six much more modest rooms (with a single bed, table and stools). The delegation was informed that it was planned to carry out works to upgrade the latter rooms to the standard of the suites. The CPT welcomes the efforts made at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 to improve conditions in the visiting facilities and trusts that similar efforts will be made in respect of prisoner accommodation, in particular the unit set aside for vulnerable prisoners and the quarantine unit (cf. also paragraph 37).

c. discipline

56. At Gobustan Prison, there were a number of disciplinary cells scattered around the different units. The cells (measuring some 6-8 m² each) had only a small window which allowed very limited access to natural light and ventilation. Further, there was no heating, and some of the disciplinary cells (in particular in unit 1) were very dilapidated and dirty.

The cells' equipment consisted of a folding bed attached to the wall during the day, a floor-level toilet and, in some of the cells, a small table and narrow bench; further, prisoners were provided with a mattress and blanket at night.

As already noted (cf. paragraph 27), prisoners placed in disciplinary cells did not take outdoor exercise. Further, they were not allowed reading matter and could not go to the bathroom during the period of disciplinary confinement.

57. The disciplinary segregation unit at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 was located in a distinct building which comprised seven disciplinary cells (for confinement of up to 15 days) and three “KTO” cells (for disciplinary segregation of up to 6 months). The cells were identical in size (some 33 m²) and equipment (three bunk beds, a table and two benches). Prisoners were provided with mattresses for the night but received no blankets. Access to natural light, ventilation and artificial lighting were inadequate; further, there was no heating in the cells. Moreover, the delegation observed the presence of rats.

The unit had a small exercise yard (measuring some 12 m²) and a bathroom with one shower. Some prisoners indicated that they were allowed one hour of outdoor exercise per day and one shower every ten days. However, according to other prisoners, there was no possibility to take outdoor exercise during disciplinary confinement.

58. **The CPT recommends that steps be taken to:**

- **remedy the failings observed as regards access to natural light, ventilation, artificial lighting and heating in the disciplinary cells at Gobustan Prison and Penitentiary establishment No. 15;**
- **equip all disciplinary cells at Gobustan Prison with a table and bench/seat;**
- **provide prisoners placed in disciplinary cells at Penitentiary establishment No. 15 with blankets at night (in addition to a mattress);**
- **carry out regular pest control in the disciplinary cells at Penitentiary establishment No. 15;**
- **ensure that all prisoners placed in disciplinary cells are offered at least one hour of outdoor exercise per day and have access to reading matter;**
- **enable all prisoners placed in disciplinary cells to take a shower at least once a week.**

APPENDIX

**LIST OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND ORGANISATIONS
WITH WHICH THE CPT'S DELEGATION HELD CONSULTATIONS**

A. National authorities

Ministry of Justice

Mr Fikrat MAMMADOV	Minister of Justice
Mr Nazim ALAKBAROV	Head of the Department of Execution of Sentences
Mr Natig TALIBOV	Deputy Head of the Department of Execution of Sentences
Mr Zahir ALIZADA	Deputy Head of the Inspectorate for Control over the Execution of Sentences
Mr Elchin AMIROV	Acting Head of the Medical Department
Mr Faig GURBANOV	Head of the Division for Human Rights

Ministry of Health

Mr Shakir MUSAYEV	Director of the Forensic Medicine Department
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Prosecutor General's Office

Mr Zakir GARALOV	Prosecutor General
Mr Eldar NURIYEV	Deputy Prosecutor General
Mr Ruslan HAJIEV	Head of International Relations Department

Ombudsperson

Ms Elmira SULEYMANOVA	Ombudsperson
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B. Non-governmental organisations

Azerbaijan Foundation of Democracy Development and Human Rights Protection
Human Rights Centre of Azerbaijan

C. International organisations

Delegation of the ICRC in Baku
OSCE Office in Baku